INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE August 24, 2012 …

INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

August 24, 201216.2

TO: The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners

FROM: Chief of Police

SUBJECT: MAJOR CRIMES DIVISIONS STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES -REVISED

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

That the Board of Police Commissioners (Board) REVIEW and APPROVE the IntelligenceGuidelines for the Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section.

DISCUSSION

The Board conducted an Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Audit for Fiscal Year 2009/2010 and madeseveral recommendations. With the exception of amending the guidelines pertaining to theLos Angeles Police Department's (Department) Secret Working Environment in March 2010, theBoard noted that the Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section's policies and procedures governing themanner in which intelligence information is gathered and maintained has not been thoroughlyreviewed and/or revised since 2003. In light of changes in the methods and modes of terroristactivity, technology, social media, open source information, and Department of Justiceguidelines, the Board requested that the Department thoroughly review its current standards andprocedures to prevent and investigate terrorist activity and report back to the Board anyrecommended changes to policies and procedures for the Board to consider.

The Board also recommended that the Department give special attention to ensure that itsmethods to prevent and investigate terrorist activity are consistent with national standards andare consistently applied.

After considerable research and analysis of the national standards set forth by the United StatesDepartment of Justice, it is requested that the Standards and Procedures reflect the followingrevisions:

1) The expansion of Anti-Terrorism Division and its transition into Major Crimes Division(MCD), as well as the creation of Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureaushould be included;

2) The existing "Standards and Procedures for Anti-Terrorism Division" should address theadvances in technology, to include an automated reporting system with MCD, theinterne, and social media websites;

ResDectful

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The Honorable Board of Police CommissionersPage 216.2

3) Address the need for a more efficient approval process to initiate investigations yetmaintain the same protection of the public's constitutional rights;

4) Revise the guidelines to be consistent with the national standards set forth by the UnitedStates Department of Justice, the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, theCalifornia Department of Justice Intelligence System recommendations, and 28 CFR Part23 (Code of Federal Regulations) - Criminal Intelligence Operating Policies as they applyto intelligence gathering.

5) Rename "Standards and Procedures" to "Intelligence Guidelines." IntelligenceGuidelines terminology is consistent with national standards. The terminology is usedinterchangeably within the current document. The name change will standardize theterminology throughout the document and prevent misunderstanding.

If you have any questions regarding this correspondence, please have a member of your staffcontact Captain Steven S. Sambar, Commanding Officer, Major Crimes Division,at (213) 486-7220.

INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

August 24, 201215.1

TO: Chief of Police

FROM: Commanding Officer, Major Crimes Division

SUBJECT: MAJOR CRIMES DIVISION STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES - REVISED

It is respectfully requested that you review and approve the attached correspondence related tothe Amendments to Major Crimes Division's Standards and Procedures. Once approved it isrequested that it be forwarded to the Board of Police Commissioners for review and approval.

Should you have any questions regarding this matter please contact Captain Steven S. Sambar, at(213) 486-7220.

STEVEN S. SAMBA', CaptainCommanding OfficerMajor Crimes Division

Attachments

APPROVED: REVIEWED:

kW'MICH '. DOWNING, Deputy Chief MICHE OORE, Assistant ChiefComma g Officer Director, e of Special OperationsCounter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENTMAJOR CRIMES DIVISIONINTELLIGENCE GUIDELINES FOR ANTI-TERRORISM INTELLIGENCE SECTIONApproved by the Board of Police Commissioners:

PREAMBLE

The Board of Police Commissioners (Board) recognizes terrorist activity asthe unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property tointimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segmentthereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. This is consistent withthe Code of Federal Regulations (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85). Terrorist activityalso includes individuals and groups who plan, threaten, finance, aid/abet,and attempt or perform unlawful acts in furtherance of terrorist activity.

The right of public expression through demonstration is expresslyrecognized and shall not, absent the reasonable suspicion to believe thatthere may be a potential for a "significant disruption of the public order," asdefined in these Intelligence Guidelines, be subject to Anti-TerrorismIntelligence Section investigation that involves the maintenance ofIntelligence Files.

Recognizing that terrorist-related intelligence information, properlygathered, analyzed, stored, maintained and disseminated, is essential tothe performance of the Department's mandated duty to protect the publicthrough crime prevention, the Board establishes these IntelligenceGuidelines to provide for the legitimate needs of law enforcement while, atthe same time, steadfastly respecting all constitutional and statutory rightsguaranteed to every individual.

Generally, the focus of an intelligence investigation is strategy oriented. Itfocuses on the goals or potential of an individual, group or enterprise ratherthan on specific violations of law. The objective is not arrest andprosecution of suspects but rather the detection, collection, analysis anddissemination of information for the purpose of developing a strategy forcrime prevention. Criminal investigations are case-oriented and focus onspecific violators of law and specific violations for the purpose of arrest andprosecution after a crime has been committed.

These Intelligence Guidelines pertain only to Anti-Terrorism IntelligenceSection's intelligence function. They do not pertain to any Departmentfunction that is primarily responsible for conducting criminal investigationsand does not maintain "Intelligence Files" as defined in these IntelligenceGuidelines.


I. DEFINITION OF TERMS

Agent Provocateur: An individual employed, directed, encouraged orallowed to associate with target members or groups in order to incite themto illegal action.

Attempt: An act done with intent to commit a crime and tending to, butfalling short of, its commission.

Dissemination: The communication of any Major Crimes DivisionIntelligence File information to any person not assigned to Major CrimesDivision's direct chain of command. All disseminations must be basedupon a right to know and need to know.

Domestic Terrorism: Is the unlawful use, or threatened use, of force orviolence by a group or individual based and operating entirely within theUnited States or Puerto Rico without foreign direction committed againstpersons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilianpopulation, or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or socialobjectives.

Fictitious Online Persona: A fictitious identity created on the Internet forthe purpose of developing online profiles.

File: A collection of information including, but not limited to, reports,photographs, documents, printed materials, tape recordings, videotape,computer information or other writings that are kept separately fromIntelligence Files. A File may include Initial Lead or Intelligence ControlCenter information.

Full Terrorism Intelligence Investigation: An intelligence investigationwhich has met the reasonable suspicion standard and has been approvedby the Commanding Officer, Counter-Terrorism and Special OperationsBureau (CTSOB), or his/her designee.

