Intake 6 Cultural Approach to Hvi Aids Prevention

8/7/2019 Intake 6 Cultural Approach to Hvi Aids Prevention

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Zambezia (19 91 ), XVIII (i).

LABOUR RELATIONS IN AZIMBABWEAN PARASTATAL

M. SHADURGraduate School of Management,University of Queensland

THE CASE OF 'Parastatal ' in which res ear ch was carried out from 1984 toearly 1988, before the Parastatals Commission was established exemplifies th at th e advent of Independence and th e Mugabe G overnment'slabou r policies had a major impact on labour relations in som e en terp rise sin Zimbabwe. Before Independence, management practices and attitudeswere typical of colonial enterprises: White managers ruled Black workerswith a m ixture of racism and paterna lism. M anagers did not feel co mpelledor obliged to react to workers' grievances. After Independence there washostility between workers and management as workers sought to havetheir pent-up grievances resolved. Over time, co-operative relations wereestablished between workers and management. Workers ' demands wererecognized as legitimate and management genuinely took workers' viewsinto account. Structures were established to enable workers' representa-tives to negotiate labour relations policies from the shop-floor workers'com mittees through to the employment board for the industry. ManyWhitesrefused to conform to the post-Independence labour relations regime andleft Parastatal, and this gave rise to rapid Black advancement which facilitatedth e shift from racist m anagem ent practice s. In this case, too , the w or ke rs'committees did not undermine trade unions; in fact the workers' com-mittees relentlessly endeavoured to strengthen union organization.

Pa rastata l is a statu tory autho rity which was estab lished in 1952. Atthe time this research was undertaken, it was virtually a monopolypurchaser, processor and supplier, controlling over 95 per cent of thedom estic m arket for its prod ucts. Domestic market comp etition occ urredwith respect to some of its minor products, although Parastatal was thesole supplier to its private-sector competitors of the basic ingredients forsuch products. Sales were overwhelmingly to the domestic market, withlimited exports to Southern African countries. In 1984 sales realized $71,5million. The nationa l workforce num bered approx imately 3 800 peop le insix proc essing en terprises and 48 dep ots located through out the co untry.Thus the organization was quite large and played an important role inZimbabwe's economy.Parastatal operated in deficit, funded by state subsidies. The annualtrading account deficit increased dramatically after Independence, risingfrom 7 pe r ce nt of sales in the year to June 1980 to ove r 50 per ce nt of sa les

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26 LABOUR RELATIONS IN A ZIMBABWEAN PARASTATAL

in each year from 1983. Parastatal managers stated that the company didnot operate at a loss: the deficit was the inevitable result of governmentpricing policy and, in particular, its subsidy to consumers. Governmentset the price paid to producers and the selling price for processed products.A major factor in the deficit, then, was that the average prices paid toproducers increased by 126 per cent from mid-1980 to 1985, while theprice to consumers remained static from 1 July 1979 until a 50 per centincrease in September 1983, and a 20 per cent increase in November 1984.After Independence, the government decided to remove the subsidies toparastatals gradually and began raising consumer prices, though economicdifficulties interrupted this policy and deficits continued. In addition,Parastatal was required to accept everything that registered producersproduced, regardless of market demand. In the mid-1980s, this requirementto accept production which was surplus to market demand contributed toParastatal's deficit. The consequence for labour relations was that fundswere not available to meet workers' demands involving money. Thissituation was largely beyond management's control.

DECISION-MAKING AT PARASTATALThere were many decision-making tiers above the six processing plants(see Table I)- Each of the six regional managers of the processing plantsreported to the General Manager through other managers at Head Officein Harare. Head Office in turn reported to the Agricultural MarketingAuthority (AMA), primarily through the industry committee of the AMA.

At Independence virtually all managers and senior employees wereWhite. There were two conditions of service: for 'established staff, whichgenerally meant skilled and senior employees, most of whom were White,and for 'non-established staff, who were invariably Black. There was noindustrial relations officer within the enterprise, nor was there any tradeunion of any significance, although some Black Bulawayo workers joined aunion federated to the United Food and Allied Workers' Union (UFAWU).There was no formal disciplinary code or grievance procedure, and record-keeping for Black workers was sketchy at best. Workers' representativesdid exist before Independence, but they were nominated by the personnelofficer, a management representative. Industrial relations between Blackworkers and White managers were probably no worse than in othercompanies; managers ruled with a mixture of paternalism and authori-tarianism. Members of the workers' committee fondly recalled one Whitemanager who disciplined workers 'like a father does'.

