Interim Storage of Spent Fuelin the United States

7/31/2019 Interim Storage of Spent Fuelin the United States

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Annu. Rev. Energy Environ. 2001. 26:20135Copyright c 2001 by Annual Reviews. All rights reserved

INTERIM STORAGE OF SPENT FUELIN THE UNITED STATES

Allison MacfarlaneSecurity Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge,

Massachusetts 02139; e-mail: [email protected]

Key Words irradiated fuel, nuclear energy, nuclear waste, dry casks

s Abstract At nuclear power reactors around the United States, quantities of spentor irradiated nuclear fuel are growing while owner-operator companies await the ap-proval of a permanent storage facility. Some reactors have run out of space in theircooling pools and have had to resort to dry cask storage. The first half of this paperlooks at the policy history of interim storage in the United States, discusses the currentstorage status at individual reactors, and then reviews the technologies available to dealwith it. The second half of the paper considers the different options for dealing with thishazardous material in the interim, before a permanent high-level nuclear waste repos-

itory is opened, and examines the safety, security, transportation, economic, political,and other issues that bear on the choice of option.

CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202

2. POLICY BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

2.1. Legislative History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204

2.2. Private-Storage Options. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2062.3. Licensing Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

3. INTERIM-STORAGE POLICIES AND PLANS

IN OTHER COUNTRIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208

3.1. France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208

3.2. United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208

3.3. Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208

3.4. Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

3.5. Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

4. INTERIM-STORAGE TECHNOLOGIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

4.1. Wet Storage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2104.2. Dry-Fuel Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210

4.3. At-Reactor and Away-from-Reactor Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

5. CURRENT STATUS OF SPENT FUEL AT US REACTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

5.1. How Much Space Is Available? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212

5.2. How Rapidly Is the Space Disappearing? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212

1056-3466/01/1022-0201$14.00 201


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5.3. Does Moving Fuel Off Site Prevent Owner-Operators

from Buying Dry Storage? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

6. ISSUES AFFECTING INTERIM-STORAGE DECISIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

6.1. Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

6.2. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218

6.3. Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219

6.4. Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

6.5. Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226

6.6. Site-Specific Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

7. CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230

1. INTRODUCTION

The management and disposal of irradiated fuel from nuclear power reactors is

an issue that burdens all nations that have nuclear power programs. None has im-

plemented a permanent solution to the problem of disposing of high-level nuclear

waste, and many are wrestling with solutions to the short-term problem of where

to put the spent, or irradiated, fuel as their cooling pools fill. The United States is

no exception.

Certainly, some aspects of the solution to the spent-fuel problem are specific to

individual countries. Japan, for instance, has plans to recycle its spent fuel to extract

plutonium for reuse in reactors. By comparison, the United States plans to throwaway its spent fuel and not recycle it. Japans domestic spent-fuel reprocessing

facility is still under construction, however. With no place for the spent fuel to

go, reactor cooling pools are beginning to reach capacity. In the United States, the

progress on the as-yet-unapproved permanent repository site at Yucca Mountain,

Nevada, has created a similar problem. As a result, while these countries, as well

as others, develop a more permanent solution, they need to find an interim solution

to the problem of spent-fuel storage.

US nuclear reactors have already produced over 40,000 metric tons (MT) of

spent nuclear fuel, which currently reside on site at reactors. By the end of the

lifetimes of the existing 103 currently licensed, operating reactors, the total amount

will likely be over 80,000 MT. Still more will be generated due to reactor license

extensions. None of these reactors is currently equipped with the capacity to store

all the spent fuel they will produce over their lifetime. Many owner-operator com-

panies expected that the spent-fuel problem would be resolved by now, as US law

stipulated that the Department of Energy (DOE) would take title to the spent fuel

and begin to move it to a repository by January 31, 1998. To relieve the burden of

spent-fuel storage from individual nuclear reactors while they await the opening of

a permanent repository, they will have to employ interim storageor the reactors

will have to shutdown.

For spent fuel that has exited the reactor core, until it enters a permanent repos-

itory (or is reprocessed), few storage options are available. It can remain at reactor


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sites or be transported to an away-from-reactor storage facility. At either location

it can be stored in cooling pools (wet storage) or aboveground in casks or modular

units (dry storage). Whether to use away-from-reactor or at-reactor storage and

whether to use wet or dry storage are decisions made according to a variety offactors, including safety, security, transportation, costs, and politics. This paper

examines these options and the factors affecting them in the context of the US

spent-fuel situation.

Although the technical aspects of dry storage are relatively straightforward, the

issue of whether to have at-reactor or away-from-reactor storage can become polit-

ically contentious. For example, during the years 19951999, strong majorities in

both houses of Congress, responding to pressure from US nuclear owner-operator

companies, supported legislation that would have mandated the rapid construction

of a large, centralized, interim-storage facility near Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Thisplan faced strong opposition from the state of Nevada and a veto from President

Clinton, and for the moment, it has been dropped in favor of at-reactor dry-cask

storage. Nevertheless, the off-again/on-again history of the US debate over the

interim storage of spent fuel suggests that in a new Administration and with a

new Congress, the idea of centralized storage may be revisited again. Moreover,

the debate over centralized storage will most likely heat up in the next few years

when two privately managed and privately financed concepts for large interim-

storage sites in the West move closer to actuality. Thus, the question of the relative

merits of on-site versus centralized storage for spent nuclear fuel remains one ofconsiderable importance.

This paper focuses on the current state of spent-fuel storage in the United States,

with reference to storage policies in other countries. It covers the policy history

pertaining to interim storage of spent fuel, discusses the current status of spent-

fuel storage at reactor sites in the United States, considers the issues that affect

interim-storage decisions and offers some conclusions on how these decisions

are made. Although the focus of this paper is the situation in the United States,

much of the discussion is pertinent to that in other countries, especially in terms

of interim-storage decision making.

2. POLICY BACKGROUND

Federal policies on the interim storage of spent fuel originally piggybacked on per-

manentdisposal legislation. Initially, thefederal government[Congress andthe Ad-

ministration, including the DOE and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)]

and the owner-operator companies were the main players in interim-storage deci-

sions. The field has expanded to include private-storage companies, Indian tribes,

state governments, and the public. Changes in regulations promulgated by the NRC

have also had an impact on the interim-storage landscape. Thus the options for

interim storage of spent fuel have broadened somewhat and may continue to do so.


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2.1. Legislative History

Interim storage of spent fuel is not a new concept. In the United States, it was

initially proposed in 1972 by James Schlesinger, chair of the Atomic Energy Com-

mission, as a way to accommodate high-level waste while a permanent repository

was located and investigated (1). The original legislation that provided for the

selection of a permanent repository for high-level waste, the Nuclear Waste Pol-

icy Act (NWPA) of 1982, envisioned the construction of a monitored retrievable

storage (MRS) facility, as it was termed. To balance the responsibilities of storing

and permanently disposing of nuclear waste, the NWPA prohibited the location of

an MRS in any state under consideration as a permanent repository site (2). Under

the NWPA, the secretary of the DOE was to submit a proposal for such a facility

to Congress for approval of federal funds. Within five years, Congress amended

the NWPA and some of the requirements changed. With the NWPA Amendments

(NWPAA) of 1987, concerns that an MRS facility would become a defacto per-

manent repository were alleviated by the provision that construction of an MRS

facility could only occur after the license for a permanent repository was granted

(3). The main thrust of the NWPAA was to designate Yucca Mountain, located par-

tially within Nevada Test Site boundaries (Figure 1), as the sole geologic repository

for the nations high-level nuclear waste. Again, as with the NWPA, the NWPAA

distinctly forbade the construction of an MRS facility in the state of Nevada, the

designated location for a permanent repository (4). The 1987 Act also established

the office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator, who was to negotiate with states or

Indian tribes for an interim-storage site, and the MRS Commission, which was to

report on the necessity of an interim facility to Congress by 1989.

The MRS Commission issued their report in 1989 (5). They determined that

some type of interim storage would be needed but not a large-volume facility.

