Internal Security.pdf

8/17/2019 Internal Security.pdf

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C ntents

• Critical Overview of Defence In India

• OROP

• Make In India in Defence

• AFSPA - Armed Forces Special Powers Act

• Bodoland -BTAD (Bodoland Territorial Area Districts)

• Chakmas and Hajongs

• Connectivity to the Region

• Passage of Three Bills by Manipur Assembly in August 2015

• Nagaland Peace Accord

• Racism / Discrimination

• Inner Line Permit for Manipur • Doctrine of Hot Pursuit

• Anti Terror Legislations

• Gujarat Control of Terrorism and Organised Crime (GCTOC) Bill, 2015

• Development and its Linkages with Extremism

• Vikas Sangarsh Samiti - Renewal of Salwa Judum

• Being a Maoist is not Illegal

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URRENT AFFAIRS

Internal Security


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tesCritical Overview of Defence In India

Standing Committee on Defence on status of Defence in India

The Standing Committee on Defence, which presented its report to Parliamenton the last day of the Monsoon Session, has highlighted several shortcomings

that need immediate attention.

Key Recommendations:

1. Wheeled Guns

a. The Defence Ministry, in its reply to the Standing Committee, had

said that “arms and ammunitions” were “by and large available”

with the Army. The Committee, headed by Major General (retd)

B.C. Khanduri, has said “it fails to understand what does ‘by and

large’ mean”. b. The Ministry’s response, the Committee has said, gives “false hope”

that ammunition levels in the Army are as per the authorized strategic

Artillery Profile 2027. The Committee has asked the Ministry to

provide details of the programme, and to step up efforts to adhere to

timelines.

2. Missiles

a. The Army has been facing a major shortage of vehicles to carry

missiles. This has affected the deployment of missiles at strategic

locations. Replying to the Committee’s recommendations that the

private sector be engaged to make missile-carrying vans, the Defence

Ministry had said that the Defence PSU, Bharat Earth Movers

Limited, was in a position to supply the vehicles. “The planning

process of Army should not be hampered due to non-availability of

missile carrying vehicles,” the Committee has said.

3. Rifles

a. The Committee expressed “dismay” that DRDO “started working

on INSAS Rifle way back in 1982 but surprisingly it took 14 years

in its development… But just after 3 years, the quality of rifle tested

in Operation Vijay revealed that product was not up to the mark… b. The Committee found it shocking that even after years of expertise;

DRDO has not evolved enough to develop a basic product like rifle

up to global standards”. Lacunae in the weapon were revealed by the

1999 Kargil conflict, but DRDO has not been able to provide a good

rifle to the Army. The Committee has asked why rifles were not

being procured from elsewhere.

4. Manpower

a. As revealed by replies in Parliament and disclosures made to the

Standing Committee, the Armed Forces face a major shortage of

officers, especially in junior ranks.

b. According to the Committee’s report, the Army is short of 9,642

officers — 40,095 against the stipulated strength of 49,737. The

Navy is 1,561 officers short, and the IAF 659.


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c. Attempts are being made to address the situation by making short

service commission more attractive. It is hoped that attractive perks

and recommendations of the Sixth Pay Commission would be able

to attract youngsters to the profession of arms. The Committee has

asked the Ministry to explore the reasons behind younger people nolonger looking at the armed forces as a career.

5. Lack of Funds

a. The Defence Ministry has noted the lack of funds as one of the

reasons behind porous pockets along the India-Myanmar border.

b. The Ministry, in its reply to the Standing Committee, has said that

“non-allotment of funds” to the Border Roads Organisation (BRO)

resulted in only 4.5 km of the proposed 15.73 km fence along the

border being completed.

c. The Defence Ministry’s disclosure is significant in the backdrop of the recent killing of 18 Army personnel by insurgents in Manipur

along the India-Myanmar border. The Army had carried out a cross

border raid subsequent to the attack. “

d. Assam Rifles is mandated to guard the 1,631 km India-Myanmar

border. All Assam Rifles units and formations operate under the

command of the Army. 15 battalions of Assam Rifles with 77

Company Operating Bases are deployed along the strategic border.

Seven of these battalions are in Manipur.

6. IAF Trainer

a. The Intermediate Jet Trainer project by state-owned Hindustan

Aeronautics Limited has run into troubled waters. The project that

started in 1999 has made no headway, the Committee has noted.

The non-induction of IJT Sitara has compelled the IAF to extend

the life of the Kiran trainers. “By not taking effective steps to procure

trainer, the government is jeopardising the lives of our pilots,” the

Committee has noted. Experts have blamed the absence of trainers

for the spate of MiG-21 crashes.

Steps by NDA Government

1. Within a year, the Narendra Modi government has brought significantchanges to India’s defence policy.

2. It has ended the paralysis on arms acquisition and put greater emphasis

on creating a defence industrial base.

3. It has encouraged the participation of private and foreign capital in Indian

defence production. These initiatives have created a much better policy

environment for the DTTI.

4. Equally important, Defence Minister Parrikar has demonstrated the political

will to shake things up in the MoD, which had become acutely sclerotic

under Antony’s extended reign. Parrikar decisively cut through the

bureaucratic logjam on the purchase of Rafale fighters.

5. He has also taken the surgeon’s knife to the DRDO. After sacking the

DRDO chief earlier, Parrikar has separated the posts of DRDO chief and

scientific advisor to the defence minister.


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6. For the first time since Indira Gandhi brought a young scientist, V.S.

Arunachalam, to head the DRDO in the early 1980s, Parrikar has injected

younger blood into leadership positions.

OROP1. Meaning of One Rank One Pension:

a. OROP implies that uniform pension be paid to the Armed Forcespersonnel retiring in the same rank with the same length of serviceirrespective of their date of retirement and any future enhancementin the rates of pension to be automatically passed on to the pastpensioners

b. It also implies “bridging the gap between the rate of pension of thecurrent pensioners and the past pensioners, and also futureenhancements in the rate of pension to be automatically passed on

to the past pensioners”.

2. Evolution of the Movement:

a. OROP was the basis for determining the pension and benefits of IndianArmed Forces till 1973, when it was terminated by the Indian Ministryof Defence (MOD).

b. The termination of OROP, and drastic decrease in Armed Forcessoldiers’ pension from 70 percent to 37 percent of last pay drawn,two years after 1971 Bangladesh war, caused disquiet in the IndianArmed Forces and, since 2008, has been cause of public appeals andprotests, and hunger strikes by armed forces veterans, theoverwhelming majority of whom retire before they are forty yearsold.

c. Koshiyari Committee: Growing unease in the Armed Forces, andescalating protest by veterans, with implementation of OROP asfocus, led to setting up of a ten-member all-party ParliamentaryPanel, known as the Koshyari Committee after its chairman, toexamine the OROP issue. The Koshyari Committee after consideringthe evidence, and hearing oral depositions for eight months, inDecember 2011, unanimously found merit in OROP and stronglyrecommended that, ‘Government should implement OROP in the

defence forces across the board at the earliest and further that for future, the pay, allowances, pension, family pension, etc., in respectof the defence personnel should be determined by a separatecommission’.

Despite the Koshyari Committee report, public commitments,including in the parliament, and visible disaffection amongst thearmed force veterans, the UPA Government was slow to reach outto the veterans and implement OROP.

d. The recently formed NDA government after it assumed officecontinued to make pledges, and promises, but was slow to implementOROP, raising doubts about its commitment to implement OROP

according to the accepted definition.

e. On 5 September 2015, the NDA Government following 83 days of protest announced, unilaterally, the implementation the ‘OROPScheme’ for the Armed Forces.


