1. The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) was redesignated the MissileDefense Agency (MDA) in January 2002. This action elevated BMDO to agency sta-tus. Has this redesignation changed your mission in any way?

The change of name reflects a change in responsibilities and authorities of the MDADirector to manage the development of a single integrated Ballistic Missile Defense(BMD) System in a single program within the Department of Defense. The neworganization and authorities will impact decision-making, especially with respect tohow we proceed. The redesignation did not change the mission, but rather itmarked the culmination of last year's extensive missile defense review to determinehow to proceed to meet our growing need for protection from ballistic missile attack.

2. What objectives have been established for missile defense?

The objective of the Missile Defense Program is to develop and, in collaboration withthe Military Departments and Joint Staff, deploy incrementally a BMD System that lay-ers defenses to intercept missiles in all phases of flight − in boost, midcourse, and ter-minal.1 The system will evolve to address all ranges of threat ballistic missiles and toprotect the territories and deployed forces of the United States, allies and friends.

Continued on page 2

Volume 3, Number 2

March 2002

Contents

Interview withGeneral Kadish 1

Introducing Dr Scannell 6

Anti-Jam GPS Pt II 7

Directors Corner 12

FYI.. 8

New Sensors & SeekersCourse 11

Calendar of Events 15

WSTIAC is a DoD InformationAnalysis Center Sponsored by the

Defense Technical InformationCenter and Operated by IiT

Research Institute

W E A P O N S Y S T E M S T E C H N O L O G Y I N F O R M A T I O N A N A L Y S I S C E N T ER

WST IAC

In terview wi thLt Gen Ronald T . Kadish Di rector , Missi le Defense Agency

1 The first opportunity to intercept a missile comes in the boost phase, as it rockets towards space. In this phase of flight,the hot missile is easy to see. The disadvantage of intercepting in this phase is that the engagement window is very small.The second opportunity is in the midcourse phase of flight, after the missile payload separates from the boosters and iscoasting through space. In this phase debris and decoys may accompany warheads, which challenges the capabilitiesof our discrimination sensors. The advantage of intercepting in this phase is that the engagement window is relativelylong. The third phase is the terminal, when the warhead plunges through the atmosphere towards its target. In this stage,the warheads move very fast, which means that the opportunity to kill it is very limited. Given atmospheric resistance,however, the lighter weight decoys are more difficult to employ in this stage.

General Kadish, thank you foragreeing to be interviewed by theWeapon Systems TechnologyInformation Analysis Center(WSTIAC). The readers of theWSTIAC Newsletter are very inter-ested in missile defense becauseit is such a critical part of ourhomeland defense strategy. Wewould like to get your response tothe following questions:

Continued from page 1

Continued on page 3

Leveraging mature and advanced technologies, and investigating newbasing options unconstrained by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)Treaty, the president has stated that a U.S. missile defense capabilitywill be deployed "when ready." At present, with the first deploymentsof Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (or PAC-3) missiles begun last yearand the existing PAC-2 forces, we have a limited capability in the fieldto defend troops and localized areas against short-range ballistic mis-siles.We currently have no defenses against longer-range threats to theUnited States or its interests abroad, forward deployed forces, alliesand friends. This past December the president notified Moscow thatthe United States is withdrawing from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missiletreaty so as to remove the 30-year old restrictions on our ability todevelop, test, and deploy the system we will need to protect ourselvesfrom missile attacks. In view of this decision, we will develop and rec-ommend deployment of capabilities that make sense within the frame-work of our mission and that have been tested sufficiently to give us ahigh level of confidence in their performance reliability and pro-ducibility.

3. We understand that the MDA budget for FY2002 is roughly $7 bil-lion. How is this money being spent?

The restructured Missile Defense Program will focus almost exclusivelyon research, development, test and evaluation (or RDT&E) activities.Much of the funding we received this year has been applied to improv-ing elements that have been under development for some years now,such as Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Sea-BasedMidcourse Defense (formerly known as Navy Theater Wide). A signif-icant share of our funding will go toward the continued developmentof the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element of the system (for-merly known as National Missile Defense) and to the expansion of ourPacific Ocean-based BMD System Test Bed. We also plan to do considerable development work in the otherdefense segments. Following up on our successful "first light" test, weare moving towards a lethality demonstration with the Airborne Laserin the 2004 timeframe against a boosting ballistic missile target. Weare also looking at alternative ways to attack a boosting missile usingkinetic energy interceptors. On the terminal side, we will continueoperational testing of Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) and welook forward to transitioning PAC-3 to full rate production to build upmissile inventory. We also will continue to support the improvement ofthe Israeli Arrow system. The bottom line is that, with the FY 2002 funding, we will pursue abroad range of activities to aggressively develop and test mature andnew technologies for integration into various missile defense elements.The $7 billion figure is roughly correct for what we need to do in thisRDT&E program, and funding at about this level will be necessary inthe out-years if we are to have the program stability required for sus-tained developmental progress.

4. Is MDA making a distinction between Theater Missile Defense andNational Missile Defense or are they now integrated in some way?

From a programmatic standpoint, we are no longer making this dis-tinction. Operationally, "theater" and "national" can take on differentmeanings. The distinction between theater and national missiledefense has gone away because we are now looking at this problemdifferently. Protection for Japan against ballistic missile attack might betheater for us, but it is national for the Japanese. Protection for Israelis theater for us, but it is national for the Israelis, and so on and soforth. You also have to consider that, at some point, a short-rangemissile positioned for launch from the sea could be used to threatenthis country just as effectively as an ICBM. So, as we look at this prob-

lem, especially after September 11, when we were reminded that sur-prise dangers from unexpected sources do arise from time to time, wewant to make sure that we engineer an integrated system that is effec-tive against all ranges of threat missiles.

5. We understand that a robust missile defense system needs toemploy a "layered defense," where threat missiles can be attacked anddestroyed at various points along their flight path. Is the United Statesplanning to use a layered defense, and if so, what will this consist of?

A defining feature of the BMD System is that it will layer defenses byleveraging different geographic environments and configuring sensors,interceptors, and the battle management, command and control com-ponent to optimize the performance of the system. This country's expe-rience in the missile defense field tells us that the technical and oper-ational challenges of intercepting ballistic missiles are daunting. So wemust try to leverage key advantages that may be created when settingup engagement opportunities against a threat missile in each of thephases of flight − first boost, then midcourse, and finally terminal.Reliability in the BMD System will be realized, in part, through theredundancy we build into it. Improved effectiveness, in part, will be afunction of the number of shot opportunities we are able to takeagainst an in-flight missile and how early in the threat missile's flight wecan take those shots. Improving the odds of interception becomes crit-ical when ballistic missiles carry weapons of mass destruction. Also, with boost, midcourse, and terminal defenses, the successful useof ballistic missiles against us will require the attacker to defeat theBMD system using countermeasures at different points along the mis-sile's trajectory. This will not be easy to do. The central point here isthat, by not attacking the missile in all phases of flight, we fail to exploitopportunities that could increase the advantage of the defense. Thisis not to say we will be perfect − no system ever is. But rather webelieve that the layered approach to missile defense is the key to evolv-ing an increasingly effective system.At present, I do not know which elements will make up these layereddefenses. Part of our acquisition approach is to pursue those tech-nologies and system integration concepts that make sense and that aredemonstrated through rigorous testing. Concurrent with these activi-ties we must plan to integrate everything into a single, synergisticwhole. We do not expect we will deploy everything we are developingtoday − some activities will show more promise than others, and weintend to put our money on the winners. This does not mean we arenot making technological progress or that we are lacking for ideas onwhat we should deploy. Based on our accomplishments to date webelieve that in the 2004 to 2006 timeframe we will be in a position torecommend initial deployment of components of the Ground-basedMidcourse Defense element within the BMD Test Bed. In emergencysituations, these same test assets will have an inherent capability toprovide a limited defense of all or parts of the United States againstlonger-range missiles. To counter the short-range air and missilethreat, today we are moving the new PAC-3 missile into productionand into the field, so we know that PAC-3 will be available. Progresson the Airborne Laser (ABL) means that an early, though limited, capa-bility within the next few years is a possibility. Development progress inthe midcourse sea-based interceptor and radars over the next fewyears could provide us with opportunities to focus on developingmobile (or ship-based) missile defense platforms. So we have a good idea of our near-term deployment possibilities, andour testing over the next few years will help clear up the longer-termpicture. Also, the system we are engineering will be able to acceptupgrades and reconfigurations (that is, we can change how we deployour sensors and interceptors), depending on the nature of the threat.What this means is that the composition of our layered defenses willperiodically change. Even in battle our configurations may change, so

Continued from page 2 WSTIAC Newsletter 2nd Quarter 2002

Continued on page 4

that the architecture that we take into a war (especially if that archi-tecture includes ships at sea) may not be the same midway into thatwar or at war's end.