They found that both an MRS option and a no-MRS option would meet safety

requirements and that no single factor favored the use of an MRS facility (5).

The Commission also noted that the undiscounted net cost of the MRS option

might be less than no MRS but that the MRS option would be more costly on adiscounted basis. They clearly stated that an MRS facility, linked to the licensing of

the permanent repository as it was in the NWPAA, would not address any storage

issues at all. The MRS Commission concluded by recommending that Congress

authorize a federal emergency storage facility licensed to hold 2000 MT of spent

fuel and an owner-operator-funded facility licensed to contain 5000 MT (5).

By 1992, 20 state, county, and tribal groups sent in applications for feasibility

grants to assess whether they could host an MRS facility to the Office of the Nuclear

Waste Negotiator (6). None of the applications was pursued by the applicants (7).

As a result, in 1995, Congress did not reauthorize funding for the Negotiator, andthe attempt to negotiate a solution to the waste problem was abandoned.

By the early 1990s, it became clear to the nuclear owner-operators that the

DOE would not meet the 1998 deadline to begin moving spent fuel off reactor

sites. A few, in fact, were already experiencing problems in obtaining public and


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Figure 1 Map of nuclear power reactor locations in the United States. (Star) Thelocation of Yucca Mountain and Jackass Flats, the proposed permanent and interim

repository sites, respectively. (Boxes) The locations of the proposed private spent-fuel

storage facilitiesthe Goshute Indian reservation west of Salt Lake City, Utah, and

central Wyoming.

government support for the addition of at-reactor dry-cask storage. For the owner-

operator companies the problem was clear: The DOE was required to dispose of

the spent fuel, but until it ultimately took title to it, interim storage of spent fuel

remained their responsibility. In response, the owner-operators began to pursue

three parallel tracks: (a) They began lobbying for legislation to force the DOE to

establish a centralized interim-storage facility at Yucca Mountain, (b) they formu-

lated lawsuits to force the DOE to meet its obligations and pay damages to the

owner-operators, and (c) they entered into negotiations with Indian tribes and other

localities to develop privately managed interim-storage facilities.

From 1995 to 1999, Congress considered legislation forcing the interim storage

of spent fuel at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. In the 104th and 105th Congresses, boththe Senate and House versions of the bill passed their respective bodies, but the

Senate bill did not receive the necessary two-thirds majority required to override

a promised presidential veto. These bills required the construction of an interim-

storage facility near Yucca Mountain that would begin to receive waste within


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five years or so from the passage of the bill (8, 9). The facility would have been

licensed to accept 30,00040,000 MT of spent fuel. The Clinton Administration

continued to promise to veto any bill that would establish an interim-storage site

at Yucca Mountain because they believed that a centralized facility located therewould presuppose that the proposed permanent repository for high-level nuclear

waste would be approved (10). In addition, construction of an interim facility at

Yucca Mountain could erode political support for the permanent repository, not to

mention the financial resources available (10).

In mid-1999, the DOE offered an alternative solution to the problem. The Sec-

retary of Energy, Bill Richardson, proposed that the DOE take title to spent fuel

while it remained at reactors and cover the costs of on-site dry storage. Senate lead-

ers accepted this change and reformulated the bill so that the permanent repository

was the focus instead of a centralized interim-storage facility. To ensure the open-ing of the permanent site in a reasonable time, they included language that forced

shortened timetables on DOE and NRC decisions on the suitability of the Yucca

Mountain site. Unfortunately, the bill contained language that opponents, including

the Administration, considered unacceptable. In particular, it would have restricted

the ability of the Environmental Protection Agency to set radiation standards at the

permanent repository site (11). In February 2000, a Senate floor vote on the refor-

mulated bill again failed to achieve a veto-proof margin of votes.

A number of owner-operator companies are involved in ongoing lawsuits with

the DOE over its failure to meet the deadline. In one, Xcel Energy (formerlyNorthern States Power) is attempting to claim $1.6 billion in damages (12). A

summary judgement for three New England reactors may result in awards of up to

$268 million (13). At least 11 other cases are working their way through the US

Court of Federal Claims, with claims totaling more than $4 billion (14).

2.2. Private-Storage Options

Three private-storage options have recently received serious attention, two on

tribal lands and one on state land (Figure 1). Indian tribes have been the focus

for interim-storage facilities because of sovereignty issues. As sovereign nations,

the tribes can choose to do as they please with their land and can claim immunity

from lawsuits (15). The two on Indian lands grew out of initial discussions with the

Nuclear Waste Negotiator. Once the Negotiators office was disbanded, the tribes

began working directly with owner-operator companies, who then formed private

consortia to open these facilities (16).

The Mescalero Apache tribe of southern New Mexico joined forces with 11

owner-operator companies led by Northern States Power to attempt to establish a

10,000-MTU facility on tribal land (17, 18). The decision to offer Mescalero land

for an interim facility met with strong resistance within the tribe. The Mescaleros

first vote on the interim facility decided against it, but a second, possibly coerced,

vote decided for such a facility (15). The deal fell through in April 1996, when the

owner-operator consortium suspended negotiations with the tribe (18).


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INTERIM STORAGE 207

Under serious consideration is another offer from a consortium of electric

power owner-operators and an Indian nation, the Skull Valley Band of the Goshute

Indians, in Utah. Eleven owner-operator companies signed an agreement with

the tribe in December 1996 to open a spent-fuel storage facility on the Goshutereservation, 70 miles southwest of Salt Lake City. The group submitted a license

application to the NRC on June 25, 1997, on which prehearings began in January

1998 (19, 20). The proposed facility would contain up to 40,000 MTU of spent

fuel. To date, the NRC has issued a draft environmental impact statement and a

safety evaluation report on the site, and neither has identified any significant prob-

lems with the site (21). If approved, the group hopes to open the facility by 2002

(20). Such an early date is unlikely based on the promised legal battles from the

state of Utah, which vigorously objects to the proposed facility. For example, the

governor of the state, Mike Leavitt, tried to derail the facility by taking title tothe land surrounding the proposed facility in an attempt to create a state-owned

moat that would prevent waste from being transported to the facility (22). The

Bureau of Land Management, in response to Leavitts actions, ruled that the state

has no right to designate federal roads as state highways (23).

Yet another proposal for a privately owned interim facility is gaining momen-

tum, the Owl Creek Energy project proposed for a site near Shoshoni, Wyoming.

The Owl Creek project is directed by a consortium of members, including NAC In-

ternational, an energy consulting and nuclear fuel storage and transport company;

Parsons-Brinkerhoff and Woodward-Clyde, international engineering companies;Virginia Power; and NEW corporation, a Wyoming-based group (24). The local

government is open to the project and strongly supported by the local state senator,

Bob Peck (R-Riverton) (B. Peck, personal communication). The consortium plans

to submit a license application to the NRC by 2000 and hopes to be operational by

early 2004 (I. Stuart, personal communication). The future of the project remains

uncertain, with the governor of Wyoming appearing to oppose the facility (25),

and other state legislators, such as Mike Massie (D-Laramie), coming out against

the project (M. Massie, personal communication).

2.3. Licensing Requirements

The NRC is responsible for licensing all spent-fuel storage facilities. Wet storage

at reactors is licensed with the operating reactor. The NWPA required the NRC

to rewrite its regulations so that on-site dry-storage facilities could be licensed

under the general reactor license. In 1990, the NRC altered 10 Code of Federal

Regulations (CFR) Part 72 to meet these requirements. As a result, at-reactor dry

storage can be licensed under the reactors general license (as long as the reactor is

licensed under Part 50) or can be licensed separately (26). A general license applies

only if the proposed dry storage meets certain requirements. For example, the site

must meet NRCs seismic requirements, the concrete pad for the casks must be

placed a certain distance from the site boundary, and the reactor must use NRC-

licensed dry-storage systems and approved fuel types (27). If these requirements


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are not met, if the reactor shuts down, or if the facility is an away-from-reactor

one, then the facility owners must seek a separate dry-storage license. Currently

9 dry-storage systems have NRC licenses, and 5 out of 13 reactors are using

dry systems under their general license (28).

