Intrigue in SA

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The Politics of Espionage: Nazi Diplomats and Spies in Argentina, 1933-1945

A dissertation presented to

the faculty of

the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University

In partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree

Doctor of Philosophy

Richard L. McGaha

November 2009

2009 Richard L. McGaha. All Rights Reserved.


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This dissertation titled

The Politics of Espionage: Nazi Diplomats and Spies in Argentina, 1933-1945

by

RICHARD L. MCGAHA

has been approved for

the History Department

and the College of Arts and Sciences by

Norman J.W. Goda

Professor of History

Benjamin M. Ogles

Dean, College of Arts and Sciences


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ABSTRACT

MCGAHA, RICHARD L., Ph.D, November 2009, History

The Politics of Espionage: Nazi Diplomats and Spies in Argentina, 1933-1945 (415 pp.)

Director of Dissertation: Norman J.W. Goda

This dissertation investigates Nazi Germanys diplomacy and intelligence-

gathering in Argentina from 1933-1945. It does so from three perspectives. This study

first explores the rivalries that characterized the bureaucracy in the Third Reich. It argues

that those rivalries negatively affected Germanys diplomatic position in Argentina. Theactions of the AO in Argentina in the 1930s were indicative of this trend. This created a

fear of fifth-column activity among Latin American governments with large German

populations.

Second, this study explores the rivalry between the Sicherheitsdienst (Security

Service, SD) of theReichssicherheitshauptamt(Reich Security Main Office, RSHA) and

Auswrtiges Amt(Foreign Ministry, AA). It argues that the rivalry between these two

organizations in Argentina was part of a larger plan on the part of Amt VI, SS Foreign

Intelligence to usurp the functions of the AA. Intelligence operations were not

necessarily undertaken to further the foreign policy goals of Nazi Germany, but to further

the ambitions of the head of Amt VI, Walter Schellenberg.

Third, this dissertation looks at the issue of ideology. Argentina was one of the

last countries to break relations with Nazi Germany. This dissertation attempts to answer

the question of how much ideology permeated individuals who were not exposed to Nazi


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ideology on a daily basis. This section attempts to add to recent studies that have argued

the importance of ideology in Nazi Germany.

In answering these questions, this study mainly relies on the German-language

records of the AA held in College Park, MD. It also utilizes interrogation reports of

individuals involved in diplomacy and espionage in Argentina, as well as messages

decrypted by the British between German spies in Argentina and their superiors in Berlin.

This study fits into new examinations of the nexus between intelligence and diplomacy

and the role of ideology in the Third Reich.

Approved: _____________________________________________________________

Norman J.W. Goda

Professor of History


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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

No dissertation writes itself, this one included. I would like to thank the

following people and institutions who helped in the research and writing. First, my very

long-suffering supervisor, Norman J.W. Goda, who suggested the Nazis and Argentina as

a topic of study. Thanks to some timely encouragement on his part this dissertation was

finished. His comments and criticisms have made this better than it would have been in

anyone elses hands. Second, my friend and mentor Tom Taylor of Seattle University.

He has had to listen to more about Nazis in Argentina than any person should. He hasbeen a good friend and I thank him for listening patiently.

Next, I would like to thank the staff of the National Archives and Records

Administration, College Park, MD. I would especially like to thank Larry Macdonald

and Mary Tomic who helped me navigate my way through the myriad record groups that

formed the bulk of my research. The staff at The National Archives, Kew went above

and beyond the call of duty. The friendliness and efficiency of The National Archives

should be a model for archives worldwide. At Ohio University I would like to thank the

members of my dissertation committee along with my graduate coordinators, Katherine

Jellison and Chester Pach.

Finally, I would like to thank my family for their love and support. First, my

aunts, Diane McGaha and Shirley Morgan, who always gave me a place to stay when I

was doing research. Second, my father, Richard McGaha, who though he has no idea of

what I am doing, continues to be supportive knowing only that I am happy doing what I

am doing. Next, my wife Kristina who supported me in more ways than I can count. I


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hope this makes her proud. Finally, my son Ian Gabriel, the light of my life. Throughout

the trials and tribulations of writing this dissertation he always reminded me that

discussing the merits of different vacuums was far more important than what is in here

despite my silly notion to think otherwise. All that is good in here belongs to them; the

errors are, of course, my own.


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To my son Ian Gabriel, may he see better times than these


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Abstract 3

Acknowledgements.. 4

Introduction.. 9

Chapter 1: Thermanns Arrival and the Crisis of the New Diplomacy 25

Chapter 2: The Patagonia Affair and the Fear of Nazi Fifth Column Activity, 1939..76

Chapter 3: Ad-hoc Diplomacy, 1939-1942113Chapter 4: The Rise and Fall of the Abwehr in South America, 1941-1943.169

Chapter 5: Sargo and the Creation of an SD Intelligence Network210

Chapter 6: The Illusion of Control.257

Chapter 7: The Case of Osmar Hellmuth...296

Chapter 8: The Jewish Question339

Chapter 9: Aftermath .370

Conclusion. 391

References. 402


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Introduction

[This] is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury...

William Shakespeare,Macbeth, V, v, 261

In February 1946 the U.S. government published a document titled Consultation

among the American Republics with Respect to the Argentine Situation more commonly

known as the Blue Book from the color of its cover.2 It alleged that Argentina

collaborated closely with Nazi intelligence agents during the war and that the government

of Argentina and Colonel Juan Domingo Pern were fascist sympathizers. The ostensible

reason for publishing the Blue Book was to expose Argentinas lack of cooperation in

the defense of the Western Hemisphere and the reasons behind it. The real reason was to

thwart Perns presidential ambitions and hopefully replace him with someone more

amenable to the U.S.3 These questionable motives have led historians to discount the

revelations in the Blue Book. As a result of the Blue Book and news coverage the post-

war public viewed Argentina and Latin America as full of fascist sympathizers who gave

succor to fleeing Nazis. This perception was underscored by individuals, such as

Undersecretaries of State Spruille Braden and Sumner Welles. In 1946 Braden

characterized Argentina as a hotbed of Nazi and fascist sympathizers.4 Bradens charges

were similar to those made by Welles in 1942. The prominence of Braden and Welles

1 William Shakespeare, Macbeth, in Jessie M. Lander ed.Macbeth (New York: Barnes and NobleShakespeare, 2007), p. 265.2 U.S. Department of State, Consultation among the American Republics with Respect to the ArgentineSituation (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946).3 See especially Gary Frank,Juan Pern versus Spruille Braden (New York: Rowan & Littlefield, 1982).4 Ronald C. Newton, The Nazi Menace in Argentina, 1931-1947(Stanford: Stanford University Press,1992), pp. xiii-xiv. Bradens view was colored by the fact that he and Pern loathed each other. For thissee Frank,Juan Pern versus Spruille Braden.


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added gravitas to the charges and influenced public opinion regarding the Nazis and

Latin America.

This perception continued through the 1980s and was buttressed by fact and

fiction. The arrest of Adolf Eichmann by Israeli agents in Argentina in 1960 and his

subsequent trial captivated the world.5 This incident seemed to confirm that Argentina

and other countries willingly gave asylum to major Nazi war-criminals.6 Popular culture

also contributed to the idea of a Nazi resurgence in South America. Novels and movies

from the 1960s and 1970s reinforced fears that a secret cabal of Nazi war-criminals wereplanning for a Fourth Reich. Frederick Forsyths novel The Odessa File mixed fact and

fiction in its description of Nazis aiding their brethren in escaping justice. The fact that

Eduard Roschmann, one of the main characters was real made the novel more chilling.7

Ira Levins novel The Boys from Brazil also mixed fact and fiction.8 It related how Dr.

Josef Mengele, the so-called Angel of Death at Auschwitz, planned to bring about a

Fourth Reich through the cloning of a new Hitler. Nazis bent on creating a Fourth

Reich were popular topics for movies and books. These included, The Quiller

Memorandum,Marathon Man, The Holcroft Covenantand The Rhinemann Exchange to

5 Eichmanns arrest and his trial has been the subject of numerous studies. See especially, Hannah Arendt,Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Penguin Classics, 2006), DavidCesarani,Becoming Eichmann: Rethinking the Life, Crimes, and Trial of a "Desk Murderer"(Cambridge,

MA: Da Capo Press, 2006) and Hans Safrian,Die Eichmann-Mnner(Vienna: Europaverlag, 1993).6 War criminals found asylum in numerous countries including Canada, Great Britain, and the U.S. to namea few. See Michael Neufeld, Von Braun: Dreamer of Space, Engineer of War(New York: Alfred A.Knopf, 2007). Neufeld explores the issue of Von Brauns complicity in the deaths of prisoners who builtthe V-1 and V-2 rockets. Also, Richard Breitman et. al., U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis (New York:Cambridge University Press, 2005).7 Fredrick Forsyth, The Odessa File (New York: Viking Press, 1972). The antagonist of the novel wasEduard Roschmann the Butcher of Riga who obtained refuge in Argentina in 1948 until he was forced tomove to Paraguay in 1977 after West Germany demanded his extradition.8 Ira Levin, The Boys from Brazil (New York: Random House, 1976).


