Inherency - sp Web viewUS- Sino Relations already check cyber attacks. Katie Bo Williams, 6-21-16

Cybersecurity NegBHN 3 Week SDI 2016

Cybersecurity NegInherency.....................................................................................................................................................3

Attacks Decreasing Now......................................................................................................................4

Solvency......................................................................................................................................................7

China Says No......................................................................................................................................8

China Will Pocket.................................................................................................................................9

No Enforcement................................................................................................................................10

Competitiveness Advantage......................................................................................................................11

Internals................................................................................................................................................12

Doesn’t Hurt Econ—General.............................................................................................................13

Alt Cause—Russia..............................................................................................................................16

AT: Stock Prices..................................................................................................................................17

AT: IP Theft........................................................................................................................................19

AT: Grid Attacks.................................................................................................................................20

Impact Defense......................................................................................................................................21

AT: Econ.............................................................................................................................................22

AT: Heg..............................................................................................................................................23

AT: Grid..............................................................................................................................................25

Relations Advantage..................................................................................................................................27

Internals................................................................................................................................................28

Relations Up......................................................................................................................................29

Alt Causes—Taiwan...........................................................................................................................31

Alt Causes—Pivot...............................................................................................................................33

Trade War Alt Cause..........................................................................................................................34

Impacts..................................................................................................................................................36

Relations Resilient—Interdependence..............................................................................................37

Relations Can’t Solve—General.........................................................................................................38

No Warming Impact...........................................................................................................................39

No Trade War Impact........................................................................................................................40

Miscalc Advantage.....................................................................................................................................42

Internals................................................................................................................................................43

Cyber Conflict Won’t Escalate............................................................................................................44

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Interdependence Prevents Escalation...............................................................................................45

Deterrence Checks.............................................................................................................................46

Low Probability..................................................................................................................................47

Impacts..................................................................................................................................................48

AT: Cyberwar General........................................................................................................................49

AT: South China Sea...........................................................................................................................53

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Inherency

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Attacks Decreasing Now US- Sino Relations already check cyber attacksKatie Bo Williams, 6-21-16 http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/284235-security-firm-sees-sharp-decline-in-chinese-hacking Chinese hacking sharply declining: report National Security Reporter for The Hill, The Hill

Chinese hacking of U.S. government and corporate networks has sharply declined since 2014 , according to a new report from a prominent cybersecurity firm. FireEye observed only a handful of network intrusions attributed to Chinese groups in April of this year, down from more than 60 in February

of 2013. The shift is likely the result of a confluence of factors, including actions taken by the U.S. government — but it is not solely the result of a September anti-hacking pledge struck by President Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping , FireEye said. When China’s expansive hacking operations began to come into the public eye, according to the report, the U.S. was able to muster the political support to confront China directly on its cyber espionage tactics — indicting five Chinese military officers in 2014 and striking the anti-hacking pledge. Lawmakers and others have repeatedly pressed the Obama administration on whether the September deal — which prohibits hacking commercial firms for economic gain — has lead to a drop in intrusions. “Although many in the U.S. initially doubted that these

actions would have any effect, they may have prompted Beijing to reconsider the execution of its network operations,” the report said. But the decline in hacking attempts started prior to the September deal, and FireEye stops short of suggesting that the anti-hacking pledge are solely responsible for the decrease. “The problem with the question, ‘is it working?’ is that it’s a yes-or-no answer, and there’s really no yes-or-no answer. You’ve got a really complex system behind China’s cyber activity,” Jordan Berry, FireEye’s principal threat intelligence analyst, told The Hill. “It’s more a confluence of events that caused this decline.” Military reforms within the Chinese government also played a role, Berry said. Since taking power in late 2012, Xi has implemented a series of significant military reforms aimed at centralizing China’s cyber elements that may also be a factor. FireEye also noted that there is a lag time in its research, meaning that it’s possible the trend has reversed since April — although Berry said that’s not what he expects to see. Chinese hackers are still targeting some private-sector U.S. firms, he said — but that data could be considered “dual use,” meaning that it has military applications, not just commercial ones. This suggests that the intrusions could be traditional intelligence-gathering, which is not prohibited by the September agreement. The country’s cyber operations have remained in the spotlight thanks to the massive breach of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), discovered last summer and widely believed to be the work of Beijing-backed hackers. The hack, thought to be a traditional intelligence-gathering mission, exposed the personal information of more than 20 million U.S. employees, contractors and others.

Sharp decrease in Chinese cyber attacks after Obama and Jinping agreementSanger, chief Washington correspondent of The New York Times, 2016 (David, “Chinese Curb Cyber Attacks on U.S. Interests, Report Finds,” New York Times, June 20, Online: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/21/us/politics/china-us-cyber-spying.html?_r=0, accessed July 16, RS)

WASHINGTON — Nine months after President Obama and President Xi Jinping of China agreed to a broad crackdown on cyberespionage aimed at curbing the theft of intellectual property, the first detailed study of Chinese hacking has found a sharp drop-off in almost daily raids on Silicon Valley firms, military contractors and other commercial targets. But the study, conducted by the iSight intelligence unit of FireEye, a company that manages large network breaches, also concluded that the drop-off began a year before Mr. Obama and Mr. Xi announced their accord in the

White House Rose Garden. In a conclusion that is largely echoed by American intelligence officials, the study said the change is part of Mr. Xi’s broad effort to bring the Chinese military, which is considered one of the main sponsors of the attacks, further under his control . As a result, the same political forces that may be alleviating the theft of data from American companies are also responsible for Mr. Xi’s stunningly swift crackdown on the Chinese media, bloggers and others who could challenge the Communist Party. “It’s a mixed bag,” said Kevin Mandia, the founder of Mandiant, now part of FireEye, which first detailed the activities of a People’s Liberation Army cyber-arm, called Unit 61398, that had been responsible for some of the most highly publicized thefts of American technology. “We still see semiconductor companies and aerospace firms attacked.” But the daily barrage of attacks has diminished, which Mr. Mandia attributed to “public pressure” from, among others, the Justice Department’s decision to indict five members of the P.L.A. unit about a year after its activities were exposed. Today, Unit 61398 appears to be largely out of business, its hackers dispersed to other military, private and intelligence units. Many China scholars and legal experts remain skeptical that the Chinese are deterred

by American indictments, since the P.L.A. officers are unlikely to see the inside of an American courtroom. But John P. Carlin, the assistant attorney general for national security, said the report validated his strategy. “The lesson is that when you figure out who has done this kind of theft, don’t fear making it public,” he said. “This is a slow process, but we are beginning to make people realize that even in cyberspace, laws and norms are applicable.” Mr. Obama and Mr. Xi drew up their agreement narrowly. It covers intellectual property theft — Chinese cybercriminals have stolen everything from designs for the F-35 fighter jet to the design of gas distribution networks — but not ordinary espionage against government targets. So, for example, the administration has not publicly talked about penalizing China for the theft of personal data on roughly 22 million Americans, whose security-clearance information was taken from the Office of Personnel Management. In fact, the administration has never publicly blamed China for that theft, although the director of national intelligence, James R. Clapper Jr., did

talk about China’s role once, before he was told by the administration not to refer to any specific country. As recently as last week, senior administration officials were in Beijing trying to flesh out the agreement between the two

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http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/284235-security-firm-sees-sharp-decline-in-chinese-hacking


presidents. Participants say that among the points of discussion was how to set up a hotline through which the two countries can alert each other to malicious software they have detected in global networks, with the expectation that Chinese and American investigators would work to find its source . Establishing such norms of behavior is far more likely to be effective than attempting to negotiate a treaty, according to outside experts who have been trying to devise the cyberequivalent of arms-control agreements. “Treaties are not verifiable in the cyberarena,” said Joseph Nye, a Harvard professor known for his studies of how nations use “soft power,” who in recent years has turned to the problem of regulating activity in cyberspace. “The same code can be benign or a weapon depending on the user’s intent,” he said. For example, a six-digit code that unlocks a cellphone is a protection for the user — and a potential weapon for a hacker. “So instead of focusing on the weapons, you have to focus on targets,” Mr. Nye said. “You start by saying that you don’t target something that has a clearly civilian use, like a power grid.” Mr. Nye and Michael Chertoff, the secretary of Homeland Security during the Bush administration, who now runs a private firm that is deeply involved in cybersecurity, were among the lead authors of a report to be published on Tuesday by the Global Commission on Internet Governance that will describe those norms to the United Nations and other groups. Just how fundamentally the Chinese are changing is a matter of debate. There is some evidence, American intelligence officials say, that while the People’s Liberation Army is not stealing as much on behalf of Chinese state-owned firms, much of the hacking activity has been shifted to the intelligence agencies, which can make the case that they are stealing national security secrets, not commercial information. Often, the difference is blurry, especially when the target is, say, the design of a satellite or a ship. Even after Mr. Obama and Mr. Xi announced their agreement last fall, American officials have said they have discovered malware in power grids, cellphone networks and other purely civilian targets. But it is unclear whether that malicious software is intended to collect information about users, shut the system down or both. The FireEye study concluded that as early as 2014, around the time of the indictment of the P.L.A.’s officers and hackers, the Chinese government had already been modifying its approach

to cyberoperations. The study of 72 Chinese hacking groups showed a sharp drop-off in the volume of attacks. But as recently as March, FireEye saw efforts to obtain information on American military projects by stealing access credentials to a contractor, and there has been continual theft of personal information from health care providers. The Chinese hacking groups have also focused on non-American targets, including Russia, South Korea and Vietnam, and have sometimes aimed at targets related to the disputes over Chinese claims in the South China Sea. The report concludes that Chinese attacks have decreased in volume, but increased in sophistication. The result is that Chinese hackers are now acting more like Russian hackers: They pick their targets more carefully, and cover their tracks. “We see a threat that is less voluminous but more focused, calculated, and still successful in compromising corporate networks,” the report said.

China seems to be decreasing the amount of economic cyberattacks on the USA Menn and Finkle 13 (Joseph Menn is the technology projects reporter for Reuters in San Francisco and the author of "All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn Fanning’s Napster and Fatal System Error: The Hunt for the New Crime Lords who are Bringing Down the Internet”. Jim works in the Reuters Boston bureau covering cyber security, hacking and technology privacy issues. He previously covered technology, media and biotechnology for Broadcasting & Cable, the Orange County Register and Bloomberg News out Tokyo, Taipei, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Santa Ana, California." Reuters. June 21, 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-spying-china-idUSKCN0Z700D)

The Chinese government appears to be abiding by its September pledge to stop supporting the hacking of American trade secrets to help companies there compete, private U.S. security executives and government advisors said on Monday.

FireEye Inc, the U.S. network security company best known for fighting sophisticated Chinese hacking, said in a report released late Monday

that breaches attributed to China-based groups had plunged by 90 percent in the past two years . The most dramatic drop came during last summer's run-up to the bilateral agreement, it added.

FireEye's Mandiant unit in 2013 famously blamed a specific unit of China's Peoples Liberation Army for a major campaign of economic espionage.

Kevin Mandia, the Mandiant founder who took over last week as FireEye chief executive, said in an interview that several factors seemed to be behind the shift. He cited embarrassment from Mandiant's 2013 report and the following year's indictment of five PLA officers from the same unit Mandiant uncovered.

Prosecutors said the victims included U.S. Steel, Alcoa Inc and Westinghouse Electric. Mandia also cited the threat just before the agreement that the United States could impose sanctions on Chinese officials and companies.

"They all contributed to a positive result," Mandia said.

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A senior Obama administration official said the government was not yet ready to proclaim that China was fully complying with the agreement but said the new report would factor into its monitoring. "We are still doing an assessment," said the official, speaking on condition he not be named.

The official added that a just-concluded second round of talks with China on the finer points of the agreement had gone well. He noted that China had sent senior leaders even after the U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security pulled out because of the Orlando shootings.

China's Foreign Ministry, the only government department to regularly answer questions from foreign reporters on the hacking issue, said China aimed to maintain dialogue on preventing and combating cyber-spying.

"We've expressed our principled position on many occasions," ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying told a daily news

briefing on Tuesday. "We oppose and crack down on commercial cyber-espionage activities in all forms."

FireEye said that Chinese intrusions into some U.S. firms have continued, with at least two hacked in 2016. But while the hackers installed "back

doors" to enable future spying, FireEye said it had seen no evidence that data was stolen.

Both hacked companies had government contracts, said FireEye analyst Laura Galante, noting that it was plausible that the intrusions were stepping stones toward gathering information on government or military people or projects, which remain fair game under the September accord.

FireEye and other security companies said that as the Chinese government-backed hackers dropped wholesale theft of U.S. intellectual property, they increased spying on political and military targets in other countries and regions, including Russia, the Middle East, Japan and South Korea.

Another security firm, CrowdStrike, has observed more Chinese state-supported hackers spying outside of the United States over the past year, company Vice President Adam Meyers said in an interview.

Targets include Russian and Ukrainian military targets, Indian political groups and the Mongolian mining industry, Meyers said.

FireEye and CrowdStrike said they were confident that the attacks are being carried out either directly by the Chinese government or on its behalf by hired contractors.

Since late last year there has been a flurry of new espionage activity against Russian government agencies and technology firms, as well as other targets in India, Japan and South Korea, said Kurt Baumgartner, a researcher with Russian security software maker Kaspersky Lab.

