Introduction - National Agricultural Aviation Association...Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Docket ID: FAA-2015-0150 Page 2 waterways and ranchland from

1440 Duke Street, Alexandria, Va. 22314

Telephone: (202) 546-5722 Fax: (202) 546-5726 www.agaviation.org

April 24, 2015

Docket Management Facility

U.S. Department of Transportation

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE

West Building Ground Floor, Room W12 – 140

Washington, DC 20590

Re: Comments of the National Agricultural Aviation Association on “Operation and

Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems” Docket ID: FAA-2015-0150

Introduction Since 2005 the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has been working to develop a regulatory

framework to integrate unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System

(NAS), and in 2012 those efforts were doubled following the passage of the Federal Aviation

Modernization and Reform Act (P.L.112-95), which has culminated in the milestone introduction

of this rule, the first step in the “integration” phase, as outlined by the FAA’s UAS roadmap.

Throughout this process the National Agricultural Aviation Association (NAAA) has been

engaged in a constructive dialogue with the Agency’s UAS Integration Office. NAAA works to

support the agricultural aviation industry which is made up of small businesses and pilots that

use aircraft to aid farmers in producing a safe, affordable and abundant supply of food, fiber and

biofuel, in addition to protecting forestry and controlling health-threatening pests. In NAAA’s

communications with FAA’s UAS Integration Office, NAAA has stressed that above all else

UAS, particularly small UAS (sUAS), need to be identifiable, visible and safely operator to

agricultural aviators (ag aviators) given ag aviation is one of the sectors of general aviation

whose missions are performed close to the ground. While this proposed rule takes into account

some of NAAA’s recommendations, we feel that there are a number of provisions that serve to

not only create an unsafe environment at low altitudes for ag aviators, but will also take existing

safety conditions for sUAS operations operating under Certificates of Waiver or Authorization

(COA) and make them unsafe should COA operators be operating under the proposed Part 107.

NAAA appreciates the opportunity to comment on the FAA’s proposal. First we will provide an

outline of the aerial application or ag aviation industry, then we will discuss our industry’s sUAS

safety concerns and again provide recommendations already provided to the Agency, and finally

NAAA will discuss specific concerns regarding the NPRM’s proposals.

Importance of Aerial Application Industry Aerial applicators have been protecting the nation’s cropland since 1921, nearly 94 years. The

NAAA was founded in 1966 and consists of more than 1,900 members in 46 states, and

represents the interests of small business owners and pilots licensed as commercial applicators

that use aircraft to enhance the production of food, fiber and bio-fuel; protect forestry; protect

DRAFT National Agricultural Aviation Association Comments to FAA on

Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Docket ID: FAA-2015-0150

Page 2

waterways and ranchland from invasive species; and control health-threatening pests. Aerial

application is important to agriculture, forestry and public health protection because it is by far

the fastest method of application. Furthermore, when the presence of water, wet soil conditions,

rolling terrain or dense plant foliage or late stage crops prevents the use of other methods of

pesticide application due to the risk of crop damage, aerial application may be the only

remaining method of treatment. Aerial application is also conducive to higher crop yields, as it is

non-disruptive to the crop and causes no soil compaction. Applying crop protection products by

air is an essential component of no-till or reduced tillage farming operations which limit storm

water runoff and reduces soil erosion. These farming methods, through their preservation of

organic matter and topsoil, help maintain productive soils and reduce greenhouse gas emissions

through the sequestration of carbon. According to the USDA’s Economic Research Service,

there are a total of 408 million cropland acres in the U.S., of which approximately 70 percent are

commercially treated with crop protection products. Further, according to NAAA data nearly 20

percent of commercial crop protection product applications are made through aerial applications.

As a result, NAAA estimates that 71 million acres of cropland are treated via aerial application

in the U.S. each year. This does not include the aerially treated pasture and rangeland of which

there are 614 million total acres in the U.S. or the 671 million total forestry acres and 61 million

total urban acres in the U.S.—a portion of which are treated by air.

Because aerial applicators fly as low a few feet above ground level when making applications

and up to several hundred feet in the turnarounds and while ferrying, it is vital that safe low-level

airspace exists to ensure these pilots can continue to do their jobs safely. Ensuring safe low-level

airspace includes minimizing obstructions which are difficult for pilots to see and identify. In

addition to aerial application operations, aircraft users of low-level airspace include: Emergency

Medical Services (EMS), air tanker firefighting aircraft and their lead aircraft; power line and

pipeline patrol aircraft; power line maintenance helicopters; fish and wildlife service aircraft;

animal control aircraft (USDA-APHIS-ADC); military helicopter and fixed-wing operations;

seismic operations (usually helicopters); livestock roundup (ranching or animal relocation);

aircraft GIS mapping of cropland for noxious weed populations and the like; and others.

Safety Recommendations Previously Provided to the FAA by NAAA NAAA is concerned that the widespread use of UAS as projected in agricultural areas without

being safely integrated for ag aviators to track and see, will result in conditions ripe for low-level

agricultural aviation accidents. Not only could this result to harm and death for agricultural pilots

and chemical spills resulting in environmental endangerment, but it could also result in a black

eye for the promising UAS industry. NAAA understands that sUAS will be used to aide farmers

as another tool to conduct crop-sensing and to collect aerial images for precision agriculture

purposes,1 services manned aircraft and satellites have been performing for years. Not only does

the aerial application industry support the use of precision agriculture to farm more productively,

1 Precision agriculture (PA) or satellite farming or site specific crop management (SSCM) is a farming management concept based on observing, measuring and responding to inter and intra-field variability in crops.




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efficiently and with great environmental stewardship, it also provides crop-sensing, aerial

imaging2 and precision agricultural applications services to farmers.3

The agricultural aviation industry places a great amount of importance on the ability to see and

avoid obstructions and other aircraft in the airspace in which they operate. While this principal is

the backbone of safety for our industry and all air traffic operating under visual flight rules

(VFR), it can only be utilized effectively when other aircraft do their part in avoiding collisions.