In the absence of an effective voice for workers through trade unions,and in line with government policy, workers' committees were formed in1980. In the early 1980s, a volatile atmosphere characterized industrial


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M. SHADUR 27

Table IAUTHORITY STRUCTURE AT PARASTATAL PRE-1988

Cabinet Committee on Parastatals[Parastatals Commission 1988-1990]Minister of Agriculture, Ministry of AgricultureAgricultural Marketing AuthorityAMA Industry CommitteeGeneral Manager

Regional ManagersProcessing plants

Harare Bulawayo Gweru Kadoma Mutare Chipingerelations at Parastatal and the workers' committees were in the forefrontof these confrontations. A strike took place at the Harare processing plantin April 1980. Many White managers left, but wages and basic conditions ofemployment did not improve as quickly as workers had hoped. The twodifferent conditions of service remained intact, although senior Blacksnow enjoyed the superior benefits in terms of pension, health and leaveentitlements. Tensions built up as workers' calls for increased wages,improved conditions and an end to authoritarian management were notmet. Workers were frustrated and a Black manager was beaten up byworkers at one Harare depot in August 1982. This involved the police anda court case ensued against the workers, including workers' committeerepresentatives. The manager was transferred. The labour relations climatewas fractious, and the workers' committee agitated strongly for demands tobe met. They could not afford to be accused of being vatengesi (sell-outs).

LABOUR RELATIONS AT PARASTATALHarare plant managers stated that Parastatal workers remained 'heatedup' and 'Bolshie' until the Harare bus drivers' strike early in 1982. Thecentre of this strike was situated immediately across the road fromParastatal's Harare processing plant, and its workers witnessed policeusing batons to load about 500 workers into police vans. This signal thatthe government would no longer tolerate strikes had a powerful impact indampening workers' demands. It was clear that militant action would notbe tolerated by the government, to whom workers had felt they could turnfor support against management. The prosecution of workers followingthe depot assault confirmed this, and workers' claims became less sweepingand instead focused on more immediate issues, those thought to be more


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achievable. With moderated demands, tension was reduced betweenmanagement and workers and relations slowly became more amicable.Militancy declined, though workers' committees still pushed for reforms,and labour re la t ions procedures were gradual ly p laced on aninstitutionalized basis. These included worker representative bodies,disciplinary and grievance procedures, job grading and remuneration,training and promotion.The Paterson Method of job evaluation w as im plem ented in 1982 aftera government decision that all agricultural parastatals would use thismethod. There were constant appeals from wo rkers for jobs to be regrad ed.Many workers and their representatives were perplexed by the PatersonMethod but they were unable to formulate persuasive objections to thescheme as a whole. However, Parastatal m anagem ent agreed to regradingexercises and generally these were carried out by mutual agreement.The disciplinary procedures at Parastatal were handled amicably.There was a strong emphasis on reaching consensus, and generallymanagement administered discipline qu ite leniently. In m any disciplinaryhearings the head of departm ent was extrem ely loa the to dism iss workerseven where clear grounds existed under the code of conduct. This was inkeeping with management's policy to act as an enlightened employer.Another factor was that the Ministry of Labour had a marked influence onthe outcome of disciplinary cases. Many applications for dismissal wererejected by the Ministry and, as a result of these precedents, hearingcomm ittees frequently decided not to dism iss emp loye es on the b as is thatthe Ministry of Labour would probab ly reject th e app lica tion . In the assaultcase mentioned earlier, the Ministry of Labour ordered the reinstatementof the workers' committee chairman even after the General Manager hadargued strongly for his dismissal and had so ught su pp or t for th e dism issalfrom the Ministry of Agriculture.Parastatal's workers' committee representatives strongly defendedaccused workers. In one case, a clerk with six years of unblemishedservice was apprehended in a theft valued at 48 cen ts. The co de of con du ctstated that theft entailed dismissal but workers' committee membersstaunchly defended the employee for over an hour, and the head ofdepartment was sympathetic to their case. The hearing committee wasunable to reach a decision, and the wo rkers ' com m ittee successfullyappealed to the Regional Manager for the employee's retention. Workersfelt that discipline was generally carried out fairly. Senior employees, andnot just workers, were subject to dismissal: in one case a White tra ns po rtcontroller was dismissed for misusing company property.Training was extensive at Parastatal and Black advancement tookplace rapidly. By 1984 most managerial and senior positions were held byBlacks. Ten of the thirteen senior head office positions were held by