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3. Arguments Against the OROP:

a. Financial burden of its implementation will be 12,000 crore (said in

2011).

b. Administrative challenges : it a gigantic task, records of early 80s aremanually maintained.

c. If OROP is accepted for the Armed Forces, then there will be similar

demands from the civilian pensioners,

d. All central pay commissions have opposed it since 1970s.

4. Arguments in Favor of it

a. Importance of rank is inherent in armed forces. These ranks are even

allowed to be retained by the individual concerned after his/her

retirement. Hence, two armed personnel in the same rank and equallength of service should get same pension.

b. To the argument that there will be similar demands from the civilian

pensioners, Koshyari Committee argued that civilian terms and

conditions of service are not comparable with military conditions

which are ‘tougher and harsher’ (risk to life, adverse family life).

After retirement they have a limited job opportunity.

c. Demand of OROP for armed forces has been considered time and

again by various committees of the Government and Central Pay

Commissions. This shows the merit in demand.

d. It’s a cause of disquiet in the Armed Forces, who are already critical

of govt. for their low salaries.

e. Koshyari committee cited its non-implementation as a case of

bureaucratic apathy. The higher posts in Ministry of defence is

manned by IAS who are not familiar with the working of armed

forces.

f. OROP is affordable as it is small fraction of the defense budget. At

present, our defence budget is Rs 250,000 crore.

g. Delays in its implementation will damage the pride of the veteransand lowering the morale of the armed forces.

5. Features of OROP Announced by Government in September 2015:

a. Will keep certain premature retirement (PMR) categories out of

OROP like those who have taken VRS or penalized with

administrative strictures.

b. “Pension equalization or adjustment” to be done at five-year intervals

c. Base year for pension fixation is calendar year 2013.

d. Set-up of a one-man judicial commission to submit its report onOROP implementation in six months.

e. Pension of old retirees to be fixed at the average of the maximum

and minimum retirees.


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6. Criticism of OROP features Announced by Government

a. “Pension equalization or adjustment” to be done at least once every

two years

b. Base year for pension fixation to be financial year 2013-4

c. Five-member committee would have been better, with three of

representatives from armed forces, to submit its report within a

month.

d. Pension of old retirees to be fixed at the maximum of current retirees.

Make In India in Defence

India is probably the only large country in the world which is overwhelmingly

dependent on external sources for its defence requirements. According

to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India is the world’s

largest arms importer, accounting for 14 per cent of global arms import during

2009-13. Replying to a question in the Rajya Sabha, the Union Defence Minister

stated that India spent a whopping Rs. 83,458.31 crore on arms imports in a

matter of three years ending 2013-14. This dependency on arms import is a

stark reminder of how far India is from the objective of substantive self-

reliance in defence production that it has aspired to since the early days of independence.

However all is not lost. The ‘Make in India’ (MII) initiative launched by the

government offers a ray of hope. Under the initiative, 25 sectors including

defence manufacturing have been identified to revive India’s industrial growth

and more importantly propel the nation as a global manufacturing hub. If theobjectives of the MII are to be realized in the defence manufacturing sector,

the government needs to address some pressing issues that have hindered

India’s drive for self-reliance.

Present Institutional Mechanism for Defence Manufacturing and Challenges

in it

a. The greatest weakness in India’s defence manufacturing is the lack of a

high-powered institution that can lay out a long term roadmap for the

defence industry, set a target for the industry, monitor the progress, and

more importantly bring all the stakeholders on one platform and commit

to the common cause of MII or self-reliance.

b. In the absence of such an institution, crucial decisions with far reaching

implications are being pursued by various stakeholders in a piecemeal

fashion, and often at cross-purposes. For instance, while the armed forces

are interested in acquiring equipment in the shortest possible timeframe

without being too concerned about where it is acquired from, the Defence

Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), the premier R&D

agency of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), seems content with endless

design and development efforts, with scant respect to timelines and the

sanctioned budget.

c. For their part, the defence production agencies, major parts of which areowned by the government, appear to be happy manufacturing, while the

technology for it is not in their control. Consequently, the focus of

producing defence equipment in-house and achieving true self-reliance

loses focus and India ultimately ends up importing.


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d. Government has created a Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) that would,

“lay down the broad objectives of the long term equipment policies and

planning on production, simplification of procedures.” However, as the

name suggests, the DAC is geared towards addressing the short-term

procurement-related hurdles rather than addressing the concerns of thedomestic industry for achieving self-reliance in the long term. As a matter

of fact, indigenisation is a mere by-product of the DAC’s decisions rather

than being the cornerstone. For the MII to become a reality in the defence

manufacturing sector and more importantly for the initiative to become a

self-sustaining drive, the long existing culture of apathy towards indigenous

defence manufacturing needs to change.

Defence Manufacturing and R&D Plan

a. The apathy towards in-house production of defence equipment is perhaps

best exemplified in the way various defence plans are prepared and pursued.

True, India has a well-articulated, if not the best, system of drawing defenceplans that covers three distinct time periods: 15-year Long Term Integrated

Perspective Plan (LTIPP), five-year Services Capital Acquisition Plan

(SCAP) and two-year roll-on Annual Acquisition Plan (AAP). All these

plans are prepared with a focus on ‘acquiring’ the best possible equipment

available in the world. The DRDO and domestic industry are completely

ignored in the planning process. To make matters worse, there is no channel

for the armed forces to provide advance information to the domestic

industry so as to enable the latter to come up with detailed financial,

technological and industrial plans to meet the requirements in a timeframe

that is acceptable to the armed forces. The Technological Perspective and

Capability Roadmap (TPCR), announced in April 2013 as a means to bridge this gap, has been disappointing and regarded as completely useless

by both industry and analysts for its lack of specificities and absence of

any commitment from the government.

b. Consequently, when the acquisition process begins, it is often too late for

the R&D and production agencies to offer a solution. To overcome this

difficulty, the Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister, in a

report of September 2013, had recommended that it would be useful to

“convert the LTIPP into a defence manufacturing and R&D plan”. More

significantly, the advisory council had suggested that the conversion should

be undertaken by a joint working group involving all important stakeholders

including the Indian industry and R&D establishments. This vitalrecommendation does not seem to have received the required attention of

the policy makers. Since much of the success of MII lies in translating the

long term requirement of the armed forces into technological and industrial

outputs, it is high time that the government comes out with a detailed

plan for the industry and R&D agencies at the earliest. The plan, in order

to be successful, must identify specific projects that would be executed by

local agencies.