3. INTERIM-STORAGE POLICIES AND PLANSIN OTHER COUNTRIES

The way in which other countries deal with their spent fuel is dependent on the

type of fuel cycle they use (open or closed) and how far along they are in per-

manently resolving the problem of high-level nuclear waste. In some countries,

recent changes in government policies toward nuclear energy have also impactedthe plans for spent-fuel storage. Below are compared the spent-fuel storage policies

of several countries with relatively large nuclear power programs.

3.1. France

France reprocesses much of its spent fuel and as a result stores spent fuel awaiting

reprocessing in a 14,400 MT pool storage complex in La Hague (29). It has one

small dry-storage vault at Cadarache for exotic fuels (30). It is still in the initial

planning stages for a permanent high-level nuclear waste repository. France isbeginning to consider alternative interim dry-storage strategies for three reasons:

(a) Reprocessing of spent fuel cannot keep pace with MOX (mixed oxide) fuel use,

resulting in some spent fuel spending many years in the La Hague storage pool;

(b) there are no plans to reprocess MOX fuel, thus soon there will be a need to

store this material; and (c) most likely not all spent fuel will be reprocessed (31).

3.2. United Kingdom

The United Kingdom also reprocesses most of its spent fuel. Much of the spent fuelis in pools at the Sellafield reprocessing facility (29). [These pools are somewhat

controversial because they use a once-through water flow that empties into the

Irish Sea after conditioning (30).] All Magnox spent fuel must be reprocessed

because it is unstable in water. Some of the advanced gas reactor fuel is stored on

an interim basis in pools at the Sellafield facility. Spent fuel from the countrys one

pressurized water reactor is stored on site in the reactors cooling pool, which has

the capacity to store 30 years worth of spent fuel (32). Only one reactor, Wylfa,

currently uses short-term dry storage for Magnox fuels (30).

3.3. Germany

Until 1994, German policy required the reprocessing of all spent fuel. With the

amendment of the German Atomic Energy Act in 1994, spent fuel can be directly

disposed of, which, along with slow MOX use, has provided a need for interim


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4.1. Wet Storage

All reactors employ wet storage of spent fuel on site. Cooling pools are fitted with

stainless steel and aluminum racks that hold the fuel assemblies. These pools are

lined with stainless steel to prevent leaking and are very deep; at least 2.53 m

of water covers the tops of the assemblies to provide radiation shielding (38).

These pools use deionized water that is usually attached to a purification system

to decrease the reactivity of spent-fuel cladding with the water (39). They also

employ cooling systems that use natural circulation to cool the spent fuel (38).

In the United States, the owner-operator companies first response to diminish-

ing storage capacity was to refit their pools with high-density storage racks. These

racks allowed reactors to at least quadruple their storage capacity (38). Increasing

the density of spent fuel in pools meant reevaluating the four criteria above and

resulted in (a) neutron-absorbing materials being added to the racks themselves to

control criticality, (b) recalculations of the radiation and thermal load to be borne

by the pool, and (c) reevaluation of seismic analysis because of the increased struc-

tural load in the pool (38). For most US reactors, wet storage alone will not address

all their storage needs.

4.2. Dry-Fuel Storage

Spent-fuel dry-storage designs are well-established technologies that have been

licensed in the United States since 1985. Currently, 17 reactors employ dry storageto enhance their ability to meet their spent-fuel storage needs.1 Another 13 sites

have identified a vendor for dry storage (40) and are expecting to receive license

approval from the NRC in the next few years (41). The NRC has currently approved

nine storage designs (28).

An owner-operator has a fairly large choice of dry-storage systems. Those who

want to add dry storage piece by piece, banking on the early opening of a permanent

repository, can select from a number of different small-unit designs, such as metal

casks, concrete casks, and dual-purpose cask systems. Seven US reactors use

single-unit casks. These designs have outer shells, made of cast iron, forged steel,or a stainless steel and lead combination that acts as a radiation shield, and inner

baskets that hold spent-fuel assemblies. Some designs are loaded vertically and

some horizontally. These units use passive cooling to remove thermal radiation

from the spent fuel and therefore require the spent fuel to cool substantially before

loading. Some cask designs are loaded in the pool, then are dried and filled with

either a vacuum or an inert gas such as helium to prevent spent-fuel degradation.

1

These reactors are Surry 1 and 2 and North Anna 1 and 2 (Virginia Power); Robinson 2(Carolina Light & Power); Oconee 1, 2, and 3 (Duke Power); Fort St. Vrain (Public Service

Co. of Colorado); Calvert Cliffs 1 and 2 (Baltimore Gas & Electric); Palisades (Consumer

Power Co.); Prairie 1 and 2 (Northern States Power Co.); Point Beach (Wisconsin Electric

& Power Co.); Arkansas Nuclear 1 (Energy Operations Inc.); and Davis-Besse (Toledo

Edison Co.) (40).


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INTERIM STORAGE 211

Dual-purpose casks are similar to metal ones that can be used for storage and

transportation. Currently, the NRC licenses only one dual-purpose cask design. In

the future, the NRC may license multipurpose casks that can be used for storage,

transport, and disposal of spent fuel (38, 40).Having two different storage systems provides better economies of scale for

those owner-operators that require a large amount of dry storage for a considerable

amount of time. Concrete modular systems use stainless steel canisters, stored

vertically or horizontally inside a larger concrete housing. Ten US reactors use a

NUHOMS type design, which employs metal canisters in a horizontal concrete

module (30). This system requires the use of a transfer cask and transporter to

move the spent fuel from the cooling pool to the concrete housing. Modular vault

systems provide metal fuel tubes in a vertical array housed in a concrete structure

(38, 40). Only one such system is in use in the United States, at the shutdown FortSt. Vrain high-temperature gas reactor facility in Colorado.

4.3. At-Reactor and Away-from-Reactor Storage

Most spent fuel is currently stored at reactors in the United States. Both wet-

and dry-storage designs are available for both at- and away-from-reactor storage.

There are four facilities in the United States that in the past have accepted spent fuel

for away-from-reactor storage. The Morris facility in Illinois and the West Valley

Project in upstate New York were originally established as reprocessing facilitiesin the early 1970s. With the change in policy in the country and the poor economic

outlook for reprocessing, these ventures were abandoned except for their spent fuel

cooling pools, which remain today. Morris holds 3217 assemblies and West Valley

holds 125 assemblies (42). The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and the

Hanford site, both facilities of the nuclear weapons complex, hold smaller amounts

of civilian spent fuel [Hanford has seven assemblies and INEL 125 (42)]. Some

owner-operator companies have transferred spent fuel from one reactor site to an-

other or to away-from-reactor storage such as Morris. This practice has sometimes

met with public protest. For instance, the state of Illinois banned transport of spentfuel to the Morris facility from out of state. A court subsequently ruled the ban

on transport unconstitutional and some spent fuel was transported to the facility

(38). For the most part, essentially no away-from-reactor facilities are currently

available for use in the United States.

5. CURRENT STATUS OF SPENT FUEL AT US REACTORS

The problem facing many owner-operator companies is obvious: As power reac-

tors age, they produce more spent fuel and spent-fuel storage capacity decreases.

Indeed, at some plants, cooling pools have reached capacity and some spent fuel

has been transferred to on-site dry-storage facilities. Although spent-fuel stor-

age capacity is a pressing issue for owner-operator companies that need to find


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additional space, it should be noted that, to date, no reactors have shut down for

lack of storage space. The question in the United States is how dire is the need for

additional spent-fuel storage?