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M. SHADUR 29

Blacks, includ ing that of the General Manager, and th re e of the six regionalmanagers were Black. At the Harare processing plant, six of the fourteensenior positions were held by Blacks in late 1984, and this increased toeight in mid-1985, including the post of Regional Manager. One majorrea son for th e de pa rtu re of W hites was their racial views, and a no the r w asthe m uch higher pay levels in the p rivate secto r. The rate of prom otion forBlack managers was exceptional.This high rate of promotion was beneficial for employee morale, andwas a major compensation for low managerial salaries. But there were anumber of problems associated with high staff turnover. Most serious wasthe promotion of inexperienced personnel into important managerialpositions. Parastatal was fortunate in that most of its staff coped wellunder these hectic conditions. There were some cases where staff wereconsidered not to have coped, and this resulted in some demoralizingdem otion s. This issue was comp licated, since no formal perform anceappraisal was in operation at least until mid-1985. Another problem withrapid promotions was that high expectations were raised and senior stafftended to become frustrated as promotions slowed in the later 1980s. Theslowing down of promotions resulted in a decline in morale.

Rapid promotion, however, did not apply to low-level workers.Turnover there was very low and many semi-skilled workers viewed therise of the bright young Blacks with a certain degree of wistfulness. Thiswas similarly the case with some of the White senior employees whostayed during the mid-1980s. There were cases where older or moreexperienced Whites felt passed over for promotion in favour of Blacks,though Whites continued to be promoted after Independence and someexperienced rapid promotion. The general view remained, though, thatBlacks were favoured for advancement. This form of affirmative actionwas to be expected given the historical changes in Zimbabwe, go vernm entpolicy and the fact that the company is a Parastatal.PARASTATAL'S WORKERS' COMMITTEES

At the Harare processing plant, there were 30 members of the centralworkers' committee, one from each department and from nearby depots.They elected six members to negotiate with management on the workscouncil, including the chairman and secre tary . Since there was no certifiedtrad e union, each of the workers' comm ittees at the six processing plantselected a member to a national committee to represent workers at theem ploym ent bo ard for the industry (see Table II). Training for lab ournegotiations had been provided to workers' committee representatives atSilveira House, a respected Catholic-funded organization that had longpromoted the development of Black Zimbabweans.


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Table IITHE STRUCTURE OF WORKER REPRESENTATIONAT PARASTATAL

Employment BoardDomestic Employment Board Meeting

National Employee Representatives MeetingWorkers' Committee Chairmen + Harare Secre ta ry(Harare Bulawayo Gweru Kadom a M uta re Ch ipinge)

Harare Works Council(4 w orkers + 4 managers)Central W orkers ' Co mm ittee(30 workers)

WorkforceAt t he p lan t l eve l, w orke r s ' com m i t t ee s an d w ork s co un c i l s dea l tpr imar i ly wi th day- to-day l abou r re la t ions i ssu es , su ch a s w or k sch ed ul in g ,j ob g rad ing and can t een i s sues . Th e re w as a l so so m e i n t e r e s t in t h efunc tion ing of t h e en t e rp r i se , suc h a s p ro m ot i ng t h e co m p an y ' s m or eprof it ab le p roduc t s , and ques t i on i ng of app o i n t me nt p ro ce d u re s fo llowi ngt he embezz lement of funds by a r ecen t l y ap po i n t ed ac co un t an t . Exe cu t i vem e m b e r s e x h o r t ed w o r k e r s ' c o m m i t te e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t o e n c o u r a g eh o n e s t w o rk a n d d e p r e c a t e a b s e n te e i s m a n d l a z in e s s . T h e a c h i e v e m e n t sthrough these bodies t ended to be p iecemeal , l ike se t t ing pay-day a few

days earl ie r in the mo nth or having speci fi c job s reg rad ed . At th e na t ion a llevel, worke r s ' com mi t t ee r ep re se n t a t i ves ob t a i n ed b ro ad e r b ene f i t s su chas the formula t ion and review of the job eva lua t ion scheme and code ofcond uct , the in t roduc t ion of shif t a l low ances , inc rea se s in va ca t io n l eave ,bonuses and long-service l eave , and the provi s ion of a bas ic wage forvend or s wh o se ll on commi ssi on . W orke r s ' com mi t t ee r ep re se n t a t i v es a l sonegot ia ted general pay increases a t employment board level (see below).

WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONSMany dem ands of th e workers w ere not met by m ana gem en t : the se inc ludedcal ls for massive wage increases (30 to 60 per cent ) and the uni f icat ion ofthe condi t ions of se rvice be tween es tabl i shed and non-es tabl i shed staff.Establ ished staff enjoyed super ior condi t ions of service ( for example, a


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M. SHADUR 31

sh or te r working week, and longer vacation leave). This division con tinuedthro ug ho ut t he period of my researc h, despite pe rsistent stron g calls fromworkers for unification. Management correctly argued that this was agovernment decision and workers had to put their case to the AMA. Thisthey did and th e AMA in turn maintained it was a m inisterial, indeedCab inet, decisio n. This buck-passing was largely an ac cu ra te reflection ofthe extensive decision-making layers controlling all parastatals. However,it was also a convenient means for higher authorities to avoid a difficultissue. Parastatal's management was committed to maintaining differentialrewards, and resisted moves from workers' committees to challenge this.Furthermore, its large deficits led Parastatal's management and governmentauthorities to minimize wages, allowances and other costs, so workers'requests that involved increased expenditure generally met with strongopposition. At times the atmosphere in meetings was very charged asworkers became frustrated with management's unwillingness to agree totheir proposals .

Contrary to the view that workers' committees have underminedtra de u nions, Parastatal 's wo rkers ' comm ittees worked hard to strengthenunion organization. Two rival unions existed in the industry, both ofwhich were unregistered. As mentioned earlier, a few hundred Bulawayoworkers belonged to a union federated to the well-established UnitedFood and Allied Workers' Union based in Bulawayo, and several hundredHarare workers were members of a union operated virtually by one man,the Secretary-General, R. Marufu. On 28 February 1983 Marufu's Unioncon sisted of only 461members. By February 1984 this num ber had d oubled,although the union was poor. It operated from a single room in officesshared by other poor, ZANU(PF)-aligned unions. The Ministry of Labourhad rejected an application for its registration, since government policywas to have only one union in each industry and the union was incompetition with the unregistered Bulawayo-based union; hence neitherunion could represent its members at employment board meetings. TheHarare union did very little for Parastatal's workers. This was under-standable, given the union's lack of financial and other resources. Thew ork ers' com m ittee continued to supp ort the union, and gave its blessingto check-off payments, even though there was very little return for thew ork ers' Z$5 du es p er year. They argued that it was nec essary to su ppo rtthe union in the hope it would eventually merge with the Bulawayo unionand become registered.

Parastatal's workers' committees were thus not a threat to unionorganization: indeed, for years they pushed the two rival unions to mergeand then be registered, without success. In early 1985 the workers'committees decided to hold the workers' union dues in trust until am erger was achieved . When this did not happen , the w ork ers' co m mittees


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formed a new union which was registered in October 1985, and wasaffiliated to the UFAWU. During this long pro ces s, the w ork ers 1 committeescarried out the functions of trade unions.Workers' committee representatives also fought hard to obtain wageincreases, but government wage policy had greater im pact on wage ra tes .Table HI shows that while the statu tory industrial minimum ros e slightly inreal terms between 1980 and 1985, th e real minimum at Paras tatal fellduring this period.Relations between Parastatal's workers and m anag em ent were strainedon several issues. Workers' committee members at times prejudiced theTable III

NOMINAL AND REAL MINIMUM WAGES FOR PAR AST AT ALCOMPARED TO THE INDUSTRIAL MINIMUM WAGEDate(July)