Research and Development: Looking Beyond the DRDO

a. One of the unique features of India’s defence industrialisation process has

been the near monopoly enjoyed by the DRDO over defence research anddevelopment. This began with the establishment of the DRDO in 1958and has been perpetuated ever since. The dependence on DRDO for technology has however not yielded the desired results. Despite having alarge pool of scientists/engineers and over 50 labs and establishments, the


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DRDO has been beset with many a problem leading to failures and costand time overruns in the projects undertaken. This, combined with lack of R&D in industry and academia, has compelled the country to sourcetechnology from outside, leading to a vicious cycle where initial imports

lead to further imports. b. Compared to India, other advanced defence manufacturing countries

encourage R&D at diverse sources that include dedicated research institutes,universities and industry. The model followed by many counties is one of R&D management, rather than limiting it to one agency. For instance, the

Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency ( DARPA) of the US, which has been at the heart of the several radical innovations including in the areasof stealth, internet, Global Positioning System( GPS) and Unmanned AerialVehicle (UAV), does not do R&D on its own. In fact, DARPA does notown a single lab of its own! Rather, it identifies talent and ideas fromindustry, academia, government laboratories and individuals, and awards

R&D contracts to be executed in typical time scales of three-to-fiveyears. DARPA’s role is limited to short listing of projects and managingthe programmes, which it does through 140-odd programme managers.

c. In order to expand its R&D base, India also needs to have an institutionsimilar to DARPA. For this to happen there is need to look beyond theDRDO. The Scientific Advisor to Raksha Mantri (SA to RM) who is alsoSecretary, Defence Research & Development and Director General DRDO,should be relieved of his daily duties at the DRDO and given a role likethat of the head of DARPA or OCS with a dedicated R&D fund at hisdisposal. This will not only create a healthy competition between DRDOlabs and other agencies, but also lead to more innovation.

Human Resource Development

a. Unlike in most other sectors, defence industry requires a highly skilledlabour force. Currently, there is hardly any thinking on how to create arobust human resource base both in terms of number and quality. Clear evidence to this effect is visible in the DRDO, which is the premier institution for India’s defence innovation. The number of scientists atDRDO has not increased since 2001, although the number of projects hasincreased exponentially, with the organisation currently pursing 44 major projects (each costing over Rs 100 crore) worth Rs. 39,560 crore.

Private Sector as Equal Partner

a. Although the Indian defence industry was opened to the private sector in2001, the latter is yet to contribute in any meaningful manner. The biggesthindrance in the private sector’s participation so far has been mistrust.When it comes to big contracts, procedural hurdles come in the way,making it virtually impossible for the private sector to get into complexdefence manufacturing. Moreover, single source procurement from theprivate sector is still considered a taboo, whereas import withoutcompetition is greatly admired.

b. For the MII to succeed there is a need to change the mind-set and treatthe private sector as an equal partner. This can only be demonstrated by

awarding big contracts, preferably through the ‘Make’ and ‘Buy and Make(Indian)’ procurement categories, which hold the key to the success of theprivate sector’s participation in defence production. For the government,it is imperative to announce a list of contracts which can be awardedunder these two categories.


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A Conducive Financial Framework

a. The Indian defence industry, however, operates in a hostile financial

framework that tends to render it less competitive vis-à-vis foreign

manufactures. It operates in a double-digit interest regime compared to

the nearly zero interest rate system prevalent in Europe, US and many

other countries. This increases the cost of working capital for the Indian

industry which is reflected in the final products, making them

uncompetitive vis-à-vis the products offered by foreign manufactures. The

Indian industry also suffers on account of the variation in exchange rates.

As per the MoD’s Defence Procurement Procedures (DPP), local private

companies winning contracts under the ‘Buy (Indian)’ category are required

to bear all the risks associated with exchange rate variation (ERV). Non-

protection against ERV has, however, led several companies to virtual

bankruptcy due to a wide variation in exchange rates as has been witnessed

in the recent past.

b. Apart from the above, Indian industry also suffers from prevailing taxes

and duties, which offer virtually no incentive for any local company to

undertake defence production.

Reform DRDO, DPSUs and Ofs

a. It is a fact that much of India’s defence industrial woes are attributable

to the inefficiency of the three major players – DRDO, the Defence

Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) and the Ordnance Factories (OFs) –

which, despite having a long presence in the sector, are yet to become

globally competitive. Several efforts have been made in the past to reform

these organisations but all have failed due to vested interests and lack of political will. Given that these are major players and their functioning will

have a direct impact on the MII initiative, it is imperative to examine

afresh the recommendations given by several past committees. Among

others, the OFs should be corporatized and made more accountable for

their functioning. All the unlisted DPSUs need to be listed in the stock

exchanges to bring in transparency and enhance their corporate governance.

The recommendations of the Rama Rao Committee on DRDO, especially

the one for creation of a defence technology commission, should also be

implemented at the earliest.

Summary and Recommendations

The ‘Make in India’ (MII) drive of Prime Minister Narendra Modi offers a

way of improving the country’s self-reliance in defence production. However,

for the MII to succeed in the defence manufacturing sector, the government

needs to address some legacy issues. These are:

a. Establish a Defence Minister’s Council on Production (DCMP) to prepare

a long term roadmap and set a target for the defence industry, monitor

progress, and, more importantly, bring all the stakeholders on one platform

and subscribe to the vision of MII.

b. Convert the Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) of the Indian

armed forces into a defence manufacturing and R&D plan, to be executed by local entities.

c. Promote a certain degree of defence research and development outside

the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).


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d. Set up a dedicated defence technology university on the lines of the

Indian Institute of Space Science and Technology to meet the vast human

resource requirement of defence.

e. Treat the private sector as an equal partner and expedite big-ticket contracts

to be awarded to them under the ‘Make’ and ‘Buy and Make (Indian)’

procurement categories.

f. Create a conducive financial framework that incentivises defence

manufacturing by domestic industry.

g. Reform DRDO, Defence Public Sector Undertaking (DPSUs) and Ordnance

Factories (OFs) along the lines suggested by past committees appointed

by the Government.

Conclusion

As per the official estimate of the MoD, India is likely to spend around $130 billion on defence modernisation in the coming seven-to-eight years. While

this makes India one of the largest defence markets in the world, the opportunity

it offers should be fully exploited for the benefit of local industry. This will not

only improve India’s self-reliance in defence production but will have a multiplier

effect on the wider economy. The government must ensure that the local

industry is geared and incentivised enough to rise up to the expectations and

make the government’s ‘Make in India’ initiative a success story.

AFSPA – Armed Forces Special Powers Act

1. AFSPA is imposed in areas declared as disturbed under section two of the

act.

2. The ‘special powers’ of armed forces under Section 4 are -

a. ‘Power to use force, including open fire’ at an individual if he

violates laws which prohibit (a) the assembly of five or more persons;

or (b) carrying of weapons.

b. ‘Power to arrest’ without a warrant; (Under section 5 the Armed

Forces have to hand over the arrested person to the nearest Police

Station “with the least possible delay”.

c. ‘Power to seize and search’ without any warrant any premise.

These armed forces are immune from prosecution unless Union Government

provides sanction to the prosecuting agencies.

3. At present the act has been in place in 2 regions (i) some areas of J&K

and (ii) North east (except Sikkim and Tripura ).

4. In May 2015, Tripura government announced the withdrawal of AFSPA

from the state.

5. Arguments for retaining AFSPA –

a. Need to control insurgency

b. Can even lead to secession

6. Arguments against AFSPA –

a. Across states, insurgencies seem to be winding down


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i. In J&K, toll has come down from 4,500 in 2001 to 40 till May

2015.

ii. In NE, death toll has reduced from 717 in 2005 to 122 in 2015.

b. License to kill and immunity has led to alleged extra-judicial killings,human rights abuse

i. Santosh Hegde commission in 2013 found that 6 encounters

done in manipur were “not genuine”.

ii. Union govt. hasn’t prosecuted the armed forces for human right

abuses done in J&K (amnesty international report in July 2015)

c. In fact it has increased alienation among people and thus instead of

preventing secession, can lead to secession.

d. Like Tripura follow a multi-dimensional approach to counter-

insurgency.

i. Counter-insurgency operations were led by a trained and

reorganized state police rather than the army. This led to

1. Establishing state presence,

2. Increased accountability by Govt., thus fewer complaints of human rights violation.

ii. Provide jobs and basic services for people in affected areas,

iii. Opportunities for surrendered militants to return to the

mainstream.

e. Against FRs of people.