5.1. How Much Space Is Available?

Spent-fuel cooling pools at over half of the US power reactors are currently more

than 50% full. Figure 2a and 2b present calculations of space remaining at re-

actors based on (a) calculations based on DOE and owner-operator data [owner-

operator-based estimates of the total number of assemblies on site at individual

reactors (43) divided by the licensed space in the reactors pools (42)] and (b)

owner-operator-based estimates [the total number of assemblies on site at in-

dividual reactors divided by their own estimates of remaining capacity in thepools (43)]. The owner-operator-based estimates suggest that as of 1998, slightly

more reactors are over 50% capacity than the DOE and owner-operator data cal-

culations show. For the most part, the DOE and owner-operator estimates in

Figures 2a and 2b are slightly higher than those of the owner-operator compa-

nies because the licensed storage capacity instead of the owner-operators esti-

mates of storage capacity was used. The difference in the two capacity estimates

lies in the fact the some of the licensed pool space may be occupied by other

equipment.

5.2. How Rapidly Is the Space Disappearing?

Although storage space for spent fuel at reactors is decreasing, the question re-

mains: How rapidly is this space disappearing? Most US reactors were originally

designed with spent-fuel pools that would hold about two times the amount of fuel

in the core of the reactor, because they planned to reprocess their spent fuel. A 1977

federal policy to defer indefinitely reprocessing of civilian spent fuel changed the

owner-operators plans, and to deal with the mounting spent fuel, they began to

fit their pools with denser racks that hold more fuel. Currently, it is conventional

wisdom (but not required by law) to hold a full-cores worth of space empty in

the pool in case the core needs to be off-loaded for maintenance (J. Thorpe, per-

sonal communication). All calculations in this paper reserve space for a full-core

off-load.

Figures 3a and 3b compare the results of three model predictions for the date

of loss of spent-fuel pool space by reactor. As above, a pool is considered over

capacity when the ability to off-load a full-core of spent fuel is lost. One model

is supplied by individual owner-operators estimates of loss of storage capac-

ity at their reactors (43). Another model is supplied by the Office of Civilian

Radioactive Waste Management (44) and is based on historical spent-fuel dis-

charges, energy output, estimates of nuclear capacity growth, and plant operating

performance. The third model is based on (a) my own calculations of storage

capacity [based on estimating the number of years to off-load loss and adding


13/39

INTERIM STORAGE 213

them to the year 1998, with years to off-load loss calculated by subtracting the

core size (42) from the available space in the poolcalculated by subtracting the

owner-operator companies estimates of the total number of assemblies on site (43)

from the licensed space in reactors pools (42)and dividing this by the averageactual discharge of spent-fuel assemblies per year]; (b) average annual spent-fuel

discharge based on average annual historical discharge [calculated by using raw

spent-fuel discharge data listed by reactor (J. Thorpe, personal communication);

and (c) DOE and owner-operator data on licensed pool capacity. All models show

that by 2010, over half of the reactors will have lost pool-storage capacity and will

require some other form of storage.

5.3. Does Moving Fuel Off Site Prevent Owner-Operatorsfrom Buying Dry Storage?

A corollary to the question in the previous section is whether a centralized storage

facility could relieve the burden of storage from individual reactors. In other words,

will many reactors, regardless of efforts to ameliorate the space problem, still have

to install dry-storage capacity? The above models do not include the schedule for

transportation of spent fuel away from reactors to a permanent repository or an

interim site. Using the transportation schedules for spent fuel at owner-operators

around the country (45) and calculated annual spent-fuel discharges averaged for

an owner-operator, it is possible to determine the impact of transport of spentfuel off reactor sites on the need of owner-operators to supply on-site dry-cask

storage. Figure 4 shows the number of owner-operators that will need to purchase

dry-cask storage for the cases of (a) no transportation of spent fuel off site and

(b) transportation of spent fuel off site beginning in 2005. For the case of trans-

port beginning in 2005 (the earliest conceivable year in which an interim-storage

facility could open, given that it is 2001 now), for a given year, I calculated the

amount of spent fuel owned by the owner-operator, subtracted the amount to be

transported for that year (according to DOE schedules), and compared the result

with the total capacity of storage pools at the operator-owned reactors, leav-

ing full-core off-load space in the pool. The analysis presented in Figure 4 as-

sumes that spent fuel is transferred between reactors within an owner-operator

(although this can be complicated by public opposition; see Section 6.5). Fig-

ure 4 indicates that by 2005, almost two thirds of US nuclear owner-operators

will face the need to supply on-site dry storageeven if shipments begin in 2005.

Shipments beginning in 2005 would save only one owner-operator from buy-

ing on-site dry storage by the year 2007 (Figure 4). By 2010, transporting spent

fuel off site would save four owner-operators (6% of all owner-operators)

from buying on-site dry storage. Any delay in transportation would increase the

number of owner-operators that needed to buy dry storagefor instance, if trans-

port of spent fuel begins in 2007, almost 75% of owner-operators will be re-

quired to buy dry storage to deal with spent-fuel storage on site at some of their

reactors.


14/39

214 MACFARLANE

Figure2

(Continued)


15/39

INTERIM STORAGE 215

Figure2

Plotofthepercentageof

spaceremaininginspent-fu

elcoolingpoolsatindividu

alreactorsintheUnitedStates.

Twoestim

atesaregiven:Thosebased

onmycalculationsusing1994and1995DepartmentofEnergydata[EnergyInforma

tion

Administration(1996),Table10(42),andEnergyInformationAdministration,unpublished

data,Table10with1995

data

included]

andthosegivenbyowner-operatorstotheNuclearRegulatoryCommission(1998).Themajorityofreactorshave

41%50%

ofthespaceintheirspent-fuelcoolingpoolsopen.


16/39

216 MACFARLANE


17/39

INTERIM STORAGE 217

6. ISSUES AFFECTING INTERIM-STORAGE DECISIONS

As the above analysis confirmed, US owner-operators will require some type of

spent-fuel storage beyond their existing reactor pool storage in the near future.There are two ways to approach this need: by adding more spent-fuel storage at

reactor sites (in dry casks) or by constructing a centralized storage facility (also

in dry casks or large vaults). The option of creating new wet-storage facilities at

or away from reactors would likely be prohibitively expensive to build and oper-

ate. Deciding which of the two approaches to use should be based on a number

of criteria, including which option provides better safety and security, the effects

and implications of spent-fuel transportation, which approach is politically and

managerially feasible, which option is more cost-effective, and whether specific

considerations at a particular storage site could overly delay an option. The follow-ing discussion focuses on issues surrounding dry storage of spent fuel at reactor

sites and at a potential centralized facility and addresses each of the above criteria

in turn.

6.1. Safety

Dry storage of spent fuel in the United States has a good safety record. Since storage

began in 1985, no major safety incidents with radiation release have occurred. The

1990 NRC Waste Confidence Decision Review (46) asserted that spent fuel issafe at reactors, in either cooling pools or dry-storage systems, for at least 30

years beyond the reactors licensed life of operation. Furthermore, the NRC went

on to say that dry storage in particular is safe and environmentally acceptable

for a period of 100 years (46, p. 38482). Although dry storage of spent fuel is

considered relatively safe and straightforward, continuing problems with dry-cask

storage serve as a reminder of potential safety issues.

A few recent events have highlighted the fact that dry-storage systems need to

be carefully licensed and closely monitored. In 1999, the Trojan reactor site in

Oregon began to load spent fuel into Sierra Nuclear Corporations TRANSTORdry-storage modules only to find that the zinc-carbon coating on the carbon steel

basket, intended to provide protection against the borated water of the cooling

Figure 4 Plot showing the effect of different transportation schemes on the need for

dry-storage capacity at reactors within owner-operators. In the models used in this plot,

spent fuel is transported from owner-operators (not individual reactors) according to

the schedule outlined by the Department of Energy (77). Categories of transportation

are No Transportation and Transportation beginning in 2005, the earliest conceivabledate to begin transport of spent fuel off reactor sites. By the year 2005 already 32

owner-operators will require dry-cask storage for their spent fuel. By the year 2010,

transportation of spent fuel away from reactor sites will save four owner-operators

from buying dry-cask storage for their spent fuel.