He said those groups use tools and infrastructure that depend on Chinese-language characters.

One of those groups, known as Mirage or APT 15, appears to have ended a spree of attacks on the U.S. energy sector and is now focusing on government and diplomatic targets in Russia and former Soviet republics, Baumgartner said.

(Reporting by Joseph Menn in San Francisco and Jim Finkle in Boston; Additional reporting by; Megha Rajagopalan in Beijing; Editing by Jonathan Weber and Richard Chang)

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Solvency

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China Says No Cybersecurity negotiations with China won’t go through- they view the U.S. as a threat and are looking to replace the U.S. as the hegemonic power. Harold et al., ’16 (Scott Warren, Associate Director at the Center for Asia Pacific Policy, a political scientist and faculty member of the Pardee RAND graduate school, Martin C. Libicki, Senior Management scientist and professor at the Pardee RAND graduate school, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Project Associate of the RAND corporation, “Getting to Yes with China in Cyberspace”, RAND Corporation, 05/02/2016, Online: www.rand.org/t/rr1335, accessed 07/15/16, SH)

China remains very concerned , perhaps obsessed, with cyberspace hegemony —the ability of certain countries to get their way consistently in cyberspace, while others have to play by rules set by hegemons. U.S. officials and experts do not talk (and may not even think) in terms of hegemony but assume that countries, if playing under fair and reasonable rules (whose provenance is held to be irrelevant) will be able to achieve their legitimate aims in cyberspace much as in the

physical world. Could China someday become a cyberspace hegemon? What is it about the United States that has made it, in Chinese observers’ views, a cyberspace hegemon? If the U.S. advantage lies with its inherent national capabilities (e.g., education, capital), China’s path to usurping U.S. hegemony should be straightforward and legitimate: more spending on education and more support to innovation. But Chinese thinkers also appear to believe that the U nited S tates holds unfair advantages in cyberspace as a function of having invented the relevant technologies that made the Internet—an advantage fairly won but unfairly extended. U.S.-based Internet governance groups, such as ICANN (a nonprofit corporation that serves to manage certain aspects of domainname registration on the Internet) and, to a lesser extent, the Internet Engineering Task Force (an open-membership organization that

promotes common, voluntary Internet standards) are also targets of China’s ire. The U nited S tates resists reforming these organizations in a direction that would take consideration of China’s interests because it reasons that China’s preferred rules for cyberspace would come at the expense of Internet freedom. For its part, China believes that Internet freedom is an essential element o f U.S. hegemony and a direct threat to the ruling status of the CPC . To better insulate itself from the perceived threat of U.S.-inspired Internet-based subversion, China has expressed an interest in building a direct Asia-to-Europe fiber-optic cable connection to avoid sending its Internet traffic across servers based in the United States (where Chinese

observers worry it will be intercepted or potentially, in case of a conflict, blocked). Similarly, China wants to leverage its internal market to promote the proliferation of technical standards with a distinct made-in-China look to favor Chinese companies. China therefore makes determined efforts to displace what it calls the eight guardian warriors of U.S. Internet hegemony (Cisco, IBM, Google, Qualcomm, Intel, Apple, Oracle, and Microsoft).10 Yet, as successful as Chinese firms have been in making serious inroads into hardware markets (e.g., Huawei routers, ZTE handsets, Xiaomi cell phones), the country’s firms have enjoyed far less success in the software market. The latter requires an ability to invent or reinvent new things for computers and devices to do. It also benefits from network effects (i.e., yesterday’s leader establishes the conventions that attract people to align with the current leader, thereby making yesterday’s leader a future leader). Neither the capacity to innovate (in contrast with making marginal improvements to an existing design) nor the ability to leverage prior market success is considered a Chinese comparative advantage. Another problem for China in cyberspace is that, while it might aspire to be the East Asian hegemon in the physical world, it makes no sense to be the East Asian hegemon in cyberspace. What level of hegemony need it achieve in cyberspace? Does it suffice to nullify whatever advantages the United States reaps from being a global hegemon in cyberspace, or should it try to establish some sort of regional autarky in cyberspace?

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China Will Pocket China will pocket the aff Philipp 2016 - Joshua, Epoch Times Staff, January 20, "CHINA SECURITY: What Can Be Done to Stop Chinese Economic Theft?", http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/1944921-china-security-what-can-be-done-to-stop-chinese-economic-theft/

What was probably most interesting was that despite the noise around Chinese economic theft, there is an air of quiet tolerance among

businesses, with government procurement, and with international regulation. If the cyber agreement between the United States and China has shown us anything, it’s that the CCP will not cooperate when it comes to stopping economic theft. For them, the risk of these attacks is negligible, the benefits of the attacks are too great, and the Chinese economy has come to rely too heavily on theft to just switch it off. One of the key problems is that the United States still doesn’t have a real strategy for dealing with cyberattacks. This issue was highlighted by Gen. Michael Hayden, the former

director of the NSA and CIA, during a recent speech at the S4x16 ICS/SCADA cybersecurity conference in Miami. “We lack a legal policy

framework,” Hayden said, according to cybersecurity news website Dark Reading. He added, “People ask how come government isn’t doing something about it … Government will be permanently late to the need in providing cybersecurity.” This ties back to the cybersecurity

agreement with China. One of the key problems with cybersecurity, in general, is that the United States has not yet demonstrated that using cyberattacks for economic gain is a risky endeavor. Cyberattacks are often carried out from countries that have no extradition treaties with the United States, U.S. businesses are not allowed to launch counterattacks, and the business environment often has CEOs petrified of making the attacks public for fear of lawsuits and angry investors. It’s a crime with high profit and little risk, and as the “60 Minutes” segment highlighted, even businesses with alleged stolen products are still able to sell these products freely in the United States. Daniel McGahn, the head of American Superconductor, spoke about his experience of having his software stolen in China. He said in the “60 Minutes” segment that he had to then fire 600 of his nearly 900 employees, and his company lost “well over a billion dollars.” Sinovel, the company partly owned by the Chinese regime that allegedly robbed him, now exports wind turbines running on his technology. They were even able to sell one of these turbines to the state of Massachusetts, which was paid for with federal stimulus funds. The case is a clear example of what a cyber agreement with China needs, yet still lacks: sanctions that can discourage theft. Obama signed an executive order giving himself the ability to sanction companies that commit economic theft, and the threat of sanctions was believed to be one of the key tools used to nail down the cyber agreement in September. But as I reported at the time, the sanctions were not mentioned directly in the agreement. In other words,

the cyber agreement lacks teeth. It still gives the Chinese regime no real reason to stop its attacks—and instead just gave it a platform of dialogue where it can continue pretending it has no part in the problem.

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No Enforcement Agreements can’t be enforcedAustin 2015 - Dr Greg, Professorial Fellow with the EastWest Institute in New York and a Professor at the Australian Centre for Cyber Security at the University of New South Wales, October 7, "Why the China-US Cyber Agreement May Prove Destructive", http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/why-the-china-us-cyber-agreement-may-prove-destructive/

Third, as many commentators have argued, the agreement on commercial espionage may create more diplomatic minefields than it eliminates because of imprecise language and lack of enforcement capability. But there are several much

larger considerations as well. In cyberspace, there is no wall big enough to prevent commercial cyber espionage across national borders. This applies as much to the Great Firewall (the nickname for China’s efforts at technical control of cyber space) as it does to the ‘Little Firewall’ — that is, U.S. efforts to stem Chinese (and Russian, French or Israeli) cyber espionage by technical and policy

means. According to a senior FBI official, 90 percent of the cyber security systems in the United States are hackable with only moderate levels of technology and determination. The current approach in most countries to cyber security can

be summed up as “patch and pray,” a reference to the reality that existing technical systems have very large numbers of vulnerabilities that are only gradually discovered and are addressed by periodic “patches” to update software. One unfortunate corollary of this situation is that in countries such as China that have a heavy reliance on pirated software (which does not

receive patches), almost all corporate data is highly vulnerable to theft and leak. But the problem is also a human one. We need new suites of “highly secure computing” technologies that can begin to compensate for the weakness of the people who operate them. The concept of “highly secure computing,” as an alternative model to “patch and pray,” refers to information technologies that are likely to be breached only in exceptional and rare circumstances, and at high costs and risk to the attacker. In 2009, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security declared that scalable secure computing should be the first of 11 national priorities for research and commercial development to “transform the cyber-infrastructure so that critical national interests are protected from catastrophic damage.” But highly secure computing is still being developed for the business world. The global user community would then have to adapt to it and be adapted for it. As pointed out in a study by the EastWest Institute, this will definitely be difficult and costly.

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Competitiveness Advantage

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Internals

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Doesn’t Hurt Econ—General The Chinese cyber-threat is exaggerated and the government realizes the benefits of an interdependent global economy- cyber operators lack capabilities to launch a serious cyber-attack against the U.S. and fail to understand even legitimately collected foreign data. Lindsay ’15 (Jon R., an assistant research scientist at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and an assistant adjunct professor at the University of California, San Diego School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, “Exaggerating the Chinese Cyber Threat”, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy University, 05/15, Online: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/25321/exaggerating_the_chinese_cyber_threat.html, accessed 07/17/2016, JL)

Policymakers in the U nited S tates often portray China as posing a serious cybersecurity threat . In 2013 U.S. National Security Adviser Tom Donilon stated that Chinese cyber intrusions not only endanger national security but also threaten U.S. firms with the loss of competitive advantage. One U.S. member of Congress has asserted that China has “laced the U.S. infrastructure with logic bombs.” Chinese critics, meanwhile, denounce Western allegations of Chinese espionage and decry National Security Agency (NSA) activities revealed by Edward Snowden. The People’s Daily newspaper has described the United States as “a thief crying ‘stop thief.’” Chinese commentators increasingly call for the exclusion of U.S. internet firms from the Chinese market, citing concerns about collusion with the NSA,

and argue that the institutions of internet governance give the United States an unfair advantage. The rhetorical spiral of mistrust in the Sino-American relationship threatens to undermine the mutual benefits of the information revolution. Fears about the paralysis of the U nited S tates’ digital infrastructure or the hemorrhage of its competitive advantage are exaggerated. Chinese cyber operators face underappreciated organizational challenges, including information overload and bureaucratic compartmentalization, which hinder the weaponization of cyberspace or absorption of stolen intellectual property . More important, both the U nited S tates and China have strong incentives to moderate the intensity of their cyber exploitation to preserve profitable interconnections and avoid costly punishment. The policy backlash against U.S. firms and liberal internet governance by China and others is ultimately more worrisome for U.S. competitiveness than espionage ; ironically, it is also counterproductive for Chinese growth. The U nited S tates is unlikely to experience either a socalled digital Pearl Harbor through cyber warfare or death by a thousand cuts through industrial espionage . There is, however, some danger of crisis miscalculation when states field cyberweapons. The secrecy of cyberweapons’ capabilities and the uncertainties about their effects and collateral damage are as likely to confuse friendly militaries as they are to muddy signals to an adversary. Unsuccessful preemptive cyberattacks could reveal hostile intent and thereby encourage retaliation with more traditional (and reliable) weapons. Conversely, preemptive escalation spurred by fears of cyberattack could encourage the target to use its cyberweapons before it loses the opportunity to do so. Bilateral dialogue is essential for reducing the risks of misperception between the United States and China in the event of a crisis. THE U.S. ADVANTAGE The secrecy regarding the cyber capabilities and activities of the United States and China creates difficulty in estimating the relative balance of cyber power across the Pacific. Nevertheless, the United States appears to be gaining an increasing advantage. For every type of purported Chinese cyber threat, there are also

serious Chinese vulnerabilities and growing Western strengths. Much of the international cyber insecurity that China generates reflects internal security concerns . China exploits foreign media and digital infrastructure to target political

dissidents and minority populations. The use of national censorship architecture (the Great Firewall of China) to redirect inbound internet traffic to attack sites such as GreatFire.org and GitHub in March 2015 is just the latest example of this worrisome trend. Yet prioritizing political information control over technical cyber defense also damages China’s own cybersecurity. Lax law enforcement and poor cyber defenses leave the country vulnerable to both cybercriminals and foreign spies. The fragmented and notoriously competitive nature of the Communist Party state further complicates coordination across military, police, and regulatory entities. There is strong evidence that China continues to engage in aggressive

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cyber espionage campaigns against Western interests. Yet it struggles to convert even legitimately obtained foreign data into competitive advantage, let alone make sense of petabytes of stolen data. Absorption is especially challenging at the most sophisticated end of the value chain (e.g., advanced fighter aircraft), which is dominated by the United States . At the same time, the United States conducts its own cyber espionage against China , as the Edward Snowden leaks dramatized, which can indirectly aid U.S. firms (e.g., in government trade negotiations).

