Infantry - United States Army

Infantry

••••• INFANTRY (ISSN: 0019-9532) is an Army professional bulletin prepared for bimonthly publication by the U.S.Army Infantry School at Building 4, Fort Benning, Georgia. • Although it contains professional information for theinfantryman, the content does not necessarily reflect the official Army position and does not supersede any informationpresented in other official Army publications. • Unless otherwise stated, the views herein are those of the authorsand not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it. • Official distribution is to infantry andinfantry-related units and to appropriate staff agencies and service schools. • Direct communication concerningeditorial policies and subscription rates is authorized to Editor, INFANTRY, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA31995-2005. • Telephones: (706) 545-2350 or 545-6951, DSN 835-2350 or 835-6951; [email protected]. • Bulk rate postage paid at Columbus, Georgia, and other mailing offices. •POSTMASTER: Send address changes to INFANTRY, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005. •USPS Publication No. 370630.

JULY-AUGUST 2007 Volume 96, Number 4

PB 7-07-4

MG WALTER WOJDAKOWSKICommandant, The Infantry School

RUSSELL A. ENOEditor

MICHELLE J. ROWANDeputy Editor

BETTY J. BYRDEditorial Assistant

Soldiers with the 2nd Battalion,319th Field Artillery Regiment,2nd Brigade Combat Team,82nd Airborne Division, patrol aneighborhood in Baghdad.(Photo by Sergeant Mike Pryor)

This medium is approved for officialdissemination of material designed to keepindividuals within the Army knowledgeable ofcurrent and emerging developments withintheir areas of expertise for the purpose ofenhancing their professional development.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

GEORGE W. CASEY, JR.General, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Distribution: Special

Official:

JOYCE E. MORROWAdministrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army 00719803

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

FRONT COVER:

BACK COVER:Soldiers with the 2nd Battalion,12th Infantry Regiment, 2ndBrigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, radio tosuperiors during a patrol in Baghdad July 24. (Photo byMaster Sgt. Jonathan Doti, USAF)

FEATURES26 INFANTRY DOCTRINE FOR DISMOUNTED PATROLLING

Arthur A. Durante, Jr.31 THE EVOLUTION OF IRANIAN WARFIGHTING DURING THE IRAN-

IRAQ WARSergeant Ben Wilson

36 OPERATION CAESAR RETURNS: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DISMOUNTEDINFANTRYCaptain Eric G. Evans

DEPARTMENTS1 COMMANDANT’S NOTE2 INFANTRY NEWS5 PROFESSIONAL FORUM

5 POST TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER IMPACTS ALL LEVELS OFLEADERSHIPCommand Sergeant Major Samuel M. Rhodes, Sr.

7 CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING: THE CORNERSTONE OFSUCCESS IN A COIN ENVIRONMENTMajor Mark S. Leslie

13 THE MORTAR FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMDavid Super and Travis Kundel

15 SETTING THE CONDITIONS FOR DECISIVE ENGAGEMENTS INBUHRIZCaptain Larry Sharp

19 OPERATION AL HASN: PLANNING AND EXECUTING A FULL-SPECTRUM OPERATION IN THE AFGHAN THEATER TODAYMajor Scott T. McGleishMajor Darin J. BlattCaptain Peter G. Fischer

41 TRAINING NOTES41 DEFENSIVE AND EVASIVE DRIVER TRAINING

Major Rich R. Rouleau46 A CONCEPT FOR ALL SEASONS: THE COE AND ITS RELATION TO REAL-

WORLD EVENTSMajor George Stroumpos

50 ROGERS’ RANGERS STANDING ORDERS REVISITEDLieutenant Colonel (Retired) Michael E. Reichard

51 BOOK REVIEWS

MAJOR GENERAL WALTER WOJDAKOWSKI

Commandant’s Note

Today we are fighting the enemy on his own turf, and inthe contemporary operational environment that meanswe must train intensively for dismounted operations.

The dismounted infantry fight demands the utmost of our Soldiers,and in this Commandant’s Note I want to discuss the changingmissions of non-infantry units and some of the considerations thatcontribute to the successful execution of dismounted operations.

The dismounted fight is no longer the sole province of theinfantryman. Soldiers of other military occupational specialtiesare patrolling, securing convoys, training local forces and performingwhat we once saw as purely infantry tasks in the built-up areas andcountryside of Iraq. Their peers are carrying out similar missions inAfghanistan, in the Balkans, and other regions of national interest.These are demanding missions, often requiring a paradigm shift inhow we train, and the Infantry School and other branch schools arecommitted to training Soldiers and their leaders in the skills theywill need as they fight on unfamiliar terrain.

The global war on terrorism is characterized to a large extentby the complexity of the terrain on which dismounted U.S. andCoalition forces operate, and we must learn how to fight there.Soldiers serving in Iraq and Afghanistan face extremes of weatherranging from the blistering heat of the Iraqi deserts and plains tothe numbing cold of the Hindu Kush. They fight on terrain asdense as the urban sprawl of Baghdad and in the rarified air ofAfghan mountains at elevations ranging up to well over 10,000feet. At those elevations Soldiers, leaders, and medics have toremain alert to cold weather injuries, but also to the danger ofaltitude sickness, something we are learning to deal with in termsof both medical and physical conditioning.

Physical conditioning is an imperative to sustain the mentaland physical toughness the infantry fight demands. We cannotevaluate physical readiness by APFT scores alone, and leadersmust avoid excessive optimism based solely upon these test results.The Ranger-Athlete-Warrior conditioning initiative of the 75thRanger Regiment highlighted in the May-June issue of Infantryis applicable to non-Ranger units as well. Dismounted units wellunderstand the matter of the Soldier’s load, and we must train aswe will fight. This includes road marching while carrying combatapproach march loads and practicing to quickly reduce the fightingload once contact is imminent or underway. FM 3-21.10 (FM 7-10),The Infantry Rifle Company, offers doctrinal guidance on Soldier’sload planning. Common sense tells us that we need to tailor the loadto the mission, and planning for link-up with our vehicles will furtherreduce the burden on Soldiers and save their stamina for when theymost need it. Even though combat developers are making every effort

July-August 2007 INFANTRY 1

DISMOUNTED OPERATIONSTraining to Achieve Victory

to reduce the weight of the Soldier’scombat load, leaders must ensurethat the infantryman goes intobattle with what he needs, butunencumbered by non-missionessential equipment. Ultimately,the success of a dismountedoperation will depend on mobility,stealth, and surprise and we must train to achieve these.

The Center for Army Lessons Learned has made available vastamounts of data gathered over the past three decades and particularlyduring the global war on terrorism. We see that Russian operationsin Afghanistan and Chechnya revealed the limitations of theircommand and control (C2) systems once their fight moved into thecomplex terrain of mountainous and urban environments. Today, ourown infantry leaders conducting dismounted operations rely uponcurrent dedicated C2 systems, while the Defense Advanced ResearchProjects Agency (DARPA) is working to field more advanced C2technology for testing and evaluation under field dismountedconditions. With the materiel assistance of DARPA and otheragencies, units hunting down insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistanare employing the latest in C2 equipment as they deny the enemythe use of terrain he formerly dominated.

The time required to maneuver dismounted Soldiers throughcomplex terrain reinforces the necessity of detailed intelligencepreparation of the battlefield (IPB). IPB must include likely enemycourses of action once the attack is initiated or discovered, and weemploy both human and electronic intelligence to gather the datawe need. Unmanned aerial vehicles and satellite imagerycontribute to the effort as well. Units need to realistically considerthe time needed to reach the objective for day and night operations,and must include recovery time prior to the action. When planningfires to restrict enemy mobility, we must consider our own coursesof action to ensure that we do not restrict our own ability tomaneuver.

Our Army’s success at dismounted operations is due in largepart to Soldiers’ and leaders’ ability to quickly adapt to changingenemy tactics and incorporate what they have learned into training.Today’s many initiatives in the lessons learned program lie at thecore of how we train Soldiers and units to fight, and because ofthis each Soldier deployed in the global war on terrorism is bettertrained than his predecessors. We have seized the initiative fromthose who would destroy us and are closing the circle around theterrorists and their sanctuaries.

Follow me!

2 INFANTRY May-June 20072 INFANTRY July-August 2007

2007 DOUGHBOY RECIPIENTS NAMED

In 1968, Robert Hall left Gaffney,South Carolina, population 12,000, and went looking for “something

more.” Something more than cotton.“I was a country boy raised on a cotton

farm. I worked in a cotton mill. All I knewwas cotton,” Hall said. “I thought theremight be something better out there.”

Thirty-two years later, after an Armycareer that took him to 48 states and 47countries and saw him from Drill Sergeantof the Year to Sergeant Major of the Army,Hall went looking for a place to call homeagain. A place where he “could just be BobHall.”

He found it back in Gaffney, population12,050 plus two since 2000, when Hallreturned with his bride of 30 years.

“Gaffney is a place we can just relax andenjoy our good neighbors,” said Hall, whoserved as the 11th sergeant major of theArmy before retiring. These days, Hallchampions Soldier issues as a militaryaffairs representative for USAA.

On the other hand, there’s Colonel(Retired) Ralph Puckett, who lives as a legendin his own hometown. The Columbus,Georgia, resident was a first lieutenant in1950, when he formed and commanded thefirst Ranger company since World War II, the8th Army Ranger Company in Korea.

Months after its formation, Puckett waswounded when his company, outnumbered600 to 71, captured a Chinese strongholdand repelled five counterattacks. On thesixth attack, Puckett was wounded a secondand third time. He ordered his men towithdraw, but he stayed behind to fight.Two Rangers returned, fought back theChinese, and dragged their commander tosafety.

As the honorary colonel of the 75thRanger Regiment and an alumnus of thefirst class of Ranger Hall of Famers, Puckettuses his platform to preach all things Ranger.But, like Hall, he eschews any personal

Puckett Hall

accolades. It’s all about the Soldiers todaywho fight the global war on terrorism.

September 18, it will be “all about” Halland Puckett. The two will be presented oneof the Army’s highest awards, the NationalInfantry Association’s Doughboy Award atthe annual Centennial Dinner

Since 1980, the Doughboy Awards haverecognized individuals who contributegreatly to the cause of the Infantry Soldier.Hall and Puckett join the likes of the lateBob Hope, Senator Bob Dole and General(Retired) Colin Powell, previous Doughboyhonorees.

The award is “more than amazing,” Hallsaid.

“I’m flabbergasted. When you look at allthe people who are more deserving … well,I’m floored,” he said. “For me, it was anhonor to spend my life working withSoldiers, being a Soldier.”

The Doughboy Awards ceremony is heldeach year during the Infantry WarfightingConference.

The term “Doughboy” was popularduring World War I, when the AmericanExpeditionary Force was led by Gen. JohnPershing, who had commanded anexpedition against Pancho Villa in 1916.Then, the Infantry troops were constantlycovered in dust while marching throughnorthern Mexico, giving them theappearance of “dough boys.”

(Bridgett Siter is the assistant editor ofThe Bayonet at Fort Benning, Georgia.)

BRIDGETT SITERNEWS BRIEFS

2007 Sniper Competition Set —The 7th International U.S. ArmySniper Competition will be held atFort Benning, Georgia, from October26 to November 3. The competitionwill be conducted regardless of weatherconditions and is designed to physicallyand mentally challenge sniper teamsfrom all over the world. The winningteam will be the one that demonstratesa proficiency in a wide range of sniper-related skills. Unlike most snipercompetitions, a high level of physicaland mental toughness is needed. Thisis not only the premier snipercompetition in the armed forces, but itis an excellent training opportunity forsnipers. Competitors from differentunits and countries will be able toexchange techniques and tactics duringthe event.

For more information on thecompetition go to the Web site https://www.benning.army.mil/197th/courses/sniper/index.htm or contact CaptainKeith Bell at (706) 545-7507 or MasterSergeant Craig Irwin at (706) 544-6006.

CALL Releases New LeaderHandbook on Iraq

The Center for Army LessonsLearned (CALL) at Fort Leavenworth,Kansas, has just released “The First 100Days” leader’s handbook. The first 100days are critical to the survival of Soldiers.In this brief initial period, Soldiers andunits adjust to the tactical environment,the enemy, and each other. “There’s nodoubt that the early part of the deploymentis the most dangerous, when people areunderstanding their environment,” saidColonel Steven Mains, director of CALL.The second in a series of three handbooksis available to Soldiers, Army civilians,and validated contractors on the CALLWeb site at http://call.army.mil.

May-June 2007 INFANTRY 3July-August 2007 INFANTRY 3

In an ongoing effort to reduce the weight of the M-240B, the Soldier BattleLab at Fort Benning, Georgia, recently evaluated the new short barrel.

The short barrel M-240B is four inches shorter and 1.66 pounds lighter thanthe standard barrel. It has already passed technical tests conducted by the ArmyResearch, Development and Engineering Center. Now the Soldier Battle Lab istesting it from a user’s perspective.

“The testing we do is directly with the Soldiers,” said Sam Bass, Soldier BattleLab project officer. “We get their feedback on whether it is something they will use,and if it enhances their ability to perform.”

Soldiers from the 63rd Engineer Company and Headquarters and HeadquartersCompany, 11th Engineer Battalion, spent July 23-27 comparing and contrastingthe two weapons. They found that the shortened M-240B did improve theirperformance.

“The short barrel was easier to get up the ladder,” said Private First Class DustinPruett, 11th Eng. Bn. “The long barrel stopped me as I was going up because it gotcaught on the concrete.”

The Soldiers tested both weapons at the McKenna urban operations site formobility and compatibility. Each Soldier ran two courses, one with each weapon.After each course, they completed a user survey.

The long barrel and the short barrel were also tested at the firing range. The targetdata from both weapons will be compared in terms of how the weapons performed andhow the Soldiers preformed with each weapon.

In addition to the target data, subjective data was collected, including Soldiers’comments and opinions, Bass said. They rate both weapons and list strengths andweaknesses of each so researchers can decide if the new technology is better, worseor if there is no appreciable difference.

Army researchers don’t know when the new short barrel M-240B will be available,but they do know that any reduction in weapon size and weight can increase Soldierperformance without sacrificing accuracy.

“It doesn’t sound like a lot,” Bass said. “But when you take a pound and a halfand you have to pick it up, carry it and move it — that pound and a half makes adifference.”

(Michelle L. Gordon writes for the Fort Benning Public Affairs Office.)

SHORT BARREL PASSES TESTMICHELLE L. GORDON

Michelle L. Gordon

The reduction in weapon size and weight can increase Soldier performance withoutsacrificing accuracy.

Dear Infantry,I wanted to take a few moments and

comment on Captain Trenton Conner’sarticle “A Commander’s Guide to theForward Support Company” in the March-April 2007 issue of Infantry. First of all, itwas a great article and very wellresearched. It had a good introduction onthe doctrinal capabilities and assets of theFSC in the modular force. CPT Connerdoes a good job of introducing the “how tothink” concept of the FSC in respect tocounterinsurgency (COIN). FSCoperations are no different and should begiven no less consideration than any othercombat patrol and this is clear in thearticle. In the combat logistics patrolssection, he mentions air/ground and settingthe conditions, but another important pieceis missing. With intense coordination, thepassage of l ines piece is sometimespossible. This is where combat logisticspatrols can be “passed” from unit to unitas it rolls through different areas ofresponsibility. This requires coordinationand is sometimes possible (or not) due toa variety of reasons. In my experience andopinion, however, it is well worth the effortfor high priority logistics patrols.Additionally, CPT Conner does anexcellent job of bringing to light the issueof host-nation logistics, which is oftenoverlooked or neglected. I can tell you frompersonal experience that this is a key issueand failure to address this in combined/joint combat operations is a tacticalmistake waiting to happen. The issues ofammunition, food, water, vehicle repair,and fueling are serious concerns that every taskforce will face during their tour at least once ifnot more often. Better to train and plan and doas little “discover learning” as possible.

It is a good article that has great pointswhich will remain valid in future conflicts aswell as the current conflict. As an introductionto FSC logistics, what they bring to the fight,and how to prep, plan and execute, this is anarticle that the smart commander will earmarkand pass on to his subordinates.

— Major Mark S. LeslieChief of Training, Stryker Transition Team,

Fort Benning, Georgia

LETTERS

INFANTRY NEWS

4 INFANTRY July-August 2007

A new compact, eat-on-the-moveassault ration is well on its way to warfighters’ hands.

“The First Strike Ration (FSR) isintended for the first-on-the-ground, first-to-fight warfighter,” said Barbara Daley,food technologist and FSR project officer,Combat Feeding Directorate (CFD), U.S.Army Natick Soldier Research,Development and Engineering Center(NSRDEC).

Usually when warfighters are issued twoor more Meals, Ready-to-Eat (MREs) they“field strip” them to lessen the bulk andweight they are carrying.

Personnel at NSRDEC found that notonly were warfighters tossing what theyconsidered extra weight, such as theflameless ration heater and Tabasco sauce,but they were also tossing food items.According to the Product Optimization andEvaluation Team at NSRDEC, if awarfighter is given 3,600 calories, he or shewill often strip it down to 2,500 calories.

The FSR attempts to reduce thisstripping by providing a lighter, smallerpackage with eat-on-the-go items that alsoenhance performance. These items arecalorically dense and provide appropriatenutritional content and energy towarfighters for short durations of highlymobile, highly intense combat operations.

Items included in the FSR includepocket sandwiches, First Strike energy bars,Zapplesauce™ (a carbohydrate-enhancedapplesauce), high-energy drinks, pouchesof tuna and chunk chicken, and caffeinatedgum.

The FSR is designed to be about halfthe size of the three MREs it replaces and

it provides, onaverage, 2,900calories per day. “It isnot intended to sustainthe warfighter for longperiods of time,”Daleyemphasized.

Because of itslower caloric content,the FSR is classifiedby the Office of theSurgeon General as arestricted ration. As such, it can only beused as a sole source of food for 10 days orless in accordance with Army Regulation40-25.

CFD conducted user evaluations on theFSR in Nevada and Germany in FY 2004,and in Afghanistan and Iraq in FY 2005.When compared with a field-stripped MREin Iraq in 2005, more than 70 percent ofSoldiers said the FSR was more convenientto carry and consume than the MRE.

“The best feedback we have received todate has been from warfightersparticipating in OIF/OEF in the mountainsof Afghanistan and Iraq. They loved it,”Daley said.

More than 6,500 FSRs have been usedin theater in response to urgent requests by25th Infantry Division and the MarineCorps, and modifications have beenincorporated based on warfighters’feedback.

Lieutenant Colonel David Exton of the25th Infantry Division told CFD: “You havecreated something great here. Do not failin this ration. Need to make these happenfor the Soldiers who go outside the wire.Could not get enough of them into theater.”

In July 2006, CFD conducted anoperational test at Fort Bragg, NorthCarolina. With more than 100 Soldiersparticipating from an airborne infantrybattalion, one group consumed the FSRfor three days while the other groupconsumed MREs for three days. Then thegroups switched. From monitoring whatthe Soldiers ate and what they threw out,CFD saw less waste and greaterconsumption with the groups eating theFSR.

Based upon these successful tests, andthe introduction of this ration in-theater,the demand for the FSR is immense.

In November 2006, a Joint ServicesDecision Board consisting of the Army,Marine Corps and Defense LogisticsAgency approved the FSR for procurementand fielding.

NSRDEC was able to compress theacquisition process by nearly 30 percentwhile maintaining support for all otherration platforms in order to maintain theschedule of 3rd quarter FY 2007procurement by Defense Logistics Agency/Defense Supply Center Philadelphia, withdelivery in 4th quarter FY 2007.

SOLDIERS TO RECEIVEFIRST STRIKE RATION

Sarah Underhill

Two Soldiers assess the components of the First Strike Ration duringa recent evaluation at Fort Bliss, Texas.

SOLDIER SYSTEMS CENTER - NATICK

INFANTRY MAGAZINE NEEDS ARTICLESSend us your articles, comments or ideas:

(706) 545-2350/DSN [email protected]

Since I served in the Middle East for approximately 30months, the thoughts and reminders of my time therecome and go so often that I really cannot acknowledge

them. It is also tough acknowledging them to peers or superiorswithout concerns that they may see weakness.

I had the toughest time dealing with these constant thoughtsand reminders as I transitioned from a unit that frequently deployedto taking over duties as a brigade command sergeant major of aBasic Combat Training unit at Fort Benning, Georgia. I continuedto embody those traits and characteristics that I thought had keptme and my Soldiers alive for 32 months in the Middle East andincorporated them into my everyday work habits. The 192ndInfantry Brigade could not be doing better.

Unfortunately for most of the first nine months, little did anyonerealize their brigade CSM was not doing well at all. I was able toperform my military duties on a daily basis without any negativethoughts whatsoever until I attended a Soldier’s memorial servicein February 2006.

As I walked into the chapel, my body began to tremble, and mymind began flashing back to memories of the 16 Soldiers I hadlost during my last deployment with 2nd Squadron, 11th ArmoredCavalry Regiment (ACR). The chaplain began to speak and thenthe roll call was given. My eyes began to water and then tearsrolled down my face like a waterfall. How did I get here? Whatwas the root cause of all the issues? What did I see that triggeredthese constant memories? I had no control; being a Warrior and amember of a team reduced to this was tough to swallow. After theroll call finished and we all stood up I said, “OK, the worst isover.” Then, like a knife in my heart the bugler began playingTaps. My knees buckled and I couldn’t feel my legs so I grabbedonto the front bench. The brigade commander, Colonel CharlesW. Durr, Jr., looked at me and immediately knew this was havinga negative effect on me. We talked briefly later that day about itbeing worse for me than any memorial I attended in Iraq.

After the memorial service, I began to lose control of my eatinghabits, and nightmares came every night. I began to work longerhours in order to not have any free time. The only problem is thatyou can only work so much! What triggered this? Are my fellowSoldiers having the same problems?