7. Recommendations of BP Jeevan Reddy Commission

a. AFSPA should be repealed and its appropriate provisions should be

inserted in the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.

b. Clearly defined powers of armed forces.

c. Establish a Grievance redressal mechanism in each district where the

armed forces are deployed.


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DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH-EAST OF INDIA

Bodoland –BTAD (Bodoland Territorial Area

Districts)

1. Background

a. Bodoland or BTAD created in 2003 consists of four districts of Assam, namely, Kokrajhar, Chirang, Baksa and Udalguri.

b. A Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) created under 6TH Schedule of the Constitution has been given legislative powers over 40 subjects.

c. Demography of bodoland: 30 % of the population is Bodos (who areSTs) and rest comprises of tribals, Bengali Muslims and Hindus andAssamese.

2. Violence in bodoland is a common feature. In past 5 years some 3,500riots have been reported, most recent being the December 2014 Violence

by NDFB (songbijit) against adivasis and retaliatory violence.

3. Reason for Violence

a. Demand for a separate state of bodoland,

b. Occupation of their land by illegal Bangladeshi migrants.

c. Illegal migration from Bangladesh who have settled on their land(loss of land rights),

d. Adivasis demand to be included in ST list.

i. They argue that 34 of the 40 seats of BTC are reserved for STs. Now bodos having ST status dominates it, although theyare only 34% of population.

ii. This is opposed by Bodos who don’t want to lose power.

4. Solution

a. Security measures

i. Have permanent security forces here.

ii. Intensify operations against the militants.

iii. Curb the proliferation of illegal weapons.

iv. Seek cooperation from Bhutan and Bangladesh.

b. Solve underlying reasons

i. Stop illegal migration and update land records.

ii. Ensure equal rights and opportunities to all socio-religious andethnic communities in the area and if need arises then reviewthe BTAD model, where the minority Bodos rule over themajority non-Bodos.

Chakmas and Hajongs

1. Overview

a. Chakmas are Buddhist, while Hajongs are Hindus.


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b. They were inhabitants of the Chittagong Hill Tracts of erstwhile

East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) who migrated to India and settled in

Arunachal Pradesh due to following reasons

i. Their land was submerged by the Kaptai dam in the 1960s.ii. Faced religious persecution in East Pakistan.

2. Supreme Court in September 2015 ordered that Chakmas and Hajongs

needed to be protected, and their claims of citizenship need to consider

“as per applicable procedure”. Reasons –

a. Almost all present-day Chakmas and Hajongs were born in India

thus should be citizens by birth.

b. Settlement of (these) people in AP will help in developing the

unoccupied regions. Besides, the presence of stretches of vacant land

along the border is strategically not desirable.

3. AP governemnt argued that they were not against Indian citizenship for

Chakmas and Hajongs, but objected to their permanent settlement in

Arunachal.

a. Their settlement goes against the Inner Line Permit provisions,

b. Dilute the constitutional safeguards for the indigenous communities

of the state,

c. Affects the demography of state thus threatens their identity and

puts pressure on its limited resources. (Acc. To a 1998 white paper,numbers of chakma had increased by 300% from the original numbers

in 1965)

4. AP governemnt subsequently filed a review petition in SC.

Connectivity to the Region

1. Present Status

a. 99% of NE border are international; only 1% is connected to mainlandvia a narrow Siliguri corridor (aka chicken neck corridor); NH-31passes through it.

b. Rail connectivity is poor. E.g. Meghalaya got its first rail connectivityin 2014; capitals of Manipur, Nagaland, Mizoram and Sikkim arestill off the map.

c. Air connectivity is also confined to few regions only. It is PawanHans Helicopters Ltd, which provides helicopter services in somestates with subsidy from Government for carriage of passengers,emergency/medical evacuation.

d. Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project is in limbo – Theproject envisages

i. Connectivity between Indian Ports on the eastern seaboard andSittwe Port in Myanmar.

ii. And then through riverine transport and by road to Mizoram.


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2. Reasons

a. Ignored by central government as NE doest constitutes an attractive

constituency (under 4% of population); 25 seats in LS (for NE &

Sikkim).

b. Faraway from Delhi, thus attention not given.

c. Ignored by media.

d. Continuing insurgency which prevents execution by government.

3. Consequences

a. Prevents Socio-economic development.

b. Difficult to monitor situation over.

c. Strategic – can be blocked by NE insurgents and even by china in

future conflict.

d. Poor border roads will ensure delays supply to our armed personnel

guarding the NE borders.

4. Solution

a. Execute the projects ASAP by outing a special person/agency in

charge for it.

b. Focus on air-connectivity as the terrain is inhospitable for development

of roads and railways. For this do the following

i. Development of small low cost ‘no-frill‘ airports.

ii. Development of regional airlines.

iii. For this provide subsidies.

5. Steps by NDA Government to Connect NE

a. Kolkata – Dhaka – Agartala bus service started in June 2015. Kolkata

to Agartala via chicken neck corridor takes 36 hours, but via this

route only 16 hours.

b. Guwahati-Dhaka bus service started in June 6, 2015.

c. Signing of BBIN-MVC agreement.

d. Moving towards implementing of IMT – India Myanmar Thailand

highway.

e. In April 2015 Govt. announced a direct daily air flight from Delhi

to Dimapur in Nagaland via Kolkata.

Passage of Three Bills by Manipur Assembly in

August 2015

1. In august 2015, on 31 August 2015, State Government headed by Ibobi

Singh hurriedly enacted three Bills in the State Assembly. The Bills are:

a. Protection of Manipur People (PMP) Bill-2015 – it fixes 1951 as the

base year to detect outsiders.


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b. Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reform (MLRLR) Bill-2015 –

aims at preventing alienation of land in the Imphal Valley from the

Meitis.

c. Manipur Shops and Establishments (MSE) Bill-2015 – to monitor the engagement of non-Manipuris by the State’s commercial and

private establishments.

2. Justification for Passing of Bills

a. These bills along with ILP will control the flow of non-Manipuri tothe State.

b. Critics argue that the incumbent CM Ibobi Singh is himself a meitei,thus it was case of vote-bank politics.

3. The situation in Manipur has turned volatile as the enactment of bills was

criticized on following grounda. Hill tribes (Kukis, Mizos and Chins) who feel that they will identified

as outsiders/refugees as they came to Manipur after 1951 or their lineage may not meet the list of criteria set out in the Bills.

b. The processing of these Bills was done in a non-consultative manner,thus violating the constitution (Article 371C – hold prior consultationswith tribal representatives elected from the hill areas of the State,

before any enactment involving the interests of tribal people).

c. Hill tribes argue that documentation of residential status in 1951 wasextremely poor, thus taking a clear-cut view on the ‘native people of

the State‘ is highly contentious issue.d. Since starting, the Hill tribes have remained backward relative to the

Imphal Valley districts. Govt. has done little to improve their conditions, thus it’s natural for them to migrate down.

i. Manipur does not have a good track record of devolution of powersand resources to its district and autonomous councils – in the hilldistricts as well as in the plains.

4. Way Forward

a. In all probability, formal assent to these Bills by the future Governor

of Manipur will not be a smooth affair. b. All this has increased the enmity between hills and valley tribes and

thus will renew the militancy.