China’s uneven industrial development, fragmented cyber defenses, erratic cyber tradecraft, and the market dominance of U.S. technology firms provide considerable advantages to the United States. Despite high levels of Chinese political harassment and espionage, there is little evidence of skill or subtlety in China’s military cyber operations. Although Chinese strategists describe cyberspace as a highly asymmetric and decisive domain of warfare, China’s military cyber capacity does not live up to its doctrinal aspirations. A disruptive attack on physical infrastructure requires careful testing, painstaking planning, and sophisticated intelligence. E ven experienced U.S. cyber operators struggle with these challenges. By contrast, the Chinese military is rigidly hierarchical and has no wartime experience with complex information systems. Further, China’s pursuit of military “informatization” (i.e., emulation of the U.S. network-centric style of operations) increases its dependence on vulnerable networks and exposure to foreign cyberattack . To be sure, China engages in aggressive cyber campaigns , especially against nongovernmental organizations and firms less equipped to defend themselves than government entities. These activities, however, do not constitute major military threats against the United States, and they do nothing to defend China from the considerable intelligence and military advantages of the United States . PROTECTION OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE Outmatched by the West in direct cyber confrontation yet eager to maintain the global connectivity supporting economic growth, China (together with Russia and other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) advocates for internet governance reform. These changes, predicated on so-called internet sovereignty, would replace the current multistakeholder system and its liberal norms of internet openness with a formal international regulator, such as the United Nations’ International Telecommunication Union, and strong norms of noninterference with sovereign networks. Chinese complaints of U.S. internet hegemony are not completely unfounded: the internet reinforces U.S. dominance, but it does so through a light regulatory touch that relies on the self-interest of stakeholders— academic scientists, commercial engineers, government representatives, and civil society organizations. The internet expands in a self-organized fashion because adopters have incentives to pursue increasing returns to interconnection. The profit-driven expansion of networks and markets through more reliable and voluminous transactions and more innovative products (e.g., cloud services, mobile computing, and embedded computing) tends to reinforce the economic competitiveness of the United States and its leading information technology firms. Many Western observers fear that cyber reform based on the principle of internet sovereignty might legitimize authoritarian control and undermine the cosmopolitan promise of the multistakeholder system. China, however, benefits too much from the current system to pose a credible alternative. Tussles around internet governance are more likely to result in minor change at the margins of the existing system, not a major reorganization that shifts technical protocols and operational regulation to the United Nations. Yet this is not a foregone conclusion, as China moves to exclude U.S. firms such as IBM, Oracle, EMC, and Microsoft from its domestic markets and attempts to persuade other states to support governance reforms at odds with U.S. values and interests. CONCLUSION Information technology has generated tremendous wealth and innovation for millions, underwriting the United States’ preponderance as well as China’s meteoric rise.

The costs of cyber espionage and harassment pale beside the mutual benefits of an interdependent, globalized economy. The inevitable frictions of cyberspace are not a harbinger of catastrophe to come, but rather a sign that the states inflicting them lack incentives to cause any real harm. Exaggerated fears of cyberwarfare or an erosion of the United States’ competitive advantage must not be allowed to undermine the institutions and architectures that make the digital commons so productive.

The impact is exaggerated—current contracts proveAustin 2015 - Dr Greg, Professorial Fellow with the EastWest Institute in New York and a Professor at the Australian Centre for Cyber Security at the University of New South Wales, October 7, "Why the China-US Cyber Agreement May Prove Destructive", http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/why-the-china-us-cyber-agreement-may-prove-destructive/

First, the United States overestimates the negative impact of China’s cyber espionage on U.S. competitiveness. Take for example the case of Westinghouse, the giant U.S. corporation named as a victim in the indictments brought against five

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People’s Liberation Army (PLA) personnel in May 2014 for commercial espionage. Westinghouse was almost certainly the victim of cyber

espionage and its trade secrets were undoubtedly handed to a Chinese competitor. But within two months of the

indictment, Westinghouse raised its estimates of likely new contracts in China to US$20 billion. Its competitiveness does not appear to have been impacted negatively in the short to medium term. And Westinghouse was already in a long term technology transfer relationship with China that had seen it hand over some 75,000 technical documents as well as engaging in joint nuclear construction projects in China.

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Alt Cause—Russia Russian hacking is comparatively worseGady 2015 - Franz-Stefan, Senior Fellow with the EastWest Institute and associate editor at The Diplomat, March 3, "Russia Tops China as Principal Threat to US", http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/russia-tops-china-as-principal-cyber-threat-to-us/

“While I can’t go into detail here, the Russian cyber threat is more severe than we had previously assessed,” the director of national intelligence, James Clapper, told the Senate Armed Services Committee during the 2015 presentation of the “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.” The report lists sophisticated cyberattacks as the

principle national security threat facing the United States. “Cyber threats to U.S. national and economic security are increasing in frequency, scale, sophistication, and severity of impact,” the assessment notes. Russia is singled out as one of the most sophisticated nation-state actors in cyberspace. The report notes that Russia’s Ministry of Defense is establishing its own cyber command, responsible for conducting offensive cyber activities (similar to the United States Cyber Command). The report says that Russia’s cyber command will also be responsible, again similar to its U.S. counterpart, for attacking enemy command and control systems

and conducting cyber propaganda operations. Furthermore, “unspecified Russian cyber actors” have developed the capability to target industrial control systems and thereby attack electric power grids, air-traffic control, and oil

and gas distribution networks. However, the report points out that the United States will not have to fear debilitating strategic cyberattacks on a large scale: “Rather than a ‘Cyber Armageddon’ scenario that debilitates the entire U.S. infrastructure, we envision something

different. We foresee an ongoing series of low-to-moderate level cyber attacks from a variety of sources over time, which will impose cumulative costs on U.S. economic competitiveness and national security.” The assessment also provided a hint that we may see an increase in “naming and shaming” campaigns, similar to the cyber espionage charges against five Chinese military officials accused of hacking into U.S. companies back in May 2014. The report argues that “the muted response by most victims to cyber attacks has created a permissive environment in which low-level attacks can be used as a coercive tool short of war, with relatively low risk of retaliation.” In addition, the report notes that identification of perpetrators has become a lot easier in the last few years. Perhaps this is the

reason why the U.S. intelligence community chose to go public at this stage. U.S. intelligence agencies have known for years that Russia is a much more capable adversary in cyberspace than China and that Moscow employs more sophisticated and stealthier

cyberattack methods. “The threat from China is overinflated, (and) the threat from Russia is underestimated ,” Jeffrey Carr, head of the web security firm Taia Global and author of the book Inside Cyber Warfare, emphasized in an interview last year. Carr added: “Russia certainly has been more active than any other country in terms of combining cyber-attacks, or cyber-operations, with physical operations. The Russia-Georgia war of 2008 was a perfect example of a combined kinetic and cyber operation. And nobody else has ever done that – China has never done anything like that.” In another article back in 2014, Carr stated that the United States has neglected to keep track of Russia’s ever growing cyber power. “If you want to properly assess a threat, you need to understand your adversary’s intent, capability and opportunity,” Carr wrote. “The U.S. government has not kept current on Russian technical advancements which means that we cannot estimate capability accurately.”

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AT: Stock Prices Data breaches don’t affect stock prices – won’t hurt the economyKvochko, cyber security and technology strategist, and Pant, Chief Technology Officer and Vice-President of The New York Times, 2015 (Elena and Rajiv, “Why Data Breaches Don’t Hurt Stock Prices,” Harvard Business Review, March 31, Online: https://hbr.org/2015/03/why-data-breaches-dont-hurt-stock-prices, accessed July 16, RS)

Recent high-profile data breaches like those at Target and Home Depot have exposed the private sensitive information of millions of employees and consumers . While consumers are rightfully worried that their personal information may be compromised, shareholders and companies’ management have a wider set of concerns, including loss of intellectual property, operational disruption, decreased customer trust, tarnished brand, and loss of investor commitment. Companies are

spending millions in litigation costs, efforts to restore brand loyalty, and refunds. However, even the most significant recent breaches had very little impact on the company’s stock price. Industry analysts have infer red that shareholders are numb to news of data breaches. A widely accepted notion goes that there are only two types of companies: those that have been breached and those that don’t know they have. It is true that that breaches are expected and have become a regular cost of doing business, but there are deeper reasons for the market’s failure to respond to these incidents. Today, shareholders have neither enough information about security incidents nor sufficient tools to measure their impact. As every company is becoming a digital company, every leader (who is also becoming a digital leader) is realizing that breaches may negatively affect profitability and the company’s long-term ability to do business. The long and mid-term effects of lost intellectual property, disclosure of sensitive data, and loss of customer confidence may result in loss of market share, but these effects are difficult to quantify. Therefore, shareholders only react to breach news when it has direct impact on business operations, such as litigation charges (for example, in the case of Target) or results in immediate changes to a company’s expected profitability. Delays in disclosing information security incidents often contribute to shareholders’ hesitation and uncertainty with regard to how to factor in the effects of the breaches. For instance, current SEC regulation leaves leeway for public companies as to when to disclose cyber incidents: “To the extent a cyber incident is discovered after the balance sheet date but before the issuance of financial statements, registrants

should consider whether disclosure of a recognized or nonrecognized subsequent event is necessary”. Overall, stock prices during and following the high profile security data breaches for the in the past several years have decreased slightly or quickly recovered following the breach. Let’s look in some more detail at a few cases. Home Depot’s hack, compromised 65 million customer credit and debit card accounts. Breach-related costs are estimated to be around $62 million. The company’s stock price decreased slightly one week after the announcement. In the third quarter of 2014, Home Depot showed a 21% increase in earnings per share . During the 2013 holiday season shopping period, Target was the object of then the biggest cyber attack on a retailer . Credit and debit card data of 40 million customers and personal information of about 70 million were said to be affected by the breach. The stock experienced a 10% drop in price in the aftermath of the security breach, but by the end February, Target had experienced the highest percentage stock price regain in five years. Three years after the 2011 hack that compromised payment data of millions of Sony gaming users, Sony had to deal with a massive data breach targeting its pictures industry. The personal data of producers, actors, and current and former employees dating back to 2000 was compromised. Attackers have collected over a Terabyte of data and records of 47,000 employees.

The stock price kept growing following the announcement, decreased slightly three weeks after the breach. By now, it has long surpassed its one-year maximum. Sears announced in October 2014 that one of its companies, Kmart, was the target of a data security breach and that credit/debit cards and personal information were compromised by hackers. The company did not reveal how many cards were affected. In the midst of the announcement, stock prices increased. The Sears stock price steadily rose during the month after the announcement. The company later announced loss in sales, but this has been tied more to a

pattern of low profits in the last few years since the company’s merging with Kmart, than to the October data breach. In the beginning of October, 2014 , the largest U.S. bank in assets, JP Morgan Chase, announced that in August, hackers had accessed its security system and that approximately seven million small businesses and 76 million households had been affected by a data breach. The company unveiled that data that was compromised

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included contact information such as names, addresses, telephone numbers, and email addresses, but account numbers, passwords, dates of birth, and social security numbers were protected. While no unlawful

transactions were made in the aftermath of the data breach, JP Morgan Chase warned its customers of potential phishing attacks. Stock prices for JP Morgan Chase were stable following the announcement and then rose by the beginning of November . While companies’ stock prices were largely not affected , security breaches had other consequences. Target, for example, pledged to spend $100 million upgrading its security. The company lost a total of about $236 million in breach-related costs, $90 million of which were offset by insurance. A judge recently ruled that Target will have to defend itself against accusations of negligence by banks, credit unions and consumers when it came to preventing the 2013 security breach. The stock price declined 0.3% after the judge stated Target would have to face civil suits. Several banks are suing the company claiming that its negligence cost them tens of millions. At Sony the aftermath of the revelation of sensitive employee information included a management shake-up and box office losses. And while customers and shareholders might forgive the first wave of data breaches and might be too apathetic to change brands or loyalty to their stores, they might be less tolerant of future attacks. This mismatch between the stock price and the medium and long-term impact on companies’ profitability should be addressed through better data. Shareholders still don’t have good metrics, tools, and approaches to measure the impact of cyber attacks on businesses and translate that into a dollar value. In most cases, at the time a security breach is disclosed, it is almost impossible for shareholders to assess its full implications. Shareholders should look beyond short-term effects and examine the impact on other factors, such as overall security plans, profitability, cash flow, cost of capital, legal fees associated with the breach, and potential changes in management. . Now that major security breaches have become an inevitability in doing business, companies should put strong data security systems in place, just as they protect against other types of business and operational risks. However, companies whose assets are primarily non-digital have less incentive to invest in prevention if they know their stock price will survive — and that takes a toll on the overall economy and consumer privacy.

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AT: IP Theft Other forms of IP theft aren’t coveredPhilipp 2016 - Joshua, Epoch Times Staff, January 20, "CHINA SECURITY: What Can Be Done to Stop Chinese Economic Theft?", http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/1944921-china-security-what-can-be-done-to-stop-chinese-economic-theft/

The other key problem is also one I’ve mentioned before. Economic theft is not just a cyber problem, and the Chinese regime—in particular—still uses a large number of conventional spies to carry out its work. This was also highlighted in the “60 Minutes” segment, with American Superconductor. McGahn noted in the segment that when he started doing business with China, he made sure his systems were locked tight. They used strong encryption and had a solid system for cybersecurity. Then, in 2011, they tested their

software on Sinovel’s turbines. The system had been programmed to shut down after the test, but the blades kept spinning. The Chinese company had successfully broken his encryption. It turned out the breach took place through one of their employees—an Austrian named Dejan Karabasevic, who would later spend a year in jail for his crime. McGahn said the Chinese regime “offered him women. They offered him an apartment. They offered him money. They offered him a new life.” And all it took for McGahn’s company to lose its key product to China, was for Karabasevic to say “yes .” The

problem of economic theft seems complicated on the surface, but when you boil it down, it’s pretty simple: the Chinese regime and its state-run companies will use any means they have to steal U.S. intellectual property , and gradually push U.S.

companies out of the global market. To solve the problem, the United States needs to broaden its view of economic theft past cybersecurity. And it needs to find a solution that turns what is currently a highly profitable, and generally safe, operation into something that isn’t worth the risk.

