Introduction, H. Gene Blocker - Westmont Collegehomepage.westmont.edu/hoeckley/readings/Symposium/PDF/201_300/290.pdf · tion known as “liberalism,” especially its early-eighteenth-century

WHAT KIND OF GOVERNMENT BEST protects its citizens from each other and fromthe day-to-day hardships of life? And how should a government go aboutproviding such protection? Such questions have inspired debate for almosttwo thousand years. In ancient Rome, for example, the esteemed statesmanCicero developed the concept of natural law as he grappled with these issues.Natural law, Cicero believed, is an innate sense in all human beings as towhat is fundamentally right and wrong—on the basis of which all humanlyconstructed laws ought to be based.

Many centuries later, the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes(1588–1679) offered his own interpretation of natural law. As Hobbesexplained, natural law is a kind of egoistic law of the jungle, in which onlythe strongest survive in a highly competitive “dog eat dog” world. Hobbesfurther suggested that natural rights—that is, innate entitlements, like theright to life, are really more like natural mights, as in the actual struggle forsurvival in competition with others. Perhaps not surprisingly, Hobbesthought of life as generally “nasty, brutish, and short,” and pictured societyas a cauldron of violent individuals constantly at war with one another. Forthese reasons, Hobbes advocated an autocratic government—which hebelieved was the only form of leadership that could control humankind’s nat-urally savage impulses.

Hobbes’s contemporary, the English writer John Locke (1632–1704),saw things a little differently. In Locke’s view, natural law is a universal,moral impulse that human beings are born with. Most people, Lockebelieved, would conform to this moral law easily and naturally if left to theirown devices (that is, if they lived in a hypothetical “state of nature” in whichthere were no government or civil authority). In other words, Locke believedthat we all have an inherent capacity to support the protection of naturalrights—which Locke defined as the right to life, liberty, and property.

It’s probably obvious that Locke did not view human beings in the “stateof nature” in nearly as unflattering a light as Hobbes did. Nevertheless,Locke conceded that this state of nature is far from ideal, because it lacks a

AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL,EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT

John Locke

�Introduction, H. Gene Blocker

formal mechanism for dealing with those who violate natural law. Butinstead of looking to a sovereign to keep order, as Hobbes advised, Lockerecommended that each individual in a society agree to form a social unionand to abide by the rules of a designated civil authority. In effect, Locke wasdescribing a kind of social contract between members of the society and anauthority that the society itself put in place.

Locke argued that the job of the civil authority was to protect the naturalrights (life, liberty, and property) of the society’s members. If the authorityfailed to provide this protection or violated the social contract in some otherway, he said, then the contract would no longer be valid. The society’s mem-bers would then have the right to rebel against the authority. To encouragefairness and responsibility in government, Locke advocated democratic ruleand a check-and-balance system between the branches of government. Inaddition, he advised a separation of church and state. All of these principlesstrongly influenced the leaders of the French and American revolutions.

Locke played an important role in the development of the political posi-tion known as “liberalism,” especially its early-eighteenth-century “libertar-ian” version. Both terms derive from the word liberty, meaning freedom—inthis case, freedom of the individual from undue governmental restraint. Lib-eralism states that an individual should be able to pursue his or her life goalsuninhibited by others, so long as that person is not infringing on the rights ofothers to pursue their life goals.

Locke’s thinking has generated much analysis over the years. As we’veseen, his concept of individual, natural rights included the right to accumulateprivate property—which, he believed, one should have the right to bequeathto one’s children. Some recent thinkers have thus interpreted Locke’s ideas asjustification of the “entitlement” theory, which says that individuals have theright to keep whatever wealth they have gained legally. These same thinkersbelieve that Locke would have rejected the “egalitarian” claim that a govern-ment should redistribute such wealth equally among the poor.

Of course, the unprecedented, tremendous gap between rich and poorcaused by the Industrial Revolution came after Locke’s time. Therefore, it isperhaps unfair to attribute to him the views of modern-day “libertarians.” Butthat doesn’t necessarily mean that we should assume that he was an egalitar-ian. Even so, some contemporary egalitarians interpret Locke as supportingwhatever policies would allow individuals to freely enjoy their basic rights—including an equitable distribution of a nation’s wealth. As these egalitariansexplain, to enjoy the kinds of rights that Locke argued for, individuals must

� AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL . . . �

have adequate food, shelter, clothing, schooling, and so on. Egalitarianspoint out that a homeless person has no practical way to enjoy the right torun for public office, open a newspaper, attend Harvard Law School, or evenapply for a job at the hamburger joint on the corner.

As you read the following selection by John Locke, think about howbest to interpret him. The American statesman Thomas Jefferson admiredLocke partly because he proposed mechanisms by which people could rebelagainst their government—something that Jefferson argued for passionatelyin the American Declaration of Independence. Still, how sure can we be thatLocke had the same picture in mind that Jefferson did?

Also, how should we interpret Locke in light of the more recent debatebetween libertarians and egalitarians? Do you think that Locke’s viewsclosely resemble either of these contemporary positions? If so, which one?Perhaps more important, what problems might arise from trying to fit himinto either category? To illustrate, what would happen to Locke’s theory ofproperty if all common land were claimed by individuals as private propertythrough their own labor, and if the only land available were that which is forsale? Finally, do you agree with Locke that all human beings are born withnatural rights assured by a universal, moral law of nature? Why or why not?If you do agree, then what do you see as our natural rights?

To understand political power aright, and derive it from its original, wemust consider what state all men are naturally in, and that is a state of

perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions andpersons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without ask-ing leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.

A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is recip-rocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more evidentthan that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to allthe same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should alsobe equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection, unlessthe Lord and Master of them all should by any manifest declaration of Hiswill set one above another, and confer on him by an evident and clearappointment an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty. . . .


From Two Treatises on Government, from The Works of John Locke, Vol. 5 (London: ThomasTegg, W. Sharpe and Son; G. Offor; G. and J. Robinson; J. Evans and Co. 1823).

But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of license; thoughman in that state have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person orpossessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as anycreature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preserva-tion calls for it. The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, whichobliges everyone; and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind whowill but consult it, that, being all equal and independent, no one ought toharm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions. . . . Everyone, as he isbound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station willfully, so, by the likereason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, asmuch as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and not, unless it be to dojustice on an offender, take away or impair the life, or what tends to thepreservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.

And that all men may be restrained from invading others’ rights, andfrom doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be observed, which wil-leth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law ofnature is in that state put into every man’s hand, whereby everyone has a rightto punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree as may hinder its vio-lation. For the law of nature would, as all other laws that concern men in thisworld, be in vain if there were nobody that, in the state of nature, had a powerto execute that law, and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders.And if anyone in the state of nature may punish another for any evil he hasdone, everyone may do so. For in that state of perfect equality, where natu-rally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another, what any maydo in prosecution of that law, everyone must needs have a right to do.

