INTRODUCING RAMCHANDRA GANDHI

7/30/2019 INTRODUCING RAMCHANDRA GANDHI

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Mind Association

Presuppositions of Human Communication. by Ramchandra GandhiReview by: J. MasonMind, New Series, Vol. 86, No. 341 (Jan., 1977), pp. 148-151Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association

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I48 BOOK REVIEWSascribea propertynd thestatusof theproposition e empirical.Neithercondition eemsclearly atisfied; he RHS merely xcludesan identifica-tionwhoseexclusion s alreadynecessary iven he dentification ade inthe LHS.Schlesingeropts for the view that induction s the only-satisfactorymethodforprognosticatingb6ut theunobserved.Counter-induction,eclaims,does not yielddeterminate onclusions ince there are infinitelymanyways n which thefuturemay differ rom hepast. Unfortunatelybythesametolkenhere remanyways n which hefuturemaybe likethepast (p. 43) so that this offers o sound basis forchoosing nduction npreferenceo otherpredictive olicies.The linguisticconservatism nherent n the author's dismissal of'artificiallyonstructedpredicatessuch as grue' is perverse;thereis,he says, no alternativeo usingthe stock of predicates vailable in ournatural languagesbecause there is no way of choosing amongsttheinfinite umber of alternative redicates p. 43). We need to increaseand improveour stock ofpredicates s new challenges o our languagearise n the form f new theories nd newphenomena nd atthesepointschoices have to be made.The book ends witha pot-pourri f materialon self-reference,imeand determinism hich seems rather enuously elated owhathas gonebefore hough he section ntime s as interestings anythingn thebook.I would recommend ProfessorSchlesinger's presentationof theParadoxes of Confirmation. ut I suspect that the intelligent nder-graduate will have a numberof questionswhicheven an introductorytextshouldtry o answer.The book is too short nd I cannotgive veryhigh marks o the authoror to thepublisher'sreaderon thiscount.SAINT DAVID S UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, R. A. SHARPELAMPETER

Presuppositionsf Human Communication.y RAMCHANDRA GANDHI.OxfordUniversity ress, 974. Pp. I47. C2.00.RamchandraGandhi's PresuppositionsfHuman Communicationsa usefuland exploratory ontinuation f work begunby philosophers f speech,particularly y H. P. Grice in his I957 article on speaker's meaning.Grice's account of speaker's meaning s oftenconfusedand seeminglyincoherent, ut there have been many who have thought hat there ssomething mportantn Grice's work. Gandhi has sought,with a fairdegree of success,to untangle heproblemsbequeathedto us by Grice,and in theprocesshas many nterestinghings o say about thenatureof communicativection.

The virtueof Gandhi's work is that it shiftsthe emphasis of theinvestigation rommeaning o communication. e need to be able tounderstand he natureof communication n its own terms.What hasso oftenhappened s thatmeaning-theoristsave employed heconceptof communication ithout iving tadequate analysis.Gandhi's positionis that before we can advance in our understanding f meaning,e.g.,

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BOOK REVIEWS 149in terms of human institutions nd conventions,we must alreadybeoperatingwiththe thought f humanbeings as communicativegents.We must omehowbe able togivea non-circular ccount of communica-tion,or ourappeal to institutionsnd conventionswillbe vacuous.Gandhi focuseson twoquestionstomake his projectclear:a. What is it for omebody S tofail to communicate o somebodyelse A absolutely nything t all?b. What is it forS to communicate omethingo A, as opposed tofailing o communicate bsolutely nything t all? (p. 25).An answer o theformer uestionwould giveus thenecessary onditionsfor ommunication,ndan answer o the atterwould giveus the ufficientconditions.