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AT: Grid Attacks Cyber attacks on the military and grid won’t lead to any major impactsPalmer, writer for Slate and Earthwire, 2012 (Brian, “How Dangerous is a Cyberattack?,” Slate, April 27, Online: http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2012/04/how_dangerous_is_a_cyberattack_.html, accessed July 17, RS)

The House of Representatives passed the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, or CISPA, on Thursday. Rep. C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger,

D-Md., said the bill would help protect the country from a “catastrophic cyberattack.” What’s the worst-case scenario for a cyberattack? Nuclear winter, but don’t count on that happening . In a 2009 paper for the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, cybersecurity analyst Jason Fritz described how computer hackers could trigger a nuclear war. Hackers would infiltrate the detection systems of a nuclear state, he wrote, and fool its military into believing a nuclear strike was already underway. Officials would have 15 minutes, at most, to decide whether the alarm was genuine and how to respond. The hackers could create confusion during that brief period by shutting down communications systems with a denial-of-service attack—an event that would mimic the electrical disruptions that might occur if a nuclear weapon were to detonate in the atmosphere above the country. Ultimately, the panicked

leaders might order a counterstrike, leading to an all-out nuclear war. Most cybersecurity experts regard this scenario as exceedingly far-fetched, though. There are too many encryption points, and too much human involvement, in nuclear launch systems for this to happen . A hacker, or team of hackers, would have a better chance of infiltrating the military’s non-nuclear computer systems , but even that isn’t likely to produce any catastrophic results. Chinese hackers reportedly gained access to the nonclassified data on the defense secretary’s

computer in 2007, but machines containing classified information are far more difficult to contact. Slightly more worrying was the infiltration of the control systems for the Joint Strike Fighter plane , made public in 2009, although the most highly classified and critical elements of the aircraft’s computer systems were insulated from the attack, according to military sources. Analysts say that any infiltration of the plane’s systems could, at worst, merely degrade its radar or targeting capabilities, reducing the number of enemies it could successfully engage at one time . The nation’s power grid would be a more viable target. In 2007, programmers hired by the Department of Homeland Security demonstrated how easy it was to overcome the grid’s antiquated software security systems and remotely take control of a generator. Once hackers had a line in, they might cause turbines to spin out of control until the generator had been reduced to a smoking, shaking, and, ultimately, broken-down pile of metal. The simulated attack very closely resembled the one used to damage

centrifuges at Iran’s Natanz nuclear complex: The Stuxnet virus commanded those machines to spin beyond their tolerances. The nightmare scenario of a cyberattack on the grid would be the destruction of so many generators that the entire country would lose power for months . That probably wouldn’t happen, though, because officials would shut the system down as soon as the first couple of generators went haywire. The result would likely be a two- or three-day regional blackout, akin to the 2003 loss of power in the Northeast or the successful 2005 cyberattack on the Brazilian power grid. Whether you consider that catastrophic depends on your interpretation of the word.

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Impact Defense

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AT: Econ Econ decline does not lead to war Drezner 12 (Professor of International Politics, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” International Institutions and Global Governance Program, October 2012, http://www.cfr.org/international-

organizations-and-alliances/irony-global-economic-governance-system-worked/p29101)

The final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on crossborder conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power .19 Whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border

disputes in the South China Sea, and eventhe disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder.The aggregate data suggests otherwise, however. A fundamental conclusion from a recent report by the Institute for Economics and Peace is that “the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.”20 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis—as have military

expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict ; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.21 None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to precrisis levels—primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard V-shaped recovery was unreasonable. One financial analyst characterizes

the current global economy as in a state of “contained depression.”22 The operative word is contained, however. Given the severity, reach, and depth of the 2008 financial crisis, the proper comparison is with the Great Depression. And by that standard, the outcome variables look impressive .

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AT: Heg Heg doesn’t solve warFettweis 10 Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College. (Christopher J. Fettweis, “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” Survival, Volume 52, Issue 2 April 2010 , pages 59 – 82//informaworld)

One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilising power of the US hegemon , and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defence spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defence in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defence hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible 'peace dividend' endangered both national and global security. 'No serious analyst of American military capabilities', argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, 'doubts that the defense budget

has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace'.30 And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces . No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilis-ing presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the

reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the

George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.

No impact to the transition – international order accommodates rising powersIkenberry 08 professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University (John, The Rise of China and the Future of the West Can the Liberal System Survive?, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb)

Some observers believe that the American era is coming to an end , as the Western-oriented world order is replaced by one increasingly dominated by the East. The historian Niall Ferguson has written that the bloody twentieth century witnessed "the descent of the West" and "a reorientation of the world" toward the East. Realists go on to note that as China gets more powerful and the United States' position erodes, two things are likely to happen: China will try to use its growing influence to reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to better serve its interests, and other states in the system -- especially the declining hegemon -- will start to see China as a

growing security threat. The result of these developments, they predict, will be tension, distrust, and conflict, the typical features of a power transition. In this view , the drama of China's rise will feature an increasingly powerful China

and a declining United States locked in an epic battle over the rules and leadership of the international system. And as the world's largest country emerges not from within but outside the established post-World War II international order, it is a

drama that will end with the grand ascendance of China and the onset of an Asian-centered world order. That course,

however, is not inevitable. The rise of China does not have to trigger a wrenching hegemonic transition. The U.S.-Chinese

power transition can be very different from those of the past because China faces an international order that is fundamentally different from those that past rising states confronted. China does not just face the

United States; it faces a Western-centered system that is open, integrated, and rule-based, with wide and deep political foundations. The nuclear revolution, meanwhile, has made war among great powers unlikely --

eliminating the major tool that rising powers have used to overturn international systems defended by declining hegemonic states. Today's Western order, in short, is hard to overturn and easy to join. This unusually

durable and expansive order is itself the product of farsighted U.S. leadership. After World War II, the United States did not simply

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establish itself as the leading world power. It led in the creation of universal institutions that not only invited global membership but also brought democracies and market societies closer together. It built an order that facilitated the participation and integration of both established great powers and newly independent states. (It is often forgotten that this postwar order was designed in large part to reintegrate the defeated Axis states and the beleaguered Allied states into a unified international system.) Today, China can gain full access to and thrive within this system. And if it does, China will rise, but the Western order -- if managed properly -- will live on.

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AT: Grid Grid segmented- no impactLeger 7-31-12 [Donna Leinwand Leger, USA Today, “Energy experts say blackout like India's is unlikely in U.S.,” http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-07-31/usa-india-power-outage/56622978/1]

A massive, countrywide power failure like the one in India on Tuesday is "extremely unlikely" in the United States, energy experts say. In India, three of the country's government-operated power grids failed Tuesday, leaving 620 million people without electricity for several hours. The outage, the second in two days in the country of 1.21 billion

people, is the world's biggest blackout on record. The U.S. electricity system is segmented into three parts with safeguards that prevent an outage in one system from tripping a blackout in another system , "making blackouts across the country extremely unlikely ," Energy Department spokeswoman Keri Fulton said. Early reports from government officials in India say excessive demand knocked the country's power generators offline. Experts say India's industry and economy are growing faster than its electrical systems. Last year, the economy grew 7.8% and pushed

energy needs higher, but electricity generation did not keep pace, government records show. "We are much, much less at risk for something like that happening here, especially from the perspective of demand exceeding supply," said Gregory Reed, a professor of electric power engineering at University of Pittsburgh. "We're much more sophisticated in our operations. Most of our issues have been from natural disasters." The U.S. generates more than enough electricity to meet demand and always have power in reserve , Reed said. "Fundamentally, it's a different world here," said Arshad Mansoor, senior vice president of the Electric Power Research Institute in Washington and an expert on power grids. "It's an order of magnitude more reliable here than in a developing country." Grid operators across the country analyze power usage and generation, factoring outside factors such as weather, in real time and can forecast power supply and demand hour by hour, Mansoor said. "In any large, complex interactive network, the chance of that interconnection breaking up is always there," Mansoor said. "You cannot take your eye off the ball for a minute." Widespread

outages in the U.S. caused by weather are common. But the U.S. has also had system failures, said Ellen Vancko,

senior energy adviser for the Union of Concerned Scientists, based in Washington. On Aug. 14, 2003, more than 50 million people in the Northeast and Canada lost power after a major U.S. grid collapsed. The problem began in Ohio when a transmission wire overheated and sagged into a tree that had grown too close to the line,

Vancko said. That caused other power lines to overheat until so many lines failed that the system shut itself down, she said. "That was less a failure of technology and more a failure of people, a failure of people to follow the rules," Vancko said. "There were a whole bunch of lessons learned." In 2005, in response to an investigation of the blackout, Congress passed a law establishing the North American Electric

Reliability Corporation (NERC) to enforce reliability standards for bulk electricity generation.

No cyberattack on the grid Paul Clark 12, MA Candidate, Intelligence/Terrorism Studies, American Military University; Senior Analyst, Chenega Federal Systems, 4/28/12, “The Risk of Disruption or Destruction of Critical U.S. Infrastructure by an Offensive Cyber Attack,” http://blog.havagan.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/The-Risk-of-Disruption-or-Destruction-of-Critical-U.S.-Infrastructure-by-an-Offensive-Cyber-Attack.pdf

An attack against the electrical grid is a reasonable threat scenario since power systems are "a high priority target for military and insurgents" and there has been a trend towards utilizing commercial software and integrating utilities into the public Internet that has "increased

vulnerability across the board" (Lewis 2010). Yet the increased vulnerabilities are mitigated by an increased detection and deterrent capability that has been "honed over many years of practical application" now that power systems are using

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standard, rather than proprietary and specialized, applications and components (Leita and Dacier 2012). The security of the

electrical grid is also enhanced by increased awareness after a smart-grid hacking demonstration in 2009 and

the identification of the Stuxnet malware in 2010: as a result the public and private sector are working together in an " unprecedented effort" to establish robust security guidelines and cyber security measures (Gohn and Wheelock 2010).

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Relations Advantage

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Internals

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Relations Up Status Quo Solves- US Sino Relations already strong and improving. Trevor Clark 1-21-15 http://insight.amcham-shanghai.org/u-s-china-relationship-strong-improving-u-s-official-says/ U.S.-China Relationship Strong and Improving, U.S. Official Says Responsible for supporting AmCham Shanghai's GR programs and activities and providing policy support on key business and regulatory issues such as research, policy analysis and strategic engagements with key government agencies

The U.S.-China relationship is strong and improving, U.S. Economic Minister Counselor Jonathan Fritz told a roundtable of American businesses at AmCham Shanghai on January 20, 2015. Mr. Fritz, spent the morning at AmCham Shanghai discussing the current U.S.-China bilateral economic relationship, the focus of the U.S. government’s China team in 2015, and upcoming hot topics and major economic issues with AmCham Shanghai member companies. Members also provided their views on the state of the bilateral

economic relationship and updated him on their investment outlook. Several new agreements between the U.S. and China headlined the relationship in 2014. The U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change and Clean Energy Cooperation and new visa agreement that extends short- term business/tourist visas from 1 to 10 years and student visas from 1 year to 5 years, led the way, Mr. Fritz said. These types of agreements demonstrated the deepening ties between the two countries and, he hopes, will be beneficial to American businesses. The Bilateral Investment Treaty featured heavily in the discussion. Mr. Fritz noted that the U.S. side is currently awaiting China’s first draft of its “negative list”, which will help set the tone for negotiations on the treaty in 2015. U.S. negotiators expect to see it in early 2015, he added. The BIT will continue to be a focus of AmCham Shanghai’s Government Relations work, and remains one of AmCham’s top priorities when meeting with Chinese and American government officials. Mr. Fritz noted that 2014 saw several high-level visits from the U.S. to China, most notably the visit by President Obama in November 2014 for the APEC Summit in Beijing and separate bilateral meetings with President Xi Jinping. Secretary of State John Kerry, U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman and other senior U.S. officials accompanied the President during his November visit. The Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), hosted in Chicago, IL in December 2014,

wrapped up the year and continued the very successful and ongoing dialogues between the U.S. and China. He expected another busy year of high-level meetings in 2015 and reported that Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker and Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz will visit China in April and stop by Shanghai on that trip.