And thus in the state of nature one man comes by a power over another;but yet no absolute or arbitrary power, to use a criminal, when he has got himin his hands, according to the passionate heats or boundless extravagance ofhis own will; but only to retribute to him so far as calm reason and con-science dictate what is proportionate to his transgression, which is so muchas may serve for reparation and restraint. For these two are the only reasonswhy one man may lawfully do harm to another, which is that we call punish-ment. In transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares himself to liveby another rule than that of common reason and equity, which is that mea-sure God has set to the actions of men, for their mutual security; and so hebecomes dangerous to mankind, the tie which is to secure them from injuryand violence being slighted and broken by him. Which, being a trespassagainst the whole species, and the peace and safety of it, provided for by the


law of nature, every man upon this score, by the right he hath to preservemankind in general, may restrain, or, where it is necessary, destroy thingsnoxious to them, and so may bring such evil on anyone who hath trans-gressed that law, as may make him repent the doing of it, and thereby deterhim, and by his example others, from doing the like mischief. And in thiscase, and upon this ground, every man hath a right to punish the offender,and be executioner of the law of nature. . . .

And thus it is that every man in the state of nature has a power to kill amurderer, both to deter others from doing the like injury, which no reparationcan compensate, by the example of the punishment that attends it fromeverybody, and also to secure men from the attempts of a criminal who hav-ing renounced reason, the common rule and measure God hath given tomankind, hath by the unjust violence and slaughter he hath committed uponone, declared war against all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as alion or a tiger. . . .

’Tis often asked as a mighty objection, Where are, or ever were there,any men in such a state of nature? To which it may suffice as an answer atpresent: That since all princes and rulers of independent governments allthrough the world are in a state of nature, ’tis plain the world never was, norever will be, without numbers of men in that state. I have named all gover-nors of independent communities, whether they are or are not in league withothers. For ’tis not every compact that puts an end to the state of naturebetween men, but only this one of agreeing together mutually to enter intoone community, and make one body politic; other promises and compactsmen may make one with another, and yet still be in the state of nature. Thepromises and bargains for truck, etc., between the two men in Soldania, in orbetween a Swiss and an Indian, in the woods of America, are binding tothem, though they are perfectly in a state of nature in reference to oneanother. For truth and keeping of faith belong to men as men, and not asmembers of society.

To those that say there were never any men in the state of nature, I . . .moreover affirm that all men are naturally in that state, and remain so, till bytheir own consents they make themselves members of some politic society;and I doubt not, in the sequel of this discourse, to make it very clear.

The state of war is a state of enmity and destruction; and thereforedeclaring by word or action, not a passionate and hasty, but a sedate, settleddesign upon another man’s life, puts him in a state of war with him againstwhom he has declared such an intention, and so has exposed his life to the


other’s power to be taken away by him, or anyone that joins with him in hisdefense and espouses his quarrel; it being reasonable and just I should have aright to destroy that which threatens me with destruction. For by the funda-mental law of nature, man being to be preserved as much as possible, whenall cannot be preserved, the safety of the innocent is to be preferred; and onemay destroy a man who makes war upon him, or has discovered an enmity tohis being, for the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion; because theyare not under the ties of the common law of reason, have no other rule butthat of force and violence, and so may be treated as a beast of prey, thosedangerous and noxious creatures that will be sure to destroy him wheneverhe falls into their power.

And hence it is that he who attempts to get another man into his absolutepower does thereby put himself into a state of war with him; it being to beunderstood as a declaration of a design upon his life. For I have reason to con-clude that he who would get me into his power without my consent, woulduse me as he pleased when he had got me there, and destroy me too, when hehad a fancy to it; for nobody can desire to have me in his absolute power,unless it be to compel me by force to that which is against the right of myfreedom, i.e., make me a slave. To be free from such force is the only securityof my preservation; and reason bids me look on him as an enemy to mypreservation who would take away that freedom which is the fence to it; sothat he who makes an attempt to enslave me, thereby puts himself into a stateof war with me. He that in the state of nature would take away the freedomthat belongs to any one in that state, must necessarily be supposed to have adesign to take away everything else, that freedom being the foundation of allthe rest; as he that in the state of society would take away the freedom belong-ing to those of that society or commonwealth, must be supposed to design totake away from them everything else, and so be looked on as in a state of war.

This makes it lawful for a man to kill a thief who has not in the least hurthim, nor declared any design upon his life, any farther than by the use offorce, so to get him in his power as to take away his money, or what hepleases, from him; because using force, where he has no right to get me intohis power, let his pretense be what it will, I have no reason to suppose that hewho would take away my liberty would not, when he had me in his power,take away everything else. And, therefore, it is lawful for me to treat him asone who has put himself into a state of war with me—i.e., kill him if I can;for to that hazard does he justly expose himself whoever introduces a state ofwar, and is aggressor in it. . . .


The natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power onearth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to haveonly the law of nature for his rule. The liberty of man in society is to beunder no other legislative power but that established by consent in the com-monwealth; nor under the dominion of any will or restraint of any law, butwhat that legislative shall enact according to the trust put in it. Freedom thenis not what Sir Robert Filmer tells us, . . . “a liberty for everyone to do whathe lists, to live, as he pleases, and not to be tied by any laws.” But freedom ofmen under government is to have a standing rule to live by, common toeveryone of that society, and made by the legislative power erected in it; aliberty to follow my own will in all things, where that rule prescribes not;and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will ofanother man: as freedom of nature is to be under no other restraint but thelaw of nature.

This freedom from absolute arbitrary power is so necessary to, andclosely joined with, a man’s preservation, that he cannot part with it but bywhat forfeits his preservation and life together. For a man not having thepower of his own life cannot by compact, or his own consent, enslave him-self to anyone, nor put himself under the absolute arbitrary power of anotherto take away his life when he pleases. Nobody can give more power than hehas himself; and he that cannot take away his own life, cannot give anotherpower over it. Indeed, having by his fault forfeited his own life by some actthat deserves death, he to whom he has forfeited it may (when he has him inhis power) delay to take it, and make use of him to his own service; and hedoes him no injury by it. For whenever he finds the hardship of his slaveryoutweigh the value of his life, ’tis in his power by resisting the will of hismaster to draw on himself the death he desires.

This is the perfect condition of slavery, which is nothing else but thestate of war continued between a lawful conqueror and a captive, for if oncecompact enter between them, and make an agreement for a limited power onthe one side, and obedience on the other, the state of war and slavery ceasesas long as the compact endures; for, as has been said, no man can by agree-ment pass over to another that which he hath not in himself—a power overhis own life. . . .

God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given themreason to make use of it to the best advantage of life and convenience. Theearth and all that is therein is given to men for the support and comfort oftheir being. And though all the fruits it naturally produces, and beasts it


feeds, belong to mankind in common, as they are produced by the sponta-neous hand of nature; and nobody has originally a private dominion exclu-sive of the rest of mankind in any of them as they are thus in their naturalstate; yet being given for the use of men, there must of necessity be a meansto appropriate them some way or other before they can be of any use or at allbeneficial to any particular man. . . .

Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yetevery man has a property in his own person; this nobody has any right to buthimself. The labor of his body and the work of his hands we may say areproperly his. Whatsoever, then he removes out of the state that nature hathprovided and left it in, he hath mixed his labor with, and joined to it some-thing that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by himremoved from the common state nature placed it in, it hath by this laborsomething annexed to it that excludes the common right of other men. Forthis labor being the unquestionable property of the laborer, no man but hecan have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough,and as good left in common for others.