18/39

218 MACFARLANE

pool, generated hydrogen, which can cause an explosion (27, 30, 47). Similar

events occurred at both Michigans Palisades and Wisconsins Point Beach re-

actors, when hydrogen generated from the Sierra Nuclear Corporations VSC-24

basket coating caused a hydrogen ignition event, or explosion, when the caskwas welded closed (27). During the Point Beach event, the explosion lifted the

3000-kg cask lid and displaced it (30). Defective welds and cracked seals were

detected in casks at Michigans Palisades reactor and the Arkansas One reactor

(48, 49). Again, these casks were of the VSC-24 design by the Sierra Nuclear

Corporation. The NRC has identified some of the sources of these problems,

which include poor cask-vendor oversight of subcontractors and failure of ven-

dors (a) to perform quality assessment during the design process, (b) to follow

regulatory processes during cask fabrication, and (c) to document repairs to casks

(47, 50).Other potential safety issues for dry storage are (a) whether the casks will main-

tain their integrity after their 20-year licensed lifetimes, (b) whether the current

cask designs can handle spent fuel with burnups higher than 45,000 megawatt-

days (MWd)/MT (27), and (c) how to find spare storage space if a shutdown

reactor has transferred all its spent fuel to dry storage and needs to transfer spent

fuel out of a leaking cask (38). The NRC is just beginning to consider the first

two issues (27). None of these issues threatens the viability of dry-cask storage

as an interim solution to the spent-fuel storage problem, but they do highlight

the need for both continued vigilance by the regulators over both cask manu-facturers and reactor operators and monitoring of cask performance during their

use.

6.2. Security

A problem unique to the nuclear energy industry is the connection between nuclear

energy and nuclear weapons. Spent light-water reactor fuel contains plutonium

and uranium-235, fissile materials used to power nuclear weapons. In addition, the

fission products and higher actinides contained in spent fuel are highly toxic and

could contaminate humans and the environment if released. Because of this, spent

fuel must be adequately protected against theft and sabotage.

One of the principal arguments for a centralized interim-storage facility is based

on the notion that a single facility will provide a much higher level of physical

security against sabotage or theft than the many nuclear reactors in which the

spent fuel currently resides (e.g., 51). Although this may be true in the abstract

(it is certainly easier to guard one facility than many), in actual practice it is not

likely to be so. First, there is no evidence to suggest that spent fuel currently stored

at reactors poses any unacknowledged security threat for which reactors are not

already prepared: After all, none has ever been sabotaged or robbed, and all reactors

and storage facilities are required to use physical protection measures according to

NRC regulation 10 CFR 73.51, which includes two barriers, constant monitoring,

and an identification and lock system. Second, a centralized site would not actually


19/39

INTERIM STORAGE 219

put all the spent fuel in one place. It would simply add one more place to the list

of spent-fuel locations, because reactors that continue to operate will continue to

have spent fuel on site.

The most obvious problem with the argument that a centralized facility is moresecure is the fact that all spent fuel would have to be transportedwith literally

thousands of shipments. For those concerned about security, that translates into

thousands of opportunities for attacks or thefts of spent fuel. In actuality, spent fuel

will be at much higher risk for sabotage or theft on the roadways than at reactors.

Reactors are relatively well-guarded and well-monitored places, whereas spent

fuel in a moving vehicle with one or two escorts presents a more plausible security

risk. NRC regulations (10 CFR 73.37) require that in populated regions, spent-fuel

transports have two escorts: one in the shipping truck and one, who is armed, in an

additional car. In unpopulated areas, however, no armed escort is necessary. Railshipments of spent fuel through populated areas also require two armed escorts,

although in unpopluated areas, only one unarmed escort is necessary. Both rail and

truck shipments require a communications center that continuously monitors the

transports, and all truck shipments require equipment that can be used to immobi-

lize thevehicle.Nonetheless, neither of these types of shipments will be protected to

the degree that nuclear weapons are under DOE and Department of Defense guide-

lines (52, 53).

Only a few studies have considered the effects of sabotage on nuclear spent fuel

(5456). Some reports have presented conflicting findings on sabotage. Althoughthe DOE claimed that an attack could release only 34 g of respirable irradiated

fuel, a State of Nevada report asserted that eight acres would be contaminated

for every 2,00010,000 Ci released (54, 56). Little information is available on the

potential theft of spent fuel, although one DOE report suggests that a dry-storage

cask could be breached by a small team of well-trained and -equipped people in 10

or 20 min (52). Dry-storage casks are clearly more vulnerable if stored outside on

concrete pads (but within the fence of the reactor or centralized storage site) instead

of within a reinforced concrete building, which would add additional protection

against attack. Of course, it is not clear that spent fuel is more attractive to saboteursthan, for instance, federal office buildings.

6.3. Transportation

The transportation of spent fuel will be an important factor in the use of away-

from-reactor storage facilities. Worldwide, the nuclear industry has transported

over 88,000 MT of spent fuel in over 40,000 casks over the past 40 years (30). In

the United States, over 2200 MT of spent fuel have been shipped to away-from-

reactor storage sites (30). For any large-scale transport of spent fuel to a centralized

storage facility (or a permanent one, for that matter), a number of issues must first

be resolved, including transportation canister design, transport organization and

management structure, political opposition (see Section 6.5), safety and security

concerns (see Section 6.2), and cost (see Section 6.4).


20/39

220 MACFARLANE

In the United States, to be cost-effective, the DOEs original plan was to design

a multipurpose canister that would hold spent fuel for storage, transport, and

final disposal. The Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management in the DOE

suspended work on such a design in 1996, and the design work was picked up bycontractors. Currently, no multipurpose canister design has been approved because

the DOE has yet to issue disposal criteria for the permanent repository. Most

vendors are working on canister designs that have a single inner container that can

be moved between different outer containers, such as storage containers, transport

containers, and disposal containers (N. Mote, personal communication). Shipment

of spent fuel is further complicated because there is no standard size of reactor fuel,

so no standard size of canister will be practicable, making it impossible to take

advantage of economies of scale. Only one vendor has received an NRC license

for a dual-purpose canister (the NAC-STC cask), one that can be used for storageand transport, but other vendors have submitted licenses for their own designs

(N. Mote, personal communication).

A more serious obstacle to large-scale transportation of spent fuel in the United

States is the organization and management of it. As matters are currently struc-

tured under federal law, 10 federal agencies and numerous state, tribal, and local

governments would be involved (57). For the transport of spent fuel to a permanent

repository, the proposed Yucca Mountain site in Nevada, the DOE is charged with

managing the transportation process and will take title to the spent fuel just before

it leaves the reactor sites, but it will not have direct control over the spent fuel asit makes its way to Yucca Mountain (58). The Department of Transportation and

the NRC will regulate the shipments. The Department of Transportation must en-

sure the safety of hazardous materials transport, whereas the NRC will license the

packaging of the materials (57). Other federal agencies involved in transportation

are the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the National Response Team,

the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, the Occupational Health and Safety

Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Railroad Ad-

ministration, and the Research and Special Programs Administration. The situation

is further complicated when material is transported across state and tribal bound-aries because states and tribes also have some control over such shipments (57). In

the past, states have designated transportation routes, regulated the hours of trans-

port, and required licenses, permits, or fees for transport of hazardous materials

(57, 59). In many cases, conflicts between federal and state, tribal, or local rules

exist and must be settled in the courts (57, 59).

Although the public is fearful of spent-fuel transport on their roads and railways

(see Section 6.5), over the past 40 years, no major accidents that released radiation

have occurred in the United States or elsewhere. Of the 70 incidents since 1949

involving spent-fuel shipments, 13 involved actual transportation accidents, somein which loaded casks were damaged, but no radiation release was detected (60).

In the United States, NRC regulations (10 CFR 71) require all transport casks to

be drop tested, fire tested, and immersion tested. The NRC is currently reviewing

its method for assessing these standards in response to public criticisms.


