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International Decision Making in the Age of Genocide: Srebrenica 1993-1995

June 28 – July 1, 2015

The Hague

Edited Transcript

Public Session

From left: David Rohde, Yasushi Akashi, Carl Bildt, Muhamed Duraković, Zlatko Lagumdžija, Rupert Smith, Joris Voorhoeve

ABIODUN WILLIAMS: Welcome to The Hague Institute for this public panel on

“International Decision Making in the Age of Genocide: Srebrenica 1993-1995.” Over the

past two days, we have hosted an extraordinary group of people to discuss the events that

led to the Srebrenica genocide in July 1995. For the first time, we brought together the key

decision-makers from that period, including the leaders of the civilian and military

branches of the UN mission in Bosnia, senior officials from UN Headquarters, and political

leaders and officials from key governments, including the Netherlands, US, France, UK and

Bosnia itself. We were particularly honored to have with us a Srebrenica survivor. Our goal

was to better understand the chain of events that led to the genocide, with the aim of

preventing such calamities in the future.

Our public panel this morning includes Muhamed Duraković, a Srebrenica survivor

who survived the genocide by making a 37-day trek through Bosnian Serb Army controlled

territory, Yasushi Akashi, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in the

former Yugoslavia from 1993 to 1997, Joris Voorhoeve, Minister of Defense of the

Netherlands from 1994 to 1998, General Sir Rupert Smith, the UNPROFOR Commander in

Bosnia from 1995, Assistant Chief of Defense Operations from 1992 to 1994, Carl Bildt,

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European Union Special Envoy to the former Yugoslavia 1995, and Zlatko Lagumdžija,

former Deputy Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1994.

Our moderator for the morning session is David Rohde, an award winning author

and investigative reporter who won the Pulitzer Prize for international reporting in 1996

for his work on Srebrenica. He later wrote Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica

and is now an investigative journalist for Thomson Reuters. I am delighted that David has

agreed to moderate our panel this morning and give him the floor. Thank you.

DAVID ROHDE: Thank you all for coming this morning. It has been an extraordinary two

days. We agreed that each of the panelists will first talk about lessons and insights from the

last two days. After that, we are going to open it up for questions. Let us begin with Mr.

Akashi.

Yasushi Akashi, center, with Abiodun Williams and Zeid Al-Hussein (in private session)

YASUSHI AKASHI: Thank you David. The last two days were indeed soul searching and

revived many vivid memories. On the 20th anniversary of the unspeakable tragedy of

Srebrenica, I offer my most sincere remorse as a former Special Representative of the UN

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Secretary-General for the sufferings of so many people. UNPROFOR was the largest

peacekeeping operation in history but it had to operate in most inhospitable circumstances.

It had to muddle through, when one of the parties to the conflict [the Bosnian government]

wanted peace enforcement rather than peacekeeping. The other party [the Bosnian Serbs]

did not want any kind of UN operation.

UNPROFOR was not given the necessary means or resources for the implementation

of the very complex and ambitious mandate. Philosophically speaking, a perfect solution is

an enemy of a good solution. We all wanted a durable peace. Our highest priority at the

time, however, was to provide humanitarian assistance and achieve ceasefires to stop the

bloodshed, even if we knew that they would soon be violated. European governments had

pressured the United Nations to dispatch a peacekeeping force in the absence of a peace to

keep. The group of European wise men, headed by the French Minister of Justice, Robert

Badinter, had earlier cautioned against the premature recognition of the former Yugoslav

republics [as independent states] until some kind of constitutional agreement had been

achieved with ethnic minorities within these countries.1

I would like to emphasize that UNPROFOR had to operate under the mandate given

by the UN Security Council. The Security Council issued innumerable numbers of high

sounding resolutions and statements that were difficult to implement. I presume they were

acting under pressure from governments who wanted to show public opinion and the

media that the UN was doing something. We read these resolutions ten, fifty, sometimes

one hundred times without making sense of them. Having two headquarters also made it

hard for us to operate. (UNPROFOR was established initially in Sarajevo, but moved to

Zagreb, which was more peaceful.) Ensuring cooperation between civilians and the military

was not easy but not impossible. There was also a high degree of professional cooperation

between the UN and NATO.

We did not want to repeat the mistakes of past operations. Prior to our involvement

in Yugoslavia, we had the debacle of Somalia and the tragedy of Rwanda. We told ourselves,

1 Robert Badinter headed the five-member Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, established by the European Council of Ministers in August 1991. The Commission issued a series of opinions on legal issues resulting from the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

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“Let’s not cross the Mogadishu line.”2 We remembered that the United States lost 18

soldiers in Somalia. Pakistan lost 24. We cautioned ourselves against the UN getting

involved in peace enforcement. Maybe some of us learned the lessons too much.

The Dutch peacekeepers in Srebrenica were given an almost impossible task. The

Canadians did not want to continue their mission and Sweden refused. How can you fight a

war when you have only 150 troops left in the face of more than 2,000 invading troops?

And you are short on food, medicine, water and fuel? [Dutchbat] had to operate on foot. I

admit that there was some confusion over the use of air power [to protect Dutchbat], and

[an unclear] distinction between close air support which is a limited action of self-defense,

and full scale air strikes. I would like to urge the Dutch people not to blame their troops or

themselves too much. UN work is always difficult and sometimes even dangerous, but that

does not mean that the UN is not doing necessary work.

The so-called “safe areas” were a misnomer. They were not safe. The UN Secretary-

General issued three or four reports arguing against the creation of safe areas without

requisite conditions. Troop contributing nations were, of course, concerned about the

safety of their troops. What the UN could accomplish in the six safe areas, including

Srebrenica, was limited, in hindsight, even impossible.

The UN is constantly looking for ways to improve its peacekeeping operations. One

such example was the Brahimi report issued in 2000.3 Another report came out just last

week, stressing the need for military action to be accompanied by a political peace

process.4 I subscribe to these conclusions. We cannot blame the soldiers for not being able

to keep the peace. I think political leaders have to assume their responsibilities. We must

balance the need for justice with the need for reconciliation. We have to accept that the UN

is imperfect and in a constant state of evolution. We need a more robust type of

peacekeeping.

2 Akashi expressed this viewpoint on multiple occasions, including a June 9, 1995 meeting with Generals Janvier and Smith in Split. 3 United Nations, “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,” A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000. 4 United Nations, “Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace,” A/70/95-S/2015/446, June 17, 2015.