Nagaland Peace Accord

1. Background

a. Nagas are a congeries of tribes living in eastern Himalayas (NagaHills) along the Burma border.

b. The two major demands of the Naga movement are independenceand creation of greater Nagaland by merging of Naga-inhabited areasof AP, Assam, and Manipur

2. On August 3, 2015, Naga Peace Accord (a framework agreement) wassigned between the National Socialist Council of Nagalim-Isak-Muivah(NSCN-IM) and the Government of India.


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3. Details of Accord – Although exact details of the accord are not out, but

following has been reported through media and experts

a. There is a ceasefire agreement till April 27, 2016.

b. They will drop their demand of sovereignty.

c. Non-Territorial Framework – under this Instead of Greater Nagalim,

there will be greater autonomy for Naga in other states by

establishment of autonomous district councils. Thus there won’t be

any territorial division of other states.

4. Critical Analysis:

Benefits

a. Advantages of a Non-Territorial Framework for all –

i. To AP, Assam and Manipur – maintain the territorial statusquo while only giving up developmental privileges in their Naga

inhabited areas to a new Naga non-territorial body.

ii. To Nagas – meet their core demands – such as recognition of

their “unique history” and culture, Naga leverage over deciding

the development path for the Naga inhabited areas, etc.

b. Accord has been signed with the strongest insurgent group, the NSCN

(IM) which moreover has demonstrated representation across tribes.

Rival group NSCN (K) is on decline.

c. The accord is supported by various Naga civil society groups (shows

that it enjoys support among people).

d. It shows the flexibility and realism of the NSCN (IM) to alter goals.

e. Resolution of Naga conflict can offer a way forward to resolving

many other ethnic conflicts in the region such as those involving

Kukis, Meiteis, Bodos, Dimasas, Hmars, and Karbis.

Challenges

a. The exact details are still not out.

b. It’s a framework agreement only, the groundwork needs to be done.

c. Not an all group/party accord –

i. Rival faction NSCN (khaplang) has been excluded from accord – it

broke ceasefire with GOI in March 2015 and following it up with the

June 4 ambush in Manipur that killed 20 military personnel.

ii. Shillong accord of 1975 wasn’t accepted by some leaders of Naga

movement and led to formation of NSCN. Thus it needs to be all-

party accord.

d. It will be opposed by other three states.

e. Can be a time-buying step by NSCN (IM) to regroup itself. According tointelligence, post accord, it has increased its cadre strength.

5. Way forward

a. Naga movement leader should remember the following


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i. In 2014 general elections, Nagaland recorded a voter turnout

of 87% which shows faith of Naga people in Indian democracy.

ii. Mizo peace accord, 1985 ended the insurgency and led to

development of Mizoram (has peace and highest literacy).

b. So what’s the way forward

i. Bring NSCN (K) also on board via negotiations. If it doesn’tthen Reach out to Myanmar and formulate a coordinatedmechanism to deal with separatist and terror groups using hardpower.

ii. Prevent illegal migration from Bangladesh which threatens their identity.

iii. Protect their indigenous rights of land.

iv. Aim for socio-economic development of the region. Followingrecent steps in this direction are a good move.

1. Budget 2015 announced the creation of Indian Institute of

Science Education and Research (IISER) to be setup in

Nagaland.

2. In April 2015 Govt announced a direct daily air flight

from Delhi to Dimapur in Nagaland via Kolkata.

Racism / Discrimination

1. According to Bezbaruah committee report, 86 percent of NE in Delhi

face some type of racial discrimination.

2. Ways of discrimination

a. Landlords refusing accommodation.

b. Being called as chinki, noodles, Momos, etc

c. Considered as foreigners

3. Reasons for discrimination

a. Unique identity of north eastern states.

b. Poor awareness of their cultural heritage due to neglect by media,school textbooks.

c. Attitude of neglect by government.

4. Recommendations by Bezbaruah committee – submitted report in July,

2014

a. Legal Aspect

i. Have a Law against racial discrimination by making offencecognizable and non-Bailable.

ii. Make NE people aware of their legal rights by undertakingawareness campaigns, introducing lectures in universities.

iii. Time-bound prosecution (Investigation of the FIR should becompleted in 60 days by a special squad, trial should becompleted in 90 days by a special prosecutor).


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b. Education

i. Have chapters on NE culture in schools curriculum.

ii. Higher education institutions should be setup in NE areas, so

that large scale migration doesn’t happen.

c. Use of social media in improving communication with the

community.

d. Sports

i. Hold national and international events in the North East.

ii. Promote Indigenous games of the North East.

5. Some steps by Government

a. Under the ‘Ishan Uday’ scheme scholarships to granted for

undergraduates.

b. Under the ‘Ishan Vikas’ scheme, select students will be taken to the

IITs, the NITs for internship.

Inner Line Permit for Manipur

1. Since July 2015, in Manipur there is a renewed demand of imposition of

ILP (inner line permit)

a. ILP is a system making it mandatory for Indian citizens to seek

permission from entering the state.

b. ILP is currently in operation in Mizoram, AP and Nagaland. Manipur

had the system of ILP but it was abolished in 1950.

2. Arguments for it

a. Manipuri (esp. Meitei’s living in valley) fear that like in Tripura, they

too will too become a minority in their land due to influx of outsiders

who are buying their Ancestral land.

i. According to 2001 census size of the migrant community (7

lakh) was nearly as much as that of the dominant ethnic Meiteis

(7.5 lakh).

b. Criminals flee to Manipur to escape arrest in their States and indulge

in criminal activities here.

c. Although people have the FR to move freely throughout the territory

of India (19(1)(d)) and to settle in any part of the territory of India

(19(1)(e)). However, constitution also says that this right can be

restricted in tribal areas to protect the distinctive culture, language,

and customs of Tribals and prevent their exploitation.

d. “One-sixth of the total area” of Manipur has been leased out for oil

exploration and drilling to international oil majors without sharing of

benefits with them.3. These concerns are understandable, but does the solution lie in the ILP?

a. Firstly ILP is a colonial-era permit system introduced by the British

to protect their commercial interests, particularly in oil and tea.


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b. Manipur should realize that it can emerge as a major trading hub to

Southeast Asia esp. with the implementation of BCIM corridor (it

will pass through Barak valley of Manipur) and IMT trilateral

highway. But having ILP will keep people as well as capital outside

their state thus stunting their eco growth.

c. What Government should do?

i. Don’t compromise on the rights and entitlements of the local

population.

ii. Don’t follow a piece-meal approach instead follow a long-term,

composite agenda for the region. E.g. Opposing ILP for Manipur

while allowing it for Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland and Mizoram

is wrong.

iii. Do socio-eco development.


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TERRORISM

Doctrine of Hot Pursuit

1. Hot pursuit means crossing the international boundary in pursuit of terror

groups.

2. The international law principle of hot pursuit is analogous to the common

law principle, but was probably conceived independently. It began to

coalesce into a general custom of international relations during the early

years of the 20th century, although the general principle had been advanced

before in national legislation such as the British Hovering Acts.

The participating states at the League of Nations CodificationConference of 1930 broadly agreed on the validity of the right of hot

pursuit, but the proposed convention on territorial waters in which it was

included was never ratified. It was finally codified as Article 23 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas in 1958.