He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or theapples he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated themto himself. Nobody can deny but the nourishment is his. I ask, then, When didthey begin to be his—when he digested, or when he ate, or when he boiled, orwhen he brought them home, or when he picked them up? And ’tis plain if thefirst gathering made them not his, nothing else could. That labor put a distinc-tion between them and common; that added something to them more thannature, the common mother of all, had done, and so they became his privateright. And will anyone say he had no right to those acorns or apples he thusappropriated, because he had not the consent of all mankind to make them his?Was it a robbery thus to assume to himself what belonged to all in common? Ifsuch a consent as that was necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding theplenty God had given him. We see in commons which remain so by compactthat ’tis the taking any part of what is common and removing it out of the statenature leaves it in, which begins the property, without which the common is ofno use. And the taking of this or that part does not depend on the express con-sent of all the commoners. Thus the grass my horse has bit, the turfs my ser-vant has cut, and the ore I have dug in any place where I have a right to them incommon with others, become my property without the assignation or consentof anybody. The labor that was mine removing them out of that common statethey were in, hath fixed my property in them. . . .


It will perhaps be objected to this, that if gathering the acorns, or otherfruits of the earth, etc., makes a right to them, then anyone may engross asmuch as he will. To which I answer, Not so. The same law of nature that doesby this means give us property, does also bound that property too. “God hasgiven us all things richly” . . . is the voice of reason confirmed by inspiration.But how far has He given it us? To enjoy. As much as anyone can make useof to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labor fix aproperty in; whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs toothers. Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy. And thus con-sidering the plenty of natural provisions there was a long time in the world,and the few spenders, and to how small a part of that provision the industryof one man could extend itself, and engross it to the prejudice of others—especially keeping within the bounds, set by reason, of what might serve forhis use—there could be then little room for quarrels or contentions aboutproperty so established.

But the chief matter of property being now not the fruits of the earth,and the beasts that subsist on it, but the earth itself, as that which takes in andcarries with it all the rest I think it is plain that property in that, too, isacquired as the former. As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, culti-vates, and can use the product of, so much is his property. He by his labordoes as it were enclose it from the common. Nor will it invalidate his right tosay, everybody else has an equal title to it; and therefore he cannot appropri-ate, he cannot enclose, without the consent of all his fellow-commoners, allmankind. . . .

Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land, by improving it, anyprejudice to any other man, since there was still enough and as good left, andmore than the yet unprovided could use. So that in effect there was never theless left for others because of his enclosure for himself. For he that leaves asmuch as another can make use of, does as good as take nothing at all.Nobody could think himself injured by the drinking of another man, thoughhe took a good draught, who had a whole river of the same water left him toquench his thirst; and the case of land and water, where there is enough ofboth, is perfectly the same. . . .

This is certain, that in the beginning, before the desire of having morethan man needed had altered the intrinsic value of things, which dependsonly on their usefulness to the life of man; or had agreed that a little piece ofyellow metal which would keep without wasting or decay should be worth agreat piece of flesh or a whole heap of corn, though men had a right to


appropriate by their labor, each one to himself, as much of the things ofnature as he could use, yet this could not be much, nor to the prejudice ofothers, where the same plenty was still left to those who would use the sameindustry. . . .

For it is labor indeed that puts the difference of value on everything; andlet anyone consider what the difference is between an acre of land plantedwith tobacco or sugar, sown with wheat or barley, and an acre of the sameland lying in common without any husbandry upon it, and he will find thatthe improvement of labor makes the far greater part of the value. . . .

To make this a little clearer, let us but trace some of the ordinary provi-sions of life, through their several progresses, before they come to our use,and see how much they receive of their value from human industry. Bread,wine, and cloth are things of daily use and great plenty; yet, notwithstanding,acorns, water, and leaves or skins, must be our bread, drink, and clothing, didnot labor furnish us with these more useful commodities. For whatever breadis more worth than acorns, wine than water, and cloth or silk than leaves,skins, or moss, that is wholly owing to labor and industry. . . .

Thus labor, in the beginning, gave a right of property, wherever anyonewas pleased to employ it upon what was common, which remained a longwhile the far greater part, and is yet more than mankind makes use of. Menat first, for the most part, contented themselves with what unassisted natureoffered to their necessities; and though afterwards, in some parts of theworld (where the increase of people and stock, with the use of money, hadmade land scarce, and so of some value), the several communities settled thebounds of their distinct territories, and, bylaws within themselves, regulatedthe properties of the private men of their society, and so, by compact andagreement, settled the property which labor and industry began—and theleagues that have been made between several states and kingdoms, eitherexpressly or tacitly disowning all claim and right to the land in the other’spossession have, by common consent, given up their pretenses to their natu-ral common right, which originally they had to those countries; and so have,by positive agreement, settled a property amongst themselves in distinctparts of the world—yet there are still great tracts of ground to be foundwhich, the inhabitants thereof not having joined with the rest of mankind inthe consent of the use of their common money, lie waste, and are more thanthe people who dwell on it do or can make use of, and so still lie in common;though this can scarce happen amongst that part of mankind that have con-sented to the use of money . . . some lasting thing that men might keep with-


out spoiling, and that, by mutual consent, men would take in exchange forthe truly useful but perishable supports of life. . . .

But since gold and silver, being little useful to the life of man in propor-tion to food, raiment, and carriage, has its value only from the consent ofmen, whereof labor yet makes, in great part, the measure, it is plain that theconsent of men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession ofthe earth—I mean out of the bounds of society and compact; for in govern-ments the laws regulate it; they having, by consent, found out and agreed in away how a man may rightfully and without injury possess more than he him-self can make use of by receiving gold and silver, which may continue longin a man’s possession, without decaying for the overplus, and agreeing thosemetals should have a value. . . .

Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect freedom, andan uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law ofnature equally with any other man or number of men in the world, hath bynature a power not only to preserve his property—that is, his life, liberty, andestate—against the injuries and attempts of other men, but to judge of andpunish the breaches of that law in others as he is persuaded the offensedeserves, even with death itself, in crimes where the heinousness of the factin his opinion requires it. But because no political society can be nor subsistwithout having in itself the power to preserve the property, and, in orderthereunto, punish the offenses of all those of that society, there, and thereonly, is political society, where every one of the members hath quitted thisnatural power, resigned it up into the hands of the community in all casesthat exclude him not from appealing for protection to the law established byit; and thus all private judgment of every particular member being excluded,the community comes to be umpire; and by understanding indifferent rulesand men authorized by the community for their execution, decides all thedifferences that may happen between any members of that society concern-ing any matter of right, and punishes those offenses which any member hathcommitted against the society with such penalties as the law has established;whereby it is easy to discern who are and who are not in political societytogether. Those who are united into one body, and have a common estab-lished law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to decide controversiesbetween them and punish offenders, are in civil society one with another; butthose who have no such common appeal—I mean on earth—are still in thestate of nature, each being, where there is no other, judge for himself andexecutioner, which is, as I have before shown it, the perfect state of nature.