On May 5, 2006, while attending a course at Fort Jackson, itall came full circle when I found myself crying continuously forabout an hour, thinking about those Soldiers who died in Iraq. I

POST TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDERIMPACTS ALL LEVELS OF LEADERSHIP

COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR SAMUEL M. RHODES, SR.

had awakened early in the morning from one of the worst dreamsI ever had. It wasn’t really a dream — I was there. I have seenthe aftereffects of losing two great company commanders andseeing their bodies placed in bags. It was then that I beganreceiving counseling. I had been diagnosed in March of 2006with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), but like many leadersI put it off — too busy. Too busy almost cost me forever! Fromtalking with Yvonne Wilbanks, Fort Benning’s Alcohol & DrugControl Officer, I learned that PTSD needs to be treated early totry to avoid other serious problems such as depression andsubstance abuse. Her office, the Army Substance Abuse Program,had sponsored training on PTSD in conjunction with NationalDepression Screening Day at my unit.

While I did not develop substance abuse issues, I gained weightand was up to 260 pounds. Even at this weight I was still able torun and do PT without a lot of acknowledgment of my weight. Ithank God for the ACUs that covered that up. The weight issuehas since been fixed through continued dedication and with thehelp of the medical staff at Troop Medical Clinic (TMC) 5.

Later that summer, I was not feeling very well so the primaryphysician assistant sent me to the hospital to have some lab workdone. Early the next morning I received a phone call from theTMC; the caller was different than normal and sounded a littleanxious.


Courtesy photo

Command Sergeant Major Samuel M. Rhodes, Sr., attends a memorialservice for a Soldier while serving in Iraq.

She said, “CSM, you need to come tothe TMC right now.”

I replied, “I am in a meeting.”She said, “CSM, don’t make me come

get you.”I went into the physician assistant’s

office, and he began to tell me about thelab work and how I was showing signs ofheart disease. He said if I didn’t dosomething about it soon, he couldn’t predictthe timeline.

We talked about the findings and aboutmy family history; my father and his brotherboth passed away at the ages of 64 and 65from heart disease so the family history wasnot helping.

Having received this information alongwith a booming blood pressure, I took ahard look in the mirror and continuedreceiving counseling from a combat stressdoctor from Walter Reed Medical Centervia the telephone. I was also counseled byhim in Iraq during my last deployment. Istarted dieting and working out harder andharder. The TMC folks continued to stayon top of me every day about my bloodpressure checks and monthly lab work.

I found out during this period that theroot causes of all my issues were the anxietyand the emotional instability I was dealingwith from my extended stay in the MiddleEast.

Though we as leaders choose to fightmost of our individual battles by ourselves,it’s great to know we have excellent medicalpersonnel who care about Soldiers of allranks. We definitely don’t appreciate themenough! I remembered Ms. Wilbanks had

also told me leaders can be helpful to theirSoldiers by being aware of symptoms ofPTSD and making it a priority to gettraining and assistance for each Soldier. Ibelieve my experiences have made me moresensitive to helping my Soldiers.

After six months, I lost more than 40pounds and can run like the wind again; Ifeel terrific! Emotionally, I still have issueswhenever someone mentions a Soldier’sdeath, but all in all I have recovered to adegree.

Who would have thought a Soldier couldhave a PTSD incident while running downthe road in a garrison environment? I wasrunning down Moye Road at about 0545hours when all of a sudden three loud burstsof gunfire rang out. My heart felt like itstopped on the first burst. Then there was asecond burst and then the third. My eyesbegan to water — I knew instantly what thosethree volleys were for. It was a firing squadfrom the 1st Battalion, 50th Infantryrehearsing for a funeral support mission. Itried to continue running, but I found myselfremembering that time and time again thishas happened over the last four years.

Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in myopinion is not curable and will remain apart of my life forever. I am dealing withit by trying to replace any bad memories


SYMPTOMS OF PTSD Reliving a trauma, intrusive

memories Staying away from places/

people that remind you of thetrauma Feeling on guard, irritable, or

easily startled Difficulty sleeping, outbursts

of anger

PTSD MAY OCCUR WITHOTHER PROBLEMS

SUICIDE WARNING SIGNS Current suicide thoughts/plan Perceived lack of resources Perceived loss of military career Domestic issues Financial issues Relationship problems Prior suicidal behavior

Command Sergeant Major Samuel M.Rhodes, Sr., is currently serving as the brigadecommand sergeant major for the 192nd InfantryBrigade on Fort Benning, Georgia.

* Depression* Anxiety* Substance abuse

* Fear* Social anxiety

Alcohol/drug abuse Sudden purchase of

firearms/weapons Legal problems Depression/PTSD Traumatic childhood

experiences

with the great memories of those fallencomrades and what this life is because oftheir efforts.

We as leaders do not get trained on howto react to losing our Soldiers or even losingour fellow leaders during combat. Wecontinue to learn and grow through thestruggles of our current conflict. It’s aninstinct to be a Warrior. It’s also an instinctto be saddened by the memories that comeand go due to the loss of these greatAmericans. I am not able to develop theinstinct to allow the memories of theseevents to disappear from my mind. Ms.Wilbanks explained that when thesememories interfere with normalfunctioning or if the thoughts turn tosuicide, to get help immediately.

As I sat in the 47th Infantry Regiment’sreunion last year, I talked to some of theheroes who fought in previous wars. I talkedto them specifically about what I wasfeeling and going through on a daily basis.

The best words I heard were, “Neverforget, but let it go.” I would add, “Neverforget, get help, and let it go.”

WHERE TO GET HELP National Center for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder — (800) 296-6300

or http://www.ncptsd.va.gov Military One Source — (800) 342-9647 (If overseas precede number

with U.S. access code) Military Mental Health Organization — www.mentalhealthscreening.org National Depression Screening Day — www.MilitaryMentalHealth.org

(anonymous screening) Emergency call 911 Chaplains, Troop Medical Clinics, Mental Health Providers,

Emergency Rooms, and National Depression Screenings

PROFESSIONAL FORUM

“Military operations, as combat actions carried out againstopposing forces, are of limited importance and are never the totalconflict.”

— Roger TrinquierAuthor of Modern Warfare

Cultural awareness is a term that has grown and morphedin the course of the global war on terrorism, and theactual meaning and the “how can I implement this in

actual combat” and “why this is important to me” has beensomewhat lost in the “big picture” in my opinion. Some Soldiersperceive cultural awareness training as another block to checkduring required pre-deployment training. This assumption is partlycorrect — it is mandated training. But if this is where the unit, orthe Army as a whole, draws the line then we are significantlyshortchanging our troops in their preparation for combat in acounterinsurgency (COIN) environment. Cultural awarenesstraining must be embraced by the unit early on in the train-upprocess and implemented in all echelons of training. Cultural

awareness is a combat multiplier in a COIN environment and itsimportance is relative to that of our combat skills training. Culturalawareness training should not be the training event that issacrificed at the expense of time in the training schedule.

When most people think of cultural awareness training, theythink of sitting in a classroom learning a litany of cultural do’sand do not’s. This may be a baseline and is the first step in theladder of our real objective, which is cultural understanding. But,it is not cultural awareness training. Real cultural awarenesstraining takes those do’s and do not’s, as well as history, geography,cultural nuances, and social norms and expands them into trainingat all echelons of training. For example, the task of conducting acordon and search operation is given to a platoon. One way tointegrate cultural awareness training would be to include roleplayers (as civilians on the battlefield) who would react to the


CULTURAL UNDERSTANDINGThe Cornerstone of Success in a COIN Environment

MAJOR MARK S. LESLIE

A Soldier with the 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regimenttalks with some young citizens during a search for

weapon caches in Iraq February 10, 2007.Tech Sergeant Molly Dzitko, USAF

actions of the platoon based on socialnorms, etc. Then, the outcome and conductof the exercise are based on the tacticaldecisions of the leader on the ground, whoshould incorporate cultural sensitivity andcultural awareness into the planning,preparation and execution of the mission.This cultivates and builds culturalunderstanding, which is our overall goal.If we place emphasis at all echelons onintegrating cultural awareness into ourthought process in a COIN environment,then we are successfully building culturalunderstanding and the impact it has on howwe conduct warfare in a COINenvironment. The ability to recognize theimportance of cultural awareness intraining, and therefore culturalunderstanding on the battlefield, candetermine our actions on the battlefield andour success in a COIN fight. Our successesin sector are directly linked to how weconduct ourselves on a daily basis “outsidethe wire” in regards to the population. It isindisputable that the population is thecenter of gravity in a COIN fight, andtherefore, our understanding of their cultureand our attitude and demeanor in respectto that should be a significant factor that istaken into consideration in that fight.

An outstanding publication put out bythe Combat Studies Institute, Through theLens of Cultural Awareness: A Primer forU.S. Armed Forces Deploying to Arab andMiddle Eastern Countries by William D.Wunderle, provides us with some baselineof reference in relation to all things culturerelated:

Culture: A set of traditions, beliefsystems, and behaviors. Culture is shapedby many factors including history, religion,ethnic identity, language, and nationality.Culture evolves in response to variouspressures and influences and is learnedthrough socialization; it is not inherent. Inshort, a culture provides a lens throughwhich its members see and understand theworld.

In a military context, think of culture assimply another element of terrain, parallelto geographic terrain. Just as a hill or saddleaffect a Soldier’s ability to maneuver, socan religion, perceptions, and languagehelp military planners find centers ofgravity and critical vulnerabilities, andassist in campaign planning and the properallocation of resources.

Cultural Awareness: The ability torecognize and understand the effects ofculture on people’s values and behaviors.

In the military context, culturalawareness can be defined as the“cognizance of cultural terrain in militaryoperations and the connections betweenconnections and war fighting.” Culturalawareness implies an understanding ofthe need to consider cultural terrain inmilitary operations, a knowledge ofwhich cultural factors are important fora given situation and why, and a specifiedlevel of understanding for a target culture.

At an elementary level, culturalawareness is information, the meaninghumans assign to what they know about aculture. A principal task involved inacquiring cultural awareness is to collectcultural information and transform it byadding progressively greater meaning asunderstanding deepens.

The Primer goes on to explain culturalconsideration, cultural knowledge, culturalunderstanding, and cultural competence,with a corresponding illustration thatcaptures our goal in reference to culturalawareness/understanding training andimplementation.

Cultural Consideration: (“how andwhy”) The incorporation of genericconcepts in common military training –knowing how and why to study culture andwhere to find cultural factors and expertise.

Cultural Knowledge: (specifictraining) The exposure to the recent historyof a target culture. It includes basic culturalissues such as significant groups, actors,leaders, and dynamic, as well as culturalniceties and survival language skills.

Cultural Understanding: (advancedtraining) This refers to a deeper awarenessof the specific culture that allows generalinsight into thought processes, motivatingfactors, and other issues that directlysupport the military decision-makingprocess.

Cultural Competence: (decisionmaking and cultural intelligence) This isthe fusion of cultural understanding withcultural intelligence that allows focusedinsight into military planning and decisionmaking for current and future militaryoperations. Cultural competence impliesinsight into the intentions of specific actorsand groups.

Lieutenant Colonel Chris Hughes of the2nd Battalion, 327th Infantry of the 101stAirborne Division provided an excellent


Figure 1 — The Cultural Awareness Pyramid

PROFESSIONAL FORUM

example of cultural understanding and competence. LTC Hughes’actions were detailed in the book Banking on Baghdad by EdwinBlack. His highly publicized use of cultural competence in Iraqis just one of many situations in our current war whereunderstanding the culture has worked into the military decision-making process and influenced tactical actions in order to resolvea situation. In the case of LTC Hughes, his actions thwarted thoseof the insurgents, frustrating them and their efforts, and in theend, coerced and influenced local leaders into cooperation.

Many will argue that it is not the job of the Army to be culturallysensitive or aware, that we are an Army that destroys the enemyand moves on with the next mission. This is a false, naïve, andoutdated assumption. General David H. Petraeus, commander ofMulti-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I), put it into perspective wellin a memo dated May 10, 2007, to all Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen,Marines and Coastguardsmen serving MNF-I. He wrote, “We are,indeed, warriors. We train to kill our enemies. We are engaged incombat, we must pursue the enemy relentlessly, and we must beviolent at times. What sets us apart from our enemies in this fight,however, is how we behave. In everything we do, we must observethe standards and values that dictate that we treat noncombatantsand detainees with dignity and respect. While we are warriors,we are also human beings.”

Fair treatment of detainees is a given, considering all thenegative press the actions of a few at Abu Ghraib have brought toour Army as well as the mountain of IO material that was providedto the enemy. What is interesting in this statement is that thetreatment of noncombatants is specifically addressed. Once again,think of yourself as a “quasi-policeman.” If the customer, the centerof gravity, in this case the noncombatant Iraqi citizen, does not

trust us and we have not taken steps to gain his trust and developa rapport – where does this leave us? The only way to win trustand develop a rapport is through an understanding of the cultureand maybe even to embrace it to a certain degree. We are after allin their country. I had a colleague point out to me that it is notnecessary for the Iraqis as a whole to like us or even consider usfriends; what is important is for them to trust us and understandthat their interests, safety, and well-being are our objectives.Counterinsurgency has been and will continue to be with us for along time, inevitably. No, I am not advocating that major combatoperations are a thing of the past; what I am proposing is that Ibelieve that as long as we have major combat operations (MCOs)we will have smaller scale conflicts (SSCs) in the post-MCOsthat are dominated by COIN.

Understanding that COIN and cultural awareness areinextricably linked is one of the first steps. In COIN, there is a lotof gray area; there is a lot of room for low-level leaders to makecultural mistakes that could affect the strategic level. This is knownas the strategic corporal theory and is very valid throughout Iraqtoday. Therefore, in order to avoid these subtle mistakes andalienate ourselves from the center of gravity — the populace —we must teach our leaders a new way to think. Think of culturalconsiderations as a combat multiplier, force multiplier and a validinject in the military decision making process. When he wasdeveloping Marine Corps warfighting doctrine, the late ColonelJohn Boyd said “Do not write it as a formula. Write it as a way toteach officers to think, to think in new ways about war. War isever changing and men are fallible. Rigid rules simply won’t work.Teach men to think.” COIN is a thinking man’s game.

Integrating cultural sensitivity considerations into our tacticalexercises at all levels and into ouroperations on the battlefield isdoing just that — teaching ourleaders and Soldiers to thinkabout a war that is ever changingand varies area of responsibility(AOR) by AOR and tour by tour.

Our use of cultural sensitivityin our daily interactions withIraqis will be largely unnoticedon a daily basis. There will be nobig battles, no great revelations,and therefore, a limited feelingof success. But culturalcompetence is paramount in aCOIN fight. Our character andperseverance is the key tosuccess. Colonel T.E. Lawrence,one of the greatest and mostlegendary Arab advisors of alltime, characterizes the power ofinfluence and the embodiment ofcultural understanding in hisbook Seven Pillars of Wisdom.He said, “I was sent to theseArabs as a stranger, unable to


Sergeant Jeffrey Alexander

A Soldier with the 3rd Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment talks with an Iraqi man through an interpreterduring the opening of a gas station in Baghdad.

think their thoughts or subscribe their beliefs, but charged by dutyto lead them forward and to develop to the highest any movementof theirs profitable to England in her war. If I could not assumetheir character, I could at least conceal my own, and pass amongthem without evident friction, neither a discord nor a critic but anunnoticed influence.” Is that not the ultimate goal in acounterinsurgency — to pass among the populace without frictionas an unnoticed influence? The center of the gravity is the populace,and the only way to pass among the population with little as littlefriction and as nonabrasively as possible is to be not only somewhattolerant of their culture and social norms but actually embracecertain aspects of their culture to endear yourself to the populaceitself.

This is a tall order. As mostly non-Muslims and Arabs as awhole, we are very low on the Arab Loyalties Model (See Figure2). Although not perfect, this model serves as a good lens into themind of the population and our adversaries in Iraq.

Is it possible for us to move up higher in this model, eventhough we do not meet many of the criteria on this model? Yes, ithas been done numerous times by many of our leaders at all levelsduring the course of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Myfellow advisors and I felt that while we were never considered“Iraqis,” we were considered part of an extended family. How didthis happen? Because the Iraqis saw that although we could beviolent and were absolutely relentless in our pursuit of the enemy,we were passionate about the welfare of the citizens in our sector,the welfare of the families of our Iraqi soldiers, and werecompassionate to the plight of the population. We took risks ofnot engaging known insurgents in order to prevent harm to thepopulace. We also took precautions to ensure those that providedus information were protected and cared for. When our Iraqisoldiers were killed, we ensured their benefits were paid to thefamilies and at the advice of our interpreters, bought sheep andpresented them to the families of the soldiers. Our area was largely

rural and this was considered anhonorable thing to do in that area.I had never been formallyinstructed on the proper way to buysheep, nor had the Iraqi local sheep“vendors” ever seen an Americandrive up and buy sheep and stuffthem in a HMMWV for transport.But once the haggling wasinitiated, the price negotiated, andthe word of our deeds spreadthrough the community, ourreputation as compassionatewarriors who could be trusted grew— therefore our intelligence grewfrom local sources, and thedetention of actual verifiedinsurgents grew. This is just asmall example of the how and whyof cultural awareness is importantand is a combat multiplier.

One of the Iraqi populace’sgreatest causes of concern, and the American Soldier’s cause ofconcern, is the escalation of force. Rarely in a COIN environmentwill there be an easy call in regards to deadly force. There are


PROFESSIONAL FORUM

Family Extended Family Tribe/Clan Regionalism (within the country) Nationalism Arabs like us (Muslim) Arabs not like us (non-Muslim) All the rest

Stronger Ties

Weaker Ties Common error: Focusing too much on religion

Figure 2 — Arab Loyalties Model

Figure 3

www.jimwagnertraining.com


many factors that determine the use of forcein Iraq, and not just deadly force since anyforce can cause a rift in the populace. Whilethis article is not about rules of engagement(ROE) or the escalation of force, I think itis paramount and would be negligent notto discuss it in relation to culturalawareness.

In his book, Afghanistan & The TroubledFuture of Unconventional Warfare, authorHy S. Rothstein states: “The pursuit ofattrition efficiencies against an irregularenemy can only be damaging to one’s owncause … by producing collateral damage,antagonizing the population, increasing theranks of the enemy, and eventually

demoralizing one’s own forces as a resultof increasingly well-coordinated attacksgenerated by an increasingly hostilepopulation.”

This passage highlights the importanceof precision and controlled fires, andmeeting escalation of force is an issue thatis ingrained at all levels of leadership inour training. As an Army, we often placegreat value on firepower and a show ofstrength. And arguably so, this is anappropriate response to force. Butgraduated response is a better way andsimply having it available to us does notmake it the appropriate tool. A visualrepresentation of meeting force with the

appropriate force is sometimes useful inconveying a message to the troops. Meetingforce with the appropriate measure of forceis critical in a COIN fight in order to notalienate the population even further.Figures 3 and 4 are two examples ofescalation of force modules. Figure 3 is acivilian model designed by Jim Wagner, aworld renowned law enforcement andmilitary instructor. It is a good model andhas applications that, although notdesigned for military use and are not cookiecutter solutions for Iraq, they could be abase line for Soldiers at the individual level.Figure 4 is a graduated response matrix(GRM) card from FM 3-19.15, CivilDisturbance Operations. This GRM is asample and could be modified at thebattalion or brigade levels to fit specificneeds. A GRM should be war-gamed,molded and developed to fit each unit’sindividual conditions in respect to thenature of enemy attacks, rapport with thelocal populace, as well as the cultural andsocial considerations unique to their area.A reevaluation of this matrix based onevents and proper measure of effectiveness(MOE) would be recommended at thebattalion level. It is important to rememberthe IO campaign plan when developing thismatrix in order to capitalize on our effortsto minimize civilian causalities andcollateral damage. Proper use of forcecreates a tremendous amount of stress onSoldiers and leaders alike. The properdevelopment of a graduation of force ladderassists in the mitigation of this stress. Thismakes the populace safer, and in the end –Soldiers safer by gaining the trust andrespect of the Iraqi people.

The enemy in Iraq succeeds daily in theirgoal of engaging us in attrition-based warfarewhile they slowly strengthen their lines ofcommunication with the center of gravity ina COIN fight — the Iraqi populace. We mustdo all we can to discard the idea that this waris about simply killing the enemy. Without adoubt, that is a micro part of our objective,but the real mission is gaining the confidenceof the Iraqi people in their government andstrengthening the lines of communicationbetween them, their government, and us. Thiscannot be done without some degree ofcultural awareness and culturalunderstanding. Some ways we can achievethis are by integrating cultural sensitivity into

Figure 4 — Sample GRM Card

our training and our combat operations.* Cultural awareness training: Soldiers

must know, understand, and be able toeffectively integrate what is the social norm intheater.

* Language training: This is an invaluableskill that serves a unit well throughout the tour.Every unit has its language training challenges.Be innovative. Some Stryker brigade combatteams (SBCTs) at Fort Lewis, Washington,have realized the importance of this skill and have accepted riskin some areas to capitalize on this combat multiplier. Knowingsome of the language and body language helps break down socialand cultural barriers.

* Leader training: Develop scenario-based vignettes andexercises involving escalation of force. Develop and implementnegotiation training and arbitration at all levels of training. Ourleaders in Iraq and Afghanistan are going to have to do this on adaily basis in some form or another. Why not give them the propertools to do so? A surprising number of civilian courses have aplethora of information that can be applicable and have utility inIraq if looked at through the lens of cultural awareness.

* Rules of engagement and escalation of force training: ROEand EOF vignettes are culturally sensitive. Soldiers may have tomake a life or death decision within moments. UnderstandingROE and EOF enhances the Soldier’s ability to make the rightdecision. Rehearse these prior to every mission.

* Diversify training events: Integrate ROE, EOF, role-playing,and civilians on the battlefield into all tactical exercises. Ensurethere are consequences for cultural blunders and blatantlydisregarding cultural social considerations in the planning andexecution phase.

* Draw the line: Emphasize that cultural sensitivity in noway jeopardizes the lives of Soldiers. Ensure that Soldiersunderstand that sometimes tactical decisions that are not culturallysensitive must be made, but that is the exception rather than thenorm. Care towards civilians and treating them with dignity andrespect is “the culture of our organization.”

