© 2011 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

Institute of Nuclear Power OperationsInstitute of Nuclear Power Operations

INPO Engineering – Configuration INPO Engineering – Configuration

Management ActivitiesManagement Activities

INPO Engineering – Configuration INPO Engineering – Configuration

Management ActivitiesManagement ActivitiesPresentation to CMBG

June 20-22, 2011

Presentation to CMBG

June 20-22, 2011

Bob GambrillDepartment Manager, Engineering-CM

Carl FallerAssistant Department Manager, Engineering-CM

© 2011 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

TopicsTopics

• Consequences of Fukushima

• Industry Performance (EN & CM Evaluation Results)

• Margin Management

• Engineering Product Quality

• Digital Systems

• Technical Conscience

• Other Emerging Issues

• Consequences of Fukushima

• Industry Performance (EN & CM Evaluation Results)

• Margin Management

• Engineering Product Quality

• Digital Systems

• Technical Conscience

• Other Emerging Issues

© 2011 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

Consequences of FukushimaConsequences of FukushimaConsequences of FukushimaConsequences of Fukushima

© 2011 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

IER Level 1 11-1 OverviewIER Level 1 11-1 Overview

• Issued March 15 (rev March 18)

• Focus is to provide near-term assurance of high state of readiness to respond to both design basis and beyond design basis events

• Frequently asked questions—clarified intent of recommended actions

• Walk down and inspection guidelines

– Industry drafted, endorsed following INPO review and comment

• Issued March 15 (rev March 18)

• Focus is to provide near-term assurance of high state of readiness to respond to both design basis and beyond design basis events

• Frequently asked questions—clarified intent of recommended actions

• Walk down and inspection guidelines

– Industry drafted, endorsed following INPO review and comment

© 2011 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

Gap OverviewGap Overview

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• SAMG programs / processes have not been updated to

reflect changes to plant configuration

• Required equipment no longer exists

• Procedure execution weaknesses

• Contract elapsed / no longer valid

• Required tools / equipment not staged

• Material not properly maintained

• Design vulnerabilities exist

• SAMG programs / processes have not been updated to

reflect changes to plant configuration

• Required equipment no longer exists

• Procedure execution weaknesses

• Contract elapsed / no longer valid

• Required tools / equipment not staged

• Material not properly maintained

• Design vulnerabilities exist

IER 11-1 General Trends / ThemesIER 11-1 General Trends / ThemesIER 11-1 General Trends / ThemesIER 11-1 General Trends / Themes

© 2011 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

IER 11-2, Spent Fuel Pool Loss of Cooling and MakeupIER 11-2, Spent Fuel Pool Loss of Cooling and Makeup• Issued April 26

• Increase sensitivity to SFP storage event response

1. Verify shutdown safety provisions applied to SFP during outage

2. Apply increased protection for SFPduring operating modes while heat load remains high

3. Provide time to saturation conditions to control room and emergency response staff

4. Abnormal operating procedures address loss of cooling and makeup

5. Emergency procedures contain precaution for monitoring SFP level and temperature

• Issued April 26

• Increase sensitivity to SFP storage event response

1. Verify shutdown safety provisions applied to SFP during outage

2. Apply increased protection for SFPduring operating modes while heat load remains high

3. Provide time to saturation conditions to control room and emergency response staff

4. Abnormal operating procedures address loss of cooling and makeup

5. Emergency procedures contain precaution for monitoring SFP level and temperature

© 2011 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

Fukushima - Next StepsFukushima - Next Steps

• Review and consider EAG Working Group

recommendations

• Detailed Fukushima event timeline and causes

• Industry lessons learned working meetings

• New IERs to address other Fukushima lessons learned

• SBO / focus on AC power

• Review and consider EAG Working Group

recommendations

• Detailed Fukushima event timeline and causes

• Industry lessons learned working meetings

• New IERs to address other Fukushima lessons learned

• SBO / focus on AC power

© 2011 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

Industry Performance (CM & EN Evaluation Results)

Categories of AFIs (through end of 1st Qtr 2011)

Industry Performance (CM & EN Evaluation Results)

Categories of AFIs (through end of 1st Qtr 2011)

Num

ber of AFIs

Performance Categories

02468

10121416

2008

2009

2010

2011

© 2011 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

Margin ManagementMargin Management• Ongoing department focus area

• Most stations have performed gap analysis to INPO 09-003, Excellence in the Management of Design and Operating Margins, and addressed identified gaps.

