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InterpretationA JOURNAL A OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHYFall 1993 Volume 21 Number 1

Carl Page The Unnamed Fifth: Republic 369d

Patrick Coby Socrates on the Decline and Fall of RegimesBooks 8 and 9 of the Republic

Richard Burrow Gulliver's Travels: The Stunting of aPhilosopher

Book Reviews

Charles E. Butterworth A If Lay la wa Layla, The Arabian Nights,translated by Husain Haddawy

Michael P. Zuckert The Unvarnished Doctrine: Locke,Liberalism, and the American Revolution,by Steven M. Dworetz

Charles T. Rubin Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, by ArneNaess

Lucia BoydenProchnow

An Index to Interpretation, Volumes 11through 20


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InterpretationEditor-in-Chief

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Hilail Gildin, Dept. of Philosophy, Queens CollegeLeonard GreySeth G. Benardete Charles E. ButterworthHilail Gildin Robert Horwitz (d . 1987)Howard B. White (d . 1974)Christopher Bruell Joseph Cropsey Ernest L. FortinJohn Hallowell (d . 1992) Harry V. Jaffa DavidLowenthal Muhsin Mahdi Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr.Arnaldo Momigliano (d . 1987) Michael Oakeshott(d . 1990) Ellis Sandoz Leo Strauss (d . 1973)Kenneth W. ThompsonTerence E. Marshall Heinrich MeierWayne Amble r Maurice Auerbach Fred BaumannMichael Blaustein - Mark Blitz Patrick CobyEdward J. Erler M aureen Feder-Marcus Joseph E.Goldberg Stephen Harvey Pamela K. Jensen KenMasugi Grant B. Mindle James W. Morris WillMorrisey Aryeh L. Motzkin Charles T. RubinLeslie G . Rubin Bradford P. Wilson Hossein ZiaiMichael Zuckert Catherine ZuckertLucia B. ProchnowSubscription rates per volume (3 issues):

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InterpretationFall 1993 Volume 21 Number 1Carl Page The Unnamed Fifth: Republic 369d 3Patrick Coby Socrates on th e Decline and Fall of Regimes:

Books 8 and 9 of th e Republic 15Richard Burrow Gulliver's Travels : The Stunting of a

PhilosopherBook Reviews

41

Charles E . Butterworth AlfLayla wa Layla, The Arabian Nights,translated by Husain Haddawy 59

Michael P. Zuckert The Unvarnished Doctrine: Locke,Liberalism, and th e American Revolution,by Steven M. Dworetz 67

Charles T . Rubin Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, by ArneNaess 73

Lucia BoydenProchnow

An Index to Interpretation, Volumes 1 1through 20

Copyright 1993 - interpretation

ISSN 0020-9635

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The Unnamed Fifth: Republic 369dCarl PageEmory University

Halfway through Book II of Plato's Republic, Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus embark upon their famous construction of a "city in speech"(369c).Their aim is to read th e idea of justice off th e scrutable face of the city as analternative to having to fathom th e obscurer depths of men's individual souls(368d-369a). Full development of th e city in speech occurs in a series of dist inguishable phases, culminating in th e program of education that Socrates proposes fo r his philosopher-kings at th e end of Book VII (521c-540c). Of th emany transitions that mark th e overall development, tw o stand out for being theonly ones marked by a dramatic interruption of th e conversation. The one isoccasioned by Glaucon in Book II (372c) and th e other by Adeimantus (onbehalf of Polemarchus) at th e beginning of Book V (449b). Groundwork fo r th ecity in speech begins with Adeimantus and runs through tw o stages beforeGlaucon interrupts . The second, elaborated from 370c-372b, produces a modelcity that Socrates soon calls "healthy" and "truthful" (372e), while th e very firststage of th e construction is dubbed "the most necessary city"(he anagkaiotatepolis) and it is made up "from four or five men (andres)" (369d). As it happens, th e very brief account of skills demanded by "the most necessary city"had included only four by name: th e arts of th e farmer, th e housebuilder, th eweaver , and th e shoemaker.

In light of th e procedurally crucial resolve to spell out their city with th elargest, clearest, most discernible alphabet possible, th e casualness of this "fouror five" at th e very outset appears arbitrarily vague; there is no evident reasonfor allowing th e outlines of th e model city to become blurred so early on. Stillworse, however, is the oxymoronic conjunction in exactly th e same Socraticbreath of "mostnecessary"nd "four or five." Is th e fifth needed or not? Whatsort of superlative necessity can they have discovered, if Socrates is unableeven to count th e number of occupations essential to "the most necessary city"?These tw o observations suggest that Socrates' mention of a fifth man is notsome casual slip of the tongue or thoughtless momentary embellishment. It isto o logically embarrassing or ridiculous fo r that . The unnamed fifth, therefore,presents a puzzle that calls fo r interpretation. Why should he (Socrates does sayandres) have been mentioned at all? What could his unnamed function be?

