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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS The Promise of Liberal Institutionalism

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS The Promise of Liberal Institutionalism

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Page 1: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS The Promise of Liberal Institutionalism

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS

The Promise of Liberal Institutionalism

Page 2: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS The Promise of Liberal Institutionalism

Your task for this lecture…

Identify at least one piece of evidence to support the argument that international law doesn’t matter for explaining state behavior (e.g. evidence that the world is governed by realpolitik)

Identify at least one piece of evidence to support an argument that international law does in fact constrain or affect how states act.

Page 3: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS The Promise of Liberal Institutionalism

The Purpose of Laws and Institutions Think about the purpose of laws in our own country

A fundamental reason we consent to be governed by laws and institutions is to overcome collective action problems in order to achieve public goods.

Public goods: Examples: public roads and transportation, public

schools, food safety, national defense, preservation of natural resources….

Page 4: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS The Promise of Liberal Institutionalism

Collective Action Problem

Individuals are unlikely to contribute resources (money, time, etc.) to the attainment of a common good (even if they really want that good to be attained) unless they know that everyone else will contribute as well. If you can’t be sure that others will contribute, it is doesn’t seem rational for you to contribute or try to solve the problem on your own. Being a free-rider can seem most rational.

How do our domestic legal institutions help overcome this free-rider problem? -Example, we pay taxes to pay for the public goods because

there are institutions that ensure (and enforce the law) that everyone pays taxes.

Page 5: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS The Promise of Liberal Institutionalism

Now let’s think about how this applies to international laws and organizations…..

Page 6: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS The Promise of Liberal Institutionalism

Global “Public Goods”

What are some of the things that states might want to work together to achieve?

Just a Few Examples: Clean and healthy global environment/

sustainable ecosystems Efficient systems for global commerce--Economic

exchanges that increase economic prosperity Safe airways for international travel Eradication of diseases and epidemics that cross

borders—improved global health Peace—collective security

Page 7: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS The Promise of Liberal Institutionalism

Liberal institutionalism argues that international law and international institutions can help states work together to achieve common goals (public goods).

Page 8: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS The Promise of Liberal Institutionalism

Types of IGOs

Global, general purpose IGOs UN

Regional IGOs Organization of American States (OAS), African

Union (AU), European Union (EU) Functional IGOs

OPEC, International Whaling Commission

Page 9: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS The Promise of Liberal Institutionalism

Purpose of the United Nations Established after WWII to achieve the

global public good of international peace and security

Collective security: An approach to security in which states agree to act collectively to repel aggression- The idea is that an attack on one is an attack on all

The UN now address a broad array of other issues beyond tradition security issues

Page 10: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS The Promise of Liberal Institutionalism

Structure of the UN

Secretariat (Currently: Sec. General Ban Ki Moon)

Security Council Perm 5 (United States, Russia, China, Great

Britain, France) 10 rotating members

General Assembly (192 member states) Economic and Social Council International Court of Justice (ICJ or

World Court)

Page 11: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS The Promise of Liberal Institutionalism

The Secretariat

Bureaucratic arm of the UN 9,000 employees to carry out day-to-

day activities Secretary General: Ban Ki Moon

Can bring issues before the Security Council and utilize soft power to persuade and pressure states to resolve global issues

Page 12: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS The Promise of Liberal Institutionalism

The Security Council

Has authority (Chapter VII of UN Charter) to use force to reduce threats to international security

15 member countries Permanent 5 (United States, Russia, United

Kingdom, China, France) + 10 rotating members Perm 5- have veto power—any one of the

perm 5 can stop a resolution by veto For a measure to pass the SC there must be 9

votes (including all of Perm-5 to be on board)

Page 13: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS The Promise of Liberal Institutionalism

The General Assembly

192 member states Based on the principle of sovereign

equality of states Serves as a forum and issues non-

binding resolutions

Page 14: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS The Promise of Liberal Institutionalism

Economic and Social Council 54 member countries, elected for 3 year

terms Coordinates and oversees UN’s major

economic and social programs Oversees work of important affiliated

institutions World Health Organization World Bank

Page 15: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS The Promise of Liberal Institutionalism

ICJ

15 elected judges Two primary functions:

Issue advisory opinions at request of the SC (example: Kosovo’s independence)

Decide contentious cases between states

Page 16: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS The Promise of Liberal Institutionalism

An essential difference between domestic and international legal systems….