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DAVID ROHDE: Thank you Mr. Akashi. Speaking of political leaders and diplomats, let us

turn to Mr. Bildt. What did you learn over the last two days that was new?

CARL BILDT: I learned more about what we did not know. We have been going through the

sequence of events, day by day, document by document. But there are still things we do not

know. For me, one of the big unknowns concerns the events of July 9, 1995. We know that

the Bosnian Serb Army had launched an operation against Srebrenica. The war crimes

tribunal found the original order [dated July 2, from the commander of the Drina Corps,

Major-General Živanović] calling for the enclaves of Žepa and Srebrenica to be “split apart”

and reduced to “their urban area.” On July 9, that direction was changed. They decided to

capture the whole Srebrenica safe area. That was a momentous decision. Why was it taken?

We still don’t really know.

The second, even more momentous decision, according to the tribunal, was the

decision that was taken in the evening of July 11. Srebrenica had been captured, they had

thousands of people who could have been regarded as prisoners of war and they decided

on a mass execution.5 This was not the first time, unfortunately, there had been many

atrocities previously, particularly in the Drina valley in 1992. But the machine-like

execution of thousands of men in an organized way was different. That decision was taken

in the evening of July 11. Why was it taken? We don’t really know.

On the bigger picture, we need to examine why the war started and why we were

unable to prevent it. The war started in the spring of 1992. The political process collapsed

in the spring of 1993. Up until that time, you can argue that it was not a peacekeeping

operation. It was a humanitarian assistance operation combined with a determined

political attempt to settle the conflict. The Vance-Owen plan collapsed in the spring of

1993, largely because of disagreements across the Atlantic. There were disagreements in

the region, by definition, but the transatlantic disagreements caused the Vance-Owen peace

plan to collapse. We did not have a credible political process between the spring of 1993

and the late summer/early autumn of 1995. 5 The evidence for this decision is circumstantial. Mladić began mobilizing transportation assets for the deportation of Srebrenica residents on the evening of July 11. A former Bosnian Serb intelligence officer, Momir Nikolić, has testified that he was informed on the morning of the July 12 that military-age men were to be killed. The separation of men and boys from other refugees began shortly afterwards.

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In the meantime, a lot of other things are done. One of them the “safe areas.” Here

we must be self-critical. As Mr. Akashi said, the “safe areas” were not safe. The UN

Secretariat repeatedly told the member states of the Security Council, “We don’t have

enough forces there. It’s not going to work.” The Security Council told the UN Secretariat,

“We don’t really care. We need to do something.” We then had “pretend” safe areas that

were not safe. The combination of these two things—a collapsed political process and

unserious, pretend policy—was a recipe for future disaster. The disaster came in

Srebrenica in July 1995. It could have come elsewhere, but it came there. I would go back to

the collapse of the political process in the spring of 1993 and, in the particular case of

Srebrenica, a decision to create safe areas without making the safe areas safe.

The lessons coming out of the horrible experience of Srebrenica are obvious:

Always have a political process. The political process is paramount. Needless to say,

you also need a humanitarian operation and military operations as appropriate to

advance certain political goals.

Be honest as an international community about what you can and cannot do.

Do not write Security Council resolutions because you want to have a nice press

conference. Write Security Council resolutions that you believe can be

implemented.

Put the necessary resources at the disposal of the people down in the field. Make it

realistic for them to achieve what the diplomats are deciding in New York.

DAVID ROHDE: Of all the panelists here, Muhamed Duraković deserves the most answers.

Do you feel you were given adequate answers, or at least more answers, in the last two

days?

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Muhamed Duraković

MUHAMED DURAKOVIĆ: Thank you David. When we first met [in 1995] a few months after

Srebrenica was occupied, while you were doing your research on your book [Endgame: The

Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe’s Worst Massacre Since World War II], I told you

many questions to which I wanted answers. Twenty years have passed since then. It has

been a privilege for me, as it would have been for any other Srebrenica survivor, to join the

other members of our panel in searching for answers to these questions. I think we were

able to find some answers.

This conference provided us access to many of the documents that support the

arguments and discussions we have been having. In Bosnia, we live in a society with three

ethnically divided groups, each with its own “truth.” If you talk to people from the Bosniak

side, they will tell you what “really” happened. You then go over to the Serb side, and they

will tell you what “really” happened. I always insist that we Bosnians must talk about facts.

We’re not ready to talk about truth. Maybe the next generation will accept a truth that

everyone will recognize. Before that happens, however, we have to talk about facts. What

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was really important for me at this conference was the documentation of every single fact

that came up in our discussion.

As someone who experienced everything at the local level, it was very important for

me to meet the people from the policy-making level. The decisions that were taken at these

higher levels had a tremendous impact on people living in Srebrenica. If a decision was

made to halt food convoys, that had an immediate effect on people in Srebrenica. If a

decision was made not to stop [Serb] shelling and sniping that had an immediate effect on

everyone living in Srebrenica. I wanted to know why the mandate given to the international

community [by the Security Council] was not implemented? International officials greatly

underestimated [the Serb threat] to Srebrenica. This resulted in the failure of the

international community to save the civilian population of Srebrenica.

I saw this conference as a kind of truth commission. Twenty years on, we cannot

bring back the dead, but we can learn from what went wrong in Srebrenica. I think it would

be humane to recognize the mistakes that were made. Not to apologize to the Government

of Bosnia and Herzegovina, not to apologize to me personally, but to apologize to the kids

who grew up without a father, or a brother, or an uncle, or grandfather. There are

thousands of Srebrenica children who will never know what it means to have a male family

member. These people are still suffering today. The effects of Srebrenica live on.

Although the policy makers are unable to understand decisions taken on July 9 or

July 11, for the people who were in Srebrenica on those days, it is all very clear. We knew

that Srebrenica would fall and, as a result, everyone in Srebrenica would be killed. When I

left Srebrenica, and said goodbye to my mother who was walking towards Potočari while

being shelled, I did not think I would ever see her again. I thought that I had a much greater

chance of survival than she did.

Srebrenica was the final stage in the larger policy of ethnic cleansing that took place

throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. You could say that the people of Srebrenica were

lucky. Even though some women were killed and many raped, at least some women and

children did survive. Other communities throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina were not so

lucky.