The necessary technology to allow UAS to “sense and avoid” other aircraft is currently in the

nascent stages of development and is nowhere near commercial viability. Furthermore, the U.S.

Government Accountability Office (GAO), an independent federal agency, determined in

September, 2012 that no adequate technology currently exists that would allow UAS to

adequately sense and avoid other aircraft4. NAAA believes until this technology is developed,

UAS operators should be required to be equipped with strobe lights on the UAS itself, and, to

assist with identification of UAS operating areas, on the UAS operator’s ground vehicle.

Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out technology is a key component of

the FAA’s Next Generation Air Transport System (NextGen) that allows the identification of

aircraft based on transponder and GPS signals, and allows nearby aircraft with the proper reading

equipment to identify their exact location. Proven, ADS-B systems designed for UAS’ are

currently on the market and should also be a requirement for commercial UAS operations,

allowing low-level manned aircraft to identify them. NAAA has contacted a number of ADS-B

transceiver manufacturers, and many already make units for UAS. These units weight as little as

300 grams and cost as little as $1,200. An ag aviator equipped with ADS-B In technology in his

cockpit would be informed of a UAS in his vicinity, then he would know to look for a strobe

outside of the cockpit so that he could sense and avoid the object.

NAAA also believes the FAA should require that UAS be painted in colors which make them

readily distinguishable from the background. According to the FAA’s advisory circular (AC) on

obstruction and tower marking, 5 the color of the obstruction should maximize visibility of

obstructions to pilots. Although this AC primarily makes recommendations for marking a

stationary obstruction, a similar condition would occur when looking for a UAS against various

sky and terrain colors. Chapter 3, paragraph 31, of the AC recommends “Alternate sections of

aviation orange and white paint should be used as they provide maximum visibility of an

obstruction by contrast in colors.”

Another necessary precaution that NAAA believes the FAA should require to protect low-level

pilots from the safety threat of UAS aiding them in sensing their whereabouts is to post a Notice

2 In addition to precision agricultural, aerial imaging is also currently performed by manned ag aviators. A 2012 NAAA survey found that 21% of ag aviators perform variable rate application, a method of precision agriculture. 3 “A Low-Cost Imaging System for Aerial Applications,” Agricultural Aviation. November-December 2014. Pages 45-51. (see Appendix) 4 Testimony of Gerald L. Dillingham, Director of Physical Infrastructure issues, Government Accountability Office before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science, Space and Technology, Subcommittee on Oversight. UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS Continued Coordination, Operational Data, and Performance Standards Needed to Guide Research and Development. 5 FAA AC 70/7460-1, Obstruction Marking and Lighting.




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to Airmen (NOTAM) 48-72 hours prior to their operations. Such a requirement is already in

place by the FAA for the Certificates of Waiver or Authorization (COA) granted for current

limited commercial operations. UAS operators should also be required to have radios on the

ground tuned to a locally defined frequency, allowing them to monitor air traffic in the area and

to alert local manned and unmanned aircraft operators in the area to their presence. Whenever a

manned low level aircraft is detected operating in the immediate area, the UAS should land as

soon as practicable and remain grounded until the manned aircraft is clear of the area.

Supporting NAAA’s safety fears with UAS is the number of incidents that have occurred when

UAS are utilized by some of the most well trained operators, the military. As the Washington

Post reported in June 2014, “More than 400 large U.S. military drones have crashed in major

accidents around the world since 2001… Military drones have slammed into homes, farms,

runways, highways, waterways and, in one case, an Air Force C-130 Hercules transport plane in

midair.”6 Further, between 2005 and 2014 the FAA had received 50 reports of incidents

involving civilian UAS7, with that number continuing to rise in recent months.

Another supporting point in regards to the aerial application industry’s safety fears pertaining to

UAS stems from a similar low-flying obstacles such as birds and other low-level obstacles like

aircraft and towers. According to a joint report by the FAA and the U.S. Department of

Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA-APHIS), between 1990 and

2012 over 131,000 wildlife strikes occurred with civil aircraft, 97 percent of which were the

result of collisions with birds, with 25 producing fatalities.

It also doesn’t take a very large bird to

do significant damage to an airplane

either. As the photo above indicates a

turkey vulture, which has an average

weight range of between 1.8 to 5.1

pounds has broken through an ag aircraft

windshield. Even smaller birds such as a

mallard duck have broken through ag

aircraft windshield and that species of

waterfowl only weighs 1.6–3.5 pounds8.

NAAA fears what will happen if a sUAS

weighing as much as 55 pounds traveling

at 100 mph—both allowed under the

proposed rule—will do to an agricultural

aircraft when much smaller birds are

6 “When Drones Fall from the Sky”, Washington Post. June 20, 2014. 7 “Close Encounters on Rise as Small Drones Gain in Popularity, Washington Post. June 23, 2014. 8 “Fowl Play: Aviation Bird Strikes Could be a Harbinger of Things to Come Once UAVs Are Approved for Agriculture,” Agricultural Aviation. May – June 2015. Pages 12-15. (see Appendix)

Above: Luckily, operator Steve Fletcher only sustained minor

injuries when a turkey vulture blew out the cockpit window of

his Air Tractor 802 while he was flying.




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known to do significant damage. It is again, for this reason, that we are requesting strobe

lighting, ADS-B like tracking equipment and visible painting so that we can avoid these airborne

obstacles. It is also why we adamantly oppose that the FAA have a separate Micro sUAS

proposal mandating far fewer requirements for operation or safety for sUAS under 4.4 pounds.

Even if these Micro sUAS are made of “frangible” materials such as plastic, they still likely have

a hard battery pack and could still penetrate a cockpit window just as a relatively light weight

bird consisting only of feathers, hollow bones, muscle and sinew are able to.