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name but a few.9 All of these were popular with audiences. This mixture of truth and

fantasy made dispelling notions of Latin America as a hotbed of Nazism difficult.

Wherein does the truth lie? This study will examine German diplomacy and

intelligence-gathering in Argentina from 1933-1945. It does so from a bilateral

perspective focusing primarily on German actions and Argentine reactions. This study

relies primarily on the captured records of the Auswrtiges Amt (German Foreign

Ministry usually abbreviated as AA) held in microfilm format at the U.S. National

Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in College Park, MD as part of RecordGroup (RG) 242. It also utilizes the recently declassified records of The Nazi War

Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group (IWG)

located at NARA. These records contain the postwar interrogations of Walter

Schellenberg, head of Amt VI (Department VI) SS Foreign Intelligence, Theodor

Paeffgen, Schellenbergs subordinate and head of Amt VI/D SS Foreign Intelligence for

the Americas and their subordinates. The IWG reviewed and recommended for release

from the records of the FBI, CIA and other agencies numerous files detailing German

intelligence activities in Latin America. Interrogations of German diplomats stationed in

Argentina from RG 59, the Records of the Department of State and RG 65, Records of

the FBI, are also used. These records are an invaluable source for researching German

intelligence operations in the Americas.

9 Robert Ludlum, The Rhinemann Exchange (New York: Doubleday, 1974) and The Holcroft Covenant,paperback ed.(New York: Bantam Books, 1984). The Rhinemann Exchange actually place in BuenosAires during autumn 1943. More recently, the writer W.E.B. Griffin wrote Secret Honorwhich takes placein Argentina in 1943. W.E.B. Griffin, Secret Honor(New York: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 2000).


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Also used are the German messages decoded by British Intelligence (codename:

Ultra) between German agents in Latin America and their superiors in Berlin. These

messages are located at NARA in College Park, MD and at The National Archives, Kew.

Previous studies have not utilized these sources because of their classification. These

declassified documents from the U.S. and Great Britain allow historians to place German

intelligence operations within the power struggles between Hitlers subordinates. This

broader look reveals that intelligence-gathering in the Third Reich was inherently

ideological and political. That is, intelligence operations were not necessarily initiated tofurther the diplomatic aims of Nazi Germany. They were partly the result of

organizations undercutting each other in an attempt to gain the upper-hand in the

internecine struggles that characterized the bureaucratic structures of the Third Reich.

Most studies of German intelligence and diplomacy have treated the two as

separate issues. As this study will argue intelligence and diplomacy were intertwined to

the detriment of both. This was not only a hallmark of Nazi Germany, but went back to

the Imperial German state in World War I. From 1914-1918, the German embassies in

Mexico, Argentina and the U.S. supported German sabotage efforts against the Allies.10

In World War II, the German embassy in Argentina not only supported intelligence

activities, but actively participated in the smuggling of strategic materials. Neither of

10 Most prominent is Friedrich Katz, The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, the United States and the MexicanRevolution (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981). See also Chad Millman, The Detonators:The Secret Plot to Destroy America and the Epic Hunt for Justice (New York: Little, Brown and Company,2006), Jules Witcover, Sabotage at Black Tom: Imperial Germany's Secret War in America, 1914-1917(Chapel Hill: Algonquin Books, 1989), and Robert Koenig, The Fourth Horseman: One Mans Mission toWage the Great War in America (New York: Public Affairs Books, 2006), pp. 233-235.


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these activities could be construed as within diplomatic prerogatives. The reports of the

Anti-Argentine Activities Committee, the FBI, and Ultra bear this out.

This study of German diplomacy and intelligence-gathering will add to the

historiography of Germany relations in Latin America during World War II. The

historiography of Germany relations with Latin America during the Nazi period is thin.

The historiography concerning German diplomacy and intelligence operations in Latin

America is even more sparse. Most studies of German diplomatic relations with neutral

nations during World War II have tended to focus on Europe.

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The notable exceptionwas Japan, which was an ally of Nazi Germany. Older studies that look at Germany and

Latin America have tended to be rather broad. They focused on either the period before

World War II, the region as a whole, or narrow issues, such as economics and trade. 12

Newer studies by Olaf Gaudig, Holger Meding and others have continued this trend.13

While these studies are valuable, their scope limits their treatment of diplomacy or

intelligence.

Scholarly studies of German intelligence in Latin America consist of three books.

While all three are valuable they all have one major shortcoming: the classification of

11 The literature in this regard is daunting. Two recent and notable books are Christian Leitz,NaziGermany and Neutral Europe During the Second World War(New York: New York University Press,2001) and Stanley G. Payne, Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany and World War II(New Haven: YaleUniversity Press, 2008).12

See Thomas Schoonover, Germany in Central America: Competitive Imperialism, 1821-1929(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1998), Arnold Ebel,Das Dritte Reich und Argentinien: diediplomatischen Beziehungen unter besonderer Bercksichtigung der Handelspolitik, 1933-1939 (Kln:Bhlau, 1971) and Reiner Pommerin,Das Dritte Reich und Lateinamerika: Die deutsche Politik gegenberSd- und Mittelamerika (Dsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1977).13

Olaf Gaudig and Peter Veit,Der Widerschein des Nazismus: das Bild des Nationalsozialismus in derdeutschsprachigen Presse Argentiniens, Brasiliens und Chiles 1932-1945 (Berlin: WissenschaftlicherVerlag, 1997); Olaf Gaudig and Peter Veit,Hakenkreuz ber Sdamerika : Ideologie, Politik, Militr(Berlin: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 2004); Holger Meding ed.Nationalsozialismus und Argentinien:Beziehungen, Einflsse und Nachwirkungen (Frankfurt: Lang, 1995).


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relevant documentation at the times they were written. Stanley Hiltons study of German

intelligence in Brazil is one of two monographs that studies German operations in one

country in any detail.14 Hiltons work is outstanding but dated. While Hilton was

hampered by the classification of documents, particularly interrogations, FBI reports and

Ultra, he ably used the available archival material to produce a sound study. Leslie Rout

and John Bratzels study examines German intelligence-gathering and U.S. counter-

intelligence efforts throughout Latin America.15 Rout and Bratzel faced the same

problems Hilton did regarding sources so their focus in mainly on the Abwehr(ArmedForces Intelligence), to the detriment of Amt VI. Utilizing mostly English-language

sources, their study is well-constructed and masterfully argued. Their meticulous

examination of the archival record produced tentative conclusions that hold up well in

light of the declassification of intelligence documents. Both studies are in many ways

fine examples of first-generation intelligence history.

Ronald C. Newtons study is more recent. Like Hiltons it also focuses on one

country. Newtons study has much to commend it and is in some ways outstanding. It

utilized archives in Argentina, the U.S., Great Britain and Germany, but its use of

German sources is somewhat superficial. Newton also implied that he began his study by

trying to prove a negative. He began with the assumption that there was no Nazi threat to

the Western Hemisphere. His scope limited his use of German-language sources. This

underutilization of German archival material affected his conclusions. Also, historians of

14 Stanley E. Hilton,Hitler's Secret War in South America, 1939-1945: German Military Espionage andAllied Counterespionage in Brazil (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981).15 Leslie B. Rout and John F. Bratzel, The Shadow War: German Espionage and United StatesCounterespionage in Latin America during World War II(Frederick: University Publications of America,1986).


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Latin America in general tend to discount Hitlers global ambitions. They usually cite

the inability to find any such plan in the archives as evidence such a threat did not exist.16

This fundamental misunderstanding of how Hitler operated affects their conclusions.

Newton was also handicapped by the classification of intelligence material,

particularly Ultra, which showed what Allied policymakers knew regarding German

actions in Argentina. His study also suffers from what historian Gordon Wood labeled

presentism.17 That is, he used present knowledge to work backward instead of

examining the evidence from the perspective of its contemporaries. He implied that sincethe U.S. had been wrong about so much in Latin America, including Jacobo Arbenz in

Guatemala, Salvador Allende in Chile and others, it must have been wrong in Argentina.

Newton argues that U.S. policymakers saw what they wanted to see in Argentina to the

detriment of all else. This study rejects that view and shows that U.S. policy-making

towards Argentina was based on solid evidence.

Journalist Uki Goi has also written two books that study German intelligence in

Argentina. Goi is primarily interested in the connections between Pern and German

intelligence rather than the larger issues presented here. Gois first bookPern y los

Alemanes (Pern and the Germans/Nazis) examines the wartime contacts between

German intelligence and the Argentine government.18 His second book, The Real

16 This was the general consensus of numerous discussions held with Latin American historians at theCALAS Conference in Calgary in October 2006. A study which supports this argument is Norman J.W.Goda, Tomorrow the World: Hitler, Northwest Africa, and the Path Toward America (College Station:Texas A&M University Press, 1998).17 Gordon Wood, Presentism in History, in The Purpose of the Past: Reflections on the Uses of History(New York: Penguin Press, 2008), pp. 293-308.18 Uki Goi, Pern y los Alemanes (Buenos Aires, Sudamericana, 1998).