3. The Geneva Convention on the High Seas was eventually folded into

the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Article 111 of the

latter treaty grants a coastal state the right to pursue and arrest ships

escaping to international waters, as long as:

a. The pursuers are competent authorities of the state;

b. They have good reason to believe that the pursued ship has violated

the state’s laws or regulations;

c. The pursuit begins while the pursuing ship is in the State’s internal

waters or territorial waters; and

d. The pursuit is continuous.

4. If the foreign ship is within a contiguous zone, the Exclusive Economic

Zone (EEZ), the Continental Shelf, and the Safety Zones in the EEZ or

the Continental Shelf then the pursuit may only be undertaken if there

has been a violation of the rules and regulations (customs, fiscal,

immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal state) as

applicable in the respective regimes (areas, zones).

5. The right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship pursued enters the

territorial sea of a foreign state.

6. Where a coastal state, stopping or arresting a foreign ship outside theterritorial sea on the basis of its right of hot pursuit, fails to justify the

exercise, it shall be liable to compensate the ship for any loss or damage

cause to it due to the exercise of this right.

7. This right is particularly relevant to fisheries management, maritime

pollution laws, and the seaborne illegal drug trade.

8. In addition, some have proposed translating the maritime right of hot

pursuit into a comparable right to pursue criminals over land borders.

Although it does not form a settled tenet of international law, the principle

has been invoked by the United States regarding Taliban militants crossing

into Pakistan, by Turkey regarding its attacks on Kurdistan WorkersParty bases in northern Iraq, and by Colombia regarding its raid on

a Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia camp in Ecuador, which led

to the 2008 Andean diplomatic crisis.


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Critical Analysis

1. It was in news when in June 2015 after Indian army crossed into Myanmar

territory to raid NSCN (Khaplang) camps without Myanmar’s consent.

Now this led to a debate on the issue.2. Arguments in favor

a. It was done in response to attack by militants on the Indian Army

in Manipur on June 4, 2015.

b. Every country has the right to protect its boundary.

c. Myanmar’s relation with NSCN(K) are warming up, it wouldn’t have

helped us the way Bhutan and Bangladesh did.

d. These terror outfits are taking benefits of the border i.e. after

conducting strikes they went back to Myanmar knowing that Indian

forces won’t cross the border. In this asymmetric warfare, they don’t

have an option.

e. India has a reputation of respecting the sovereignty of other country,

hasn’t invaded any till now, and so won’t do this unnecessarily.

3. Arguments Against

a. The doctrine of hot pursuit lacks legal validity on land. It has validity

only in high seas. This doctrine has been codified only for navy tocross international waters under United Nations Convention on the

Law of the Sea). But no such doctrine has been codified for state

to pursue criminals crossing land border.

b. As the term is open-ended/vague thus armed forces can use it

attack not only militants, but even armed forces thus leading to war

among the nations.

c. It will set a bad precedent as other countries can also start using

it to cross border.

d. If Myanmar had done the same vis-à-vis India then how would we

have reacted?

e. It is more to assert regional dominance and coerce neighbours.

f. Even a possibility of military action justified by hot pursuit can fuel

wide-scale humanitarian crises e.g. displacing the innocent people.

4. Way forward

a. First option is that the 2 countries should coordinate so no need

arises (like Bhutan and Bangladesh did).

b. If not then cross the border as everything is valid to protect our

sovereignty. but only for self-defense, not to assert dominance.

c. And quote the expanded doctrine of self defense under UN charter

instead of hot pursuit (which lacks legality) – which is used by manystates after 9/11 to deal with non-state actors. It is more acceptable.

d. And above all stop chest-thumping as witnessed in its aftermath.

Remain silent while doing it.


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Anti Terror Legislations

Context – Gujarat Control of Terrorism and Organised Crime (GCTOC) Bill,

2015

Laws – Governement has passed the following laws with respect to Terrorism

Name of law

1. TADA, 1985Terrorist

and Disruptive Activities

(Prevention) Act

2. POTA, 2002Prevention

of Terrorism Act, 2002

3. NSA, 1980

4. UAPA, 1967

Status

Status: Repealed

Details:

• It was the first anti-terrorism law legislated by the government to define

and counter terrorist activities.

• It was in force between 1985 and 1995 under the background of Punjab

insurgency and was applied to whole of India.

• It was allowed to lapse in 1995 due to increasing unpopularity due to

widespread allegations of abuse.

Status: Repealed

Details:

• It was an anti-terrorism legislation enacted by in 2002. It was supported

by the governing National Democratic Alliance.

• The act was enacted due to several terrorist attacks that took place in

India especially the attack on the Parliament.

• The act was repealed in 2004 by the United Progressive Alliance coalition.

Status: in existence; but is w.r.t preventive detention. It is not specifically w.r.t

terrorism

Status: in existence; Thus, at present this is the only Union Legislation dealingspecifically with terrorism

Details

• This law was enacted to provide for more effective prevention of certain

unlawful activities of individuals and associations and for matters

connected with it.

• It empowered appropriate authorities to declare any association as

‘unlawful’ if it is carrying out ‘unlawful activities’.

• This law was comprehensively amended by the Unlawful Activities

(Prevention) Amendment Act, 2004 to deal with terrorist activities. (it

was further amended in 2008 and 2012)

• It incorporates provisions regarding

o Defining a ‘terrorist act’ and defining a “terrorist organisation”

o Listing of terrorist organizations

o Seizure and forfeiture of property,

o Enhanced punishments and


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Should we bring back TADA and POTA – Need of a Stronger,

Comprehensive Law

1. Recently Gujarat enacted Gujarat Control of Terrorism and Organised

Crime Act, 2015 to curb terrorism. This led to the debate that whether

we should have a similar central legislation (as TADA and POTA have

been repealed.

2. Opposition by human rights activists

a. Against the spirit of constitution

b. It confers excess power on law enforcement agencies which can be

misused as seen in past

c. Leads to undeclared emergency aimed to curb dissent

3. Arguments in favor

Law commission in its 173rd report and 2nd ARC have recommended the

enactment on the following grounds

a. Human rights are important but the 1st priority is to ensure sovereignty

and territorial integrity of nation which is under threat due to LWE/

terrorism (esp. rise of IS; Indian youth is joining IS).

b. They will be some human rights violation, but it will be negligible as

compared to the areas getting under control of these extremists (brutality

of IS in front of us).

c. Almost all western democracies (USA (USA PATRIOT act, 2001),

Australia, Canada) with strong traditions of democracy and civil liberty

have enacted such legislations to deal with the threat of terrorism.

d. SC in the past has observed that Potential to misuse is not an excuse for

denying the power to agencies.

e. SC has upheld the constitutional validity of anti – terrorism laws. Our

constitution allows for preventive detention.

f. At present we have only UAPA specifically for dealing with terrorism but

it also has some limitations like doesn’t provide for Special courts. Enhanced

powers of investigation and Provisions regarding confessions made before

police officers.

g. Also the present laws are not sufficient to deal with the linkages of

organized crime and terrorism.

h. When it becomes an Act, will undergo course corrections egged on by the judiciary and the many social watchdogs.

i. Under MCOCA and GCTOC, there are several safeguards for the citizen

- Permission of a Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG)/Additional

• But it has certain limitations like

o It does not provide for special courts or

o Enhanced powers of investigation and

o Provisions regarding confessions made before police officers.


