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Colombia Case Matrix Network January 2016 Case Mapping, Selection and Prioritisation Case Analysis Command Responsibility International Criminal Law Guidelines:

International Criminal Law Guidelines: Command · PDF filecommitted the crime INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW GUIDELINES: ... international case law on the modes ... structure that underpins

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  • Colombia

    Case Matrix NetworkJanuary 2016

    Case Mapping, Selection and Prioritisation

    Case Analysis

    CommandResponsibility

    International Criminal Law Guidelines:

  • Case Matrix Network

    The Case Matrix Network (CMN) provides knowledge-transfer and capacity

    development services to national and international actors in the fields of

    international criminal and human rights law. We seek to empower those

    working to provide criminal accountability for violations of core international

    crimes and serious human rights violations, by providing access to legal

    information, legal expertise and knowledge tools. The CMN is a department of

    the Centre for International Law Research and Policy, which is an international

    not for profit organisation, registered in Belgium.

    Acknowledgments

    The publication was drafted by Alexandre Skander Galand, Emilie Hunter and

    Ilia Utmelidze and was reviewed by Olympia Bekou. Sections 3-11 are based

    on the legal requirements framework developed by Morten Bergsmo and

    Ilia Utmelidze. Additional research was provided by Agnieszka Kasztalska,

    Angel Kulakov and Agata Odrobinska. Translation was provided by Alejandro

    Chehtman and Mara Luisa Piqu.

    Centre for International Law Research and Policy

    January 2016

    ISBN: 978-82-8348-053-5

    Part of the CMN International Criminal Justice Toolkits Project

    Designed by Sonda

    www.sondadesign.com

    Funded by the European Union and the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

    This publication has been produced with the assistance of the European

    Union. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the

    Case Matrix Network and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the

    European Union.

  • CASE MATRIX NETWORK02

    Introduction

    Purpose

    Structure

    Methodology

    Glossary of key terms and acronyms

    Command Responsibility in International Legal Instruments

    The International Criminal Court (1998)

    Other Treaties Establishing ad hoc or International(ised) Tribunals

    International Humanitarian Law

    International Human Rights Treaties

    Introduction to Command Responsibility

    ICC Art 28(a): Elements of command responsibility according to the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC

    Concurrent Conviction

    Liability for crimes committed by others

    The Underlying Offence or Principal Crime

    A crime within the jurisdiction of the Court was committed or was about to be committed by the forces

    Superior Subordinate Status

    The perpetrator was a military commander or a person effectively acting as a military commander

    The perpetrator was a military commander; OR

    The perpetrator was effectively acting as a military commander of the forces that committed the crime

    Publicists

    Control

    The perpetrator had effective command and control, or effective authority and control over the forces that committed the crime

    INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW GUIDELINES: COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY

    Table of Contents

    1.

    1.1.

    1.2.

    1.3.

    1.4.

    2.

    2.1.

    2.2.

    2.3.

    2.4.

    3.

    3.1.

    3.2.

    3.3.

    4.

    5.

    5.1.

    5.2.

    6.

    4

    6

    7

    7

    13

    16

    17

    20

    23

    26

    28

    29

    33

    41

    48

    49

    54

    55

    55

    56

    59

    64

    65

  • TABLE OF CONTENTS

    CMN ICJ Toolkits Project 03

    The perpetrator had effective command and control; OR

    The perpetrator had effective authority and control

    Publicists

    Causation

    The crimes committed by the forces resulted from the perpetrators failure to exercise control properly over forces

    Acts of Omission

    The perpetrator failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress the commission of such crime(s) or failed to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution

    Distinct duties: the duty to prevent, to repress and/or to punish

    The perpetrator failed to ta ke the necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power the prevent the commission of such crime; OR

    The perpetrator failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to repress the commission of such crime; OR

    The perpetrator failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution

    Publicists

    Mens Rea

    The perpetrator either knew or owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit one or more of the crimes

    The perpetrator knew that the forces were committing or about to commit the crime

    The perpetrator should, owing to the circumstances at the time, have known that the forces were committing or about to commit the crime

    Publicists

    Index of Cases and Publicists

    6.1.

    6.2.

    7.

    8.

    8.1.

    8.2.

    8.3.

    9.

    9.1.

    9.2.

    10.

    65

    71

    75

    82

    83

    90

    91

    99

    101

    107

    112

    113

    118

    119

    119

    122

    131

    136

  • CASE MATRIX NETWORK

    INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW GUIDELINES: COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY

    04

    1

    Introduction

    Purpose

    Structure

    Methodology

    Glossary of key terms and acronyms

    1.

    1.1.

    1.2.

    1.3.

    1.4.

  • CMN ICJ Toolkits Project 05

    1. Introduction

    Command responsibility assigns criminal responsibility to higher-ranking members of military for crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by their subordinates. It has been adjudicated upon through the form of superior responsibility in a number of cases before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, based on overlapping yet distinct legal classifications as well as the International Criminal Court, through the classification of command responsibility.1

    While command responsibility has emerged from the practice of international criminal tribunals, its relevance for national criminal justice efforts for conduct that amounts to core international crimes should not be overlooked. The possibility to hold those individuals who are in positions of seniority or leadership accountable for their failures to adequately supervise their subordinates or who turn a blind eye may have a valuable deterrent effect on the commission of future crimes. It can also contribute towards ensuring accountability of those considered to be most responsible before criminal justice institutions at the national and international level.

    However, the concept of command responsibility has many guises: it is recognised as a form of criminal liability, a disciplinary offence for violation of military duties and a corollary to other liabilities or separate offences. It is also variously applicable to military leaders as well as leaders of military-like organisations, such as paramilitary groups, armed defence organisations and rebel groups. Moreover, the legal classification of command responsibility as established in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute) introduces a requirement of causation, which cannot be found in the legal definitions of preceding international legal instruments.2 Taken together, it is understandable that the concept of command responsibility as well as its legal codification in the ICC Statute may generate misunderstandings amongst criminal law practitioners for many of the 123 States Parties of the ICC. An absence of information on the construction and application of the liability by national authorities may also limit accountability efforts against those most responsible persons who hold positions of authority. At least 16 State Parties have implemented all or many of the legal requirements of command responsibility, described in Article 28(a) of the ICC Statute (ICC Art.28(a)) and at least 50 other States include various provisions which punish commanders or those in positions of responsibility for the failure to act or of acts of omission.3

    This includes Colombia, where the national criminal code establishes the liability of perpetration by irregular commission (commission by omission)4 which shares several of

    1 These Guidelines adopt the terminology of Art.28 of the ICC Statute, differentiating between the responsibility of commanders under Art.28(a) and non-

    military or military-like superiors in Art.28(b). See 1.4.

    2 ICC Statute.

    3 A further publication on the status of command responsibility in national laws is under preparation by CMN.

    4 Colombian Criminal Code (Law 599/2000), Art. 25.

    http://www.legal-tools.org/en/doc/7b9af9/http://www.legal-tools.org/en/doc/7b9af9/

  • CASE MATRIX NETWORK

    INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW GUIDELINES: COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY

    06

    the legal requirements of ICC Art.28(a).5 Notwithstanding the availability of commission by omission, some have argued for the direct application of command responsibility through the constitutional block and constitutional provisions on the superiority of international laws,6 although this is a contested issue within the criminal law community in Colombia.7 The vibrancy of this debate is reflective of the overlapping challenges facing accountability efforts in Colombia. It takes into accoun