6. We understand that some of our missile defense systems will use a"hit-to-kill" strategy, where the warhead's kinetic energy is the kill mech-anism and no explosives are involved, while other defensive systemswill employ blast and fragmentation as kill mechanisms. Why are weusing different types of kill mechanisms?

You are correct to point out we have other kill mechanisms in devel-opment, to include interceptors using a blast-fragmentation warhead(PAC-3 is a hit-to-kill interceptor that uses a blast-fragmentation war-head to help increase the probability of intercept against cruise mis-siles and aircraft) as well as weapons that use directed energy to killthe target. The use of blast-fragmentation warheads in the PAC-3 ispart of the Patriot legacy, and the use of explosive warheads continuesto be important for engaging air-breathing targets. Many of the ele-ments under development today will use "hit-to-kill" technologies, thatis, sensor-propulsion packages that rely initially on external sensorsand then execute endgame engagement using internal sensors to col-lide with the in-flight ballistic missile or warhead. We are investigating new technologies in order to identify the bestapproach(es) for effectively performing the missile defense mission.The development of multiple kill mechanisms will allow us to continueto advance the state of the art for missile defense, choose what worksbest in meeting the challenges we face (for example, perhaps we willlearn that directed energy is critical to deploying a highly effectiveboost phase intercept capability), and use various kill mechanisms inoptimum combinations to help build up the layered defense architec-ture.

7. The MDA has had a number of fairly recent successes where youdemonstrated that it's possible to "hit a bullet with a bullet." Can youplease describe the types of tests that have been conducted and whatyou were able to demonstrate?

In order to meet the challenges of flight-testing, we use an extensivetest bed. Collectively, ground-test, range, sensor, targets, and instru-mentation assets, as well as our modeling and simulation and associ-ated analytical support activities, provide valuable test capability fordemonstrating technologies and integration concepts. Missile defensetest schedules are complex and use a variety of facilities and rangesspread out across the world. We also use a variety of threat repre-sentative targets. This past year we successfully conducted a number of intercept flighttests. We conducted two successful intercept tests involving theGround-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element, so that we nowhave enough confidence in our hit-to-kill interceptor that we can addadditional complexity (that is, countermeasures) into upcoming tests.This past January we conducted our first successful midcourse interceptof a medium-range ballistic missile target using a sea-based intercep-tor. We also conducted with mixed success several intercept testsinvolving multiple engagements of the PAC-3 ground-based terminaldefense against short- and medium-range ballistic missile and air-breathing targets. Our tests in this area are becoming increasinglycomplex and we have learned that we still have more work do beforewe can move into full production.

8. Some people claim that the hit-to-kill tests conducted to date havenot been realistic enough because an actual threat ballistic missilewould employ countermeasures of one sort or another. What types ofcountermeasures are possible and what are MDA's plans for includingrealistic countermeasures in future tests?

Many types of countermeasures are possible to design, but not all ofthem are practical. Also, countermeasures may be developed for usein each of the engagement phases (boost, midcourse, and terminal−critics mostly address midcourse countermeasures), but it is not likelythat there will be a single countermeasure that is effective in all of theengagement phases. Layered defense introduces significant complex-ity into an attacker's plans. It also is not easy for many countries, froma technical standpoint, to integrate a countermeasure into a missilepayload and successfully employ it. Moreover, few states are likely totest those countermeasures for fear that we will learn about them, andso they will not have confidence that they will work as intended. Yet we also know that the missile defense countermeasures technolo-gy is proliferating and that several nations have countermeasures pro-grams. We are taking the countermeasures threat seriously, especial-ly as it may evolve to defeat our midcourse interceptors.Discrimination, or our ability to find the target in the presence of coun-termeasures, is a major technical challenge. The ability to discriminatebetween decoys and reentry vehicles has always been a part of ourdesign criteria for the Ground-based Midcourse System. We aredeveloping advanced sensor and propulsion technologies, exploitingmajor leaps in computer processing, and advancing the state of the artin battle management, command and control to address these chal-lenges. There is a great deal of uncertainty as to what states are developing,and there is every reason to believe that countermeasures technologywill continue to advance. Therefore, we are using a capability-basedapproach in the development of the BMD System, so that we will havecapability against many of the known types of countermeasures, andwe will improve that capability over time as we learn more about thethreat and as we demonstrate critical counter-countermeasure tech-nologies. Because we are not designing the system only to defeat aspecific threat, this approach will help us to deal with surprise threats,or so-called "unknown unknowns." We have an extensive counter-measure activity underway to explore countermeasure possibilities anddevise responses to them. This activity includes "red team/whiteteam/blue team" analysis and a process whereby we can leverage gov-ernment and industry experts to vet plausible ideas and identify systemweaknesses. As our testing of the individual elements of the BMD sys-tem advances from developmental to more realistic operational test-ing, we will be incorporating more countermeasures into our testingregime.

9. Some people have criticized the MDA for not doing enough tests.Do you think this criticism is warranted and what plans do you havefor testing during the rest of 2002?

Testing has always been an integral part of the Missile DefenseProgram, but we have listened to our critics and are taking steps toconduct more tests and introduce a greater degree of realism into ourtest scenarios. Each test provides valuable data, data that goes direct-ly into development of effective missile defenses. We use disciplined,proven, and scientific methods learned over more than four decadesof missile development, deployment, and operations to conduct thesetests in order to learn as much as we can − we learn from our failuresas well as our successes. Our test philosophy is to add step-by-step complexities over time byusing countermeasures and testing in increasingly stressful environ-ments. Early in our intercept tests when we are testing hit-to-kill, inother words, we will not employ sophisticated countermeasures. Weuse a walk-before-you-run, learn-as-you-go approach to testing.When successes come in increasingly complex tests, we know we areon track. So, our tests help us to determine performance capabilitiesand identify potential design problems. We use what we learn toimprove the elements in preparation for the next test. Over all, our

tests help demonstrate system element performance under varying andstressing conditions and identify challenges. In some cases, the testswe perform help prove out construction, transportation, and logisticsconcepts we will need to build and operate deployment facilities. Thispast year, we conducted roughly one major test a month, most ofwhich were intercept flight-tests. For the remainder of FY 2002, weplan to conduct fifteen element flight tests involving PAC-3, AirborneLaser, Ground-based Midcourse Defense, Sea-based MidcourseDefense, the Israeli Arrow program, and our kinetic energy conceptdevelopment work. We are projecting sixteen more element groundtests (to include testing of all the elements listed above as well asTHAAD and Space-based Laser), eleven system-wide tests or exercises,and four joint interoperability exercises. As you can see, our testingapproach is not limited to flight-testing. Our ground-testing providesperformance assessment in a much broader set of conditions and sce-narios than can be addressed in flight tests. We have wind tunnels thatprovide aerodynamic, aero-thermal, aero-optic jet interaction andshroud separation. We have hardware-in-the-loop test facilities thatemploy state-of-the-art computers in environmental chambers with tar-get scene projection systems and flight motion simulators. We use aunique ballistic missile range facility to investigate real gas effects onaerodynamic shapes above Mach 12 and to test interceptor lethality.We also use modeling and simulation.

10. Can you please explain how modeling and simulation are beingused in our missile defense programs?

Modeling and simulation is an essential part of our development andtest approach. It is used to perform trade-off analyses, to assist indesign and engineering of the integrated BMD System and its ele-ments, to aid in the development of operating concepts, and to per-form as an adjunct to live testing in the characterization and assess-ment of BMD System capability and military utility. We make extensiveuse of modeling and simulation in order to test operational scenariosand conditions that are impractical, difficult, or costly to replicate infight-tests, such as operating in nuclear environments and engagingmultiple ballistic missile attacks against U.S. forces or the UnitedStates. Other constraints − particularly those related to the physicaldimensions of test ranges and the location of fixed test instrumentation− present limitations on the performance envelope that can be fullyflight-tested. We must rely on computer-based testing in order toadvance understanding in these areas. Importantly, our flight testsallow us to gather data to anchor and update our models and simu-lations, so that they are highly representative of real environments.

11. Can you please describe the an airborne laser and the space-based laser and explain how these two system fit into our overall mis-sile defense plans?