• Examples of Performance Gaps: … issues that could adversely affect margin not consistently identified and prioritized as margin issues and integrated with the priority of other station issues ...

… several margin issues not identified and adequately evaluated for resolution ...

• Ongoing department focus area

• Most stations have performed gap analysis to INPO 09-003, Excellence in the Management of Design and Operating Margins, and addressed identified gaps.

• Examples of Performance Gaps: … issues that could adversely affect margin not consistently identified and prioritized as margin issues and integrated with the priority of other station issues ...

… several margin issues not identified and adequately evaluated for resolution ...

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© 2011 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

Margin ManagementMargin Management

Contributors: …. lack of process / expectation guidance to review SSC deficiencies for potential impact on operating margin

… insufficient management oversight to ensure margin issues are identified, tracked, and resolved; insufficient procedural guidance contributes ...

… site personnel have insufficient understanding of program requirements / expectations

Contributors: …. lack of process / expectation guidance to review SSC deficiencies for potential impact on operating margin

… insufficient management oversight to ensure margin issues are identified, tracked, and resolved; insufficient procedural guidance contributes ...

… site personnel have insufficient understanding of program requirements / expectations

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© 2011 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

Engineering Product QualityEngineering Product Quality• Focus is on the quality of the modification (produced in-

house or by engineering service provider) when released by Engineering

• Typically 10 AFIs / year (1/3 vendor, 2/3 in house)

• Examples of Performance Gaps:

… key design inputs not sufficient to assess the affect the modification will have on plant equipment …

… validation and testing of modifications not adequate to ensure the modifications performed intended functions ..

… (vendor associated) undetected errors in engineering products provided by vendors …

• Focus is on the quality of the modification (produced in-house or by engineering service provider) when released by Engineering

• Typically 10 AFIs / year (1/3 vendor, 2/3 in house)

• Examples of Performance Gaps:

… key design inputs not sufficient to assess the affect the modification will have on plant equipment …

… validation and testing of modifications not adequate to ensure the modifications performed intended functions ..

… (vendor associated) undetected errors in engineering products provided by vendors …

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© 2011 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

Engineering Product QualityEngineering Product Quality

Contributors … not being thorough with assumptions (e.g. not recognizing an assumption was made, not verifying)

… cross cutting weak human performance …

… weak failure modes affects …

… (for vendors) inadequate engineering oversight and review of vendor supplied products ..

… (for vendors) insufficient specification, missed verification of design requirements during owner acceptance reviews, compressed project schedules, lack of intrusive oversight of vendor activities …

Contributors … not being thorough with assumptions (e.g. not recognizing an assumption was made, not verifying)

… cross cutting weak human performance …

… weak failure modes affects …

… (for vendors) inadequate engineering oversight and review of vendor supplied products ..

… (for vendors) insufficient specification, missed verification of design requirements during owner acceptance reviews, compressed project schedules, lack of intrusive oversight of vendor activities …

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© 2011 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

Product Quality – Industry Aggregate

Performance(Product Quality)

Engineering Fundamentals

Tools & Techniques

Monitoring Performance(Product Quality)

Training (to Improve

Performance)

HU Tools

Technical Risk Assessment

Tools

Challenge Boards, Design Review Boards

Post Product Critique

Quality Review Teams

Performance IndicatorsObservations

Employee Development

Knowledge Worker Process

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© 2011 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

Digital SystemsDigital Systems

• Digital system issues continue to result in consequential events, some resulting in plant scrams (six scrams in past two years linked with digital).

• Evaluation findings (2009 and 2010)– 6 AFIs and 3 PDs– causes / contributors:

• missed design attributes and failure modes

• insufficient review / validation of vendor-supplied firmware

• weaknesses in control of vendor software and testing

• modifications not adequately specified on drawings

• specifications not adequately reviewed and tested

• Digital system issues continue to result in consequential events, some resulting in plant scrams (six scrams in past two years linked with digital).