Other reasons our industry is concerned about UAS is that other low-level, unmarked obstacles

have become hazards to agricultural aviators. Accident records maintained by NAAA, as taken

from NTSB accident reports, indicate that since 2004 there have been 13 collisions between ag

aircraft and towers, a number of which were unmarked, resulting in 7 fatalities. The tower

collisions are itemized below:

Date Location Injury NTSB Number

9/11/2004 Lake Wales, FL Fatal (2) ATL04LA177

5/19/2005 Ralls, TX Fatal DFW05LA126

6/18/2005 Senath, MO Fatal CHI05LA149

8/22/2008 Sarartia, MS Non-fatal MIA08CA170

1/10/2011 Oakley, CA Fatal WPR11LA094

4/17/2011 Horseshoe Lake, AR Non-fatal CEN11CA294

7/28/2011 Forest City, IA Non-fatal CEN11CA545

8/8/2011 Willcox, AZ Non-fatal WPR11LA375

4/9/2012 Lakin, KS Non-fatal CEN12LA236

2/15/2013 Jennings, LA Fatal CEN13LA163

7/19/2013 Steward, IL Non-fatal CEN13LA425

8/5/2013 Balko, OK Fatal CEN13FA465

8/13/2014 Cimmarron, KS Non-fatal CEN14CA427

Accidents that occur more frequently to ag pilots is a collision with power lines or their related

structures. Power lines are also a difficult-to-see, low-level obstruction that demand a certain

amount of the pilot’s attention. The graph below shows collisions that have occurred during the

10-year period ending in 2014:

Year Power Line Accidents Power Line Fatalities

2005 13 1

2006 4 1

2007 7 2

2008 15 0

2009 6 0

2010 10 2

2011 10 0

2012 10 0




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2013 5 0

2014 13 5

These same records show there were 10 collisions between aircraft, in which at least one of the

aircraft was an ag aircraft during the last 10 years (2004-2013). These were full size aircraft with

two pilots with the responsibility to see and avoid other aircraft and not small, difficult to detect

UAS without an airborne pilot to do their part in fulfilling this safety responsibility. A list of

those mid-air collisions are listed below:

Date Location Injury NTSB Number

6/3/2004 Weldon, AR 2 Uninjured FTW04LA151(A/B)

5/28/2005 Smith Center, KS 2 Uninjured CHI05LA128 (A/B)

7/14/2005 Bonita, AR 2 Uninjured DFW05LA182 (A/B)

5/18/2006 DeWitt, AR 1 Fatal; 1 Serious DFW06LA130 (A/B)

3/28/2008 Abbeville, LA 1 Minor DFW08LA089 (A/B)

5/6/2009 Maryville, CA 1 Serious; 1 Uninjured WPR09LA228 (A/B)

4/18/2011 New Madrid, MO 1 Serious; 1 Uninjured CEN11LA296 (A/B)

6/7/2011 Odessa, WA 2 Uninjured WPR11CA252 (A/B)

5/23/2012 Sedgwig, AR 1 Fatal; 1 Serious CEN12FA312 (A/B)

5/25/2012 Alicia, AR 2 Uninjured CEN12LA323 (A/B)

An example of where lack of proper safety regulations has caused significant damage and loss of

life for our industry and affected other major industries can be found in a recent settlement

related to unmarked meteorological evaluation towers.

In Sept. 2014 a group of defendants representing tower manufacturing, wind energy, land-

owning and farming interests agreed to pay $6.7 million to the family of agricultural aviator

Steve Allen to settle a wrongful death action brought against the above entities for failing to

mark an unmarked meteorological evaluation tower (MET) or make Allen aware of its location

prior to his fatal collision with the tower in 2011. The settlement puts tower entities on notice of

their duty to take safeguards to protect low-level aviators from towers erected in agricultural

areas.

Allen’s death isn’t the first time an agricultural aviator has had a fatal collision with an unmarked

and unlit MET during daytime operations. An analysis of FAA and NTSB accident data by

NAAA showed that 10 fatal agricultural aircraft accidents in the past 14 years (2000–2014)

involved collisions with towers—including three with unmarked MET towers.

The circumstances surrounding Allen’s death served as a wakeup call for state legislators,

regulators and safety watchdogs about the dangers of unmarked METs, leading to 13 states




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enacting MET tower marking laws9. Since then, METs have been the subject of NTSB advisories

pointing out the dangers they pose to agricultural aviators with NTSB recommending that the

FAA establish a database of MET tower locations10 and require tower marking, and where

feasible, lighting of towers above 50 feet.11 Based on the lack of federal enforceable safety

regulations promulgated by federal government pertaining to protecting manned aircraft from

unmarked METs and the similarity between METs and UAS in terms of jeopardizing manned

aircraft’s safety, NAAA fears history will repeat itself and low-level pilots will lose their lives

and a promising UAS industry will face significant liability in its early, crucial development.

Operational Safety Without the ability to safely use aerial application services, blocks of farm land in UAS high-

usage areas may be untreatable when field conditions require application by air. In addition to

the above recommendations to better identify UAS’, NAAA requests that the FAA amend its

sUAS proposed rule to require the following measures and that these measures also be required

in the near term regarding small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS):

NAAA UAS Operations Suggested Requirements 1. UAS should give the right of way to all manned aircraft.

2. UAS must be equipped with ADS-B Out technology or the like pending its effectiveness

and usability to track UAS.

3. UAS must be equipped with strobe lights.

4. UAS must be coated in a highly visible color(s) markedly contrasted from the

surrounding airspace and ground.

5. UAS operators should be attending/monitoring UAS at all time and attentive to

surroundings (no headphones, etc., or other distractions).

6. UAS support vehicles should be equipped with a strobe light that is active when UAS is

operating.

7. For authorized use of UAS in the national airspace system (NAS) – either as a public

operator under a COA or as a civil operator under a Special Airworthiness Certificate -

the UAS operator must insure that a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) is issued 48-72 hours in

advance of an operation.