Our acquisition approach is to explore different kill mechanisms andgeographic basing modes in order to develop the most effective lay-ered BMD System possible. With the decision to withdraw from the1972 ABM Treaty, it will now be possible to objectively consider cost,operational, and performance trade-offs that different approaches tomissile defense present, to include approaches involving other physi-cal principles, such as directed energy. While hit-to-kill shows greatpromise and will characterize our early 21st century missile defensecapabilities, directed energy has significant military promise over thelong-term. A laser, like that under development for ABL, can offer keyadvantages. High-energy lasers are capable of serving as long-rangeweapons, especially when they can be operated above the atmos-phere. Since we are talking about a speed-of-light weapon, directedenergy also can help overcome the timeline problem faced by all kinet-ic energy interceptors, which rely on boosters and can take several

minutes to reach the point of intercept. Lasers, in other words, canimprove our response time. Ballistic missiles can be attacked within oroutside the atmosphere. All boosting missiles are vulnerable to attackin the early stages of flight from platforms based in the air, at sea, oron the ground. Similarly, a missile or its payload can be attacked inthe midcourse phase from any of the other geographic environments,including from space. The ability to create a layered defense archi-tecture that uses all geographic environments would allow us toimprove the overall effectiveness of the BMD System. Should we overcome the technical challenges that face us in the devel-opment of an ABL or a Space-based Laser (SBL), these elements couldoffer a significant enhancement of system performance. The ABL isintended to target a boosting missile above cloud level by focusing ahigh-energy beam of light on the missile body. The energy of thebeam would heat the skin and weaken the missile structure or cause afuel tank to rupture. This capability, which could be flown to the regionof conflict and positioned to attack missiles as they boost, would addan important additional layer of defense to the architecture. By termi-nating powered flight early, ABL confronts an adversary with theprospect of having missile payloads fall short of their targets, perhapseven on the adversary's own territory. We have known for quite some time that, given adequate deploymentof spacecraft, orbiting platforms could give us a capability to destroyin a timely manner ballistic missiles launched from almost anywhere onthe globe. The long-stand-off distances involved mean that significantenergy and operational demands will be placed on orbiting platforms.With space-based lasers, it would be possible to lase a missile targetas it ascended or in the midcourse part of its trajectory. Space-basedlasers could provide the upper layer of a defense against theater-rangeand intercontinental-range ballistic missiles. Exoatmospheric weaponscould help thin out an attacking force before it released multiple reen-try vehicles or countermeasures. There are still a number of challengesto be met, including developing a light-weight system to withstand therigors of launch. The spacecraft would also have to be designed forrefueling in orbit. So there are plenty of technical and operational dif-ficulties to address.

12. We understand that the Russians have deployed a missiledefense system to defend Moscow against ballistic missiles and thatthis system may use interceptors armed with nuclear warheads. Doesthe United States plan to use nuclear warheads as part of our missiledefense system?

No, the United States has no plan to develop nuclear-tipped missiledefense interceptors. The first U.S. missile defense systems relied onnuclear warheads to increase the probability of killing the warheadand its penetration aids. In 1976 the United States deployed anuclear missile defense system called Safeguard to defend an inter-continental ballistic missile base in Grand Forks, North Dakota.Concerns about the earth environment and political consequences ofnuclear explosions in space and the atmosphere led to Safeguard'sdismantling just a few months after it was declared operational.Today, precision has replaced our earlier reliance on the massed andwide-area effects that only a nuclear weapon can deliver. We nowhave the technology to find an in-flight warhead and to collide withit. Perhaps one day we will also have the capability to destroy thatwarhead with pinpoint accuracy using directed energy.

13. What are some of the key technologies that the United States willneed to develop in order to achieve a robust missile defense systemand what progress is being made to develop these technologies?

The legacy of technologies employed in our missile defense systemscurrently under development can be traced back at least to the 1980s.

Continued from page 3

Continued on page 5

This means that we have been able to build on the investments andhard work of the previous decades. The development of ground-based sensor elements, such as the X-Band Radar (XBR) and theUpgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWRs), may be traced back to thedays of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) that wasfielded in the 1960s. Since that time, we have made significantadvances in relevant technologies, including the development of solid-state Transmit/Receive Modules for X-Band Radars, and in electronicsfor signal and data processing in our sensors and missiles.Over the years, we have had great success in miniaturizing technolo-gies relevant to the BMD mission and making them more reliable.Our sensors are becoming smaller and more sensitive. Space-basedsensors for early warning trace their lineage as far back as the devel-opment of the Defense Support Program begun in the early 1970s.We also have capitalized on subsequent space-based sensor develop-ment programs, so that today we look forward to the deployment of avery capable Space-Based Infrared System (Low) to improve our track-ing and acquisition capabilities. Major advances in focal plane arraytechnology and computer processing will allow us to deploy extremelysensitive "eyes" in space and on the ground, on our sensors and inter-ceptors. We have also had advances in development of longer-lifecryocoolers needed for infrared sensor operations in space. Similarly, our battle management and advanced information process-ing and handling capabilities have a legacy going back to early com-puterized command and control systems like SAGE (Semi-AutomaticGround Environment), which was developed and deployed in the1950s. Computers are critical to all aspects of the missile defensemission, but especially for the battle management function and ourhighly sensitive radars. Using increasingly fast, small, and powerfulcomputers, the battle-management system we have been developingprocesses large volumes of data in order to integrate operations, sortthrough and prioritize tracking and cueing information, and controlmultiple intercepts.Non-nuclear ground-based interceptor technologies owe a great dealto the successes we have had since the 1984 Homing OverlayExperiment (HOE), when we had the first exoatmospheric intercept withthe relatively large and heavy HOE kill vehicle, to include theExoatmospheric Reentry Interceptor System (ERIS) program, and thecurrent Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) and Theater HighAltitude Area Defense (THAAD), and Ground-based MidcourseDefense (GMD) activities. We are now able to develop exoatmos-pheric kill vehicles and endoatmospheric interceptors today that aresmaller and more agile. The advances in on-board computer process-ing capability; larger and more sensitive infrared focal plane arrays;lightweight cryogenic cooling; lighter inertial measurement instru-ments; lighter, higher capacity batteries; lighter-weight structures; andminiaturized propulsion all synergistically combine to provide dramat-ic advances in hit-to-kill capability.Today's exoatmospheric kill vehicles leverage all these advances. TheHOE kill stage weighed roughly 2,500 pounds. This contrasts sharplywith the roughly 120-pound Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) that hasbeen developed for the legacy NMD program. This much smaller andlighter EKV can help us to keep the costs of production down, whileincreasing lethality potential, range, and speed. Even at this lighterweight, the high speed of the intercepts helps ensure lethality. Larger,more sensitive focal plane arrays can detect warheads farther awayand track them more accurately, allowing earlier corrections of the killvehicle trajectory toward the intercept point. The dramatic increase inon-board processing capability is essential for processing the flood ofdata from complex target signatures gathered by these larger focalplane arrays. The enhanced on-board processing combined with theadvanced inertial measurement instruments and miniature propulsion

thrusters enables rapid, precise adjustments of the kill vehicle trajecto-ry toward the selected aimpoint. We have been able to exploitadvanced proportional navigation techniques and smaller, more effi-cient divert propulsion nozzles for our hit-to-kill interceptors.Furthermore, new capabilities for measuring several different colors orwavelengths in a kill vehicle's optical sensor combined with enhancedon-board processing can dramatically enhance our capability to dis-criminate between debris or decoys and an actual warhead.We have made significant technology advances. However, we stillhave a ways to go in areas such as improved target discriminationalgorithms, high speed parallel computer processors for multi-colorseekers, and automated battle management decision algorithm devel-opment. Of course, as we integrate technology into the BMD System,we will need increased technical fidelity in our testing infrastructure toverify increases in system performance.

14. What has MDA accomplished in the last few years that you aremost proud of?

I am proud to be in the forefront of a development activity that is mak-ing steady and consistent progress towards our goal of providing thisnation with an effective, reliable BMD System and, in doing so, work-ing with some of the most talented, skilled, and knowledgeable peo-ple in a very challenging area of engineering. In both government andindustry, the people make a difference. So my focus over these nextfew years will be to convince the best and the brightest in this countryand in allied countries to come to work on this program, to becomevalued contributing members of our missile defense national team. Because we are trying to build effective missile defenses on a prioritybasis, and the technical challenges facing us are significant, a rigor-ous testing program is required if we are to advance towards con-struction and deployment. So I am proud of the progress we havemade in our tests and in advancing the processes (from test prepara-tion to post-test analyses) required to make certain that we spend thetaxpayer's money wisely and get the most out of each test. Testing isalso one of the most significant ways we, and others, can grade ourprogress. We have succeeded in introducing significant rigor in ourtest regimes, which we must do if we are to have any confidence thatwhat we deploy will work reliably. It all comes back to the quality ofthe people we employ − and there are literally hundreds who areinvolved in the tests we conduct. We are meeting the technical chal-lenges head on and, I am pleased to state, making steady strides.