The claim that we did not know what would happen is unfair to Srebrenica victims.

It was important for me to say that. It was important also for international politicians to

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know that genocide happened throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to the

genocide scholar, Greg Stanton, the final step in genocide is denial. You can see a very

strong movement of denial of genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina, implemented by the

politicians. This is not only an insult to the victims who are forced to relive these memories

again. As Dr. Stanton says, genocide denial is “the surest indicator of further genocidal

massacres."6 What this means is that if we are not able to go through the process of fact-

finding, truth and reconciliation, we may be creating problems for future generations. This

is why this conference was very important for me. It represents another tool to break the

cycle of violence and help the communities of Bosnia and Herzegovina and neighboring

countries heal and move forward and maybe, one day, become a member of the European

family.

DAVID ROHDE: Dr. Lagumdžija, you were a senior Bosnian government official throughout

the war. Muhamed mentioned “truth.” Did you feel you got more truth here than you did

during the conflict?

ZLATKO LAGUMDŽIJA: First I want to thank all the people who participated in, and

organized, our very fruitful discussions. I thought I knew a lot as someone who was both

inside the box and someone who spent years trying to find out what had happened from

files and discussions. I came here with a few questions:

First question. Are safe areas and rapid reaction forces a valid concept regardless of

the fact that they failed in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

Second question. Was the bankruptcy of the international community in Bosnia-

Herzegovina, and Srebrenica in particular, the result of a failure or mismanagement

by particular stakeholders?

Third question. Was it possible to prevent what happened? Can we learn lessons

from what happened so we can prevent it someplace else?

6 A paper by the genocide expert Greg Stanton, “The 8 Stages of Genocide,” describes denial as the final stage of the genocide process. Stanton writes that “Every genocide is followed by denial,” and that denial is “among the surest indicators of further genocidal massacres.”

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Fourth question. Do we really know who is guilty or responsible, or at least

circumstantially responsible, for what happened?

Fifth question. Was there a legally clear mandate [from the UN Security Council] to

deter attacks [on the Safe Areas] that was altered for political reasons?

Sixth question. As someone said during our discussions, should we "redefine the

notion of being neutral?" The notion of neutrality, as it was applied to Bosnia [by the

UN], was very wrong. I used the analogy of a wolf and a lamb ready to have dinner,

and someone trying to define neutrality by geometrically measuring the mid-point

between them. Obviously, we need to redefine the notion of neutrality to mean

standing up for our values, including all those UN resolutions.

Seventh, and perhaps key, question for me. Was what happened [in Bosnia-

Herzegovina and Srebrenica] part of a strategically planned, organized, and brutally

executed mass murder that ended in genocide? There is a theory that I call the “four

M Model”: the mad men, Milošević and Mladić, were responsible. Just now, Carl Bildt

talked about the decisions that were taken by Mladić on July 9 and July 11, based on

what he was thinking or not thinking and his mental profile. There is a theory that

he was obsessed with the past, and was driven to exact revenge by 500 years of

Serbian myth. Or that everything happened because he suddenly became crazy. This

is a very dangerous theory.

I do not have enough time to go into detail but my answer to all those seven

questions is the same: Yes. Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, and yes.

The genocide was planned and conceived from the very beginning. It started in the

Tomašica, Prijedor area, with white ribbons on people's sleeves.7 The Muslim inhabitants

of Prijedor were forced to wear white ribbons on their sleeves. Mass graves were recently

discovered with nearly 400 bodies in one spot, and more than 200 in another, dating back

to June 1992. Then there was the murder of the Prime Minister in the APC vehicle [in

7 In August 2013, Bosnian authorities discovered a mass grave in Tomašica village, near Prijedor in northwest Bosnia, dating back to the first phase of the Bosnia war. ICTY investigators later identified the remains of 600 victims, many of whom had disappeared from their homes in the Prijedor area in June-July 1992. The Serb authorities in Prijedor had issued an order, on May 31, 1992, for the non-Serb population of the town to wear white ribbons on their arms when they went outside their outside their homes, which were identified by white sheets.

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Sarajevo in January 1993], then the massacres in the Markale market [in February 1994

and August 1995], in Tuzla [in May 1995], and so on. As Ambassador Arria reported,

following his visit to Srebrenica in April 1993 with a UN Security Council delegation, this

was “a slow-motion genocide.”

As Carl said, we did not get a political solution until the end of 1995, until the people

who were brutally executing [the genocide] plan were stopped by force. After Srebrenica,

from August 30 to September 20, there were real air strikes in accordance with the same

United Nations mandates that existed before. This was what brought everybody to the table

to talk about peace. We discussed what two or three or four planes were able to do on July

9 or 10 or 11 (during the fall of Srebrenica), but 400 planes were required to actually do

the job in August and September.

Our discussions have been very valuable for me. I was afraid that we would come to

the conclusion that [former US defense secretary Robert] McNamara reached in his book

about the Vietnam War, that he made good decisions which led to the wrong outcome. I

thought that would be the conclusion here, that everybody made the right decisions but the

outcome was wrong. No! We discovered that these were bad decisions, terrible decisions,

wrong decisions.

At our opening dinner, Tom Blanton quoted Karl Marx. I was shocked! You do not

expect an American to quote Karl Marx in his welcoming remarks. Let me reply to Tom

with another Karl Marx quote, “Philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various

ways. The point is to change it.” That is how I viewed this exercise. We have a Srebrenica

survivor with us, a true survivor, a representative of the other survivors. To a certain

extent, we are all survivors. We all survived these events, and we have survived again, over

the last two three days. I saw our role as survivors not in explaining what happened, but

changing the world so this does not happen again. I think we have enough elements to do

this.

DAVID ROHDE: I have the same broad question for General Smith on what you have

learned from this conference. But I also wanted to ask you specifically, based on our

discussions over the last couple days and based on your experience in Bosnia, was there

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enough military force on the ground to save Srebrenica? Or was that force not applied as it

could have been, in your view?

RUPERT SMITH: Let me come back to that. First I would like to echo the thanks to the

organizers of this conversation. For me, it was a deep reminder of those cataclysmic,

catastrophic, and very difficult times for everybody here, each in their own way. It was

much worse for the victims than for the likes of me, of course. I have four particular lessons

that echo some of what has been said, and then I will answer your specific question.