Adeimantus happens to make no comment about the oddities in Socrates'

summary statement that "the most necessary city would be made from four or

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4 Interpretationfive men"(369d). Were it not fo r the fact that Socrates' interlocutors are sooften represented as only partially understanding th e force and direction of hisquestioning, this might be some ground fo r dismissing th e need to interpret th eunnamed fifth. More importantly, though, Socrates' remarks do not have to bemeaningful in th e context of his immediate conversation in order fo r them to bemeaningful at all. Not only in th e particular case of th e Republic is there anaudience represented within th e dialogue, there is also th e audience beyond th edialogue fo r whom Plato has constructed his monologic text. Moreover, it is tothis latter level that all intradramatic speculations must eventually be referred. Ihave already given tw o reasons fo r supposing that at least Pla to intended th eunnamed fifth to be noticed, whether or not it could also be said that Socrateswas tacitly addressing others in th e dialogue or saying more than he knewAdeimantus would understand fo r reasons of his own where

"own"has onlydramatic meaning. My aim in what follows is to confirm that th e unnamed fifth

was meant to be noticed and to show that it is worth noticing, by derivingdirectly from th e document entitled Republic the means for articulating itslarger contextual significance.

Plato's dialogues are full of th e quirkiest details. Hermeneutic response tosuch details varies along a continuum from impatient dismissal to sycophanticobsession. While I intend to pursue an expansive rather than lean interpretationof th e unnamed fifth, there is in this case an obvious deflationary (though notdismissive) reading that in th e interests of moderation needs to be consideredfirst. It will turn out to be not so much incorrect as inadequate.

Here is th e entire discussion leading up to Socrates' summary characterization of th e "most necessary city"at 369d:

S. "Well now, first and greatest of our needs is th e provision of food fo r th e sakeof being and living."

A. "Absolutely."S. "Second is th e need fo r housing, and third th e need for clothing and such

things."

A. "That's so."S. "Come then," I said, "how will th e city be up to such provision? How else bu t

that one be a farmer, another a housebuilder, and some other a weaver? Orshall we also install there a shoemaker or some other caretaker of bodilythings?"

A. "Quite."S. "So th e most necessary city would be from four or five men."A. "Apparently."'Socrates' countdown of needs stops at three: food first, shelter second, then

"clothing and such things" third. There is some vagueness built into th e last of


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The Unnamed Fifth: Republic 369d 5these needs, and it seems to be th e ground fo r th e question of whether th eenumerat ion of skilled me n corresponding to them should be extended to include "a shoemaker or some o th er c ar et ak e r of bodily things." Although th e"other caretaker"is not named, he is different (tin' allon) and therefore countedseparately from th e shoemaker, in th e same way that th e weaver is "someother"(alios tis) in relation to th e farmer and housebuilder. The named occupations may reasonably be taken to correspond to the "four" of Socrates' summary, which leaves "some other caretaker of th e bodily things" as the obviouscandidate fo r th e unspecified fifth . Whatever else may be said about this, th enumber of human occupations in other words, th e character of human lifeeven in th e most necessary city is underdetermined by th e number o f m an'sbasic needs. This is represented by th e indeterminate inequality of "three" and"four or five." In fact, "four or five" is strictly speaking not even a number.The most necessary city, once realized, is necessarily indeterminate.

The deflationary reading would have m att er s e nd here; Socrates says "fouror five" because he has named four and only vaguely alluded to th e possibilityof a fifth caretaker of bodily things. I accept the correlation, but deny that itsufficiently explains either th e indeterminacy of th e count itself or th e merelygeneric characterization of th e unnamed fifth . There is still an inconsistencybetween th e resolve to be a s p re ci se as p os si bl e a nd th e insouciance of counting"four or five," and still an inconsistency between th e claim to have describedth e most necessary city without having said anything of th e specific need inwhich th e fifth occupation is rooted, that is, th e need that makes it truly necessary. There must therefore be more meaning to be gleaned from th e simple factthat th e unnamed fifth is a "caretaker of bodily things" than this vague characterization. Moreover, there is e ve n g re at er reason to s us pe ct s om e irony in th etext at this point, fo r in expatiating on bodily care Socrates is made to add ashoemaker to th e "mostnecessary"ity. Not only are s ho em a ke rs n ot obviouslynecessary, Socrates himself is notorious fo r going about unshod. If Socratesdoes not need shoes, th e shoemaker is not necessary for at least th e Socraticway of life (cf. Phaedrus 229a, Symposium 174a).

