Introduction - California Oroville... · Introduction The Oroville Dam Failure Response Plan ... the spillway chute, but should not lead to a failure of the dam or the flood control

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Introduction

The Oroville Dam Failure Response Plan (ODFRP) outlines

immediate response activities with a focus on evacuations,

mass care, research and rescue in the event of a total failure

of the Oroville Dam. Although total failure is highly unlikely,

the impetus for this Plan was Oroville Dam spillway erosion

occurring in early February 2017 that led to the evacuation of

nearly 200,000 individuals in cities below the dam. This

framework supports the Department of Water Resources

Oroville Dam Emergency Action Plan and does not replace

existing local plans. While the Plan contemplates total failure,

it may be scaled and adapted to a lesser dam event.

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Background

In January of 2017, record rainfall in the Feather River watershed led Department of

Water Resources (DWR) officials to release water down the Lake Oroville flood

control spillway. In early February 2017, DWR increased releases through the flood

control spillway to offset higher inflows from rainfall. During this process, DWR

discovered a large amount of debris coming out of the concrete-lined spillway and

stopped all releases to inspect the damage.

Given the extensive nature of the damage to the concrete, DWR authorities opted to

reduce flows to the damaged spillway. The lake, swollen from heavy storms, rose

nearly 50 feet in five days and on February 11, 2017 overtopped its emergency

spillway for the first time. On February 12, 2017, flows down the emergency spillway

caused erosion to progress up the right side of the emergency spillway. DWR officials

feared the erosion would cause the collapse of a concrete slab holding water in the

reservoir. Consequently, local officials ordered the mandatory evacuation of people in

towns downstream. DWR increased the gated control spillway releases to draw down

the water level. Within hours, water ceased flowing over the emergency spillway. On

February 14, 2017, authorities lifted the mandatory evacuation order, but asked

residents to remain vigilant. Crews have been working around the clock to repair the

eroded areas below the emergency spillway.

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Planning Support and Coordination

NCCFRP

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Catastrophic Planning Process For Base Plan and Unified Coordination Group (UCG) Approval Management Objectives - Prepare for changing conditions in a dynamic situation and be prepared to adjust plans. - Keep cost commensurate with values at risk. - Provide public with key information, maintain positive public relations. Control Objectives - Provide for public and emergency responder safety. - Position appropriate resources to anticipate changing conditions. - Coordinate information between cooperating agencies. - Evacuate or rescue citizens as necessary. - Provide for evacuee short and long term needs.

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Catastrophic Advance Planning Process Step One: Define the Mission and Expectation for the Unified Coordination Group (UCG) Approval

[Estimates Defined]

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Catastrophic Advance Planning Process Step Two: Establish Baseline Planning for Gap Analysis/ESF Capability Based Response

[Gap Analysis]

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Catastrophic Advance Planning Process Step Three: Identify ESF Capability Based Objectives to Provide Resource Phased Support

[ESF Priority and Support Objectives Defined]

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Catastrophic Advance Planning Process Step Four: Synchronize ESF Capability to Resource Phased Support and Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments

Pre-Incident Post-Incident

[ESF Synchronization – Putting it all Together]

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• Resource Phasing by ESF

• Developed in accordance with UCG recommendations – Director will

be able see critical resource management by phase pre or post event

Resource Phasing

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• Resource Phasing by ESF

• Developed in accordance with UCG recommendations – Director will

be able to pull the trigger on a mission pre or post event

Pre-scripted Missions

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Risk / Current Threat If severe weather causes high inflows for sustained durations, reservoir levels will rise and

encroach into the operating freeboard. As a result, gated control spillway releases would be

increased to prevent the use of the emergency spillway. Currently, the Hyatt Power Plant’s

capacity to outflow up to 13,000 cubic feet per second has been impaired. Efforts are underway

to bring that outflow capacity back online to assist with potential high, sustained inflow events at

Lake Oroville. Extremely high releases in the gated control spillway could continue the erosion of

the spillway chute, but should not lead to a failure of the dam or the flood control gate structure.