The first lesson. Do not get involved in other people's wars unless you are prepared

to fight one or all of the parties. And I mean both prepared up here [points to his

head] and prepared with whatever you hold in your hand. Before you march in,

decide, who are you going to fight? All of them? Or one of them? Make up your mind

before you start.

Second lesson. Do not have two operations in, and over, the same place (I am talking

about NATO and the UN) conducted simultaneously and answering to different

political directions. We will probably get a question about the “dual key.” That is

why we had a dual key. If you conceive of two operations in and over the same place

answering to different political directions, you will get the muddle that we have

been discussing.

Third lesson. Clarify the political/military debate before you go in. There is an awful

tendency to view this as a debate in which you compromise your positions in order

to arrive at a solution. But you cannot compromise a military position. A military

position is measured against the opponent, not your political master. If your

political master is part of the negotiation, his political position is not measured

against you. It is measured against the person with whom he is negotiating. In the

debate between soldiers and politicians, each party must arrive at a result that

accommodates their position, and does not compromise them away with some

comfortable phrases, as in a Security Council Resolution, for example. It is a savage,

iterative, hard argument, and basic to the relationship between a military

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commander and his political masters. You do not compromise. If it comes to

compromise, you ought to go.

The last lesson. People matter, whether they are decision-makers or victims. In the

end, these humanitarian operations are about people. The people make up the

objective. Those who decide to intervene may do so for relatively narrow national

interests but the commanders they send to achieve these humanitarian objectives

must be empowered to represent the interests of the people as a whole, the

objective, not their narrow national interest.

To answer David Rohde’s question, in light of what I have just said, I do not think that

military force applied by the UN or NATO, or any combination of the two, would have

prevented something like the collapse of Srebrenica. It might have delayed it, it might have

made it slightly different, but I do not think it would have changed the outcome of the

defense of the enclave to any great degree.

DAVID ROHDE: Mr. Voorhoeve, obviously we're in the Netherlands, and obviously this

tragedy has had a huge impact here as well. Were any of your questions answered in the

last two days? You have recently written a book about your experiences.8 What are your

present views on safe areas? Should there be peacekeeping? Is it possible to do it

successfully?

JORIS VOORHOEVE: The very candid exchanges that we have had over the last two days

have helped us better understand how to avoid such disastrous developments in the future.

That is ultimately the goal of the exercise. The mass murder that took place after the fall of

Srebrenica was not the last mass murder. We live in a world with a poisonous mix of arms

spreading to every corner of the world, enormous groups of unemployed young men,

collapsing, poorly designed states in many areas of the world, and religion-driven politics

and ideologies that are used as justifications to commit crimes. That is why an analysis of

past Holocausts is so important. If we do not apply the lessons well in the future, they will

be repeated again and again in different spots on earth.

8 See June 30, 2015 book summary of Yoris Voorhoeve, Safe Areas? Failures and Successes in Protecting Civilians in War.

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One of the most important lessons I learned in these meetings was that looking for a

single scapegoat is the wrong approach. Once you have pointed your finger at a particular

official, institution, or country, you stop thinking. You have a sense of relief: he or she or

this is guilty. Actually, in cases like this, there is a collective failure. The disastrous end is

the sum of many individual and institutional failures and an underestimation of the power

of evil, to use an old-fashioned word. An early 19th century English philosopher, Edmund

Burke, said that “all that is necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.”

We can amend that by saying that “evil prevails if there is a collection of inadequate

decisions based on underestimating the power of evil.” We saw evil in the former

Yugoslavia in the form of ethnic hatred mobilizing people to gain power. Once a country or

ideology declines, mobilizing people based on group differences is poisonous. We see that

same process taking place in many countries. This is why I hope that the conference

organizers will continue to analyze past events to draw lessons of prevention.

DAVID ROHDE: Thank you. Let us open it up now to questions from the audience.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: At the end of 1994, the Bosnian Serb government offered to create a

safe passage to Bosnian territory from the enclaves. Bosnian President Izetbegović did not

accept that offer. Did the UN pressure Izetbegović to accept the offer? Also, after the

buildup of Serbian troops around the enclave, why did the UN not take any counter-

measures to reinforce the enclaves.

DAVID ROHDE: Dr. Lagumdžija, do you remember receiving such an offer and what did the

Bosnian government decide?

ZLATKO LAGUMDŽIJA: From the very beginning, there were some people arguing that we

could prevent the war if we accepted Karadzić's offer of a population exchange. Two

million people would go in one direction and two million people would go in the other

direction. It was called "ethnic cleansing by agreement."

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Zlatko Lagumdžija, left, with Hasan Muratović (in private session)

This was not a war of civilizations, this was a war against civilization. Srebrenica is a

clear example of a war against civilization. This was not a fight between religious or ethnic

groups. It was a fight between two concepts of the future of the country, a shared society or

a segregated society. It was fighting between exclusive societies and inclusive societies.

That was the fight between good and evil, as far as I am concerned. A representative of the

international community told me, "Mr. Lagumdžija, you are promoting the idea of people

living together. You have a constitution that promotes the idea of people separating. We

should peacefully finish what was left unfinished by the war.” He told me that it was not the

fault of the international community that “some people in your country are wrongly

parked.” That was when I realized how far things can go if you allow that way of thinking.

The question is not why we did not do a peaceful ethnic cleansing in 1994. The

question is why we did not do it in1992? We could have said to the Bosnians then: “you are

in the wrong country. For 500 years, when you were in the Ottoman Empire and then the

Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Kingdom of South Slavs, under fascism, and Yugoslavia

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under Tito, you all lived together in a shared society. Then democracy came and they

decided that you cannot live in a shared society because we have democracy.” In 1992, we

were told to go back to safe areas, to areas where only Muslims live, where only Christians

live, where only Jews live, and so on.

I have always been a strong promoter of a shared society. Some people in my

country think that I am evil. People who deny genocide. So yes, there was an idea to move

people around but, wait a second, there were other safe areas. Were we supposed to

remove people from Žepa, from Srebrenica, from Goražde, from Bihać? I asked one

international representative if we should leave people in the Bihać area and only withdraw

those people in Žepa and Srebrenica. He said, “Maybe Bihać can stay.” What does that

mean? We would have one group of Bosnian Muslims around Sarajevo and the Bosnian

River, and another group in Bihać? Why don't you call it West Bank and Gaza? Western

Bosnia could become the West Bank, and Sarajevo could be the Gaza strip.