This observation can be immediately interpreted in one of tw o ways: eithershoemaking is without further qualification less necessary to the city thanweaving, housebuilding, and farming, or Socrates is out of place even at th emost fundamental level of th e polis. On th e second reading, th e civilizationimplied by shoes would be a necessary part of political life yet not a necessarypart of th e philosophical one. But if shoes should mark th e city fo r the sake ofthis contrast , it is still puzzling why they should do so with utmost necessity.On either reading, then, the sophistication or apparent luxury of shoes, theirnon-necessity, cannot be overlooked.

Socrates' mention of a shoemaker intimates that corporeal need, while compelling, does no t in truth supply th e complete m ea su re e ve n of the m os t n ec essary city. According to Socrates' picture, th e cities of men embody needs fo r


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6 Interpretationthings not strictly necessary fo r survival, fo r things like shoes in addition tofood, shelter, and clothing. The principle that underlies this enriched form ofneed is not survival, to which need only food is explicitly related in Socrates'list, but care (therapeia). This Socrates clearly indicates by his general characterization of th e unnamed fifth as "some other caretaker (therapeutes) of bodilythings." In seeking to care for th e body, one seeks more than to ensure itssurvival, hence one is inclined to speak of self-preservation as an instinctinstead of something purposive. Rather, such caring implies an emergingconsciousness of th e body's well-being and its potential flourishing, in otherwords, an emerging consciousness of th e good. For this reason, it could be saidthat care responds to need with infinitely more than is necessary, fo r it locatesneed inside a universal horizon; care fo r the body is th e first manifestation ofhuman freedom.2 There can therefore be no simple deduction of th e forms ofhuman care from physical necessity alone, and hence th e number of primaryarts must indeterminately outstrip th e number of corporeal needs, even at th every foundation of th e city in speech.The peculiarly unnecessary addition of th e shoemaker as fourth in "the most

necessary city"is a first clue that th e necessity proper to cities cannot be understood on th e paradigm of survival. It is not material necessity. Foi creaturesthat care, their actions are compelled in different ways from th e activities ofcreatures that do not, and such a difference is at th e root of politics.3 Theparadigm of care, which contains th e seed of freedom from th e given, is inserted even before Socrates arrives at th e unnamed fifth. It is against this background that th e latter may be further understood.

II

The unnamed fifth has been all but universally neglected. Aristotle at leastnoticed him (Politics, iv 1291a23) yet gave no further comment. Most recently,however, Seth Benardete has hazarded that th e unnamed fifth must be a warrior.4 Warriors do not officially appear until some time after Glaucon's interruption and therefore after Socrates and company have long since expandedtheir model beyond th e most necessary city. At first the warriors appear underth e ambiguous designation of "guardians (phulakes)" (374d), and not untilmuch later is th e distinction between rulers (archontes) and warriors (stratiotai)explicitly made (412a). It is clear, though, that they are originally introduced toserve an expressly military function and lead a martial way of life. The development that leads from th e most necessary city to the emergence of warrior-guardians is the requisite background for understanding Benardete's proposal.The most necessary city was never, in th e first place, complete. Having

gotten to "four or five," Socrates soon points out that the skills of farming,housebuilding, weaving, and the rest are in need of auxiliary arts. They there-


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8 InterpretationGlaucon, on th e other hand, represents th e gesture of actively negating th e

given, of being unwilling to accept that simple necessity must dominate humanlife. His own first suggestion for how to improve his brother's city is to get th evegetarian feasts that were portrayed by Socrates off th e "rushes strewn withyew and myrtle,"i.e., up off the ground, and onto th e tables and couchesappropriate to civilized men (372d).7 Glaucon thus asserts a certain freedomby setting up distance between himself and th e earth, creating such distance byinterposing artefacts produced by a form of human ingenuity uncompelled bymaterial necessity but driven by an inchoate urge fo r refinement.At its root, human dissatisfaction with th e given is indeterminate; simple

rejection or negation does not result in any specific plan of action. Hence th eyoung Glaucon is represented as not being entirely sure of what is missing fromhis brother's city. Socrates, on the other hand, th e expert in human eros, hasfathomed th e reaches of human des ire and is perfectly capable of immediatelyfilling out Glaucon's presentiment in terms of their city in speech.8 There maybe extravagance and luxury in th e full-blooded version of Glaucon's city, but itis at least a city in which a rt, s ex , social structure, educa tion, pol it ics , and in amoment , war may be found and recognized. The fevered city is manifestly amore adequate portrayal of th e phenomena of civilized political life, because itacknowledges th e forces of spirit, imagination, and erotic desire.Immediately following their second expansion of th e city, th e first having