21/39

INTERIM STORAGE 221

To date, the major safety problems have to do with leaking transport con-

tainers that result in contamination of casks, trucks, pads, and roadways. In 1998,

radiation contamination was detected in French transports of empty German waste

containers at levels 200 times above authorized levels (6163). Similarly, in a num-ber of civilian and military shipments in the United States, spent-fuel casks arrived

contaminated at levels higher than allowed by the Department of Transportation

(64). Since 1949, there have been 4 cases where radioactive contamination went

beyond the transport vehicle, 4 cases where the transport vehicle itself was con-

taminated, and 49 cases where surface contamination was detected (60). In this

case, the radiation leakage occurred through mechanisms, not fully understood,

that involve the interaction of an oxide film on the cask surface, which incorporates

radionuclides from pool water during cask loading. At some point during trans-

port, these radionuclides migrate to the outer layer of the oxide film and createdetectable levels of contamination (64).

6.4. Economics

An important factor to the owner-operator companies, the government, and taxpay-

ers in the interim-storage debate is economics. Owner-operator companies have

claimed that the DOEs missed deadline for shipping spent fuel to a permanent

repository (January 31, 1998) will cost them upward of $56 billion in additional

storage costs, including the addition of credit card interest rates to estimates of totalowner-operator costs and refund of all past fees (65). Because of the potentially

huge amounts of money at stake, it is in the interest of all involved to have an

accurate accounting of the costs of interim storage of spent fuel.

For the purposes of example, this paper presents a comparison of the costs for a

centralized facility at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, versus spent-fuel storage at reactor

sites. The analysis also accounts for costs associated with transportation of spent

fuel to the interim site, which would not accrue from at-reactor storage (at least

until a permanent storage site was ready). Table 1 shows some of the costs and

their sources used in the economic analysis in this paper.Capital costs for dry storage at reactors involve (a) up-front costs, which

include costs for design, engineering, NRC licensing, equipment, construction

of initial storage pads, security systems, and startup testing (66), and (b) stor-

age system and loading costs, which include costs for storage casks, additional

pads, labor, decommissioning, and consumables (67). Net operating costs for at-

reactor dry storage are divided into those at sites with operating reactors and

those at sites with shutdown reactors. Operating costs at shutdown reactors will be

higher than those at operating reactors because costs can no longer be charged

against the operating reactor and instead all costs will have to be charged tospent-fuel storage. In addition, operating costs will vary depending on the num-

ber of shutdown reactors and pools at a particular site. Table 2 shows the op-

erating costs for pools at shutdown reactors given the number of reactors at a

site, the number of pools at the site, and the number of shutdown reactors. For


22/39

222 MACFARLANE

TABLE 1 Cost categories and sources for dry storage cost calculations in 1998 dollars

Cost category Capital costs Operations & maintenance

Up-front costs Storage system Operating reactor Shutdown& loadinga costs reactor costs

At-reactor dry $9 M/siteb $60,000c $470,000d $49 M/year/

storage $80,000a/MTU $750,000a/year/site sitee

Centralized

Interim

facility $680 Mf $60,000c $127 M/yearg

$80,000a/MTU

Nevada Transport Civilian transport and operations

Mobilization & Waste Acceptance & Transportation,

Acquisition 20102041

Transportation $153740 Mh $86 Mi $3912 Mj

aIncludes storage casks, pads, labor, decommissioning, and consumables.

bTable E-7, TRW Environmental Safety Systems Inc., 1998.

cN. Mote, personal communication, and TRW, 1998, Table E-7.

dTRW Systems Analysis, 1993.

eCosts for reactors shut down at least 5 years. (TRW Environmental Safety Systems Inc., 1998.) For reactors shutdown

fewer than 5 years, see Table 2.

fTRW, 1998, Table E-1. Costs are for construction of a canister transfer module and one waste handling building, and one

additional canister transfer module.

gTRW, 1998, Table E-2. Operating costs are for the canister transfer module, the waste handling building, and the dry-cask

storage area (an additional $4 M/year).

hTRW, 1998. Nevada transport is for either heavy-haul trucks or new railroads from Caliente, NV, to Yucca Mountain.

iTRW, 1999. Includes costs to develop transportation schedules, license and procure transportation equipment, and develop

contracts with rail and truck lines for shipping. Represents 78.4% of the total transportation costs for this category, which

are those to be borne by the civilian sector.

jTRW, 1999. Covers the costs of shipping all spent fuel at reactors to Yucca Mountain. Represents 78.4% of the total

transportation costs for this category, which are those to be borne by the civilian sector.

reactors shutdown fewer than 5 years, operating costs are given in Table 2. For

reactors shutdown 5 years or more, pool and dry-storage operating costs are

estimated to be $9 million per year (67). For shutdown reactors with all their

spent fuel in dry storage, operating costs are estimated to be $4 million per year

(67).

A recent DOE report, which describes a modular interim storage and waste pro-

cessing facility that would be integrated with the permanent repository facilities at

Yucca Mountain, contains a description of the facilities necessary for centralized

storage (67). The capital costs below are the bare minimum required for a cen-

tralized storage facility and nothing further, and they do not include costs for

facilities to handle uncanistered spent fuel. Capital costs of building an indepen-

dent dry-storage facility include construction of (a) a carrier preparation building,

where loaded transportation casks would be received and prepared for, (b) a waste


23/39

INTERIM STORAGE 223

TABLE 2 Annual costs for pool operations and maintenance at shutdown

reactors in 1998 dollarsa

Number of shutdown Number ofCosts by number of reactors on site

reactors at a site pools on site 1 2 3

1 1 $4,675,024

1 2 $738,742 $738,742

1 3 $738,742

2 1 $4,675,024

2 2 $5,149,142 $738,742

2 3

(1 shutdown) $738,742

2 3

(2 shutdown) $1,576,718

3 1

3 2 $5,248,376

3 3 $6,097,378

aFor reactors shut down fewer than 5 years. For reactors shutdown 5 years or longer, if no other pools are

operating, then the operating costs jump to $9 million/year. For reactors, like Trojan in Oregon, that move all

their spent fuel into dry storage (instead of continuing to operate pools), once all the fuel is in dry storage,

operating costs are $4 million/year. (Adapted from TRW Systems Analysis, 1993.)

handling building, where the fuel would be unloaded from the transport carrier and

loaded into storage casks if necessary (67), (c) a canister transfer storage module,

where overflow casks await processing (for the scenario in which up to 3000 MT

of spent fuel is shipped per year), and (d) pads and concrete storage casks for

the spent fuel. Decommissioning costs are included as a separate capital cost be-

cause they are not considered in DOEs analysis. Estimates for decommissioning

costs (which depend somewhat on the availability of multipurpose casks; if storage

casks are different from those emplaced in the permanent repository, then costs

will increase because of the need to decommission the storage casks as well as the

spent-fuel transfer facilities and other radioactive areas) are based on 15%20%

of the facility capital costs (66). Operating costs are a bare minimum estimate

and apply to costs accrued only from operating the carrier preparation building,

$44.1 million/year (without facilities for uncanistered fuel), the one waste handling

building, $78.8 million/year (67), and those for the maintenance of dry-storage

facilities, estimated at $4 million/year based on operating costs for an independent

spent-fuel storage facility (68). All at-reactor scenarios assume that no license

extensions are granted to currently operating power plants.

Although many of the interim-facility costs in this analysis originate from

owner-operator industry estimates, transportation costs are based on estimates


24/39

224 MACFARLANE

provided by DOE analyses (see Table 1 and Figure 5). Various routing options

through Nevadaexist and account forthevariation in cost (See Section 6.6; Table 1).

Costs for the transportation of all civilian spent fuel (Table 1) are estimated to be

78.4% of total transportation costs (with the remainder accounted for by spent-fueland high-level waste from DOE and Department of Defense programs) (69). The

transportation and operations cost estimate in Table 1 does not include costs for

waste acceptance, storage, and transportation development and evaluation (esti-

mated to be $36 million between 20002005) (69).