* Information Operations (IO) training: IO training at alllevels ensures that this powerful tool in a COIN environment isadequately utilized throughout our organization. Know that IO isthe name of the game and integrate it into our daily operations.“Knowing your neighborhood” is essential in the IO plan. As anexample at the micro level, while I was an advisor, in our AORthere were no local newspapers, etc., and the local populace washungry for printed material. One of my NCOs was a big NASCARfan. While looking at some photos one day, we came up with theidea of enlarging sector-specific IO products and pasting them allover our vehicles and our Iraqi vehicles. While the appearancewas rather “unmilitary looking” in a traditional sense (theyresembled a NASCAR car with the sponsor logos), the responsewas overwhelming from the locals. They actually read our vehicleswhile at halts, on security, etc., and subsequently provided usvaluable intelligence based off this.

* Every Soldier is a sensor: This is almost a cliché now, but a

Major Mark S. Leslie is the chief of Training for the Stryker TransformationTeam at Fort Benning. Leslie is a veteran of Operations Just Cause, DesertShied/Desert Storm, and Iraqi Freedom. He has served as a Long RangeSurveillance team leader, Ranger instructor and commander of A Companyand HHC, 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, and as the SeniorIraqi Army Advisor for 2-7 CAV, 1CD.


true one. Intelligence information in a COIN fightis more often than not garnered through personalrelationships. Verbal engagements are morecommon than kinetic engagements. Debriefingsare critical to reaping the rewards.

* Civil Affairs training: Pre-deploymenttraining on public works, animal husbandry, wastedisposal process, etc., are essential. While no oneexpects us as infantry Soldiers to be masters ofthese tasks, general knowledge can and will give

you a point of reference to base ideas, thoughts, and mostimportantly – solutions – off of. Although Columbus, Georgia,and Clarksville, Tennessee, are not Baghdad, the local cities inthe area can provide you with a working model to base “nationbuilder” duties off of. Attending a local city meeting may seem afar cry from what you will be doing in Iraq, but the same principalas above applies – working model.

* Embrace the culture: This is difficult for most but notimpossible. Understanding the Iraqi people, the center of gravityin our fight, is a combat multiplier. Knowing the history, culturalnorms, and social norms enhances understanding and reinforcesthe belief that they are not the enemy — the insurgents are theenemy. Assimilate local customs and sensibilities as closely aspossible.

In our Army today, there is no excuse to deploy culturallyignorant. There are multitudes of tools, models, and assets atour disposal as leaders. Tools such as Rosetta Stone, ArmyContinuing education classes on Arabic, and Internet resourcessuch as the 11th Infantry Regiment’s Web site dedicated tocultural awareness (https://www.benning.army.mil/11th/culture/culture.asp) are just a few examples. Our imaginationis all that limits us in our ability to train our Soldiers effectivelyin preparation for the rigors of combat. Traditional warfightingskills are important as ever and are not meant to be marginalizedby cultural awareness. The next step in progression in the levelof difficulty is obviously the integration of the cultural factorsthat so often determine defeat or failure in a COIN fight. Todisregard the implications of cultural ignorance or the inabilityto be culturally savvy is to place not only the mission of victoryin Iraq in jeopardy but also our most precious asset – the livesof those in our charge, our Soldiers.

Let there be no misconception that I understand we areengaged in deadly combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet we musttemper that necessary violence in a COIN fight with culturalawareness, cultural understanding, and ultimately culturalcompetence. For as Clausewitz said: “The people are everythingin war.“

PROFESSIONAL FORUM

In our Army today,there is no excuse to

deploy culturallyignorant. There aremultitudes of tools,

models and assets atour disposal as

leaders.


In 2004, the M95/M96 Mortar FireControl System (MFCS) was fielded to the 1st Cavalry Division in

support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)II. The M95 MFCS is used with the120mm mortar vehicle and primarilyconsists of the commander’s interfacecomputer, gunner ’s display, driver ’sdisplay, and a navigation suite. The M96MFCS is used in the fire direction center(FDC) and consists primarily of thecommander’s interface computer. Thesystem gives the battalion’s mortar platoonincreased overall accuracy, responsiveness,survivability, and lethality. MFCS allowsthe battalion’s heavy mortar platoon toperform technical fire direction via thecommander’s interface computer. Thisdigitalized system lets MFCS integrate into

THE MORTAR FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMDAVID SUPER AND TRAVIS KUNDEL

the digital fires network through theexisting SINCGARS radio suite. MFCS iscompatible with the Advanced FieldArtillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS)and the Force XXI Battle CommandBrigade and Below (FBCB2). MFCS usesan accurate pointing device whicheliminates the need for aiming posts andsights as the primary method of lay. Thedriver’s display allows the driver to roughlay the mortar carrier. Finally, the gunner’sdisplay lets the gunner know where themortar tube is actually laid. MFCS iscurrently fielded in the M1064A3 MortarCarrier (M113) and M1129 Stryker MortarCarrier.

MFCS can conduct final protective fires(FPF), precision registrations, grid, polar

plot, and shift missions. It conductsfratricide checks, stores meteorologicalmessages and safety fans as well. MFCSallows the FDC to quickly and accuratelychange sheafs to fit the tactical situation.These sheafs include linear, open, parallel,converged, and special sheafs.

MFCS first saw operational experiencein the battles in Najaf and Fallujah in 2004.In all instances, MFCS gave the maneuvercommanders confidence in the system. Onebattalion fire support officer said the 120s(MFCS) were so good, that the Marinesrequested 120mm mortar support in lieuof using their own organic 81mm mortars.

All interviewees were impressed withthe accuracy of MFCS. One companycommander reflected upon his unit’sconduct of a deliberate attack when they

received more enemyresistance than expected.The unit, pulled back and

called in the battalion’s120mm mortar platoon. He

Courtesy photo

The Mortar Fire Control System iscurrently fielded in the M1064A3

Mortar Carrier (M113) and M1129Stryker Mortar Carrier.


PROFESSIONAL FORUM

was amazed at the accuracy of the MFCS. The mortars destroyedthe enemy position within meters of the target location. In Najaf,one maneuver platoon leader commented that within a round or twoof adjustment on a target of opportunity, the mortars accuratelyconverged on the targeted building with great success. MFCSsignificantly reduces the circular error probable (CEP) of the 120mmmortar systems. One of the capabilities of MFCS is the use ofmeteorological conditions (MET) to account for nonstandardconditions. This allows MFCS to be more accurate. One mortarplatoon leader said, “…with a good MET it has been steel on targetfor us.” The same platoon leader said, “We have primarily firedillum missions with it, and the sheafs have been picture perfect.”Another Soldier said, “MFCS allows for greater accuracy than we’veever had and that equates to immediately suppressing and destroyingthe enemy.”

MFCS enhances responsiveness for maneuver commanders,especially with the ability of the system to conduct hip shoots in lessthan a minute. In Fallujah, mortars were extensively used, in partbecause mortars are the battalion commander’s organic fire supportsystem. Additionally, with howitzers located more than 10 kilometersaway, communications were difficult, especially when conductingurban operations. Artillery’s role was further complicated by its tacticalmission of general-support reinforcement, which slowedresponsiveness. MFCS allows the maneuver commander to receivefire for effect in a substantially less amount of time than through theprevious method of fire control which required use of a plotting board,aiming posts, and sight units.

Survivability is increased by use of MFCS. The ability toconduct hip shoots in less than minute means not only can themortars emplace in a short amount of time, but they can alsodisplace quickly. If a fire direction center is taken out of action,any gun can easily fulfill the FDC role as required.

Several Soldiers commented that the lethality of the 120mmmortar was excellent, especially in an urban environment.Improved accuracy results in less time taken to adjust roundsprovided the observer’s target location is accurate. Numerous

Soldiers commented they preferred using 120’s in urban operationsbecause of its accuracy compared with 81mm or 60mm mortars.MFCS has enabled the 120mm mortar to become more lethal basedon its improved accuracy, responsiveness, and survivability. WhileMFCS has enabled 120mm mortars to become much more effectiveand accurate, the system will not make 120mm mortar ammunitionprecise enough to destroy high value point targets with minimalcollateral damage. For these applications against lightly armoredvehicles, bunkers, and buildings, where “one shot, one kill” isrequired, mortar users still need the Precision Guided MortarMunition.

The Mortar Fire Control System is managed by the office ofthe Product Manager (PM) for Mortar Systems. In response tothe 1995 MFCS Operational Requirements Document (ORD), PMMortars developed an evolutionary development strategy to fieldthe full required functionality. The MFCS hardware was baselinedwhen the system was type classified standard in April 2003. Thefull functionality of the MFCS software will be achieved throughdevelopment and release of 5 Versions of software. Because MFCSis a core system in Army Software Blocking (ASB), releases ofMFCS software versions are accomplished concurrently with ASBreleases. MFCS Version 4 is slated to be released with ArmySoftware Block 2 in FY 2007. Through Version 4, MFCS softwareincorporates: all basic mortar firing missions, digital MET,interface with FBCB2, fire support coordination measures, digitalcommunication, the NATO ballistic kernel, and the ballistic kernelfor the most recently fielded U.S. mortar rounds. MFCS Version5, which will be released with ASB 3, will incorporate all of Version4 plus multiple safety fans, search and traverse, the XM395Precision Guided Mortar Munition, and the dismounted 120mmMFCS.

The MFCS program is fully funded and will be fully fielded bythe end of FY 2008 to all heavy and Stryker brigade combat teamsin both the active force and National Guard. PM Mortars iscurrently qualifying a dismounted variant of MFCS which will beintegrated with the M120 120mm towed mortar. This MFCSvariant, called the XM150 Dismounted 120mm MFCS, will beused in conjunction with the M1101 trailer and the Quick Stowdevice which will be mounted on the trailer. The Quick Stow willenable the mortar crew to rapidly emplace and displace the M120towed mortar. Qualification of the dismounted 120mm MFCSwill be completed in early FY 2008. Fielding of this system toinfantry brigade combat teams will begin in FY 2009. The XM150Dismounted MFCS will enhance the IBCTs ability to deliver moreaccurate, responsive, and lethal 120mm mortar fires.

Honeywell Aerospace Electronic Systems in Albuquerque, NewMexico, is the systems integrator responsible for systemsprocurement, staging, and fielding. The Life Cycle SoftwareEngineering Center, located at the U.S. Army Armament Research,Development, and Engineering Center, Picatinny Arsenal, NewJersey, is responsible for software development.

David Super is the Deputy Product Manager for Mortar Systems, atPicatinny Arsenal, New Jersey.

Travis Kundel is employed by Honeywell Aerospace Electronic Systemsand works on-site in the Office of the Product Manager for Mortar Systems.

Courtesy photo

The Mortar Fire Control System gives the battalion’s mortar platoonincreased overall accuracy, responsiveness, survivability, and lethality.

Doctrine requires human judgment when applied to a specificsituation. In choosing a solution to a tactical problem, applicablelaws and regulations, the mission, the laws of physics, humanbehavior, and logistic realities constrain the tactician, notstandardized techniques and procedures. The true test of thetactician’s solution is not whether it uses the specific techniquesor procedures contained in this manual, but whether the techniquesand procedures used were appropriate to the situation.

— FM 3-90, Tactics

In January 2006 my company assumed responsibility for thesouthern half of Baqubah, the largest city in Iraq’s Diyala Province (Figure 1). Our battalion was charged with

preparing an Iraqi Army brigade to assume the security lead andfor setting the conditions for provincial government control inDiyala. My company’s mission was to disrupt a Sunni-basedinsurgency to give the Iraqi Police and Army space and time todevelop capabilities and assume the security lead. As I deployedmy company, my biggest challenge was in focusing our combatpower into tactical operations against an asymmetric opponent ina decentralized fight.

The conventional Army is manned, equipped, and trained torapidly find, fix, and destroy other conventional forces. When wefind ourselves facing an enemy who can readily blend in to anopaque society, we are challenged to affect a decisive outcome.Because we cannot readily discriminate friend from foe in thisenvironment, we look towards indigenous security forces toovercome this limitation. However, until those forces areadequately manned, trained, and equipped to do the job, we mustintervene to provide them space and time to mature. It is in thisperiod that discrete application of combat power against theenemy’s vulnerabilities is critical.

We have been fighting a number of opposition groups in Iraq.While each has unique agendas and goals, they all appear to haveat least one common operational goal, namely the premature exit

SETTING THECONDITIONS FOR

DECISIVEENGAGEMENTS IN

BUHRIZ

of U.S. forces from Iraq. This translates into a common set oftactics against coalition forces and leads to difficulty in modelingand predicting enemy activity in Iraq. However, an accurateaccounting and analysis of both enemy and friendly patterns canlead to useful assumptions that allow us to shape operations thatdecisively attack the enemy’s vulnerabilities.

My company consisted of two organic mechanized infantryplatoons, the battalion mortar platoon, and one armor platoonwith an engineer squad. We had M2 Bradley fighting vehiclesand M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks. All platoons were alsomotorized with M1114 armored trucks and 25 to 30 Soldiers. Wesupplied two platoons a day to protect the force, and we fieldedtwo platoons a day for offensive operations.

Our area of operation included the boroughs of Tahrir andKatoon and the village of Buhriz. Unlike Tahrir and Katoon,Buhriz is an independent municipality with its own mayor, citycouncil, and police department. It also serves as the administrativeseat for the Buhriz Nahia which extends many kilometers south.(The Nahia is an administrative district similar to the county inthe U.S.) Buhriz, which is a largely conservative Sunni agriculturecommunity, is generally poor. The people earn their living throughthe palm groves which produce dates, oranges, and other fruitand from grain raised on irrigated farmlands. There is no industryor service economy aside from small shops in the central marketarea. Major infrastructure such as roads, power, water, and sewerare poorer than in neighboring Baqubah.

The village is isolated geographically by a dense palm grove


CAPTAIN LARRY SHARP

Figure 1

and the Diyala River on the west, and byirrigated farmland on the east (Figure 2).A wide irrigation canal runs north-southand splits the village. East-west traffic isconstricted to three bridges large enoughto support vehicles and to a handful ofpedestrian bridges. Within the villagetraffic is constricted to narrow, paved andgravel roads. A paved road runs the lengthof the village on the west side of the canal.Because of profuse irrigation canals, thevillage is accessible by only a few roads:the primary road in the north and the south,and by three improved gravel roads runningto the east. Traffic is controlled bypermanent checkpoints at the extreme northand south of the village, but internally isunregulated. Historically, the village hadbeen a zone of support for various Sunniinsurgent groups and the site of numerousfirefights, engagements, and uprisings.Most notably was the downing of anAmerican helicopter in 2004.

The Buhriz police were understrengthand poorly trained. Barely capable ofdefending their station, they rarely patrolledthe village. The checkpoints at the northand south of town were manned by officersfrom Baqubah traffic department and theirguard mount constituted the only regularnon-coalition patrols through town. Theoriginal police station had been attackedand completely destroyed in 2004, and thesouthernmost checkpoint was frequentlyattacked and on several occasionscompletely destroyed.

We were challenged to paint acoherent picture of the enemy inBuhriz. Solid intelligence on enemyactivity there proved difficult toobtain. External reporting was atbest vague and often wildlyinaccurate and unverifiable. Weinherited a robust humanintelligence program from theprevious unit; however, their vettingsystem was largely intuitive. Whilethey were extremely proactive anddetained many low-level terroristsand criminals, they had notaccurately tied activity in Buhrizwith a larger insurgency. Recurringreports from sources and contactsindicated that large groups of armedmen massed after curfew to attackthe Iraqi Police positions. Finally,

the enemy routinely employed roadsidebombs in Buhriz, but they were not aseffective as in other areas in the province.

Several assumptions drove my tacticalanalysis. First, the enemy can afford astalemate because time is on his side. Heis here for the rest of his life, but we can’tstay indefinitely. Our operational reach inIraq is virtually equivalent to the amountof time our Nation will keep us there. Noother factor limits us to the extent of thisgreat unknown. History, however,guarantees that two things will shorten thisreach: unacceptable U.S. casualties andabuse of U.S. firepower. Because of this,effective attacks are more valuable for theenemy than us and ineffective or inaccurateattacks are more prejudicial to us than theenemy. The details of every Americancasualty and every botched operation arepublished in every major Americannewspaper, whereas most enemy dieanonymously and enemy attacks with noeffects are underreported even by us. Theresult significantly limits the amount of risk

PROFESSIONAL FORUM


we are willing to take, and it limits theavailable kinetic options at our disposalwhile the enemy is relatively unfettered.

Marginalizing him from the society hehides amongst is the surest route to victory.This entails building and protecting anumber of complementary effects withinthat society. In this sense fighting theenemy is only necessary when he threatensour effects. We do not necessarily have todestroy him when it will suffice to merelydisrupt him. This is a much easier tacticaltask.

My METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain,troops, time, civilians) analysis resulted infour effects objectives that served as theframework for all company operations:

Ø Fix and destroy the enemy when andwhere he exposes himself;

Ø Develop Iraqi security forces (ISF) toassume basic security and law enforcementoperations;

Ø Foster local popular confidence in theISF; and

Ø Capture or kill enemy leadership andresources with combined operations.

I wanted to relate all companyoperations back to one or more of theseobjectives. Because of its independentnature and because of its reputation as aSunni stronghold, I chose to focus mycompany’s effort in Buhriz. While wecontinued to comprehend the enemystructure and target his leadership andsupport element, we nonetheless had to

confront the real danger posed bythe reports of forces massing inBuhriz. To confirm or deny thesereports we reconnoitered at night.The restrictive terrain favored ourtruck mobile platoons. During theday we trained the IPs andcanvassed the neighborhoods toacquire solid intelligence.

Our first two direct fireengagements were in Buhriz(Figure 2). The first was fromelevated positions near the centralmarket area. There the enemyattacked with machine guns as theplatoon crossed a bridge. Theplatoon immediately returned fire,and the platoon leader pushedacross the bridge and south toescape. From there he was unableto flank the enemy with his trucks,Figure 2

Marginalizing him (the enemy)from the society he hides

amongst is the surest route tovictory. This entails buildingand protecting a number of

complementary effects withinthat society.

and by the time he led his squad afoot to maneuver on the enemythey broke contact and evaded capture.

Less than a month later, another platoon was moving norththrough the village when the enemy engaged it with a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and machine-gun fire. The platoonattempted to maneuver on the enemy, but could not precisely locatethe foe. Then the enemy detonated a roadside bomb near one ofthe trucks and engaged the platoon with a machine gun. Theplatoon leader attempted to fix the enemy and maneuver on itwith his squads, but again the enemy was able to break contact.

Neither engagement proved decisive for us because the enemycombined an early warning system, with a disciplined engagementcriteria and a calculated withdrawal plan that set the conditionsin his favor. In both instances the enemy attacked four armoredgun trucks at night. The enemy surprised the patrol with a directfire attack, the platoon reacted aggressively and attempted tomaneuver on the foe, but they evaded the platoon in the restrictiveterrain and suffered no apparent damage.

To change the dynamics, the company before us hadexperimented with infiltrating snipers into key terrain, but theywere unable to do so clandestinely. Because they couldn’t gainsurprise, the enemy refused to commit while the snipers were inplace. While this suppressed enemy activity, the company couldnot sustain them for more than a few days and so achieved nolong term effects. They also tried committing more firepower by

employing Bradley fighting vehicle sections. The Bradley’sfirepower advantage was offset by its lack of mobility in the narrowstreets and along the irrigation canal. This neither decreasedattacks nor netted decisive engagements because the enemyretained the initiative and decided when and how to engage.

I intended to decisively and consistently defeat the enemy atnight on his own turf. This would neutralize the Sunni resistancethreat, provide operating room for the beleaguered Iraqi police,and provide us with a positive IO message which we could leverageduring the day. The challenge then was: how to circumvent hisearly warning and engagement criteria to get him to commit whenwe could decisively maneuver on and destroy him.

We began to model and track the enemy’s intent andengagement criteria. Our assumptions from his patterns indicated:

Ø His intent was to set the conditions for attacks that he couldleverage in a prolonged IO campaign. Complete success for himwas a catastrophic kill that destroyed a coalition vehicle, killedSoldiers, or elicited a gross overreaction on our part. Directparticipation with small arms was critical to his ethos and his IOcampaign. Partial success was to periodically engage us withoutsustaining any losses. Failure for him was no attacks.

Ø The enemy concealed sentries in houses near all mountedapproaches to Buhriz, and these sentries used cell phones tocommunicate with the ambush position.

Ø Because of its symbolic importance the enemy was more


Staff Sergeant Stacy L. Pearsall, USAF

Soldiers react to a situation while on foot patrol in Buhriz in February 2007.

PROFESSIONAL FORUM


Captain Larry Sharp is currently serving asan assistant operations officer for the 3rd BrigadeCombat Team, 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson,Colorado.

likely to attack Thursday or Friday night.(I never determined if the so called “FightNights” on Thursday and Friday werefactual or anecdotal. A previous S2suggested that over the course of a year nonight or nights incur more attacks thanothers.)

Ø The enemy was more likely to attemptto attack us after a successful non-kineticoperation.

Ø He would use the same engagementareas consistently.

Ø The enemy would not engage patrolslarger than a certain number of trucks.

As a result we implemented thefollowing control measures:

Ø Our platoon’s mission in Buhriz aftercurfew was: Destroy enemy forces massingin Buhriz to neutralize their influence andprovide ISF freedom of maneuver.

Ø Frequent daytime reconnaissance oflikely enemy engagement areas bothmounted and on foot to familiarize theplatoons with the area.

Ø From Sunday to Wednesday night wedeployed another platoon to a nearbyneighborhood, either to the north or to thesouth. While both patrols had separatemissions, they stood ready to maneuver toand reinforce each other.

Ø Platoons deployed their rifle squadsto clear through likely engagement areason foot.

Ø Patrols would only engage confirmedenemy locations and observe suspected andlikely locations. (The intent was tominimize collateral damage and avoidgross overreactions.)