9 States with MET tower marking laws are California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota. Washington, and Wyoming. Legislation is currently under consideration in Texas. 10 NTSB Safety Recommendation A-13-017, May 15, 2013 11 NTSB Safety Recommendation A-13-016, May 15, 2013




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8. UAS operator should be trained and equipped with an aviation radio set to a locally

defined frequency to account for various areas.

9. UAS operator procedure if an agricultural aircraft or any other type of low-flying aircraft

is within two miles should be to immediately ground the UAS as soon as practicable.

10. UAS operators should comply with all current FAA regulations, policies and procedures

and state department of agriculture and EPA procedures if pertaining to an application

being made from the aircraft.

11. The operator should have a commercial pilot’s certificate with a newly-developed UAS

type-rating which demonstrates the knowledge and skills to operate a UAS within the

NAS and includes requiring a second-class medical certificate.

12. UAS are required to have a separate visual observer as part of the crew who possesses a

second-class medical certificate and is responsible to assist the operator with clearing and

monitoring a flight path for the UAS from any other airborne traffic.

13. UAS should be required to have an airworthiness certificate.

14. UAS operators should maintain line-of-sight with the UAS to ensure the operator is able

to visually recognize other aircraft operating in close proximity or physical obstructions

which may exist in the area.

15. UAS should be required to have appropriate aviation liability insurance. This is

particularly important considering agricultural aircraft can be quite expensive. An Air

Tractor 802 fully loaded ag aircraft can run upwards of between $1.5-1.7 million.

Canada’s Micro UAS rule requires an insurance policy, as discussed in the NPRM and

most farm policy’s contain aviation riders that would exclude coverage of UAS incidents.

16. UAS observers should be present and able to communicate with the UAS operator from

the most minimal distance possible and are not allowed to perform crew duties for more

than one UAS at a time.

17. UAS operator must be well-versed in UAS operator manual and UAS must be properly

maintained.

18. UAS should have a registered N-number on an indestructible and unmovable plate

attached to the UAS for identification in case of an accident or incident.

19. UAS conducting low-level aerial application work must comply with 14 CFR Part 137

Just as manned aircraft pilots are required to undergo a rigorous training curriculum and show

that they are fit to operate a commercial aircraft, so too must UAS operators. Holding a




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commercial certificate holds UAS operators to similar high standards as commercial aircraft

operators and ensures they are aware of their responsibilities as commercial operators within the

national airspace (NAS). Medical requirements ensure they have the necessary visual and mental

acuity to operate a commercial aircraft repeatedly over a sustained period of time.

It is vital that commercial aircraft, manned and unmanned, have received airworthiness

certification by the FAA to ensure they can safely operate in the NAS without posing a hazard to

persons or property. ADS-B Out equipage, strobe lighting, and marking, as discussed above,

ensures the aircraft is visible to manned aircraft, law enforcement, the public and other UAS

operators.

The issue of protecting all pilots from mid-air collisions, when they are operating in close

proximity to unmanned aircraft is vitally important. In the case of agricultural aviators, timely

treatment of the crop is an issue of great importance to the safe, affordable and abundant

production of food, fiber and bio-fuel to our global population.

NAAA is aware of the important functions which can be accomplished by UAS, but at the same

time protecting the safety of current and future users of the NAS is mandatory. NAAA

appreciates the FAA addressing this life-saving issue vital to the agricultural aviation industry,

and urges the Agency to consider the above stated comments in an effort to strengthen aviation

safety overall.

Small UAS Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Comments As aforementioned, NAAA believes UAS hold a world of potential on a number of fronts, The

backbone of this proposed agricultural fleet is the Small UAS (sUAS), those weighting 55

pounds or less, many of which are made from lightweight materials. While these materials are

frangible to some degree they are still small, difficult to see and many are made of metal, carbon,

and other materials that are not easily destructible, particularly those parts containing the battery

of the vehicle. While some may think their size reduces their risk, NAAA believes this in fact

increases the risk to aerial applicators. The following comments pertain to NAAA’s thoughts,

concerns and recommendations to the FAA’s sUAS proposed rule (note: Section numbers

correspond to locations in the NPRM).

III A. Incremental Approach

NAAA appreciates the incremental approach that the FAA is taking toward integration UAS. As

the Agency discusses in the preamble, attempting to accomplish full UAS integration in a single

rule is a futile effort. In the preamble the Agency says that this proposal takes a “data-driven, risk

based approach,” toward integration of UAS operations that pose the least amount of risk,

however, as noted several times throughout the NPRM, there is a severe lack of data on UAS

operations, despite the existence of the six UAS test sites mandated under P.L. 112-95 to provide

this data. In light of that we believe the agency has failed to fully assess the risk sUAS pose to

the National Airspace System, has not analyzed or paid attention to military accidents and

civilian incidents involving UAS’ aforementioned, and has failed to utilize the data available to

them on other NAS hazards (such as bird strikes, unmarked towers, and as previously mentioned




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the over 131,000 wildlife strikes between 1990 and 2012 that occurred with civil aircraft, 97

percent of which were the result of collisions with birds, with 25 fatalities) available to them. We

understand the pressure to utilize UAS technology but it is important to integrate UAS into the

NAS safely—that is Congress’ directive and it is also the mission of the Federal Aviation

Administrations. We feel that in an effort to minimize the burden on sUAS operators, the

Agency has imposed an unacceptable level of burden on existing manned aircraft operators. P.L.

112-95, which the Agency uses to justify this NPRM directs the agency to integrate UAS into the

NAS without posing an unacceptable level of risk to other aircraft, people, or property. Further

details of this risk are discussed in subsequent sections of these comments.