US-China relationship- especially the trade relationship- is already very strong and stable.Wu Jianmin 9-26-14 https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/china-us-relationship-basically-good ‘The China-U.S. Relationship is Basically Good’ Executive Vice Chairman of China Institute for Innovation and Development Strategy President of China Foreign Affairs University, Executive Vice President of the China National Association for International Studies, Vice Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and Spokesman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. He served as China’s Ambassador

A few days ago, I was in Washington, D.C. for a conference. While there, I met some American friends. We had an interesting discussion about what seems to me to be a debate going on in the U.S. about China-U.S. relations: One side believes the China-U.S. relationship is going through a rocky patch and is at a “low point,” with many tough issues surfacing. The other side maintains

that the overall China-U.S. relationship is good, notwithstanding the present difficulties. I share the second viewpoint for the following reasons: First,

the foundation of the China-U.S. relationship remains strong. Let me quote President Xi Jinping’s speech at the opening of the sixth round

of the China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue on July 9: In the past 35 years since the establishment of diplomatic ties, relations between China and the U.S. on the whole have moved forward and made historic progress although there have been ups and downs. There are now over

90 mechanisms for dialogue, and last year the bilateral trade volume exceeded $520 billion, bilateral investment accounted for over $100 billion. There are over 41 pairs of friendly provinces or states from both sides, and 202 sister cities. People-to-people exchanges exceeded 4 million every year. China-U.S. cooperation not only benefits our two peoples, but also promotes peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and the world as a whole. In both China and the U.S. there are people complaining about the lack of strategic trust between the two countries. They mention quite a few facts to illustrate their worries. No

one can deny these facts, but a coin has two sides. A comprehensive vision of the China-U.S. relationship is very much needed. I went to the United States for the first time in 1971 to

attend the United Nations General Assembly Session. At that time, trade between China and the U.S. was a mere 5 million U.S. dollars. Last year, it amounted to 520 billion U.S. dollars. In the 1970s, ’80s and even ’90s, such a rapid growth in bilateral trade was beyond anybody’s imagination. If there had been no mutual strategic trust, how could this growth have been achieved? It would simply have been inconceivable. I strongly believe that the mutual strategic trust can be achieved and strengthened through practical projects of cooperation. The two sides countries ought to make a greater effort to increase cooperation in all fields. Second,

President Xi Jinping and President Obama have reached an important consensus on the new model of major country relationship. The two leaders held an informal summit in Sunnylands, California, in June, 2013. They agreed to build a new model of major country relationship. They were determined not to let the bilateral relationship slip into a Thucydides’ trap. The summit had historic significance; never in history had an established power and a rising power made such an agreement. The two leaders meant

what they said and chose to steer the China-U.S. relationship towards a new model of major country relationship, for the benefit of the two countries and the rest of the world. Third, we have a series of mechanisms through which we can talk to each other and manage our differences . I don’t

deny the existence of many problems in our bilateral relationship. But the China-U.S. relationship is one of the most important bilateral

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http://insight.amcham-shanghai.org/u-s-china-relationship-strong-improving-u-s-official-says/


relationships in the world and no bilateral relationship is problem-free. There are problems when the relationship moves backward. There are problems when the relationship stands still. There are also problems when the relationship moves forward. I think that most problems appear along with advances in the China-U.S. relationship. China and the United States are two quite different countries. We have different histories, traditions, and cultures. We have different political and social systems. It is quite natural that we may have problems. What matters is that we have a series of mechanisms to cope with those problems. President Xi Jinping and President Obama meet frequently. They call each other by telephone

from time to time and they exchange letters. At the ministerial level, our two sides meet regularly. In addition to track I exchanges, our “Track II” interactions are active and dynamic on issues of mutual concern. U.S. National Security Advisor Susan Rice came to China not long ago to prepare for the forthcoming visit of President Obama to China and his participation in the APEC Summit. She met President Xi Jinping, State Councilor Yang Jiechi and Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Her talks with Yang Jiechi lasted more than eight hours. Both sides are

quite happy with that visit, because it has enabled the two sides to enhance mutual understanding, coordinate policies on global issues, and pave the way for the success of President Obama’s forthcoming visit to China. A few weeks ago, I gave an interview to an Asahi Correspondent based in Beijing about the China-U.S. relationship. He focused on the problems. I said there was no denying that there were problems and even that one shouldn’t underestimate them. However, what determine the quality of a bilateral relationship are common interests. The common interests of China and the U.S. far outweigh the differences. In trying to manage our differences properly, through various mechanisms, summit meetings, strategic and economic dialogues, etc., the two sides are learning how best to deal with their differences, and consequently, our bilateral relationship is growing mature. The U.S. is the only superpower in the world today. China is the largest developing country and the second-largest economy. A good, stable, and robust China-U.S. relationship is not only good news for the two countries, but also for the rest of the world.

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Alt Causes—Taiwan Cybersecurity issue not key to US- Sino Relations – other vital factors like Taiwan and the economy. These factors also key for solving for cooperationZhu Shida, 02, The author is a researcher with the Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences http://www.china.org.cn/english/2002/Mar/29138.html , China and the US: A Unique Relationship

The relationship between China, one of the oldest civilizations with the biggest population, and the United States, one of the youngest civilizations with the strongest economy, is significant not only for the two peoples but also for the future of the whole world. The factors influencing the Sino-US relationship include economic, strategic, diplomatic and cultural elements.

Undoubtedly, among them the economic factor is the most important one. Economic interests are at the heart of China-US relations. In 2001, trade volume between the two nations hit US$80,400 million, 8.1 percent higher than the previous year. Tempted by the colossal Chinese market,

the US has become China’s biggest investor with an investment of US$4,858 million in 2001 and an accumulated investment of US$35,548 million. Since many American companies who have invested in China are multinational corporations, any fluctuations in Sino-US economic relations may affect the global trading and financial system, and may in turn exert influences on the two countries’ political and diplomatic decisions. Strategically, China and the US have common interests. The White House needs China’s assistance and influence to handle North Korea and non-proliferation issues. America also needs China’s cooperation in fighting terrorism.

On the Taiwan question that remains the most sensitive issue, China asks the United States to abide by the three joint communiqués and

pursue the one-China policy. Diplomatically, the imbalance of the mutual foreign policies is one of the reasons for misunderstandings and difficulties between the two nations. On the US side, by redefining China as its rival rather than strategic partner,

the Bush Administration indicates that China is not at the key position in its Asian and Pacific policies. However, in China’s foreign policies, the United States is important both economically and strategically, especially when dealing with the Taiwan issue. The ideological discrepancy explains why the United States has always taken China as its enemy rather than a partner or friend. Thus, learning the origins of American culture and spirit is necessary for China in dealing with political and diplomatic relations with the United States. Domestic politics has played an important role in shaping the China-US relationship. In the United States, a sharp increase in the population of minorities resulted in the popularity of multiculturalism over the past decade, a movement that aims to achieve for minorities -- including African, Latin and Asian Americans -- the same status white Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASP) have enjoyed in political, social and cultural life. Multiculturalism has strengthened the political power of minorities and intensified the conflicts between whites and minorities. Consequently, conservatives hope to strengthen the influence of the mainstream, i.e. WASP values and attitudes in response to the growth of multiculturalism. Recently, Asian, especially Chinese Americans have become a newly emergent force in computer, educational, scientific and technological fields in the United States. The rise of Chinese Americans may arouse antipathy and jealousy of racists, conservatives and other minorities, which has been seen in the Wen Ho Lee “Spy” Case. In addition, after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, the White House reexamined its opening-up, adopted tougher immigration policies, and said it would restrict the granting of immigrant visas. This tendency of conservatism may play a negative role in the Sino-US cultural exchanges. On the contrary, in China, intellectuals as well as young people hold a good opinion of the United States. A survey indicates that 87 percent of Chinese youngsters regard US as a rich and powerful country, and 74.3 percent are impressed by the colorful cultural and entertainment life in America. According to a poll made in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou in September, 1997, some 58 percent of those polled nursed quite a favorable impression of the US in general; 27.1 percent thought that by then US was China’s international friend; while only 13 percent described China-US ties as hostile. In a survey conducted in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Wuhan and Harbin on first impressions of the United States, 40.4 percent of the interviewees brought up the wealth of the US and its standing as a superpower, 7.5 percent reflected on such social problems in the United States as drug addiction, unemployment and homelessness, 5 percent mentioned Motorola, Coca Cola, IBM, the Silicon Valley and other high-tech and branded products. Of all countries referred to in the interview, people were most impressed by the United States and listed it as the richest and most powerful country in the world. In addition, the US has been the first preference among Chinese people as a place to visit, travel to and send their children to study in. However, after China-US IPR (intellectual property rights), MFN (Most Favored Nations status) and WTO (World Trade Organization) negotiations, especially after the missile attack on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the Air-Collision Incident last year, an anti-America feeling is growing among Chinese young people who are rather westernized both in their wearing and thinking. This is a signal to the American policy-makers: When dealing with US-China relations, they need to fully consider traditional Chinese culture and national feelings since Chinese people who are cultivated by their distinctively face-saving culture value mutual respect greatly. To handle the Sino-US relationship appropriately, both sides should realize the necessity to further understanding and respect for each other’s cultures, which, unfortunately, often has been neglected. The origins of American culture lie in a combination of Puritanism, liberalism, individualism and republicanism. Reflected in politics, American culture takes the form of hegemonism with a strong religious flavor and labeled by its self-defined freedom, democracy and human rights standard. The cultural reason for American people’s conceit and authoritativeness lies in the so-called “America exception” derived from the American political culture. Beginning with the original immigrating Puritans, Americans have regarded themselves as the chosen people, superior to any other peoples in the world. Meanwhile, in free and open America, there is no room for the strict consensus system characteristic of traditional societies. Therefore, without a unified attitude and consistent account in all fields of its political culture, discordant voices can be heard from time to time in American society, which is unimaginable and almost impossible in China. The essence of Chinese culture is family affection and attachment. Any individual behavior damaging national dignity and group honor is not encouraged in Chinese society that thinks highly of collective benefits and reputation, which is beyond the understanding of American people. In addition to the cultural differences between the two nations, we also need to realize the inherent discrepancies in American culture that influence American politics and foreign policies frequently. On the one hand, in terms of Puritanism, one of the origins of the American culture, since the earliest Puritans came to the New World due to the religious persecutions they suffered in England, the freedom and right for individuals to pursue welfare have occupied a special position in Puritanism. Naturally, Puritans harbor religious fervor for human rights. On the other, the protracted existence of racial discrimination and segregation did not change until after the Civil Rights movement during the 1950s and 1960s. Even today, the deep-rooted barrier between whites and minorities is still hard to be removed completely in the United States. The cultural contradictions are the source of America’s double standards on the human rights issue. The aggressive American culture with a short history of a little more than 200 years is built on the basis of individualism and liberalism, while the introversive Chinese culture with a 5000 years’ tradition lays stress on collectivism and cultural consensus at the expense of individual voices. Obviously, the essences of these two cultures are contradictory. This cultural contradiction is the main reason for the constant Sino-US clashes. Nevertheless, mutual complementarities in economy magnetize the two nations, forcing them to compromise for their cultural discrepancies. To maintain close ties between China and the United States, the establishment of culturally complementary, mutually trusting and crisis handling systems is necessary. The differences between Chinese and American cultures as well as the inherent contradictions of American culture need to be fully considered. Mutual opening based on mutual trusting is also important to bilateral

relations. Meanwhile, cooperation on economic, strategic and anti-terrorist issues cannot change the essential political and cultural discrepancies, which makes it inevitable for the constant appearance of crises

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between the two nations. By and large, China and the United States need to face their cultural differences and establish mutually trusting relations based on deepened understandings and reasonable analyses and judgment on cases. Only in this way, any possible crises in the future can be reduced to the degree benefiting both sides.

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Alt Causes—Pivot Alt cause - US “Pivot” policy hampers US-Sino tiesZhu ’15 Zhiqun Zhu is Director of the China Institute and an Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Bucknell University. He is the author and editor of 7 books including China's New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies and Significance (Ashgate, 2013); and U.S.-China Relations in the 21st Century: Power Transition and Peace (Routledge, 2006). He was a visiting senior research fellow at East Asian Institute of National University of Singapore, and a POSCO fellow at the East-West Center in Hawaii, hi the early 1990s, he was Chief Assistant to the Public Affairs Officer at the U.S. Consulate General in Shanghai. From the article: “Dispel Distrust: Start from North Korea” ” – International Affairs Review - Volume XXIII, Number 3 • Summer 2015 – available at: http://iar-gwu.org/sites/default/files/articlepdfs/China%20Special%20Issue%20DOC%20C%20-%2006%20Dispel%20Distrust%20-%20Zhu.pdf

While U.S. allies and most countries in Asia support the U nited S tates' "rebalance" or "pivot" to Asia in the

context of China's rapid resurgence, China remains suspicious of U.S. intentions. The key components of this pivot include strengthening U.S. ties with Asian allies, deepening the United States' working relationships with emerging powers, engaging with

regional multilateral institutions, expanding trade and investment, forging a broad-based military presence, and advancing democracy and human rights . Though Obama administration officials have reiterated that the United States does not and will not contain

China, many believe that the pivot strategy was at least partially designed to counter China's growing power.2 Chinese leaders feel deeply uncomfortable that the U nited S tates has strengthened ties with most of China's neighbors , especially those that have territorial disputes with China; that the U nited S tates has begun shifting more naval and air forces to Asia even though it already has forward troops in Japan and South Korea; and that the United States has claimed that the U.S.-Japan mutual defense treaty covers the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands without maintaining a position regarding sovereignty over the islands. Chinese leaders also fear that these U.S. policies are emboldening and encouraging the adventurist behaviors of some politicians in Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam as evidenced by these politicians' confrontational approaches towards China. The Chinese leadership wonders what Washington has done to

improve U.S.-China relations while consolidating the United States' presence in the Asia-Pacific region. These concerns may not sound interesting or sensible in Washington, but they are real and serious for many Chinese analysts and

policymakers. The bottom line is the distrust between the U nited S tates and China has not declined as a result of the pivot.