Ø No platoon operations onThursday and Friday nights or after non-kinetic operations. On these nights wecoordinated one or two platoons and thecompany headquarters.

My concept for the company operationswas to leverage our organic Raven smallunmanned aerial vehicle (SUAV) inconjunction with two platoonsmaneuvering in Buhriz. The companyheadquarters with three trucks usually setin position first and we launched the Ravenfrom the edge of town. Another platoonwith four trucks would move to a blockingposition. Then, as the third platoon of fourtrucks entered town, we would attempt tolocate enemy ambush positions andmaneuver our forces on them. After several

iterations we became proficient with ourRaven SUAV, but we were unable to makecontact with the enemy.

We concluded that either the enemy hadrelocated to another area or that theenemy’s early warning was sophisticatedenough to detect our intent. Occasionalnight attacks against the southernmostpolice checkpoint convinced us that he wasstill there, but the police could never conveywhere they came from or where they wentafter the attack. To defeat the earlywarning, we scaled down the operation toa single platoon with four trucks, and theheadquarters with three trucks ready tomaneuver and support. With eachoperation we pushed our Raven launch sitefurther from town, and still we netted nosignificant contact. On the last night weran this operation, our platoon in townfound a roadside bomb, but no fighters. Inretrospect I believe that it was virtuallyimpossible to hide our signature from hissentries. Shortly after this patrol, wehanded Buhriz over to another company,and the IA took the security lead inBaqubah. The battalion assumedoperational overwatch and we focused onQRF support to the IA, select combinedraids, and daytime non-kinetic operations.

While we never achieved my intent ofdecisively beating the enemy on his ownturf at night, we nonetheless forced theenemy to failure through a careful analysisof his patterns and by leveraging histriggers against him. Never once did theenemy engage us when we wereimplementing this plan.

This allowed us to do several things.First and foremost it gave us immeasurableclout with the Buhriz police. As the weeksprogressed, we worked closely together firstteaching them marksmanship and thenmore complex tactical skills. As we provedthe enemy was unwilling to challenge us,the police grew bolder. Soon theyaccompanied us on daytime patrols and afew select raids. At the same time, wepromoted them with the people of Buhriz.By linking our success to them it increasedthe number of citizen contacts coming tothe police with intelligence. This providedboth a positive measure of popularconfidence in the institution and a sourceof intelligence to drive future operations.

The other benefit was directly with the

people of Buhriz. Immediately they noticedour subtle approach and appreciated bothour controlled operations and the generaldecrease in violence. This lent uscredibility with the civil authorities, andallowed us to restart some sidetrackedprojects. Finally, our success gave thebattalion commander leverage with thelocal Sheiks. In this sense he was able tonegotiate several deals between the tribesto further our cause. In the end we managedto effectively transition the gap betweencoalition and Iraqi security lead in Buhrizthrough our discrete application of combatpower and by carefully setting theconditions for decisive engagements.

Focusing your available combat powerand setting the conditions for successfultactical operations takes a great deal ofanalysis and consideration. Remember todefine the effects you want to generate inyour area. Get all your assets into the fight,and fight for the esoteric ones. Some assetsthat I could have used included: signaldetection equipment to confirm or deny thecapability of his early warning capability,tactical UAVs to reinforce my limitedreconnaissance stealth UAV, and an Iraqiarmy close target reconnaissance team toreport clandestinely from inside town.

Your METT-TC analysis has to considerthe enemy’s intent and scheme ofmaneuver. Don’t just look at what he mightor can do. Consider what he needs to win,and look at how he loses. Assess his tacticaltriggers, and update your model with everyengagement. Then you are ready to developa scheme of maneuver to defeat him. AsFM 3-90 reminds us:

Success in tactical problem solvingresults from the aggressive, intelligent,and decisive use of combat power in anenvironment of uncertainty, disorder,violence, and danger. A commander winsby being on the offense, initiating combaton his own terms — at a time and place ofhis choosing.

OVERVIEWIn 2005, members of a Special Operations task force conducted

an offensive operation in the Tagab Valley located in thesoutheastern corner of the Kapisa Province in central Afghanistan.This assault sent insurgent fighters into nearby Pakistan to escapethe coalition offensive. Once the coalition troops stabilized thesecurity situation in the Tagab Valley, they shifted to other partsof the theater leaving the valley undefended. By the fall of 2006,insurgent Taliban fighters had returned to the Tagab Valley fromPakistan and had firmly regained control. The Tagab Valley wasas deadly in September 2006 as it was before the 2005 offensive.Local leaders reported to coalition forces that there were almost500 Taliban fighters living in the area, some of whom had trainedat one of the three nearby suicide bomber training facilities. TagabValley residents symbolically burned humanitarian assistance (HA)drops of blankets and winter clothing in the southern portion ofthe valley only weeks before the cold winter months. Talibanfighters littered the Kohi Safi Mountains which separate the TagabValley from Bagram Airfield with weapons caches and fightingpositions to fire on coalition forces (CF). Up until this pastNovember, coalition ground convoys could not pass through thevalley without receiving small arms fire as part of a series of pre-planned ambushes. The Tagab Valley, running 40 kilometers northto south only 60 miles northeast of Kabul, was an ideal safe havenfrom which Taliban commanders could project suicide bombersand other insurgent activity into nearby Bagram, Jalalabad, Kabul,and Kapisa (See Figure 1). Clearly, a stable and peaceful Tagabwould have significant effects on the security of centralAfghanistan.

Special Operations Task Force 33 (SOTF-33) from the 3rdBattalion, 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne), worked hand-in-hand with the Kapisa Provincial Governor and soldiers from theUnited Arab Emirates (UAE) Special Operations Task Force 8(TF-8) to bring long-term stability to the Tagab Valley. On October31, 2006, these partners began Operation Al Hasn (Arabic for“fortress” or “castle”) as a joint, multinational, multi-agencyoperation designed to clear, hold, and build the Tagab Valleyagainst the insurgency. The operation featured more than 1,000Soldiers and policeman from the Afghan National Security ForcesAfghanistan National Police (ANP)/Afghanistan Border Patrol(ABP), TF-8, four Operational Detachments -Alpha (ODAs), OtherGovernment Agencies (OGAs), and Afghanistan National Army

OPERATION AL HASN

(ANA) personnel, which operated under the command and controlof SOTF-33.

PLANNING AS A PARTNERSHIP“This is the first time that the government of Afghanistan has

been involved in all phases of the operation. This is the way thatoperation(s) should be conducted.”

— Kapisa Province Governor Satar Murad,November 8, 2006

SOTF-33, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel SamuelAshley, rotated into Afghanistan for Operation Enduring FreedomIX. SOTF-33 established a strong partnership with TF-8 whoseleader, Lieutenant Colonel Nasser Al Ottabi, was eager to applyhis country’s significant assets where they could be most effectivein stabilizing Afghanistan. Immediately after SOTF-33transitioned into Afghanistan, SOTF-33 and TF-8 plannersrecognized the strategic importance of denying the Taliban TagabValley as a safe haven. With this in mind, SOTF-33 and TF-8began to create a friendly network to degrade the Taliban network

MAJOR SCOTT T. MCGLEISHMAJOR DARIN J. BLATT

CAPTAIN PETER G. FISCHER

Planning and Executing a Full-Spectrum Operationin the Afghan Theater Today

Figure 1

BAGRAM

TAGAB

KABUL

JALALABAD


PROFESSIONAL FORUM


in the valley. This required theidentification of key friendly personalitieswith whom SOTF-33 and TF-8 could buildtheir alliance. SOTF-33 and TF-8understood that the key to success for long-term stability in the Kapisa Province wasempowering the Afghan officials in theprovince. With similar Islamic culturalnorms and streamlined financial supportprocedures, TF-8 had the unique ability tobuild almost instant rapport with localAfghan leaders. LTC Nasser had developeda relationship with the Kapisa GovernorSatar Murad and recommended hepersonally participate in the planningoperations to deny Taliban use of the TagabValley. In September 2006, LTC Ashley,LTC Nasser, and Governor Murad met atthe UAE compound to discuss the futuresecurity of the Tagab Valley.

From the first planning sessions,Governor Murad and officials from SOTF-33 and TF-8 agreed that bringing stabilityto Tagab was not exclusively a militarymatter. Instead, this was a battle that mustbe won by the local legitimate government.Long-term success in the Tagab Valleyrequires tangible demonstrations of theAfghan government’s commitment tosecurity and stability in the region. Thegovernment of Afghanistan (GOA) woulddo more than provide symbolic ownership;it would bear the leadership mantle for thisoperation.

SOTF-33, TF-8, and the regionalAfghan leaders began to plan an operationto clear the insurgents from the valley, holda lasting security posture, and buildlegitimate government structures capableof combating an insurgent threat over thelong-term. SOTF-33 conducted the U.S.military decision-making process (MDMP)to include both Afghan partners and TF-8.This challenged U.S. planners accustomedto tightly structured MDMP. Elements ofthe planning that might take minutes for aU.S. staff to accomplish, took significantly

longer when working in a combined/interagency environment with partners notaccustomed to MDMP. Moreover, the GOAleaders were forced to divide theirattentions between operational planningand their governing duties. Despite thesechallenges, SOTF-33 gave their Afghanpartners ownership of the process bypushing the plan forward according to theirpriorities. The operational principle ofhaving “Afghan ownership” was recentlyderived from lessons learned in conductingeffective operations from the tactical tostrategic levels.

When planning Operation Al Hasn, thecoalition evaluated the historical operationsand looked to three lessons learned inprevious Tagab Valley operations. First andforemost, Operation Al Hasn was designedas a true partnership between the U.S.,UAE, and the government of Afghanistan.Throughout Operation Al Hasn, SOTF-33and TF-8 included Governor Murad in theplanning, coordination, and execution asan equal partner. Successfulcounterinsurgency (COIN) operationsseparate the insurgent from the populace.Today, special operations forces inAfghanistan must empower Afghangovernmental agencies to separate thecivilians from the insurgents and minimizethe impact of those insurgents on thelegitimate government organizations.While kinetic operations may be anecessary catalyst for change, it is just asimportant for non-kinetic operations to beimbedded in these operations to have thelasting effects necessary to win inAfghanistan. SOTF-33 and TF-8 designedthe partnership between coalition forcesand the government of Afghanistan duringOperation Al Hasn to set the conditions forthe Kapisa government to separate the localpopulace from the insurgent fighters.

Second, this mission marked thebeginning of a long-term Afghan andcoalition government presence in the Tagab

Valley. Temporary displays of militarymight do not lead to effective growth andtransformation in Afghanistan. Longbefore the kinetic operations have ended,the battle to win the support of the localpopulace must begin. The Afghangovernment must provide security andstability through non-kinetic and kineticoperations that have a long term strategiceffect. COIN operations require a multitudeof aggressive non-kinetic operations thatdraw on assets provided by PsychologicalOperations (PSYOPS), Civil Affairs (CA),and Provincial Reconstruction Teams(PRTs). To bolster the legitimacy of theAfghan government in the minds of theAfghan people, the local officials must beseen leading actions that are both relevantto their lives and effective at meeting theirneeds. Tactical success in the short termholds little value if it does not lead tooperational success in the long-term.

Finally, the partnership and the long-term presence must be supported by aresponsive and flexible logistics system thatare sustainable through an Afghanistan-owned system. Stockpiling all classes ofhumanitarian assistance and civil-militaryresources is essential to ensure a seamlesstransition from kinetic to non-kineticoperations within the valley. CA teams,humanitarian assistance (HA) drops,medical civil affairs programs (MEDCAP),and PSYOPS resources must be pre-positioned for movement prior to the startof the operation. This allows the leadersto move non-kinetic assets throughout thearea of operations where and when theywere needed, not when they becameavailable.

SHAPING“If the enemy is to be coerced, you must

put him in a situation that is even moreunpleasant than the sacrifice you call onhim to make. The hardships of the situationmust not be merely transient — at least notin appearance. Otherwise, the enemy wouldnot give in, but would wait for things toimprove.”

— Karl Von Clausewitz

Initial shaping efforts began over sixweeks prior to the execution of OperationAl Hasn through extensive and thoroughmeetings between SOTF-33, TF-8 and the

Successful counterinsurgency operations separate theinsurgent from the populace. Today, special operations forces in

Afghanistan must empower Afghan governmental agencies toseparate the civilians from the insurgents and minimize the

impact of those insurgents on the legitimate governmentorganizations.

governor of Kapisa. During these meetingsSOTF-33 planners determined that the keylocation for the forward command andcontrol element should be north of TagabValley because it was the most securelocation from which to direct Operation AlHasn and receive accurate intelligence. Atthe onset of the operation, an ODA fromSOTF-33 and a company of the AfghanNational Army’s 201st Corps would securea small foothold in the north of TagabValley that would later become thepermanent firebase for that ODA. SOTF-33 and TF-8 gathered intelligence throughthe Afghan security organizations in theTagab Valley region. This location hassince become the regional governmentcenter in the valley.

Members of the SOTF-33 PSYOPSsection prepared products for each stage ofthe operation. These products includedleaflet drops to provide instructions to thelocal population and military deceptionplans. Also, radio messages were utilizedto provide important information to thelocal populace during the operation. Allof these products helped to support aneffective information operations plan thatcircumvented any attempts by the Talibanto undermine the efforts of the operation.Several days before the operation, GovernorMurad recorded messages of assurance,guidance, and leadership for play on localradio stations during the operation toencourage his people to identify theinsurgents who have brought instability,poverty and violence to their otherwisepeaceful valley. The Voice of Kapisa radiostation agreed to play Governor Murad’smessages and work with SOTF-33PSYOPS personnel to ensure the messageswere spread throughout its broadcastregion. To support the informationoperations, SOTF-33 PSYOPS distributedseveral thousand radios to enable thepopulation to listen to Governor Murad’sradio messages. The radio transmissionsallowed Governor Murad to personallyupdate the people of Tagab with critical andaccurate news and information.

Executing these radio programs requiredthe distribution of CMO assets at the righttimes in the right places. Prepositionedlogistics allowed the coalition to providesupport to the Afghan leaders when andwhere they were required, rather than

binding them to a coalition supply timeline.Operation Al-Hasn’s logistics, HA, andMEDCAP movements were event driven toprovide the command the ability to react toevents on the ground. More than 30 daysbefore the operation began, SOTF-33ordered and requisitioned blankets, sundrykits, radios, food stuffs, and clothing. Allclasses of logistics were requisitioned,drawn and prepared for movement weeksbefore the mission began. Days before theoperation began, SOTF-33 and TF-8 loadedprepackaged medical and HA supplies onAfghan trucks. SOTF-33 packaged,prepared, stocked, and assembled logisticalpackages to respond to operational needsin the valley.

By pre-positioning supplies weeks inadvance, coalition forces have the abilityto support operations without delay. Thelarge MEDCAP package that consisted ofmore than 30 medical personnel deployedto the Tagab Valley region on the first dayof Operation Al Hasn. The SOTF-33surgeon spent more than a monthassembling a robust medical teamconsisting of personnel from the UnitedStates, Unites Arab Emirates, Afghanistan,Romania, and Korea. SOTF-33 medicalpersonnel provided refresher training forRomanian, Korean, and UAE medicalpersonnel in trauma training in preparationfor the medical mission. The SOTF-33surgeon assembled the MEDCAP to includeexpanded capabilities for treating women,

children, and a veterinary package fortreating pets and livestock. CA plannersworked with the ANA to provide bothinternal and external security and a patientmanagement system that would maximizethe number of people who could receivecare. As the MEDCAP plan came together,TF Tiger and the Bagram PRT contributedmedical supplies and equipment to thealready robust package. Medical personnelprepared this package, like the logisticalpackage, to move days in advance, andactually entered the valley only hours afterthe initial phases of kinetic operations.

Establishing the initial foothold in thevalley was made easier by using the“firebase in a box” concept developed bythe CJSOTF-A engineer. The SOTF-33support center delivered relocatablebuildings and ready-made defensiveresources at the onset of the operation. Thisalong, with CJSOTF-A pre-coordinatedcontracting with host nation workers,ensured that this firebase was in placewithin days after the initial assault.

While SOTF-33 and TF-8 assembled thelogistics, Governor Murad and hisintelligence chiefs identified key enemylocations, key players, and discussingunique environmental and politicalchallenges in the Tagab with the SOTF-33and TF-8 planners. The local Afghanleadership drove the targeting process withtheir unique knowledge of the environment.Their unparalleled insight into the region

Courtesy photos

Governor Satar Murad, Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Ashley and Lieutenant Colonel Nasser AlOtabbi discuss aspects of Operation Al Hasn.



PROFESSIONAL FORUM

gave Operation Al Hasn precise targeting information that wouldreduce the risk of collateral damage and allow the coalition tomaximize the effectiveness of its reconstruction efforts.

In October, SOTF-33 published the warning order and TF-8,ODAs and their partnered Afghan forces began mission-focusedtraining in preparation for the operation. SOTF-33 tasked TF-8and their partnered ODA to execute an air assault mission tocapture key leaders of the Tagab Taliban network. To prepare forthis mission, TF-8 and their partnered ODA began a crawl, walk,run training program to execute an air assault against a statictarget to capture key individuals in the northern part of the valley.They first rehearsed helicopter loading and off-loading proceduresand practiced each of their contingency plans. Two nights beforethe operation, the training culminated in a full fly-away task forcerehearsal where the entire assault element loaded onto theirhelicopters, and flew away to a mock target which they assaultedand secured at full speed.

Other ODAs, tasked by SOTF-33 to create blocking or clearingpositions during Al Hasn rehearsed military operations in urbanterrain with their Afghan partners. Contingency procedures andmovement techniques were polished so that by the 30th of Octobereach element of the kinetic operation had planned and rehearsedkey phases of its operations for over three solid weeks.

EXECUTION“The clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does

not allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on him.”— Sun Tzu

During the initial phase of the operation, ANSF, SOTF-33,and TF-8 planned to isolate and deliberately clear the valley. Thefirst phase would separate the insurgents from the populace. Thecoalition expected 250 ANP from surrounding provinces to link-up with ODAs to conduct the clearing operations. To SOTF-33’ssurprise, the night before the operation, almost 900 ANP respondedto Governor Murad’s call by reporting for duty at the governor’sheadquarters while others went to the northern part of the valleyto collocate next to the ANA/ODA’s location. With this goodnews and a favorable weather forecast, Governor Murad, LTCAshley, and LTC Nasser met in the SOTF-33 operations center tomonitor and direct the beginning of Operation Al Hasn. WithGovernor Murad co-located with the military commanders, real-time intelligence from the Kapisa intelligence officers flowed tothe ODAs and ANP on the ground almost instantly.

On the first evening of Operation Al Hasn, ANP, ANA, TF-8,ODAs from SOTF-33, and AH-64 Apaches from Task ForceCentaur cleared Taliban insurgents from their positions andestablished a security presence in the valley. The operationcoordinated three different key efforts throughout the valley. TF-8 and their ODA partners conducted a successful air assault raidas the main effort against a known Taliban leader in the north ofthe valley while ANSF and two ODAs sealed the south of thevalley (Figure 2).

An ODA, TF-8, FBI, and a dog team commenced the air assaultraid just after midnight on October 31, signaling the beginning ofthe operation. This was the UAE military’s first air assault into a

combat situation. Once on target, the element cleared the objective,captured a key Taliban leader, and established strong points. Within30 minutes of arriving on target, squad-sized elements of Talibanengaged the TF-8 positions. TF-8 suppressed the enemy while theODA called in AH-64s and AC-130 gunships for close air support(CAS).

As the air assault began, the SOTF-33 support center commanderdelivered his convoy brief to the massive logistical convoy as itprepared to move from Bagram Airfield towards the Tagab Valleyunder the cover of darkness. This convoy included not only theHA, MEDCAP and logistics necessary for sustained operations,but also the armored vehicles to be delivered to the air assaultelement once they had secured their initial objective. A companyof ANA and an ODA met the logistical convoy when it arrived atthe new Tagab firebase. The ANA, the ODA, and a portion of thelogistical convoy moved from the firebase by ground convoy tolink-up with the TF-8 air assault element.

On the first morning of the operation, as the Afghan, U.S., andUAE forces began clearing the Taliban insurgents from the valley,LTC Ashley, LTC Nasser, and Governor Murad moved into thenorthern part of the Tagab Valley and established a forwardcombined command post. To ensure the operation’s success,Governor Murad stayed at this forward headquarters to plan anddirect operations for the entire 11 days of the operation. Thegovernor, co-located with the military commanders, was anessential link with the people of the valley and the Afghan media.When the Taliban insurgents published false information in thepress about civilian casualties during kinetic operations, thegovernor immediately contacted the Afghan Minister ofInformation, the Minister of Interior, and President Karzai toexpose the misinformation. During the operation, Governor Murad

Command and control vehicles line up outside the Task Force 1-15Infantry Tactical Operations Center in western Baghdad. One M577

Figure 2

sent factual information to the Afghan national media that theypublished on the same day. As a result, the Taliban’smisinformation campaign stopped within the first few days of theoperation.

Meanwhile, the ABP and two ODAs in the southern part of thevalley began fighting their way northward towards the center ofthe valley and Tagab Village. A-10 Warthogs, B-1 Bombers, AC-130 Gunships, and AH-64 Apaches provided essential close airsupport as the enemy force increased the intensity of itscounterattacks the further the north element moved in the valley.Simultaneously, two ODAs, TF-8 and their partnered ANP pushedsouth toward Tagab Village.

By the fifth day of operations, on November 4, all of theelements involved in Operation Al Hasn turned eastto attack the fiercely defended Bedrab Valley on theeastern wall of the Tagab. TF-8 and their partneredODA established a blocking position along knownTaliban egress and ingress routes in the BedrabValley. By dusk, the ANSF and their ODA partnerssealed the southern and northern egress routes outof the valley while another ODA established ablocking position on the approach route out ofBedrab Valley in the west.