III B. Applicability

The FAA proposed to create a new section of the Federal Aviation Regulations titled Part 107 to

replace “certain existing FAA regulations that impede civil small UAS operations.” NAAA

agrees that there are certain regulations that are impractical for small UAS operations, however

it’s vital that the Agency utilize the existing regulatory structure to the greatest extent possible,

as this approach has been tested and utilized over decades to ensure a safe NAS. Compromising

this structure could jeopardize aviation safety to pilots. Utilization of the existing structure

coupled with adoption of NAAA’s UAS Operations Suggested Requirements will ensure a

consistent safety environment in the NAS but not requiring anything more of sUAS than what is

required currently of general aviation operations.

III B 1. Air Carrier Operations

NAAA supports the FAA’s proposed prohibition on transporting persons or property for

compensation under this NPRM. As the agency notes, there is an expectation of safe

transportation when money is exchanged. Before these operations are permitted, a more stringent

regulatory regime including certification of the safety of the sUAS and its utilization should be

developed.

III B 2. External Load and Towing Operations

NAAA supports the FAA’s proposed prohibition on external load operations. Additional data is

needed on use of sUAS for external load operations. Existing manned aircraft data is not

analogous given the difference in altitudes at which manned aircraft fly, and the 500 foot altitude

covered under Part 107. NAAA believes that these aircraft would require airworthiness

certification, as well as additional pilotage skill beyond the written test proposed in Part 107.

III B 3. International Operations

NAAA supports the prohibition by the FAA on international operations by sUAS covered under

Part 107, however we do feel that FAA has not given appropriate credence to ICAO’s

recommendations, which could be applied to domestic use of sUAS, and aid with harmonization

with international standards for future rulemaking. ICAO Annex 7 standards, for instance,

require UAS to “carry an identification plate inscribed with at least its nationality or common

mark and registration mark… made of fireproof metal or other suitable physical properties.”

NAAA supports this requirement as it will ensure proper identification of the aircraft in the event

of a sUAS accident, of which there is a heightened risk to aerial applicators given the low




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altitudes at which these aircraft operate. While NAAA appreciates the requirement of an “N

number,” per Part 45, an exterior decal is subject to damage from an accident, which could make

it extremely difficult if not impossible to identify the owner of the aircraft.

III B 4. Foreign Owned Aircraft

NAAA has no comments with regard to FAA’s proposal to limit this NPRM to U.S. registered

aircraft.

III B 5. Public Aircraft Operations

NAAA agrees that public aircraft operations should continue to be conducted under the COA

process. As the Agency says, “The existing COA system has been in place for over eight years,

and has not caused any significant human injuries or other significant adverse safety impacts.”

NAAA believes this is because military, law enforcement, Department of the Interior, and other

COA operators maintain a level of aeronautical knowledge and professionalism that has

prevented adverse safety impacts. Many maintain pilot and medical certificates, detailed

standardized checklists, and aircraft manuals that have undergone rigorous review and testing, a

standard which NAAA feels needs to be required to ensure safety in the current airspace by

incorporating commercial sUAS operations. Additional details are discussed in future sections of

these comments, including the pilot certification section and medical certificate section.

III B 6. Model Aircraft

NAAA feels that greater regulation and oversight needs to be given to the model aircraft

industry. The majority of UAS incidents that have occurred in recent years have been by UAS

operated as model aircraft as stated earlier, including two in 2014 where ag operators were

harassed by model aircraft in Idaho12 and Illinois. However, NAAA recognizes that P.L. 112-95

has limited the Agency’s authority to develop new regulations for model aircraft. NAAA does

recommend that FAA continue to utilize every tool possible to ensure model aircraft are

operating safely with in the NAS.

III C. Definitions

NAAA believes the proposed definitions of control station, corrective lenses, operator and visual

observer, small unmanned aircraft, and small unmanned aircraft system are in compliance with

P.L. 112-95 and established practice and has no further comment.

III D. Operating Rules

In the NPRM FAA discusses the initial approach that the Agency took toward developing its

UAS framework, and while NAAA believes, as stated earlier, that the incremental approach is

necessary, there are elements of this initial approach that NAAA believes would have worked

better to preserve safety with regards to the NAS.

This initial framework would have required the sUAS operator to: (1) obtain a permit to operate

(PTO) from the FAA, which would have to be renewed after one year; (2) file quarterly reports

with the FAA providing their operational data; (3) establish a level of airworthiness that would

12 The police report related to this incident is contained in the Appendix.




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be sufficient to obtain an airworthiness certification (the initial approach would have merged

airworthiness certification into the PTO); (4) obtain a pilot certificate by passing a knowledge

test, a practical test, and completing required ground training with an FAA certificated instructor;

(5) obtain a NOTAM from the FAA prior to conducting certain UAS operations (the operator

would do this by filing notice with the FAA); and (6) maintain records documenting the

complete maintenance history of the UAS.

NAAA believes this initial approach would have been much more favorable toward preserving

the safety of the NAS. As FAA points out, there is a lack of data regarding sUAS operations.

This approach would have provided a means via quarterly reporting to collect that data. At the

same time this approach would have subjected UAS to similar rigorous airworthiness criteria,

pilot training standards, and maintenance standards as manned aircraft. This certification process

has served the NAS well for decades creating the safest airspace in the world. To provide a

blanket exemption of a new entrant such as sUAS from any airworthiness certification,

maintenance logging, or other requirements without significant data to prove that is safe to do so

serves to create a dangerous precedent.

III D 1. Micro UAS Classification

NAAA agrees with the FAA’s decision not to pursue a Micro UAS classification at this time. For

the sake of simplicity NAAA believes it’s best to have one category for small UAS rather than

several.

III D 2. Operator and Visual Observer

NAAA supports the Agency’s definitions of operator and visual observer, however NAAA

believes that the observer should be certificated and the roles should be clearly understood. As

proposed, the visual observer is not trained and tested to the standards applicable to the operator

of the UAS. The operator has the final see-and-avoid responsibility for safe flight and the visual

observer’s function is solely to assist the operator in this duty. NAAA believes that a visual

observer is necessary to safely operate a UAS in the NAS in all except the most basic of

operations. During the majority of UAS operations, the UAS may be temporarily out of the

operator’s line of sight behind trees, obstructions, etc. We believe these instances require the use

of a visual observer. FAA has demonstrated this fact by requiring a visual observer for all of the

Certificate of Waivers or Authorizations (COAs) and exemptions granted under Section 333 of

the Federal Aviation Modernization and Reform Act.