I salute the people who risked their lives to be part of the UN peacekeeping mission

in our country. But, forgive me, we have to stand up for certain values. If I was the one who

had to decide whether to accept such an offer [of safe passage], I would say, “no, we have to

keep on fighting for the values of the UN and the European Union. If democracy and shared

society cannot co-exist in Bosnia-Herzegovina, I do not know where they can. Other

European countries, including Holland, are facing the same problem.

DAVID ROHDE: Mr. Akashi, you repeatedly pointed out that there were not adequate troops

to implement the safe haven concept. Did you bring that up when you were serving as

Special Representative of the Secretary-General in 1993, 1994 and 1995?

YASUSHI AKASHI: Yes, on the advice of our military experts, the Secretary-General argued

[in June 1993] that we would need 34,000 additional troops to implement the safe area

mandate that was given to him by the UN Security Council, especially under Resolution

836.9 The Secretary-General may have erred in saying that we would need 34,000 extra

troops but we could agree to a “light option” with 7,600 extra troops. The Security Council

picked up on the “light option” of 7,600, who only arrived in theater about one year later. In

9 UNSC, “Resolution 836 (1993),” S/RES/836, June 4, 1993.

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hindsight, the Secretary-General should have said that the only choice is the heavy option

of 34,000. This option assumed full cooperation between NATO and the United Nations on

the basis of so-called dual key system.

Dual key was a cumbersome system, but I think it was necessary to ensure a

marriage of political and military considerations. Most of the time in the theater there was

full sharing of information and frank discussion between the UN and NATO. Within

UNPROFOR, there was a committee of civilian and military experts with a civilian majority

on the use of air power. We viewed “close air support” as an act of self-defense for the

safety of our personnel. We approved these requests without qualifications or reservations

since it was the question of life or death of our soldiers and our personnel. On the other

hand, an “air strike” was the political action that required full examination of relevant

factors from all possible angles. We could have done a much better job with full resources

had we been given the 34,000 troops requested by the Secretary-General [in June 1993]. I

cannot say for sure, however, that it would have been a panacea.

DAVID ROHDE: I have a question for Mr. Voorhoeve. The Dutch government has a certain

responsibility for the number of Dutch soldiers that were in the enclave. I know you were

not involved in [the original deployment decision] in 1994, but do you think it was a

mistake that the troop levels got so low, particularly for Dutchbat III, that rotations were

happening and the soldiers were not able to come back from leave. Looking back, do you

think you made a mistake in terms of the size of the force?

JORIS VOORHOEVE: That was not the major problem. The fall of the enclave has very little

to do with Dutchbat, although it looks as if it did. There were a number of causes for the fall.

The primary cause was the wrong design of the peace operation. It should have been a

green helmet peace operation rather than a blue helmet operation. The eastern enclaves,

which were extremely vulnerable, should have been under the protection of NATO. NATO

should have given a warning to the Bosnian Serbs and should have applied deterrence. If

you do it well, deterrence is the most humane form of applying military power, because

there are no casualties. Deterrence means telling the enemy, “if you touch these people, we

will take out your command centers, your air fields, your arsenals, you will suffer much

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more damage than you can gain by overrunning these enclaves.” The principle of

deterrence was forgotten, brushed aside by many politicians after the Cold War. The word

“deterrence” was linked to “nuclear deterrence,” but it is an age-old principle of applying

power. It is basically playing poker against your enemy. Your enemy has to know you can

call his bluff because you have escalation dominance. NATO has escalation dominance.

The fact that Dutchbat went down to a much smaller number of people than were

required has nothing to do with this. Dutchbat could not be rotated with fresh new

personnel, because of the convoy terror from the side of the Bosnian Serbs who blocked

this. Dutchbat did not get fuel and had to eat emergency rations for months. By the

beginning of June, Dutchbat was no longer militarily operational. Karremans warned us [on

June 4] that Dutchbat could no longer carry out its mission.10 But the horrible fate of

Srebrenica is not caused these problems. It is related to [Mladić’s] decision to overrun the

enclave, with a relatively overwhelming force, and the later decision to execute the

prisoners, as Carl Bildt mentioned. Those are the origins of the horror that we have been

discussing.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Voorhoeve, you spoke about Colonel Karremans. He raised a

glass with the butcher of Srebrenica, but did not order his soldiers to fight against that

butcher. The Blue Berets were well trained but were unwilling to fight.

JORIS VOORHOEVE: You can see the entire conversation between Karremans and Mladić

[on July 11] on Youtube.11 If you take the trouble to look at it, you will notice first of all that

Karremans asks nine times for Mladić's cooperation in evacuating the population together

with Dutchbat. He was concerned about what would happen to the 20,000/27,000 refugees

around the Dutchbat compound.

10 Karremans to BH Command, “Deteriorating situation in Srebrenica,” Dutchbat Compound Potočari, TK9588, June 4, 1995. 11 A transcript of the Karremans-Mladic session on July 11-12 is available through ICTY. Video of the first, second, and third Mladic-Karremans sessions on July 11-12 is available on Youtube.

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Mladić and Karremans in Bratunac, July 11, 1995, Serb video

You raise the question of the glass. That is also a misconception. It shows us the power of a

video cut. What went across all the channels in the world was this glass and not these nine

requests to cooperate in taking care of the refugees and agree to a joint evacuation of the

refugees and Dutchbat. Mr. Karremans refused the glass three times. At the end of the

conversation, Mladić wanted to have a picture with glasses raised. Karremans refused it. He

said, "my soldiers don’t drink beer, so in my opinion, I shouldn’t drink beer."12 A glass was

then put in his hand. He did not at all congratulate Mladić with a victory, as was claimed

later on. It was a false image.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am an intern with the ICTY. I have a question for Mr. Bildt. This

happened in the backyard of the European Union, but we did not really do anything about

it. European decision making was very confused until finally America assumed a leadership

role and made Dayton happen. This has become a widely accepted narrative. I would like to

hear what your experience was back then.