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Odessa: Smuggling the Nazis to Perns Argentina, covers mainly the postwar period.19

While both studies use German-language sources, some of Gois interpretations are

overdrawn and not supported by the evidence. He is also hampered by an agenda seeking

to undermine Pern. As will be shown, the evidence against Pern is a bit more

ambiguous.

At its broadest level this study examines the issue of continuity versus change.

Was Hitlers foreign policy simply a continuation of the expansionist policies of

Wilhelmine Germany or was it something more radical and new?

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The evidenceregarding Argentina is somewhat ambiguous. In the 1930s and the first two years of the

war theAuswrtiges Amt(AA) pursued traditional economic policies towards Argentina.

Many of these policies dated to the nineteenth century. Following Hitlers assumption of

power in 1933 new groups, such as theAuslandsorganisation (AO) and SS, increasingly

placed a primacy on ideology to the detriment of practical realities. This is not to argue

that the AA was not ideological. However, the AA could subordinate ideology to reality,

which the AO and SS were reluctant to do. In that sense, the AA represented continuity

and the AO and SS change.

Previous studies, such as Hilton and Newton, did not examine how the

intelligence-gathering apparatuses of the Third Reich fit within the regime. Describing

the actions of a nations intelligence agency without the domestic context only tells half

the story. Intelligence agencies are reflections of the society and governments that they

19 Uki Goi, The Real Odessa: Smuggling the Nazis to Perns Argentina (London; Granta Books, 2002).20 The classic works on this question are Hans-Ulrich Wehler, The German Empire 1871-1918(New York:Berg Publishers, 1985) and Fritz Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht(Hamburg: Droste Verlag, 1964) andFrom Kaiserreich to the Third Reich: Elements of Continuity in German History 1871-1945 (London:Unwin Hyman, 1986)


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serve. This study adds to recent efforts by historians to place the activities of theAbwehr

and Amt VI within the political and ideological context of the Third Reich.21 This has

broadened our understanding of not only how intelligence agencies operated within an

ideological environment, but also how they adapted. Recent studies also reveal the

competition between different intelligence-gathering agencies in the Third Reich.

In studying the German-language archival material on Argentina, it became

apparent that conflict between the AA and other Nazi organizations was endemic. This

in turn, affected how German diplomats handled issues that arose. The AA expended anextraordinary amount of time fending off challenges to its authority. The first challenge

during the 1930s was from the AO. This was the agency of the Nazi Party that was

responsible for Germans abroad. Following the outbreak of the war the SS went to great

lengths to try and usurp the functions of the AA. The files of the AA are full of folders

detailing SS intrigues in Argentina.22 Another issue that was that Germany lacked any

long-term geo-political strategy towards Argentina. The only clue to any coherent policy

is a statement Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop made to Otto Reinebeck, head of

Politische Abteilung IX which covered the Americas in the AA. Ribbentrop told

Reinebeck that Argentina is the last German bridgehead in the Western Hemisphere, the

21 See the fine study by Katrin Paehler, Espionage, Ideology and Personal Politics: The Making andUnmaking of a Nazi Foreign Intelligence Service(Washington D.C.: American University, Ph.D diss.,2002). Also of interest is the forthcoming dissertation by Alexandra Luce which looks at Germanintelligence operations in Portugal. I thank her for bringing her study to my attention at the 2008International Intelligence History Association conference in Hamburg, October 2008.22 See especially, Abteilung Inland II G: Beauftragen Becker nach Sdamerika,NARA, Record Group242/Serial T120/Roll 228 and Abteilung Inland II G: Abwehr Angelegenheit Hellmuth,NARA, RG242/T120/351.


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maintenance and development of which are of the greatest significance for later on.23

The meaning of this statement is ambiguous. The records of the AA show an agency

engaged in reactive diplomacy. That is, the AA was simply dealing with matters as they

came up instead of anticipating problems and devising solutions. The lack of any

meaningful and broad look at German foreign policy by the diplomats in the

Wilhelmstrasse resulted in periodic crises, such as the so-called Patagonia Plot of 1939.

While this study relies mainly on the records of the German foreign ministry, it

also utilizes material from U.S. and British archives. The material from the U.S. andBritish archives consists mainly of interrogations of the principles involved.

Interrogations are problematic sources. They can be unreliable since witnesses lie,

obfuscate or cannot remember details.24 In this case, the opposite is generally true.

Comparing the interrogations against the archival record show the interrogations are

reliable regarding events. The interrogators meticulously went through relevant German

documents in preparing for their interrogations. In some cases, where the interrogators

thought an individual was lying or needed his memory refreshed the subject under

interrogation was shown documents. This showed the subjects that the interrogators

knew their facts and that lying was futile. Where the interrogations tend to be less

reliable is regarding an individuals personal opinion towards Nazism. Here, most of the

subjects interrogated understandably downplayed their allegiance to Hitler. Where

23 Interrogation of Otto Reinebeck, 4 February 1946, NARA, Record Group 59, Records of theDepartment of State, File 862.20235/4-2646, Argentine Blue Book, p. 7.24 For a discussion of the methodological problems inherent in using interrogations see Christopher R.Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland, new edition(New York: Penguin Books, 2001) and Christopher R. Browning, Collected Memories: Holocaust Historyand Post-War Testimony (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003).


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information could not be corroborated I had to make a judgment based on my knowledge

of the documents regarding the reliability of the information.

Other source materials are FBI investigative reports and decrypted messages.

While Newton downplays the reliability of the FBI reports on the whole I have found

them to be reliable. This is particularly true after 1942-43 when the FBI managed to

obtain reliable sources in the Argentine police and government. A recently declassified

history of the SIS is frank regarding the issues the FBI faced in Latin America and

Argentina.

25

The FBI also had access to decrypted messages between German agents inArgentina and their superiors in Germany. This gave them an invaluable source of

information regarding German intentions and actions. The same material was available

to State Department policymakers including Secretary of State Cordell Hull and

Undersecretaries Sumner Welles and Adolf Berle. While interpretations of this material

could be overdrawn and sometimes exaggerated, it was in the main reliable.

Interrogations, Ultra material, and the captured documents of the German foreign

ministry were the documentary base for the Blue Book.

Historians have questioned the reliability of the Blue Book as a historical source.

Historian Ronald C. Newton doubts the veracity of the document.26 He implies it was the

result of long-standing U.S. ambitions to dominate Latin America and British

manipulation of U.S. policymakers. Thus, there was no Nazi menace in the Western

Hemisphere. It was simply a figment of imagination. Historians Gary Frank and

25 SeeHistory of the SIS, 3 vols., declassified 8/10/04. I am grateful to Larry Valero for bringing this to myattention and providing me with a copy.26 Ronald C. Newton, The Nazi Menace in Argentina, 1931-1947(Stanford: Stanford University Press,1992).


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Michael Francis also discuss the Blue Book in their studies of Argentina.27 However,

Frank and Francis focus on the narrow topic of U.S.-Argentine relations without

extensively using German-language sources. It is this source material that exposes the

extent of German activities in Latin America. The Ultra material adds detail to the

documentary framework provided by the AAs records.

Despite the abundant Ultra material any scholar using this material faces several

challenges. The decoded messages are not very detailed which limits their usefulness.

The material is also not complete resulting in gaps in coverage. This was mainly due toatmospheric problems which resulted in garbled and missed messages. This was a vexing

problem to the Germans as well as the Allies. Also, most detailed reports were sent from

Argentina to Germany on ships which meant that very few were intercepted. These

reports were destroyed at the end of the war. The loss of these reports limits the historian

in understanding the intentions and proposed actions of German intelligence in

Argentina. Messages have to be placed within a larger context to discern meaning and

intent. Most of the messages were not signed; instead codenames were used, if at all.

Some German agents had numerous codenames and aliases. For example, Johannes

Siegfried Becker, head of SS Intelligence for Latin America, had 31 different aliases and

codenames. The combining of the Abwehrand SD radio networks in late 1942-early

1943 under the Bolivar heading makes it doubly difficult to assign authorship to any

one individual. Despite these problems the Ultra material provides valuable insight and

detail into the inner-workings of German intelligence.

27 Frank,Juan Pern versus Spruille Braden and Michael J. Francis, The Limits of Hegemony: UnitedStates Relations with Argentina and Chile during World War II(Notre Dame: University of Notre DamePress, 1977).


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This is also not a comprehensive history of German-Argentine relations during

the period of the Third Reich since the records of the AA regarding Argentina from 1933-

37 have been lost. Additionally, Argentina did not play a major role in Hitlers thinking.