And thus the commonwealth comes by a power to set down what punish-ment shall belong to the several transgressions which they think worthy of itcommitted amongst the members of that society, which is the power of mak-ing laws, as well as it has the power to punish any injury done unto any of itsmembers by anyone that is not of it, which is the power of war and peace; andall this for the preservation of the property of all the members of that societyas far as is possible. But though every man entered into civil society, has quit-ted his power to punish offenses against the law of nature in prosecution ofhis own private judgment, yet with the judgment of offenses, which he hasgiven up to the legislative in all cases where he can appeal to the magistrate,he has given a right to the commonwealth to employ his force for the execu-tion of the judgments of the commonwealth whenever he shall be called to it;which, indeed, are his own judgments, they being made by himself or his rep-resentative. And herein we have the original of the legislative and executivepower of civil society, which is to judge by standing laws how far offenses areto be punished when committed within the commonwealth, and also by occa-sional judgments founded on the present circumstances of the fact, how farinjuries from without are to be vindicated; and in both these to employ all theforce of all the members when there shall be need.

Wherever, therefore, any number of men so unite into one society, as toquit everyone his executive power of the law of nature, and to resign it to thepublic, there, and there only, is a political, or civil society. And this is donewherever any number of men, in the state of nature, enter into society tomake one people, one body politic, under one supreme government, or elsewhen anyone joins himself to, and incorporates with, any governmentalready made. For hereby he authorises the society, or, which is all one, thelegislative thereof, to make laws for him, as the public good of the societyshall require, to the execution whereof his own assistance (as to his owndecrees) is due. And this puts men out of a state of nature into that of a com-monwealth, by setting up a judge on earth with authority to determine all thecontroversies and redress the injuries that may happen to any member of thecommonwealth; which judge is the legislative, or magistrates appointed byit. And wherever there are any number of men, however associated, that haveno such decisive power to appeal to, there they are still in the state of nature.

Hence it is evident that absolute monarchy, which by some men iscounted the only government in the world, is indeed inconsistent with civilsociety, and so can be no form of civil government at all. For the end of civilsociety being to avoid and remedy those inconveniences of the state of nature


which necessarily follow from every man’s being judge in his own case, bysetting up a known authority to which everyone of that society may appealupon any injury received or controversy that may arise, and which every oneof the society ought to obey; wherever any persons are who have not such anauthority to appeal to and decide any difference between them there, thosepersons are still in the state of nature. And so is every absolute prince, inrespect of those who are under his dominion.

For he being supposed to have all, both legislative and executive powerin himself alone, there is no judge to be found; no appeal lies open to anyonewho may fairly and indifferently and with authority decide, and fromwhence relief and address may be expected of any injury or inconveniencethat may be suffered from or by his order; so that such a man, however enti-tled Czar; or Grand Seignior, or how you please—is as much in the state ofnature, with all under his dominion, as he is with the rest of mankind. Forwherever any two men are, who have no standing rule and common judge toappeal to on earth for the determination of controversies of right betwixtthem, there they are still in the state of nature, and under all the inconve-niences of it, with only this woful difference to the subject, or rather slave, ofan absolute prince: that, whereas in the ordinary state of nature he has a lib-erty to judge of his right, and according to the best of his power to maintainit, now, whenever his property is invaded by the will and order of hismonarch, he has not only no appeal, as those in the society ought to have,but, as if he were degraded from the common state of rational creatures, isdenied a liberty to judge of or to defend his right; and so is exposed to all themisery and inconveniences that a man can fear from one who, being in theunrestrained state of nature, is yet corrupted with flattery, and armed withpower. . . .

Men being, as has been said, by nature all free, equal, and independent,no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power ofanother, without his own consent, which is done by agreeing with other mento join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceableliving one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and agreater security against any that are not of it. This any number of men maydo, because it injures not the freedom of the rest; they are left as they were inthe liberty of the state of nature. When any number of men have so consentedto make one community or government, they are thereby presently incorpo-rated, and make one body politic, wherein the majority have a right to actand conclude the rest.


For when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual,made a community, they have thereby made that community one body, witha power to act as one body, which is only by the will and determination ofthe majority. For that which acts any community being: only the consent ofthe individuals of it, and it being one body must move one way, it is neces-sary the body should move that way whither the greater force carries it,which is the consent of the majority; or else it is impossible it should act orcontinue one body, one community which the consent of every individualthat united into it agreed: that it should; and so everyone is bound by thatconsent to be concluded by the majority. And therefore we see that in assem-blies empowered to act by positive laws, where no number is set by that pos-itive law which empowers them, the act of the majority passes for the act ofthe whole, and of course determines, as having by the law of nature and rea-son the power of the whole.

And thus every man, by consenting with others to make one body politicunder one government, puts himself under an obligation to every one of thatsociety, to submit to the determination of the majority, and to be concludedby it; or else this original compact, whereby he with others incorporates intoone society, would signify nothing, and be no compact, if he be left free andunder no other ties than he was in before in the state of nature. For whatappearance would there be of any compact? What new engagement if hewere no farther tied by any decrees of the society, than he himself thought fit,and did actually consent to? This would be still as great a liberty as he him-self had before his compact, or anyone else in the state of nature hath, whomay submit himself and consent to any acts of it if he thinks fit.

For if the consent of the majority shall not in reason be received as theact of the whole and conclude every individual, nothing but the consent ofevery individual can make anything to be the act of the whole, which consid-ering the infirmities of health and avocations of business, which in a number,though much less than that of a commonwealth, will necessarily keep manyaway from the public assembly, and the variety of opinions, and contrarietyof interest, which unavoidably happen in all collections of men, ’tis next toimpossible ever to be had. . . . Such a constitution as this would make themighty leviathan of a shorter duration than the feeblest creatures, and not letit outlast the day it was born in; which cannot be supposed till we can thinkthat rational creatures should desire and constitute societies only to be dis-solved. For where the majority cannot conclude the rest, there they cannotact as one body, and consequently will be immediately dissolved again.


Whosoever therefore out of a state of nature unite into a communitymust be understood to give up all the power necessary to the ends for whichthey unite into society, to the majority of the community, unless theyexpressly agreed in any number greater than the majority. And this is doneby barely agreeing to unite into one political society, which is all the com-pact that is, or needs be, between the individuals that enter into or make up acommonwealth. And thus that which begins and actually constitutes anypolitical society is nothing but the consent of any number of freemen capableof a majority to unite and incorporate into such a society. And this is that,and that only, which did or could give beginning to any lawful government inthe world.

To this I find two objections made.First: That there are no instances to be found in story of a company of

men independent, and equal one amongst another, that met together and inthis way began and set up a government.

Secondly: ’Tis impossible of right that men should do so, because allmen being born under government, they are to submit to that, and are not atliberty to begin a new one.

To the first there is this to answer—That it is not at all to be wonderedthat history gives us but a very little account of men that lived together in thestate of nature. The inconveniences of that condition, and the love and wantof society, no sooner brought any number of them together, but theypresently united and incorporated if they designed to continue together. Andif we may not suppose men ever to have been in the state of nature, becausewe hear not much of them in such a state, we may as well suppose the armiesof Salmanasser or Xerxes were never children, because we hear little of themtill they were men, and embodied in armies. Government is everywhereantecedent to records, and letters seldom come in amongst a people, till along continuation of civil society has, by other more necessary arts, providedfor their safety, ease, and plenty. And then they begin to look after the historyof their founders, and search into their original, when they have outlived thememory of it. . . .