The coalition partners coordinated the kineticoperation against the Taliban stronghold in thecentral portion with both Governor Murad’sinformation operations and a comprehensiveMEDCAP in the north. More importantly, GovernorMurad brought together key mullahs in the valleyto encourage them to identify Taliban criminals.After constructive discussion about the future of thevalley, the governor sent these mullahs to the center

of Tagab to help the ANP and the ODAs toseparate the insurgents from the civilians. Thegovernor then hosted a meeting with Kapisa’sparliament members from Kabul to keep theminformed on the progress of the battle in the areaand received their unbridled support for theoperation. Governor Murad followed up thismeeting with a local Shura with the local leadersto spread the message of support andencouragement that he had just received fromKabul. Meanwhile, the first of seven MEDCAPsbegan. Throughout the valley, U.S. medicalpersonnel saw almost 4,200 patients in the firsttwo weeks of the operation. The stacking of HAand medical assets enabled the MEDCAPs tobe employed when and where the localpopulation needed them according to the localsentiment. The first MEDCAP in TagabVillage only saw 400 patients. That night thegovernor decided to plan a second MEDCAPfor the following day and announced the newtime and place over the new Voice of Kapisa radiostation, at local mosques and through thegovernor’s personal contacts. The next day, the

MEDCAP attendance doubled to more than 800. Theoperational and logistical flexibility given by pre-positionedassets and wide breadth of local influence gained from theAfghan leadership provided the coalition forces the ability totailor their operations based on the local conditions.

As operations continued, supplying maneuver units becameincreasingly important. The intensity of the fighting requiredcontinuous resupply by either rotary wing or containerizeddelivery system (CDS). On the second day of the operation,clearing elements participated in decisive direct fireengagements throughout the valley for more than 10 straighthours. As the clearing elements moved closer to the center ofthe Tagab Valley insurgent resistance intensified. Essential

During the operation, Governor Murad presented factual information to the Afghannational media that they published on the same day, which resulted in stopping the Taliban’smisinformation campaign.

Governor Murad brought together key mullahs in the valley and encouraged them toidentify Taliban criminals.



PROFESSIONAL FORUM

ground resupply and aerial resupply dropsreached the troops in contact when andwhere needed. Every night of the first weekof operations, Air Force aircraft conductedCDS drops for the maneuver units. Inaddition, TF Centaur conducted fiveimmediate resupplies of ammunition andwater by rotary wing assets.

Throughout the maneuver phase ofoperations, TF-8 was an invaluablepartner in fighting shoulder-to-shoulderwith SOTF-33 ODAs. TF-8 soldiers wereessential to the main clearing element andin facilitating ground resupply for troopsin contact. TF-8’s tactics and weaponssystems increased fire superiority duringthe long decisive direct fire engagements.TF-8’s soldiers’ valiant combat actionearned them the right to wear the USArmy’s revered combat infantryman’sbadge.

As Coalition forces cleared each area,the kinetic operations flowed seamlesslyinto stability operations. Local radiostations played prerecorded messages fromGovernor Murad, encouraging the localsto reject the violent ways of the Talibancriminals and support the coalition forceswho have brought security and prosperityto the Tagab. Governor Murad wasinstrumental in placing the right asset in

the right place at the right time. Everynight, Governor Murad conducted a two-hour operations meeting with his keyleaders. This meeting followed a formatsimilar to an AAR in which the governor’skey leaders discussed what went well, areasto improve, and the essential goals for thenext day’s operations.

By the seventh day, coalition forcesnearly completed the clearing operationsin the major population centers, allowingthe ANSF, TF-8, and their partnered ODAsto clear secondary portions of the valley andsolidify the security posture. The coalitionnow focused on supporting the localpopulation and bolstering the legitimacy ofthe local officials. All of the coalition andAfghan elements received actionableintelligence from the local population.Some local residents contacted ODAs todisclose the location of large caches. ANPunits received constant reports on thelocations of stalwart insurgentcommanders who remained in the valley.Sensing a key turning point in the Tagab,Governor Murad took the opportunity topublicly address the local people at theTagab bazaar. He made an extemporaneousspeech that was broadcast by the Voice ofKapisa Radio discussing the evils of theTaliban. The villagers appeared eager to

see a secure and prosperous Tagab with aconfident and competent leader.

One week after the kinetic operationsbegan, the homes in the Tagab Valley litup again as life in the valley began to returnto normal. SOTF-33 provided messagesto the Voice of Kapisa radio station to bebroadcast for 10 minutes every hour ofevery evening during the operationdescribing the future of Tagab. No longeranxious about the coalition presence, thepeople of Tagab became curious aboutwhether this operation was the same asmany of the operations in the past; “Arethe Americans here to stay?” As theresidents asked these questions atMEDCAPs and CA events throughout thevalley, SOTF-33 logistics trains built apermanent firebase in the northern part ofthe Tagab Valley. This firebase serves asthe new home for an ODA and a companyof ANA soldiers. As coalition forcesconducted MEDCAPs throughout thevalley, non-kinetic planners madepreparations for monthly Tagab MedicalHumanitarian Aid Programs. CombinedJoint Task Force -76 (CJTF-76) committedmillions of dollars in Commander’sEmergency Relief Program (CERP)funding specifically to rebuild the Tagabinfrastructure. Representatives of UnitedStates Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID) developed astrategy with the Provincial ReconstructionTeam (PRT), the Kapisa government andthe coalition to establish long-terminfrastructure development projects. Tomaintain the relationship, SOTF-33 heldweekly coordination meetings betweenGovernor Murad, his key leaders, and theTagab ODA. The people of Tagab now haveclose allies and security support for theforeseeable future.

EFFECTS ACHIEVED“I am Taliban, I have been Taliban, but

I am not a stupid Taliban. I have seen whatthe government of Afghanistan is doing forthe people and their ways are much betterfor the people than the Taliban ways are.”

— Local elder Afghanya ShuraNovember 6, 2006

During Governor Murad’s final day inthe Tagab Valley, he held a press conferencewith all of the national Afghan TV and

U.S. and coalition medical personnel saw nearly 4,200 patients during the first two weeks of theoperation during medical civil affairs program missions throughout the Tagab Valley.

radio stations to emphasize the progress in the Tagab Valley.In his statement, he emphasized partnership with the coalitionin both security and development. SOTF-33 ODAs are takingthe lead in developing the local law enforcement capabilitiesin the Tagab. A permanent structure is under construction atthe new Tagab firebase to facilitate meetings between thecoalition and the ANSF. An ANP and National Defense Services(NDS) liaison will be permanently stationed at the firebase tomaintain the constant partnership between the Kapisagovernment and coalition forces. Meanwhile, Tagab officialsare encouraging locals to build stores outside of the firebase inwhich vendors from the local area will be able to sell goods inorder to stimulate local economic development and progress.

Less than eight weeks after Operation Al Hasn began, the TagabValley is a different place. Counting the number of deadinsurgents does not tell the story of the Tagab’s transition. Thestory is best told by the Afghan men, women, and childrenwho returned to the valley and flooded the streets in celebration.Shopkeepers in the main bazaar are replacing doors, repairingwalls, and hanging new signs. The local ANP, trained by SOTF-33 ODAs conduct constant patrols to instill a sense of securityand stability. Parents dress their children with coalitiondistributed backpacks and drive around in vehicles openly

Major Scott T. McGleish is currently the executive officer for 3rd Battalion,3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) and recently served as the SpecialOperations Task Force 33 Director during Operation Enduring Freedom IX.He has over 20 years of light infantry and Special Forces experience both asan officer and NCO. His previous assignments include serving as a SpecialForces engineer sergeant for Operational Detachment - Alpha (ODA) 072,3rd Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne); infantry platoon leaderand company executive officer for the 3rd Infantry Regiment (The Old Guard);detachment commander for ODA 385; adjutant and plans officer for 3rdBattalion, 3rd Special Force Group; and EUCOM desk officer and chief ofReadiness Branch for the United States Army Special Forces Command(Airborne).

Major Darin J. Blatt is currently the operations officer for 3rd Battalion,3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) and recently served as the SpecialOperations Task Force 33 operations officer during Operation EnduringFreedom IX. His previous assignments include serving as an infantry platoonleader with the 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82ndAirborne Division; detachment commander of ODA 335; assistant operationsofficer and company commander with the 1st Battalion, 3rd Special ForcesGroup (Airborne). Major Blatt also served in the John F. Kennedy SpecialWarfare Center and School as a small group instructor for Phase III of the18A course.

Captain Peter G. Fischer is the Judge Advocate for the 3d Battalion, 3dSpecial Forces Group (Airborne). He previously served as a trial counsel andoperational law attorney with the 2nd Infantry Division in Korea. He has earneddegrees from Emory Law School, Emory University, and the London Schoolof Economics.

displaying pro-Afghanistan stickers throughout the valley.Governor Murad sees an improvement at his level as well. Withincreased security, a $3 million CERP-funded road projectthrough the Tagab Valley is expected to be completed on-time.What was a four-hour drive from Bagram Airfield to Tagabnow takes little more than 90 minutes.

SOTF-33 and TF-8 now turn their focus towards thedevelopment of Tagab’s infrastructure and civil society tomaintain the momentum and long term strategic effects thatSOTF-33 designed Operation Al Hasn to deliver. The primaryobjective in the Tagab Valley remains the maintenance ofstability and strengthening the rapport amongst the localpopulace to discourage insurgent elements returning in force.Since Operation Al Hasn ended on November 11, there hasbeen little enemy activity in the Tagab Valley and the insurgentrelated violence in nearby Kabul has been significantly reduced.Operation Al Hasn has become a template for COIN operationsin Afghanistan.

During the first night of operations in the SOTF-33operations center, Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry,Combined Forces Commander-Afghanistan, said, “This is thebest example of full spectrum counterinsurgency operations.This should be the model for COIN operations in Afghanistan.”

Success against an insurgency demands that the time, place,and conditions are set in order to establish long-term stabilityfor the legitimate government.

During one of the medical civil affairs program missions in the TagabValley, a Soldier meets a few local children.



Today, in Iraq and Afghanistan, infantrymen are going out on foot more and more oftento patrol the streets and countryside to find the enemy and determine the situation, toreport on conditions, provide security, and to defeat the insurgent while reassuring the

populace that he will not return.This increase in dismounted patrolling is part of a new effort to improve the security situation

and counter the insurgency, but dismounted patrolling is not new to the Infantry. It is acontinuation of a long history of small-unit combat that stretches back to the origin of ourArmy.

The American Infantry has a long and distinguished history of patrolling on foot. Theunique conditions the English colonists faced on the new continent created a new type of military

IIIIINFNFNFNFNFANTRANTRANTRANTRANTRYYYYY D D D D DOCTRINEOCTRINEOCTRINEOCTRINEOCTRINE FORFORFORFORFORDDDDDISMOUNTEDISMOUNTEDISMOUNTEDISMOUNTEDISMOUNTED P P P P PAAAAATRTRTRTRTROLLINGOLLINGOLLINGOLLINGOLLING

ARTHUR A. DURANTE, JR.


Senior Airman Steve Czyz, USAF

Soldiers with the 3rd BrigadeCombat Team, 82nd AirborneDivision patrol the streets of AlHaymer, Iraq, during a recentmission.

force, one with unconventional skills anda reliance on the initiative of the individualnot often practiced by the armies of Europe.

The origins of one of our premierInfantry units, today’s 75th RangerRegiment, can be traced back to smallgroups of battle-hardened men “ranging thewoods” over vast distances, relying on theirskill at arms and their intimate knowledgeof the forests and fields for their securityand mission success. Their story came tobe the story of the American infantryman,one of small groups of hardy, well-trainedand disciplined warriors moving on foot,able to generate combat power far out ofproportion to their actual numbers.

The early colonists had to adapt to theAtlantic seaboard’s vast woodlands, withits rugged terrain and variable climate.They faced the fierce resistance of the nativetribes head-on for more than a century, andin the process they created and maturedtheir new tactics of small-unit warfare.

These new tactics emphasized being ableto operate independently, and to movequickly and undetected across thecountryside in day or night, unencumberedby plodding baggage trains, massformations or heavy weapons.

The early American forces formed smalllightly armed units that could remainundetected while seeking out the enemy.They could then either report back or makea sudden, decisive surprise attack.

As the years went by and the Army grew,these Soldiers passed the tactics andtechniques of patrolling down fromgeneration to generation. Eventually, theywere written down and the writings becamecodified and orderly, transforming themfrom “tribal knowledge” into what we knowtoday as doctrine.

The U.S. Army Infantry School isresponsible for keeping our doctrine fordismounted patrolling up-to-date. It doesthis by reviewing what was written in thepast, looking at what is being done by unitsin the field today, and developing whatshould be done as we face enemies yetunknown, on the battlefields of the future.

The newest Infantry School doctrine ondismounted patrolling can be found in FM3-21.8, The Infantry Rifle Platoon andSquad. This manual, dated 28 March 2007,supersedes the 1992 version of FM 7-8 withthe same title. Until it comes out in papercopy later this summer, you can find it atthis Web site: http://www.army.mil/usapa/

d o c t r i n e /7_Series_Collection_1.html.

This is how thenew FM 3-21.8describes a patrol:

“A patrol is adetachment sent outby a larger unit toconduct a specificmission. Patrolsoperate semi-independently andreturn to the mainbody uponcompletion of theirmission. Patrollingfulfills the Infantry’sprimary function offinding the enemy toeither engage him orreport hisdisposition, location,and actions. Patrolsact as both the eyesand ears of the largerunit and as a fist todeliver a sharpdevastating jab andthen withdrawbefore the enemycan recover.”

The discussion of patrols and patrollingin the new manual is not totally new. Itexpands and builds on the doctrine that wehave had in place for years and that hasserved us well in previous wars. However,there are some new terms and new definitionsthat infantry leaders should know about.These terms and definitions can be found inthe new version of FM 3-21.8.

There are some issues concerningpatrolling doctrine that always generatediscussion and which are sometimes notunderstood clearly. The new version of themanual addresses these in more detail thanthe version it supersedes.

One of the issues that always comes upin discussions about patrolling is the needfor commanders to be specific when theygive a unit the mission to send out a patrol.

Units should not be sent out simply to“patrol.” A commander must provide aspecific combat, reconnaissance, or securitytask, with an associated tactical purpose.Upon completion of that task, the patrolleader returns to the main body, reports onhis actions and describes the events that

took place, the status of the patrol’smembers and equipment, and anyobservations the patrol may have made.

There is no standard size for a patrol. Afire team can be used for a patrol, but squad-and platoon-sized patrols are alsoappropriate at times. Sometimes, forcombat tasks such as a large raid or an areaambush, a patrol may consist of most ofthe combat elements of a rifle company.

Unlike operations in which the infantryplatoon or squad is integrated into themaneuver of a larger organization, a patrolis semi-independent and relies on its ownresources and actions for security althoughit may have indirect fire and aerial support.

Patrols are never administrative, neverconducted casually, even if the situation onthe ground may seem almostnonthreatening. The leader of every patrol,regardless of the type or the mission, hasan inherent responsibility to prepare andplan for possible enemy contact. Duringoperations within the United States, insupport of civil authority, there may not bean actual “enemy” force, but leaders mustalways consider the possibility of violence

The American Infantry has a long and distinguished history ofpatrolling on foot.



and lawlessness. There are several specific purposes fordismounted patrols: Gathering information on the enemy, the terrain, or the

populace; Gaining or regaining contact with the enemy; Making contact with adjacent friendly forces; Engaging the enemy in combat to destroy him or inflict

losses; Reassuring or gaining the trust of a local population; Preventing and controlling public disorder; Deterring and disrupting insurgent or criminal activity; Providing unit security; and Protecting key infrastructure or bases.

The two major categories of patrols are combat and reconnaissance.Patrols that depart the main body with the clear intent to make directcontact with the enemy are called combat patrols. The three types ofcombat patrols are raid patrols, ambush patrols, both of which conductspecial purpose attacks, and security patrols.

Patrols that depart the main body with the intention of avoidingdirect combat with the enemy while seeking out new informationor confirming the accuracy of previously-gathered informationare called reconnaissance patrols.

The traditional types of reconnaissance patrols are area, route,and zone. The new FM 3-21.8 introduces and describes a fourthtype, the point reconnaissance patrol.

Point reconnaissance patrols are tasked to move to a veryspecific location, such as a power station, a mosque, or a school,and gather detailed information on the conditions there, often byinterviewing members of the local populace or the workforce.

Point reconnaissance patrols are often used during stabilityoperations or during operations in support of civil authority whenthe general situation is confusing and normal reporting systems

are not functional. They provide the commander with a trustedset of eyes on the scene to provide him with “ground truth”.

Leaders can also dispatch reconnaissance patrols to track theenemy, or to establish contact with other friendly forces. Trackingpatrols follow the trail and movements of a specific enemy unit,often for long distances. Contact patrols move to and makephysical contact with adjacent units and exchange informationon their location, status, and intentions.

In the Army today, electronic position reporting and informationtransfer systems have reduced the need for contact patrols betweenU.S. units, but they are still vital when working with allies andcoalition partners who may not have fielded such high-techsystems.

There is another type of patrol that has been very controversialsince the fighting in Iraq began — the presence patrol.

Presence patrols are not new. They have been a part of Infantrydoctrine since the publication of FM 3-21.21, The Stryker BrigadeCombat Team Infantry Battalion, in April 2003. In fact, under adifferent name, the same sort of patrol was described in the 1967version of FM 21-75, Combat Training of the Individual Soldierand Patrolling.

The presence patrol is not a new concept, but because ofconfusion about the execution of a presence patrol, FM 3-21.8discusses it in much more detail than has been done in any previouspublication.

Some leaders have not understood the doctrinal principlesbehind the planning and execution of presence patrols. Some unitshave misunderstood the term and even disagree with its utility. Tobetter explain the concept, the new manual goes into significant detaildescribing and explaining the operational environment and the setof METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, civilians)conditions under which presence patrols are appropriate.

A presence patrol, like all other types of reconnaissance patrols,


Staff Sergeant Bronco Suzuki

Soldiers with the 2nd Brigade Combat Team,2nd Infantry Division patrol an area ofBaghdad June 3.


Arthur A. Durante, Jr., is currently serving as deputy chief of Doctrine,Doctrine and Collective Training Division, Combined Arms and TacticsDirectorate, U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia.

has a specific task and purpose. It gathersinformation the commander needs to support hisdecision-making process. However, because ofthe conditions under which the patrol operates,

its actions are carefully calculated not onlyto gather specific information but also toconvey a message to those with whomthe patrol comes into contact.

The uniqueness of a presence patroloriginates with the fundamental ideathat all other reconnaissance patrols

start out with the intent to accomplishtheir mission while remaining undetected.

Even combat patrols intend to remainundetected until they reveal themselves in

a sudden and deadly attack.The presence patrol is different in

that from the very beginning itintends to both see (conduct

reconnaissance) and to be seen(demonstrate presence).

A presence patrol is normally used mostoften in stability or civil support operations.It has many purposes, but should always be

seen in a specific manner, onepredetermined by the commander after

careful analysis of the existing situation.The primary task of a presence patrol is to gather information

about the conditions in the unit’s area of operations. To do this,the patrol gathers critical (as determined by the commander)information, both specific and general.

The patrol seeks out this information, observes and reports. Itssecondary role is to be seen as a tangible representation of theU.S. military force, projecting a particular image that furthers theaccomplishment of the commander’s intent.

In addition to the reconnaissance tasks, presence patrols candemonstrate to the local populace the presence and intent of theU.S. forces. Presence patrols are used to clearly demonstrate theintent, determination, competency, confidence, concern, and whenappropriate, the overwhelming power of the force to all whoobserve it, including local and national media.

In Iraq, some units send out patrols made up of combined U.S.and Iraqi security forces. These are examples of presence patrolsbeing used to demonstrate a national will, unity of effort, a growingIraqi competence and responsibility, and a partnership in thecounterinsurgency effort.

In some situations, presence patrols may be used to demonstratethat calm prevails and the situation is returning to normality. Insuch cases, the patrol members may deliberately adopt a friendly,nonthreatening, benign demeanor. An example of this was thepresence patrols sent out by the 82nd Airborne Division in theaftermath of Hurricane Katrina.

The Soldiers were armed and ready to meet violence with forceif necessary, but they did not wear body armor or Kevlar helmets.Instead, they wore the distinctive maroon berets of the airborne,and conducted themselves in such a way as to show the populacethat the preceding days of anarchy and disorder were over, andthat calm and normalcy were returning. Their presence did much

to restore that calm, and they were soon able to transition largeareas of the city back to civil control.

The commander always plans for the possibility that a presencepatrol may make enemy contact, even though that is not his intent.Rarely should a commander use a presence patrol in a situationwhere significant enemy contact is expected or likely.

Presence patrols work best for some types of stability operationssuch as peace operations, humanitarian and civil assistance,noncombatant evacuations, or shows of force. Before sending outa presence patrol, the commander should carefully consider whatmessage he wants to convey, and then clearly describe his intentto the patrol leader.

To accomplish the “to be seen” part of its purpose, a presencepatrol reconnoiters overtly. It takes deliberate steps to visiblyreinforce the impression the commander wants to convey to thepopulace. Where the patrol goes, what it does there, how it handlesits weapons, what equipment and vehicles it uses, and how itinteracts with the populace are all part of that impression.

When the presence patrol returns to the main body, thecommander thoroughly debriefs it not only for hard information,but also for the patrol leader’s impressions of the effects of thepatrol on the populace. This allows the commander to see to modifythe actions of subsequent patrols.

Another type of patrol that the new FM 3-21.8 discusses is reallyan old type that had fallen out of Infantry doctrine after the VietnamWar but has now been reintroduced. It is the security patrol.A security patrol is a small combat patrol sent out from a unitlocation, when the unit is stationary or temporarily halted, tosearch the local area, detect any enemy forces near the mainbody, and to engage and destroy the enemy within the capabilityof the patrol. This type of is normally sent out by units operatingin close terrain with limited fields of observation and fire. It is acommon type of patrol to be sent out during operations in thejungle or dense forests, or in some urban areas.A security patrol detects and disrupts enemy forces that areconducting reconnaissance of the main body or that are massingto conduct an attack. Although this type of combat patrol seeksto make direct enemy contact and to destroy enemy forces withinits capability, it should always attempt to avoid decisiveengagement.Security patrols are normally away from the main body of theunit for limited periods, returning frequently to coordinate andrest. They do not operate beyond the range of communicationsand supporting fires from the main body, especially mortar fires.