Further, as FAA says numerous times throughout the NPRM, see-and-avoid is the bedrock

general aviation operations are based upon. Not requiring a visual observer in a situation (sUAS

operations) where the operator temporarily lacks the ability to see-and-avoid and in a situation

where an operator is responsible for seeing a relatively small object, NAAA believes, endangers

the safety of the NAS. As mentioned in the pilot safety brochure contained within the docket

titled “Pilot Vision:” Vision is a pilot’s most important sense to obtain reference information

during flight. Having two eyes on a small moving aircraft, and scanning the surrounding

airspace, increases the level of safety within the NAS. We also believe that it should be clearly

understood it is not allowed to use a visual observer for the purpose of observing the UAS




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beyond the operator’s visual distance range by stationing the observer at the limit of the

operator’s range and having the observer act as a safety observer beyond that point.

NAAA also believes visual observers need to be fully certified and medically qualified airmen so

they are aware of what they are observing and what to look for, especially when on the lookout

for manned aircraft operations. Having a set of untrained eyes does little to enhance safety.

Additionally, being able to command the sUAS is advantageous in the event the visual observer

sees a safety threat the operator doesn’t, and needs to take control from the operator in an

emergency situation to avoid an imminent collision.

III D 3. See-and-Avoid and Visibility Requirements

III D 3 i. See-and-Avoid

NAAA supports the fact that the FAA decided not to permit see-and-avoid through electronic

means, given the technology remains unproven and unreliable. NAAA also supports the FAA’s

requirement of operation within line-of-sight and limiting UAS operators to operating one UAS.

Additionally, as previously mentioned, the Government Accountability Office has said that no

adequate sense and avoid technology currently exists13.

FAA requested comments on usage beyond line of site via deviation authority once appropriate

technology is developed. NAAA believes this is a matter to refer to the Beyond Visual Line of

Sight Aviation Rule Making Committee (BVLOS-ARC). The BVLOS-ARC was established by

the FAA to develop standards related to BVLOS use of UAS, and is populated with experts in

both manned and unmanned aviation (including NAAA). Allowing BVLOS use of UAS prior to

consulting with the ARC defeats the purpose establishing such a committee.

III D 3 ii. Additional Visibility Requirements

NAAA believes that all UAS should be equipped with contrast painting and strobe lighting for

day and night time operation, therefore agrees with the FAAs recommendation that UAS only be

permitted to operate during daylight hours. If the Agency allowed operation outside of daylight

hours, safety and visibility dictate the use of lighting that meets the technical standards

applicable to manned aircraft. NAAA agrees lighting standards are necessary for operation in the

NAS. Additional details can be found in the section relating to airworthiness.

NAAA supports the FAA’s proposed visibility and cloud clearance requirements as they are

consistent with VFR visibility requirements under Part 91.155 and 91.115.

III D 3 iii. Yielding Right of Way

NAAA emphatically supports this provision requiring the sUAS yield the right of way to manned

aircraft. This is consistent with the general principles of Part 91 requiring the more maneuverable

13 Testimony of Gerald L. Dillingham, Director of Physical Infrastructure issues, Government Accountability Office before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science, Space and Technology, Subcommittee on Oversight. UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS Continued Coordination, Operational Data, and Performance Standards Needed to Guide Research and Development.




Page 14

aircraft to yield to the less maneuverable aircraft. NAAA believes that without this provision

safety in the NAS for manned aircraft would be markedly jeopardized.

III D 4. Containment and Loss of Positive Control

III D 4 i. Confined Area of Operation Boundaries

The FAA proposes to limit risk of incidence where the UAS may become uncontrollable, “loss

of positive control,” by “limiting UAS operations to a confined area.” NAAA agrees that this is a

good method, however in the NPRM, FAA does not define “confined area” citing the need for

flexibility. NAAA believes this standard is too lax when it comes to safe operation of the UAS.

UAS operations should be limited to a defined distance visual area so when manned aircraft

operators know a UAS is operating nearby, either from the operator or by other means, they have

a defined boundary within which they know to visually scan and they know they have to move

away from to prevent an incident compromising aviation safety if they are too close.

FAA notes “the proposed visual-line-of-sight requirement in 107.31 would create a natural

horizontal boundary on the area of operation.” While this may be true in theory, this undefined

distance creates an uncertain “alert area” for manned operators to be on alert for UAS operations

when fulfilling their see-and-avoid responsibilities. For this reason, NAAA believes FAA needs

to designate a defined distance supported by data ensuring that the operator can see the UAS of a

certain size and design characteristics at the defined distance in order to meet see-and-avoid

requirements and by a medical certification (discussed later).

FAA states that it chose a 500 foot operating ceiling as the vertical limit in their confined area

boundaries because “most manned aircraft operations take place above 500 feet… specifically,

most manned aircraft operations conducted over uncongested areas must be flown at above 500

feet AGL.” The FAA continued by addressing exceptions to the 500 foot altitude requirement

stating “while most manned aircraft operations fly above the 500-foot ceiling proposed in this

rule, there are some manned-aircraft operations that could fly below this altitude… including

aerial applicators.” FAA then concludes that “As a result of this difference in air-traffic density,

the FAA has determined that small UAS operations would not pose a significant risk to manned

aircraft operations taking place below 500 feet altitude if proper precautions are taken by the

small UAS operator.” This reasoning assumes that proper precautions are followed by all UAS

operators, but there is no UAS operation data available to indicate UAS will follow proper

precautions in fact UAS data contrary to following proper precautions does exist. As mentioned

before the agricultural aviation industry experienced two near misses with UAS the summer of

2014 and according to the Washington Post in the last several years there have been over 300

near-misses involving military UAS. Meanwhile, users of the airspace system below 500 feet

AGL are put at great risk rather than minimal risk as the argument states. These users are not

only aerial applicators, but emergency medical services (EMS), air tanker firefighting aircraft

and their lead aircraft; power line and pipeline patrol aircraft; power line maintenance

helicopters; fish and wildlife service aircraft; animal control aircraft (USDA-APHIS-ADC);

military helicopter and fixed-wing operations; seismic operations (usually helicopters); livestock

roundup (ranching or animal relocation); aircraft GIS mapping of cropland for noxious weed

populations and the like; and others.