“All men,” say they, “are born under government, and therefore theycannot be at liberty to begin a new one. Everyone is born a subject to hisfather, or his prince, and is therefore under the perpetual tie of subjection andallegiance.” It is plain mankind never owned nor considered any such naturalsubjection that they were born in, to one or to the other that tied them with-out their own consents, to a subjection to them and their heirs.


For there are no examples so frequent in history, both sacred and pro-fane, as those of men withdrawing themselves and their obedience from thejurisdiction they were born under, and the family or community they werebred up in, and setting up new governments in other places. . . .

Every man being, as has been shown, naturally free, and nothing beingable to put him into subjection to any earthly power but only his own con-sent, it is to be considered what shall be understood to be sufficient declara-tion of a man’s consent to make him subject to the laws of any government.There is a common distinction of an express and a tacit consent, which willconcern our present case. Nobody doubts but an express consent of any manentering into any society makes him a perfect member of that society, a sub-ject of that government. The difficulty is, what ought to be looked upon as atacit consent, and how far it binds, i.e., how far anyone shall be looked on tohave consented, and thereby submitted to any government where he hasmade no expressions of it at all. And to this I say that every man that hathany possession or enjoyment of any part of the dominions of any governmentdoth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged to obedience tothe laws of that government during such enjoyment as anyone under it,whether this his possession be of land to him and his heirs for ever, or a lodg-ing only for a week; or whether it be barely traveling freely on the highway;and in effect it reaches as far as the very being of anyone within the territo-ries of that government. . . .

But submitting to the laws of any country, living quietly and enjoyingprivileges and protection under them makes not a man a member of that soci-ety. This is only a local protection and homage due to and from all thosewho, not being in the state of war, come within the territories belonging toany government to all parts whereof the force of its law extends. But this nomore makes a man a member of that society a perpetual subject of that com-monwealth, than it would make a man a subject to another in whose familyhe found it convenient to abide for some time; though whilst he continued init he were obliged to comply with the laws, and submit to the government hefound there. And thus we see, that foreigners by living all their lives underanother government, and enjoying the privileges and protection of it, thoughthey are bound even in conscience to submit to its administration as far forthas any denizen, yet do not thereby come to be subjects or members of thatcommonwealth. Nothing can make any man so, but his actually entering intoit by positive engagement, and express promise and compact. This is that,


which I think, concerning the beginning of political societies, and that con-sent which makes anyone a member of any commonwealth.

If man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said, if he be absolutelord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject tonobody, why will he part with his freedom, this empire, and subject himselfto the dominion and control of any other power? To which, it is obvious toanswer, that though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoy-ment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasions of oth-ers. For all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greaterpart no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the propertyhe has in this state is very unsafe, very unsecure. This makes him willing toquit this condition, which, however free, is full of fears and continual dan-gers; and it is not without reason that he seeks out and is willing to join insociety with others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for themutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates, which I call by thegeneral name, property.

The great and chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into common-wealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation oftheir property, to which in the state of nature there are many things wanting.

First, There wants an established, settled, known law, received andallowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and thecommon measure to decide all controversies between them. For though thelaw of nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures; yet men, beingbiased by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not aptto allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their particu-lar cases.

Secondly, In the state of nature there wants a known and indifferentjudge, with authority to determine all differences according to the establishedlaw. For everyone in that state, being both judge and executioner of the law ofnature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt tocarry them too far, and with too much heat in their own cases, as well as neg-ligence and unconcernedness, to make them too remiss in other men’s.

Thirdly, In the state of nature there often wants power to back and sup-port the sentence when right, and to give it due execution. They who by anyinjustice offend, will seldom fail, where they are able by force to make goodtheir injustice; such resistance many times makes the punishment dangerous,and frequently destructive to those who attempt it.


Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of nature,being but in an ill condition, while they remain in it, are quickly driven intosociety. Hence it comes to pass that we seldom find any number of men liveany time together in this state. The inconveniences that they are thereinexposed to by the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power every manhas of punishing the transgressions of others, make them take sanctuaryunder the established laws of government, and therein seek the preservationof their property. It is this makes them so willingly give up everyone his sin-gle power of punishing, to be exercised by such alone, as shall be appointedto it amongst them; and by such rules as the community, or those authorizedby them to that purpose, shall agree on. And in this we have the original rightand rise of both the legislative and executive power, as well as of the govern-ments and societies themselves.

For in the state of nature, to omit the liberty he has of innocent delights,a man has two powers.

The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself,and others within the permission of the law of nature, by which law, commonto them all, he and all the rest of mankind are of one community, make upone society, distinct from all other creatures. And were it not for the corrup-tion and viciousness of degenerate men there would be no need of any other,no necessity that men should separate from this great and natural commu-nity, and associate into lesser combinations.

The other power a man has in the state of nature is the power to punishthe crimes committed against that law. Both these he gives up when he joinsin a private, if I may so call it, or particular political society, and incorporatesinto any commonwealth separate from the rest of mankind.

The first power, viz., of doing whatsoever he thought fit for the preser-vation of himself and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be regulated bylaws made by the society, so far forth as the preservation of himself and therest of that society shall require; which laws of the society in many thingsconfine the liberty he had by the law of nature.

Secondly, The power of punishing he wholly gives up, and engages hisnatural force (which he might before employ in the execution of the law ofnature, by his own single authority as he thought fit), to assist the executivepower of the society, as the law thereof shall require. For being now in a newstate, wherein he is to enjoy many conveniences, from the labor, assistance,and society of others in the same community, as well as protection from itswhole strength; he has to part also with as much of his natural liberty, in pro-


viding for himself, as the good, prosperity and safety of the society shallrequire; which is not only necessary but just, since the other members of thesociety do the like.

But though men when they enter into society give up the equality, libertyand executive power they had in the state of nature into the hands of the soci-ety, to be so far disposed of by the legislative as the good of the society shallrequire; yet it being only with an intention in everyone the better to preservehimself, his liberty and property (for no rational creature can be supposed tochange his condition with an intention to be worse), the power of the society,or legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend fartherthan the common good, but is obliged to secure everyone’s property by pro-viding against those three defects above-mentioned that made the state ofnature so unsafe and uneasy. And so whoever has the legislative or supremepower of any commonwealth is bound to govern by established standinglaws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by extemporary decrees;by indifferent and upright judges, who are to decide controversies by thoselaws; and to employ the force of the community at home only in the executionof such laws, or abroad, to prevent or redress foreign injuries, and secure thecommunity from inroads and invasion. And all this to be directed to no otherend but the peace, safety, and public good of the people.