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Commissioner of Police (ACP) is required for registering a case;

Investigating officer will have to be of the rank of Deputy Superintendent

(DSP) and the permission of an Additional Director General of Police

(ADGP) is required for charge sheeting an accused before a court.

j. Some findings of the Dharmadhikari Committee on misuses of MCOCA

– only a small number from the minority communities is charge-sheeted;

an average of about 40 cases registered annually and about 6-7 persons

arrested in each case; thus the act has been extremely selective and not

indiscriminate as was the case with TADA or POTA. The main crux is

that police in other states have to pattern themselves after their

Maharashtra counterparts.

4. Way forward

a. To make a claim or take the position that an anti-terror law such as

the one Gujarat is now steering will eliminate terror would be

dishonest and hypocritical. At the same time, to portray GCTOC as

being diabolical and a tool to serve the ruling dispensation’s political

ends would also be unfair and preposterous

b. Enact a law by reconciling the 2 (i) Security and (ii) Human rights.

c. Law should contain provisions pertaining to:

i. Definition of terrorist acts,

ii. Enhanced punishment for such acts,

iii. Special powers of investigating officers regarding seizure and

attachment of property representing proceeds of terrorism,

iv. Constitution of special fast track courts,

v. Protection of witnesses,

vi. Confessions made to police officers to be taken into

consideration,

vii. Enhanced police custody, making release on bail extremely

difficult for the accused,

viii. Protection of action taken in good faith etc.

ix. Cutting the source of funding for terror activities etc.

Gujarat Control of Terrorism and Organised

Crime (GCTOC) Bill, 2015

1. In March 2015, Gujarat assembly passed the Gujarat Control of Terrorism

and Organised Crime (GCTOC) Bill, 2015. At present the bill is awaiting

Presidential assent (as any Bill passed by an Assembly on issues

contravening Central laws needs Presidential assent.

2. It is the 4th attempt by Gujarat to pass the bill. In the past it has been

rejected thrice by president due to its controversial provisions. Even thepresent bill has been criticized on following grounds –

a. Clause 16, which makes confessions before police officers admissible

in court (it violates the Indian Evidence Act which makes confessions

before the police inadmissible in evidence)


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b. Empowers police to tap telephonic conversations and submit them in

court as evidence (Intercepting phone is against privacy, will allow

agencies in snooping all the time)

c. Extends period of probe from 90 days to 180 days before filing of

charge sheet.

d. Offences under this act are non-bailable

e. Section 25 of the Bill provides immunity to the State government

from legal action for acts done in good faith in pursuance of this

Act.(will dilute its accountability)

3. Arguments in favor of the Bill

a. Use all points mentioned above for a central bill.

b. Citing past terror attacks in Gujarat by Pakistan, Gujarat’s vulnerable

coastline and the proliferation of criminal gangs and linkages betweenorganized crime groups and terrorists.

c. GCTOC replicates only the MCOCA in Maharashtra. It has been

there for 15 years and has been successful).


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NAXALISM (LWE)

Development and its Linkages with Extremism

Present Status of Development Activities by NDA Government to Counter

LWE – (as of September 30, 2015)

1. Rising number of Attacks by Maoists

a. The string of audacious attacks on security forces, civilians and

politicians carried out by Maoist rebels in recent times, the calling

of a two-day ‘Bastar Mahabandh’, and the abduction of villagers who

were on their way to attend Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s public

meeting in Dantewada, point to the current strategy and intent, as

well as determination, of the CPI (Maoist) organisation.

b. Despite suffering severe reverses in several States and failing in its

efforts to spread the “revolutionary” movement to new territories,

the rebels want to send the message across that they are still a forceto reckon with. What is happening in the Bastar forests in Chhattisgarh

remains the best example of the failure of counterinsurgency

strategies adopted by successive governments.

c. If the UPA government’s strategy was to rely heavily on the security

forces, under its now infamous “clear, hold, and build” model, the

BJP government appears to be pursuing a pronounced strategy of

development. The first-ever visit by a Prime Minister to a Maoist

stronghold, to inaugurate the mega steel plant at Dilmili village in

Dantewada and the extended rail line between Rowghat and Jagdalpur,

represents this shift from the deployment of ‘battalions’ to

‘development’.

2. In this background, over the last few months, the Central government has

initiated a series of steps like:

a. Upgrading communications and transport infrastructure in areas

affected by naxalite activity. The larger project is to not only usher

in development in the tribal areas and improve the living conditions

of populations in hilly and forest terrains, but also facilitate security

operations against Maoists, who specialise in ambushes and hit-and-

retreat tactics.

b. Hundreds of mobile phone towers have been erected along the Red

Corridor, and roads and bridges are being built to connect naxalite-

affected districts. Ending the isolation of some of the villages in

remote areas of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand is, no doubt, part of a

strategy to win over local populations and wean them away from the

influence of armed groups of Maoists.

c. PM in his visit to Bastar rightly said that if Punjab can be free from

terror, then why not bastar. On his visit to bastar region in May

2015, PM inaugurated 2 projects with an estimated investment of

Rs. 24,000 crore in bastar region. These were – Mega steel plant at

village dilmili in dantewada and Extension of 140 km rowghat

jagdalpur railway line (2nd

phase).

3. Critical aspect of these steps

a. Developmental activities invariably take time to have a visible and

positive impact on socio-economic conditions. Counterinsurgency


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strategists and the political leadership must be equally sensitive to

the political component of the Maoist movement, which has at its

core many issues relating to the people. The Raman Singh-led

government in Chhattisgarh is a stable one no doubt, but its ability

to ensure ‘effective’ governance needs to be ensured: this is the criticalcomponent of any counterinsurgency strategy.

b. The Centre should first formulate a counterinsurgency doctrine

encompassing also the development and security-related components.

Such a doctrine would provide a certain unity of approach among

States and security agencies, irrespective of which political party is

in power. Out of such a doctrine, area-specific strategies and tactics

could be developed and implemented across States. Security agencies

must stop using assassination as a tool in counterrevolutionary warfare.

The fact that top Maoist leaders Roopesh (with his wife) in

Coimbatore, and Ajith in Pune, were arrested, and not killed in theprocess, is notable. Prime Minister Modi’s advice to a child in

Dantewada to learn from failures is even more apt for the political

establishment and the security forces. If only they did so, the problem

of Maoist extremism could have been tackled to a large extent by

now.

c. But, coming as it does with heavy deployment of Central police

forces, such infrastructure development is suspect in the eyes of

many villagers in the tribal regions. The ‘development’ is often seen

more as an effort to allow access to tribal areas for security personnel

in pursuit of Maoists rather than as an attempt to open up the

outside world to the villages. Invariably, the state is seen as an externalagency waiting to wield its authority and extend its reach without

allowing substantial consequential benefits to the villages. Any state-

sponsored activity, even if it is in the name of development, is thus

met with hostility, and viewed as no more than an extension of the

security apparatus.

d. Better facilities can at best mark the beginning of a process of

addressing the livelihood concerns and social insecurities of tribal

populations. Without investing in health and education infrastructure,

increasing employment opportunities, and raising the quality of life

in tribal areas, it would be difficult to address the socio-economic grievances that feed into the Maoist agenda.

e. While the government ought to do everything in its power to end

arbitrary and irrational violence by the Maoists, ‘development’ should

not be reduced to building mobile towers, roads and bridges.

f. Democratic institutions are yet to take root in many of the villages

where Maoists have their sympathizers. In many areas Maoists have

assumed a representative character and elections are boycotted at the

instance of leaders of the Communist Party of India (Maoist).

g. Thus, merely concentrating on upgrading infrastructure withoutaddressing long-standing grievances will not meet the government’s

objectives. Representative institutions in the villages must be made

party to decision-making in the development process, which should

go beyond the infrastructure needs of the security personnel.