Informant: (2003 LAPD Informant Manual, Volume I Section 110)a person is an informant when the following criteria are satisfied:

1. The person is directed by an officer at any time, for any reason,2


whether on one or many occasions, in an attempt to secureinformation on criminal and/or terrorist activity; or

2. The person requests to be compensated for information or tasksperformed; or

3. The person requests a letter of consideration or a contract to work offan existing criminal case.


Initial Lead Investigation: The lowest level of investigative activity whichallows a limited follow-up of initial lead information, generally received fromthe public but may include Department and other law enforcement sources;of such a nature that some follow-up as to the possibility of terrorist activityis warranted. The Initial Lead Investigation threshold need not rise to thereasonable suspicion standard, and shall be concluded within a 60-dayperiod. Two 60-day extensions may be granted with the approval of theCommanding Officer, Major Crimes Division. Initial lead information shallbe stored separately from Intelligence Files. Only information that meetsthe reasonable suspicion standard may be placed in Intelligence Files.

Note: A 60-day extension will only be granted with the approval of theCommanding Officer, Major Crimes Division when articulablecircumstances exist that are beyond the control of theInvestigating Officer that prevents ongoing investigative efforts.

Intelligence Control Center: A temporary function performed byDepartment personnel to collect and disseminate intelligence informationduring the course of a potential or actual unusual occurrence. Theinformation sought in such an investigation shall be that needed to facilitatean adequate law enforcement response.

Intelligence File: An Intelligence File contains the investigative intelligenceinformation gathered, received, developed, analyzed and maintainedpursuant to a Full Terrorism Intelligence Investigation, for the purpose ofidentifying terrorist individuals, terrorist groups, and victims of terrorism.The contents of the Intelligence file documents the reasonable suspicion toopen or continue a Full Terrorism Intelligence Investigation.

International Terrorism: Involves violent acts or acts dangerous to humanlife that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any state,or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of theUnited States or any state. These acts appear to be intended to intimidateor coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government byintimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a government byassassination or kidnapping. International terrorist acts occur outside theUnited States or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means bywhich they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerceor intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek

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LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENTMAJOR CRIMES DIVISIONINTELLIGENCE GUIDELINES FOR ANTI-TERRORISM INTELLIGENCE SECTIONApproved by the Board of Police Commissioners:asylum.

Investigator's Working Folder: The Investigator's Working Folder isretained by the assigned investigator and is specifically designated tocontain the investigative materials gathered, received, and developed forthe specific purpose of updating an approved ongoing Full TerrorismIntelligence Investigation. However, the Investigator's Working Folder is notpart of the Intelligence File.

LAPD Sensitive Work Environment (SWE)/Sensitive CompartmentedInformation Facility (SCIF): A facility requiring a national securityclearance for access, housed within the LAPD Police AdministrationBuilding, in which classified FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) directedintelligence investigations are processed and handled by JTTF membersassigned to CT 10.

Maintenance: The process of recording, collating, analyzing, evaluating,indexing, updating, securing, retaining, and purging Intelligence Fileinformation gathered pursuant to an Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Sectionintelligence investigation.

Monitoring: The short-term or preliminary act of observing or watching theactivities of an individual or organization by Anti-Terrorism IntelligenceSection investigators for the purposes of gathering information relevant toan Initial Lead Investigation or Full Terrorism Intelligence Investigation.This short-term monitoring activity shall not rise to the level of"Surveillance" as defined in these Intelligence Guidelines.

Need to Know: A precondition for the communication of intelligenceinformation to entities outside Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section or itsimmediate chain of command.

Online: Activity that occurs over the internet.

Online Investigative Activity: The use of a fictitious online persona toengage in investigative activity existing exclusively over the Internet.

Online Undercover Activity: The use of a Fictitious Online Persona toengage in on-going interactive communication existing exclusively over theInternet with an identified person and is related to an ongoing Terrorism

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LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENTMAJOR CRIMES DIVISIONINTELLIGENCE GUIDELINES FOR ANTI-TERRORISM INTELLIGENCE SECTIONApproved by the Board of Police Commissioners:Intelligence Investigation.

Organizations: Any association or group of individuals.

Pending Activity: A future event possibly requiring operational planningfor policing or police services.

Plan: Organized activity by individuals in preparation for theaccomplishment of an illegal action involving possible terrorist activity.

Reasonable Suspicion: An honest belief, based on known articulablecircumstances, which would cause a reasonable and trained lawenforcement officer to believe that some activity, relating to a definablecriminal activity or enterprise has occurred, may be occurring or has apotential to occur. (This term is in accordance with Department of Justicedefinition: 28 CFR Part 23).

Right to Know: The authority or privilege to receive Anti-TerrorismIntelligence Section intelligence information.

Significant Disruption of the Public Order: Pertains only to publicdemonstrations involving unlawful acts which can reasonably be expectedto result in death, serious bodily injury or property damage and which areintended to have such results to further societal objectives, to influencesocietal action or to harass on the basis of race, religion, national origin, orsexual orientation. The mere fact of a potentially large demonstration shallnot, by itself, constitute a significant disruption of the public order.

Storage/Storing: To provide a place in which any file is kept for thepurpose of records retention and not for the purpose of updating. All storedinformation is kept separate from Intelligence Files.

Surveillance: The continuous or prolonged observation of a targetedindividual or group by clandestine means for the purpose of collectinginformation material to an approved Initial Lead or Full TerrorismIntelligence Investigation.

Target: The subject of an approved investigation.6


Terrorism/Terrorist Activity: The unlawful use of force and violenceagainst persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, thecivilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political orsocial objectives (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85). This definition includesindividuals and groups who plan, threaten, finance, aid/abet, and attempt orperform unlawful acts in furtherance of terrorist activity.

Threaten: The advocacy of, or a statement of intention to commit acriminal act where such advocacy appears to be a viable threat.

Undercover Investigation: An approved Full Terrorism IntelligenceInvestigation involving the use of an undercover officer who clandestinelyobtains information about individuals or organizations through thedevelopment of ongoing in person relationships with such individuals ororganizations.

Undercover Investigation Committee: The President of the Board ofPolice Commissioners and another Commissioner designated by thePresident shall comprise the Undercover Investigation Committee. TheCommissioner comprising that Committee shall serve a maximum of threeconsecutive years, and shall have the duties and assignments asprescribed by these Guidelines.