The majority having, as has been shown, upon men’s first uniting intosociety, the whole power of the community, naturally in them, may employall that power in making laws for the community from time to time, and exe-cuting those laws by officers of their own appointing: and then the form ofthe government is a perfect democracy; or else may put the power of makinglaws into the hands of a few select men, and their heirs or successors, andthen it is an oligarchy; or else into the hands of one man and then it is amonarchy; if to him and his heirs, it is an hereditary monarchy; if to himonly for life, but upon his death the power only of nominating a successor toreturn to them, an elective monarchy. And so accordingly of these, the com-munity may make compounded and mixed forms of government, as theythink good. And if the legislative power be at first given by the majority toone or more persons only for their lives, or any limited time, and then thesupreme power to revert to them again; when it is so reverted, the commu-nity may dispose of it again anew into what hands they please, and so consti-tute a new form of government. For the form of government depending uponthe placing of the supreme power, which is the legislative, it is being impos-sible to conceive that an inferior power should prescribe to a superior, or any


but the supreme make laws, according as the power of making laws isplaced, such is the form of the commonwealth.

The great end of men’s entering into society being the enjoyment oftheir properties in peace and safety, and the great instrument and means ofthat being the laws established in that society: the first and fundamental pos-itive law of all commonwealths, is the establishing of the legislative power;as the first and fundamental natural law, which is to govern even the legisla-tive itself, is the preservation of the society and (as far as will consist withthe public good) of every person in it. This legislative is not only thesupreme power of the commonwealth, but sacred and unalterable in thehands where the community have once placed it; nor can any edict of any-body else, in what form soever conceived, or by what power soever backed,have the force and obligation of a law, which has not its sanction from thatlegislative which the public has chosen and appointed. For without this thelaw could not have that, which is absolutely necessary to its being a law, theconsent of the society over whom nobody can have a power to make laws;but by their own consent, and by authority received from them; and thereforeall the obedience, which by the most solemn ties anyone can be obliged topay, ultimately terminates in this supreme power, and is directed by thoselaws which it enacts; nor can any oaths to any foreign power whatsoever, orany domestic subordinate power discharge any member of the society fromhis obedience to the legislative, acting pursuant to their trust; nor oblige himto any obedience contrary to the laws so enacted, or farther than they doallow; it being ridiculous to imagine one can be tied ultimately to obey anypower in the society which is not the supreme.

Though the legislative, whether placed in one or more, whether it bealways in being, or only by intervals, though it be the supreme power inevery commonwealth, yet,

First, It is not nor can possibly be absolutely arbitrary over the lives andfortunes of the people. For it being but the joint power of every member ofthe society given up to that person, or assembly, which is legislator; it can beno more than those persons had in a state of nature before they entered intosociety, and gave it up to the community. For nobody can transfer to anothermore power than he has in himself; and nobody has an absolute arbitrarypower over himself, or over any other to destroy his own life, or take awaythe life or property of another. A man as has been proved cannot subject him-self to the arbitrary power of another; and having in the state of nature noarbitrary power over the life, liberty, or possession of another, but only so


much as the law of nature gave him for the preservation of himself, and therest of mankind; this is all he doth, or can give up to the commonwealth, andby it to the legislative power, so that the legislative can have no more thanthis. Their power in the utmost bounds of it, is limited to the public good ofthe society. It is a power that hath no other end but preservation, and there-fore can never have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverishthe subjects. The obligations of the law of nature cease not in society, butonly in many cases are drawn closer, and have by human laws known penal-ties annexed to them to enforce their observation. Thus the law of naturestands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as others. The rulesthat they make for other men’s actions must, as well as their own, and othermen’s actions be conformable to the law of nature, i.e., to the will of God, ofwhich that is a declaration, and the fundamental law of nature being thepreservation of mankind, no human sanction can be good or valid against it.

Secondly, The legislative, or supreme authority, cannot assume to itselfa power to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees, but is bound to dispensejustice, and decide the rights of the subject by promulgated standing laws,and known authorized judges. For the law of nature being unwritten, and sonowhere to be found but in the minds of men, they who through passion orinterest shall miscite or misapply it, cannot so easily be convinced of theirmistake where there is no established judge. And so it serves not, as it ought,to determine the rights, and fence the properties of those that live under it,especially where everyone is judge, interpreter, and executioner of it too, andthat in his own case; and he that has right on his side, having ordinarily buthis own single strength hath not force enough to defend himself frominjuries, or punish delinquents. To avoid these inconveniences, which disor-der men’s properties in the state of nature, men unite into societies that theymay have the united strength of the whole society to secure and defend theirproperties, and may have standing rules to bound it, by which everyone mayknow what is his. To this end it is that men give up all their natural power tothe society which they enter into, and the community put the legislativepower into such hands as they think fit, with this trust, that they shall be gov-erned by declared laws, or else their peace, quiet, and property, will still be atthe same uncertainty as it was in the state of nature.

Absolute arbitrary power, or governing without settled standing laws,can neither of them consist with the ends of society and government, whichmen would not quit the freedom of the state of nature for, and tie themselvesup under, were it not to preserve their lives, liberties, and fortunes; and by


stated rules of right and property to secure their peace and quiet. It cannot besupposed that they should intend, had they a power so to do, to give to any-one, or more, an absolute arbitrary power over their persons and estates, andput a force into the magistrate’s hand to execute his unlimited will arbitrarilyupon them. This were to put themselves into a worse condition than the stateof nature, wherein they had a liberty to defend their right against the injuriesof others, and were upon equal terms of force to maintain it, whether invadedby a single man or many in combination. Whereas, by supposing they havegiven up themselves to the absolute arbitrary power and will of a legislator,they have disarmed themselves, and armed him, to make prey of them whenhe pleases. He being in a much worse condition that is exposed to the arbi-trary power of one man who has the command of 100,000, than he that isexposed to the arbitrary power of 100,000 single men; nobody being securethat his will, who hath such a command, is better than that of other men,though his force be 100,000 times stronger. And, therefore, whatever formthe commonwealth is under, the ruling power ought to govern by declaredand received laws, and not by extemporary dictates and undetermined reso-lutions. For then mankind will be in a far worse condition than in the state ofnature, if they shall have armed one, or a few men, with the joint power of amultitude to force them to obey at pleasure the exorbitant and unlimiteddecrees of their sudden thoughts, or unrestrained, and, till that moment,unknown wills, without having any measures set down which may guide andjustify their actions. For all the power the government has, being only for thegood of the society, as it ought not to be arbitrary and at pleasure, so it oughtto be exercised by established and promulgated laws; that both the peoplemay know their duty and be safe and secure within the limits of the law; andthe rulers too kept within their due bounds, and not be tempted by the powerthey have in their hands to employ it to such purposes, and by such mea-sures, as they would not have known, and own not willingly.