1980198119821983T19841985

Parastatal's minimum wages(Z$ per month)Nominal

91,21104,90125,00135,00152,25175,09

Real*91,2192,7599,8487,6182,2187,15

Industrial minimum wage(Z$ per month)Nominal

70,0085,00105,00115,00125,00143,75

Real*70,0075,1583,8774,6367,4971,55

In 1980 prices.t For September 1983.

working relationship with management. A prominent case in this regardwas the assault on the depot manager. The Harare workers' committeechairman gave conflicting evidence to the police and the court, andmanagement believed him to be involved in the assault. However, in myview it would be incorrect to argue that at Paras tatal th e w orke rs ' represen-tatives have been co-opted into compliance. The co-optation argumentmight be summarized as follows. Institutionalized procedures like thecode of discipline locked workers into the management system andremoved their militancy; national employee representatives were accom-modated in hotels three times per year to buy them off; and two of themost articulate workers' committees' chairmen were promoted to beindustrial relations officers in order to quieten them . This line of argum entdoes not convince me that workers' representatives were co-opted tocompliance The formal procedures were a substantial improvement on


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M. SHADUR 33

the previous arbitrary and discriminatory practices. The intensity withwhich w orke rs' represen tatives debated w hen bargaining with m anagem entalso belies the co-optation thesis. The promotion of the two workers'committee chairmen did not quieten the next vociferous chairman, andthe work ers ' comm ittee mem bers strongly supported th ese app ointm entsbecause they then had sympathet ic off icers with whom to deal .Furthe rmore, the election results, inwhich a high proportion of the w ork ers'committee incumbents were returned, indicated that the workforce ingeneral did not regard the workers' committee as sell-outs.

CONCLUSIONLabour relations at Parastatal were conducted in a basically co-operativemanner. The organization was faced with severe constraints in terms of alack of finance and the extensive decision-making layers through whichgovernm ent placed con trols over Parastatals. This meant tha t m any of th ew ork ers ' claims involving funds were opposed , as we re the ir requ es ts forconditions of service that were not in conformity with those in otherParas tatals. Despite these con straints, workers and management ove rcam ethe hostilities of the early 1980s and developed a constructive workingrelationship. To an extent, this decline in hostilities was imposed by thegovernment, which acted to prohibit strikes and other industrial action.However, conflicts w ere not simply represse d: there we re m any way s inwhich managem ent and workers developed an und erstand ing of the o th er 'sposition. Personnel and labour relations systems such as those for jobevaluation and discipline were introduced and fairly managed, and rapidBlack advancement took place. Employee development and promotionsw ere an important co mpensa ting factor for the low pay levels at P ara stata lcompared to private sector companies. Workers' committees played amajor role in improving relations between workers and management andat the sam e time they vigorously pursued wo rkers' interests. The wo rke rs'committees endeavoured to strengthen trade union organization, andeventually formed their own union affiliated to an existing union federa tion .Management showed trust and reasoned with workers' committeem em be rs rath er than relying on autocratic rule. Fundam ental differencesremained between the two parties, and workers were certainly not p rep aredto forego the pursuit of their interests in favour of organizational goals.Nonetheless, workers and management were able to establish a modusvivendi to balance the interests of the organization and the workers.Government had a substan tial impact on the conduct of labour relationsat Parastatal in the years following Independence. Before 1980 managerialpo s i t ions w ere dom inated by W hi tes , and labour re la t ions w erecharacterized by a mixture of paternalism and autocratic rule. Workers


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endeavoured to obtain improved terms and conditions of service beforeIndependence, but management retained the prerogative to determinewhich issues could be discussed. After Independence , managem en t's pow erover labour relations outcomes was reduced. Government intervened toattenuate management's right to hire and fire. Selection for and pro m otionto senior positions was no longer the pres erv e of Wh ites, and term inationof employment was regulated by the government in important ways.Management felt obliged to bargain in good faith with employees and notmerely pay lip-service to workers' claims. The se ttler s ta te was no longerthere to buttress a racial and dictatorial ap pro ach to m anagem ent. Mana-gers generally considered that the new government actively championedworkers' interests. Conflicts between workers and managem ent con tinuedbeneath the surface, and the se regularly brok e out into th e open. But overtime bitter conflicts were avoided, and both sides attempted to reachnegotiated agreements.

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Intake 6 Cultural Approach to Hvi Aids Prevention