Undercover Officer: A Los Angeles Police Officer who, pursuant to anapproved Full Terrorism Intelligence Investigation, clandestinely obtainsinformation about individuals or organizations through the development ofongoing in person relationships with such individuals or organizations.

Unusual Occurrence (U0): An event involving potential or actualpersonal injury and/or property damage arising from fire, flood, storm,earthquake, tidal wave, landslide, wreck, enemy action, civil disturbance, orother natural or man-caused incident necessitating the declaration of aTactical Alert or Mobilization. (Emergency Operations Policies &Procedures - Volume 1 of the LAPD Emergency Operations Guide 11)


II. STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLE

A. These Intelligence Guidelines govern the collection, maintenance,storage and dissemination of intelligence information by the Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section. These Guidelines also govern thecollection, maintenance and dissemination of intelligence informationby all other functions and personnel of LAPD when their primaryresponsibility is gathering intelligence information.

In establishing these Guidelines, the Board of Police Commissionersprovides for the legitimate needs of law enforcement within limitscreated by constitutional and statutory protections which guaranteerights: of privacy, to receive, hold and express ideas, to dissent freely,to write and to publish, to petition for the redress of grievances, andto associate publicly and privately for any lawful purpose.

B. In reaching the delicate balance of protecting the rights of individualsand providing for effective prevention of terrorist activity, communitypeace, and in recognizing that no other aspect of the Department'sduties requires such detached and sensitive judgments on the part ofindividual peace officers and that nowhere else is reverence for thelaw more demanded, the Board affirms the following principles:

1 The Department has a policy of absolute prohibition against theuse of illegal or unauthorized methods of collecting, maintaining ordisseminating intelligence information, a policy which shall remainin full force and effect. The Commanding Officer, Major CrimesDivision, shall report to the Chief of Police any intelligence activityreasonably believed to be contrary to the scrupulous observationof this principle.

2. The Department considers it both unnecessary and wrong tomaintain an intelligence file on any individual or organizationunless the reasonable suspicion standard for a Full TerrorismIntelligence Investigation, in accordance with these IntelligenceGuidelines, has been met.


3. Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section personnel shall not collect,maintain or disseminate information about an individual's sexual,political or religious activities, beliefs or opinions unless suchinformation is material to an approved investigation.

4. Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section personnel shall exercise duecaution and discretion in the use of information collected,maintained and disseminated so as not to interfere with thelawfully exercised rights of any person


III. FUNCTIONS AND OBJECTIVES

A. The primary objective of the Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section'sintelligence operation is the prevention of terrorist activity in the Cityof Los Angeles and environs by:

1. Identifying terrorist trends.

2. Identifying terrorist networks.

3. Examining terrorist tactics, developing terrorist profiles, assessingterrorist threats, and developing information to protect potentialtargets.

4. Investigating, identifying and monitoring individuals and groups forwhich reasonable suspicion exists to believe are engaged interrorist activity.

5. Maintaining Intelligence Files on individuals and groups for whichreasonable suspicion exists to believe are engaged in terroristactivity.

6. Assessing and analyzing the capabilities of terrorist individuals orgroups, and providing concerned Department entities withsufficient information to thwart their terrorist goals.

7. Assisting other subdivisions of the Department and other lawenforcement agencies to prevent terrorist activities.

8. Conducting and assisting in criminal investigations for the purposeof disrupting terrorist activity.

B. A secondary objective of Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section is toadvise the Chief of Police and other executive managementpersonnel about pending events which may require operationalawareness or planning for policing or police services.


C. The focus of Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section activity is on thesafety of persons and protection of property through the prevention ofterrorism in the City of Los Angeles. The Board is aware, however,that terrorists do not respect municipal boundaries. It is thereforeappropriate to gather intelligence on international terrorists and otherpersons and organizations whose conduct can reasonably beexpected to affect the City of Los Angeles. Similarly, information maybe gathered with respect to persons residing in Los Angeles who maycommit acts of violence elsewhere and then return. In fulfilling theseresponsibilities, Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section may work withother agencies and pursue investigations into other jurisdictions.


IV. INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

Generally, the focus of an intelligence investigation, (usually of a long-termnature), is the group or individual enterprise, rather than just individualparticipants and specific unlawful acts. The immediate purpose of such aninvestigation is to obtain information concerning the nature and structure ofa group or enterprise, including information relating to the group'smembership, finances, geographical dimensions, past and future activities,and goals. This is done with a view toward detecting and preventingunlawful acts which are intended to have such results to further theirsocietal objectives, to influence societal action or to harass on the basis ofrace, religion, national origin, or sexual orientation.

The objective of the Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section intelligenceinvestigation is not the arrest and prosecution of suspects, but rather thedetection, collection, analysis and dissemination of information for thepurpose of developing a strategy for crime prevention.

A. LEVELS OF INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

The Intelligence Guidelines for Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Sectionallow for two types of investigative activity and allow the necessaryflexibility to act well in advance of the commission of a plannedterrorist attack. The levels of investigative activity are: (1) Initial LeadInvestigations and (2) Full Terrorism Intelligence Investigations.

Whether it is appropriate to open an investigation immediately, or firstengage in a limited follow-up of lead information, depends on thecircumstances presented. If the available information demonstratesat the outset that the threshold standard for a Full TerrorismIntelligence Investigation is satisfied, then approval to conduct theappropriate investigative activity may be requested immediately,without progressing through the more limited investigative stage.However, if the reasonable suspicion standard has not been met,only an Initial Lead Investigation may go forward.


INITIAL LEAD INVESTIGATIONS

The lowest level of investigative activity is the prompt and limited follow-upof initial leads, many of which are initiated by the public. Investigation ofleads should be undertaken whenever information is received of such anature that some follow-up as to the possibility of terrorist activity iswarranted. This limited activity should be conducted with an emphasistoward promptly determining whether further investigation, such as a FullTerrorism Intelligence Investigation, should be conducted.

Many initial investigative leads from the public and other sources areexpected to be somewhat vague and may not meet the reasonablesuspicion standard for a Full Terrorism Intelligence Investigation. However,public safety demands a limited but prompt follow-up investigation. Theauthority to conduct inquiries short of a Full Terrorism IntelligenceInvestigation, allows Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section to respond in ameasured way to ambiguous or incomplete information.

INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES FOR INITIAL LEAD INVESTIGATIONS

The following investigative techniques are authorized for Initial LeadInvestigations:

• Examination of records available to the public (open source);

• Examination of LAPD records;

• Examination of available federal, state, local government records, etc;

• Interview of the person reporting;

• Interview of the potential subject;

• Interview of witnesses;

• Monitoring;


• PhotographyNideography;

• Informants;

o The use of informants requires the approval of the President ofthe Board of Police Commissioners or if unavailable, the othermember of the Undercover Committee. In the event of theabsence of both members of the Undercover Committee, anyother member of the Police Commission may grant approval.

• Surveillance;

o Use of surveillance on an Initial Lead must be approved by theCommanding Officer, Major Crimes Division. The primaryintent for the use of informants and/or surveillance whileconducting an Initial Lead Investigation is to corroborateinformation. Use of informants and/or surveillance on InitialLeads should not be used if there is a less intrusive means toobtain the desired information.

Initial Lead Investigations shall be completed within 60 days from the dateof receipt of the specific lead. Two 60-day extensions may be granted withthe approval of the Commanding Officer, Major Crimes Division. Allrequests for extensions must be documented in the Initial Lead File. Allmaterials collected during the Initial Lead Investigation shall be storedseparately from Intelligence Files unless the initial investigation results inan approved Full Terrorism Intelligence Investigation.

Note: A 60-day extension will only be granted with the approval of theCommanding Officer, Major Crimes Division when articulablecircumstances exist that are beyond the control of theInvestigating Officer that prevents ongoing investigative efforts.


FULL TERRORISM INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

The commencement of each Full Terrorism Intelligence Investigation shallbe approved by the Commanding Officer, Counter-Terrorism and SpecialOperations Bureau (CTSOB), or his/her designee, who shall ensure thereasons for initiating the investigation meet the required threshold as statedbelow.

A Full Terrorism Intelligence Investigation may be initiated when thereexists a reasonable and articulated suspicion that an individual ororganization may be:

• Planning, threatening, attempting, performing, aiding/ abetting,or financing unlawful acts;

• The results of which are intended to further their societal objectives,influence societal action or harass on the basis of race, religion,national origin, or sexual orientation.

INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES FOR FULL TERRORISM INTELLIGENCEINVESTIGATIONS

All lawful investigative techniques may be used in a Full TerrorismIntelligence Investigation.


B. PENDING ACTIVITY REPORTS

1. Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section personnel often receive ordiscover information regarding events significant to the City of LosAngeles. Such events include, but are not limited to: parades,demonstrations, dignitary visitations, and VIP appearances. Theseevents may require operational awareness. Anti-TerrorismIntelligence Section personnel have the responsibility todisseminate this information to the appropriate Department entityor outside agency. The purpose of this dissemination is to facilitatean adequate law enforcement response, to ensure public healthand safety, and to protect the exercise of First Amendment Rights.

2. Pending Activity Reports are subject to the constraints delineatedin the Preamble to these Intelligence Guidelines and shall bestored separately from Anti-Terrorism Intelligence SectionIntelligence Files.

3. Pending Activity Reports shall be transmitted to the appropriateDepartment operational entities immediately upon completion andapproval. Major Crimes Division shall maintain a log of suchreports for audit purposes.


C. INTELLIGENCE CONTROL CENTER FUNCTION

1. The Intelligence Control Center collects and disseminatesintelligence information gathered during an unusual occurrence ora potential unusual occurrence. The information sought in such aninvestigation shall be that needed to facilitate an adequate lawenforcement response.

2. Major Crimes Division personnel may be temporarily assigned tothe Intelligence Control Center. In the event of an unusualoccurrence, Department personnel outside Major Crimes Divisionmay be called upon to assist the functions of the IntelligenceControl Center.

3. At the conclusion of an Intelligence Control Center activation, allmaterials gathered, organized and produced shall be storedseparately from Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section's IntelligenceFiles unless the information is material to a Full TerrorismIntelligence Investigation. Access to information and materialsobtained through the Intelligence Control Center after it has beenclosed will only be allowed with approval of the CommandingOfficer, Major Crimes Division.

4. Personnel assigned to the Intelligence Control Center shallconduct their investigations in a manner that supports the generalprinciples of these Guidelines. While completing the work of theIntelligence Control Center, personnel are not required to adhereto the investigative procedures for Full Terrorism IntelligenceInvestigations as described in these Guidelines or Major CrimesDivision's Divisional Orders. However, personnel shall follow allappropriate Department approved investigative techniques andprocedures.


D. MULTI-AGENCY TASK FORCE

Members of Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section, with the approval ofthe Chief of Police, may be assigned to a multi-agency task force.Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section personnel that are members of amulti-agency task force which is headed by another agency mayengage in the investigative methods legally authorized for use by thatagency, as long as those methods do not violate current laws.


V. LIMITATIONS AND PROHIBITIONS

Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section personnel shall recognize and abide bylegal and policy limitations placed upon their investigations. In addition tothe parameters established by these Intelligence Guidelines, the followingspecific limitations and prohibitions apply to Anti-Terrorism IntelligenceSection personnel and investigations:

A. No member of Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section may engage in anyunlawful activity in the collection, maintenance or dissemination ofintelligence data or information.

B. No member of Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section may knowinglyemploy or direct any individual to illegally engage in the collection,maintenance or dissemination of intelligence data or information.

C. No member of Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section may act orknowingly engage another individual to act as an agent provocateur.

D. No member of Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section may employ theuse of restricted electronic surveillance equipment without conformingto policy as stated in the Department Manual.

E. Initial Lead Investigations are authorized for 60 days withthe possibility of two 60-day extensions. In no event shall an InitialLead Investigation exceed 180 days.


VI. UNDERCOVER INVESTIGATIONS, SURVEILLANCE ANDINFORMANTS

The Board of Police Commissioners recognizes its critical task in balancingthe needs of law enforcement in its efforts to protect the broader society,versus the need to safeguard individual rights guaranteed by a democraticpeople. Necessarily involved in this process is the recognition that a fewgroups and individuals espouse, finance, aid or abet violence and/or thewanton destruction of property and that many such groups have attained ahigh level of criminal sophistication. It is that same criminal sophisticationthat causes law enforcement to resort to the use of undercover operations,surveillance and informants to counteract their progress. However, asserious as these concerns are, they do not outweigh the previouslymentioned societal rights. It is imperative that constitutionally guaranteedrights remain the focal point when utilizing these investigative methods.The law enforcement intelligence community must therefore make optimumuse of appropriate resources when available and maximize its capabilitieswhile operating within legal and ethical constraints.