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Trade War Alt Cause U.S.-China Tensions over trade high now-- unemployment Talley and Magnier 6/16 (Ian Talley and Mark Magnier, The Wall Street Journal, “U.S.-China Trade Troubles Grow: Domestic politics exacerbate tensions between world’s two largest economies.” June 2, 2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-china-trade-troubles-grow-1464887897.) KLB

The U.S. and China, facing mounting political pressures at home, are seeing economic tensions flare to their worst point in years over currency and trade practices.

China has pushed the yuan to a five-year low against the dollar, reviving charges from American firms of currency manipulation to gain a competitive advantage for Chinese goods. The Obama administration has fired off a series of trade complaints and levied duties on several Chinese industries, from chicken feet to cold-rolled steel used in appliances and auto parts.

The friction between the world’s two largest economies could worsen as domestic politics collide with already weak growth.

The U.S., seeing heightened anti-China rhetoric in the presidential election, wants China to press ahead with promised policies to open up its markets and allow greater international investment.

Chinese leaders, worried about a deeper economic slowdown, are trying to keep factories humming and prevent the kind of market unrest that gripped global investors over the past year.

U.S. Treasury and State Department officials fly to Beijing early next week for two days of talks to try to calm some of the trade irritants and address ongoing geopolitical tensions, particularly over the South China Sea, where their militaries are operating in sometimes dangerous proximity.

The U.S., which moved on Wednesday to cut off North Korea from the banking system , wants Beijing to help rein in its increasingly belligerent ally .

U.S. officials also will seek reassurance from Chinese officials about moving ahead with promised reforms, such as restructuring state-owned enterprises and reducing industrial overcapacity, and try to advance talks on an investment treaty.

“Implementing this reform agenda—and resisting the urge to hang on to an outdated growth model—offers the best formula for China to achieve an orderly transition and put its economy on a more sustainable footing,” said Nathan Sheets, U.S. Treasury’s undersecretary for international affairs.

China’s Vice Finance Minister Zhu Guangyao, while acknowledging at a media briefing Thursday major challenges for China’s economy, insisted Beijing would adhere to its reform agenda and commitments made by the Group of 20 against competitive currency devaluation.

Some analysts think President Xi Jinping, wanting to consolidate power in the Communist Party ahead of a leadership transition next year, has paused reform efforts and instead is revving up the old playbook of credit-fueled growth and infrastructure spending. His aim: Ensure economic stability and mollify rivals, they say.

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http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-china-trade-troubles-grow-1464887897

http://www.wsj.com/articles/north-korea-hardens-nuclear-stance-at-party-congress-1462873768

http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-moves-to-cut-off-north-korea-from-banking-system-1464797927


An attempt last year by Beijing to allow markets to play a role in setting its exchange rate was mismanaged, adding to a summertime of woe for China’s financial markets and sparking global jitters. The reaction surprised Chinese officials and created a headache for reformers.

The Chinese government is keeping steel mills, coal plants and a host of manufacturing industries afloat despite dwindling demand and a tumble in commodity prices that should have closed many.

The U.S. recently slapped Chinese cold-rolled steel imports with duties worth 267%, accusing the country of selling products below production cost.

By supporting excess production capacity, the Chinese government is “engaged in economic warfare against the U.S.,” said John Ferriola,chief executive of North Carolina steel giant Nucor Corp. “Thousands of hardworking Americans have lost their jobs because of these illegal, unfair trade practices.”

The Chinese economy has decelerated after decades of double-digit expansion. Growth is clocking in at 6.7%, its slowest pace since the global financial crisis amid rising debt, growing labor unrest and factory output well above demand.

China acknowledges it has an excess-capacity problem. “But we have to prevent massive unemployment,” Premier Li Keqiang said in March.

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Impacts

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Relations Resilient—Interdependence Relations are resilient—interdependence Kung Pao -08 (Ta Kung Pao, September 9, 2008, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, Chinese scholar “confident” in stable Sino-US ties under new administration, Lexis)

Since the end of the Cold War, China has dealt with not only a liberal [US] president of the Democratic Party, but also a moderate president and

a conservative president of the Republican Party separately. The ever-growing common interests between China and the United States are driving the bilateral relations forward as a whole. Therefore, we are confident in the prospect of maintaining stability in the Sino-US relations following the change of US presidency. The national conventions of both the Democrats and the Republicans in the United States have ended. Obama-Biden and McCain-Palin have been officially nominated by the two parties as presidential and vice-presidential candidates and the party platforms of both parties have also been officially published, marking the end of the intraparty rivalries and the beginning of a new phase in the presidential election, i.e. the phase of intense interparty contentions. What concerns us - scholars and the general public in China- the most is, naturally, the China policies of the two parties' candidates. Treatment of the China policy in both party's platforms is very brief, but based on the two candidates' speeches and articles, remarks made by members of their teams, and the two parties' disparate political views in the past, we can still make a preliminary comparison. The new president's policy cannot afford to stray from the current status quo of Sino-US relations. Following the pendular movements in the Sino-US relations through the 1990s, they have remained stable for over seven years since July 2001. It has been the longest period of steady

development since the two countries established diplomatic relations. This is no accident. Today, the ties between the two countries have gone far beyond the ambit of bilateral relations, as the relative importance of regional and global security and economic issues on the agenda is steadily growing. As globalization progresses,

interdependence between the two countries on the strategic and economic fronts is constantly deepening and this trend is set to continue. Given these circumstances, there will be considerable continuity between the post-election China policy of the incoming president and the current policy and the fluctuations and pendular movements of the past are unlikely to resurface. Judging by the current platforms of the two parties, the remarks made by the candidates, and what their teams have said, they have more in common than they have in conflict.

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Relations Can’t Solve—General US-Sino coop can’t solve the world’s problems Carafano 14 [James Jay Carafano is Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy at the Heritage Foundation, “Why a U.S.-China "G-2" Won't Work”, The National Interest, 1/6/14, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/why-us-chinese-g-2-wont-work-9653]

Back in 2009, it seemed that all the White House had to do to demonstrate wisdom was to declare that the solution—whatever the problem—was "Anything But Bush " (ABB). Those were heady days for the Obama administration.

How to deal with China? The ABB solution was the G-2, or Group of Two. It was quite the hot idea—before it flamed out. The logic behind the G-2 was pretty simple. The U.S. and China, as two great powers, should sit down and settle the world's problems between them. The idea had some high-powered fans. Zbigniew Brzezinski loved it. In January 2009, marking the 30th anniversary of diplomatic ties between Washington and Beijing, he called pursuit of the G-2, "a mission worthy of the two countries with the most extraordinary potential for shaping our collective future." Newly-minted Secretary of State Hillary Clinton got caught up in the "happy" fever, declaring, "The opportunities for us [the U.S. and China] to work together are unmatched anywhere in the world." Soon,

the G-2 was being promoted as the "easy button" for handling almost every intractable challenge, from climate change to the global financial crisis to Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. The idea quickly died a natural death. And no wonder: there was a huge divide between the notion that the U.S. and China could agree on how to solve the world's problems (and the related idea that they could then convince the rest of the world to go along) and reality. And reality wouldn't budge . In an article for Foreign Affairs, Elizabeth

Economy and Adam Segal warned that the G-2 was an idea whose time had not come. "It will raise expectations for a level of partnership that cannot be met," they wrote, "and exacerbate the very real differences that still exist between Washington and

Beijing." Their article went on provide a long list of reasons for why the idea was impractical. They were right. Nobody in Washington talks seriously about the idea anymore. Yet the ghost of the G-2 still wanders around Asia-focused think tanks and academic fora, as well as Asian foreign ministries—and it’s no "friendly" ghost. The new iteration of the G-2 is not only more simplistic than the one embraced by Brezinski and Clinton; it’s malevolent as well. The new G-2 holds that the U.S. and China can solve the world's problems simply by divvying up the world—with China getting Asia. From Delhi to Canberra to Seoul, that’s a scary notion that spooks a lot of people. The nightmare is fueled by popular writings like those of Hugh White. An Australian professor of strategic studies, White argues that China is rising and the U.S. isn't; so everybody should just get used to Beijing having more influence in Asia. But China getting its own piece of the rock isn’t likely to happen. China is a mercantilist power in a globalized world. That inconsistency creates friction that can’t be greased over—not even if White is right and Beijing increases its power dramatically in its half of the world. That also means the G-2 remains a non-starter for the U.S. Carving up the planet today as the Soviets and the West split the spoils of World War II is inconceivable. Back in the day, Washington didn't much care that Moscow walled itself off from the West. The Western world didn't do much business with the Russians. All the productive economies emerged on our side of the Iron Curtain. But, that was then. Today, Asia is peopled with growing economies and vibrant democracies. America isn't going anywhere—least of all back to the other side of the Hawaiian Islands. So if the idea of G-2 makes no sense even on the surface, why do people in Asia still fret about it, even after Obama promised to "pivot" to Asia? Partially, it’s because—from the East China Sea to the Indian Ocean—many people still have trouble making sense of what the administration means by “rebalancing.” Indeed, now that the Oval Office is a few years into its rebalancing project, folks in Asia are starting to wonder if there is much “there” there.

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No Warming Impact Warming not real- recent temperatures show no increaseHapper ‘12 (William is a professor of physics at Princeton. “Global Warming Models Are Wrong Again”, Wall Street Journal, 3/27/12, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304636404577291352882984274.html)

What is happening to global temperatures in reality? The answer is: almost nothing for more than 10 years . Monthly values of the global temperature anomaly of the lower atmosphere, compiled at the University of Alabama from NASA satellite data, can be found at the website http://www.drroyspencer.com/latest-global-temperatures/. The latest (February 2012)

monthly global temperature anomaly for the lower atmosphere was minus 0.12 degrees Celsius, slightly less than the average since the satellite record of temperatures began in 1979

Climate impact exaggerated ---mitigation and adaptation will solve Mendelsohn ‘9 (Robert O. Mendelsohn, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf)

These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention,

society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences . The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of

Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net

economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential ” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long ‐ range climate risks . What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.

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No Trade War Impact China is economically interdependent with the US and will not risk trade conflict.Economy and Segal 03 [Elizabeth and Adam, director of Asia studies and senior fellow for China studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, The Baltimore Sun 12/11/03]

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao told a grateful President Bush that China would take steps to redress the growing trade deficit, now threatening to top $120 billion. But the question remains as to whether the two leaders have made real progress or merely papered over their differences. Trade disputes between the United States and China over textiles, televisions and iron fittings are quickly becoming a major irritant in the

relationship. Given their growing shared economic and political interests, a full-blown trade war between the two countries is unlikely. The increasing interdependence of the Chinese and U.S. economies makes tit-for-tat retaliation dangerous. In fact, Mr. Wen told New York bankers Tuesday that "we should not and will not fight a trade war." But domestic politics on both sides of the Pacific could quickly overwhelm the restraint leaders in Washington and Beijing have been showing until now, taking the trade conflict in directions neither side expected or wanted. U.S.-China trade has become a high-stakes game in Washington. Faced with a burgeoning trade deficit with China and an economy whose recovery has not yet embraced the Midwestern manufacturing base or the textile mills of the Carolinas, Congress has threatened six trade-related bills, the harshest of which would impose tariffs of up to 27.5 percent on Chinese imports. Several of the Democratic challengers to President Bush have also jumped on the bandwagon, recognizing an opportunity to pick up votes in crucial states. To their credit, Mr. Bush and top members of his economic team, including Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan and U.S. Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick, have done their best to argue that long-term U.S. economic interests are not well served by such blatant trade protectionism. The president has tried to address congressional concerns and at the same time avoid a trade war with China by responding in a highly measured fashion: Recent quotas on Chinese textile imports, for example, actually affect only 5 percent of China's total textile imports to the United States. Most recently, Mr. Bush announced his decision to withdraw steel tariffs. Still, the administration's actions have sent a signal to U.S. manufacturers and

agricultural producers that the election year is in full swing, and the special interest queue is likely to get longer every day. Beijing's response has been muted, confined largely to conciliatory words and exhortations to Washington not "to politicize trade." China's leaders recognize that textile and television quotas may be merely an opening salvo to bring pressure on them to purchase more U.S. goods and to make headway in reducing trade barriers. A recent trip by Chinese officials to the United States to purchase soybean, cotton, fertilizer and telecommunications products was canceled, but the Ministry of Commerce explained that this was not in retaliation for textile quotas but rather due to "visa problems." In a diplomatic move previously unthinkable for a Chinese leader (and worthy of any U.S. presidential candidate), Mr. Wen met with American workers whose jobs were said to be threatened by Chinese exports. Washington should realize that trade pressure on China is not without potential costs. Beijing has its own battles to wage on the domestic front. President Hu Jintao and Mr. Wen are new leaders with little international experience, and they are still consolidating their power against significant domestic opposition. At some point, either to demonstrate nationalist credentials to domestic constituencies or to show Washington that there are costs to taking China for granted, these leaders may decide to react to U.S. pressure with less-conciliatory measures. In critical

respects, the interests of U.S. and Chinese leaders are closely aligned . After all, both Mr. Bush and Mr. Wen have articulated their commitment to global free trade and believe it is essential to the continued growth of their respective economies . Also, the tenuous strategic environment, including North Korea, Iraq, the war on terror and rising tensions across the Taiwan Strait, means that neither side is inclined to create additional distractions for itself or the relationship. Legitimate gripes concerning China's trade practices remain and need to be addressed. But the proper arena in which to do this is the World Trade Organization. The United States and China negotiated the terms of China's entry into the WTO for more than 15 years. We wrote the rules together, and both sides should live by them. Otherwise, as the world's largest and sixth-largest economies, we risk far more than several months of trade disputes and increasing invective. We risk undermining the very basis of the global free trade regime.