The answerto these questions will involve the notion of addressingsomebody communicatively. his is both a necessaryand sufficientcondition or ommunication. subsidiary uestion,which s neverthelesscrucial to a theoryof speech-acts s what the necessary nd sufficientconditionsare fortellingsomebodysomething, s opposed to merelyaddressing somebodycommunicatively. andhi believes that once wehave ordered urunderstanding f what t s to tell omebody omething,we will have gone a long way towardsunderstandinguch othertypesof speech acts as imperatives nd interrogatives. andhi also tries toelucidatethe notionofnon-serious rnon-literalpeech, ince he realizesthatcommunication,n the broad sense, is not restrictedo the literalexchangeof nformation.Communicatingwithsomeonealways nvolvesbringinghim to knowsomething, ut not everycase ofbringing omeoneto knowsomethingis a matterof communicatingwith him. For example, a burglar whobreaksa vase is not communicativelyddressinghimself o the sleepingoccupants, houghhe doessucceedbringing hem oknowof hispresence.We cannotby-passthisproblem bywritingn a condition o the effectthat o communicate t s necessary o want to bringsomeone's attentionto oneself.An exhibitionistresumably xhibitshimself ut of a desireto be noticed,and he also expectsthat those who notice him will seethathe desires theirattention;yethe could hardlybe said to be com-municatingwith them. He has not, in fact, even addressed himselfcommunicativelyoward hem.Amongthe technicalterms thatGandhi introduces n the course ofhis discussion, henotionofaddressings central.He holdsthatthe actof communicativelyddressingoneself o an audience, n an open way,is a necessary nd sufficientondition or ommunication. he speaker'sact of addressing,Gandhi argues,must both implythat S wantsA toattend o S, and S's actmustnotbe describableby A as S's tryingo getA to noticeS in some merely ausal fashion. . .. S addressesA if andonly fS attractsA's attention o thefact that S is trying o attractA'sattention o the fact thatS is trying o attractA's attention o himself,i.e., to the factthatS wantsA to attend to the factthat S wants A toattend o him' (p. 39).The next questionis how S can succeed in addressingA. Gandhi'sansweris complex. S must succeed in attractingA's attention o the



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I50 BOOK REVIEWSfacts that S is trying o attractA's attention, nd thathe could do soin a purelycausal fashion, ut thathe is also at the same time showingreluctance o attractA's attentionn a merely ausal fashion. n orderforS to successfullyddress A, he must nvitea response,not induceresponse, romA. Put simply, o addresssomeone s tobring hatpersonto recognize hat one wishesto communicate omething. do not nvitea response f compel omeone's ttention o myselfnd thusdo not stab-lishcommunicative ontact.Moreover, ommunication,s Gandhi rightlystresses,s reciprocal,nd a necessary eneral ondition or he successofaddressing s that he addressee cknowledgeshathe hasbeen addressed.Grantedthat the act of addressing omeone is a necessary onditionforcommunicating ithhim, t is obvious that f all we were able to dowere to address people our communication ystemwould be severelyrestricted.We need to be able to tell people various things,primarilylinguistically,f our full communicative otential s to be realized. Inwhatfollows will addressmyself o Gandhi's account ofassertion, orit s nthis ccount hatwe find he basisforunderstanding hat tellings.Once we havethis,Gandhi claims,we will be a fairway towardunder-standing ther orts of speech-acts uch as imperative nd interrogativeutterances.Gandhi begins by assuming, rightly, hat for S to tell A thatp, Scommunicates ome informationoA. The informationnvolved s whatS bringsA to know in communicatingwith him. For telling, mustcommunicatemore han imply hathe wants o communicateomething.This result s alreadyestablishedbytheact ofaddressing.Can we thensay that S should communicativelyringA to knowthatp? Obviouslynot,since S might ucceed in tellingA thatp, and p mightneverthelessbe false.Nor is it sufficientimply o utter n indicative entence n thepresenceof A to make an assertion, ince A must be in a positiontorecognizethat it is he who is being told something.Furthermore,wecannotanalyse telling'by saying hatS tellsA thatp only fS believesthatp. S might, fter ll, be lying.So the informationhat S communi-catesto A inthecourse oftellinghimthatp is notthat S believesthatp.The minimumnformationhichmustbe communicated, eyond implyaddressing omeone, n order o tell himthatp, is thatthe nference anbe drawn,but is notnecessitated,hatS believesthatp. We cannotsaythat S told A somethingnd in the same breath dd thatS's behaviouris primafacie evidencefor the assertion hatS doesnot believe thatp.WhateverS does in tellingA thatp cannot be incompatiblewith S'sbelievingthatp, although t need not be necessaryfor S actuallytobelievethatp. Thus telling equiresno sincerityondition.Afterhavingsaid what tellingsomeone is not, Gandhi presentshisownpositive nalysis.A should be able tointerpret's action s implyingat leastthatS wantsA' to believe that S wantsA to believe .. that Sbelievedthatp, forhimto be able to interprett as an act oftellinghimthatp' (p. 56). The ellipsis n themiddlemarks heplacefor n indefinitenumberof clauses to repeat themselves ccordingto the exigenciesofparticular xamples.Such indefinitenessfrepetitionndicates heopen-ness which s essential o communicative ctivities.