12 The video and transcript of the first Karremans-Mladić meeting on July 11 at Hotel Fontana show that Karremans reluctantly accepted a glass of spritzer (white wine and mineral water) that was placed in his hand after refusing an initial offer of beer. He was photographed with the glass to his lips while Mladić looked on.

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CARL BILDT: I agree with you, that is the popular perception. In my opinion, it does not

reflect reality. The role of the European Union was limited to one of two elements of the

peace process. At the London Conference, in August 1992, an International Conference on

the Former Yugoslavia was established, co-headed by the European Union and by the

United Nations. The co-chairmen were David Owen [appointed by the European

Community] and Cy Vance [appointed by the UN Secretary-General]. They produced the

Vance-Owen peace plan in the early days of 1993. That peace plan collapsed due to

disagreements across the Atlantic. The Clinton administration had just come in and was

effectively saying “we want to do something better.”

I would not say that the Vance-Owen peace plan was perfect (neither is Dayton, by

the way), but the collapse of the Vance-Owen peace plan guaranteed two and a half more

years of war, and all the deaths and displaced and suffering that went along with it. I was

appointed Co-Chairman to replace David Owen [on June 5, 1995], a few weeks before

Srebrenica. Eventually, with the cooperation with the Americans and Holbrooke, we

managed to get something going. The key military element was the British-French Rapid

Reaction Force. The French guns around Sarajevo were far more important than all of the

[NATO] planes flying there. The devastating accuracy, firepower and consistency of the

artillery fire around Sarajevo changed the equation in a way that people flying from Aviano

air base can never do. That tends to be forgotten.

We should learn the lessons of Bosnia and Srebrenica, but we should not be afraid of

trying. One of the big problems facing the United Nations is to get countries to send soldiers

to do dangerous things. We [politicians] know that we will be held responsible for going to

our respective parliaments and saying we want to send soldiers to Afghanistan or to Mali

for a very dangerous operation. Can we guarantee that we will bring peace to Mali? No, we

can't. We can easily say, “It went wrong in Bosnia, so it's better to stay home and pontificate

for a while and let the UN try to find something else to do.” There has been a tendency after

Srebrenica for European nations to back away from UN peacekeeping because it is

dangerous for the soldiers and politically difficult for the respective governments because

it might not succeed. We have to be honest and say, “This is extremely difficult.” Sometimes

it succeeds, sometimes it fails, but it should not be a crime to try. The real crime is staying

home and not even trying. I fear there is a certain Srebrenica effect in European public

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opinion, the idea that it is better to stay home and pontificate than actually be out there,

running the risk of failure.

I was Prime Minister of Sweden at the time of the Bosnian war proper and was

responsible for sending five mechanized battalions of Swedish soldiers to the former

Yugoslavia. Did they bring peace to the country? No, they didn't. Did they save lives? Yes,

they did. Did they facilitate a lot of humanitarian assistance? Yes, they did. Would things

have been better if they had not have been there? No, they wouldn't. It’s the same with the

Dutch. Was it perfect? No, it wasn’t. Would it have been better if the Dutch government had

said, “we will stay at home and issue a press release?” No, it wouldn't. For all of the soul

searching we should have about the need to learn from our failures, the key failure is not to

even try. There are too many governments at the moment who are not even trying to do

something.

MUHAMED DURAKOVIĆ: To be fair, along with the failures that Carl has mentioned, we

should remember that the population of Srebrenica was overwhelmed with joy in 1993

when the UN came to Srebrenica. We hoped that the onslaught and killing were over.

Although we have been focusing on UNPROFOR, let’s not forget the other international

agencies in Srebrenica during that period, including the Swedish Rescue Services Agency,

who did a fantastic job in helping people move out of the overpopulated downtown area

and live in much better conditions. Let's not forget the courageous work of UNHCR who

fought their way through the checkpoints that had been set up almost all the way from

Belgrade to Zvornik, to Bratunac, eventually entering the enclave via the yellow bridge, OP

Papa, as the military called it. All these people did a fantastic job and very courageous job.

They were shot at; some were wounded and some died. I know people who died bringing

humanitarian assistance to Srebrenica. Let’s also not forget the contribution of the

International Criminal Tribunal [ICTY-a UN agency] in the process of fact finding, truth and

reconciliation following the fall of Srebrenica.

While we focused on the failures of the policy makers, at the tactical level and the

level of the decision-makers in Zagreb, let's not forget the “unsung heroes” who saved

many lives not only in Srebrenica, but throughout Bosnia. They deserve our respect. They

played a very positive role.

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I divide my own life between the period before Srebrenica and the period after

Srebrenica. I became a human rights activist because of Srebrenica. My heart goes to the

people who are currently suffering. In a written address to the UN for this anniversary, I

wrote, "While we remember the fate of Srebrenica and the victims of Srebrenica, let's not

forget ... there are people who are going through exactly the same kind of torture

throughout the world...Let's not betray them again." The people of Srebrenica were

betrayed. I am not talking now about governments, the Republika Srpska or the Bosnian

government or the international community. I am talking about ordinary people of

Srebrenica, the women and children. They paid a horrible price. Their lives were changed

forever and there is nothing we can do to fix it.

By condemning those who promote the politics of genocide denial, we can heal the

whole community. Hopefully their children will have a better life than I had. We need to

learn the lessons of Srebrenica. When we go in [to a conflict situation], we must go in

strong, and pick the right side. Your conscience will tell you which side to pick. You can

never be on the side of the perpetrator, you have to be on the side of the victim. Sometimes

you have to be only on one side, as in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, using the analogy

of the wolf and the sheep. Sometimes you have to be on all sides because everybody

committing atrocities against each other.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am from Belgrade. I am a PhD student [in the Netherlands].

Following up on the story of victim and perpetrator, I would like to pose a question to Mr.

Voorhoeve. I would like to ask you about Hasan Nuhanović [a former UN interpreter in

Srebrenica] who is not with us today for some reason. Do you or perhaps the Dutch state

feel responsible for failing to protect his family? I am not generalizing. I am just talking

about one guy and his family.13

13 Hasan Nuhanović was a UN interpreter whose father Ibro, mother Nasiha, and brother Muhamed were killed by Bosnian Serbs following the fall of Srebrenica. The family sought refuge in the Dutchbat HQ in Potočari on July 11. Dutchbat officers ordered 18-year-old Muhamed Nuhanović to leave the compound on the early evening of July 13. A September 6, 2013 ruling by the Netherlands Supreme Court concluded that Dutchbat troops knew by the afternoon of July 13 that the “Bosnian Serbs were committing crimes against the male refugees” and “should not have caused Muhamed to leave the compound.” The court concluded that the Dutch state “acted wrongfully” toward both Muhamed and Ibro, who chose to accompany his younger son to his eventual death. See also Michael Dobbs, “Who killed Muhamed Nuhanović?” Foreign Policy, March 26, 2012. For video with Hasan Nuhanović, see USHMM, Bosnia Eyewitness Testimony.