been from utmost necessity to health and th e one now from health to luxury,Socrates discerns th e origin of war (373d):S. "And what about th e land, th e land that was then sufficient for feeding th e

men then; it will become small from having been sufficient. Or how should wespeak?"G. "This way,"he said.S. "Then there will be need of cutting off th e land of our neighbours, if we are

going to have enough to graze and plough, and there will be need fo r them tocut off ours, should they to o le t themselves go to the unlimited acquisition ofwealth, overstepping th e boundary of what is necessary."

G. "Quite necessarily, Socrates," he said.S. "So we shall go to war after that, Glaucon? Or how will it be?"G. "This way,"he said.S. "Well let's not say yet,"I said, "whether war works evil or good, bu t only this

much, that we have in its turn discovered an origin of war out of those thingsthat most of all occur bad in cities, both in private and in public, when theyoccur.

G. "Quite so."For reasons he does not here specify, Socrates simply assumes th e existence

of other cities and a natural scarcity of material resources. The first suppositionmakes no difference to th e conflict implied by finite resources and expansivedesire, fo r th e same conflict would also occur in a single, global polity. The


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12 InterpretationSocrates reveals his awareness that rule is demanded even by th e dynamics

implied by th e city of utmost necessity in several ways. First is his discussionof th e kairos in th e exercise of any art (370b). There is a proper moment fo r th eperformance of any task, and it cannot be left "to await the leisure of the manwho does it." This raises th e question of who is to ensure that a man shouldcompromise his leisure, which is to say his autonomy. Next, in introducing th eauxiliary art of shopkeeping, Socrates makes a passing reference to "rightlymanaged cities"(371c) wherein th o se to o weak to engage primary tasks take upth e secondary ones. Finally, some t ime after Glaucon's interruption Socrateshints at th e need for policing th e most necessary city when he notes that "w eprevented th e shoemaker from trying at the same tim e to be a farmer or aweaver or a housebuilder; he had to stay a shoemaker just so the shoemaker'sart would produce fine work fo r us" (374b). Aristotle's commentary on th emost necessary city confirms th e point: "Yet even amongst th e four or howevermany partners there be, there must be someone to assign and to judge what isjust" (Politics, iv 1291a22).

The coordination of doctoring and rule is almost too pervasive to requireseparate comment. In setting up th e problem of justice, doctors and pilots appear as important examples in th e opening exchanges with Polemarchus (332e)and Thrasymachus (341c, 346b), while they are also mentioned in Glaucon'srequest fo r a more thorough treatment (360e). When rulers (archontes) arementioned fo r th e very first time, their function is directly compared with th edoctor, th e gymnastics trainer, and th e pilot (389b). This is done in an effort toexplain th e potential justification for using lies as drugs (pharmaka), itself afurther and subsequently crucial medicinal analogy; Asclepian medicine is characterized as "statesmanlike" (politikon; 407e); th e infamous "noble lie" of BookIII is Socrates' first actual example of a pharmacological lie told for th e sake ofth e city's health (414c); at 459c he calls fo r a "most courageous doctor," notone of th e ordinary kind, who is willing to use a further "throng of lies anddeceptions" as drugs "for the benefit of th e ruled"; and finally, in th e well-known image of th e city as a ship (488a ff), Socrates asserts a direct analogybetween the excellence and nobility of th e pilot, th e doctor, th e philosopher,and the statesman (489b).

Not naming th e doctors of the healthy city, therefore, is entirely of a piecewith not alluding to its governance and th e governance of th e necessary city atits core. The unnamed fifth is both a doctor and th e hidden ruler in th e firstcity; he is both th e prime example and regulator of care's first manifestations. Itcould be said that th e doctor is in truth th e first of human beings to overrulenature and by that right he rules those who remain subservient to th e imperatives of th e given. In other words, his is th e first architectonic art. The doc to rdoes not, however, negate th e given; Asclepian medicine is th e necessary butnot sufficient condition for freedom.