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In addition, NAAA believes that FAA needs to take into account the missions performed by

aircraft operating at low altitudes. Agriculture is considered the largest potential market for small

UAS, along with newsgathering14. Because of this, it’s reasonable to assume that there will be a

greater concentration of small UAS operations in the agricultural areas where aerial applicators

are operating. The same is true of areas where medical aircraft are in operation (MedEvc), which

tends to draw news entities. Because of this, as well as the unique missions both aerial

applicators and medical aircraft perform, NAAA believes that FAA needs to give proper

credence to the safety of manned aircraft operators operating at these low altitudes. It should also

be noted that when operating at low altitudes, the pilots have their attention on additional

operational factors, such as their task being performed, obstructions, terrain, etc.

III D 4 ii. Mitigating Loss of Positive Control Risk

NAAA believes that the Agency should require a flight termination system for sUAS. FAA says

that they chose not to make this a requirement due to the “size and weight of small UAS,”

however most of these technologies are software based and utilize GPS systems already onboard

the UAS, therefore have no effect on the weight of the aircraft.

NAAA agrees with the many of the FAA’s recommendations, including requiring the operator to

test the link between the UAS and the control station, and prohibiting operation of the UAS over

a person not directly involved in the operation. However NAAA feels an addition needs to be

made here explicitly subjecting UAS operators to Part 91.103 requiring each pilot in command

to… “Become familiar with all available information concerning [the] flight.” Making this

provision applicable to small UAS operators ensures that UAS operators utilize every possible

means of information gathering prior to flight.

III D 5. Limitations on Operations in Certain Airspace

III D 5 i. Controlled Airspace

NAAA agrees with FAA that “restricting use of controlled airspace to approved operations

would reduce the risk of interference with other aircraft activities.” Small UAS operations would

be prohibited in Class A airspace and in Class B, Class C, Class D, and within the lateral

boundaries of the surface area of Class E airspace designated for an airport without prior

authorization from the ATC facility having jurisdiction over the airspace. NAAA believes that

the prior authorization is best accomplished by requiring the same approval from ATC that

manned aircraft are required to obtain, per 91.120 – 91.131 for Classes D, C, and B airspace.

This includes requirements to establish two-way radio communication with ATC (and

permission to enter in the case of Class B). This is not only for the safety of the UAS operator,

but manned aircraft as well that are operating in the vicinity. This would require UAS operators

flying in controlled airspace to have appropriate radio communications equipment in order to

operate. While this adds to the cost of operations, we do not believe this is overly burdensome,

because if the controlled airspace extends below 500 feet in a particular area, it must be because

aircraft are likely to be operating in that area. Also, because UAS do not have a pilot onboard,

14 Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International, The Economic Impact of Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration in the United States




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they have the ability to obtain relatively low cost ground-based radio equipment for operational

use, as opposed to the more costly aircraft mounted systems manned aircraft are required to

have. Having communications equipment available provides ATC with instant communications

with the UAS operator. Leaving this coordination provision too lax and unspecified endangers

the safety of the NAS though lack of standardization. The current, proven-safe, system should be

utilized to the greatest extent possible.

NAAA also believes that FAA needs to require operators to coordinate with airport operators

when operating near uncontrolled and private airports given the difficulty of manned aircraft

pilots to see these small UAS objects. Notification would allow dissemination of the UAS

activity through local airport and UNICOM frequencies, as well as through NOTAMS and other

communications.

III D 5 ii. – iii. Prohibited or Restricted Airspace; Areas Designated by Notice to Airmen

NAAA agrees with FAA’s proposal in these areas as it is consistent with Part 91 and as stated

earlier, NAAA believes it should take this a step further and continue to require NOTAMS for

sUAS activity as it currently does for the 337 exemptions/COAs 48 hours in advance of UAS

activity.

III D 6. Airworthiness, Inspection, Maintenance, and Airworthiness Directives

III D 6 i. Inspections and Maintenance

NAAA disagrees with the agency’s approach to abandon the aviation industry’s longstanding

requirement of proper recordkeeping and inspections in favor of accommodation for a new NAS

entrant. While requiring the same number of inspections may be overly burdensome, requiring

no inspection of an aircraft up to 55 pounds and flying 100 mph that is operating where manned

aircraft operate endangers passengers and crew of manned aircraft and persons or property on the

surface. We believe the Permit to Operate requirements (PTO) outlined in the NPRM would

have been the proper compromise between requiring full compliance and allowing the necessary

flexibility for UAS.

It also appears FAA is reliant upon manufacturers operating instructions in order to provide the

only level of safe operation, however unlike the requirements of a FAA-approved Pilot Operators

Handbook (POH), FAA has set no standards for what manufacturer’s instructions for UAS are to

contain. Some can be as short as one page, but are supposed to provide an equivalent level of

safety to a FAA-approved manual, which seems unlikely without proper guidance from FAA.

NAAA believes the manufacturer should make a manual available and it should be approved by

the FAA.

III D 6 ii. Airworthiness Directives

NAAA agrees with FAA’s proposed requirement for sUAS to comply with airworthiness

directives (AD) when they are issued for parts that are FAA-certificated, have received PMA, or

are TSO-authorized for manned-aircraft use on the small UAS whenever they are installed on a

UAS. NAAA believes a system should be developed for alerting users to defects in other parts

that do not have FAA approval when they are detected.