The mission of the Infantry, to close with and engage the enemy,requires many skills. Among the most important of them is theability to patrol, to disperse across the countryside, to seek out theenemy and engage him at the time and place of our choosing.

For infantrymen to gain those skills, to truly master them, takeslong hard training, dedication, physical fitness, initiative, and anintense will to win. All this has to begin with a well defined doctrinethat clearly lays out the principles, tactics, techniques and proceduresassociated with patrolling. The newly published FM 3-21.8provides the infantry rifle squad and platoon with that doctrine.


After the Islamic revolution in1979, two different perspectiveson warfighting influenced

the tactics of Iranian ground forces.There was a traditional militaryperspective, based on Iran’smilitary history, which reliedon modern equipment andEuropean and Americanofficer training. Then therewas the revolutionaryperspective that often placed Shiitereligious values of perseverance andmartyrdom ahead of some military practices.These two perspectives contradicted each other at times,and the troops on the ground were the ones most harmed by this.However, it was the synthesis of elements of these two that wouldeventually become Iran’s most effective means of fighting by theend of the war.

By the 1970’s, Iran had become one of the most dominantmilitary powers in the region, and the fifth largest armed force inthe world. The armed forces had established contingency plansand training and relied on the west for equipment and support.They trained for conventional war, but had little combatexperience. The Shah wanted to become the dominant militarypower in the region, and, by some measures, he had achievedthis. The vestiges of this military development in Iran, in theform of military technique and leaders that had not been purged,provided the ability to pursue the war with conventional militarytactics.

The clerics purged a large part of the conventional militarystructure after the 1979 revolution leaving the military brokenand barely able to defend Iran from the initial Iraqi ground invasionin 1980. There were only two Iranianarmored divisions with tanks in bad needof maintenance, and several infantry unitsin the main theater of Khuzestan at the timeof the invasion, and it would be weeksbefore they could mobilize. While sufferingfrom poor maintenance and lack of spareparts, the Iranian Air Force was able tolaunch a surprising counterattack just daysafter Iraqi preemptive strikes on Iranian airfields. They also launched a major airliftusing Boeing 747, 707, and C-130 aircraftto move conventional forces to the front.

THE EVOLUTION OF IRANIAN WARFIGHTINGDURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

SERGEANT BEN WILSON

The Iranian Air Force, equipped with Maverickmissiles, proved critical during the

initial defense by attacking Iraqiground forces. On the ground, mostof the initial defense of Khuzestanwas left to the Iranian RepublicanGuards Corps (IRGC). The Iranianregime created the IRGC in 1979 as

a counterweight to the military,and as a defender of the newregime and upholder of

revolutionary values in Iran.This group represented

Shiite revolutionaryvalues and initially

disdained militaryprofessionalism and

training. The IRGC was composed of two arms: the cadreGuards (Pasdaran) and the part-time Basij militia. The Basij werea large group of volunteers, said to have numbered in the millionswhen fully mobilized. The Pasdaran were a better trained andequipped group of religious loyalists that commanded the Basij.

The IRGC in Khuzestan was hardly able to defend itself againstthe Iraqi armor and artillery, especially in the vast open areas ofKhuzestan. Possessing only small arms, they retreated to urbanareas and set up defenses. The slow advance of the Iraqi Army,often due to Iranian air power, gave them plenty of time to establishdefenses and to bring in reinforcements. The Iranians set up verystout defenses in the cities that were able to withstand Iraqi armoredand air attacks. Saddam’s wish to minimize casualties resulted inIraqi armor being sent into cities without infantry support. TheIRGC was able to destroy many Iraqi tanks using only rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and Molotov cocktails. The Iraqis

only captured one major city in Khuzestan:Korramshahr. Here, Iran initially repelledIraqi armored attack as they were canalizedinto narrow avenues of approach throughthe marshy areas outside of the city. Finallya large force of Iraqi infantry took the cityin house-to-house fighting. Even then,casualties were tremendous. The badlysupplied Iranians made a controlledwithdrawal street by street through the city.It took Iraq over a month to take the citywhile sustaining around 15,000 casualtiesand losing more than 100 armored vehicles

When Dismounted Light Infantry Made the Difference

The IRGC (IranianRepublican Guard Corps) in

Khuzestan was hardly able todefend itself against the Iraqiarmor and artillery, especially

in the vast open areas ofKhuzestan. Possessing onlysmall arms, they retreated to

urban areas and set updefenses.



to disorganized light infantry.By October 1980, the first stage of the

war had ended and Saddam declared thatIraq’s army had accomplished its goals andhe was ready to negotiate peace. Up to thispoint, Iraq had experienced sporadicresistance. While the resistance was notenough to stop Iraq from taking the vastopen areas of Khuzestan, the now-reinforced cities convinced Saddam not tooverextend his supplylines and to declare anend to operations. ThePasdaran lacked adefined chain ofcommand and effectivedirection from above,possessed only smallarms, and had nosupport. It was onlytheir dedication to therevolutionary cause,which was strengthenedby the Iraqi invasion,that enabled them tostand up and fight theIraqis. In spite ofinferior technology andfailure to deter theIraqis in open ground,their concentrations inurban areas made thema formidable foe. TheIraqis conductedineffective siegesaround the other citieswhich gave the Iraniansplenty of time toreinforce.

In January 1981,Iran launched its firstcounterattack (Map 1).By this time, the armyhad reorganizedsufficiently to beginoperations. Theyattacked on the plainssouth of Dezful nearSusangerd in whatwould be one of thelargest armored battlesof the war. The Iraniansbroke through Iraqilines but were thentrapped in a doubleenvelopment. Iran lostmore than half of itstanks in the battle.

They were caught in a low-lying marshyarea. When they attempted to maneuver,many vehicles became stuck in the mud andwere disabled. Unable to recover theirvehicles due to intense Iraqi fire, theyabandoned much of their armor. Moreproblems surfaced which would plague theIranians for the duration of the war: lackof coordinated air and artillery support,poor logistics, and lack of coordination

between IRGC and regular military forces.The IRGC and the conventional militarywould often refuse to work together,ignoring one another’s orders. In fact, thissplit, and the poor state of the IRGC in theearly stage of the war was in part due tothen President Bani Sadr’s and moderatemilitary leaders’ distaste of the IRGC. Thisdistaste worked both ways. This battlebecame one of the critical events that

Map 1

convinced the regime to shift its support to the IRGC as aconventional fighting force and not just a guardian of the regime.It is ironic that while Khomeini fully supported purging the regularmilitary before the war, he had pressured Bani Sadr, thecommander of regular military forces, to initiate the firstcounteroffensive. After this failure, the Mullahs continued to gainsupport for their revolutionary method of fighting, while themoderate secular voices were swept aside.

The IRGC gained favor and support from the regime andemployed simple tactics of its own. Initially, the IRGC attackedwith revolutionary fervor and huge numbers, hoping that thiswould overcome Iraqi advanced technology. They employed thehuman wave attack reminiscent of World War I. They sent inBasij volunteers as the lead element. These forces often consistedof old men and young children. The primary purpose of this initialwave was to clear mines, breach obstacles (often by laying on topof concertina wire), and to absorb enemy fire. Many of the Basijwere found with plastic keys to heaven in their hands, or a notefrom the Ayatollah giving them permission to enter heaven.Separated perhaps by a few hundred meters, waves and waves ofunder-trained conscripts would storm Iraqi defenses. Eventuallythe more experienced, better trained and equipped IRGC Pasdaranwould attack in an attempt to break through the lines and dislodgethe Iraqis from their positions. This was not always the casehowever as Basij and Pasdaran would often be intermingled asIRGC tactics became more adaptive and complex. Sometimes,through superb infiltration, the IRGC would attack a unit’scommand center, thus breaking the integrity of the Iraqi lines andthen defeating the Iraqi positions in detail. This tactic was possibledue to the Iraqi’s lack of defensive depth throughout the war. Iraqiunits were often placed in isolated strong points. The areas betweenstrong points were wide, and loosely patrolled, but heavily coveredby artillery. The Iraqis often failed to garrison the urban areasthat they had overrun, allowing Iran to mass troops in Iraqi rearareas. The armored and other heavy equipment units, which wereorganic to independent army units or integrated within the IRGC,were the last to join the battle. In the case of the IRGC, armorand heavy weapons would not be deployed below battalion strengthuntil later in the war, and at the beginning of the war the IRGCdid not even have any armor. This led to poor combined armscoordination and execution, particularly when supporting theinfantry, according to The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis byEfraim Karsh. In many cases, the armor would not move up tosupport the initial infantry push. This was probably done to curbtank losses, but lack of integration inevitably led to heavy Iraniancasualties.

Iranian tactics improved throughout their initial campaign toexpel the Iraqis from Khuzestan. One of their major improvementswas at the small unit level. Faced with a vastly superior IraqiArmy, the Iranians learned the value of fire and maneuver,especially with their own armor. While not discontinuing thehuman wave attack, the infantry and IRGC improved theirpatrolling and infiltration techniques. They began to rely onintelligence and scouting to find the weak spots in the Iraqi lineswhere they would launch their human wave attacks. They wouldfollow an infiltration with surprise attacks at multiple points alongthe Iraqi lines. Iranian attacks created confusion in the Iraqi forcescausing premature or incorrect commitment of reserves and

shifting of forces. The Iranians demonstrated initiative and surprisein other areas during the early stages of the war. In operationTariq Al Quds, they used heavy equipment to build a 14-kilometerroad through an area of undefended sand dunes to attack Iraqirear areas. They used the same approach later in the war to assailIraqi mountain outposts. They also used electronic warfare tosend false messages through the Iraqi’s communications networks.The marshes that proved fatal to the Iranians at Susangerd providedgreat advantages to the Iranians in later battles. They intentionallyflooded marsh areas to canalize Iraqi forces during their urbanattacks. This also provided help to their infiltration tactics. TheIraqis were road bound so the marsh areas often fell under Iraniancontrol and proved to be excellent avenues of approach for Iranianlight infantry.

Iranians increasingly relied on night and poor weather attacks.They regarded the Iraqis as poor night fighters and attempted totake advantage of this. The Iranians never received nightobservation devices during the war, but relied on superior lightinfantry tactics. The use of the night and poor weather was alsoto counter U.S. intelligence efforts, including satellite imagerywhich supplied Iraq with intelligence on Iranian movements.Though they suffered various setbacks throughout the war, Iraniantactics gradually improved. The first human wave attacks wereoften carried out in broad daylight against fully-defended positionswith no real mind given to terrain or proper planning. Eventually,they were able to launch limited attacks using infiltration, lowvisibility, and the static Iraqi defenses. However politicaldifferences among high level officials would often lead to theIranian forces suffering from poor planning as conventional warfighting gained and lost favor with the regime.

After the initial Iraqi expulsion from Khuzestan, the Iraniansdecided to launch an invasion of Iraq. Their first target was thecity of Basra in the south. Using more primitive planning thanwas often used in Khuzestan, Iran launched large human waveassaults on the prepared Iraqi defenses at Basra. These attacksdid not yield the large victory that Iran was seeking. In 1984, theregime conducted reforms to correct the failures in capturing Basra.Unplanned, unsupported human wave attacks were not working.They began to improve leader training and procedures,coordination between the IRGC and conventional military,planning and logistics. The poor coordination between theIRGC and the conventional military may have been one of thelargest contributors in the initial failures in Iraq. The regime’sdesire to invade Iraq had been opposed by the IRGC andconventional military leaders. The operations, which wereimposed by the regime, put the IRGC and conventional militaryin an awkward and eventually disastrous position which againled the IRGC to operate on its own. These fundamental reformsgave the armed forces the successful foundation for integratedplanning that would serve them well throughout the war andafterwards. However, these reforms were not enough, as betterintegration of Iranian forces would take years. While Iran could

(The Iranians) began to rely on intelligence andscouting to find the weak spots in the Iraqi lineswhere they would launch their human waveattacks.



often achieve an initial breakthrough ofIraqi defenses, their lack of effectivelogistics and combined arms supportprevented the Iranians from penetratingin depth and achieving “final” victory.The Mullahs supported achieving largeoperational goals, with tactics that couldonly achieve limited gains.

The shift from an idea of “final” victorywas needed as this often proved to beoverambitious and led to massing on theimmediate objective becoming vulnerableto Iraqi counterattacks and artillery. Theleadership’s idea was to launch suddenhuge swarming attacks overwhelming theenemy on as many points as possible. Theyintended for the IRGC to advance fromposition to position not allowing themselvesto lose momentum, become pinned down,and lose morale. There was a lack ofmilitary understanding within the IRGCsupporters in the regime. While leadership

and planning improved, the Iranian forcescould only move as far as they could beresupplied and supported. More often thannot, this was not very far and this provedto be one of the fatal flaws in therevolutionary style of fighting. Theseproblems proved even more severe as heavyIraqi fire, and chemical weapons, were usedto strike Iranian supply centers.

The Iranian infantry tactics eventuallywere superior to that of the Iraqis. Whilethe Iraqis relied on static positions andconcentrations of armor, the Iranians foundways to cope with this. They honed theirskills in infiltration, patrolling, night

fighting, and marsh and mountain warfare.They seemed to have had the most successin the marshy areas around the MajnoonIslands and the mountains of the North.This was the ideal area for them to use lightinfantry tactics using the mobility offeredby helicopters and boats to give them anadvantage over mechanized forces.

After pushing Iraq back to theinternational border, the Iranianseventually occupied the marsh areas aroundHoweiza. This gave them opportunities toattack Basra and launch attacks towards theTigris in an attempt to cut off the Baghdad-Basra highway. The Iranians experiencedcontinual failure in their attempts to breakout of the marshes and occupy Basra andthe outlying areas. Their forces and theirtactics could not survive against a concerteddefensive effort once they left the protectionof the marshes. While they made limitedgains, they lacked the support and

Map 2

(The Iranians) honed theirskills in infiltration, patrolling,night fighting, and marsh and

mountain warfare.

organization to move further into Iraq.The combat in the marsh areas was

another story. The marshes provided a greatarea for the Iranians to employ and honetheir small unit tactics. The marshes’ wetground and tall, dense reeds providedconcealment for the Iranian forces,impeded Iraqi armor, and absorbedartillery shells in its soft ground. Iranthoroughly scouted the marsh areas withpatrols and numerous water craft. Iran used the lessons learnedin this area to launch one of the most successful attacks of thewar farther south (Map 2). While launching a diversionaryattack north of Basra, Iran launched a commando raid usingBasij frogmen, boats and pontoon bridges to cross the Shatt AlArab and take the Al Faw peninsula. Their attack tookadvantage of darkness and rain and totally surprised the Iraqidefenders, many of whom fled their posts. The Iranians quicklyestablished a bridge head and reinforced the peninsula. Theydispersed their defenses and dug in quickly. They made alltroop and supply movements at night to prevent the Iraqis fromacquiring artillery targets. This attack provided one of thegreatest demonstrations of the Iranians’ potential in lightinfantry attacks in difficult terrain. Indeed, it seemed that Iranpreferred, and found the most success, in light infantry warfare.Their ability in infiltration, use of the night, and lightningattacks gave them the advantage over Iraq’s cumbersome forces.

The Iranian war began in a defense and counterattack toexpel the Iraqi invaders, but once the Iranian forces weresuccessful, they continued their conventional operations toinvade Iraq. However, from the beginning, and throughoutthe war, Iran employed unconventional tactics to project its power.This often included supporting international terrorist operationslike the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Kuwait in 1986, and thecoup attempt in Bahrain. Iran began its support for Kurdishuprisings in Iraq years before the war. However, this had littleeffect until Iran was able to control the Kurdish insurgency in itsown country. In fact, they had hoped for a quick end to the war inIraq with the revolt of the Iraqi Shiites in the south. At the time,Iran continued its attempts to export revolution. This includesIran’s support of Shiites in the war in Lebanon where they sentseveral hundred IRGC members to the Bekaa valley in 1982 aswell as Iran’s support for the Mujahedeen fighting the Soviets inAfghanistan. The hit and run insurgency tactics and support ofterrorists may have yielded the most lessons learned for theIranians.

The northern area of Iraq was perhaps the most fertile areafor Iran’s insurgent aspirations. Iran’s presence in the northdated to before the war where the Shah fomented rebellionamongst the Iraqi Kurds to pressure the Iraqi regime. In part,this eventually led to Saddam grudgingly accepting the AlgiersAccord. Once the war began, the IRGC once again exploiteddifferences between the Kurds and the Iraqi regime. Thiscampaign was aided by the mountainous terrain of the north,and the fact that Iraq’s main forces were tied down in the South.The Kurds often acted as scouts and guides for the Iranianforces in conventional attacks. Much more common, however,

Sergeant Ben Wilson is Middle East analyst at the Foreign Military StudiesOffice at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

The references for this article are on file and available through InfantryMagazine.

was the presence of Iranian agents whoorganized and directed small groups ofKurdish Peshmerga raiding parties.These were organized into small groupsof about 12 Peshmerga. They werecapable of operating semi-independently, relying on natural watersources and stashed arms and food.They also received extensive supportfrom the local population and

infrastructure. They would carry out insurgent activities suchas assassinations of government officials, car bombings ofgovernment buildings, and attacks on Iraqi Army troopformations and vehicles. One of their prime targets was theoil and population center of Kirkuk. They launched numerousraids on oil facilities and military posts in the area with somesuccess. They even developed a rocket known as the “Karad”with a range of 20 kilometers in order to strike the city ofKirkuk.

In the final stages of the war, the Iranian regime had reachedits highest tactical evolution. However, friction between theIRGC and conventional military continued until the end of thewar. This evolution led to the capture of the Al Faw peninsulaand the Majnoon islands in the Howeiza marsh areas. However,there remained several obstacles to Iran’s success on thebattlefield which eventually led to the failure of their invasionof Iraq. This was mostly due the Iran’s inability to emerge fromareas of difficult terrain and engage in combined arms warfare onopen ground as occurred in Iran’s various offensive operationswhich attempted to break out from the marshes.

Through eight years of war, the Iranian regime learned how toproperly employ and integrate foreign guerilla forces, IRGC,and conventional military forces to defeat a moretechnologically advanced foe given the right circumstances.From a U.S. standpoint, it is difficult to say that their combinedarms capabilities were ever performed satisfactorily. Commandand control, logistical, and support problems, as well as failureto implement sound military doctrine prevented the Iraniansfrom taking to open ground and hampered the Iranians’potential to make a large breakthrough in the war. They gaineda definite tactical advantage over the technologically superiorIraqi forces when they employed light infantry tactics in difficultterrain. They learned to attain small gains with theircoordination of these light infantry tactics, religiously-motivated conscripts, and guerilla tactics. While these were notenough to initiate an all out invasion of Iraq, they did proveeffective in repelling the Iraqi invasion and creating havoc in Iraqiterritory, especially in difficult terrain areas.

They gained a definitetactical advantage over the

technologically superiorIraqi forces when theyemployed light infantry

tactics in difficult terrain.



I was the platoon leader of 3rd Platoon, Alpha Company, 1stBattalion, 327th Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade CombatTeam, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), when my

unit deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom IV. We werestationed at a forward operating base (FOB) in the vicinity ofHawija, Iraq, and operated there for 12 months.

Once we arrived at the FOB, we drew new equipment from theunit we replaced. My platoon drew up-armored HMMWWs(M1114), M-2 .50 caliber machine guns, Mk-19 40mm grenadelaunchers, and 240B machine guns. This greatly increased themobility and firepower of my platoon. It also introduced newtactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) which we wouldcontinue to develop throughout our deployment. We task organizedinto two sections. Alpha section — led by me when we splitsections — consisted of three trucks. Alpha section had an Mk-19, M-2, and M240B for mounted weapons. Bravo section, undermy platoon sergeant, consisted of three trucks. Another significantchange to our task organization was the addition of the duty ofsection sergeant. The section sergeants would remain mounted atall times and control the fires of their sections. The dismounts ofeach section were led by the dismounted squad leaders. My platooncould dismount 12 infantrymen, one medic, and one interpreter. Iled the dismounts and my platoonsergeant took control of themounted elements when wedismounted.

The enemy in our area ofoperation was adept at the use ofimprovised explosive devices(IEDs) which he employedfrequently along the one route intoand out of our FOB, as well asother routes. The enemy alsoemployed snipers concentrated incomplex urban terrain. Enemyforces also had a substantialnumber of rocket propelledgrenades (RPGs), PKC machineguns, and hand grenades. Theenemy could mass his forces forsquad plus sized ambushes usuallyconsisting of eight to 12 men.These men would be armed withPKC machine guns and RPGs andoperated mostly in the rural areasat night.

A common enemy tactic wasthe emplacing of IEDs along theroutes, especially in culverts that

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CAPTAIN ERIC G. EVANS

ran underneath the road. In town the enemy would use handgrenades as convoys passed by targeting the trail vehicle of theconvoy. We could not move through town with our gunners upbecause of the amount of sniper fire we encountered. It wascommon to receive small arms fire exiting town due to the inabilityof my platoon to react quickly enough to kill or capture theinsurgents. The shooters would simply blend back into thepopulace. The enemy had roving patrols consisting of one sedanstyle car with two to three individuals inside. They would be armedwith an RPG and Dragunov sniper rifle. If an American platoonhalted, these patrols would attempt to maneuver on that platoonand engage with whichever weapon was most appropriate for theirtarget.