15. What areas currently give you the most concern?

In a program as complex and unprecedented as the Missile DefenseProgram, I am always concerned about encountering surprises, espe-cially in the engineering, cost, and schedule areas. Unwelcome sur-prises in any of those areas can delay our achievement by years. Wecurrently have no defenses in place that can protect the nation, or ourforces and interests abroad, against a ballistic missile attack. There isa certain urgency, not only to deploy a system, but also to ensure thatthat system is both effective and affordable.As a program manager, needless to add, I am always on the lookoutfor better ways to manage this program. Our program is now enter-ing a new phase, moving from technology development to systemengineering, and we face a very significant challenge of integratingmany diverse elements into one system. We employ thousands of indi-viduals throughout the United States. We also are collaborating exten-sively with all of the Military Departments, the Joint Staff, and thewarfighting CINCs as we investigate different basing modes and dealwith associated operational and planning challenges. The manage-

Continued from page 4

Continued on page 6

WSTIAC Newsletter 2nd Quarter 2002

ment challenges we face pose at least as many difficulties as the tech-nical challenges.

16. Is there anything else you would like to share with our readers?

There have been four presidents and nine congresses since 1983 thathave been pressing us along in the area of missile defense. While thenational guidance and priorities relating to missile defense havechanged a number of times over the years, I think we have been goodstewards of the resources that have been entrusted to us. The nation-al support we have received in this area has gotten us to the pointwhere we are today. The efforts of the past have not been wasted; theyfeed directly into the successes we have had this past year. But I believe missile defense today is at a crossroads, both from thedecision-making and technological points of view. We will be makingsome fundamental decisions over these next few years that will giveshape to our defenses for the next decades. How we make those deci-sions, and what we base those decisions on, are highly important inthis process. This is why I have focused so heavily on the managementof the program − not only so that we can be good stewards of the tax-payer's money, but also so that we are structured adequately to makedecisions that this country will have to live with for many years to come.The threats we face and the timelines for developing such a complexsystem are such that we must proceed with all due haste, but not with-out proper deliberation concerning the direction we must take andadequate validation of our choices regarding the functional elementsof the BMD System. That crossroads, in other words, represents thedecisions we have to make, and the testing performances that musttake place, to either get us into a very effective system or to pushdeployment somewhere out into the future (a result that will mean thatthis country will have to abide certain dangers for an undefined peri-od of time). I am confident, however, in our direction and in theprogress that is yet to come.

General Kadish, thank you very much for updating us on the MissileDefense Agency's program and future plans. The Weapon SystemsTechnology Information Analysis Center and our more than 6,000 usersextend our best wishes to you and your staff for future success. ♦

Introducing.. . .

Dr . Edward Scanne l l

WSTIAC is pleased to introduce the new DivisionManager of the Tactical Systems Division, Dr Edward P.Scannell. Dr Scannell, an internationally renowned

specialist in directed energy weapons, joined IITRI in January2002. He is an experimental physicist with over 30 years ofexperience in a broad range of technical areas, in both con-ducting and managing research and development (R&D) pro-grams. His areas of technical expertise include: plasmaphysics; alternative energy sources, such as controlled fusion,magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) generators, nuclear isomers,and fuel cells for both large scale industrial and compact mili-tary applications; electromagnetic (EM) accelerators for EMguns, space propulsion and nuclear weapons simulation; andhigh power microwave (HPM), particle beam, laser and pulsepower physics for directed energy (DE) applications. Prior tojoining IITRI, Dr. Scannell was the chief of the Directed Energyand Power Generation Division including the ElectrochemicalBranch, now in the Sensors and Electron Devices Directorate ofArmy Research Lab at Adelphi MD. ♦

Continued from page 5

In the NEWS...DARPA, ARMY ANNOUNCE FUTURE COMBAT

SYSTEMS LEAD SYSTEM INTEGRATOR

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and theArmy today announced the selection of the team of the Boeing Co.(Anaheim, Calif., and Seattle, Wash.) and Science ApplicationsInternational Corp. (SAIC), (McLean, Va., and San Diego, Calif.) as theLead Systems Integrator (LSI) for the concept and technology develop-ment phase of the Future Combat Systems program. Subject to nego-tiation, the Boeing-SAIC team will receive a $154 million award forthis 16-month effort.The Boeing-SAIC LSI will support the Army's development of the con-cept design, organization and operational structure, and performancespecifications for the FCS program. The LSI Team will develop thearchitecture for the system of systems envisioned for the FCS, and willidentify and evaluate potential concepts and technologies, conductdemonstrations and select the most promising efforts for further defini-tion. The work accomplished by the LSI will ensure the FCS program isready to transition from the concept and technology developmentphase into the system development and demonstration phase during8

NEWS(cont.)the third quarter of fiscal 2003. The LSI approach affords opportuni-ties to insert "leap ahead" technology upgrades when they are mature,to incorporate best business practices and to ensure an integratedeffort from all concerned.The FCS program is a joint DARPA/Army program that is identifying thepromising systems and technologies for achieving the Army's vision offielding an "Objective Force" beginning this decade. "Future CombatSystems is a major step in the transformation of the Army," statedClaude M. Bolton, Jr., assistant secretary of the Army for Acquisition,Logistics and Technology. "The LSI is critical to making the ObjectiveForce a reality in this decade." "FCS is an Army networked system of systems that serves as the corebuilding block within all Objective Force maneuver units of action toenhance advanced joint and coalition warfighting capabilities to pro-vide options for decisive victory to our Nation," said Lt. Gen. JohnRiggs, director, Objective Force Task Force. The FCS is envisioned asa networked system of systems including manned and unmanned plat-forms that will be capable of conducting missions for assault, indirectfires, air defense, reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition,and battle command and communications. The Objective Force is the Army's future full spectrum force; organized,manned, equipped and trained to be more strategically responsive,deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable acrossthe entire spectrum of military operations from major theater warsthrough counter terrorism to homeland security. FCS tactical forma-tions enable the Objective Force to see first, understand first, act firstand finish decisively as the means to tactical success."The DARPA/Army Future Combat Systems effort has been and contin-ues to be a close and effective partnership. (Continued on page 10)

is required to deliver a minimum of 21.88 W = 10 log 10 (21.88) =13.4 dBW of input power to the transmit antenna for the L1 C/A-codesignal. The entire set of specified parameter values for minimum guar-anteed GPS received signal power is as follows:

20

15

5

10

30

1 5 2 01 05 2 5

25

y (Mm)

x (Mm)

Weapon Location

GPS Satellite Orbit

Reo

Rsato

Earth

Horizon25,785 km

25,150 km

5º

Re = radius of earth = 6,370 kmRsato = radius of GPS satellite orbit = 26,560 km

Figure 1: Geometry for max range encounter between GPS receiver and satellite.

Anti-Jam (AJ) GPS Part IIJamming Weapon Receiversby Mark ScottIIT Research Institute

Background

In the September issue of the WSTIAC newsletter, Part I of this seriesdescribed the proliferating employment of Global Positioning System(GPS) navigation receivers in precision guided munitions (PGMs). Alsodescribed were the fundamentals of GPS navigation from the perspec-tive of a weapon guidance function. This discussion explained how aGPS receiver's acquisition and tracking of signals transmitted from theGPS satellites, enables computation of accurate position fixes forapplication to weapon precision guidance functions.

If simple jamming techniques are effective in blocking reception ofGPS signals, then the precision guidance that we are beginning todepend on GPS providing, could be denied to current/future genera-tions of weapons. Accordingly, in this newsletter, Part II in this serieswill describe the characteristics of GPS navigation signals andreceivers that relate to the potential for a weapon-grade receiver to bejammed by tactically feasible electronic countermeasure (ECM)devices.

GPS Satellite Signals

Each GPS satellite transmits navigation signals at two different carrierfrequencies. The primary frequency is called L1 = 1.57542 GHz andthe secondary frequency is called L2 = 1.22760 GHz. The reason foremploying two different carrier frequencies is to enable the GPS receiv-er to correct for variations in the speed of light through the ionospher-ic portion of the earth's atmosphere (ionospheric delay in electromag-netic wave propagation is frequency dependent, and can thus be vir-tually eliminated via dual-frequency ranging measurements).

Both carrier waves are binary phase shift key (BPSK) modulated withwide band, spread spectrum, pseudo-random noise (PRN) codes -unique codes being employed by each satellite (code division multipleaccess or CDMA). These codes are used to accomplish the measure-ment of range from the receiver to the GPS satellite, as described inPart I of this series. The L1 signal carries two codes: the C/A-code(coarse/acquisition-code) and the P-code (precision-code). The C/A-code has a period of 1 msec, a bandwidth of 1.023 MHz, and wasdesigned to be the navigation modulation for general purpose, unre-stricted use in the Standard Positioning Service (SPS). The P-code is ahigher rate, wider bandwidth (10.23 MHz), longer code, with a periodof 1 week. The P-code was designed to be the navigation modulationfor the Precise Positioning Service (PPS) of the GPS system. Intendedprimarily for use by DoD and US Government agencies, the P-codecan be denied to civilian and other SPS users by encryption, to form asecure version of the code known as the Y-code or P(Y)-code. Whilethe L1 signal carries both C/A and P(Y)-codes, L2 usually only carriesthe P(Y)-code.