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Vikas Sangarsh Samiti – Renewal of Salwa

Judum

1. In may 2015, formers leaders of Salwa Judum formed VSS in Dantewada

district of Chattisgarh to carry forward the work of salwa judum in bastar.i.e. to finish Maoism in Bastar and bring development.

2. They argue that this will be a peaceful movement. They will do the

following i.e. Undertake padyatra to spread awareness against Maoism and

Undertake development work.

3. When asked by its leaders that can it be called as Salwa Judum part-2,

they replied in affirmative.

4. About Salwa judum – It was an anti-Maoist militia which was blamed for

large – scale forcible displacement of Bastar Tribals and extra-judicial

killings. In 2011, SC declared it illegal and unconstitutional and orderedits disbandment.

5. Opposition to formation of vikas sanhgarsh samiti –

a. State cannot support a civilian vigilante force against Maoists, under

any name.

b. But such a revival would be in flagrant violation of the Supreme

Court’s 2011 directions in Nandini Sundar v/s State of Chhattisgarh.

The SC had declared that the recruitment and arming of tribal people

as special police officers (SPOs), as a counter-insurgency measure,

was illegal and unconstitutional.

c. The SC forbade the state government from supporting any civilian

vigilante force and declared that it was the responsibility of the state

to prevent the operation of any such group. “The state of Chhattisgarh

shall take appropriate measures to prevent the operation of any group,

including but not limited to Salwa Judum and Koya Commandos,

that in any manner or form seek to take law into private hands, act

unconstitutionally or otherwise violate human rights of any person.”

The Vikas Sangharsh Samiti clearly falls foul of these directions. The

failure of the state government to prevent the creation of such a

force could justifiably attract the court’s ire.

d. Mahendra Karma launched the Salwa Judum in 2005 as a counter-insurgency measure to tackle the Maoist threat. Large-scale human

rights violations and the displacement of tribals followed at the

hands of the state-supported Salwa Judum. In 2007, a group of

petitioners approached the SC to challenge the legality of the

appointment of tribals as SPOs and highlight the violations committed

by it. The court held that the state’s policy of appointing

undertrained and ill-equipped tribals to combat the Maoists was an

extreme transgression of the Constitution — particularly the right

to equal treatment and the right to life.

e. The SC struck down these appointments as unconstitutional on the

grounds that they violated Articles 14 and 21: Article 14 because

the undertrained and ill-equipped tribals were treated on par with

members of the regular force, who were better trained and equipped.

This amounted to treating unequal persons as equals. Further, the


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policy of employing SPOs was deemed irrational and arbitrary. The

appointment of tribals for counter-insurgency measures violated their

right to live and also put at risk the lives of others.

f. Today, the Vikas Sangharsh Samiti is offering the same justificationthat was given by the state of Chhattisgarh earlier: that tribal

volunteered to fight against the Maoists. The SC rightly debunked

this “spontaneous movement” justification. It examined in detail the

required qualification, manner of training, mode of control and

provisions for protection of the SPOs, as well as for their discharge.

It was held that placing tribals “motivated by the urge of self-

protection and to defend family members from violent attacks” to

combat the Maoists was an egregious violation of their right to life.

g. The court also struck down the functions and responsibilities of

SPOs enumerated in Section 23 of the Chhattisgarh Police Act,

2007, except the duty to “help people in situations arising out of natural or man-made disasters, and to assist other agencies in relief

measures” and “to facilitate orderly movement of people and vehicles,

and to control and regulate traffic”. Thus, the court envisaged a

limited function for SPOs.

6. Concluding Remark

a. A Salwa Judum 2.0 could survive constitutional challenge only if

its role is restricted to helping out the state machinery during natural

and man-made disasters, and to the regulation of traffic.

b. The employing and arming of untrained tribals in the fight against

Maoists is unconstitutional and illegal — it doesn’t matter whether

it goes by the name “Salwa Judum”, “Vikas Sangharsh Samiti” or

any other.

Being a Maoist is not Illegal

1. In May 2015, Kerala HC freed Shyama Balakrishnan, who had been picked

up in 2014 on suspicion of being a Maoist, saying that “being a Maoist

is not a crime” i.e., it is legal to be a Maoist as long as no laws are broken.

2. Arguments in favor of it – (by Kerala HC while delivering the verdict and

judiciary in earlier cases while dealing with similar issues)

a. Kerala HC said that although the political ideology of the Maoists

ran counter to India’s constitutional polity, a person could be

prosecuted only if it could be proved that he had acted unlawfully

as a result of his adherence to this ideology. i.e. a clear distinction

was made between having a particular ideology and acting in

furtherance to it. I.E. membership of a banned outfit has to be active

– not passive – to attract penal provisions.

In 2011, SC while borrowing from a US verdict rejected the theory

of “guilt by association” by arguing prosecuting a member of

organization, who doesn’t engage to further the illegal aims of

organization, infringes on the protected freedom of individual.

b. It also said that it was a “basic human right for people to have

aspirations”. It has said that the concept of membership ought to be

read in the light of freedom and rights.


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c. While granting bail to Binayak Sen in April 2011, the SC said that

he may be a Maoist sympathizer and possessed some material onthat ideology, but that could not automatically make him guilty of sedition. If the state could not prove that Sen had propagated the

ideology or acted in collusion with Naxalites, even meeting a hardcoreNaxalite such as Narayan Sanyal in jail was not enough to prosecute

him, the court said. Could a person be called a Gandhian merely for

possessing a biography of Gandhi, the SC asked.

Latest Data : Civilians Biggest Casualty of Naxal Violence April 2015

• While left wing extremism (LWE) — the governments’ preferred phrase

for Naxal-related violence — has caused over 20,000 deaths in the country

since 1980, it is not the extremists or the security forces who have suffered

the most. Data shows that a majority of those killed were civilians.

• In fact, the ongoing conflict has claimed at least one life every single day

over a 35-year period beginning 1980. The total body count, as on June

30, 2013, stood at 19,327, according to information obtained under the

Right to Information Act.

• Latest data compiled by the Ministry of Home Affairs adds another 685

fatalities to the record taking the total tally to 20,012 as on March 30,

2015. As many as 12,146 civilians lost their lives to LWE-related violence

across the country during this period for which official data is available.

• During this period, 4,761 extremists and 3,105 security personnel were

killed. That adds up to about two security personnel dying for every three

extremists killed.

• The year 2010 was the bloodiest of this insurgency, leading to the death

of 1,177 persons — over 60 per cent of them civilians. The year saw the

horrific Dantewada ambush that led to the death of 75 CRPF men and

one Chhattisgarh police constable, the Gyaneshwari Express derailment,

the Dantewada bus bombing and the Silda camp attack in Midnapore

among other incidents.

• In fact, the six years from 2005 to 2010 were the bloodiest in the entire

two-decade timeline, with the reported death of 5,916 persons.

• LWE-affected States have their differing policies on providing financial

compensation to families of civilians and state police personnel killed insuch violence. However, under the Security Related Expenditure (SRE)

scheme, the central government reimburses expenditure incurred by the

state governments for payment of ex-gratia to the victims — Rs. 1 lakh

for every civilian and Rs. 3 lakh for each security personnel killed in

LWE violence.

Documents

Internal Security.pdf