• Evaluation findings (2009 and 2010)– 6 AFIs and 3 PDs– causes / contributors:

• missed design attributes and failure modes

• insufficient review / validation of vendor-supplied firmware

• weaknesses in control of vendor software and testing

• modifications not adequately specified on drawings

• specifications not adequately reviewed and tested

© 2011 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

Digital SystemsDigital Systems– 3 Strengths

• Project Management

• Thoroughness of pre-installation testing

• Process controls & guidance, early procurement of hardware, and diversified testing methods

• INPO actions– Annual digital upgrade working meetings

– Improve reporting of industry OE

– Involvement with EPRI and ISA working groups

– Good Practice: Improving Engineering Quality in Digital System Projects – Issued October 2010 to identify lessons learned and recommended practices in key areas

– 3 Strengths• Project Management

• Thoroughness of pre-installation testing

• Process controls & guidance, early procurement of hardware, and diversified testing methods

• INPO actions– Annual digital upgrade working meetings

– Improve reporting of industry OE

– Involvement with EPRI and ISA working groups

– Good Practice: Improving Engineering Quality in Digital System Projects – Issued October 2010 to identify lessons learned and recommended practices in key areas

Debbie Williams

© 2011 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

Digital SystemsDigital Systems

• INPO actions Related to Cyber Security

– EPIX trend codes developed to collect digital issues; includes codes for cyber .

– Developing training modules for cyber assessment teams and general awareness (June /July 2011) and technical training (November 2011).

– Developing a web page on INPO member site to share information related to cyber security.

– Reviewing INPO documents and evaluation process for inclusion of cyber security attributes. (1st quarter 2012).

• INPO actions Related to Cyber Security

– EPIX trend codes developed to collect digital issues; includes codes for cyber .

– Developing training modules for cyber assessment teams and general awareness (June /July 2011) and technical training (November 2011).

– Developing a web page on INPO member site to share information related to cyber security.

– Reviewing INPO documents and evaluation process for inclusion of cyber security attributes. (1st quarter 2012).

© 2011 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

Technical ConscienceTechnical Conscience

Frequently Asked QuestionsFrequently Asked Questions

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© 2011 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

• Incorporate the principles into ongoing organizational activities used to reinforce and anchor nuclear safety culture and professionalism of nuclear personnel.

• INPO evaluation teams will use the principles documents to help identify and communicate causes and contributors to weak performance.

• Sites are expected to provide feedback to INPO based on experiences with use of the preliminary documents.

• We do not expect anyone to create an indicator to monitor TC or OF performance.

• Incorporate the principles into ongoing organizational activities used to reinforce and anchor nuclear safety culture and professionalism of nuclear personnel.

• INPO evaluation teams will use the principles documents to help identify and communicate causes and contributors to weak performance.

• Sites are expected to provide feedback to INPO based on experiences with use of the preliminary documents.

• We do not expect anyone to create an indicator to monitor TC or OF performance.

What are INPO’s expectations for use of the preliminary document ?

© 2011 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

• Other principles documents

• Performance Objectives and Criteria

• SOER 10-02, “Engaged, Thinking Organizations”

• Other principles documents

• Performance Objectives and Criteria

• SOER 10-02, “Engaged, Thinking Organizations”

What is the relationship between the TC principles document and other INPO documents ?What is the relationship between the TC principles document and other INPO documents ?

© 2011 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

How is the industry using the TC principles document to enhance performance?How is the industry using the TC principles document to enhance performance?

• Performing a gap analysis of performance in comparison to the principles documents

• Reinforcing the principles during department and station meetings

• Training

– Familiarization/Reinforcement

– Case Studies – reviewing the principles to discuss how they were (or

should have been) applied during plant activities

• Performing a gap analysis of performance in comparison to the principles documents

• Reinforcing the principles during department and station meetings

• Training

– Familiarization/Reinforcement

– Case Studies – reviewing the principles to discuss how they were (or

should have been) applied during plant activities

© 2011 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

Technical ConscienceTechnical ConscienceINPO Engr-CM perspective:

• Overall, well received

• Helping to frame staff’s thinking and communications

• Based on feedback, do not anticipate any major changes to the finalized document

• Many sites in the process of training (approach varies)

INPO Engr-CM perspective:

• Overall, well received

• Helping to frame staff’s thinking and communications

• Based on feedback, do not anticipate any major changes to the finalized document

• Many sites in the process of training (approach varies)

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Basic Power Point Overview

Detailed Training w/ DLA & modules tailored to:• Sr Leadership (all)• Engr Leadership• Individual ContributorsIncreasing Effectiveness

© 2011 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

Emerging Industry IssuesEmerging Industry Issues

• Refocus on fundamentals and thinking vs. high reliance on process

• Time critical operator actions

• Consequences from Fukushima (to unfold over several years)

• Refocus on fundamentals and thinking vs. high reliance on process

• Time critical operator actions

• Consequences from Fukushima (to unfold over several years)

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