Because of this it is difficult to draw any general conclusions regarding foreign policy in

the Third Reich. Instead, it focuses on three areas: bureaucratic infighting, ideology, and

the relationship between intelligence-gathering and diplomacy in the Third Reich. It

asserts that even people who were far removed from the Machiavellian intrigues that

characterized the bureaucratic structure of the Third Reich were not immune to theirconsequences. It shows that diplomacy and intelligence were intertwined to an extent

previously unexplored. Underpinning all this is the question of ideology. Ideology

permeated all aspects of the Third Reich. It was also what drove the SS to undermine the

AA. Also presented is the argument that the SS was a parasitic organization that did all it

could to undermine and takeover rivals. This buttresses assertions Katrin Paehler made

in her study of Walter Schellenberg and the Reichsicherheitshauptamt(Reich Security

Main Office or RSHA).28

These arguments are presented in a case-study format. This format allows for a

clearer study of the organizations involved. Most events in Argentina took place

concurrently. Using each chapter as a mini-case-study allows for more depth and a

smoother narrative regarding events. The first chapter details German diplomacy from

1933-1938 and the AAs struggle with the AO over foreign policy aims. This struggle

resulted from Hitlers penchant for allowing agencies to compete for power. The AAs

focus on European events meant that German diplomats in Argentina were forced to deal

28 Paehler, Espionage, Ideology and Personal Politics.


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with problems with little support or guidance from the Wilhelmstrasse. The second

chapter details the so-called Patagonia Plot of 1939. It argues that this crisis was the

result of a hostile world climate in 1938-39. Germany contributed to this through its

actions in Austria and Czechoslovakia. Suspicion of German actions meant President

Getlio Vargas of Brazil and Roberto Ortiz of Argentina were willing to believe

information implicating Germans in plots to overthrow their governments. This chapter

asserts that the document which alleged Germany had ambitions to take over the

Patagonia region of Argentina was forged. However, it achieved its purpose of harmingGermanys diplomatic and economic position in Latin America and drawing suspicion on

Germans residing there. Chapter three details German diplomacy from 1939-1942 and

shows how the lack of any long-range policy hampered German diplomacy towards

Argentina. Chapter four chronicles the actions of the German naval attach Kapitan zur

See Dietrich Niebuhr and his intelligence network in Latin America. It argues that the

German embassy was a hotbed of intelligence-gathering activities aided and abetted by

the diplomatic staff. Ultimately, this cooperation would cost Ambassador Thermann his

posting when he was declaredpersona non grata in December 1941. The evidence argues

that the claims of the Anti-Argentine Activities Committee should be taken seriously,

despite the fact that the commission resulted from domestic power struggles in Argentina.

Also examined are Amt VIs attempts to establish an intelligence network in Latin

America. Chapter five details HauptsturmfhrerJohannes Siegfried Beckers failure to

establish an SS intelligence network in Argentina during 1940-41 and his return to

Germany in late 1941. It argues that Amt VI as early as 1940-41 attempted to


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marginalize the AA only to fail. Chapter six chronicles Beckers return to Argentina in

1943. It shows how Becker managed to obtain control of the Abwehrs intelligence

networks and utilize them for the SD. This chapter also examines Beckers dealings with

pro-Nazi elements in the governments of Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil and Bolivia and the

attempt to create an anti-U.S. bloc of states friendly to Nazi Germany. The extent of

German involvement with prominent figures in the governments of Argentina, Paraguay,

Brazil and Bolivia are examined here for the first time. The chief of the Paraguayan Air

Force, Major Pablo Stagni, was specifically identified as a German agent with thecodename Hermann.29 Additionally, historians, such as Cole Blasier, have suspected

German involvement in the Bolivian coup of December 1943 which overthrew President

Enrique Pearanda and installed a pro-German government.30 Blasier was unable to

confirm his suspicions because of the classification of records.

Chapter seven looks at the Hellmuth Affair of 1943. This ill-fated venture

between the Argentine government and SD highlights the increasing struggle between the

AA and Amt VI for control of foreign policy in 1943. It argues that Osmar Hellmuths

mission for the Argentine and German governments was the second major attempt that

year to wrest control of foreign policy from Ribbentrop and the AA. It also looks at how

the AA and SS were willing to place the blame for the failure of Hellmuths mission on

the Abwehr whereupon it was absorbed into the SS. Chapter eight examines the

diplomatic dealings between Nazi Germany and Argentina regarding the Jewish

29 SeeHistory of the SIS, Volume 3: Accomplishments Mexico-Venezuela, declassified 8/10/04, pp. 529-530and Argentina to Berlin, 28 February 1943, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS CommunicationsOffice Records, Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188.30 Cole Blasier, The United States, Germany, and the Bolivian Revolutionaries (1941-1946), TheHispanic American Historical Review, 52/1, (February 1972): 26-54.


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Question. Even regarding subjects, such as the Jewish Question, where consensus on

the murder of the Jews had ostensibly been achieved at the Wannsee Conference of

January 1942, there was still friction. The AA was in the position of having to defend

Argentinas Jews from the SS and the Argentine government. The epilogue details the

incarceration of German agents and Beckers efforts to continue his network. It also

chronicles Argentine attempts to sanitize the confessions of German agents in their

custody. This attempt by Pern and others to construct a seemingly innocuous account of

German intelligence activities was meant to minimize Argentine involvement with NaziGermany. In one sense it succeeded since the interrogations of Becker and his henchmen

were carefully crafted. In the absence of corroborating evidence they have been accepted

by historians as reliable.31

This study offers new perspectives on German intelligence and diplomacy in

Latin America. The opening of records allows for a fresh look at German actions and

how they fit into broader interpretations of Nazi Germany. This in turn adds to our

understanding of how agencies operated in the Hobbesian world of Nazi politics. For

those who agree or disagree with the conclusions presented here I hope they take comfort

in the words of St. Augustine, I think I have now discharged my obligationin writing

this large work. Let those who think I have said too little, or those who think I have said

too much forgive me; and let those who think I have said just enough join me in giving

thanks32

31 Rout & Bratzel in particular are accepting of Beckers statement to the Argentine Federal Police. In theirdefense, the classification of material made any critical study of Beckers statement difficult.32 St. Augustine, The City of God, ed. and trans. Marcus Dods (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1841), p. 545.


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Chapter 1

Thermanns Arrival and the Crisis of the New Diplomacy

The beginning is easy; what happens next is much harder.

Anonymous

On January 30, 1933 Adolf Hitler was appointed Chancellor of the German Reich

by President Paul von Hindenburg. Hitlers ascent to the Chancellorship and his

subsequent seizure of power heralded a new era in diplomacy. Recognizing this Gerhard

L. Weinberg titled the first volume of his study on Nazi foreign policy A Diplomatic

Revolution in Europe, 1933-1936.33 In some ways, the emphasis should be placed on in

Europe since Hitler was very continental in his outlook. He did not understand the

world outside Europe and had little interest in such matters. Hitlers view of the world

beyond European shores was based primarily on the novels of Karl May and his viewing

of movies which shaped his opinions of various countries.34 As Hermann Rauschning,

former president of the Danzig Senate and NSDAP member who broke with the Nazis,

points out Hitler was a poseurwho pontificated on many subjects sketching images of

countries which usually bore no relation to reality.35

33 Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitlers Germany: Diplomatic Revolution in Europe, 1933-1936, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).34

See especially Gerhard L. Weinberg, Hitlers Image of the United States, in World in the Balance:Behind the Scenes of World War II, (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1981), pp. 53-74.35 Hermann Rauschning,Hitler Speaks: A Series of Political Conversations on His Real Aims (London:Thornton Butterworth Ltd., 1940). Rauschning is a controversial source, whose reliability has beenquestioned by several historians. Ian Kershaw defends Rauschning stating, there is nothing in it[Rauschnings book] which is not consonant with what is otherwise known of Hitlers character andopinions. Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, 4th ed.(London: Arnold, 2000), p. 156. For other interpretations of Rauschnings reliability as a source, seeTheodor Schieder,Hermann Rauschnings "Gesprche mit Hitler" als Geschichtsquelle (Opladen:Westdeutscher Verlag, 1972). For an alternative view, see Martin Broszat, Enthllung? Die Rauschning-


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Hitler had no knowledge of Latin America and no interest in the region stating

that Latin America was part of the U.S. sphere of influence. However, his comments on

Latin America in Mein Kampf were limited to one paragraph. He commented on the

inferior racial mixture of its peoples and contrasted them with the racial makeup of

North Americans.

North America, whose population consists in by far the largest part of Germanicelements who mixed but little with the lower coloured peoples, shows a differenthumanity and culture from Central and South America, where the predominantlyLatin immigrants often mixed with the aborigines on a large scale.36

Hitler openly admired the Monroe Doctrine and wanted something similar for Germany

in Europe.37

In the 1930s German relations with Latin America as a whole, and Argentina in

particular, were primarily economic and military. For the most part, German policies

were a continuation of those that had taken place in the Wilhelmine and Weimar eras.38

While Hitler focused his attention on Europe, he left Latin American policy to his

underlings. If Hitlers guiding hand can be seen as the hallmark of Germanys European

policy, then it was conspicuously absent in Latin America. It was not only Hitler who

treated Latin America with indifference. It was a backwater for the Auswrtiges Amt

Kontroverse inNach Hitler: der schwierige Umgang mit unserer Geschichte, eds. Hermann Graml undKlaus- Dietmar Henke (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1987), pp. 249-251.36 Adolf Hitler,Mein Kampf, introduction by D.C. Watt, trans. Ralph Mannheim (Boston: Houghton

Mifflin, 1971), p. 260.37 Jrgen Mller, Hitler, Lateinamerika und die Weltherrschaft,Ibero-Amerikansiches Archiv, 18, 1/2,(1992), 89-90.38 Ronald C. Newton, German Buenos Aires, 1900-1933: Social Change and Cultural Crisis (Austin:University of Texas Press, 1977), Ronald C. Newton, The Nazi Menace in Argentina, 1931-1947(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), Arnold Ebel,Das Dritte Reich und Argentinien: diediplomatischen Beziehungen unter besonderer Bercksichtigung der Handelspolitik, 1933-1939 (Kln:Bhlau, 1971), Elizabeth B. White, German Influence in the Argentine Army, 1900-1945 (London; Taylorand Francis, 1991) and Jrgen Schaefer,Deutsche Militrhilfe an Sdamerika; Militr-undRstungsinteressen in Argentinien, Bolivien und Chile vor 1914 (Dsseldorf: Droste, 1974).