From the perspective of signal power budget, all three of the GPSsatellite signals (L1 C/A-code, L1 P(Y)-code, and L2 P(Y)-code) arequite similar. We will initially focus on the L1 C/A-code signal for pur-poses of illustration in this article. The transmitter in the GPS satellites

(minimum) dBi0 1 gain antenna receiveG

mLfc

wavelength carrier L1

(maximum) dB2 1.58 losses catmospheri L

(minimum) dBi13.4 21.88 gain antenna transmitG

1.) Figure see- elevation deg 5 at satellite for range (max km25,150

receiver weapon to satellite from range R

(minimum) dBW13.4 W21.88

antenna transmit satellite to power inputP

ra

atmos

ta

t

===

=××==

=

===

===

==

==

=

19.010575.1103)1( 98

1λ

Continued on page 8

WSTIAC Newsletter 2nd Quarter 2002

Continued on page 9

These transmitter parameters result in a minimum signal power densi-ty incident on the receiver antenna of

Note: Power in dBW = 10 log10 (Power in Watts)

This is an incredibly low RF signal! A Christmas tree light bulb sus-pended from a balloon over the California coastline would supply anapproximately equivalent intensity of optical illumination on the face ofan observer looking west from the top of the Empire State Building(assuming no atmospheric attenuation)!

There are several reasons for the faintness of the GPS signal. Thesatellite's transmitter power is modest, viz., ~10 W order of magni-tude, since the satellite is dependant on autonomous power genera-tion via batteries and solar cells. Neither satellites nor receivers havethe luxury of very high antenna gain since both entities have significantfield-of-view requirements (about 45 deg beamwidth for the satellites,to cover all of the earth, all the way out to lower satellite orbits (seeFigure 2); and almost hemispheric coverage for receivers, to simulta-neously observe all satellites above the horizon). Finally, the satellitesare pretty far away, ranging from 20,190 km overhead to 25,150 kmdown near the horizon (see Figure 1 again). Together, these factorsresult in a whispy power density incident on an earthbound receiver'santenna ~10-14 W/m2 = 0.01 pW/m2, i.e., one-hundredth of a pico-Watt (10-12 W) per square meter!

By comparison, the thermal noise resident in the receiver's spreadspectrum bandwidth that accommodates the 1 + MHz wide C/A-coded signal is given by

20

15

5

10

15 20105

25

y (Mm)

x (Mm)

Earth

~45 o

Figure 2: Satellite transmit antenna main beam width and orientationminimum gain = 13.4 dBi

214

23

2,

1081.358.188.21

)1025150(488.21

4

mW

LG

RP

Patmos

tatrdensity

−×=×

=

=

π

π

23

2

2

1

1087.2

4)1()19.0(

4

m

GA

ra

er

−×=

=

=

π

πλ

(1)

The receiver antenna parameters above result in a minimum effectivereceive aperture area of

(2)

The resulting guaranteed minimum received signal power for the L1C/A-code GPS signal (for worst case receiver performance analysis) is:

dBWW

mmW

APP errdensityr

1601009.1

)1087.2()1081.3(16

23214

,

−=×=

××=

⋅=

−

−−

(3)

Using a representative value of 4 dB for the noise figure (numericalfactor of 2.51), yields the following thermal noise level at the C/A-coded spread spectrum signal stage in a GPS receiver:

figure noises receiver' FMHz1.023

signal coded-C/A of bandwidth spectrum spread B63F) or (17C 290K etemperatur ambient standard T

KJ101.38 constants Boltzmann' k

where

FBkTN

SS

23-

SSSS

==

===

×==

=

0

0 (4)

dBWW

WNSS

1401003.1

)51.2()10023.1()290()1038.1(14

623

−=×=

××=−

−

(5)

This noise level, small though it may be, is 20 dB above the receivedGPS signal power, as calculated in equation (3)! The correspondingsignal-to-noise power ratio (SNR) is therefore, -20 dB.

RF Needle in a Thermal Noise Haystack

How then, can a GPS receiver accomplish acquisition and tracking ofweak coded navigation signals that are buried so deeply in internalreceiver noise? Two features of the GPS signal/receiver interactionprocess answer this question. These two features are correlationreception and low rate ephemeris data. First, as described in Part I ofthis series, the receiver has to measure the delay in the received signalassociated with its propagation from the satellite transmitter (it canthen convert this time delay into an estimated range, or pseudo-range,from the satellite to the receiver, for use in the navigation solution).The receiver attempts to measure the time delay in the received signalby comparing (correlating) the PRN spread spectrum code on thereceived signal (buried in noise) with a locally generated replica code.The correlation process multiplies the received and local codes togeth-er and integrates the product, sequentially varying the phase of thelocal code until the two codes line up.

When the two codes do line up, the correlation process strips the codeoff the received signal, despreading the spectrum of the resulting sig-nal down to the bandwidth of the satellite ephemeris data. Since thisdata is of low volume, it can easily be conveyed to the receiver at alow data rate (50 bits/sec) in a narrow bandwidth (50Hz). Accordingly,

Continued from page 7

Continued from page 8

the code correlation process, first and foremost, accomplishes a band-width compression function, squeezing the 1 MHz spread spectrumsignal power into a 50 Hz baseband signal. At baseband, the receivedsignal competes with only 50 Hz of noise spectral density, instead of 1MHz +, thereby realizing a signal processing gain in the ratio of thespread-to-despread bandwidths:

Continued on page 10

( )( )

dB

HzHz

BBWBWBaseSSBWBWSpectrumSpreadGSS

431005.2

5010023.1

4

6

=×=

×=

=

(6)

This spread spectrum signal processing gain yields an amplification inthe baseband signal-to-noise power ratio at the receiver output (lessreceiver implementation losses, Lr, such as cable, insertion, correla-tion, A/D losses, etc., say L r ≈ 2 dB):

dBdB

dBLGSNRSNR rSSSSBB

2124320

=−+−=

−+=

(7)

Hence at the baseband output of a GPS receiver, the weak satellite sig-nals come booming out over the narrow band noise, enabling detec-tion/tracking of the signals, measurement of the propagation timedelays from the satellite to the receiver, and demodulation of the satel-lite ephemeris data.

RF Monkey Wrenches

So what seemed to be a hopelessly weak signal in the receiver's spreadspectrum intermediate frequency (IF) section, arrives at the receiveroutput with apparently ample signal-to-noise margin. This wouldseem to say that GPS receivers should have some natural tolerance tojamming, due to spread spectrum processing gain. A significant jam-mer-to-signal power ratio (JSR) is required to overcome this signalmargin and inhibit signal acquisition/tracking. On the surface, itappears that it may, in fact, be nontrivial to throw an RF monkeywrench into the signal processing works, and jam a GPS receiver.

Such, however, is unfortunately not the case. While it is true, that alarge JSR is required to suppress the baseband GPS signal, large val-ues of JSR turn out to be relatively easy to come by. This is a result ofthe fact that, although spread spectrum processing gain yields amplesignal relative to the noise floor, the absolute signal level remains verysmall, due to the low intensity of the incident GPS signal. Even rela-tively weak jamming transmitters compare favorably with the modestGPS satellite transmitters (~ 10 W). And earth-based jammers enjoya tremendous range advantage over the space based satellite trans-mitters - tens of kilometers for the jammers compared to tens of thou-sands of kilometers for the satellites.

As a numerical example, consider a very small, simple jammer, with aneffective transmitter power (Pj) of only 10 W (10 dBW), applied to aunit gain (Gja = 0 dBi), omnidirectional antenna. The gain of theweapon receiver's antenna in the direction of the earthbound jammer(at or below the horizon) is likely to be less than unity, say Graj ≈ 0.5= -3 dBi. Then an expression for jamming power at the GPS receiv-er's output, as a function of slant range to the jammer (Rj) in km, isgiven by:

SSBWBBW

L

GG

R

PRJ

r

rajja

j

jj ⋅×

=2

14)10(4

)(21

23 π

λ

π(8)

The wavelength, λ1, is again equal to 0.19 m if the jammer centers itstransmission on the victim GPS RF signal - L1 in this case. The jam-ming signal suffers the same circuit losses as the satellite signal tra-versing the receiver, hence the loss, Lr = 1.58 (2 dB), appears in thedenominator.