A. UNDERCOVER INVESTIGATIONS — SAFEGUARDS

An investigation involving an in person infiltration of an organizationor the development of an ongoing in person relationship with anindividual by an undercover officer is the most reliable tool forinformation gathering by law enforcement. The value of theinformation so obtained has been repeatedly demonstrated in theprevention of terrorist activity and other criminal acts.

The use of information gained in undercover operations is greatlydiminished if the manner in which it is obtained casts aspersionsupon the conduct of the undercover officer. The conduct of the officerand control of the investigation is therefore critical to minimizeinterference with lawfully exercised rights. The Chief of Police andthe Board of Police Commissioners are charged with greatresponsibility in authorizing undercover investigations, and should doso only after all other reasonable investigative methods have beendetermined to be impractical or ineffective to accomplish theobjectives of the investigation.

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It is most important that the selection, training, and oversight ofundercover personnel receive the utmost attention. It is alsoimperative that undercover officers understand constitutional andstatutory rights which govern their intelligence gathering limits.

The Chief of Police shall have the authority and responsibility to useall resources available to protect the identity and safety of anundercover officer and to protect the confidentiality of informationobtained in an undercover investigation.

These Intelligence Guidelines establish the limits by which theconduct of Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section personnel andundercover investigative techniques are controlled.

B. UNDERCOVER INVESTIGATION — AUTHORIZATION

Undercover investigations (i.e. use of an undercover officer) may beinitiated subject to the following safeguards:

1. The targeted individual(s) and/or organization have been approvedfor a Full Terrorism Intelligence Investigation.

2. No undercover investigation shall be commenced without thewritten approval of the Chief of Police and the UndercoverInvestigation Committee. Prior to the actual commencement ofany infiltration by an undercover officer, the requirements set forthbelow must be met:


Exception: In an emergency involving a life threateningsituation where the Undercover Investigation Committee isunavailable, an undercover investigation may be commenced withthe approval of the Chief of Police. Telephonic notification to theUndercover Investigation Committee shall be made as soon aspossible and written approval from the Undercover InvestigationCommittee shall be requested within 72 hours.

a. The undercover investigation application shall be signed by theCommanding Officer, Major Crimes Division, through the chainof command to the Chief of Police;

b. All supporting assertions of fact in the application shall becontained in affidavits (or declarations under oath); saidaffidavits or declarations may be based on hearsay evidence.The requirements for these affidavits shall meet therequirements of these Guidelines (and shall not be equatedwith the requirements for a search warrant).

c. The application shall include information which bears upon:

1) Whether there is reasonable suspicion to believe that thetarget individual or organization may be engaged in terroristactivity as defined;

2) The expected results of the undercover operation in terms ofprevention of terrorist activity;

3) The anticipated manner in which the undercover operationwill be conducted, including likely individuals andorganizations who will be contacted;

4) The authorized duration of the undercover investigation andthe provision for periodic review;


5) What other methods have been previously used and whyAnti-Terrorism Intelligence Section believes that anundercover investigation is the only practical means toaccomplish the objectives of the investigation;

6) If the Department intends that the undercover officer shallinfiltrate a non-target organization, then there shall beincluded additional information which clearly indicates theneed to become a member of the non-target organization.No information on the non-target organization or itsmembers will be reported in any intelligence file, unlessthere is reasonable suspicion to believe that the non-targetorganization, or members of the non-target organization,may be involved in terrorist activity or in cases of publicdemonstration, activities which may have the potential tosignificantly disrupt the public order.

3. The Undercover Investigation Committee shall not issue writtenauthorization initiating an undercover investigation of an individualor organization unless the Committee agrees that all of thefollowing requirements have been met:

a. The application has been signed by the officials listed insubparagraph VI.B.2.a above;

b. All supporting assertions of fact are sworn to under oath; and

c. The Undercover Investigation Committee has consulted withlegal counsel for advice, if necessary.

• The Undercover Investigation Committee shall maintain awritten record of compliance with this subparagraph.

d. The Undercover Investigation Committee renders writtenfindings that:


1) There is an approved Full Terrorism IntelligenceInvestigation which meets the respective reasonablesuspicion standard;

2) That other means are unavailable or ineffective to achievethe investigative objectives of the Department; and

3) That the interests of privacy and free expression areoutweighed by the nature and magnitude of the likely harm.

e. Where the Department seeks to infiltrate a non-targetorganization so that an undercover officer may infiltrate thetarget organization, the Committee shall render additionalwritten findings that:

1) All other means of obtaining sufficient information on thetarget organization either have been tried without success orare not practical;

2) There is a reasonable basis for believing that the presenceof the undercover officer in the non-target organization willenable him/her to infiltrate the target organization asevidenced by the fact that:

(a)Members of the target organization are also membersof the non-target organization;

(b)That the target organization recruits members from theactive members of the non-target organization;

(c)That membership in the non-target organization is acondition of membership in the target organization; or


(d)There is a substantial link between the non-targetorganization and target organization, equal to thosedescribed in (a)-(c) above, which otherwise justifies theundercover officer's infiltration of the non-targetorganization; provided, however, that this substantialli nk shall not be based solely on evidence that:

i. The non-target organization espouses or holdsthe same political, social or economic positionsas the target organization (e.g. a non-violentorganization which opposes nuclear power plantsshall not be infiltrated in order to infiltrate a targetorganization which opposes nuclear plants byviolent means unless there are other factorspresent);

ii. The non-target organization shares the sameracial, religious or other status or concerns withthe target organization.

3) The interests in privacy and free expression of the non-targetorganization are outweighed by the nature and magnitude ofthe likely harm by the target organization. In this regard, theCommittee shall consider, in part, former and other currentinfiltrations by undercover officers of the non-targetorganization.