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(AA) which showed a lack of enthusiasm regarding policy towards the region. In their

post-war interrogations which are supported by the documentary record, Edmund

Freiherrvon Thermann and Erich Otto Meynen, respectively ambassador and charg d

affairs at the German embassy in Buenos Aires, complained of the lack of any coherent

policy regarding Argentina.39 This lack of policy and the indifference of Nazi leaders

caused many problems for German diplomats in Latin America. This chapter aims to

examine German diplomacy towards Argentina from 1933-1938. It will argue that the

lack of a coherent policy along with bureaucratic infighting hampered Germanys effortsto construct an effective relationship with Argentina. As a result, German relations with

Argentina progressively worsened during the 1930s.

In some ways there is a certain irony in this disinterest given the large German

population in Latin America.40 Hitlers regime ostensibly went to great lengths to appeal

to ethnic German peoples residing outside of Germanys borders. In his so-called

Second Book Hitler pontificated at length on the injustice that Germans in Austria, the

South Tyrol and elsewhere in Europe should be separated from their ethnic kin.41 This

focus on Germans living in Europe and lack of interest in Germans living in Latin

America could buttress the argument that Hitlers views were more geopolitical than

ethnic.

39 Final Interrogation Report of Edmund Freiherrvon Thermann, 11 July 1945, National Archives andRecords Administration (hereafter NARA), Record Group 59 (hereafter RG), Records of the Department ofState, 862.20235/7-1145, Argentine Blue Book (hereafter ABB), Box 6736 and Memorandum, re: ErichOtto Meynen, The National Archives, Kew (hereafter TNA), KV 3/81.40 By the 1930s the largest German populations in Latin America were in Brazil, Argentina and Chile.They numbered approximately 1,000,000, 500,000 and 250,000 respectively.41 See Gerhard Weinberg ed.,Hitlers Second Book, Krista Smith trans. (New York: Enigma Books, 2003).


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While the AA was ostensibly responsible for foreign policy in the Third Reich it

found many competitors, especially in the area of Germandom abroad. Before Hitlers

seizure of power in 1933, Germans abroad were represented by a variety of groups with

their own areas of interest. For example, educational contacts were handled by the

Deutsche Akademie (German Academy) in Munich and the Deutsches Auslandsinstitut

(German Foreign Institute) in Stuttgart. The most powerful and influential group was the

Verein fr das Deutschtum im Ausland (Association for Germans Abroad or VDA). It

was founded in 1881 and originally called the Deutscher Schulverein. While its focuswas on education, it also handled general social and cultural matters.42 Following the

Nazi takeover in 1933, the Auslands-Abteilung (Foreign Department), which dealt with

Germans abroad for the Nazi Party, was renamed the Auslands-Organisation (AO). It

moved quickly to supplant the leadership of groups, such as the VDA. The VDA had

worked closely with the AA and its yearly collections from the German communities

gave it considerable influence both financially and politically.

However, the AO pushed the VDA aside and quickly found itself at odds with the

AA over its activities which negatively affected Germanys position in many foreign

countries. The AO was used by Rudolf Hess, deputy Fhrerof the NSDAP and Joseph

Goebbels, Minister of Propaganda, as a way to coordinate the AA. They attempted to

replace the traditional diplomats with loyal Nazis. In this endeavor, Hitler was with them

in spirit. He had contempt for the diplomats at the Wilhelmstrasse, telling associates that

they were inept bureaucrats. However, Hitler also realized that he needed the

42 Ronald Smelser, The Sudeten Problem, 1933-1938: Volkstumspolitik and the Formulation of NaziForeign Policy (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1975), p. 16.


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experienced personnel of the German diplomatic service to move his foreign policy aims

forward. As long as the diplomats were useful then their position was secure.

However, the AO and other organizations encroached upon areas previously

under the purview of the AA. Coordinating Germans abroad into supporting the Nazi

regime was one such issue. Hess was a powerful patron and formidable adversary for the

AA. He believed in the AOs mission remarking, the greatest mistake of the former

regime was its refusal to keep up ties of blood which connect Germans in their homeland

with Germans abroad.

43

Remarks such as these fit with the Nazi world-view which wasobsessed with protecting Germans at home and abroad from the perceived threat of world

Jewry. Thus, the AO was on the frontlines of a worldwide struggle against Jewish

influence and control.

Ernst Bohle, head of the AO, was given a powerful tool in his struggle with the

AA. The Law to Safeguard the Unity of the Party and State (Gesetz zur Sicherstellung

der Einheit von Partei und Staat) was passed by the Reichstagon 1 December 1933. It

made the NSDAP the only legal authority in Germany and bound the party and state

together. Whereas before this law was passed the AO had only represented party

members, it now ostensibly represented all Germans residing abroad. Bohle argued that

the AA could not represent Germany abroad effectively and positively in the National

Socialist sense. He proposed the creation of a ministry to represent and organize

Germandom abroad so it could serve Hitlers new order. His ambitions were quashed

43 Donald McKale, The Swastika Outside Germany (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 1977), pp.3-7.


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when he realized that Hitler had no intention of replacing the AA with the AO.44 Instead

he concentrated on consolidating his control over areas where AO activity was already

taking place.

Latin America was one area where early Nazi party activity occurred. In some

ways this activity was natural since German communities in Latin America had been

exposed to dictatorships led by charismatic individuals that superficially resembled

Hitlers movement.45 Living under these dictatorships created some sympathy for Nazism

among the Volksdeutsch (ethnic German) population in Latin America.

46

This populationwas quite large with over 800,000 ethnic Germans in Brazil, 500,000 in Argentina and

250,000 in Chile. In early 1930 Nazism arrived in Argentina imported by seamen from

the Hamburg-Sd and Hapag-Lloyd shipping lines. Nazi party workers in Hamburg had

recruited the merchant seaman for two purposes: to spread the Nazi movement among

German-speaking communitys world-wide and procure funds for the party. The success

in recruiting seaman owed much to Gregor Strasser, one of Hitlers early followers, who

was killed in the Night of the Long Knives in June 1934. Strasser fought to improve

conditions for shipboard workers and provided help for seaman in foreign ports. The

sailors treatment by the AO was in stark contrast to the customary dismissal they

received from German diplomats. The success of Strassers efforts, carried on by his

44 Smelser, The Sudeten Problem, pp. 27-28.45 Heinz Sanke ed.,Der deutsche Faschismus in Lateinamerika, 1933-1943 (Berlin: Humboldt-Universitt,1966), p. 22.46 McKale, The Swastika Outside Germany, p. 22.


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successors, can be gauged by the membership of seaman in the AO. By 1938 25,000 of

the 55,000 AO members were merchant seaman.47

In 1931 the German community in Buenos Aires was invited to attend Nazi rallies

onboard ships docked in the harbor.48 On April 7, 1931 the Argentine Ortsgruppe (Local

Group)of the AO was founded with an initial membership of 59 members.49 It was at this

ceremony that the swastika was first displayed publicly in Argentina. In July the local

Nazi party held another rally where the speakers publicly harangued Chancellor Heinrich

Brning and President Paul von Hindenburg. When the republican leaning German-language newspaperArgentinisches Tageblattpublished a disparaging editorial about the

AO the Deputy Head of theLandesgruppe, Rudolf Seyd, challenged Ernst Alemann, the

papers editor, to a duel. On 9 August Germans who supported the Weimar government

held their own rally where they loudly denounced the Nazis.50 A rally in November

attracted over 800 people, another in January 1932 in conjunction with other nationalist

groups attracted over 5,000 participants. By September 1932, the party had expanded

outside Buenos Aires to seven other locations and recorded 278 members in its rolls.51

Affiliates were also formed in Brazil and Paraguay. Despite this apparent success the

Landesgruppe went through a period of turnover in its leadership. In 1932 Seyd

disappeared and was replaced by Eckard Neumann who was replaced at the end of the

year by Rudolf Gerndt, editor of the German-language newspaperDeutsche La-Plata

47 Hans-Adolf Jacobsen,Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik, 1933-1938(Frankfurt am Main: AlfredMetzner Verlag, 1968), pp. 90-107.48 The German community in Argentina numbered approximately 150,000 with the majority residing inBuenos Aires. The figure is from Alton Frye,Nazi Germany and the American Hemisphere, 1933-1941(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 65.49 Newton, The Nazi Menace, p. 38.50 Ibid, pp. 38-39.51 McKale, The Swastika Outside Germany, p. 23.