Thirdly, The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of hisproperty without his own consent. For the preservation of property being theend of government, and that for which men enter into society, it necessarilysupposes and requires that the people should have property, without whichthey must be supposed to lose that by entering into society, which was theend for which they entered into it, too gross an absurdity for any man to own.Men, therefore, in society having property, they have such a right to thegoods which by the law of the community are theirs, that nobody hath a rightto take them or any part of them from them without their own consent; with-


out this they have no property at all. For I have truly no property in thatwhich another can by right take from me when he pleases, against my con-sent. Hence it is a mistake to think that the supreme or legislative power ofany commonwealth can do what it will, and dispose of the estates of the sub-jects arbitrarily, or take any part of them at pleasure. This is not much to befeared in governments where the legislative consists wholly, or in part, inassemblies which are variable, whose members, upon the dissolution of theassembly, are subjects under the common laws of their country, equally withthe rest. But in governments where the legislative is in one lasting assembly,always in being, or in one man, as in absolute monarchies, there is dangerstill, that they will think themselves to have a distinct interest from the rest ofthe community, and so will be apt to increase their own riches and power bytaking what they think fit from the people. For a man’s property is not at allsecure, though there be good and equitable laws to set the bounds of itbetween him and his fellow subjects, if he who commands those subjectshave power to take from any private man what part he pleases of his prop-erty, and use and dispose of it as he thinks good.

But government, into whosesoever hands it is put, being, as I have beforeshown, entrusted with this condition, and for this end, that men might have andsecure their properties, the prince, or senate, however it may have power tomake laws for the regulating of property between the subjects one amongstanother, yet can never have a power to take to themselves the whole or any partof the subject’s property without their own consent. For this would be in effectto leave them no property at all. And to let us see that even absolute power,where it is necessary, is not arbitrary by being absolute, but is still limited bythat reason, and confined to those ends which required it in some cases to beabsolute, we need look no farther than the common practice of martial disci-pline. For the preservation of the army, and in it the whole commonwealth,requires an absolute obedience to the command of every superior officer, and itis justly death to disobey or dispute the most dangerous or unreasonable ofthem; but yet we see that neither the sergeant, that could command a soldier tomarch up to the mouth of a cannon, or stand in a breach, where he is almostsure to perish, can command that soldier to give him one penny of his money;nor the general, that can condemn him to death for deserting his post, or notobeying the most desperate orders, cannot yet, with all his absolute power oflife and death, dispose of one farthing of that soldier’s estate, or seize one jot ofhis goods, whom yet he can command anything, and hang for the least disobe-dience. Because such a blind obedience is necessary to that end for which the


commander has his power, viz., the preservation of the rest; but the disposingof his goods has nothing to do with it.

’Tis true governments cannot be supported without great charge, and itis fit everyone who enjoys a share of the protection should pay out of hisestate his proportion for the maintenance of it. But still it must be with hisown consent, i.e., the consent of the majority giving it either by themselvesor their representatives chosen by them. For if anyone shall claim a power tolay and levy taxes on the people, by his own authority, and without such con-sent of the people, he thereby invades the fundamental law of property, andsubverts the end of government. For what property have I in that whichanother may by right take when he pleases to himself?

Fourthly, The legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws toany other hands; for it being but a delegated power from the people, theywho have it cannot pass it over to others. The people alone can appoint theform of the commonwealth, which is by constituting the legislative, andappointing in whose hands that shall be. And when the people have said wewill submit to rules, and be governed by laws made by such men, and in suchforms, nobody else can say other men shall make laws for them; nor can thepeople be bound by any laws but such as are enacted by those whom theyhave chosen and authorized to make laws for them. . . .

The legislative power is that which has a right to direct how the force ofthe commonwealth shall be employed for preserving the community and themembers of it. Because those laws which are constantly to be executed, andwhose force is always to continue, may be made in a little time, thereforethere is no need that the legislative should be always in being, not havingalways business to do, and because it may be too great a temptation tohuman frailty, apt to grasp at power for the same persons, who have thepower of making laws, to have also in their hands the power to execute them,whereby they exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make, andsuit the law, both in its making and execution to their own private advantage,and thereby come to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community,contrary to the end of society and government. Therefore, in well-orderedcommonwealths, where the good of the whole is so considered as it ought,the legislative power is put into the hands of diverse persons who dulyassembled, have by themselves or jointly with others a power to make laws,which when they have done, being separated again, they are themselves sub-ject to the laws they have made, which is a new and near tie upon them, totake care that they make them for the public good. . . .


He that will with any clearness speak of the dissolution of governmentought, in the first place, to distinguish between the dissolution of the societyand the dissolution of the government. That which makes the community,and brings men out of the loose state of nature into one politic society, is theagreement which everyone has with the rest to incorporate and act as onebody, and so be one distinct commonwealth. The usual and almost only waywhereby this union is dissolved, is the inroad of foreign force making a con-quest upon them. For in that case (not being able to maintain and supportthemselves as one entire and independent body) the union belonging to thatbody which consisted therein must necessarily cease, and so everyone returnto the state he was in before, with a liberty to shift for himself and providefor his own safety as he thinks fit in some other society. Whenever the soci-ety is dissolved, it is certain the government of that society cannot remain.Thus conquerors’ swords often cut up governments by the roots, and manglesocieties to pieces. . . .

Besides this overturning from without, governments are dissolved fromwithin. . . .

First, That when such a single person or prince sets up his own arbitrarywill in place of the laws which are the will of the society, declared by the leg-islative, then the legislative is changed. For that being in effect the legislativewhose rules and laws are put in execution and required to be obeyed whenother laws are set up, and other rules pretended and enforced, than what thelegislative constituted by the society have enacted, it is plain that the legisla-tive is changed. Whoever introduces new laws, not being thereunto autho-rized by the fundamental appointment of the society, or subverts the old,disowns and overturns the power by which they were made, and so sets up anew legislative.

Secondly, When the prince hinders the legislative from assembling in itsdue time, or from acting freely, pursuant to those ends for which it was con-stituted, the legislative is altered. For it is not a certain number of men, no,nor their meeting, unless they have also freedom of debating and leisure ofperfecting what is for the good of the society, wherein the legislative con-sists. When these are taken away or altered so as to deprive the society of thedue exercise of their power, the legislative is truly altered. For it is not namesthat constitute governments, but the use and exercise of those powers thatwere intended to accompany them; so that he who takes away the freedom,or hinders the acting of the legislative in its due seasons, in effect takes awaythe legislative, and puts an end to the government.


Thirdly, When, by the arbitrary power of the prince, the electors or waysof elections are altered, without the consent and contrary to the commoninterest of the people, there also the legislative is altered. For if others thanthose whom the society hath authorized thereunto, do choose, or in anotherway than what the society hath prescribed, those chosen are not the legisla-tive appointed by the people.

Fourthly, The delivery also of the people into the subjection of foreignpower, either by the prince, or by the legislative, is certainly a change of thelegislative, and so a dissolution of the government. For the end why peopleentered into society being to be preserved one entire, free, independent soci-ety, to be governed by its own laws, this is lost whenever they are given upinto the power of another. . . .

There is one way more whereby such a government may be dissolved,and that is, when he who has the supreme executive power neglects andabandons that charge, so that the laws already made can no longer be put inexecution. This is demonstratively to reduce all to anarchy, and so effectuallyto dissolve the government. For laws not being made for themselves, but tobe by their execution the bonds of the society, to keep every part of the bodypolitic, in its due place and function, when that totally ceases, the govern-ment visibly ceases, and the people become a confused multitude withoutorder or connection. Where there is no longer the administration of justice,for the securing of men’s rights, nor any remaining power within the com-munity to direct the force, or provide for the necessities of the public, therecertainly is no government left. Where the laws cannot be executed, it is allone as if there were no laws; and a government without laws is, I suppose, amystery in politics, inconceivable to human capacity, and inconsistent withhuman society.