In the event that the emergency spillway must be used, erosion areas in the spillway channel

and at the base of the spillway have been armored with boulders, aggregate, and cement slurry

to minimize further erosion and weakening of the emergency/auxiliary spillway.

May 1, 2017 May 9, 2017

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How to Use this Plan The Oroville Dam Failure Response Plan is a contingency plan developed to assist emergency

management through a pre or post catastrophic dam failure. The Plan outlines the Concept of

Operations (CONOPS) to achieve desired outcomes based on existing capabilities. It calls for

the formation of state, federal and private sector partnerships, assisting local/tribal government

in gaining access and the execution of strategies. But the Plan does not execute the response.

The successful implementation of this Plan requires decisive action on the part of emergency

managers, especially those in leadership positions.

Successful execution requires decisions and actions of leaders in the organization to:

• Deploy personnel through deployment orders and mission assignments, contracts, or

memorandums of agreement.

• Form personnel into organizations and task forces directed by the Operations Section of the

Unified Command Structure and/or Unified Coordination Group.

• Provide initial Resource Phasing of critical staff and equipment.

• Provide initial Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments to be validated, than executed.

• Develop an access strategy and a temporary supply chain. That supply chain is developed by

the deployment of staging area management teams, communications capabilities, contract

support and transportation resources. The result is a capability to move resources from

unaffected areas to affected, isolated areas.

• Conduct “Movement Coordination” to evacuate, source, broker, schedule and direct

transportation, commodities and shelter operations.

• Coordinate and direct the actions of subordinate organizations through plans, directives,

operations orders, movement schedules and mission assignments.

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Base Plan

• Introduction and Background

• Oroville Dam Failure Inundation Map

• Assumptions and Considerations

• Planning Factors for Evacuation/Transportation and

Mass Care

• Mission Essential Tasks

• Concept of Operations

• Timeline for Key Response Tasks

• Gap Analysis with Recommendations

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Oroville Dam Failure

Inundation Map

• 1 million people exposed in the

dam failure inundation zone

(inundation impacted population

plus additional 5 mile buffer zone)

• Hours to max flood depth

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Statewide Response-

Time Map

• Estimated drive times to the center

of the Oroville Dam Inundation

Area from anywhere in the state

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Phases

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Annexes and Appendices

• Annex A: Task Organization

• Annex B: Situation/Intelligence

• Annex C: Operations

Appendix C-1: Mass Care Services

Appendix C-2: Law Enforcement

Appendix C-3: Mass Search and Rescue

Appendix C-4: Public Health, Healthcare, and

Emergency Medical Services

Appendix C-5: Public Information and Warning

Appendix C-6: Environmental Response / Health

and Safety

• Annex D: Logistics

• Annex E: Communications

• Annex F: Transportation/Evacuation Operations

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Annex A: Task Organization Unified Coordination Group

Area Command

North

South

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Annex B: Situation/Intelligence

• Information Collection Plan

• Essential Elements of Information

• Oroville Dam Information / Area Geography Info.

• Planning Area Demographics

• Flood Forecast and Warnings

• Information Collect Planning (ICP) Process

• Essential Elements of Information (EEI)

• ICP Desired Outcomes

• Inundation Maps (By County / Impacted Cities)

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Information Collection Plan

The Oroville Dam Failure Response Plan Information Collection

Plan (ICP) is the systematic process used by emergency

management to collect specific information, supporting all

operational response phases.

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Essential Elements of Information (EEI)

EEIs provide a flow of information/available intelligence in

understanding the situation and assisting operational response and

support agencies.

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Essential Elements of Information (EEI)

Organized by ESF: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 17

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Oroville Dam Aerial Overview

• Information Collection Plan

• Essential Elements of Information

• x

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Oroville Dam Frontal Overview

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Annex C: Operations

Mission

The mission of the joint state and federal organization is to save and

sustain human lives following a dam failure.

Response Planning Factors

Planning factors represent response requirements.

Specific requirements include:

• Support survivor movement consistent with existing movement plans.

• Gain access through a coordinated multi-modal (surface, air, and

waterways) access strategy that deploys teams and resources to

affected areas as possible.

• Support or conduct search and rescue and fatality management

operations.