The correlation process in the receiver multiplies the incoming jam-ming waveform with the local replica of the C/A-code for the satellitebeing tracked. Rather than compressing the jamming into the receiv-er's base bandwidth (BBW = 50 Hz in our example), the correlationprocess spreads the jamming signal out in the frequency domain,thereby diluting its power spectral density (multiplication of waveformsin the time domain results in the mathematical process of convolutionof their frequency spectra). If the jamming waveform is initiallymatched to the spread spectrum bandwidth of the GPS signal, its out-put spectrum will be doubled in width at the output of the correlationprocess, hence the factor of 2 x SSBW in the denominator of equation(8). Finally, this diluted jamming spectrum is filtered by the base band-width at the receiver's output, hence the factor of BBW in the numera-tor of equation (8).

The jamming power expression from the equation (8) is plotted as afunction of receiver-to-jammer range (R j) in Figure 3. Also plotted inFigure 3, for comparison purposes, are the minimum GPS signal out-put power and the noise floor in the GPS receiver output base band.Notice that the jamming power exceeds the signal power whenever theweapon gets closer than about 16 km to the jammer. This representsthe jammer's "keep-out" zone. When the weapon gets within this"keep-out" zone, its receiver can't track GPS signals - the jammingpower grows over the signal level causing the receiver's tracking loopsto loose lock. The receiver can then no longer acquire/track thereceived signals, measure satellite ranges, or demodulate satelliteephemeris data, i.e., the GPS receiver can no longer navigate.

-135

-140

-145

-150

-155

-160

-165

-170

-175

-180

-1859080706050403020100

R jRange to Jammer (km)

Pow

er L

evel

s (d

BW

)

JammerLocation

Range at whichjamming levelexceeds signal

Weapon approachingjammer

S

NJ(Rj)

Figure 3. Signal, noise, and jamming power levels in GPS receiver'soutput base bandwidth.

WSTIAC Newsletter 2nd Quarter 2002

Actually, the situation for our jamming example is a little worse thandescribed above. The signal level actually needs to be somewhatgreater than the interference (jamming plus internal receiver noise) forreliable receiver operation: signal acquisition with low false alarmprobability; signal tracking and accurate propagation delay measure-ment; and data demodulation with acceptable error rates. Actualkeepout ranges for the jammer in this example with respect to the L1C/A-code signal, are 20 km for signal tracking and 70 km for signalacquisition and data demodulation (see Figure 4).

15

10

5

0

-5

-10

-15

-20

-259080706050403020100

Range to Jammer (km)

SIR

(dB

)

JammerLocation

For Rj < 20 km GPSreceiver looses lock,

cannot track signals, iscompletelyinoperative.

Weaponapproaching

jammer

For 20 < R j < 70 kmGPS receiver can:

track signals,measure ranges.

For Rj > 70 km GPSreceiver can:

acquire signals,track signals,

measure ranges,demodulate data.

~ 12 dB

~ 1.5 dB

AcquisitionThreshold

ThresholdTracking

Figure 4. Signal-to-Interference Ratio (SIR) vs. range and receiver performance thresholds.

Conclusion

So the claims you may have heard, that relatively small, low power,unsophisticated noise jammers hold the potential to significantly dis-rupt/deny GPS navigation, are indeed true - at least for C/A-codereceivers. Furthermore, since these jammers are based on relativelysimple technology, they may represent an electronic countermeasure(ECM) that is tactically feasible to field in large numbers. A largematrix of such jammers could create a GPS denial zone with dimen-sions of hundreds of kms (areas of tens of thousands of square kms).

In the next newsletter, the third and final installment in this series of arti-cles will present the fundamental antijam (AJ) electronic counter coun-termeasures (ECCM) available to GPS receivers in weapon applica-tions. These ECCM techniques are designed to mitigate the effects ofthe tactically feasible noise jammers described in this article. For amore comprehensive description of ECM/ECCM aspects of GPS inweapon applications (including P(Y)-code receiver performance injamming environments), WSTIAC will be publishing a state-of-the-artreview on this subject this coming summer (4th quarter FY02). Detailswill be included in the next newsletter article.

References

Open literature references employed in writing Parts I and II of thisseries, that you may find useful for background and depth on GPS top-ics include:

· Herring, "The Global Positioning System," Scientific American, Vol274, No 2, February 1996.· Hurn, GPS - A Guide to the Next Utility, Trimble Navigation,1989.· Kaplan, Understanding GPS - Principles and Applications, ArtechHouse, 1996.· Logsdon, The Navstar Global Positioning System, Van NostrandReinhold, 1992.· Parkinson & Spilker, Global Positioning System:Theory andApplications, Volume I, AIAA, 1996.♦

About the Author Mark Scott received B.S. and M.S. degrees inElectrical Engineering from Michigan State University in 1974 and1976 respectively. From 1977 to 1982 he was employed by theInstrument Division of Lear Siegler, Inc., working on tactical avionicssystems. From 1982 to 1984 he was employed by IIT ResearchInstitute, performing countermeasure/counter-countermeasure(CM/CCM) analyses on air defense radars. From 1984 to 1987 hewas with Harris Corporation working on airborne data links, after whichhe rejoined IITRI. His current research interests include sensor/ coun-termeasure performance analysis, signal processing, and sensor fusionfor smart weapons, multisensor seekers, survivability suites, and C3Iapplications. Mr. Scott is a member of IEEE, the IEEE Aerospace andElectronic Systems Society, and the Association of Old Crows.

Continued from page 9

NEWS(continued from page 6)We look forward to moving ahead in this transformational endeavorwith the Army and the Lead Systems Integrator," said Anthony J. Tether,director of DARPA. Army Col. William Johnson, DARPA's programmanager for the FCS program, added, "the selection of the LSI beginsthe physical transformation of the U.S. Army to the Objective Force."Today's LSI selection follows a 21-month concept design phase duringwhich four contractor teams (Boeing, Science ApplicationsInternational Corp., Team FoCuS Vision Consortium, and TeamGladiator) developed innovative concepts for Future Combat Systems.DARPA and the Army analyzed the concepts and used them to refinethe draft FCS requirements.For more information please contact Jan Walker of DARPA at 703-696-2404, jwalker@darpa.mil or Army Capt. Amy Hannah, 703-697-4314, amy.hannah@hqda.army.mil. ♦

Planning a Conference or Seminar?

WSTIAC can assist with technical support:

· Call for papers· Announcements· Local arrangements· Author kits/paper selection· Registration· Security, meals, transport· Exhibits, receptions· Proceedings

WSTIAC Newsletter 2nd Quarter 2002

is pleased to announce the availability of its

Introduction to Sensors and Seekers forSmart Munitions and Weapons CoursePrimary instructor: Mr Paul Kisatsky, IIT Research Institute

Course Objective: The Weapon Systems Technology Information Analysis Center (WSTI-AC) developed this 2-½ day Introduction to Sensors and Seekers forSmart Munitions and Weapons Course to provide an introduction tothe most commonly used sensors and seekers employed in smartweapons (projectiles, missiles, and wide area mines). It is oriented tomanagers, engineers, and scientists who are engaged in smartweapon program development and who desire to obtain a deeperunderstanding of the sensors they must deal with, but who do not needto personally design or analyze them in depth. An undergraduate tech-nical degree is recommended. Mathematics is kept to a minimum, butimportant formulas are introduced. This course also serves as an excel-lent foundation for those scientists and engineers who desire to pursuethis discipline to intermediate and advanced levels.

Course Outline:The course covers:

♦ Classification of Seekers and Sensors; ♦ Fundamentals of Waves and Propagation; ♦ Fundamentals of Noise and Clutter; ♦ Fundamentals of Search Footprints; ♦ Introduction to Infrared; ♦ Introduction to Radar; ♦ Introduction to LADAR; ♦ Introduction to Visionics; ♦ Introduction to Acoustics; ♦ Future Projections and Interactive Brainstorming.

Course Sponsors: ♦ DUSD(S&T) Weapon Systems Directorate ♦ Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC)

About the Instructor:Mr Paul Kisatsky is a Senior Physical Scientist with the IIT ResearchInstitute. He is a nationally recognized expert on sensors and seekersfor smart munitions and weapons and has more than 30 years ofhands-on experience developing sensors and seekers fielded in mod-ern smart munitions and weapons.

Training at Your Location:WSTIAC can conduct this Sensors and Seekers for Smart MunitionsandWeapons Course at your location to reduce your travel time andcost. This is a very cost effective way to provide training on sensors andseekers to up to 25 people on-site. Please call Ms. Kelly Hopkins at(256) 382-4747 to discuss such training opportunities and/or sched-ule a course.