The final question provoked by th e unnamed fifth, therefore, is why sup-


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14 Interpretation8. Socrates consistently t e s t i f i e s to hi s own expertise in erotics. In th e S y m p o s i u m he descri bes

himself as someone who " k n o w s (epistasthai) not hi ng other t h a n erotics"(177d-e); in th e P h a edrus he claims to possess th e "erotic art"(h e erotike t echne; 257a); and in th e T h e a g e s he is leastmodest of all: " I h ap pe n to know (epistasthai) nothing except a certain small subject erotics. Y etin th is subject I rank myself as a w e s o m e l y accomplished (deinos) beyond anyone else a m o n g t h o s ewho h av e b e e n and a m o n g t h o s e who now live" (128b)." Socrates is not made to mention t h o s e tocome because t h a t would i nc l ud e P l at o .


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Socrates on the Decline and Fall of Regimes:Books 8 and 9 of the Republic

Patrick CobySmith College

At th e end of Book 9 of th e Republic, Socrates describes the human soul asan amalgam of unrelated parts, one third human, one third lion, and one thirdmany-headed beast, or hydra. Reason is th e human part, spiritedness th e lion,and appetite th e hydra. Covering th e soul is a body which in appearance isentirely human. This uniform exterior, however, misleads as to the realitywithin, fo r within there is absent any unity of form; and, barring education,there is absent as well any unity of purpose. Human beings are a composite ofbody and soul, and of reason, passion, and desire. When left to th eir naturaland uncultivated condition, human beings are divided and factious. Now it isSocrates' contention and more will be said of this below that man and cityare analogous entities, that what is present in th e individual is reflected in th egroup. If man is a combination of parts, so too is th e city a combination ofclasses. And if man's parts are unrelated in their natures and discordant in theirunion, so to o are th e classes of th e city. Accordingly, civil strife, rather than atemporary disequilibrium, is the common and expected state of political affairs.Why is there faction in politics? Because there is diversity within human beings. More importantly, there is diversity among human beings, fo r some arepredominantly appetitive, others are spirited, and a few are rational. While itmay be possible to so order th es e ty pe s that the whole can function as a unit,the whole in question is nevertheless a monstrous fabrication, th e social equivalent of a hydra tied to a lion tied to a human, all wrapped up in a form that ishuman.

Socrates argues that psychic parts and human beings do lend themselves to aright ordering and that right ordering exists when reason rules appetite with th eassistance of spirit, or when philosopher-kings with warrior auxiliaries ruleover a city of workers. Faction is a problem, but seemingly not one whichdefies resolution. The question is how to effect th e remedy. Since th e soul isnaturally diverse, unity must be created, and created out of elements apt to beat war. Only reason can create this unity because only reason is just: it gives toother parts their due (586e), whereas th e other parts, when exercising power,take fo r themselves and oppress (587a, 590a-b). The soul cannot be ruled wellby a lion or a hydra, and th e city cannot avoid faction by any scheme to set freeth e emotions and appetites. The liberation of emotion and appetite is thought by

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Socrates on the Decline and Fall of Regimes 17rather than of inclusivity and breadth of support, it should follow that th e fewerth e people who need to agree, th e more unified and secure th e regime. Accordingly, th e most durable regime is monarchy, whether a kingship or a tyranny;and th e least durable is democracy.

But this conclusion is incorrect, fo r it presupposes that th e individual, in hisoriginal state, is a unified whole with a single interest or purpose in life. Socrates' analogy of the tripartite soul says otherwise. So to o does th e conversationin Book 1 of th e Laws about th e ubiquity of war and the political primacy ofwar preparations. Two of that dialogue's discussants, Cleinias and th e AthenianStranger, agree that not only are cities perpetual enemies but also neighborhoods within cities, individuals within neighborhoods, and persons in relationto themselves (625e-626d). When discord is carried this far, into a person'svery identity, it is impossible to determine victors and vanquished in th e war ofall against all. Cities cannot recognize victory, much less achieve it, if theircitizens are divided in their ends, and th e soul cannot pursue its selfish interestsif th e self is a chaos of discordant parts. The soul or the city must be masteredand made whole before th e combatant is ready for a world at war. Thuswhether monarchy is a lasting regime depends less on the concentration ofpower than on th e harmony of th e monarch's soul. Education is what harmonizes, and if th e king is educated while th e tyrant is not, then kingship andtyranny, rather than equally durable monarchies , are political opposites withopposite prospects fo r success.

Education is mentioned frequently in Book 8 but never with precision (unlike in Book 7 where it is described as th e turning around of th e soul). Somet imes it is called argument, sometimes speech, sometimes music , and somet imes practice (546d, 548b, 549a, 552e, 554b, 559b, 559d, 560b ). It seems toinclude both instruction and habituation. Its purpose is not truth and the idea ofth e Good but psychic constancy. The soul has many parts; willy-nilly someordering will obtain with some one part in command. But whether that partremains in command depends on its skill as a guardian, and guardianship depends on education. Unless there is educat ion, th e order of th e soul and th eorder of th e city will not endure. Education is the means to peace and stability.