Figure 5 provides a comparison of costs in billions of 1998 dollars of on-site, at-

reactor dry-storage versus centralized dry-storage costs versus transportation costs,

projected out to the future for the years 2010, 2015, 2025, or 2041.2 All costs are

discounted at a 5% rate, based on government interest rate projections. At-reactor

costs to owner-operators are calculated for storage of spent fuel on site up to theyear of the particular case (2010, 2015, 2025, or 2041). Centralized storage costs

to the DOE are calculated for a centralized facility that is completed and begins to

accept spent fuel by 2005, according to the DOEs transportation schedule.3 For

example, in the year 2010, the costs would be based on the amount of spent fuel

received at the centralized facility between 2005 and 2010. Transportation costs

in this figure are calculated by discounting the per-year costs (see 68) from 1998

to 2010, 2015, 2025, or 2041, depending on the case, and adding them together

over the specified time period (68).

Costs for transportation are calculated using year-by-year cost estimates (68).Added to these costs are the mobilization and acquisition costs of $86 million,

discounted to a 2005 pay date. These costs cover establishing schedule agree-

ments with each reactor site for the removal of spent fuel, acquiring and licensing

transportation equipment, and establishing contracts for transportation shipments

(68).

Figure 5 shows that transportation costs are between 40% and 50% of those

for a centralized facility. As a result, transportation costs will add significantly

to the total costs for a centralized interim-storage facility depending on where it

is constructed (Figure 6). For a facility at Yucca Mountain, these costs, of course,will be recouped if a permanent repository opens there, except for discounting.

On the other hand, if Yucca Mountain is not approved as a permanent geologic

repository, or if it is aborted in 1030 years, then the loss to the taxpayer is on the

order of billions of dollars.

2All cases are calculated with 1998 as the initial year because costs are in 1998 dollars.

Assuming no license extensions at reactors, between 1998 and 2010, only five reactors

will shutdown. Between 2010 and 2015, 36 reactors will shutdown, and between 2015 and2025, 37 reactors will close. According to the model employed in this paper, all reactors

are shutdown by 2041.3The DOE plans to transport 400 MTU of spent fuel in the first year transportation begins,

600 MTU in the second year, 1200 MTU in the third year, 2000 MTU in the fourth year,

and 3000 MTU each year thereafter (68).


25/39

INTERIM STORAGE 225

Fig

ure5

Costcomparison

forcap

ital,operatingan

dmain

tenance,

an

dtransportationcostsfor

interim

storageof

spe

ntfuelfortheyears

2010

,2015

,2025

,an

d2041

.(Lightgrayboxes)At-reactorstorage,

highan

dlowest

imates;

(da

rkgrayboxes)centralizedfa

cilitystorage;an

d(whiteboxes)transportationcostsaccruedforcentralizedfacility

sto

rage.

Allcostsare

in1998d

ollars.

Seetextfor

details.


26/39

226 MACFARLANE

If we disregard the complexities added by transportation and just compare cap-

ital, decommissioning, and operating costs for at-reactor and centralized storage,

we see that there is little difference between the two total costs (Figure 5). An

estimate of the uncertainty associated with these figures is at least 10%, if nothigher. All of the total cost estimates, high and low, at-reactor and centralized,

for a particular case, 2010, 2015, 2025, or 2041, fall within a 10% error range of

each other. What does vary between at-reactor and centralized costs and across the

cases are the capital and operating costs. For the at-reactor case, if spent fuel is

not transferred from wet to dry storage at shutdown reactors, then operating costs

dominate. As a result, the data shown in this paper assume that all spent fuel in

the at-reactor case is transferred to dry storage after the reactor is shut down. For

the centralized-facility case, in the year 2010, the costs are fairly evenly divided

between the storage-system, up-front, and operating costs, but by the year 2015,storage system capital costs dominate.

Two other observations are possible. The first is that up-front costs are con-

sistently higher for centralized storage than for at-reactor storage. A centralized

facility will require, at the minimum, a carrier preparation building, where workers

remove the personnel barriers from the waste carriers (on truck or rail car) and the

impact limiters and inspect the carrier for contamination (70), and a waste han-

dling building, where casks are removed from the carrier, both carrier and casks are

decontaminated, and the cask is opened to reveal the inner canister of spent fuel,

which can be repaired if necessary. The waste handling building will need at leastone pool in the event of failed casks, failed spent-fuel assemblies, or earthquake

damage (70). In fact, the analysis here most likely underestimates the up-front

costs for centralized storage by accounting for only two initial waste buildings.

Actual up-front costs may be a few hundred million dollars higher.

The secondobservation is that by 2041, operating costs forthe at-reactor case are

44% higher than those for the centralized facility case. Centralized storage of spent

fuel, then, becomes more cost-effective only if spent fuel is to be stored for at least

five decades before a permanent repository is available. High transportation costs

offset these savings,though. A centralized facility will becomeeconomically viablewhen transportation costs are reduced. This cost reduction can be accomplished

by reducing transport distances by siting a centralized facility closer to reactors.

Costs could also be reduced by the introduction of a multipurpose cask that could

be used for final disposal as well as interim storage and transport. The decision on

what type of cask is needed for a permanent repository at Yucca Mountain does

not appear to be forthcoming for at least five years.

6.5. PoliticsInterim storage of spent fuel may be technically safe and cost-effective, yet political

opposition may obstruct storage plans, ultimately causing nuclear reactors to shut

down from lack of storage space. Consequently, public concerns are an issue that

should be given weight equal to those discussed previously. Political opposition


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INTERIM STORAGE 227

Figure6

Costcomparison

ofat-reactorandcentralized

storageofspentfuelfortheyears2010,

2015,

2025,

and2041.

Transportationcostsareincludedinthecentralizedcostestimates.(Light

grayboxes)At-reactor

storage,

highandlowestimates;(darkgrayboxes)centralizedfacilitystorage.

Allcostsareinbillionsof1998

dollars.


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228 MACFARLANE

to interim storage of spent fuel takes two main forms: (a) the not-in-my-backyard

syndrome against actual spent-fuel storage facilitieseither at reactors or at a cen-

tralized interim-storage facilityand (b) opposition to the transport of spent fuel.

A few reactors may be shut down if no off-site storage space is available foruse because the local public refuses to approve more on-site storage. Northern

States Power Company in Minnesota has been bound by the state legislature to

make progress finding away-from-reactor storage before the state will approve

additional dry-cask storage (71). In addition, Wisconsins public service com-

mission has allowed only 12 dry casks at the Point Beach reactorand may not

allow more until the spent-fuel problem is addressed by the federal government

(71). Although both these events caused the nuclear industry major concern, nei-

ther resulted in the shutdown of the reactorsalthough this may occur in the

future.Political opposition to proposed centralized facilities also exists. The state of

Nevada strongly opposed a centralized interim-storage facility near Yucca Moun-

tain on the grounds that it was being doubly penalized by siting not only a

permanent repository but also an interim facility there. As a result, the state of

Nevada would try to delay the opening of any storage facility as long as possible

through lawsuits and other means. Moreover, many Nevada localities, includ-

ing Las Vegas, may prohibit or at least highly restrict transport of spent fuel on

their roads. Further political barriers to a centralized facility at Yucca Mountain

would be public protests, such as those against the permanent repository, whichis on ground claimed to be sacred by the Western Shoshone and the Southern

Paiute Indians. The Clinton Administration also opposed interim storage at this

site because it could influence the decision on the location for a permanent repos-

itory. The state of Utah has responded like Nevada by opposing the creation of

a private interim-storage facility on Goshute Indian land near Salt Lake City be-

cause of concerns over safety and earning the reputation of a waste dump. It

is very likely that almost any centralized storage facility in the United States

will also face some kind of lawsuit. For example, in the case of Utah, it will

most likely be brought by the state and challenge the sovereignty of an Indiannation.

Besides the not-in-my-backyard response, the public is wary of transportation

of radioactive materials through their communities and on their roadways. The

antinuclear communitys response to congressional proposals to create an interim-

storage facility near Yucca Mountain was their (somewhat misleadingly named)

mobile Chernobyl campaign against the transport of spent fuel in which they

highlighted alleged dangers of spent-fuel transportation.Germany presents perhaps

the most spectacular example of the power of public protests against spent-fuel

shipments: Over 30,000 police were called out to defend against thousands im-peding the transport of spent fuel to the Gorleben interim-storage facility in 1997

(72). The above suggests that in any planned transportation of large amounts of

spent fuel, the transporters will first have to work hard to gain the publics trust

for the operation to be successful.