Course Description:The course stresses the basic principles and underlying physics of howsensors work, what they can do, and how they are limited. Both air-borne (projectiles and missiles) as well as ground based (smart minesand wide area denial) weapon platforms are covered. The course pro-vides both managers and non-sensor-specific engineers with theframework they need to manage the development of sensor basedsmart munitions and weapons. This course assists program engineersto define the boundaries of their "trade space" and to make themaware of the capabilities, potentials and limitations of modernautonomous sensor technology. An overview of the different types andclasses of sensors is presented. Fundamental wave propagation phe-nomena, which governs the behavior of most sensors, is reviewed.How search footprints in time and space must both define and limit thesensor properties is discussed. Noise and clutter, the predominantobstacles to success in autonomous seekers, are given emphasis. Themajor sensor types are classified and each is discussed. In particular,Infrared, Radar, Optical Laser Radar (LADAR), Imaging and Non-imag-ing, and Acoustic sensors are individually covered. Of special interestis the discussion on human visionics versus machine recognition, sincethis concept is of central importance to understanding automomousversus man-in-the-loop sensing systems. The implications of "artificialintelligence", "data fusion", and "multi-mode" sensors are also brieflydicussed. System constraints, which force tradeoffs in sensor designand in ultimate performance, are also covered. Time permitting, a pro-jection of future trends in the role of sensors for smart munitions will bepresented, followed by a "brain-storming" session to solicit studentviews.

Handout Material:Each student will receive a comprehensive set of course notes cover-ing the material presented.

Fee:The registration fee for this 2-½ day course is $950 for US governmentpersonnel and $1150 for government contractors. Contractor teamsof 3 or more, registered at the same time, are charged $950 per per-son.

Notice: WSTIAC reserves the right to substitute speakers and canceland/or change the course schedule for any reason. In the event of aschedule change or cancellation, registered participants will be indi-vidually informed.

For additional information, contact: Ms. Kelly Hopkins, Seminar Administrator, at (256) 382-4747, fax: (256) 382-4702 or by e-mail: khopkins@iitri.org

The fiscal 2003 Department of Defense Budget request of $369 billion (B), plus another $10B if needed to fight thewar on terrorism, will accelerate the changes needed to transform the U.S. military and provide for homelanddefense. This request represents a $48B increase over fiscal 2002. According to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul

Wolfowitz's testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Defense, the budget request "…addresses our country's need to fight the war on terror, to support our men and women in uniform and modernize theforces we have, and to prepare for the challenges of the 21st Century." The 2003 budget will start to implement the DoDtransformation planned as a result of the Quadrennial Defense Review examination of defense priorities. The budgetreflects several changes in DoD policy. The budget focuses on capabilities needed to counter different types of threats,rather than trying to anticipate where those threats may come from. It also expands the definition of the traditional sea,air and land-based nuclear triad to include a new type of "triad" that emphasizes offensive nuclear and non-nuclearweapons, missile defense, and responsive infrastructure. Since the U.S. is likely to face unconventional enemies that willneed to be defeated by precision weapons, agile forces and intelligence, the budget includes a substantial investment inintelligence gathering and $9.9B for science and technology. It also includes $1B for unmanned ground, sea and airvehicles, $9.4B to strengthen our fight against terrorism and $7.8B for missile defense. President Bush has called onCongress to quickly pass his fiscal 2003 defense budget request and not wait until September or October to pass the leg-islation as it has done in years past. "That's bad budgeting practices in times of peace," President Bush said, and "it's real-ly bad budgeting practices in times of war." Although hearings have already started, only time will tell if Congress will bewilling to act quickly on the DoD fiscal 2003 budget request.

This issue of the WSTIAC Newsletter features an interview with Air Force Lt Gen Ronald T. Kadish, Director of the DoDMissile Defense Agency (previously called Ballistic Missile Defense Organization) and a technical article on Anti-Jam GPSTechnology by Mr. Mark Scott, a Senior Science Advisor at the IIT Research Institute. The interview with Lt Gen Kadishcomes at a time when the Bush administration is putting increased emphasis on missile defense and the Missile DefenseAgency has just recently experienced its fourth successful intercept in six attempts during testing of the Ground-basedMidcourse Defense (GMD) Segment, formerly known as National Missile Defense. Mr. Scott's article is the second in amulti-part series that first appeared in the WSTIAC Newsletter, Volume 2, Number 4, September 2001. This article isimportant because almost all precision-guided weapons currently rely on the global positioning system (GPS). In certainsituations GPS can be jammed and rendered unusable and the implementation of robust anti-jam GPS technology is crit-ical to the success of future precision weapons that rely on GPS as their primary or secondary guidance system.

We welcome your feedback about the WSTIAC Newsletter and solicit your suggestions for future topics you would like tosee included. You can reach me by Email at wkitchens@iitri.org or by phone at (703) 933-3317. ♦

Director/Chief Scientist’sDirector/Chief Scientist’s CornerCorner

A view from Washington

by Dr. Wes Kitchens

The WSTIAC Newsletter is the current awareness pub-lication of the Weapon Systems TechnologyInformation Analysis Center (WSTIAC). WSTIAC, aDepartment of Defense (DoD) Information AnalysisCenter (IAC), is administratively managed by theDefense Information Systems Agency (DISA), DefenseTechnical Information Center (DTIC) under the DoDIAC Program. The Contracting Officer's TechnicalRepresentative (COTR) for WSTIAC is Mr. H. JackTaylor, ODUSD (S&T), Defense Pentagon,Washington, D.C. 20301-3080, (703) 588-7405. IITResearch Institute operates WSTIAC, which servicesGovernment, industry, and academia as a Center ofExcellence in Weapon Systems Technology.

WSTIAC Director: Dr. Wes Kitchens703.933.3317, Email: wkitchens@iitri.org

Database Inquiries: Vakare Valaitis703.933.3362 Email: vvalaitis@iitri.org

Internet: http://iac.dtic.mil/wstiac/

All data and information herein reported are believedto be reliable; however, no warrant, expressed orimplied, is to be construed as to the accuracy or thecompleteness of the information presented. Theviews, opinions, and findings contained in this publi-cation are those of the author(s) and should not beconstrued as an official Agency position, policy, ordecision, unless so designated by other official docu-mentation.

ADVANCED CONCEPT TECHNOLOGY DEMONTRATION LISTFOR 2002 ANNOUNCED

Edward C. "Pete" Aldridge, under secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technologyand Logistics, announced today the selection of new Advanced Concept TechnologyDemonstration (ACTD) projects for fiscal year 2002. The ACTD program aids inrapidly transitioning advanced technology into the hands of the unified command-ers. Of the funded ACTDs for fiscal year 2002, 11 will directly support the war onterrorism. The military services, theater commanders and Defense agencies submit-ted nearly 80 proposed fiscal year 2002 ACTD projects. Representatives of the mil-itary services and unified commanders reviewed the list of proposals and providedtheir priorities to the Joint Staff's Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).Marrying new operational concepts with new technologies, ACTDs reduce the timerequired to field new systems and increase end-user involvement in system refine-ment and integration. Initiated in 1995, the ACTD program focuses on rapidly plac-ing maturing technologies in the hands of warfighters. In partnership with opera-tional commanders, the services and the Joint Staff, the program delivers prototypesas tailored solutions for validated mission needs. Our products demonstrate the mil-itary utility of new technologies while giving warfighters hands-on experience todevelop concepts for operational employment. ACTD projects span a broad spec-trum of operational requirements with an emphasis on joint capabilities. In manycases, ACTDs yield transformational changes. Products such as unmanned aerialvehicles (UAVs) and unattended ground sensors (UGS) change the paradigms formilitary operations. Approximately 30 ACTD products support our nation's counter-terrorism efforts in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Noble Eagle. The ACTDs selected for initiation in fiscal year 2002 include: Active Denial System: A system mounted on stationary and mobile platforms to pro-

vide long-range, anti-personnel, non-lethal force options to commanders. Agile Transportation: A system providing visibility of transportation requirements

and assets to improve scheduling decision support tools for mode determinationand optimization of inter- and intra-theater lift assets. Coalition Information Assurance Common Operational Picture: Provides a detailed

information assurance and situational awareness picture of the information systemsecurity status of all mission critical systems on a near-or-real-time basis in supportof CINC and coalition missions. Contamination Avoidance at Seaports of Debarkation: Provides a deployable pack-

age for a chemical and biological defense capability at seaports of debarkation tominimize impact on seaport operations. Expendable Unmanned Air Vehicle and Air-Launched Extended Range Transporter:

Air vehicles providing covert delivery of off-board sensors, tactical surveillance, bat-tle damage assessment and weapons of mass destruction monitoring at low cost. Homeland Security: A homeland security capability for assured, secure, survivable

interagency network connectivity to assess and track threats across multipledomains with a coordinated response capability to neutralize threats and recoverfrom damage. HYCAS: A hyperspectral collection and analysis system with sensors integrated onto

operational platforms and into the existing tasking, processing, exploitation and dis-semination (TPED) architectures supporting a counter-concealment, camouflageand deception intelligence capability.

Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal-Knowledge and Technology OperationalDemonstration: A system providing a new integrated capability for joint and coali-tion explosive ordnance disposal forces. Language and Speech Exploitation Resources: Systems automating translation of

spoken or written foreign languages for quickly translating captured documents,debriefing witnesses and supporting communication in coalition operations. Micro Air Vehicle: A fully autonomous 6-9 inch micro aerial vehicle providing small

ground combat units with situational awareness of enemy activity using a low-cost,disposal air vehicle. Pathfinder: An integration of unattended ground vehicles, unmanned air vehicles

and smart sensors in a mobile, self-forming network providing enhanced situation-al awareness, command, control and communications to commanders and assaultforces for urban reconnaissance. Thermobaric: A penetrator payload to defeat enemy tunnel facilities and weapons.Three additional ACTD projects will be initiated during this fiscal year if funding

permits. These include:

FY I . . .

FYI Cont .

Agent Defeat Warhead: A weapon providing a hightemperature incendiary kinetic energy penetrator war-head to destroy biological and chemical manufactur-ing and storage facilities. Joint Distance Support and Response: A system pro-

viding near-real-time, reliable, accurate telemainte-nance for forward deployed forces and weapon sys-tems using a collaborative knowledge center and toolsuite, with reach-back capability. SPARTAN: An unmanned surface watercraft providing

a low-cost force multiplier with integrated expedi-tionary sensor and weapon systems for use againstasymmetric threats.

Information on ACTDs can be found athttp://www.acq.osd.mil/actd/descript.htm. ♦

WSTIAC Newsletter 2nd Quarter 2002

Smart/Precision Weapons Training SeminarLOCATION: Huntsville, Alabama, 2002

23-25 April 18-20 June 20-22 August

(Seminar starts at 8:00 AM Tuesday and ends at 12:00 PM Thursday)

Seminar Scope:The Weapon Systems Technology InformationAnalysis Center (WSTIAC) developed this 2-½ daySmart Weapons Training Seminar to provide a com-prehensive understanding of smart weapons andrelated technologies. This seminar is aimed at pro-viding general knowledge about smart weaponstechnology and a source of current information onselected U.S. and foreign smart weapons, to includesystem description, concept of employment, per-formance characteristics, effectiveness and programstatus.

Seminar Objectives:The seminar's objective is to inform materiel andcombat developers, systems analysts, scientists,engineers, managers and business developers aboutsmart weapons to include: State of the art of repre-sentative U.S. and foreign smart weapon systems;Employment concepts; Smart weapons related sys-tems, subsystems, and technologies; andTechnology trends.

Seminar Sponsors:hDUSD(S&T) Weapons

hDefense Technical Information Center(DTIC)

hJoint Technical Coordinating Group MunitionsEffectiveness(Smart Munitions Working Group)

About the Seminar:This seminar was originally developed for the U.S.Army Command and General Staff College in FortLeavenworth, Kansas. It has proven to be enor-mously popular with attendees from both govern-ment and industry. The seminar is updated annual-ly to include current information about the latesttechnology and capability upgrades being made torepresentative US and foreign smart weapon sys-tems. Instructors include: Dr. Wes Kitchens, WSTI-AC Director and former DDR&E Director forWeapons Technologies; Mr. Mark Scott and Mr.Hunter Chockley, IITRI Science Advisors; and Mr.Mike Holthus, foreign weapons expert at theNational Ground Intelligence Center.

Security Classification:The security classification of this seminar is SECRET(U.S. Citizens Only).

Fee:The registration fee for this 2-½ seminar is $950 forUS government personnel and $1150 for govern-ment contractors. Contractor teams of 3 or more,registered at the same time, are charged $950 perperson.

Registration:Attendance is limited to 35 people and the seminarsgenerally fill up fast. All registrations will beacknowledged, and each attendee will be sent anagenda, maps, and directions to the seminar site.

Please call Ms. Kelly Hopkins at (256) 382-4747 or

email khopkins@iitri.org for more information and a brochure with seminar details.

Smart Weapons Training Seminar Offered at Your LocationWSTIAC can conduct its 2-½ day Smart Weapons Training Seminar at your location dur-ing 2001 to reduce your travel time and cost. This seminar has been presented to hun-dreds of students over the past decade. This is a very cost effective way to provide smartweapons training to up to 35 people at your site.

Upcoming Conferences and Courses

29 April-1 May 2002Fuze ConferenceMarriott River WalkSan Antonio TXFor additional information:Email: rmohrmann@ndia.orghttp://register.ndia.org/interview/register.ndia?~Brochure~2560

5-8 May 5-8 2002AOC International EW Conference and ExpositionStockholm, Sweden For additional information: AOC, 888-OLD-CROW E-mail: bnelms@crows.orghttp://www.crows.org

6-9 May 200247th Annual Joint EW ConferenceLackland AFB, TXSecret/US Government-OnlyFor additional information contact: John Geise 937.255.2960E-mail: john.geise@wpafb.af.milhttps://jewc.mugu.navy.mil

6-10 May 2002Live Fire Test and EvaluationMonterey CAFor additional information:Email: pedmonson@ndia.orghttp://register.ndia.org/interview/register.ndia?~Brochure~2190

11-15 May 2002IEEE International Conference on Robotics and AutomationCrystal Gateway Marriott HotelWashington DCFor additional information:http://www.icra-iros.com/icra2002/index.html

13-16 May 200221st Century Military Operations and TechnologySheraton Atlantic City Convention CenterAtlantic City, NJFor additional informationEmail: djenks@ndia.orghttp://register.ndia.org/interview/register.ndia?PID=Brochure&SID=_0MF0QZX7J&MID=2610

21-22 May 2002Network Centric Warfare 2002 ConferenceCrystal City, Arlington, VAFor additional information contact: IQPC, 800.882.8684 E-mail info@iqpc.comhttp://www.iqpc.com/NA-1763-01

27-29 May 20029th Saint Petersburg International Conference on IntegratedNavigation SystemsSt Petersburg RussiaFor additional information:Contact: Dr. John Niemela 732 427 4635Email: john.niemela@maill.monmouth.army.milhttp://www.elektropribor.spb.ru/confs/icins02/index.html

3-5 June 20022002 Mines, Demolition and Non-Lethal ConferenceSaddlebrook Resort, Tampa FLFor additional informationEmail: djenks@ndia.orghttp://register.ndia.org/interview/register.ndia?PID=Brochure&SID=_0MF0QZX7J&MID=2500

3-5 June 20022nd Annual Intelligent Vehicle Systems Symposium Grand Traverse Resort & SpaTraverse City, MI For additional informationEmail: djenks@ndia.orghttp://register.ndia.org/interview/register.ndia?PID=Brochure&SID=_0MF0QZX7J&MID=257

4-5 June 2002UAV Payloads ConferenceArmy Research Lab, Adelphi, MDSecret/US-OnlyFor additional information contact: AOC, 888-OLD-CROW Email: bnelms@crows.orghttp://www.crows.org

21-25 July 2002Joint Advanced Weapon Systems Sensors, Simulation andSupport Symposium (JAWS S3)Air Force AcademyColorado Springs, COFor additional information:Email: CGriffith@anteon.com

23-27 September 200220th International Symposium On BallisticsThe Rosen Centre HotelOrlando, FLFor additional information:http://register.ndia.org/interview/register.ndia?~Brochure~2210

WSTIAC Newsletter 2nd Quarter 2002

Inside this issue. . .

Interview with LtGen KadishAnti Jam GPS Introducing Dr ScannellDirector’s CornerF Y I New Sensors and Seekers CourseCalendar of Events

Please return this form to:IIT Research Institute/WSTIACATTN: Publication Department1901 N Beauregard Street, Suite 400Alexandria VA 22311-1705

or fax....703.933.3325

Add my name to the WSTIAC Newsletter mailing list

Please send WSTIAC Technical Area Task Information (government)

Please send WSTIAC general information

Correct my address information (see below)

Please send WSTIAC Subscriber Information(industry)Please send WSTIAC publications list

Telephone:

Fax:

E-mail:

Name:

Organization:

Address:

Please also add my name to the following mailing lists:

MTIACManufacturingTechnologyQuality

RACReliabilityMaintainabilityand Process

AMPTIACAdvancedMaterialsand Testing

MSIACModeling andSimulation

IATACInformationAssurance

1901 N Beauregard Street,Suite 400Alexandria VA 22311-1705