The city of Hawija itself was about three kilometers square. Acanal divided the city into eastern and western halves. The easternhalf of the city was the industrial district and contained the marketarea. Residences on this half of the city were on the extremenorthern and southern ends. The Joint Command Center (JCC)and Iraqi Police (IP) station as well as the gas station were alsolocated on this side. The western side of the city was primarily theresidential side. The high school and two mosques were locatedon that side of the city. The roads were generally more narrow

Journalist 1st Class Jeremy L. Wood, USN

Captain Eric G. Evans (right) and another Soldier with the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment examinea small-caliber revolver during a mission on the outskirts of Hawija, Iraq.

here except for Market Street which becamebroad as you left town. A concrete factoryand grainery were located at the southernend of the city. Hawija had traffic controlpoints (TCPs) located on the four routesleading into and out of the city. The easternhalf of the village was from the Obeide tribewhile the western half was from the Jaboritribe. Both of these tribes were of the Sunnisect. The city was 99-percent Sunni withvery few Shias and Kurds.

American forces were repeatedlyattacked at checkpoints and even inside theJCC. The police never reported finding anyweapons at the traffic control points andvery seldom conducted patrols. Anytime thepolice with American help would try toestablish some legitimacy they would betargeted heavily. Our battalion’s conceptfor operating within our battlespace wassaturation. We would launch every platoonin the battalion for at least six to eight hoursa day conducting presence patrols,gathering information, and conductingraids when intelligence would support it.We continued to be targeted by IEDs andsniper fire during the day and ambushes atnight. My platoon was ambushed onOctober 29. The enemy ambush consistedof three to four RPG launchers and threePKC machine guns. The ambush wasactually the type of contact most conduciveto success for us. It allowed us to attemptto fix and maneuver on the enemy in therelatively simple rural terrain. The enemy’seffective use of terrain made fixing andclosing with him very difficult. My platoonwas again ambushed on February 20. Thisambush consisted of three to four RPGteams as well as four PKC machine guns.My platoon was traveling overwatch alongthe route, conducting a movement tocontact to engage such ambush cells. Theenemy initiated the ambush on Alphasection with RPGs. Then PKCs opened upon the entire patrol as Bravo section closed.I attempted to flank the enemy position withBravo section, which was not yet decisivelyengaged. Seeing a section of my trucksmoving on their eastern flank, the enemybroke contact over the inter-visibility linethey were using as cover and escaped.Although no vehicles were destroyed, wecould not pin the enemy down. The factthat he was achieving effective direct fireat night at a distance of 400 meters leadsme to believe they were night visioncapable.

The vast majority of the contact wemade, however, was not conducive tosuccess. Mostly, we were engaged by IEDsalong the routes in the rural environment.They would be remotely detonated makingit nearly impossible to catch the triggerman.Inside town we were engaged with sniperfire, hand grenades, and RPGs. Effectivesniper fire restricted our ability to movewith our gunners up in the turrets to engagethe grenadiers. Dismounting or halting inthe city for any length of time was especiallydangerous. The roving teams maneuveredon and attacked the halted patrol frombehind some form of obstacle and escapedby vehicle before the patrol could reacteffectively.

The responses to the threat in Hawijawere Operation Spartacus and OperationCaesar Returns. Operation Spartacusconsisted of obstacle emplacement withinthe city of Hawija to attempt to limit themobility of the anti-Iraqi forces (AIF). Weemplaced many fixing obstacles as well asblocking obstacles consisting of Jerseybarriers throughout the city. The obstaclescould not all be over-watched by Americanforces so responsibility for the obstacles fellto the Iraqis. The culmination of OperationSpartacus was the emplacement of twoconcrete towers; one tower was located atthe south bridge intersection and one waslocated at the north bridge intersection. Theobstacles we emplaced were removedcompletely within a week. OperationCaesar Returns was launched in response


to this action.Operation Caesar Returns started with

the occupation of Battle Position 1 (BP1)and the co-location of the Military Policeand Mortar Platoons within the JCC. Thepurpose of Operation Caesar Returns wasto provide constant presence in Hawija.This operation would last the remainingfour months of our deployment. OperationCaesar Returns embedded us with our IraqiArmy (IA) and IP brethren and forcedcooperation and mutual support. The IA’sfate was now intertwined with our own aswe manned the same battle positions, andit was impossible to tell who was who.Throughout the operation we wouldconstruct three more battle positions andmove an Iraqi Army battalion from the 5thIraqi Army Brigade into Hawija. The influxof personnel created a surge at a level wewere able to maintain. The introduction ofan IA battalion from outside the immediatearea also paid significant dividends as itforced the local Iraqi Army to improve theirown performance. No outside Iraqi Policewere brought in, however, the constantoversight by American forces combinedwith training and support paid its owndividends as well.

BP1 was located on the southern axis ofthe city. It was a large house that was stillunder construction, but about 90 percentcomplete. The house originally belonged toan AIF financier. We occupied this houseon May 17 and immediately startedimproving our defensive positions. BP 1

Tech Sergeant Andy Dunaway, USAF

Soldiers with A Company, 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment, question local Iraqi menduring a traffic control point mission October 31, 2005.

was two stories with a large porch on thesecond floor. Each of the side rooms lookeddown a route. The eastern room lookeddown the eastern bypass and the westernroom looked down the southern bypass. Wepositioned M240Bs in each of these roomsand built platforms with tripods away fromthe windows. Each of these rooms also hada platform for an M249 in bipod modecovering an alternate avenue of approach.One room also had a loophole for the M24sniper rifle which our qualified, schooltrained, and very experienced snipercarried.

The enemy began to attack us daily oncewe established BP1, repeatedly engagingus from the same areas. We developed hispattern and established target referencepoints (TRPs) at these locations. TRP1 wasat the corner of the concrete factoryapproximately 200 meters from BP1. Theenemy primarily engaged us with RPGsfrom there, then fled north along a routeback into the city. One truck wasresponsible for this TRP as well as theshooters on the rooftop. TRP2 wasapproximately 500 meters away from theeastern room. The enemy engaged theeastern room as well as this truck with smallarms and sniper fire from this TRP. Theposition in the eastern room as well as thetruck was again responsible for this TRP.TRP 3 was approximately 400 meters to thenorth of the western room. The enemyattempted to engage us with small arms fireand, occasionally, with an RPG from thisTRP. The western room and another truckwith its weapons were responsible for thisTRP. TRP4 was exactly 680 meters fromthe western room. The enemy engaged usfrom there often due to its standoff range.The enemy would engage us from a car witha sniper rifle as well as with RPGs. TRP5was in the field to the east of BP 1. Thisis where we believe the 57mm fire camefrom that destroyed the truck earlier. Thetruck with the Mk-19 was responsible forthis TRP because that weapon was bestsuited to engaging targets in the openterrain. Two other trucks were responsiblefor the rear security and provided theimmediate CASEVAC platform. The gunon one truck was dismounted and broughtinside and that weapon replaced with amachine gun. When contact was made, Itook a preselected group of Soldiers andattempted to maneuver on the enemy. Onedismounted squad leader supervised the

dismounts left inside the BP while the othersquad leader and four dismounts came withme.

Contact persisted at BP1. It was still verydifficult to maneuver against the enemy.The enemy soon gave up his attempts toengage us at close range. The lack ofknockdown power of the 5.56mm cartridgewas quickly apparent. Twice the rooftopposition engaged an RPG shooter at 200meters, and twice the enemy misfired hisRPG but was able to escape. The enemyquit sending his wounded to the localhospital where we would find them. Theenemy had an excellent casualty evacuationplan and it was rare to find bodies. Theenemy shifted to TRP4 and TRP2. This iswhen we noticed the scoutingelement. In the morning wewould notice a blackpickup truck come byevery 15 minutes. Afterwe didn’t see the truck

for about an hour, we would be engagedfrom TRP 4. The fire at TRP 4 would comefrom a car in the form of a Dragunov sniperrifle. It was difficult to gain positiveidentification of a target at that range withthe optics we had, so the positiveidentification would have to come from oursniper and his M-24 sniper rifle. We usedthe report from the sniper rifle to engagewith the M240B. The enemy quicklyadapted and would pull the vehicle forwardso that we could not engage the driver orthe engine of the vehicle. With a 700 meterhead start, it was difficult to catch thevehicle. The enemy also used commonvehicles to prevent identification by air. Theenemy would also use our rules ofengagement against us. They would driveup and stop briefly in the same location butnot present a weapon or engage and thendrive off. The effectiveness of our rooftopsniper position garnered attention from theenemy. On June 10, BP1 was engaged by asalvo of mortar fire. Approximately eightrounds of 82mm mortars were fired withno effect. This forced us to provideoverhead cover on the rooftop, but did notforce us to displace the position.

When contact was made, Itook a preselected group ofSoldiers and attempted to

maneuver on the enemy. Onedismounted squad leader

supervised the dismounts leftinside the BP while the other

squad leader and 4 dismountscame with me.



BP2 was our response to the persistent engagement of BP1from the extended range. BP2 was a few hundred meters northeast of BP1. BP1 was not able to mutually support BP2 with directfire, but BP2 had enfilading fires against TRP4 and TRP1. Wefortified BP2 much the same way as BP1. The only place in BP2that had good observation and fields of fire was the rooftop. Therooftop of BP2 was especially dangerous due to its position deeperin the city and the ability to engage it from built up urban areas.Having myself been wounded there by a sniper, I was leery ofestablishing a position there. The benefit of having anotherposition and creating an engagement area seemed to outweighthe danger at the time. BP2 would be manned by a squad, whichleft BP 1 short handed. Now when we attempted to maneuveragainst the enemy, I would only have three other dismounts andlacked a dismounted squad leader so I had to play both squadleader and platoon leader. BP2 could support the JCC from thesouth side and overwatch patrols entering the JCC. The truck inthe courtyard mounted an M-60D and protected the only gate intothe compound. The IA also dispatched a squad to assist in forceprotection at BP2. The IA would inspect people coming into andout of the grainery. The grainery was still operational at the timeso the inside of the BP was continually dusted out. I alwayswondered and thankfully never found out if BP2 would explodelike a grain silo if it were hit with an RPG. First Platoon suffereda casualty during the operation. The Soldier was hit in the upperleft side of his chest with a single round from a sniper rifle. Hewas evacuated to the FOB and then to a field hospital where herecovered.

The problem with BP2’s location was while it supported BP1no other position was able to support BP2. Alpha Company lackedthe manpower to occupy positions all over the city and could notsupport every position. BP2 actually did more harm than good.It forced the enemy out of our established engagement areas andallowed him to regain some of the initiative based off his abilityto attack BP2. It also made for two undermanned battle positionsrather than one strong one. My ability to maneuver with anythingresembling an effective force was drastically reduced based onman power requirements of the two BPs. BP 2 proved to be moreof a liability than an asset.

Battle Positions 3 and 4 were manned completely by the IraqiArmy. BP3 was located across the canal on the south western sideof the city. This battle position could observe a bridge which hadbeen blown nearly in half by repeated IED detonations. BattlePosition 3 later became the CP for the 5th IA battalion assigned tothe city. BP3 had a tower on that was about 50 meters from southbridge, the bridge crossing the canal. For force protection at theseBPs we provided the sandbags, plywood, netting, and wire for theIraqi Army to use to fortify them but left it up to the Iraqis to dothe actual fortification. A bare minimum of fortification was doneand most of the material was either stolen or used for things otherthan force protection. A lack of leadership pushed forward by theIraqi Army was the most significant factor. It was rare to ever findan officer on patrol with his unit. Due to the Iraqis’ different styleof command, the officer is the only one with any real power. Mostof the time you would get a squad of nine “Jundi” (soldier inArabic) instead of another maneuver element.

BPs 3 and 4 were often engaged at night. We would see tracerfire going up at these BPs, but would not see any return fire nor

would the IA element in contact report. Very rarely they wouldreport minor casualties. I determined after launching my strikeelement several times in support of our Iraqi counterparts that wewere being set up for a baited ambush. After we stopped launchingevery time BP3 or BP4 came in contact, the instances of the BPsbeing fired on dropped dramatically.

The two towers put up to help secure the IA battle positionswere also a subject of contention. The towers themselves werevery sturdy. They were made of sections of reinforced concreteand had a heavy roof. The towers had a machine gun mount forthe Iraqi’s PKC machine gun, and we showed them how to makerange cards. The tower near BP3 was the first to be destroyed.The Iraqi who was crewing the tower was simply told to leave bythe insurgent forces while a large IED was placed inside the towerand detonated. The Iraqi soldier said he had been attacked by 40insurgents but never fired his weapon. A week later the tower byBP4 was destroyed in much the same manner. The two Iraqismanning the tower this time were reported kidnapped and thetower destroyed by a large IED. The Iraqis who were kidnappedwere found later unharmed. The towers had become icons ofAmerican occupation in Hawija and were attacked accordingly.The towers themselves had not hampered the insurgent’s abilityto conduct operations; it was merely a symbolic gesture.

The JCC was an integral part of Operation Caesar Returns.The JCC provided the communications nucleus between Americanand Iraqi forces. An MP NCO and his platoon alternated occupyingthe JCC with the battalion mortar platoon. We were in constantradio contact with the American forces at the JCC. At first we hadto coordinate logistics support for our Iraqi Army counter partsthrough the American forces at the JCC but the IA quicklydeveloped a process of their own. The JCC also helped the IA andIP track their patrols. The MP NCO led many integrated patrolsin the city. This helped the IP develop sound tactics as well asestablish some type of battle rhythm. The IP got used to going onpatrol everyday and it became less difficult to goad them intoaction. The IP also began launching their own quick reactionforces. The IP would send units to support patrols who were havingdifficulty, especially around the gas station where civil unrest wasthe norm. The IP could also radio the JCC who was in directradio contact with the battalion tactical operations center (TOC)and could request support from our explosives ordinance disposal(EOD) teams or illumination rounds from the battalion mortars.

All the platoons from the company rotated to the BPs. Thisrotation allowed our forces to take advantage of the battalion’smaintenance facilities and the chow hall. Soldiers’ moraleremained high because they could still call home when we wereback on the FOB. This rotation limited the exposure of logisticspackages because we would carry all the food water andammunition we needed on our way out. The company had its ownemergency resupply package assembled in case the BPs neededimmediate resupply but this package would be carried forward byour own quick reaction force. The platoon that was going to occupythe BPs next would be at REDCON 2 (able to launch in less than15 minutes) to be used as a QRF or for time sensitive targets.BP1’s position in town also provided the company commanderwith more flexibility in his operations. For company- sizedoperations we could surge the entire company into town and have



the BP to act as a company command post,casualty collection point, detaineecollection point, and forward resupply.

The BP concept effectively took theinitiative away from the enemy. Theattacker usually maintains the initiative inlinear operations but the BP concept forcedhim to play to our strengths. By forcingthe enemy to come to us we negated hisability to blend into the populace, andforced him into our own preparedengagement areas. The positioning of BP1provided standoff which took away his mosteffective weapons the RKG-3 and the IED.The enemy could not engage us from anycloser than 200 meters and in doing so hadto present himself as a target. He could nolonger target us with impunity by usingremote IEDs. Having dismounts in aposition to engage from a prepared defensemaximized the useable firepower of theplatoon while minimizing the risk toSoldiers.

The concept of BP’s manned bydismounted infantry also gave flexibility tothe platoon leader and diminished theenemy’s ability to pattern us. I was able tolaunch patrols at times of my own choosingand for specific purposes. This allowed meto patrol at times when it was most effectiveand patrol only for specific purposes. Themost dangerous types of patrols are the longpresence patrols in a certain sector. Whenconducting these types of patrols, it isdifficult not to pattern yourself. Patrols ofshorter duration increased the Soldiers’vigilance and reduced the amount of timewe were exposed to the enemy’s mosteffective weapons. Presence inside townalso made our raids more effective. Theenemy no longer received reports that wewere in town so his early warning systembecame less effective. At night we could slipout of the BP leaving only the vehicles inplace and conduct dismounted patrolswhich at the time were inherently safer andmore effective.

Operation Caesar Returns completelyunbalanced the enemy. Denied the abilityto target our mounted patrols in terrain thatmade them vulnerable, he was forced toattack us on more even terms. The attacksagainst BP1 were not only more resourceintensive to the enemy but also more costlyin personnel. It was less resource intensiveto us because we were not constantlyrepairing our vehicles after IED strikes.Soldiers preferred the BP to presence

patrols because they felt like it put them ina better position to engage the enemywithout being vulnerable to weapons theycould do little about such as the IED. MySoldiers became adept at recognizing thesigns of a coming enemy attack and wewere able to interdict these attacks. The BPprovided the opportunity for Soldiers toidentify a target and shoot first rather thanbeing completely reactive. Two Soldiers,a sergeant and a specialist, were able to spotan RPG team moving into position to attackthe BP from TRP 5. The machine gunnernoticed the man through the PAS-13 sighton the M240 and brought i t to thesergeant’s attention. He spotted the samegroup through his light PAS-13 andidentified the RPG as well. The gunnerengaged at a range of 500 meters andforced the enemy to withdraw. We areunsure if he killed the RPG gunnerbecause the strike element was supportingIA in contact vicinity of BP 4 and wecould not maneuver, but it is encouragingthat we were able to shoot first rather thanreact to enemy action. Our sniperrepeatedly spotted threats with his M-24and engaged before the enemy could fire.In an environment that makes positiveidentification of a target so difficult theability to shoot first is a large step towardssuccess. The enemy became moredesperate in their attempts to destroyBP1. The most original attack was in theform of an ice cream cart rigged with 57mmrockets that would fire by remote. The firstrocket that fired missed wide and capsizedthe cart causing the rest of the rockets tomiss also.

Contact at BP1 dropped to almostnothing during the month of August. Thiscould be due to a myriad of reasons, but Ibelieve that it was due to the enemy’sinability to effectively target BP1, andbecause the mounting cost of his previousoperations forced him into a refit cycle. Nocasualties were suffered inside BP1 andonly one at BP2. In comparison to ourprevious operations, this fact is remarkableespecially because of the amount of combatpower the enemy dedicated to destroyingit. After nearly daily contact for two

months, BP1 was still standing; the enemywas frustrated for the first time. It seemedlike a doctrinal oxymoron that going staticcould in fact turn you into the hunter, butit worked. The IA also benefitted from ourexample at the BPs and the JCC. Theylearned how to make range cards, controldirect fires, and establish effective rest andrefit plans. The IA at BPs 1 and 2 becameunits that you could count on and use asanother maneuver element rather thanbystanders. IP forces and IA forces learnedto cooperate and launch patrols in supportof one another.

Battle positions proved to be veryeffective in dealing with hostile areas. AtBP1 we had the best of both worlds. Wehad the support of a battalion-sized FOBin close proximity as well as the autonomyof a smaller outpost. What allowed our BPto be so effective was the support structurebehind it. One temptation that should beavoided by commanders is to dedicate somuch of their force to decentralized battlepositions that they are unable to supporteach other or they lose all flexibility ofmaneuver because all of their forces arecommitted. To effectively man BPs in thenorth side of town would have required anentire other company. The temptation tostretch your forces too thin results in battlepositions that are targetable and you setyourself up more for tragedy than forsuccess. There is no such thing as aneconomy of force when you cannot templatethe enemy. Battle positions that aresupportable and most importantlysustainable are an incredible combatmultiplier for larger units operating in thatsector.


At the time this article was written, Captain EricG. Evans was attending the Manuever CaptainsCareer Course at Fort Benning, Georgia. He iscurrently serving as the S-4 for the 2-70 CombinedArms Battalion, 3rd Brigade, 1st Armored Division,at Fort Riley, Kansas. He was commissioned in May2004. After completing the Infantry Officers BasicCourse and Ranger School he was assigned to ACompany, 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, 101stAirborne Division, as a platoon leader and thencompany executive officer.

The concept of BP’s manned by dismounted infantry also gaveflexibility to the platoon leader and diminished the enemy’s ability

to pattern us. I was able to launch patrols at times of my ownchoosing and for specific purposes.

DEFENSIVE

AND EVASIVE

DRIVER

TRAININGMAJOR RICH R. ROULEAU

Current Army operations in Iraq, primarily those in thelarger cities such as Baghdad and Mosul require thatour wheeled vehicle drivers be well versed in congested

traffic driving techniques. Although we employ measures to keeplocal traffic away from our vehicles and convoys such as distancewarning signs and hand and arm signals, the local populationdoes not always obey. Unless Soldiers are from a large city orhave experience driving in heavy urban traffic, they are learningon the fly. Even the most experienced driver will need trainingto overcome the dangers of driving in a hostile environment.The Army needs to develop a “train-the-trainer” course inevasive and defensive driving techniques, to include practicalexercises, for our unit master drivers to follow when conductingtraining for the inexperienced younger Soldiers prior to theirdeployment.

Both AR 600-55, the Army Driver and Operator-Standardization Program (Selection, Training, Testing, andLicensing), and FM 21-305, the Manual for the Wheeled VehicleDriver, are deficient in addressing evasive driver training.

The only training resource available to unit commanders forevasive/defensive driving techniques can be found on the U.S.

Army Combat Readiness Training Center Web site in the “Driver’sTraining Tool Box (https://crc.army.mil/drivertraining toolbox/evoTrainingManual.aspx). The site has a copy of the EmergencyVehicle Operators Training Manual, a training manual developedby civilian law enforcement activities, and there are examples ofcourses taught to Military Police (MP) students. MP driving coursesare taught in accordance with AR 600-55 as indicated by thefollowing excerpt:

“Emergency vehicle operators must complete an emergencyvehicle training program prior to assuming operator duties, andevery 3 years thereafter. This training will include instruction inthe subjects outlined in appendix H and will be annotated on DAForm 348, section III, upon completion.”

— AR 600–55 • December 31, 1993

Appendix H of AR 600-55 addresses the Emergency VehicleDriver Training Course and highlights the requirement butprovides nothing that a unit can use. The tasks outlined on thenext page may or may not support evasive driving techniques, butcurrently there is no sample course of instruction that units canfollow at home station.


FM 21-305: Manual for theWheeled Vehicle Driver

This manual covers the generalprinciples of non-tactical wheeled vehicleoperation. It also describes specialinstructions for tactical vehicle operation.Military and civilian drivers ofgovernment-owned vehicles will use thismanual as a guide for safe and efficientoperation of a vehicle. Instructions in thismanual will help the wheeled vehicle drivermaintain a high degree of drivingefficiency. This manual does not restrict itscontents to any particular vehicle. It is aguide to normal everyday operations andto driving under difficult conditions. Whenmore information is needed for a specificvehicle, check the technical manual writtenfor that vehicle.