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III D 7. Miscellaneous Operating Provisions

III D 7 iii. Medical Conditions

NAAA believes that not requiring a medical certificate endangers all pilots and operators within

the NAS. The airman medical process has been established and refined over decades to ensure

that those operating within the NAS are appropriately qualified. Pilots exercising the privileges

of a commercial pilot certificate must possess at least a valid Class II medical certificate. Of

particular concern to NAAA is the lack of any eye exam requirement for sUAS operators when

safety is based on the see-and-avoid principle. NAAA does not view self-medical certification

established by NPRM as establishing an equivalent level of safety to the long established airman

medical process currently required. One option that NAAA urges the FAA to consider is a UAS

airman medical certificate that may have different standards from those under the Class I – III

medical process that currently exists. This would be a preferable alternative to no independent

medical certification.

III E. Operator Certificate

NAAA believes given the size and complexity of our national airspace, the only proper method

to ensure all airmen have a full understanding of their responsibilities is to require them to carry

the proper commercial pilot certificate when operating commercially. Being familiar with the

limitations of manned general aviation aircraft, those operating at the low altitudes where sUAS

share airspace, is crucial to UAS understanding the degree to which see-and-avoid is vital.

FAA is proposing to require a written exam in order to certify UAS operators. NAAA agrees that

a written exam should be required, but it is only one part of what needs to be considered for UAS

operator certification. UAS operators need to demonstrate proper command of their aircraft, as

manned aircraft operators do. The burden imposed on UAS operators would be minimal given

the size and weight limitations proposed by the NPRM. A operator candidate could easily put his

aircraft in the back of a vehicle, or carry it with him to the local Flight Standards District Office

(FSDO) or designated examiner and be evaluated by an examiner.

Additionally, FAA needs to establish a classroom education requirement similar to that required

by manned aircraft, with an equivalent list of subject areas a certified instructor needs to cover.

This will ensure that a sUAS operator is equipped with knowledge in the proper topics rather

than relying on the candidate to self-study any method they choose which may or may not cover

areas of safety concern. While topical knowledge is important, a certified instructor can deliver

the information in the proper context through their flight experience. This would also require the

FAA to establish standards for UAS instructors.

NAAA agrees with the requirement for recurrent aeronautical testing every 24 months. This is

identical to the recurrent flight review and knowledge testing of manned pilots.




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Conclusion Once again, NAAA appreciates the opportunity to comment of the FAA’s proposal. NAAA’s

goal is to ensure a continued safe operating environment for aerial applicators. Given that, as

previously mentioned, agriculture is the number one growth area for UAS. Hence, we believe it

is vital that the future fleet of unmanned aircraft are piloted by responsible, knowledgeable

professionals and marked and identifiable in such a way that manned aircraft pilots are able to

always know of a nearby UAS’ whereabouts so they can safely avoid them. This is pilot safety

basics, as the FAA is well aware. For this reason, we again urge FAA to consider more stringent

training and certification requirements as aforementioned, as well as requiring marking and

lighting of UAS along with ADS-B out technology to increase visibility and detection, or

something equivalent. These technologies are all available, off the shelf, for use in UAS’ now.

UAS technology has tremendous potential. NAAA is even promoting the technology to the

aerial application industry as a service that today’s aerial applicators might provide to farmers to

diversify their operations by providing crop-sensing and aerial imaging services. Agricultural

operations are a logical answer to providing these services—either using their existing

agricultural aircraft or using UAS because these operations are in rural agricultural areas and

they have the aviation know-how to do the work. However, as we promote UAS operations we

are also recommending safety as the key component in integrating these aircraft into agricultural

aviation operations.

Frankly, we believe the FAA’s proposal does not go nearly far enough towards safely integrating

UAS into the airspace that agricultural aviators will share with UAS’ being used to provide

agricultural services. This is a seminal moment for the FAA. The agency has the opportunity to

get safe UAS regulations on the books at the initial promulgation point. We urge the agency to

pay close heed to safety threats in these comments that have caused accidents and loss of life in

the agricultural aviation industry and the available data on near misses between manned aircraft

and UAS. When agricultural aviators cannot see objects they will hit them. Sadly, accidents

from collisions with wires and unmarked towers have taken the lives of agricultural aviators.

This statement is vividly illustrated by ag aircraft accidents listed in tables in the previous section

of these comments titled “Safety Recommendations Previously Provided to the FAA by NAAA.”

These are caused by a lack of awareness of the towers and wires locations and/or a lack of an

ability to see these obstacles. UAS will have a similar jeopardizing safety effect on us if they are

not able to be located or seen. In terms of near misses, there have been many between UAS and

manned aircraft and as logic would dictate these statistics, are assured of ramping up

significantly once commercial UAS are given the green light to operate under the final rule. We

urge the FAA to get this policy right the first time. Too much is at stake for both the future of a

promising UAS industry and for manned aircraft operators for the agency to miss in its first

attempt. If not, it is highly likely the FAA will be forced to revisit the issue again due to NTSB

accident reports, recommendations and political pressure. We have such a superb aviation safety

rate in this country because the FAA has strong certification standards for aircraft to ensure their

airworthiness. We have such a superb aviation safety rate in this country because the FAA has

strong operational requirements for pilots. We have such a superb aviation rate in this country

because the FAA has strong aircraft maintenance requirements. These proposed sUAS




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requirements are absent of strong sUAS aircraft certification, aircraft maintenance and aircraft

pilot requirements. Once again, we urge the FAA to take heed or our safety recommendations

and strengthen these proposed rules to require that UAS airworthy and are easier to be identified,

seen and operated professionally by their operators.

Thank you, and please feel free to contact me if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

Andrew Moore

Executive Director




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Appendix




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Idaho UAS Incident Police Report

Documents

Introduction - National Agricultural Aviation Association...Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Docket ID: FAA-2015-0150 Page 2 waterways and ranchland from