In these and the like cases, when the government is dissolved, the peo-ple are at liberty to provide for themselves by erecting a new legislative, dif-fering from the other, by the change of persons, or form, or both, as theyshall find it most for their safety and good. For the society can never, by thefault of another, lose the native and original right it has to preserve itself,which can only be done by a settled legislative, and a fair and impartial exe-cution of the laws made by it. But the state of mankind is not so miserablethat they are not capable of using this remedy, till it be too late to look forany. To tell people they may provide for themselves by erecting a new leg-islative, when by oppression, artifice, or being delivered over to a foreignpower, their old one is gone, is only to tell them they may expect relief when


it is too late, and the evil is past cure. This is in effect no more than to bidthem first be slaves, and then to take care of their liberty; and when theirchains are on tell them they may act like free men. This, if barely so, is rathermockery than relief, and men can never be secure from tyranny if there be nomeans to escape it till they are perfectly under it. And therefore it is that theyhave not only a right to get out of it, but to prevent it.

There is therefore secondly another way whereby governments are dis-solved, and that is when the legislative or the prince, either of them, act con-trary to their trust.

First. The legislative acts against the trust reposed in them when theyendeavor to invade the property of the subject, and to make themselves orany part of the community masters or arbitrary disposers of the lives, liber-ties, or fortunes of the people.

The reason why men enter into society is the preservation of their prop-erty, and the end why they choose and authorize a legislative is that theremay be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to the properties of allthe members of the society to limit the power and moderate the dominion ofevery part and member of the society. For since it can never be supposed tobe the will of the society that the legislative should have a power to destroythat which everyone designs secure by entering into society, and for whichthe people submitted themselves to legislators of their own making, when-ever the legislators endeavor to take away and destroy the property of thepeople, or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put them-selves into a state of war with the people, who are thereupon absolved fromany further obedience, and are left to the common refuge which God hathprovided for all men against force and violence. Whensoever, therefore, thelegislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of society, and either byambition, fear, folly, or corruption, endeavor to grasp themselves or put intothe hands of any other an absolute power over the lives, liberties, and estatesof the people, by this breach of trust they forfeit the power the people had putinto their hands, for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the people, whohave a right to resume their original liberty, and by the establishment of thenew legislative (such as they shall think fit) provide for their own safety andsecurity, which is the end for which they are in society. . . .

But it will be said, this hypothesis lays a ferment for frequent rebellion.To which I answer:

First, no more than any other hypothesis. For when the people are mademiserable, and find themselves exposed to the ill-usage of arbitrary power,


cry up their governors as much as you will for sons of Jupiter, let them besacred and divine, descended, or authorized from heaven, give them out forwhom or what you please, the same will happen. The people generally ill-treated, and contrary to right, will be ready upon any occasion to ease them-selves of a burden that sits heavy upon them. They will wish and seek for theopportunity, which in the change, weakness, and accidents of human affairsseldom delays long to offer itself. He must have lived but a little while in theworld who has not seen examples of this in his time, and he must have readvery little who cannot produce examples of it in all sorts of governments inthe world.

Secondly, I answer, such revolutions happen not upon every little mis-management in public affairs. Great mistakes in the ruling part, many wrongand inconvenient laws, and all the slips of human frailty will be borne by thepeople without mutiny or murmur. But if a long train of abuses, prevarica-tions and artifices, all tending the same way, make the design visible to thepeople—and they cannot but feel what they lie under, and see whither theyare going—it is not to be wondered that they should then rouse themselvesand endeavor to put the rule into such hands which may secure to them theends for which government was at first erected, and without which ancientnames and specious forms are so far from being better that they are muchworse than the state of nature or pure anarchy; the inconveniences being allas great and as near, but the remedy farther off and more difficult.

Thirdly, I answer that this power in the people of providing for theirsafety anew by a new legislative when their legislators have acted contrary totheir trust by invading their property, is the best fence against rebellion, andthe probablest means to hinder it. For rebellion being an opposition, not topersons, but authority, which is founded only in the constitutions and laws ofthe government, those whoever they be who by force break through, and byforce justify their violation of them, are truly and properly rebels. For whenmen by entering into society and civil government have excluded force, andintroduced laws for the preservation of property, peace, and unity amongstthemselves, those who set up force again in opposition to the laws do rebel-lare—that is, bring back again the state of war—and are properly rebels;which they who are in power (by the pretense they have to authority. thetemptation of force they have in their hands, and the flattery of those aboutthem) being likeliest to do, the properest way to prevent the evil is to showthem the danger and injustice of it who are under the greatest temptation torun into it.


In both the forementioned cases, when either the legislative is changedor the legislators act contrary to the end for which they were constituted,those who are guilty are guilty of rebellion. For if anyone by force takesaway the established legislative of any society, and the laws by them madepursuant to their trust, he thereby takes away the umpirage which everyonehad consented to for a peaceable decision of all their controversies, and a barto the state of war amongst them. They who remove or change the legisla-tive, take away this decisive power, which nobody can have but by theappointment and consent of the people, and so destroying the authoritywhich the people did, and nobody else can, set up; and introducing a powerwhich the people hath not authorized, actually introduce a state of war whichis that of force without authority. And thus by removing the legislative estab-lished by the society (in whose decisions the people acquiesced and united asto that of their own will), they untie the knot and expose the people anew tothe state of war. And if those who by force take away the legislative arerebels, the legislators themselves, as has been shown, can be no lessesteemed so, when they who were set up for the protection and preservationof the people, their liberties and properties, shall by force invade andendeavor to take them away; and so they, putting themselves into a state ofwar with those who made them the protectors and guardians of their peace,are properly and with the greatest aggravation rebellantes (rebels).

But if they who say it lays a foundation for rebellion mean that it mayoccasion civil wars or intestine broils, to tell the people they are absolvedfrom obedience when illegal attempts are made upon their liberties or prop-erties, and may oppose the unlawful violence of those who were their magis-trates when they invade their properties contrary to the trust put in them andthat therefore this doctrine is not to be allowed, being so destructive to thepeace of the world: they may as well say upon the same ground that honestmen may not oppose robbers or pirates because this may occasion disorderor bloodshed. If any mischief come in such cases, it is not to be chargedupon him who defends his own right, but on him that invades his neighbor’s.If the innocent honest man must quietly quit all he has for peace’s sake tohim who will lay violent hands upon it, I desire it may be considered what akind of peace there will be in the world which consists only in violence andrapine, and which is to be maintained only for the benefit of robbers andoppressors. . . .

The end of government is the good of mankind, and which is best formankind, that the people should be always exposed to the boundless will of


tyranny, or that the rulers should be sometimes liable to be opposed whenthey grow exorbitant in the use of their power, and employ it for the destruc-tion and not the preservation of the properties of their people?


Documents

Introduction, H. Gene Blocker - Westmont Collegehomepage.westmont.edu/hoeckley/readings/Symposium/PDF/201_300/290.pdf · tion known as “liberalism,” especially its early-eighteenth-century