• Conduct patient movement.

• Initiate a commodities distribution system to support shelter populations,

delivering food and potable water and durable medical equipment where

required.

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Annex C: Operations

• Comprised of six appendices.




Appendix C-4: Public Health, Healthcare, and

Emergency Medical Services


Appendix C-6: Environmental Response / Health

and Safety

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• Planning Factors

• Gap Analysis

• Shelter Coordination

• Identified locations of possible high density shelters

in the planning area

Fairground Shelter Sites

University and College Shelter Sites

• Capabilities

• Resource Phasing

• Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments

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• Geographical Area Command

• Resources

• Traffic Control and Evacuation Routes

Evacuation Corridors split into 9 areas.

• Coroner’s Mutual Aid, impact and response, with Gap

Analysis

• Gaps



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• Swiftwater Flood (SF) Search and Rescue (SAR) Teams

FIRE - 31 total mutual aid SF SAR teams

LAW - One Type 2 SF team, a unit of the Butte County

Sheriff’s Search and Rescue Team

Remaining 9 counties - various levels of trained

water rescue personnel; at least 20 boats capable

and suitable for flood related operations

• At Cal OES, both fire and law jointly share the

responsibility to coordinate SF SAR mutual aid requests

• SF SAR Resource Typing identified

• Additional OA SAR information



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Appendix C-4: Public Health, Healthcare,

and Emergency Medical Services

• Public Health and Medical System

• General Acute Care Facilities, Acute Psychiatric

Hospitals, and Skilled Nursing Facilities identified in

or out of dam inundation area

• Resource Capabilities

• Essential Elements of Information (EEIs)

• Healthcare Facilities Data



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Appendix C-5: Public Information and

Warning


• Warning / Alert /Responsibilities

• Public Information – State Assets and Capabilities

• Emergency management’s alert and notification

process for an Oroville Dam failure (pre or post

incident)

• Dissemination Channels

• Organizational Structure



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Appendix C-5: Emergency Management Alert Process


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Appendix C-6: Environmental Health and

Safety


• Mission / Execution / Responsibilities

• State/Federal Assets and Capabilities



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Annex D: Logistics

• Staging Areas and

Incident Command Posts

• CA-ESF 7 Core Function

Units Emergency

Acquisitions

Facilities

Critical Assets

• CA-ESF 7 interactions

with other CA-ESFs

identified • Resource Phasing

• Pre-Scripted Mission

Assignments

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Annex E:

Communications

• County Operational Area

contact information (phone #,

call sign, CLETS, OASIS, etc.),

regularly monitored channels,

and shared channel

infrastructure identified

• Inundated Public Safety

Communications Answering

Points identified and mapped



Assignments

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Annex F:

Transportation/

Evacuation Operations

• Primary highway evacuation

routes identified per county

• Air Coordination Group (ACG)

• Evacuation Planning Overview



Assignments

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Inundation Maps by County

and Specific Cities • Allows response and support elements to look

at individual flow rates impacting evacuation

routes, rescue operations, and support

operations

• Snapshot maps provide planners flow depths

for the inundated portions of impacted counties

upon Oroville Dam complete failure after 4, 8,

12, 16, 20, and 24 hours

4 8 12

16 20 24

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Inundation Maps by County

and Specific Cities

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Way Forward

• June 1, 2017 – Plan will be pushed out to ESF/OAs

• June 14, 2017 – Final Edits

• June 28, 2017 – ESF Functional TTX, Proof of Concept

• July 2017 – Executive/MARAC/OA Informational

CONOPS Briefing

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Advance Planning Team Contacts

Patrick T. Hammond Sr.

Cal OES Disaster Planning

SESC, Lead Planner

916-845-8777 Office

916-508-6089 Cell

[email protected]

Nate Ortiz


PMI, Project Manager

916-845-8795 Office

916-956-5780 Cell

[email protected]

Ron DeMayo


ESC, Planner

916-845-8760 Office

[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]





Documents

Introduction - California Oroville... · Introduction The Oroville Dam Failure Response Plan ... the spillway chute, but should not lead to a failure of the dam or the flood control