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INTERIM STORAGE 229

6.6. Site-Specific Considerations

To create a centralized interim-storage facility for spent fuel, policymakers have to

account for the factors discussed in the previous sections, but each specific location

will have its own unique issues that require resolution. Congressional legislation

between 1995 and 1999 that addressed interim storage of spent fuel specified

that a valley within the Nevada Test Site, Jackass Flats, located within 10 km

of Yucca Mountain, be used for a centralized facility. Jackass Flats, therefore,

provides a good example of specific additional considerations that arise once a site

is chosen.

One issue that a facility near Yucca Mountain would encounter has to do with

spent-fuel shipments. The transportation of spent fuel from reactors to a central-

ized interim-storage site near Yucca Mountain would be no small task. The vast

majority of nuclear power plants are in the east or midwest, and as a result, great

distances would be traveled over the thousands of trips that would need to be made

(Figure 1). A large chunk of capital costs will be invested in the transportation

system within Nevada because there is no direct route (rail or road) from the end

of the rail line in Caliente, Nevada, to the proposed storage facility at Jackass Flats

adjacent to Yucca Mountain. Caliente is located approximately 150 miles north of

Las Vegas (which is about 90 miles southeast of Yucca Mountain). As the crow

flies, Caliente is approximately 100 miles from Yucca Mountain. Originally, the

plan was to extend a rail line from the town of Caliente to Jackass Flats. Another

option is to forego the more expensive but potentially safer rail line and use heavy-

haul truck transport from Caliente through Las Vegas to Jackass Flats. In this case,

a facility for the transfer of spent fuel from large rail casks to smaller truck casks

would be required, in addition to improvements of various roadways to accom-

modate the increased weight of the trucks. The DOE pointed out that heavy-haul

truck transport may become untenable if the state of Nevada refuses to provide

the necessary permits, in which case a rail line would need to be constructed

(67).

Another issue particular to a storage site at Yucca Mountain is seismicity. (Thisissue also applies to individual reactor sites that are seismically active and, because

of that, cannot use their general license for dry storage.) Yucca Mountain is lo-

cated within the Basin and Range tectonic province of continental North America,

an area generally known for its mountains, desert valleys, and seismic activity.

The area within the Nevada Test Site boundaries has experienced numerous small

earthquakes over the past years, excluding those caused by nuclear weapons tests

(Figure 7). In 1992, the Yucca Mountain area experienced a magnitude 5.6 earth-

quake centered on a previously unknown fault at Little Skull Mountain, situated

about 10 km from Jackass Flats (Figure 8). The earthquake resulted in over 2000aftershocks, and some of the already-existing facilities on Jackass Flats were dam-

aged (P. Justus, personal communication).

Earthquake damage depends on a number of factors, such as the intensity of

the earthquake (the actual energy released during fault slippage), distance from


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230 MACFARLANE

the epicenter of the earthquake, duration of the earthquake, ground conditions at

a particular location, and building and structure quality.4 For the Jackass Flats

region, ground motion is one of the more salient factors in predicting damage to

structures. Jackass Flats is actually a basin filled with about 100300 m of un-consolidated boulder- to silt-size sediment (73) that experiences higher ground

motions relative to the surrounding areas because sediment is less rigid than the

surrounding bedrock (74). For example, in January 1999, a swarm of small earth-

quakes produced ground motions at Jackass Flats on the order of 0.0033 g, which

were the highest ground motions experienced in the area (P. Justus, personal com-

munication). Similar situations exist in Kobe, Japan, and the Marina District of

San Francisco, both of which are located relatively far from the epicenter of the

earthquakes that produced the wreckage but which experienced much higher dam-

age than would have been expected because of the unconsolidated sediments onwhich they are located.

The NRC has the authority to decide whether to grant a license for the con-

struction of an interim facility. Part of NRCs analysis for license approval will

be based on regulations regarding the siting of an independent storage facility

in a seismically active area (10CFR72.102). These regulations state that sites

other than bedrock sites must be evaluated for their liquefaction potential or other

soil instability due to vibratory ground motion [10CFR72.102 (c)]. The real

question to be answered for NRC license approval is whether any facilities are

planned that will require the removal of spent fuel from its inner canister in a poolof water by a crane. If so, license requirements will be more stringent because

the seismic hazards are greater from the potential for radioactivity release. Such

facilities are most susceptible to earthquake damage, especially if a load of spent

fuel is dangling from the crane when an earthquake hits. While a facility at this

location would presumably be designed to withstand plausible earthquakes, there

would inevitably be added complexities, costs, and risks compared with building

the facility at a less seismically active site.

7. CONCLUSIONS

In the United States, what is the fate of spent fuel? Because a permanent repository

will not be available before the year 2010 at the earliest, it is clear that additional

storage will be needed, most likely dry storage. The question is whether that

storage will be located at reactor sites or in a centralized facility. Technically,

either option is viable, as long as there is adequate attention paid to safety issues.

The economic analysis of the options presented here suggest that at-reactor storage

4Earthquakes are much more of an issue for surface facilities than for underground facilities

(like the proposed repository). The situation is similar to that of a ship and a submarine at

sea during a storm: The ship will be much more affected by the intensity of the storm than

will the submarine, which is not affected by surface waves.


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INTERIM STORAGE 231

is most cost-effective, but owner-operator companies may decide that the higher

costs are worth the political payoff of moving the spent fuel off site. At odds with

this is political opposition to both a centralized facility and the transportation of

spent fuel, which would, at the very least, serve to delay the acceptance of spent fuelat a centralized site. Perhaps there is some middle ground similar to that advised by

the MRC Commission a decade ago: Establish a small-volume centralized facility

that would take spent fuel from only those reactors threatened with shutdown if

they cannot move their fuel off site. This facility would need to be sited in an

accepting community.

In the 1980s there was, in fact, a proposal to site an interim-storage facility in

the United States in a locale that was supportive of such a facility: Oak Ridge,

Tennessee, home of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, which produced uranium

for nuclear weapons. Because of its central location relative to the majority of thenations nuclear reactors, the DOE planned to create a facility that would repackage

and store spent-fuel rods prior to sending them to a permanent repository (75).

Although the state government tried to block the plan with a lawsuit against the

DOE, a local Oak Ridge, Tennessee, county commission agreed to an interim-

storage site in exchange for certain guarantees and benefits (38, 76). In the end,

the state was successful in preventing the construction of the facility. Perhaps it

is time to reconsider an offer like that of Oak Ridge. Potential alternative sites

would be something like the Morris site in Illinois or the Fort St. Vrain site in

Colorado. Although the wet and dry storage at these sites are filled almost tocapacity and they are not currently licensed for more, they could be potential

locations for a small dry-storage facility because they already have spent fuel on

site.

In the end, the debate about the interim storage of spent fuel hangs on the

future of nuclear energy. If fossil fuels become a pariah energy form due to

global climate change and nuclear energy experiences a revival, or if, on the

other hand, the country decides nuclear energy has come to the end of its use-

fulness (such as the recent decision in Germany), then the political will to oppose

a solution to a problem that clearly requires one may abate. On the other hand,if the public sees no solution to the nuclear waste problem and continues to per-

ceive that owner-operator companies and the federal government are not to be

trusted with dangerous radioactive materials, then most likely no centralized fa-

cility will be successfully established and some reactors will shut down from

lack of storage space. The solution to the problem relies on a number of factors,

not the least of which is public opinionand positive public opinion must be

earned.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I thank John Ahearne, Matthew Bunn, John Holdren, Ramana, Frank von Hippel,

and Jennifer Weeks for their thoughtful reviews. I would also like to thank the

anonymous reviewer for his/her comments and suggestions. I also acknowledge


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232 MACFARLANE

the support of the Social Science Research Council and MacArthur Foundation, the

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, and

the Security Studies Program at MIT.

Visit the Annual Reviews home page at www.AnnualReviews.org

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Documents

Interim Storage of Spent Fuelin the United States