No U.S.-China trade war – It’s in no one’s interestIkenson 07- Director of Center for Trade Policy Studies, Cato, http://www.freetrade.org/node/657

Yong Tang: "According to some media coverage, China is said to be the most ideal country with which US could launch a trade war. This is because China is becoming the major target of trade protectionism in the world as it turns out to be a prime destination for global industrial relocation. Do you agree with this notion?" Daniel Ikenson: "If U.S. policymakers were intent on sending the U.S. (and world) economy

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into a profound recession, they would consider launching a trade war with China. It is a lose-lose scenario. Nobody thinks a trade war would be a good idea."

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Miscalc Advantage

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Internals

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Cyber Conflict Won’t Escalate Cyber conflict is unlikely to lead to a hot warLindsay 2015 - Jon, Assistant Research Scientist at the university of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and Assistant adjunct Professor at the University of California, San Diego School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, Winter 2014/2015, "The Impact of China on Cybersecurity: Fiction and Friction", http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00189

Exaggerated fears about the paralysis of digital infrastructure and growing concerns over competitive advantage exacerbate the spiral of mistrust. Closer consideration of domestic factors within China and China’s strategic

interaction with the United States reveals a more complicated yet less worrisome situation. This article argues that for every type of purported Chinese cyber threat, there are also serious Chinese vulnerabilities and Western strengths that reinforce the political status quo. Cyberwar between the United States and China, much like U.S.-China conventional war, is highly unlikely. Nevertheless, the economically driven proliferation of information technology enables numerous instances of friction to emerge below the threshold of violence. From a technical perspective, cyber operations are often thought to be inexpensive and effective, but

there are underappreciated institutional costs involved in their employment. Moreover, even if actors can overcome the operational barriers associated with ambitious cyber penetrations, they still have incentives to moderate the intensity of their exploitation in order to preserve the benefits that make exploitation worthwhile in the

first place. This logic culminates in a relentlessly irritating but indefinitely tolerable stability in the cyber domain. China and the United States can look forward to chronic and ambiguous intelligence-counterintelligence contests across their networks, even as the internet facilitates productive exchange between them.

It will remain contained—empirics prove it’s unlikely to escalateGartzke and Lindsay 2015 - Erik, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of California San Diego, and Jon, sistant Professor at the University of Toronto Munk, June 22, "Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace", Security Studies, Volume 24, Issue 2, 2015, T&F

Indeed, the US Department of Defense gets attacked ten million times a day; a US university receives a hundred thousand Chinese attacks per day; and one firm measures three thousand distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks per day worldwide.23 In reality,

however, most of these so-called attacks are just routine probes by automated networks of compromised computers

(botnets) run by profit-seeking criminals or spy bureaucracies—a far cry from terrorism or military assault. The most alarming scenarios of a “digital Pearl Harbor” or “cyber 9/11” have yet to materialize despite decades of warning. The

Stuxnet worm caused limited and temporary disruption of Iran's nuclear program in the late 2000s, the only known historical case

of infrastructure damage via deliberate cyber attack, but this operation seems to reveal more about the strategic limitations of cyber war than its potency.24 The cyber revolution should presumably provide rivals with potent new tools of influence, yet

actual cyber disputes from 2001 to 2011 remain restrained and regionalized, not disruptive and global.25

Computer espionage and nuisance cybercrime thrive, to be sure, but they are neither as prevalent nor as costly as they might be, leading skeptics to describe US losses as “a rounding error” in a fifteen trillion dollar economy.26 It is possible in principle that the same tools used for computer-network exploitation may one day be leveraged for more

destructive strikes. Yet even if the nontrivial operational challenges of cyber war can be overcome, proponents of the cyber-revolution thesis have yet to articulate convincing strategic motives for why a state or non-state actor might actually use cyber capabilities effectively.27 A considerable shortage of evidence in the study of cyber conflict is thus a source both of concern and relief.

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Interdependence Prevents Escalation Interdependence theories hold for cyber conflictLindsay 2015 - Jon, Assistant Research Scientist at the university of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and Assistant adjunct Professor at the University of California, San Diego School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, Winter 2014/2015, "The Impact of China on Cybersecurity: Fiction and Friction", http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00189

As long as dense interconnection and economic interdependence remain mutually beneficial for powers such as the United States and China, they will be able to tolerate the irritants that they will inevitably inflict on one another. The modern intelligence-counterintelligence contest plays out in a complicated sociotechnical space where states take advantage of economic cooperation and hedge against security competition. If their broader mutual interest frays, however, then cyberwarfare becomes just one facet of a more serious strategic problem involving more dangerous means. Exaggeration of the cyber threat feeds spirals of mistrust, which make this undesirable outcome slightly more likely.

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Deterrence Checks Deterrence prevents cyber attacks and the impacts are overblownVijayan 2010 - Jaikumar, freelance technology writer specializing in computer security and privacy topics, April 2, "Senators ramp up cyberwar rhetoric", http://www.computerworld.com/article/2516720/security0/senators-ramp-up-cyberwar-rhetoric.html

The proposed bill has its share of supporters, but the cyberwar rhetoric being used to justify the need for such measures is viewed skeptically by growing numbers of IT security professionals. Warnings about cyberwar, especially in the wake of

the China-based attacks against Google and more than 30 other high-tech companies, is unnecessary overhyping of what's going, some experts say. One of them is noted security researcher Marcus Ranum, chief security officer at Tenable Network Security Inc. In an opinion piece in U.S. News and World Report earlier this week, Ranum warned that the cyberwar rhetoric is scarier than actual war. "Suddenly,

the steady drumbeat of computer/network security has been pushed to center stage, and now our government is talking about 'cyberwar' and pointing a finger at China," Ranum wrote. "Unless you've been asleep for a decade, you ought to be worried when our government starts using the rhetoric of warfare -- especially vocabulary like 'preemptive' and 'deterrence.'" Ranum today said that

concerns about catastrophic economic losses and social havoc stemming from a cyberwar are misplaced . "When some cyberwar pundit starts talking hellfire and damnation, you need to ask them whether their scenario is going to have the physical

and psychological impact of a New Orleans flood or a 9/11," Ranum said in e-mailed comments to Computerworld. The types of disruptions that some people claim cyberwar will cause, such as large-scale power blackouts, are unlikely to result in the kind of mayhem that is being assumed, he said. Many "experience power failures sometimes lasting days -- because of winter weather -- and we don't dissolve into chaos ," he said. Ranum's views are similar to those of a growing number of other experts. James Lewis, who headed a team that developed a set of cybersecurity recommendations for President Obama, recently wrote about the issue in a blog. The nation is not in the middle of a cyberwar, Lewis stressed. Drawing a comparison to

traditional warfare, he noted that it's unlikely that a country would preemptively launch a missile strike against critical infrastructure in the U.S., because it would fear massive retaliation. The same holds true for cyberwar, said Lewis, who is a senior fellow and program director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "Foreign leaders will not lightly begin a war with the United States," he said. "And the risk of cyberwar is too high for frivolous or spontaneous engagement."

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Low Probability The risk of conflict is low and actors won’t reach the thresholds for escalationLindsay 2015 - Jon, Assistant Research Scientist at the university of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and Assistant adjunct Professor at the University of California, San Diego School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, Winter 2014/2015, "The Impact of China on Cybersecurity: Fiction and Friction", http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00189

There is one remote but serious danger, however. Although limited war between the United States and China is extremely unlikely given the high costs of naval warfare and the disruption of trade, it is possible to imagine some paths to war through miscalculation in a crisis involving Japan or Taiwan. Misperceptions about the coercive potency of cyberwarfare or mistakes in the integration of cyber with other warfighting domains would inject additional uncertainty into such a crisis and make it more unstable. Chinese ability to manage the complex intelligence and command integration necessary to create predictable (and thus usefully weaponized) effects through cyberspace is questionable, even as Chinese doctrine calls for the early and paralyzing use of cyberattacks. Cyberweapons are highly classified, even as their effectiveness is poorly understood and often exaggerated. These properties are as likely to confuse friendly commanders as they are to muddy signals to an adversary, with ambiguous implications for escalation.112 Importantly, this particular risk

emerges via misperception rather than through the actual potency of an “assassin’s mace” weapon. Barring gross misperception, however, one can expect the risk of unwanted escalation from cyber to other military domains to deter both sides from resorting to more destructive forms of computer network attack in most situations.113 Yet

although nuclear or conventional deterrence might be able to check catastrophic cyberattack, it cannot credibly discourage minor cyber aggression such as nationalist hacktivism, industrial espionage, or harassment of dissident expatriates. Indeed, the observable pattern of Chinese (and American) cyber activity conforms to the logic of the Cold War stabilityinstability paradox, but in slightly revised form. In the original formulation of the paradox, mutual vulnerability to nuclear retaliation inhibits nuclear war but encourages conventional war in peripheral theaters where nuclear threats are not credible.114 Today, the intensity of cyber aggression is bounded by the risk of any form of military retaliation as well as the need to preserve interconnection and protect sources and methods that rely on deception.

Cyberattackers intentionally keep the costs they inflict below the assessed threshold of even limited military retaliation by opponents, occupying a region where military threats of punishment would be utterly noncredible. The aggressor’s freedom of action is further constrained by the need to maintain stealth and plausible deniability for ongoing operations. Actors that are deterred by threats of military punishment, on the one hand, and threats of counterintelligence detection or loss of connection, on the other, are encouraged to find more limited ways to inflict costs. The complexity of modern computer network infrastructure, in particular, offers many inexpensive ways to inflict minor costs. One implication is that cyberspace creates more scope for nontraditional security concerns (e.g., harassment of human rights organizations and vulnerable user communities) that powerful actors usually ignore in their focus on protecting high-value economic and military assets.115

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Impacts

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AT: Cyberwar General Cyber war infeasibleClark, MA candidate – Intelligence Studies @ American Military University, senior analyst – Chenega Federal Systems, 4/28/’12 (Paul, “The Risk of Disruption or Destruction of Critical U.S. Infrastructure by an Offensive Cyber Attack,” American Military University)

The Department of Homeland Security worries that our critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) may be exposed, both directly and indirectly, to multiple threats because of CIKR reliance on the global cyber infrastructure, an

infrastructure that is under routine cyberattack by a “spectrum of malicious actors” (National Infrastructure Protection

Plan 2009). CIKR in the extremely large and complex U.S. economy spans multiple sectors including agricultural, finance and

banking, dams and water resources, public health and emergency services, military and defense, transportation and shipping, and energy (National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2009). The disruption and destruction of public and private infrastructure is part of warfare, without this infrastructure conflict cannot be sustained (Geers 2011). Cyber-attacks are desirable because they are considered to be a relatively

“low cost and long range” weapon (Lewis 2010), but prior to the creation of Stuxnet, the first cyber-weapon, the ability to disrupt and destroy critical infrastructure through cyber-attack was theoretical. The movement of an offensive cyber-weapon from conceptual to actual has forced the United States to question whether offensive cyber-attacks are a significant threat that are able to disrupt or destroy CIKR to the level that national security is seriously degraded. It is important to understand the risk posed to national security by cyber-attacks to ensure that government responses are appropriate to the threat

and balance security with privacy and civil liberty concerns. The risk posed to CIKR from cyber-attack can be evaluated by measuring the threat from cyber-attack against the vulnerability of a CIKR target and the consequences of

CIKR disruption. As the only known cyber-weapon, Stuxnet has been thoroughly analyzed and used as a model for predicting future cyber-weapons. The U.S. electrical grid , a key component in the CIKR energy sector, is a target that has been analyzed for vulnerabilities and the consequences of disruption predicted – the electrical grid has been used in multiple attack scenarios including a classified scenario provided to the U.S. Congress in 2012 (Rohde 2012). Stuxnet will serve as the

weapon and the U.S. electrical grid will serve as the target in this risk analysis that concludes that there is a low risk of disruption or destruction of critical infrastructure from a an offensive cyber-weapon because of the complexity of the attack path, the limited capability of non-state adversaries to develop cyber-weapons, and the existence of multiple methods of mitigating the cyber-attacks. To evaluate the threat posed by a Stuxnet-like cyber-weapon, the complexity of the weapon, the available attack vectors for the weapon, and the resilience of the weapon must be understood. The complexity – how difficult and expensive it was to create the weapon – identifies the relative cost and availability of the weapon; inexpensive and simple to build will be more prevalent than expensive and difficult to build. Attack vectors are the available methods of attack; the larger the number, the more severe the threat. For example, attack vectors for a cyberweapon may be email attachments, peer-to-peer applications, websites, and infected USB devices or compact discs. Finally, the resilience of the weapon determines its availability and affects its usefulness. A useful weapon is one that is resistant to disruption (resilient) and is therefore available and reliable. These concepts are seen in the AK-47 assault rifle – a simple, inexpensive, reliable and effective weapon – and carry over to information technology structures (Weitz 2012). The

evaluation of Stuxnet identified malware that is “unusually complex and large ” and required code written in multiple languages (Chen 2010) in order to complete a variety of specific functions contained in a “vast array” of components – it is one of the most complex threats ever analyzed by Symantec (Falliere, Murchu and Chien

2011). To be successful, Stuxnet required a high level of technical knowledge across multiple disciplines , a laboratory with the target equipment configured for testing, and a foreign intelligence capability to collect information on the target network and attack vectors (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010). The malware also needed careful monitoring and maintenance because it could be easily disrupted; as a result Stuxnet was developed with a

high degree of configurability and was upgraded multiple times in less than one year (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011).