4. Where the Undercover Investigation Committee finds that theapplication for an undercover investigation meets the requirementsset forth in section VI.B.3, it shall issue written authorization toconduct an undercover investigation under the following terms andconditions:

a. Specifying the individual or organization that is the target of theundercover investigation;


b. Setting forth limitations, if any, on the activities which can beengaged in by the undercover investigators with regard to thetarget individual or organization;

c. Imposing a time limit on the undercover investigation, which,however, shall not exceed a period of one year with a semi-annual status review by the Undercover InvestigationCommittee?

d. If the infiltration of a non-target organization has also beenapproved, the written confirmation shall include these additionalterms and conditions:

1) Specify the number of meetings of the non-targetorganization which the undercover officer may attend withoutfurther approval of the Undercover Investigation Committee;

2) Set forth limitations, if any, on the activities which can beengaged in by the undercover officer in the non-targetorganization;

3) Require quarterly reports from Anti-Terrorism IntelligenceSection regarding the steps taken by the undercover officerto infiltrate the target organization, estimates of theadditional time necessary to infiltrate the target organizationand an explanation of the reason why the target has not yetbeen infiltrated;

4) Require quarterly reviews by the Undercover InvestigationCommittee on whether the infiltration of the non-targetorganization still meets the requirements set forth in sectionVI.B.3, above.


5. The Undercover Investigation Committee shall make its decisionwithin 72 hours of receipt of the application of the Department. Inthe event that the Committee is unable to render a decision withinthis time frame, the Chief of Police may present the matter to thefull Board for a determination. The Board's determination shall bemade in accordance with the Undercover Standards andResponsibilities Section of this Intelligence Guidelines (VI.D).

6. If the Department seeks to continue an undercover investigationafter the initial one-year period, the Department shall request thatthe investigation be reviewed by the Undercover InvestigationCommittee.

a. The request for review shall include all information previouslysubmitted and, in addition, shall contain information on allactivities of the undercover officer during the precedinginvestigation, including all organizations and individuals whichwere contacted by him/her in that time period.

b. The Undercover Investigation Committee shall issue writtenauthorization to continue an undercover investigation of a targetorganization or individual only where in the preceding one-yearperiod:

1) The undercover officer has obtained some reliableinformation that the target may still be a viable threat interms of planning, threatening, financing, aiding/abetting,attempting or performing unlawful acts, the results of whichare intended to further their societal objectives, to influencesocietal action, or to harass on the basis of race, religion,national origin, or sexual orientation.

2) The undercover officer has taken all reasonable steps todevelop the necessary contacts with the target organizationor individual so as to ascertain whether said target isconducting activities described in paragraph 2. c. 1) above,but the undercover officer has been unable to develop suchcontacts through no fault of his/her own.

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7. Except as permitted in paragraph VI.B, no undercoverinvestigation shall be conducted absent compliance with theabove-mentioned procedures.

8. Unless already approved under Section VI.B.2.c.6 above, during aduly authorized undercover investigation, an undercover officermay be present on two occasions at events of organizations whichare not the subject of an Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Sectioninvestigation. Once the undercover officer has attended two suchmeetings, functions, demonstrations or other activities (whetherpublic or private), the attendance of the undercover officer at theseactivities shall be reported in writing to the Commanding Officer,Major Crimes Division, the Chief of Police and the Committee.The undercover officer shall not attend any further meetings,functions, demonstrations or other activities of the non-targetorganization except under either of the following circumstances:

a. The failure of the undercover officer to attend such activities willexpose him/her to immediate danger to his/her physical safetyor jeopardize the fictitious identity of the undercover officer. Inthis event, the undercover officer's attendance at theseadditional activities of the non-target organization shall bereported in writing to the Commanding Officer, Major CrimesDivision, the Chief of Police and the Committee.

b. The Committee gives written authorization for the undercoverofficer to attend further activities of the non-target organizationfor the purpose of maintaining a cover, but only in accordancewith the guidelines and findings set forth in Section VI.B.2.c.6.

c. The events and writings pertaining to (a) and (b) above shall beaudited by the Commission pursuant to Section IX, to ensurecompliance with these Guidelines.


C. REVIEW BY THE BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS

1. Each member of the Board of Police Commissioners shall havethe right to request a review by the entire Board of any decision bythe Committee and to have access to such information as may benecessary to make a determination as to whether such a requestis appropriate. In addition, in the event that the UndercoverInvestigation Committee does not confirm the infiltration by theundercover officer, the Chief of Police may request in writing thatthe proposed undercover investigation be reviewed by the entireBoard. The Board in making its review shall:

a. Consider each and every finding made by the UndercoverInvestigation Committee (including such other information asthe Board may seek from the Committee);

b. Prepare written findings if the Board rejects the decision of thecommittee. The written findings shall expressly recite the basisfor, and facts upon which, the decision to override theCommittee was made;

c. Not override the Undercover Investigation Committee unless atleast three votes in favor of said override are obtained; and

d. Report to the public on an annual basis the number of decisionsreviewed and the number of times the decision of theUndercover Investigation Committee was changed.

D. UNDERCOVER STANDARDS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. UNDERCOVER OFFICER STANDARDS

a. PRESENCE AT RELIGIOUS EVENTS: Undercover officersshall take all reasonable steps to minimize any intrusion ofreligious ceremonies, meetings or discussions. Undercoverofficers shall not report on those events unless they relate tothe undercover investigation.

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b. PARTICIPATION IN PRIVILEGED INFORMATION EVENT:Undercover officers shall, when possible, avoid attendance at ameeting which would involve information covered by CaliforniaEvidence Code Sections 954 (Lawyer-Client Privilege), 980(Privilege for Confidential Marital Communications), 992(Confidential Communication Between Patient and Physician),1012 (Confidential Communication between Patient andPsychotherapist), and 1033 (Privilege of Penitent). If anundercover officer attends a meeting where privilegedinformation is shared, the undercover officer shall not report ordivulge the content of said meeting.

NOTE: Undercover officers are exempt from this restriction ifthe holder of the privilege waives same as defined underCalifornia Evidence Code Sections 912, 956, 981, 997 and1018.

c. PRESENCE AT EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION: If attendanceby an undercover officer in an educational institution is requiredas part of the investigation, the officer shall not report on anyactivity associated with the institution which is not directlyrelated to the investigation. The undercover officer shall takeall reasonable steps to minimize any intrusion which his/herconduct might have in connection with the academic freedomsassociated with the institution.

d. WRITTEN REPORTS: Undercover officers shall not makewritten reports of their operations and activities.

e. TRAINING OF UNDERCOVER OFFICERS: The Officer-in-Charge, Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section, shall ensure eachundercover officer is familiar with these sections and is trainedregarding acceptable standards of conduct.