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Zeitung. In early 1933 Gerndt was succeeded by Dr. Gottfried Brandt, a businessman

who owned a pharmaceutical distributorship. Brandt stayed as head until 1935 when he

was expelled from the party and theLandesgruppe for unknown reasons.52 However, for

the AO Latin America remained a backwater. By January 1933 membership for the

Landesgruppe Argentina was 156.53

Like Hitler, Bohle had little interest in Latin America. As Max Paul Friedman

notes the Nazi and AO attitude towards Latin America was one of neglect.54 Bohle could

not speak Spanish or remember the names of Latin American diplomats in Berlin, andtook to calling them all Excellency. Reichsdeutsche (German citizens) who visited

Berlin from Latin America offended Bohle by congregating at the South American Club

and speaking Spanish among themselves. Bohle complained that Reichsdeutsche who

immigrated to Latin America tended to take on a very different outlook than was

generally considered fitting for good Teutons they became much more lively and light-

hearted, and often assumed a rather Latin attitude toward life which made them rather

hard to handle at times.55 The official task of the AO in Argentina was to try to convert

Germans living abroad to the Nazi doctrine. However, Ambassador Thermann held a

low opinion of AO activity. He felt its leadership was of a low caliber and that

52 Newton, The Nazi Menace, p. 41.53

Parteimitgleider, Stand30.6.1937, Bro des Chefs der AO,NARA, Record Group 242, NationalArchives Collection of Foreign Records Seized, Inter-filmed Records of the Foreign Ministry and ReichChancellery, Serial T-120, Roll 78, Frames 60145-60148 (hereafter RG/Serial/Roll/Frame Number),Jacobsen,Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik, pp. 661-664, McKale, The Swastika Outside of Germany, p.41.54 Max Paul Friedman,Nazis and Good Neighbors: The United States Campaign against the Germans ofLatin America in World War II(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 46.55 Interrogation of Ernst Bohle, 5-8 September 1945, State Department Special Interrogation Mission(Dewitt C. Poole Mission), RG 59/M679/1/12 and 20-1. Also quoted in Friedman,Nazis and GoodNeighbors, p. 46.


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individuals selected for its leadership positions were selected based on party affiliations.

Thermanns opinion was shared by the AA where the AO never really achieved any

influence and Bohle was excluded from Hitlers inner-circle of advisors.56

Thermanns time in Argentina was marked by controversy and conflict between

the AA and AO. He had to deal with most of these problems by himself given the

Wilhelmstrasses lack of interest in Argentina. This indifference is supported by the

paucity of evidence in the documentary record which suggests that the AA was content to

let Thermann deal with problems that cropped up. Despite ups and downs during histime in Buenos Aires, Thermann retained the confidence of two foreign ministers,

Constantin von Neurath and Joachim von Ribbentrop, and stayed on station for close to a

decade, when ambassadors in places such as the U.S., Soviet Union, and England were

replaced regularly.

Thermanns problems began even before his arrival. In January 1933,

Hindenburg approved the appointment of Heinrich Ritter von Kaufmann-Asser as the

new head of mission in Argentina. Kaufmann was an experienced diplomat who spoke

good Spanish and had served in postings from Vienna to Santiago. His pro-business

approach quickly won him the approval of German businessmen in Buenos Aires. On

April 9, 1933 the Law for the Reform of the Civil Service was passed which barred Jews

from the civil service. On 9 May the Argentinisches Tageblatt reported not only the

passing of the law, but that Kaufmann, who had been in his post less than a month, was to

be fired from his post due to Jewish ancestors. To add insult Kaufmann was required to

56 Final Interrogation Report of Edmund Freiherrvon Thermann, 11 July 1945, NARA, RG 59,862.20235/7-1145, ABB, Box 6736, p. 2 and McKale, The Swastika Outside of Germany, pp. 45-49.


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remain at his post and keep quiet until a replacement could be found. The German

business community in Argentina was outraged at Kaufmanns dismissal. His successor,

Edmund Freiherrvon Thermann, complained of the complications it caused for him.57 It

was not an auspicious start.

Thermann was a career diplomat who came from a wealthy family. His career

included postings in Paris, Madrid, Brussels, and Washington, D.C. His posting prior to

Argentina was in Danzig where he was consul-general for almost nine years. Thermann

described that posting as difficult since Danzig was a contentious issue in the WeimarRepublic. Following the Versailles Treaty it was declared a Free City and put under

the control of the League of Nations to give Poland access to a seaport on the Baltic.

During his time there Thermann had several confrontations with local Nazis who, he

claimed, made life difficult for him and the Foreign Ministry. However, in March 1933,

on his own initiative, he supported the Nazis during a dispute with the Danzig

government. As Herbert Levine points out, Thermann and the AA managed to

coordinate themselves quickly to Hitlers government.58 While there was common

ground between Hitler and the Auswrtiges Amtregarding the rejection of the Versailles

Treaty the AA did not fully accept all of Hitlers doctrines at first. However, they

57 Newton, The Nazi Menace, pp. 41-42 and Klaus to Spaeth, Memorandum re: Von ThermannInterrogation, 5 December 1945, NARA, RG 59, File 862.20235/12-545, ABB, Box 6736, p. 11. ArnoldEbel was told by the West German Foreign Office that Kaufmann was dismissed for political reasons.

Arnold Ebel,Das Dritte Reich und Argentinien: die diplomatischen Beziehungen unter besondererBercksichtigung der Handelspolitik, 1933-1939 (Kln: Bhlau, 1971), p. 101.58 Herbert S. Levine,Hitlers Free City: A History of the Nazi Party in Danzig, 1925-1939 (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 101, Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitlers Germany:A Diplomatic Revolution in Europe, 1933-1936, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 61 andPaul Seabury, The Wilhelmstrasse: A Study of German Diplomats Under the Nazi Regime (Berkeley:University of California Press, 1954). Seabury argues that theAuswrtiges Amtwas coordinated to Nazism

by 1938, but the evidence suggests that it was much earlier. Staatssekretrs von Blow confirmedThermann was acting without orders from Berlin. See Blow Memorandum, 24 March 1933, RG 242/T-120/2373/E 190912-13 quoted in Weinberg,A Diplomatic Revolution, p. 61, note 13.


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quickly adapted themselves to the new regime and its racist views. Given this it is not

surprising that Thermann was later able to foist Germanys problems off on Jews and

Jewish circles, instead of the actions of Germany. Thermanns actions following his

arrival in Buenos Aires and his comments in official correspondence give lie to

characterizations of him as an opportunist rather than a man of conviction. In 1933 he

joined the Nazi Party and later the SS. He later explained away his SS membership

stating that he enjoyed horse-riding and belonged to a club composed mainly ofJunkers.

It was through them that he became socially involved with the mounted SS and it was hisfriend Werner Lorenz, future Polizeifhrer of Hamburg and then head of the

Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (Vomi), who offered to induct him as an honorary member of

the SS before Thermann left Danzig in November 1932.59

In July 1933 Staatssekretr (State Secretary) Bernhard von Blow of the AA

recommended Thermann to replace Kaufmann in Buenos Aires. Blows

recommendation was approved and Thermann was promoted to Minister First Class.

Prior to leaving for Argentina Thermann paid a formal visit to Bohle, perhaps to express

his willingness to cooperate with the AO. Over the next several years Bohle and the AO

would become the bane of Thermanns existence. Relations were smooth for the

moment. Thermann arrived in Buenos Aires wearing his full SS uniform. Bohle stated

that he made an excellent impression and later commented to Hess that, our entire work

overseas would be substantially simpler if all Reich representatives took such a positive

59 For a discussion of Lorenz and the Vomi see Valdis O. Lumans,Himmler's Auxiliaries: TheVolksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the German National Minorities of Europe, 1933-1945 (Chapel Hill: TheUniversity of North Carolina Press, 1993).


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attitude toward the new state as Herrvon Thermann.60 His postwar interrogators noted

that Thermann gives the impression of being an opportunist rather than a man of

ideological principles, and that Baron von Thermann was .... in many ways dominated

by his wife, a woman of ruthless personal ambition, considerable intelligence, and

obviously unscrupulous character.61 While this suggests that Thermanns devotion to the

cause should be taken with a grain of salt he went about his duties enthusiastically and

energetically.

When Thermann arrived in Argentina on 10 December 1933, he had to deal withthe Kaufmann affair and Germanys withdrawal from the League of Nations in October.

Argentina was particularly unhappy about the latter since Buenos Aires had vigorously

protested Germanys exclusion in the early 1920s and sponsored its entrance in 1926.