Once introduced into the network, the cyber-weapon then had to utilize four known vulnerabilities and four unknown vulnerabilities, known as zero-day exploits, in order to install itself and propagate across the target network

(Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). Zero-day exploits are incredibly difficult to find and fewer than twelve out of the

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12,000,000 pieces of malware discovered each year utilize zero-day exploits and this rarity makes them valuable, zero-days can fetch $50,000 to $500,000 each on the black market (Zetter 2011). The use of four rare exploits in a single piece of malware is “unprecedented” (Chen 2010). Along with the use of four unpublished exploits, Stuxnet also

used the “first ever” programmable logic controller rootkit, a Windows rootkit, antivirus evasion techniques, intricate process injection routines, and other complex interfaces (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011) all wrapped up in “layers of encryption like Russian nesting dolls” (Zetter 2011) – including custom encryption algorithms (Karnouskos 2011). As the

malware spread across the now-infected network it had to utilize additional vulnerabilities in proprietary Siemens industrial

control software (ICS) and hardware used to control the equipment it was designed to sabotage. Some of these ICS

vulnerabilities were published but some were unknown and required such a high degree of inside knowledge

that there was speculation that a Siemens employee had been involved in the malware design (Kerr, Rollins

and Theohary 2010). The unprecedented technical complexity of the Stuxnet cyber-weapon, along with the extensive

technical and financial resources and foreign intelligence capabilities required for its development and deployment, indicates that the

malware was likely developed by a nation-state (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010). Stuxnet had very limited attack vectors. When a computer system is connected to the public Internet a host of attack vectors are available to the cyber-attacker (Institute for Security Technology Studies 2002). Web browser and browser plug-in vulnerabilities, cross-site scripting attacks, compromised email attachments, peer-to-peer applications, operating system and other application vulnerabilities are all vectors for the introduction of malware into an

Internetconnected computer system. Networks that are not connected to the public internet are “air gapped ,” a

technical colloquialism to identify a physical separation between networks. Physical separation from the public Internet is a common safeguard for sensitive networks including classified U.S. government networks. If the target network is air gapped, infection can only occur through physical means – an infected disk or USB device

that must be physically introduced into a possibly access controlled environment and connected to the air gapped network. The first step of the Stuxnet cyber-attack was to initially infect the target networks, a difficult task given the probable disconnected and well secured

nature of the Iranian nuclear facilities. Stuxnet was introduced via a USB device to the target network, a method that suggests that the attackers were familiar with the configuration of the network and knew it was not connected to the public Internet (Chen 2010). This assessment is supported by two rare features in Stuxnet – having all necessary functionality for industrial sabotage fully embedded in the malware executable along with the ability to self-propagate and upgrade through a peer-to-peer method

(Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). Developing an understanding of the target network configuration was a significant and daunting task based on Symantec’s assessment that Stuxnet repeatedly targeted a total of five different organizations over nearly one year (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011) with physical introduction via USB drive being the only available attack vector. The final factor in assessing the threat of a cyber-weapon is the resilience of the weapon. There are

two primary factors that make Stuxnet non-resilient: the complexity of the weapon and the complexity of the target. Stuxnet was highly customized for sabotaging specific industrial systems (Karnouskos 2011) and needed a large number of very complex components and routines in order to increase its chance of success (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). The

malware required eight vulnerabilities in the Windows operating system to succeed and therefore would have failed if those vulnerabilities had been properly patched; four of the eight vulnerabilities were known to Microsoft and subject to elimination (Falliere,

Murchu and Chien 2011). Stuxnet also required that two drivers be installed and required two stolen security certificates for installation (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011); driver installation would have failed if the stolen certificates had been revoked and

marked as invalid. Finally, the configuration of systems is ever-changing as components are upgraded or replaced. There is no guarantee that the network that was mapped for vulnerabilities had not changed in the months , or years, it took to craft Stuxnet and successfully infect the target network. Had specific components of the target hardware changed –

the targeted Siemens software or programmable logic controller – the attack would have failed. Threats are less of a threat when identified; this is why zero-day exploits are so valuable. Stuxnet went to great lengths to hide its existence from the target and utilized multiple rootkits, data manipulation routines, and virus avoidance techniques to stay undetected. The malware’s actions occurred only in memory to avoid leaving traces on disk, it masked its activities by running under legal programs, employed layers of encryption and code obfuscation, and uninstalled itself after a set period of time, all efforts to avoid detection because its authors knew that detection

meant failure. As a result of the complexity of the malware, the changeable nature of the target network, and the chance of discovery, Stuxnet is not a resilient system. It is a fragile weapon that required an

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investment of time and money to constantly monitor, reconfigure, test and deploy over the course of a year . There is concern, with Stuxnet developed and available publicly, that the world is on the brink of a storm of highly sophisticated

Stuxnet-derived cyber-weapons which can be used by hackers, organized criminals and terrorists (Chen 2010). As former counterterrorism advisor Richard Clarke describes it, there is concern that the technical brilliance of the United States “has created

millions of potential monsters all over the world” (Rosenbaum 2012). Hyperbole aside, technical knowledge spreads. The techniques behind cyber-attacks are “constantly evolving and making use of lessons learned over time” (Institute for

Security Technology Studies 2002) and the publication of the Stuxnet code may make it easier to copy the weapon (Kerr,

Rollins and Theohary 2010). However, this is something of a zero-sum game because know ledge works both ways and cybersecurity techniques are also evolving, and “understanding attack techniques more clearly is the first step toward increasing

security” (Institute for Security Technology Studies 2002). Vulnerabilities are discovered and patched , intrusion detection and malware signatures are expanded and updated, and monitoring and analysis processes and

methodologies are expanded and honed. Once the element of surprise is lost, weapons and tactics are less useful, this is the core of the argument that “uniquely surprising” stratagems like Stuxnet are single-use, like Pearl Harbor and the Trojan Horse, the “very success [of these attacks] precludes their repetition” (Mueller 2012). This

paradigm has already been seen in the “son of Stuxnet” malware – named Duqu by its discoverers – that is based on the same

modular code platform that created Stuxnet (Ragan 2011). With the techniques used by Stuxnet now known, other variants

such as Duqu are being discovered and countered by security researchers (Laboratory of Cryptography and System

Security 2011). It is obvious that the effort required to create, deploy, and maintain Stuxnet and its variants is massive and it is not clear that the rewards are worth the risk and effort . Given the location of initial infection and the number of infected systems in Iran (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011) it is believed that Iranian nuclear facilities were the target of the

Stuxnet weapon. A significant amount of money and effort was invested in creating Stuxnet but yet the expected result – assuming that this was an attack that expected to damage production – was minimal at best. Iran claimed that Stuxnet caused only minor damage, probably at the Natanz enrichment facility, the Russian contractor Atomstroyeksport reported that no damage had occurred at the Bushehr facility, and an unidentified “senior diplomat” suggested that Iran was forced to shut down its centrifuge

facility “for a few days” (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010). Even the most optimistic estimates believe that Iran’s nuclear enrichment program was only delayed by months, or perhaps years (Rosenbaum 2012). The actual damage done by Stuxnet is not clear (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010) and the primary damage appears to be to a higher number than average replacement of centrifuges at the Iran enrichment facility (Zetter 2011). Different targets may produce different results. The Iranian nuclear facility was a

difficult target with limited attack vectors because of its isolation from the public Internet and restricted access to its facilities. What is the probability of a successful attack against the U.S. electrical grid and what are the potential consequences should this

critical infrastructure be disrupted or destroyed? An attack against the electrical grid is a reasonable threat scenario since power systems are “a high priority target for military and insurgents” and there has been a trend towards utilizing commercial software and

integrating utilities into the public Internet that has “increased vulnerability across the board” (Lewis 2010). Yet the increased vulnerabilities are mitigated by an increased detection and deterrent capability that has been “honed over many years of practical application” now that power systems are using standard, rather than proprietary and specialized, applications and components (Leita and Dacier 2012). The security of the electrical grid is also enhanced by increased awareness after a smart-grid hacking demonstration in 2009 and the identification of the Stuxnet malware in 2010; as a result the public and private sector are working together in an “unprecedented effort” to establish robust security guidelines and cyber security measures (Gohn and Wheelock 2010).

No cyberwar and no impact – empirics, impossibility, deterrence, no motive, and engineers solveFox 11 – assistant editor of InnovationNewsDaily (Stuart, 07/02, “Why Cyberwar is Unlikely,” http://www.securitynewsdaily.com/cyberwar-unlikely-deterrence-cyber-war-0931/) EDITED FOR GENDERED LANGUAGE

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http://www.securitynewsdaily.com/cyberwar-unlikely-deterrence-cyber-war-0931/

http://www.securitynewsdaily.com/cyberwar-unlikely-deterrence-cyber-war-0931/


In the two decades since cyberwar first became possible, there hasn't been a single event that politicians, generals and security

experts agree on as havingpassed the threshold for strategic cyberwar. In fact, the attacks that have occurred have fallen so far short of a proper cyberwar that many have begun to doubt that cyberwarfare is even possible. [Cyberwar Overhyped and Unlikely, Report Says] The reluctance to engage in strategic cyberwarfare stems mostly from the uncertain results such a conflict would bring, the lack of motivation on the part of the possible combatants and their shared inability to defend against counterattacks. Many of the systems that an aggressive cyberattack would damage are actually as valuable to any potential attacker as they would be to the

victim. The five countries capable of large-scale cyberwar (Israel, the U.S., the U.K., Russia and China) have more to lose if a cyberwar were to escalate into a shooting war than they would gain from a successful cyberattack. "The half-dozen countries that

have cyber capability are deterredfrom cyberwar because of the fear of the American response. Nobody wants this to spiral out of control," said James Lewis, senior fellow and director of technology and public policy at the Center for Strategic and International

Studies in Washington, D.C. "The countries that are capable of doing this don't have a reason to," Lewis added. "Chinese officials have said to me, 'Why would we bring down Wall Street when we own so much of it?' They like money almost as much as we do." Big

deterrent: retaliation Deterrence plays a major factor in preventing cyberwar. Attacks across the Internet would favor the aggressor so heavily that no country has developed an effective defense. Should one country initiate a cyberattack, the victim could quickly counter-

attack, leaving both countries equally degraded, Lewis told InnovationNewsDaily. Even if an attacker were to overcome his/her fear of retaliation, the low rate of success would naturally give him/her pause. Any cyberattack would target the types of complex systems that could collapse on their own, such as electrical systems or banking networks.

But experience gained in fixing day-to-day problems on those systems would allow the engineers who maintain them to quickly undo damage caused by even the most complex cyberattack , said George Smith, a senior fellow at Globalsecurity.org in Alexandria, Va.

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AT: South China Sea No warShuo 9/12/12 (Wang Shuo, managing editor of Caixin Media: the top English-language magazine covering business and finance in China, "Closer Look: Why War Is Not an Option", english.caixin.com/2012-09-12/100436770.html)

It is highly unlikely that China will fight a hot war with any of its neighbors over territorial disputes , but it should still reexamine who its

friends really are There won't be a war in East Asia. The U nited S tates has five military alliances in the western Pacific : with South Korea, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore, and American battleships are busy patrolling the seas.

Without a go-ahead from Washington, there is no possibility of a hot war between battleships of sovereign countries here. As to conflicts between fishing boats and patrol boats, that's not really a big deal. The Chinese have to ponder several questions: If the country has battleship wars with Japan, can it win without using ground-based missiles? Will the war escalate if missiles are deployed? What will happen if the war continues with no victory in sight? In the last few days, one country bought islands, and the other

announced the base points and the baselines of its territorial waters. But look closely, China and Japan have at least two things in common in this hostile exchange: At home they fan up nationalism, and in the international arena no activities have exceeded the scope of previous, respective claims on sovereignty. This means there is no possibility of a war in East Asia, not even remotely. From the

East Sea to the South Sea, China has reached a new low in relations with Asian neighbors. It's hard to remove the flashpoints in territorial disputes, but the country can surely reduce their impacts . And the key is relations with the United States.

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Documents

Inherency - sp Web viewUS- Sino Relations already check cyber attacks. Katie Bo Williams, 6-21-16