We have been considering such questions as why faction exists, what factionis, whether it is curable, and how it is cured. Before a final answer is given tothese latter tw o questions, some observations are in order about th e generalcharacter of Socratic regime analysis. The starting point of Socrates' politicalscience is th e proposition th at th e individual is prior to the regime or that th ecity is an image writ large of the soul. This principle is first stated in Book 2 asSocrates begins the work of founding (368d-369a), and it is repeated here inBook 8 as Socrates relates th e history of political decay (544d-e). What itmeans is that th e democratic soul, for instance, comes before and is th e causeof th e democratic city. From this relationship Socrates concludes that th e regime is a function of the likes and dislikes of th e ruling class. By whatevermeans th e souls of th e rulers come to be arranged (whether by th e education of


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Socrates on the Decline and Fall of Regimes 23against private instruction, and th e result is a contest among th e three parts ofth e soul with spiritedness emerging victorious. The youth becomes a timocrat,but easier and more certain would th e outcome have been if th e father werehimself a timocrat, who, in concert with th e city, simply taught th e son to lovehonor above all else. The choice of an aristocratic father, then, serves to obscure th e operation of causes and to impugn th e importance of regimes. But ofcourse th e regime is itself an effect caused by th e character of th e man. Whatthen produces the man? This question also will yield no clear answer sinceSocrates chooses to investigate th e city before th e man , his reason being thatth e city is th e more "luminous" of th e tw o (545b4).

II . OLIGARCHY

But can we not do better in discovering th e origins of oligarchic man? He isa t imocrat whose secret love of wealth, supported by a private storehouse oftreasure, looks fo r commodities to buy. Timocracy is an austere regime, andt imocrats abstain from farming, manual arts, and money-making (547d). Intheory they do. In practice they break th e law, first by accumulating wealth,then by spending it conspicuously and forcing others into a rivalry with them,finally by changing attitudes about who and what is worthy (550d-551a). Theoligarch is an erstwhile t imocrat whose love of money displaces his love ofhonor. And oligarchy is created when a property qualification confers powerand privilege on a wealthy few.

There is no founder of oligarchy, or of any of th e other defective regimes.They come about because, in th e absence of education, th e soul's center ofgravity moves from reason, to spiritedness, to appetite. They come about because nature, of a kind th e body's nature assumes command when unimpeded by wise legislation. Aristocracy is safeguarded by th e music and gymnastic education, which is its law, and th e neglect of this education is theefficient cause of aristocracy's decline (546d). Timocracy declines when itsprohibitions against money-making are ignored (547d, 548a, 550d-e). Oligarchs fail to pass a law against th e alienation of one's property (552a, 555c,556a) and a law withdrawing protection from commercial contracts (556a-b).Finally, democrats lose their regime because they lack th e foresight to controlby law th e criminal and beggar drones (564b-c).12 In every case th e man,whose soul is writ large in th e regime, is not self-made or th e product offatherly tutoring or of some founder's design, but is a result of legislative/educational errors which set free th e lower powers of his soul. Hence the firstcause of either man or city is tra ce ab le to mistakes to o various to identify,committed by people to o numerous to name. Causality is truly obscure. Itfollows then that there is no political science, armed with the knowledge ofcauses, able to prevent the occurrence of faction." When Socrates laid th e


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48 Interpretationchoice of th e contemplative life. Swift allows us to calculate that Gulliver isroughly fifty years old at th e end of th e voyage to Laputa. His ripeness forphilosophy is once again reflected in his ever-increasing detachment from ordinary, domestic ties. Although he remains at home for five months this t ime alonger interval than that which preceded either of his tw o previous voyagesand in a "very happy Condition," eventually he embarks once again on TheAdventure, and this t ime he leaves his "poor Wife big with Child" (p . 221).The implication is that his curiosity is now in a sense both less passionate andmore concentrated as a result of his third voyage.