Thermann did not help matters when he struck up a friendship with retired General Juan

Bautista Molina, Argentine military attach in Berlin, who was an ardent admirer of

Hitler and fascism. Thermanns friendship with Molina caused some embarrassment to

him and the Argentine government.62 Ever the opportunist, Thermann (perhaps at his

wifes instigation) set about showing his devotion to the new regime. At the dock he

gave Hitlers personal greeting to the crowd who greeted his arrival and then led them in

singing Deutschland ber Alles and the Horst-Wessel-Lied.63

60 Newton, The Nazi Menace, p. 42 and McKale, The Swastika Outside of Germany, p. 66.61 Memorandum, Murphy to Secretary of State, Subject: Interrogation of Edmund FreiherrvonThermann, 20 June 1945, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/6-1645, ABB, Box 6736, p. 1 and FinalInterrogation Report of Edmund Freiherrvon Thermann, 11 July 1945, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/7-1145, ABB, Box 6736, p. 3.62 Interrogation of Edmund von Thermann, 10 May 1945, RG 59, ABB, Miscellaneous Affidavits andInterrogation Reports, Box 26, Entry 1088, p. 6.63 Newton, The Nazi Menace, p. 43.


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After taking up his office, Thermann attempted to ingratiate himself with the

German community. On 15 December he appeared at the year-end ceremonies of the

Goethe School in Buenos Aires. Despite the fact that most of the students were

Argentine, Thermann demanded the school hall be decorated with Nazi banners and

pictures of Hitler and led the students in singing German patriotic songs and giving the

Hitler salute. The reaction to this display is unknown, but it could not have been overly

positive since Thermann believed that no segment of the Argentine public was ever

openly pro-German.

64

On 17 December he attended the Nazi Partys solstice festival. Ateach of these events Thermann appeared in his full SS uniform to the delight of local

Nazis who believed that he would support them energetically and uncritically. However,

Thermann soon found himself locked in a struggle between the AO and other Nazi

organizations who felt he was not vigorous enough in defending them when actions they

undertook backfired.

Thermanns wife, Vilma Baroness von Thermann, played a prominent role in

promoting him and German interests in Argentina. Like her husband she attempted to

take an active role in the German community there. One of her first acts was to visit the

Nazi womens associations in and around Buenos Aires. There she announced that these

groups were the bearers of the National Socialist worldview. In an attempt to co-opt

the women outside of these groups, she invited them to teas and receptions at the

64 Final Interrogation Report of Edmund Freiherrvon Thermann, 11 July 1945, NARA, RG 59,862.20235/7-1145, ABB, Box 6736, p. 3.


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Thermanns residence. These events were popular with the women remarking to one

another what FrauThermann had said to them.65

Thermann and his wife made contradictory impressions in Argentinas diplomatic

community. British ambassador Sir Esmond Ovey remarked, Both he and his wife are

excellent linguists.I have always found him a pleasant and correct colleague and his

wife an agreeable if somewhat exotically attired table companion.66 While attending the

Chaco Peace Conference, which formally ended the war between Paraguay and Bolivia in

1938, Spruille Braden, U.S. ambassador to Colombia, stated that Thermann was anonentity, none too bright, and astutely observed that Frau Thermann was the driving

force in their marriage.67 During U.S. President Franklin Roosevelts 1936 visit to

Buenos Aires Thermann went to a diplomatic reception for President Roosevelt attired in

a black suit with a swastika armband, which did not make a favorable impression. After

observing Thermann for a time, Ovey reported that I cannot help feeling that the

somewhat blatant propaganda which he is called upon to make would be highly

distasteful to anyone not highly devoted to his master.68

Thermann quickly went about trying to undo some of the resentment in the

German business community as a result of Kaufmanns dismissal. Why the business

community in Buenos Aires protested Kaufmans firing is unknown. Perhaps the

65

Newton, The Nazi Menacep. 43, Memorandum, Murphy to Secretary of State, Subject: Interrogationof Edmund Freiherrvon Thermann, 20 June 1945, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/6-1645, ABB, Box 6736, p.2.66 Esmund Ovey to Foreign Secretary, Head of Foreign Missions, Report for 1937, 2 March 1938, TNA,FO 371/21412, see also Newton, The Nazi Menace, p. 44.67 On the Chaco Peace Conference see Leslie B. Rout, The Politics of the Chaco Peace Conference, 1935-1939 (Austin, TX: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Texas Press, 1970). Memorandum,3 August 1945, NARA, RG 84, 820.02, Box 65.68 Esmund Ovey to Foreign Secretary, Head of Foreign Missions, Report for 1937, 2 March 1938, TNA,FO 371/21412.


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German businessmen in Argentina were not coordinated to the regimes racial policies

yet. Every week Thermann lunched at the German Club with leading German

businessman in Buenos Aires. While he later disparaged their klieinbrgerlicher

Horizont (petty bourgeois views) these lunches, along with a general trend toward

Argentina in Nazi economic policies, enhanced Thermanns standing.69 His prestige was

further enhanced in 1935 when Hitler raised the German mission to embassy status, with

Thermann remaining on station as ambassador. The AA had been arguing since 1928

that Germany needed an embassy and ambassador in Argentina as a matter of prestigesince the British, French, U.S. and numerous other nations had them. Not only would it

bolster Nazi Germanys status, but that of Argentinas as well, since it would

acknowledge its aspirations as a great power.70

Thermann also ingratiated himself with powerful figures in the Nazi government.

When Thermann visited Hamburg in 1936 to push for the purchase of frozen beef from

Argentina, his friend and patron Werner Lorenz greeted him with a band followed by a

banquet and ceremonies. Thermann also became close with Heinrich Himmler who he

had met while still consul in Danzig. In 1936, Thermanns daughter became engaged to

Baron (fnu) von Hadern, Himmlers adjutant and she married him in 1939. Thermann

and his wife opposed the marriage since Hadern had no money. Thermann stated that he

would have preferred his daughter to marry a diplomat or landowner to have a secure

existence. Following Haderns death in Russia in 1943, she married Fritz Darges one of

Hitlers adjutants who was dismissed and sent to the Eastern Front in July 1944 for

69 Memorandum, Murphy to Secretary of State, Subject: Interrogation of Edmund FreiherrvonThermann, 20 June 1945, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/6-1645, ABB, Box 6736, p. 2.70 Ebel,Das Dritte Reich und Argentinien, pp. 128-129 and Newton, The Nazi Menace,p. 45.


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laughing as Hitler tried to shoo away a fly.71 Himmler also became a patron to

Thermanns son Wolfgang who he suggested should learn Japanese. This would allow

him to enter the Reichsicherheitshauptamt(RSHA or Reich Security Main Office) and

contribute to its intelligence collaboration with Japan. However, Wolfgang joined the

WaffenS.S. instead and was seriously wounded during the French campaign in 1940. He

was killed in action in 1944.72

While ambassador Thermann was given some latitude in conducting relations

between Nazi Germany and Argentina, he was also given few broad directives regardingpolicy. Thermanns approach to influencing Argentine society was multi-faceted. He

later claimed to U.S. interrogators that he and his wife had a carefully thought out

program.73 Thermann sought to appeal to Argentine nationalism and pride concerning

political independence, especially from the U.S. He directed German-language

newspapers to attack communism and sought good relations with the Catholic Church.

He exploited Argentinas sense of shared kinship with Spain, especially following

Francos victory in the Spanish Civil War in 1939.74 Thermann promised that Argentina

would profit from increased trade relations with Germany and lessen its economic

dependence on Great Britain. By the 1930s Great Britain controlled the majority of

Argentine railways and meatpacking plants. Great Britain was the leading foreign

71 Ronald Newton spells his name as Darjes, Newton, The Nazi Menace, p. 45.72 Interrogation of Edmund Freiherrvon Thermann by W. Wendell Blancke, 27 September, 8, 10, 16, 20,23, 24 October, 2, 6 November 1945, NARA, RG 59, 740.00116 EW, ABB, Box 6736.73 Ibid.74 This issue is explored by Christian Leitz in his article Nazi Germany and the Luso-Hispanic WorldContemporary European History, 12/2, (2003), pp. 183-196.


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investor in Argentina, so much so that Argentina was considered a part of the empire,

albeit informally.75

Thermann also worked to lessen French influence in the cultural field. He

arranged for honorary doctoral degrees from German universities to be conferred on

prominent professional men and trumpeted the accomplishments and superiority of

German science, art and music. His program called for nursing anti-U.S. sentiments in

Argentina and developing confidence in the strength of the German army.76 The U.S.

viewed Nazi activities in Latin America with trepidation. U.S. relations with Argentinahit a low in the late 1920s and early 1930s as a result of an embargo placed upon imports

of Argentine beef to the U.S. The U.S. claimed the embargo was necessary to prevent the

spread of hoof and mouth disease, which the Department of Agriculture claimed was

endemic in Argentina. To the Argentines this was more than an economic matter -- it

was a matter of pride, with Argentine beef a symbol to nationalists who glorified

Argentinas past.77 Another issue was the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930 which virtually

excluded most Argentine agricultural products from the U.S. market and caused

consternation in Argentina at the U.S. refusal to make an exception.78

75 See Andrew Porter ed. The Oxford History of the British Empire Volume III: The Nineteenth Century(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 122-145, Wm. Roger Louis and Judith Browneds. TheOxford History of the British Empire Volume IV: The Twentieth Century, (New York: Oxford University

Press, 2001), pp. 623-642, Rory Miller,Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth and TwentiethCenturies (New York: Longman Group, 1993) and Winthrop R. Wright,British-Owned Railways inArgentina: Their Effect on the Growth of Economic Nationalism, 1854-1948(Austin: University of TexasPress, 1975).76 Final Interrogation Report of Edmund Freiherrvon Thermann, 11 July 1945, NARA, RG 59,862.20235/7-1145, ABB, Box 6736, p. 2.77 Michael J. Francis, The Limits of Hegemony: United States Relations with Argentina and Chile duringWorld War II(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), pp. 48-49.78 Joseph Tulchin,Argentina and the United States: A Conflicted Relationship (Boston: Twayne Publishers,1990), p. 51.