The ICJ lacks compulsory jurisdiction

Important to note that in international law, jurisdiction is always by consent

States choose to participate in court proceedings and choose whether or not to abide by ruling

Page 17: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS The Promise of Liberal Institutionalism

How is international law made? Treaties

Multilateral “norm-making treaty” Example: Nuclear non-proliferation treaty

Bilateral http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/tif/index.htm Binding on contracting parties

International Custom Generally recognized principles by nations Judicial decisions

Page 18: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS The Promise of Liberal Institutionalism

How are laws adjudicated?

International Court of Justice (World Court) http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1

International Criminal Court http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/Pages/d

efault.aspx World Trade Organization

http://www.wto.org/

Page 19: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS The Promise of Liberal Institutionalism

Consider these cases…

United States versus Iran (1979-1981)

Nicaragua verses the United States (1984-1991)

What do these cases say about the power of international law to influence state behavior?

Page 20: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS The Promise of Liberal Institutionalism

How are laws enforced?

Some laws are “self-enforcing” Reprisals Enforcement Mechanisms available to the UN

Security Council Operations to Enforce Law and Order under Chapter VII of UN Charter North Korea’s invasion of South Korea (1950) Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (1990)

Peacekeeping missions—16 current missions http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/

current.shtml A future for peacemaking missions?

http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/issues/peacemaking

Page 21: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS The Promise of Liberal Institutionalism

Growing Importance of IL and IGOS?

The number of cases brought to the ICJ is increasing.

There has been a proliferation in the number of IGOs around the globe.

Does this mean international law and organizations are becoming more important for explaining world politics?

Page 22: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS The Promise of Liberal Institutionalism

Two key reasons why do states follow international law and norms?

Reciprocity principle: They want other states to follow the law too. “You scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours”. States often recognize that it is in their long-term interest to abide by rules and laws. Even if they have to take a short term ‘hit’, they reason that- in the long run- having those laws in place benefit them. States follow the rules so not to undermine laws that they feel benefit their long term interests.

Fear of reprisals: For example, neither side used chemical weapons in WWII was not because anyone could enforce the treaty banning such weapons. It was that the other side would probably use such weapons and the cost would be too high. Another example, states that don’t follow the rules can face economic sanctions. States don’t want to be excluded from the benefits of international trade and commerce.

Page 23: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS The Promise of Liberal Institutionalism

Climate Change: A Global Challenge

This is an issue area where there is a clear need for international cooperation through international law and international organizations

Consider the “tragedy of the commons”

The challenges of international cooperation around climate change are exemplified in the difficulties facing: The Kyoto Protocol

Page 24: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS The Promise of Liberal Institutionalism

UN Failures

Somalia Rwanda Bosnia Darfur Syria

Page 25: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS The Promise of Liberal Institutionalism

A critical issue to consider…

The democratic deficit: International institutions are biased in favor of powerful states and elites that are often not directly accountable often make decisions

When examining international institutions it is important to consider who is being represented? Whose voices are heard? Whose voices are silenced or marginalized?

There have been and continue to be efforts by the Global South to have their voices heard and interests represented in international institutions: NIEO

An argument to consider: International institutions are certainly biased in favor of those with the hard power, but at the same time they may also open opportunities/forums for voices of less powerful and marginalized states to assert issues on to the international agenda.

Page 26: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS The Promise of Liberal Institutionalism

Reform the UN?

Reform veto power of Security Council? Expanding membership of the Security

Council? A standing army?

Page 27: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS The Promise of Liberal Institutionalism

Lessons from U.S. invasion of Iraq? U.S. flouting of the UN in 2003 in favor of

unilateral decision making

“If the United Nations doesn’t have the will or courage to disarm Saddam Hussein and if Saddam Hussein does not disarm, the United States will lead a coalition to disarm [him]”—GWB

Page 28: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS The Promise of Liberal Institutionalism

A question for discussion…

Consider the U.S. decision to flout the UN in its decision to invade Iraq in 2003 as well as the aftermath of this decision. What does this decision and its aftermath say to you about the strength of international law and international institutions?

Do you believe that international institutions and laws will be more important or less important in the future? Why or why not?

Page 29: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS The Promise of Liberal Institutionalism

A concluding thought…

Perhaps we should not be asking is Realism the best paradigm or is Liberalism the best paradigm…..

Maybe a better question is: Under what conditions is cooperation

possible and under what conditions is it less likely?