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BOOK REVIEWS 15IGandhi has the virtue fnotfollowing Griceananalysis t thispoint.Grice's position, t least in his early work, s thatasserting omethingto someone is a matter f gettinghimto believe something, r gettinghim to believe that the speaker believes something.Gandhi makes theshrewdobservation hat f an audiencedecides thata speaker s tryingto.get him to believe something, e will have reason,not to believe ithimself, ut to believe that the speaker himself oes notbelieve it. Wecannot elucidatespeaker's meaning n termsof instrumentalntentionsandtheir ecognition yan audience.Rather han aythat elling omeonesomethings a matter fgetting im to believesomething, e shouldsaythattelling omeonesomethings a matter f 'notreally'trying o getsomeoneto believe something, r trying o gethim to believe that thespeakerbelievessomething.'Not really' trying o getsomeoneto believesomethings a matter fpresenting videncewhich s unconcealedly imulated. t does not forceany specific nterpretationpon an audience. If I tell you thatp, youmust be able to conceiveof the possibility hat I maybe lying,but itmustnot be obviousthat am lying.Nor, on the otherhand,mustyoube compelledto believethat I believewhat I am tellingyou,since thiswould rule outthepossibilityhat amlying, rhavesomeotherdeviousintention n communicating.Gandhi bases his notionof someone's 'not really' trying o get anaudienceto believe something pon the idea of 'prima acie' evidence,

and upon the fact hat an utterance an have theform, utnot theforce,ofan action ftryingoget omeone obelieve omething. o tell omeonesomething must primafacie implythat I believe thatp. I mustnotpresent rima acie evidencefor heassertionhat donot believethatp.An act which has theformbut not theforceof an act of trying o getsomeoneto believesomethings an act of not really' trying o gethimto believe it. This result, oupledwith an open-ended set of conditionsfor elling, ompletes heanalysisofassertion.I find t difficulto discover ny serious flaws n Gandhi's argument.It is original nd will need to be assessed frommanyquarters.Whateverfaultswe may discover n the course of time, Gandhi's work must berecognized s bringing ew lifeto the philosophy fcommunicationndspeech. In this review I hope merelyto have whettedthe reader'sappetiteformore.MIDDLESEX POLYTECHNIC J. MASON

Art and Imagination:A Study n thePhilosophy f Mind.By ROGER SCRUTON. London: Methuen, 974;New York: Barnes & Noble. Pp. Viii+256. ?4.-5, P.B C2.50.It is difficulto summarizeDr. Scruton'sargument nd do justiceto itssophistication.he issueswhichcall for rbitrationrelarge:for nstancewho is right bout representation-Scruton r Goodman?At the sametime some quite simple things are elaboratelysaid. A summaryofScruton's views runs the riskof misrepresentinghemand must omit

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INTRODUCING RAMCHANDRA GANDHI