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The election of Franklin D. Roosevelt as President of the United States portended

the start of a new phase of U.S. relations with Latin America. Roosevelt felt that the past

policies of the U.S. which included, the Monroe Doctrine, the Roosevelt Corollary to the

Monroe Doctrine and Dollar Diplomacy had failed to change Latin Americas negative

opinion of the U.S. Instead, Roosevelt called for a new policy of being a good neighbor

and repudiating intervention in Latin America.79 Roosevelt also decided that a trade

treaty should be negotiated with Argentina.80 However, he and his Secretary of State

Cordell Hull kept a wary eye on German intrigues in Latin America. Hull was worriedabout the effect that Nazism was having on Latin American nations.81 The most troubling

areas, as Hull saw them, were the supposed militarization of German citizens in Latin

America, German military missions to Latin American nations and the increase in trade

between Argentina and Nazi Germany.82

At the Seventh Inter-American Conference, held in Buenos Aires in 1936, the

U.S. attempted to bring Latin America closer to the U.S. The U.S. wanted Latin

Americas states to agree to compulsory consultation should war appear imminent. The

U.S. also wanted to create an Inter-American Consultative Committee along with a

common neutrality policy in the event of war in the Americas.83 However, the U.S. was

opposed by Argentine Foreign Minister Carlos Saaverda Lamas who was committed to

79

The standard work on the Good Neighbor Policy is Bryce Wood, The Making of the Good NeighborPolicy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962). While Wood concentrates on the Caribbean basin inhis study, one gets the broad outlines of Roosevelts policy.80 Tulchin,Argentina and the United States, p. 57.81 Here I am presenting Hulls view of the situation since it is his interpretation of these areas whichinfluenced U.S. policy.82 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, volume I (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), p.496.83 Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1979), p. 133.


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the League of Nations and to Argentine supremacy in Latin America. Saaverda Lamas

felt that the U.S. proposals were nothing more nor less than a means by which the

United States hoped to extend its power and influence over the smaller nations of the

hemisphere.84 This worked out well for Germany since it gave it more freedom to

pursue its policies towards Latin America.

Thermann had some autonomy regarding policy. Issues that arose were handled

through the embassy or in the case of extremely important matters, sent to Berlin and

handled there on an ad hoc basis.

85

In economic matters Thermann deferred to Berlin.

86

Thermann later explained, The theory being that once the war was decided in

Germanys favor her domination [Thermann surely meant economic] of Latin America

would follow without too much effort.87 While trade with Argentina had fallen to

historically low levels with the onset of the depression, Hitlers ascension to power

brought trade up to previous levels.

Between 1880 and 1914 trade grew to the point that Germany was supplying

between 11 and 14 percent of total Argentine imports, second to Great Britain.88 By

1914 Argentina was Germanys second largest trading partner outside Europe.89 For

84 Quoted in Ibid.85 Final Interrogation Report of Edmund Freiherrvon Thermann, 11 July 1945, NARA, RG 59,862.20235/7-1145, ABB, Box 6736, p. 2.86 Ibid. For a new view of Nazi economic policy see Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making

and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (New York: Viking, 2007).87 Interrogation of Edmund Freiherrvon Thermann by Captain Norbert Bogdahn, NARA, RG 59,862.20235/5-1845, ABB, Box 6736, p. 10.88 Great Britain was far and away Argentinas largest trading partner and took in 25% of its exports andsupplied 31% of its total imports by 1913. See Andrew Porter ed. The Oxford History of the British EmpireVolume III: The Nineteenth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 122-145, Wm. RogerLouis and Judith Brown eds. The Oxford History of the British Empire Volume IV: The Twentieth Century(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 623-642 and Rory Miller,Britain and Latin America inthe Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (New York: Longman Group, 1993).89 Newton, The Nazi Menace, p. 19.


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Latin America as a whole, Germany supplied 16.3% of all imports. Conversely, 12.3%

of all Latin American exports went to Germany.90 The outbreak of war in August 1914

brought trade to a halt. Following the war one of the first orders of the German business

community in Argentina was to rebuild trade with Germany. As early as June 1919 when

the Versailles treaty was signed Germany negotiated a two year credit of 100 million gold

pesos to purchase Argentine goods.91 By 1920 trade had almost returned to normal and

two years later the German Chamber of Commerce announced that Germany had

regained its pre-war position in trade with Argentina. German trade with Argentinacontinued to grow, ironically financed by U.S. money under the Dawes and Young

plans.92 In 1929 German sales in Argentina reached their peak at 371 million

Reichsmarks, German purchases of Argentine products were 1.76 billionReichsmarks.93

Germany bought a total of 16.5% of Argentinas total exports. German farmers,

especially the large landowners, prevented trade from expanding even more.

The Great Depression caused many nations to change trade patterns. Instead of

traditional arrangements based on equality of access, most favored nation status, and

clearing of accounts, bilateralism and barter were the new systems of commerce. In

terms of total trade with Latin America Germany ranked third behind Great Britain and

the United States with 10.7% of trade. To protect its position in the world market

90 Christian Leitz, Nazi Germany and the Luso-Hispanic World, Contemporary European History, 12/2(2003), p. 185.91 Newton, German Buenos Aires, p. 70.92 For discussions of the Dawes and Young Plans see especially: William C. McNeil,American Money andthe Weimar Republic: Economics and Politics on the Eve of the Great Depression (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1986), Theo Balderston,Economics and Politics in the Weimar Republic (New York:Cambridge University Press, 2002), and Knut Borchardt, Perspectives on Modern German EconomicHistory and Policy, trans. Peter Lambert (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).93 Newton, German Buenos Aires, p. 70.


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Argentina adopted the policy of buy from those who buy from us.94 Bilateralism was a

way to continue trade without exposing domestic markets to the instability of the world

market. However, Germany had not helped its case by protecting its domestic market at

the expense of trade. In 1928 under pressure from farmers the German government

reduced its tariff-exempt import quota of Argentine beef from 100,000 to 70,000 tons.

The following year it was reduced by a further 20,000 tons. This did not sit well with

major Argentine meat producers. German businessmen in Argentina attempted to block

the legislation, but were unsuccessful; by 1930 total Argentine sales to Germany haddeclined by half relative to 1928.95

Since Nazi Germany was unable to feed its population from domestic agricultural

production it had to turn to overseas markets to make up the shortfall. Argentinas

exports were exactly what Nazi Germany desired, especially cereals, wool, cotton, hides,

tannin and industrial lubricants. As Germany tried to make up for its shortages in

foodstuffs and raw materials world prices were rising which reduced Germanys foreign

exchange reserves. In 1934 at the instigation of Reich Minister of Economics Hjalmar

Schacht, Germany sought out barter agreements for desired goods. Schacht announced

an economic policy for Nazi Germany based on bilateralism along with controls to help

preserve Germanys foreign currency reserves. Imports would be controlled; production

for export would be encouraged and new trading relations opened with smaller countries

in Central and South America. Germany would import more and cheaper raw materials

instead of more expensive finished and semi-finished goods. Stockpiling of raw materials

94 Ibid, p. 90.95 Ibid, p. 92.


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would also be encouraged. Schacht also announced that theReichsmarkcould no longer

be sold for other foreign currencies, but could only be used to purchase German goods.96

To seek out arrangements and encourage trade with Central and South America

Germany announced the creation of the Deutsche Handelsdelegation fr Sdamerika

(German Trade Delegation for South America) in July 1934. This trade mission under

the direction of Otto Kiep spent seven months visiting nearly every Central and South

American nation.97 It concluded several trade agreements with various countries, most

prominently Argentina. On 28 September 1934 Kiep signed a balance-clearingagreement with Argentina which was designed to provide stability for bilateralism. As

Christian Leitz points out, trade was re-established on a compensation system with the

barter system being central.98 However, such agreements were anathema to Roosevelt

and Hull who argued for free and open markets. The agreements were quite complicated

but somewhat successful.

The Argentine government would make available to importers of German goods

foreign exchange at a rate equal to or great than that provided for imports from other

countries. The amounts would set at theReichsmarkvalue of sales of Argentine exports

to Germany. The German government agreed to give German importers of Argentine

goods an exchange at the most favorable rate. The Germans further agreed that it would

give Argentine goods the most favorable and equitable treatment possible. All of this

96 Ebel,Das Dritte Reich und Argentinien, pp. 116

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