2. UNDERCOVER RESPONSIBILITY

a. OFFICER'S RESPONSIBILITY: An undercover officer whoattends a meeting as described in VI.D.1.a and VI.D.1.b shallreport attendance to the investigative supervisor of the case.

b. SUPERVISOR'S RESPONSIBILITY: An investigativesupervisor who becomes aware that an undercover officer hasattended a meeting as described in VI.D.1.a. shall report suchattendance to the Commanding Officer, Major Crimes Division.

c. COMMANDING OFFICER'S RESPONSIBILITY: TheCommanding Officer, Major Crimes Division, when notified thatan undercover officer has attended two meetings, functions,demonstrations or other activities of any organization notapproved for infiltration, shall report such activity to MajorCrimes Division's immediate chain of command.

NOTE: In connection with religious ceremonies, noreporting beyond the Commanding Officer, Major CrimesDivision, is required if the religious nature of the group wasconsidered at the time the undercover operation was approved.The undercover officer shall be directed not to attend anyfurther such meetings, functions, demonstrations or activities ofany organization not approved for infiltration unless:

Failure of the undercover officer to attend such activities willpose an immediate danger to the physical safety of the officeror jeopardize his/her identity. In this event, the undercoverofficer's attendance at these additional activities shall bereported to the Commanding Officer, Major Crimes Division,and the Commanding Officer, Counter Terrorism and SpecialOperations Bureau, or his/her designee, the latter who shallauthorize attendance at further activities for the purpose ofmaintaining cover.


3. APPROVAL OF THE BOARD

Any request to modify current restrictions on acceptable conductby undercover officers as provided in the Major Crimes DivisionDivisional Orders shall be reviewed and approved by theUndercover Investigation Committee.

E. ONLINE UNDERCOVER ACTIVITY

1. Online Investigative Activity shall not be subject to the PoliceCommission approval process as with Online Undercover Activity.However, Online Investigative Activity must adhere to the MajorCrimes Division Divisional Orders regarding the code of conduct forundercover officers.

2. Once Online Investigative Activity escalates to the point of meetingthe definition of Online Undercover Activity, the investigating officershall obtain approval from the Board of Police Commissioners,Undercover Committee.

3. Fictitious Online Personas created for the purposes of identifyingand examining terrorist trends and tactics, developing profiles, orconducting threat assessments does not constitute OnlineUndercover Activity.

F. SURVEILLANCE AND INFORMANT OPERATIONS

Surveillance and informant operations are discussed in Major CrimesDivision's Divisional Orders. Inclusion of those operations in theseGuidelines would have a detrimental effect on operationaleffectiveness and could jeopardize the safety of officers andinformants.


VII. CONTROL OF INTELLIGENCE FILES

A. The Commanding Officer, Major Crimes Division, shall be responsiblefor the establishment of written procedures to ensure the security ofIntelligence Files. These procedures shall be made available to theCommission's Audit Committee or its designee at any time to monitorcompliance with these Guidelines.

B. The Commanding Officer, Major Crimes Division, shall review allintelligence reports and pending activity reports, prior to their storage.

C. Information collected by Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section personnelshall not be maintained unless it is material to an investigationauthorized under these Intelligence Guidelines. However, recognizinga determination of materiality is not always possible when informationis originally received, an investigator may record information untilsuch time as a determination can be made. Such information shallnot become part of the files maintained by Anti- Terrorism IntelligenceSection, and shall be destroyed in accordance with record keepingprocedures when it is determined that the information is not material.Initial inquiries and contacts, the working investigation notes, drafts orother writings shall be maintained in the investigator's working folder.

D. No member of Major Crimes Division may disseminate informationfrom Major Crimes Division files to any individual or agency that doesnot have both a need and a right to the information.

E. No member of Major Crimes Division may provide a copy of anintelligence report to anyone outside of Anti-Terrorism IntelligenceSection and Major Crimes Division's immediate chain of commandwithout the prior approval of the Commanding Officer, Major CrimesDivision, or the Major Crimes Division Custodian of Records.


F. Any member of Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section who copies,permits inspection of, or disseminates intelligence information fromIntelligence Files shall record the date, name of officer disseminating,name of the individual receiving, the reason for the dissemination, theinformation disseminated, and its reliability.

G. In the case of a joint investigation by Anti-Terrorism IntelligenceSection and another law enforcement agency, the CommandingOfficer, Major Crimes Division, may authorize a free flow ofinformation on the particular individual(s) and organization(s) beinginvestigated, consistent with these Intelligence Guidelines.

H. Members of Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section shall not maintain orutilize the Division's intelligence materials outside of their official worklocation without the written approval of the Commanding Officer,Major Crimes Division.

I. The dissemination of any document prepared to summarize thestatus or activities of a Full Terrorism Intelligence Investigation, otherthan that placed in the Intelligence File or investigator's working folder(such as generated for an Intelligence Briefing), shall be recorded inthe Investigator's Working Folder. Upon the closure of a FullTerrorism Intelligence Investigation, the assigned investigating officershall ascertain the status of any such documents. The findings shallbe recorded in the Investigator's Working Folder to complete theclosure process.


VIII. PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

A. Recognizing the importance and sensitivity of the duties performed byMajor Crimes Division, the Department will exercise special care andattention to the selection, development, training, and retention of allpersonnel assigned to Major Crimes Division.

B. These Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section Intelligence Guidelines shallbe distributed to Major Crimes Division's chain of command and allsubordinate personnel.

C. Major Crimes Division's chain of command and Anti-TerrorismIntelligence Section personnel shall be required to acknowledge inwriting, their receipt of these Intelligence Guidelines, and theiragreement to abide by the purpose, procedures and spirit of itscontent.

D. All Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section personnel and the MajorCrimes Division chain of command shall receive training regardingthese Guidelines.

E. As with any other Department guideline or regulation, any willful ornegligent violation of or deviation from these Intelligence Guidelineswill be viewed as misconduct and be subject to appropriatedisciplinary action.


IX. AUDITING AND OVERSIGHT

A. At least annually, the President of the Board of Police Commissionersshall appoint two Board members (hereinafter the "Audit Committee")to audit the operations of Major Crimes Division for compliance withthese Intelligence Guidelines. The Audit Committee may enlist theassistance of the Inspector General and such support staff who shallbe subject to a background examination and possess the requisiteauditing and management expertise to ensure compliance with theIntelligence Guidelines.