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JORIS VOORHOEVE: This is a question for the Netherlands courts, who should decide who

is responsible for what. I should not meddle with this. I was not informed or involved in the

decisions concerning Hasan. I talked to him in the fall of 1995. He a came to my office and

told me about the horrible things that had happened, including the loss of his father and his

brother. I offered my sincere condolences. I continue to do that, but I should not now enter

into a question that has been before the Netherlands courts, and is still before the

European Courts. I think I should leave it up to the judges.

MUHAMED DURAKOVIĆ: Let me say a few words. Hasan Nuhanović has been a friend of

mine for a long time. His brother Muhamed was a few months older than me. We had the

same name. Muhamed and I were very good friends. When we were seventeen/eighteen,

we considered Hasan to be very old and not someone that we should associate with. But

after Muhamed died, I became one of Hasan’s closest friends. We talk to each other on a

daily basis.

We are often invited to talk about Srebrenica. Hasan has a very specific story to tell,

as does every other Srebrenica survivor. The story of what happened in Srebrenica is not

just one story, it is thousands of stories. Any Srebrenica survivor could have been here

today, in my chair. I feel privileged that the organizers gave me this opportunity after

numerous consultations with Hasan and everyone else, I turned down an opportunity to

talk to the UN in New York because I wanted to see the people here. I have not seen some of

them for more than 20 years. Talking about “unsung heroes,” Larry Hollingworth of UNHCR

is here. The last time I saw Larry was back in 1994. Twenty plus years later, we are sitting

around the same table. It has been a privilege to be here and meet some of the people who,

I thought, made a great contribution. But also, at the same time, confront some people who

I felt had failed to do their job as well.

This event is not about Muhamed Duraković and it is not about Hasan Nuhanović. It

is about creating a historical record. That is why it is so important for me that the

organizers were able to produce so much evidence, in the form of declassified documents

that allow us to finally bring some things out.

I can put my demons to rest. Back in 1996, we survivors were so angry and

disappointed by our treatment by the international community [that we naturally

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gravitated to] conspiracy theories. We felt that the civilized world had failed us and decided

that we should no longer live. We felt that the civilized world was racist, Islamophobic. We

felt we were let down because we were blue eyed, blonde Muslims in the middle of a

Europe that would not allow such a state to exist.

I was able to learn, from the documentation, that some of these conspiracy theories

have no basis in fact. We have to continue investigating what really happened. I will

personally spend the rest of my life investigating. Reading and learning so I can hopefully

help future policy makers not make the same mistakes as they made in Srebrenica.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: [Question in Dutch-not translated.]

JORIS VOORHOEVE: There were a number of questions for me. The first one was, what did

the Netherlands do to prevent this evil? The short answer is, not enough. We failed. In

January 1994, the Lubbers-Kok cabinet, of which I was not a member, took the decision to

make part of a battalion available to the United Nations. The Canadians wanted to leave

[Srebrenica] as fast as possible. The only country willing to send troops was the

Netherlands. Other countries refused because the operation seemed too dangerous. In the

end, the Dutch operation failed. But it achieved significant results in terms of humanitarian

aid. Had there not been blue helmets there [in July 1995] when Mladić attacked, I am afraid

he would probably have killed many more than the men. I think the UN presence, whether

they were Dutch or Norwegian or Belgian or French, helped to reduce the terrible disaster.

I cannot prove this, but it is my understanding.

When will the Netherlands give complete openness? It has done so already. There is

a very thorough 3,500-page study, without counting the large annexes, issued by the

Netherlands Institute of War Documentation in 2002. It is of the best pieces of current

history writing, drawn up by researchers who also had access to secret material. They were

able to read the still top secret minutes of Netherlands cabinet meeting and also saw

intelligence information. Later on, we also had a very thorough [2002-2003] parliamentary

inquiry, which questioned people under oath. I myself was questioned under oath for two

days. There was no way for a politician or a military officer to avoid the questions of the

commission. I understand very well that people continue to search for answers. This

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afternoon, I will publish a book based on my own diary, but the story really is not all that

different from the conclusions of the Parliamentary inquest or the NIOD report.14

On the question of what I blame myself for, I waited for NATO air power in early

July. On July 9, I raised the question of close air support with General Janvier, the United

Nations commander. I said to his military advisor, “It's at Janvier’s discretion, he is the

commander, I'm not the UN commander.” I was a politician sitting in The Hague and was

not responsible for the actual military operations, but I said, “Air power in the sense of

close air support has been promised to the Netherlands by the United Nations Secretary-

General. This is the time it should come, even though thirty Dutchbat members are in the

hands of Mladić.” I blame myself for not having taking a plane [to UNPF HQ in Zagreb], in

early July and saying this personally to General Janvier, rather than in a telephone message.

Had I been there, I could have pressed the point more strongly. I expected a lot of air power

to be applied to help Dutchbat. It was promised to me on the night of July 10, but nothing

had come on the morning of July 11. By the time a limited close air action took place after

noon on July 11, it was too little too late.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am Robert Fox, I was the chief foreign correspondent for the Daily

Telegraph at the time of Srebrenica. Can we go back to dual key? How are you going to get a

unified command in these circumstances? When General Smith ordered the guns to fire on

[Bosnian Serb positions above] Sarajevo in that very spectacular fire power demonstration

[in August 1995], who did you clear it with?