Although appearances suggest otherwise, th e Houyhnhnms' way of life is infact governed by eros, but a rational eros, which distinguishes carefully between real and apparent satisfactions. Their complete liberation from pride is infact th e result of their complete dedication to th e pursuit of knowledge. Swiftrefers insistently to their inquisitiveness concerning Gulliver. They are said toshow "manifest Tokens of Wonder" and then "new Signs of Wonder" at hisclothing, which they examine very closely, "using various Gestures, not unlikethose of a Philosopher, when he would attempt to solve some new and difficultPhaenomenon" (pp. 224-26). The first we see of Gulliver's Master is his"Signs of Wonder" at Gulliver's gloves. Beh ind his concerted effort to teachhim th e Houyhnhnm language is a great "Curiosity and Impatience." He is"eager to learn" everything about Gulliver (p. 234). In particular he reveals"great Signs of Curiosity and Admiration" when he sees him undressed at last(p . 237). After th e revelation of Gulliver's true appearance he is even moreastonished at his reasoning powers, and urges him to exert "the utmost Diligence"to acquire th e language, so that his "Impatience to hear . . . Wonders"might be eased as quickly as possible (pp. 237-38). When Gulliver is able tocommunicate his thoughts (as always he picks up th e language quickly), hisMaster badgers him with frequent questions and interruptions, often desiring"fuller Satisfaction" as Gullivers vocabulary improves (p . 244-45). He doesnot rest until his "Curiosity seemed to be fully

satisfied"(pp. 259-60).The Houyhnhnm is th e first being Gulliver has met whose inquisitiveness

matches his own. If his dedication to th e pursuit of knowledge is even greaterthan Gulliver's it is because he has had th e advantage of being brought up in asociety where th e "grand Maxim is, to cultivate Reason" (p . 267). Friendshipand benevolence are mentioned first among th e Houyhnhnms' virtues. Although neither of these are "confined to particular Objects, but universal to th ewhole Race," it soon emerges that only benevolence is truly indiscriminate:"They will have it that Nature teaches them to love th e whole Species, and it isReason only that maketh a Distinction of Persons, where there is a superiorDegree of Virtue" (p . 268). Since there is no evidence that any Houyhnhnmfalls short of perfection in the moral virtues, it is clear that th e "Distinction ofPersons" that leads to special friendships must be founded on some other criterion. We have already been told that th e Houyhnhnms differ greatly in intellec-


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Gulliver's Travels 53equates th e essential motives of th e nonphilosopher with those of th e Yahoo,there is every reason to suppose that he considers th e potential of Gulliver inparticular to imitate th e Houyhnhnms to be very great indeed. The increasingdominance of the sense of wonder and th e progressive subordination of pride inhis soul are arrested only by a failure to become aware of himself as a philosopher. The implication that th e philosopher's education should culminate in anexplicit recognition that his soul is characterized by a desire fo r knowledge isone of many indications that Swift's teaching is fundamentally Platonic.10 AfterGulliver's traumatic enlightenment Swift draws a contrast between th e Houyhnhnms, who are "wholly governed"by reason, and Modern "Systems of Natural Philosophy." Gulliver's Master agrees with Plato (the "highest Honour"possible) that knowledge of such systems, even "if it were certain, could be ofno Use" (pp. 267-68). Gulliver adds that "many Paths to Fame would be thenshut up in th e Learned World" were this advice heeded. These systems facilitate th e enlightenment of nonphilosophers and potential philosophers who arenot yet consciously ruled by th e love of knowledge. In such circumstances thefact that man's kinship to th e Yahoo is only partial (in "every Limb and Feature") can easily be forgotten. In Platonic terms the most useful knowledge isthat which contributes to a life "wholly governed"by reason. The fact that thesystems of th e Moderns like Gulliver's expeditions to observe th e Yahoosstem from pride rather than curiosity is itself evidence of their uselessness inthis sense.

In contrast, Gulliver's Master's approach represents th e classical, especiallyth e Platonic, stance. From th e start he is convinced that Gulliver is a Yahoo,but tactfully conceals this fact (p. 234), placing more emphasis on his "Teachableness, Civility and Cleanliness," which "astonish" him . As we have seen, heis consumed with curiosity; fascinated both by Gulliver's clothes and his body,and by th e distinction between th e two, but even more "astonished at my Capacity fo r Speech and Reason, than at th e Figure of my Body, whether it werecovered or no"(p . 237). He agrees to keep th e secret of his "false Covering," apromise that he seems to break only when directly challenged by his peers, bywhich t ime th e truth has been revealed (pp. 272, 279). In fact he considers itwise for all Yahoos to "conceal many . . . Deformities . . . which would elsebe hardly supportable"(p . 260). In brief, his enquiries into human nature arecontrasted to Gulliver's in several ways: His motive is curiosity rather thanpride; he is interested rather than repelled when Gulliver's nakedness confirmshis physical affinities to th e Yahoos; and at th e same t ime he recognizes thatGulliver's own attitude is very different, and so seeks to soften and delay hisfull enlightenment (p . 237).One of the Houyhnhnm 's aims in his conversations with Gulliver is to leadhim gradually towards a sober and measured assessment of his own nature.Gulliver's concern with clearly observable phenomena, which causes him toidentify himself as a Yahoo solely on th e basis of external resemblances, is