The audit may consist of, but is not be limited to, the following:

1. A review of all Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section intelligenceregulations, rules and policies.

2. A review of all Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section investigationsconducted in the prior year.

3. A review of all materials gathered, received, developed ormaintained by Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section for intelligencepurposes.

4. Conduct an oral interview of Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Sectionpersonnel assigned to task forces wherein another agency is thelead agency and is in possession of all work product. Thisinterview is to ensure that Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Sectionpersonnel assigned to task force operations have anunderstanding of these Guidelines and are abiding by theseGuidelines when not engaged in task force related investigations.This oral interview is to include Major Crimes Division personnelassigned to the LAPD SWE/SCIF (CT-10).

5. A written report setting forth the nature of the audit and thefindings on compliance with these Intelligence Guidelines.


B. The Audit Committee or its designated administrative auditor(s) may,at any time, conduct surprise audits or inspections as deemedappropriate to monitor compliance with these Intelligence Guidelines.

C. Based upon the audit, the administrative auditor(s), under thesupervision of the Audit Committee, shall prepare a confidentialwritten report for the entire Board.

D. From the above confidential report, the Police Commission shallprepare annually, a public report of the audit on the preceding year'sactivities of Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section.

E. Annually, the Commanding Officer, Major Crimes Division, shallprovide written certification that all current Anti-Terrorism IntelligenceSection intelligence investigations have been internally reviewed andthat those investigations which are no longer viable have beenclosed.

F. The Board shall have the right to review and approve Major CrimesDivision's Divisional Orders pertaining to prohibitions on undercoverofficer conduct previously included in these Intelligence Guidelines.Any changes to those provisions shall receive prior approval from theUndercover Investigation Committee. Discussion of the contents ofthe Major Crimes Division Divisional Orders, as they pertain toundercover officers shall remain confidential.

G. Oversight and Auditing of Major Crimes Division's Intelligence Sectionpersonnel assigned to the LAPD SWE/SCIF (CT-10) (see also,Standard Operating Procedures and Physical Security Requirements- SCIF).

1. Upon receipt of the necessary security clearance(s), the InspectorGeneral for the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners willbe provided access to the LAPD SWE/SCIF for the purpose ofoversight directed at LAPD CT-10 personnel.


2. In accordance with existing Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)protocols, it is understood that certain LAPD investigations will beconverted by the FBI into FBI JTTF investigations when the FBIdetermines that those investigations meet investigative thresholdsunder the United States Attorney General Guidelines and the FBI'sDomestic Investigations and Operations Guide. Theseinvestigations and records pertaining thereto will be maintainedwithin the LAPD SWE/SCIF and are subject to FBI and UnitedStates Department of Justice (DOJ) internal inspection and/orauditing processes./

3. In order to meet the objectives of ensuring adherence to federallaw pertaining to the confidentiality of files under the control of theFBI, while also accomplishing oversight responsibilities vested inthe LAPD Inspector General (IG), the LAPD IG will, inconformance with federal laws and regulations (and with thenecessary clearance[s]), have access to audits or inspectionsconducted by the federal government concerning LAPD CT-10personnel.

4. Additionally, where the LAPD IG determines that an inspection oraudit of a particular facet of LAPD CT-10 personnel is necessary,the Special Agent in Charge of the FBI's Counter TerrorismDivision (CT SAC), will audit or inspect the particular facet andcreate a written report for the LAPD IG.

/ Specifically, primary oversight for compliance with the United States Attorney General's Guidelines for DomesticFBI Operations (AGG-Dom) and the FBI's Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG) lies with theUnited States Justice Department's National Security Division and the FBI's Inspection Division, Office of GeneralCounsel, and Office of Integrity and Compliance. Congressional Oversight is conducted by various committees ofthe United States Congress, but primarily by the Judiciary and Intelligence Committees. The Intelligence OversightBoard (I0B), comprised of members from the President's Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB), also conductsoversight of the FBI. Among its other responsibilities, the IOB reviews violations of the Constitution, nationalsecurity law, Executive Orders and Presidential Decision Directives by the FBI and issues reports thereon to thePresident and the Attorney General.

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5. Should the IG determine that it is necessary to review classifiedinvestigative records/information in order to carry out theauditing/oversight of LAPD personnel assigned to CT-10, the IGshall coordinate access to such records and investigations with theCT SAC?

6. At the conclusion of the IG's review of any "classified"inspection/audit, the IG shall prepare a confidential declassifiedreport to the Board of Police Commissioners in which the IG shallassess compliance by LAPD CT-10 personnel with applicablelaws, rules, and standards and procedures. Any use ofinformation from an FBI JTTF files, in either its original format orderived there from, must comply with federal laws and regulations.The IG may not reveal classified information in an LAPD IG report.If the information is vital to the report, the IG shall seek permissionfrom the FBI to use that information in a declassified form. Onlythe FBI can determine whether classified information can bedeclassified. The IG will consult and gain the concurrence of theFBI's CT SAC prior to any dissemination of information derivedfrom the FBI.

7. If the LAPD IG determines that there is a potential violation offederal law or regulation by an FBI Agent or other federalemployee, the IG will refer the matter to the FBI JTTF AssistantSpecial Agent in Charge for appropriate action.


X. PUBLIC ACCESS TO INFORMATION

A. Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section shall provide public access to alldocuments maintained or collected by Anti-Terrorism IntelligenceSection in accordance with the provisions of the Freedom ofInformation Ordinance (F010) of the City of Los Angeles, asinterpreted in the opinion of the City Attorney, dated July 8, 1983, andin accordance with any state or local laws which may require orpermit greater disclosure of information.

B. In providing disclosure pursuant to requests made under this section,or other applicable laws, Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section shallevaluate each document within the scope of each such request on anindividual document by document basis. Anti-Terrorism IntelligenceSection shall search documents within each category of documentsmaintained by Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section (and created afterthe effective date of these Guidelines) and shall, to the extentreasonably possible, maintain documents in a manner which enablestheir production in response to such requests.

C. The Department shall apply the test set forth in subsection "o" of theF010 to any requests and shall consult with the Office of the CityAttorney, as necessary.

Documents

INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE August 24, 2012 …