RUPERT SMITH: I commanded the guns, I commanded the soldiers on the ground, and I

commanded the rapid reaction force. It was a unified command. I answered to the UN but,

as a result of the decisions made directly after the catastrophe of Srebrenica, the authority

to use air power over and above close air support had been vested in the military

commanders. It was removed from the political chain of command after the London

Conference on July 21.15 The keys of the two key system were subsequently held by the

14 See June 30, 2015 book summary of Yoris Voorhoeve, Safe Areas? Failures and Successes in Protecting Civilians in War. 15 For changes in the “dual key” arrangement, see Lake memo to Clinton, “Your meeting with Christopher and Shalikashvili on the London Meeting on Bosnia,” July 22, 1995. Lake informed Clinton that authority to initiate air

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NATO commander, Admiral Smith in Naples, and by General Janvier in Zagreb, the overall

military commander of the UN peacekeeping forces [in Zagreb].

On this particular occasion, at the end of August, General Janvier was out of theater

on leave. The key was in my hands. I talked to Admiral Smith who talked to me, General

Smith and he turns his key [on August 28]. I do not turn my key precisely at that moment

because I wish to extract some potential hostages from the consequences of what I was

about to do. Twenty-four hours later, or thereabouts, I turn my key [on August 29 after

British troops have safely left Goražde]. Srebrenica, for all its awfulness, had a catalytic

effect on the political direction of the use of force. The keys were given to the commanders.

That raises a profound set of questions. You should ask yourself whether you want your

political leaders to hand automaticity in using force to the soldier. It was not such an easy

thing to do, but it was done and that is what I did.

YASUSHI AKASHI: I would like to make a short comment on the dual key system, prior to

this period. In February 1994, there was a crisis over Sarajevo [following the Markale

market shelling] in which 68 civilians were killed. During that time the UN and NATO

consulted together on the use of force, specifically the use of air power.16 There was an

excellent coordination between NATO and the UN. We had the same assessment of the

tragedy and the means to improve the situation. We met several times with the commander

of NATO Southern Command, Admiral Jeremy Boorda of the United States. He was an

outstanding military leader who understood both the effectiveness and the danger of the

use of force. We also engaged in discussions with the Bosnian government and the Serb

leadership. I also spoke a number of times with President Milošević of Serbia. Milošević had

action in Bosnia would be in the hands of the NATO air commander, Admiral Smith, and the UNPROFOR commander on the ground, General Smith. It described the new arrangement as “a tremendous advance over previous NATO air strike decisions.” 16 The Sarajevo crisis of February 1994 was triggered by the shelling of the open air Markale market on February 5 with a 120 millimeter mortar shell, killing at least 58 civilians and wounding more than 140. General Rose initially said that the shell had been fired from a Bosnian government position. The ICTY later concluded, on the basis of an exhaustive examination of possible trajectories (in the case of Bosnian Serb General Stanislav Galić), that the shell was fired from a Bosnian Serb position. The North Atlantic Council declared an “exclusion zone” around Sarajevo on February 9, 1994 following the shelling of the Markale marketplace, pursuant to UNSC resolutions 824, 836, and 844. The NATO statement set a deadline of February 20 for the removal of heavy weapons from the Sarajevo exclusion zone. (See Akashi comments above.) The North Atlantic Council added an additional “military exclusion zone” around Goražde on April 22, 1994, and threatened to extend the policy to other Safe Areas, including Srebrenica, in the event of “concentration or movement of heavy weapons.”

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a good understanding of the imminent threat of the use of force. We were able to extract an

agreement from the two parties for a ceasefire and withdrawal of heavy weapons twenty

kilometers outside of Sarajevo. I was happy that we were able to threaten the use of air

power, but did not actually have to use it. That is the best way to resolve such a situation.

In April 1994, we had a previous crisis over Goražde. On this occasion, we also had

NATO air power available to us. We discussed these matters with Milošević, in the presence

of Karadzić and Mladić and on the UN side, General de La Presle and myself only. Milošević

was like a professor trying to convince the recalcitrant students [Karadzić and Mladić].

After twelve hours of discussion we reached an agreement that was ratified the following

day ten minutes prior to the deadline for negotiations given by New York to me. Here again,

we were able to extract an agreement of the Serbs without resorting to the use of air power

by NATO. Unfortunately, the agreement was not respected. The NATO leadership was not

very happy that we reached that agreement through negotiations but I consider that it was

the duty of the United Nations to threaten force if necessary, but negotiate if possible.

As time went on it, getting NATO and the UN to agree became more and more

difficult. But I agreed to Rupert Smith’s request for the use of force and full scale air attack

in May 1995. That led to many UN personnel being taken hostage by indignant Serbs.

[In August 1995] the UN Secretary-General deprived me of my dual key authority. I

was not happy about this transfer of power. I thought my military leaders subscribed to

essentially the same philosophy of negotiation and the use of force [as I did].

JORIS VOORHOEVE: It was clear that things started to work when General Smith and

Admiral Smith turned the keys. Goražde was saved, and Sarajevo was saved, because of the

application of strong military power. The Serb leadership understood that the time had

come to sit down at the negotiating table. This led to the Dayton peace agreement. My wish

of course is that the policies that helped save Goražde, including the threat and use of real

military power, had been applied several weeks earlier. That might have made a difference

to the 8,000 people who were killed in Srebrenica. There is an unfortunate logic in politics:

things sometimes get much worse before they get better, when everybody understands

that muddling through will not work anymore and something radically different is

necessary. After the horror of Srebrenica, the United States understood it had to provide

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leadership to the failing UN peace operation. The US Government talked to Boutros-Ghali

and the UN generals and decided, “We are now going to apply strong military power.” That

was a message that the Bosnian Serbs and Belgrade understood. I think we owe the end of

the war to a combination of British military cunning, represented here, and American and

NATO air power.

DAVID ROHDE: I am the lone journalist who participated in the two days of private

discussion. It is clear that a critical moment occurred on July 10, 1995. A request [by

Dutchbat] for close air support went all the way to Zagreb. It was the first formal request

received by General Janvier. He declines the request. General Janvier is not here but various

participants reported that he had sincere doubts about using air power. He felt that ground

troops would be more effective. There was a general belief that air power complicated

things or might make them worse. Others thought air power would be very effective, but

Janvier turns down that request.

There were mistakes by Dutchbat. There are also questions on the Bosnian

government side. A key commander, Naser Orić, was outside of Srebrenica at the time. We

journalists also failed in our coverage of Srebrenica. What General Smith said, about the

savagery of Srebrenica creating the political will to use force, is correct. The political will,

the unity, did not exist prior to this tragedy.

[END OF PUBLIC SESSION]