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94 Interpretat ionLaughter, 13(1)91Law, 19(3)307: consti tutional, 19(1)61; divine,

15(2,3)222, 18(1)11; moral , 15(2,3)222;natural , 15(2,3)222, 16(2)264, 18(2)282,19(3)251

Laws, 11(1)6Leadership, 14(2,3)265Learning, 20(2)117Legislator, 14(2,3)277Legitimacy, 17(2)203Leninism, 11(1)73Liberalism, 16(2)193, 20(1)63, 20(3)285Liberation, 18(2)251Libertarianism, 12(2,3)301Liberty, 15(1)3, 55, 15(2,3)195, 16(2)229,

17(3)406, 20(2)135Life: good, 11(2)171; philosophic, 16(2)272,

20(3)227, 237; political, 11(2)185Limits, 20(3)232, 247Literature, 16(2)193Locke, John, 20(3)286Love, 13(1)15, 16(3)391, 19(2)128, 19(3)245Luther, Martin, 18(3)323

Machiavelli, Niccolo, 20(3)259, 280, 287Madison, James, 20(3)299Madness, 18(1)67Maimonides, Moses, 18(1)3Man, 15(2,3)157, 16(1)23, 16(2)211, 17(2)165Many, 16(2)173Marxism, 11(1)73, 14(1)135Mathematics, 20(2)117Matter, 17(2)175Media, 19(3)225Meditation, 16(3)415Methodology, 15(1)77Metaxy, 16(3)415Mime, 11(1)1Mind, American, 16(1)111Moderation, 15(2,3)222Modernism, 16(3)370Modernity, 11(3)392, 20(2)157, 20(3)285Moderns, 18(1)31, 20(1)17Moral sentiment theory, 19(2)169Morality, 14(2,3)353, 15(1)3, 15(2,3)222,

16(1)111, 16(3)465, 17(1)117, 17(2)255,19(1)29: sexual, 16(3)465

Music, 19(2)157Mythology, 11(1)1, 13(3)405Mytilenean Debate, 18(1)53

Naturalism, 17(1)111Nature, 13(3)387, 15(2,3)157, 16(1)23,

19(3)251: human, 17(1)120; State of,16(1)23, 16(2)218, 254, 17(2)194

Nicene Creed, 18(3)349Nietzsche, Friedrich, 18(3)433Nihilism, 16(1)157, 17(1)115Noble, 14(2,3)353

Objectivity, 17(1)119Obligation, 19(2)175Odysseus, 17(1)41Oedipus, 18(1)65One, 16(2)174Opinion, 15(2,3)179: Christian, 11(3)320Oratory, 15(2,3)272Oresteia, 17(1)69Orpheus, 16(3)427

Paganism, 20(1)27Parents, 18(3)416Parties, political, 17(3)383Partisanship, 18(2)253Pascal, Blaise, 17(3)407Passions, 13(2)151Peloponnesian War, 18(1)53Perception, 15(2,3)184Perfectibility, 13(2)153Persia, 19(3)225Phaedrus, 20(2)99Philosopher-king, 11(3)310, 18(1)100Philosophers, 12(2,3)349, 17(3)401, 18(2)177,

211,20(2)145Philosophy, 14(2,3)177, 15(2,3)175, 272,

16(1)157, 16(2)263, 16(3)427, 17(1)3,17(3)402, 18(1)145, 18(2)211, 19(1)43,20(2)135, 157: analytic, 12(1)107; ancient,19(1)44; Islamic, 20(3)277; medieval ,16(1)87, 19(1)46; modem, 19(1)46; moral,19(2)169; "new," 13(3)335; political,11(3)392, 12(2,3)301, 13(3)297,403,16(2)247, 17(2)193, 17(3)379, 18(2)251,20(2)157, 165, 187; social, 14(1)61, 89

Piety, 12(2,3)225, 13(1)48, 18(1)63Plato, 11(1)1, 11(3)275, 18(3)431, 19(1)6Pleasure, 13(1)1, 16(2)167, 17(2)291Pluralism, 15(2,3)323Poetry, 11(3)275, 19(2)157, 20(2)143, 187Polis, 17(2)165Politics, 11(3)335, 383, 16(1)61, 16(2)196,

16(3)391, 17(2)223, 275, 18(1)63,18(2)251, 19(1)5, 19(2)157, 19(3)309,20(1)66, 20(2)165

Power, 11(3)340, 16(3)427, 19(3)309,20(2)187, 20(3)275


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Documents

Interpretation, Vol 21-1