Chapter 8, Operating Practices andManeuvers, should address evasivedriving techniques only focuses ondriving practices, starting, steering,turning, braking, and stopping, groundguide safety procedures, backing, turningaround, parking and the elements of safedriving.

Typically, unit driver ’s trainingstandard operating procedures (SOPs)will include reviews of the aboveinformation with additional training thatis unit specific or condition specific suchas winter driving. Here is an excerpt fromone unit’s SOP.

OBJECTIVES: To establish a trainingprogram at the squadron and troop levelfor motor vehicle drivers and equipmentoperators that promotes the highest

standards of technical proficiency,equipment safety, and driver knowledge.

a. To insure that, at a minimum, thetroop master drivers license all the Soldiersthat are not in a command position on ahigh mobility multi-wheeled vehicle(HMMWV) within 60 days of arrival underthe supervision of the squadron masterdriver.

b. To teach and/or sustain basic operatorskills on motor vehicles and equipment.

c. To instill in vehicle operators andsupervisors a safety attitude and a greatersense of pride in his/her assignedequipment.

d. To ensure that Soldiers are awareof all state and post environmentalprotection and traffic laws.

e. To ensure that Soldiers’ motorvehicles and equipment are in properoperational status by complying withproper preventive maintenance checksand services (PMCS).

f. To promote safety.

Evading ContactAlthough some unit’s have convoy

leader’s handbooks and other driving-related unit level products, many focus onbreaking contact not evading it.

Several federal agencies and privatecontractors have programs whichemphasize evading contact. One of theseprograms offered by the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation (FBI) is the TacticalEmergency Vehicle Operators Course(TEVOC).

The TEVOC program instructs newagents and other law enforcementpersonnel in the basics of defensivedriving and emergency vehicle operationtechniques. It is used to improve thedriving skills and confidence of personneland reduce the possibility of accidents;students receive classroom instruction invehicle dynamics, defensive drivingprinciples, and legal and liability issues.Students also are given skill developmentexercises in skid control, performancedriving, and evasive driving techniques.Sending master drivers to the TEVOC orother federally sanctioned courses wouldassist the Army in building a trainingbase to prepare units for combat drivingin the big cities of Iraq.


TRAINING NOTES

H–2. Program of instructiona. Unit A — Introduction, organizationof course, and material review.b. Unit B — State, local, host nation,and post traffic regulations and laws.c. Unit C — Selection of routes andbuilding identification.d. Unit D — Use of radios andcommunications procedures.e. Unit E — Emergency vehicle driving.

(1) Lights and sirens.(2) Parking and backing.(3) Negotiating traffic.(4) Intersections.(5) Turns.(6) Following distance.(7) Road conditions.(8) Yield right of way.(9) Negotiating curves.

f. Unit F — Handling unusualsituations.

(1) Adverse weather.(2) Collisions.(3) Skids.(4) Vehicle malfunctions.(5) Placement of warning devices.

g. Unit G — Specialized instruction.(1) Section I—Ambulances.(a) Responsibilities.(b) Route planning.(c) Inspection and maintenance of

medical supplies and life supportequipment authorized for the type ofambulance the individual is beingtested for.

(d) Driving to the scene.(e) At the scene.(f) Directing traffic.(g) Driving with a patient aboard.

(2) Section II — Police vehicles.(a) Responsibilities.(b) Emergency communications.(c) Pursuit driving.(d) Making a traffic stop.(e) Emergency escort of another

vehicle.(f) Directing traffic.

(3) Section III — Fire apparatus.(a) Responsibilities.(b) Inspection and maintenance of

specialized equipment.(c) Vehicle characteristics.(d) Selecting routes.(e) Operating systems.(f) Special considerations.

(4) Vehicle dynamics.(5) Size and weight.(6) Speed.(7) Basic control tasks.

(a) Steering.(b) Braking.(c) Shifting.(d) Backing.(e) Parking.(f) Intersections.

h. Unit H — Introduction to drivingrange and safety briefing.i. Unit I — Driving range.j. Unit J — Operator’s performanceevaluation.

Appendix H of AR 600-55Emergency Vehicle Driver Training Course

Combat Drivers Assault CourseFigure 1 is a concept and example of a scaled down/modified

version of training a Soldier received while attending a courseprior to his unit deploying to Iraq.

The unit named its training course the Combat Drivers AssaultCourse (CDAC). The following is an example concept brief usedby the unit to brief the participants.

The purpose of the course was to improve drivers’ survivabilityin a combat environment. The course consisted of limitedclassroom training and a series of driving exercises designed toteach drivers new techniques and to instill in them confidence intheir abilities.

The training objectives for CDAC were:• Free a Trapped Vehicle• Precision Steering• Precision Backing• Ramming Techniques*• React to Contact• React to Media• React to Civilians on the Battlefield (COBs)*This training was trained only in a classroom environment,

but not put into practice. The unit used its post military operations on urban terrain

(MOUT) site as its training site, and it provided a great settingfor the training. The personnel at the site were able to acquireevery training aid requested. These included junked cars, telephonepoles, tires, 55-gallon drums, and barriers, all of which made thetraining more realistic. Sound effects (call to prayer, weaponsfire, and screams) were used to add realism. The MOUT site’stheater also proved to be the ideal place to conduct classroomtraining and after action reviews (AARs).

Old tires were used to provide protection to the vehicles usedin training to protect them from unnecessary damage. Tying used


tires to the four corners of the vehicles with parachute cord tookabout five minutes per vehicle and were very effective in reducingdamage suffered during training. Additionally, the vehicles nevercollided with anything while moving more than 10 miles per hour(mph), and the tires prevented damage to vehicle lights and body.The low-speed collisions included contact with other HMMWVs,junked cars, and 55-gallon drums.

The student-to-instructor ratio is very important in order toprovide proper instruction. One instructor for approximately everyfive students is the desired level. This allowed for smooth rotationof the students and vehicles for each exercise, and it allowed forsome instructors to do administrative work for the course (set-up,etc) while the others ran the exercises. The number of instructorsalso allowed the students to be split into small groups to betteruse all of the training sites in the limited time available.

Instructors with experience driving HMMWVs are key to thesuccess of this course. Without experienced instructors, the leadercertification would have easily taken several days. With theexperienced NCOs, the leader certification focused more on thespecifics of each exercise. Classroom instruction followed bypractical exercises and a written exam completed the certification.

Leader CertificationUnit leaders and trainers are certified in providing this type of

instruction. The course instructor teaches unit master drivers thetechniques to be trained and certifies them to teach thesetechniques.

Driver’s Training ProgramThe target audience for this course is drivers of wheeled vehicles

(i.e. supply specialist, NBC specialist, and command groupdrivers). A small group was chosen to ensure the student toinstructor ratio was low. Additionally, other units from post sent

Figure 1 — Concept Brief for Combat Drivers Assault Course

Mission: Unit conducts evasive driving course vicMOUT site NLT JAN 04 IOT improve driver’s and TC’ssurvivability in a combat environment.

Training Objectives:1. Deploy/Redeploy2. Move Tactically3. Conduct CSS Operations

1. Free a Trapped Vehicle2. Precision Steering3. Precision Backing4. React to Contact5. React to Media6. Reac to Civilians on the Battlefield

Resources:Time:Terrain: MOUT Site, Motor PoolO/C: Troop Commander, Selected personnel* See resource request

Task Organization:

personnel through the course to develop their own training course.Initially, students were given classroom instruction (the crawlphase) followed by controlled execution in the motor pool withtraffic cones (the walk phase), and then advanced execution (therun phase) with an instructor in the vehicle in the urban sprawl ofthe MOUT site.

The morning of Day 1 included classroom instruction forafternoon execution. Soldiers were trained by on the fundamentalsof evasive driving, a serpentine course (as depicted in Figure 2) undercontrolled conditions and then given a practical exercise (PE) in theafternoon in the MOUT site with typical urban sprawl. Each vehicleused consisted of the driver, the vehicle commander/instructor andtwo additional students. After each student executed the course, theywere immediately AAR’d by the instructor and their peers on theapplication of the techniques being trained. Soldiers executednumerous iterations of the course and due to the immediate feedbackand low student-to-instructor ratio were able to retrainingeffectively. A sample Day 1 schedule is listed below.

instructor and their peers on the application of the techniquesbeing trained. Soldiers executed numerous iteration of the courseand due to the immediate feedback and low student-to-instructorratio were able to retraining effectively. A sample Day 2 scheduleis listed below.

TRAINING NOTES


Leader Certification

0900-0945 Overview/Read-ahead Review* (MOUT Clrm)0945-1030 Media / CA overview1030-1200 MOUT Site walk / obstacle set-up1200-1300 Lunch1300-1310 Motor Pool orientation1310-1400 Drive Motor Pool exercises (all instructors)1400-1600 Drive MOUT Site exercises (all instructors)1600-1700 Revise/Refine/Drive (as required) obstacles and

exercises1700 Return vehicles to Motor Pool

*Instructors are responsible for reading instructor packet before LeaderCertification IOT expedite leader training

CDAC, Phase I

The morning of Day 2 included the fundamentals of precisionbacking (Figure 2), lane change (Figure 3), and precision drivingcourses (Figure 4) under controlled conditions with traffic conesand then given a PE in the afternoon in the MOUT site with typicalurban sprawl. Each vehicle used consisted of the driver, the vehiclecommander/instructor and two additional students. After eachstudent executed the course, they were immediately AAR’d by the

The morning of Day 3 included a review and execution ofadvanced urban steering, free a trapped vehicle and classroominstruction of evasive driving techniques followed by a PE. Againinitial introduction to training was first executed under controlledconditions with traffic cones and then given a PE in the afternoon inthe MOUT site with typical urban sprawl. For advance techniques,each vehicle used consisted of the driver and the vehicle commander/instructor. After each student executed the course, they wereimmediately AAR’d by the instructor and their peers on the applicationof the techniques being trained. Soldiers executed numerousiterations of the course, and due to the immediate feedback andlow student-to-instructor ratio were able to complete retrainingeffectively. A sample Day 3 schedule is listed below.

0900-1030 Fundamentals of Evasive Driving/4WDapplications (MOUT Classroom)

1030-1200 Media / CA Considerations (MOUTClassroom)

1200-1300 Lunch1300-1330 Prep Vehicles for Operations (Motor Pool)1330-1430 Drive Serpentine Course (Motor Pool)1430-1600 Drive Basic Urban Steering Course

(MOUT Site)1600-1630 Review (MOUT Site)1630-1700 Return Vehicles to Motor Pool

Day 1CDAC, Phase I

0900-0930 Prep Vehicles for Operations0930-1030 Drive Precision Backing Course (Motor Pool)1030-1130 Lane Change Exercise (Motor Pool)1130-1300 Lunch / Course Set-up1300-1330 Walk Precision Steering Course (Motor Pool)1330-1500 Drive Precision Steering Course (Motor Pool)1500-1530 Walk Advanced Urban Steering Course

(MOUT Site)1530-1600 Drive Advanced Urban Steering Course (slow,

MOUT Site)1600-1630 Return Vehicles to Motor Pool

Day 2,CDAC, Phase I

The purpose of the course was to improve drivers’ survivability ina combat environment and with a small student-to-instructor ratio ofthe first execution CDAC, which was completed in four days. Day 4was left for retraining, vehicle maintenance, and site clean-up.

0700-0730 Prep Vehicles for Operations (Motor Pool)0730-0900 Drive Advanced Urban Steering Course (fast,

MOUT Site)0900-0930 Free Trapped Vehicle (MOUT Site)0930-1000 Evasive Driving Overview1000-1200 Drive Evasive Driving Exercise (MOUT Site)1200-1300 Lunch1300-1600 Drive Evasive Driving Exercise (MOUT Site)1600-1630 AARs1630-1700 Move Vehicles to Motor Pool

Day 3CDAC, Phase I

0900-1200 Convoy Driving Overview (MOUT Classroom)1300-1430 AAR (MOUT Classroom)1430-1700 Clean-up (MOUT Site) / Post-ops PMCS

(Motor Pool)

Day 4CDAC, Phase I


Again, this training was adaptive to meet the goals of a unitcommander based on available resources and knowledge. Thefollowing were some of the resources required to execute thetraining:

PersonnelInstructors: 5x NCO (troop master drivers)Set-up/tear down detail: Instructors + 5 SoldiersMinimum student-to-teacher ration: 5:1LandClassroom: MOUT site classroomUrban obstacle course: MOUT siteSkills area: Motor PoolVehicles1x dedicated medic HMMWV5x training HMMWVsOtherUrban obstacle course:

20 55-gal. drums (empty) or equivalent10 plastic Jersey barriers (empty)10 junk vehicles (kept at MOUT site permanently)

Skills area: 100 road cones/pylons, 18-36” heightTargets (simulate COBs)

ConclusionThe days of conducting simple operator/driver’s training in a

sterile environment are gone. Convoy live fires are now a wayof life for units preparing to go to combat in Iraq. Even in thethird world, urban sprawl and modernization has madedefensive or tactical driving in a congested urban environment afact of military life. Doing so requires the careful application ofcreative training by unit leaders. This brief article showed howone unit maintains its combat edge by using all the available toolsat hand.

Leaders must continue to draw on the experience of its combatveterans, seasoned in operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia,Haiti, and Bosnia. Finally, a unit never stops refining its tactics,techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in combat drills that improvethe unit’s ability to meet the challenges of urban operations.This is an example of how one unit made up for inadequaciesin Army training as it prepared for combat in Iraq.Figure 4 — Lane Change Exercise

Figure 3 — Precision Backing Course

Figure 2 — Serpentine Course

Figure 5 — Precision Steering Course

Major Rich R. Rouleau is currently assigned to the National TrainingCenter at Fort Irwin, California, as the Light Task Force XO Trainer. He enlistedin the Army National Guard in 1982 and transferred to active duty in 1984 asan M60A1 armor crewman. He has served as a tank platoon leader, companyexecutive officer, and battalion maintenance officer for the 2nd Battalion, 37thArmor, 3rd Infantry Division, and assistant S3, S4 and troop commander of ATroop,3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry, 10th Mountain Division. He also served asan armor/mechanized observer/controller at the Joint Readiness TrainingCenter at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and as S3 and XO for the 4th Squadron, 14thCavalry, 172nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team in Iraq.

The contemporary operational environment (COE),introduced in February 2000, has proven surprisinglyadept at maintaining its training relevance to the present

day. The number of changes and seemingly “new” occurrences incurrent conflicts are staggering; yet those who understood the COEwould have been prepared for just such occurrences. Essentially,those with a thorough grounding in the COE would be able toreplicate any real world environment for any preparatory, pre-deployment, training or experimentation purpose. Armed with athorough understanding of the COE and opposing force (OPFOR)operations and tactics, today’s trainers can prepare the Army forany conflict — both today and tomorrow.

Describing the Environment: A Look at the RevisedCOE

The contemporary operational environment is the synergisticcombination of all the critical variables and actors that crate theconditions, circumstances, and influences that can affect militaryoperations today and in the future. An operational environment(OE) consists of all the conditions, circumstances, and influenceswhich affect military operations, to include the application of otherinstruments of national power within a specific area. An OE is asubset of the COE and is defined as here and to the foreseeablefuture (determined to be 15 years), according to Joint Publication3-0, Joint Operations. COE environments described more than15 years into the future are considered to be the future operationalenvironment (FOE).

The COE is the holistic view of the environment of theconditions that exist within the operational environment that bestand most realistically challenge Army units, leaders and Soldiersin the execution of Army and joint tasks (FM 7-100.4, OpposingForce Organization Guide). Variables of the COE are used todescribe distinct operational environments whether real orcontrived for training. The strength of the COE is that it is flexibleand scalable, capable of replicating any environment U.S. forcesmight encounter along the full spectrum of conflict, from apeacetime military engagement to major combat operations. Asimple look at the conditions as they exist in the world today willgive an observer a series of considerations to prepare and trainour Army for successful engagements, regardless of contingency.

The COE was based on a few key assumptions. First, we willnot be able to predict what and where, with any degree ofconfidence, the threats are we must train for in the near- to mid-term. Second, the missions of the Army are widespread anddisparate, covering the range of operations including disaster relief,nation building, full spectrum conflict, or a conglomeration of allthree occurring simultaneously.

A CONCEPT FOR ALL SEASONS

TRAINING NOTES

MAJOR GEORGE STROUMPOS

The COE and its Relation to Real-World Events

When introduced, the COE initially used 11 variables todescribe the operational environment. Due to how Joint doctrinedescribes the respective parts of an OE, these 11 variables werechanged, adopting the Joint OE framework of PMESII: political,military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure. In aneffort to ensure a complete capture of the environmental conditionsthat the Army would face, the Army adds +PT (physicalenvironment and time) to the framework of analysis. As a memoryaid to ensure consideration of all the variables in describing anOE, one uses the acronym PMESII+PT to fully describe a COEenvironment.

Revised, though fundamentally unchanged, the new COEvariables still maintain all of the original variable considerations,albeit packaged in a more ubiquitously accepted context. Tounderstand the power of the COE, we must first understand theinteracting variables — what they mean and their effects. Includedis a brief overview of the OE and COE variables for reference.Each description captures the gist of the variable as it is currentlydefined. A more in-depth look at the variables and their effectscan be found in FM 3-0, Operations, and the soon to be publishedFM 3-0.2.

The Variables of the COE: PMESII+PTPolitical (P): This variable provides an overview of the political

system and political power within an OE. In essence, the natureof political authority within the state refers to all actors within anOE with political authority and the degree of legitimacy. Thepolitical variable includes the analysis of all relevant political,economic, military, religious or cultural mergers and/orpartnerships of the key entities of a given OE. Another aspectthis variable deals with is the idea of “national will” in the politicalsense.

Military (M): This variable explores the military capabilitiesof all relevant actors in a given OE. This includes conventionalforces, police forces and special forces and these capabilitiestypically include equipment, manpower, training levels, resourceconstraints and leadership issues. The variable focuses on anactor’s ability to field forces and leverage them for use domestically,regionally or globally. Moreover, the variable also analyzes theflexibility, innovation, and adaptability of an actor.

Economic (E): The economic variable provides an overviewof the economic conditions/indicators within an OE. A study ofthis variable establishes the boundaries between the “haves” andthe “have-nots.” Control of and access to natural or strategicresources are also considered as this can cause conflict. Beingable to affect another actor, positively or negatively, througheconomic not military means, may become the key to regional


hegemonic status or dominance. Economicdeprivation is also a major cause of conflict.One actor may have economic superiorityover another for many reasons, includingaccess to natural resources or power.

Social (S): A social system is the people,groups, and social institutions of a society,with shared characteristic values andbeliefs, which are organized, integrated andnetworked by relationships, interactingwithin their environment. A subset of thisvariable, culture, is a system of sharedbeliefs, values, customs, behaviors andartifacts that the members of society use tocope with their world and with one another.This variable includes the cultural,religious and ethnic makeup of a given OE.Analysis is conducted on the network ofsocial institutions, statuses, and roles thatsupport, acculturate, and enableindividuals.

Information (I): The informationvariable discusses the nature, scope, andcharacteristics of the informationenvironment of a given OE. Informationinvolves the access, use, manipulation,distribution, and reliance on informationtechnology systems, both civilian andmilitary, by an entity (state or non-state).Understanding whatever communicationinfrastructure exists is important becauseit ultimately controls the flow ofinformation to the population and thethreat. Moreover, communicationavailability acts as a leveling function withregards to mitigating our technicaladvantages to a surprising extent.

Infrastructure (I): The infrastructuresystem is composed of the basic facilities,services, and installations needed for thefunctioning of a community or society. Thedegradation or destruction of infrastructurewill impact the entire OE, especially thepolitical, military, economic, social, andinformation variables. This variable alsoreflects the technological sophistication ofa given OE. Technology encompasses theability of an actor to conduct research anddevelopment (R&D) and capitalize on suchresearch for both civil and militarypurposes. The variable reflects thetechnological level of the OE in terms ofsectors of technological success or

advancement, scientific and researchinstitutions, technology acquisition policiesand the education and training facilitiesthat support the acquisition of technology.

Physical Environment (P): Thephysical environment defines the physicalcircumstances and conditions surroundingand influencing the execution of operationsthroughout the domains of air, land, sea andspace. The defining factors are complexterrain and urban settings (super-surface,surface and subsurface features), weather,topography, hydrology and environmentalconditions.

Time (T): The variable of timeinfluences military operations within an OEin terms of the decision cycle, tempo ofoperations and overall planning; it may alsoinfluence popular support for operations,success of operations and final victory. Howmuch time is available and how long eventsmight take will affect every aspect ofmilitary planning, to include force packagedevelopment, force flow rate, quality ofintelligence preparation of the area ofoperations, and the need for forward-deployed forces and logistics. Time is theone variable that is invariably unfavorableto us.

A deeper look at “M” — the threat:the capabilities-based, thinkingenemy

Gone are the “space invader” armies ofyesterday: predictable, mechanized andwell understood formations. Today’s threatis extremely lethal, adaptive and capableof reaching niche parity or superiority withour own force capabilities. Moreover, thisthreat is innovative, leveraging adaptivetactics in an effort to negate our militarysuperiorities and tactics, techniques andprocedures (TTPs). The thinking,capabilities-based and adaptive threat is,and will likely be, the threat norm for ournation’s military forces — today and in theforeseeable future. A merely cursory studyof our most elusive and stubborn threatsdemonstrates this reality. COEaccommodates this new reality.

For example, no one on September 10,2001, would have easily foreseen theinvasion of Afghanistan and the speedy

defeat of the Taliban three months later.Moreover, five years on, few could trulyhave foreseen a resurgent Taliban,successfully employing guerilla tactics,either. Our inability to predict futureconflict enhances the value of the COE.Also, the COE conceptual frameworkreflects much of the “new” tactics that havebeen employed recently, in Lebanon,Afghanistan, and Iraq with an astonishingdegree of accuracy.

Originally proposed in the February2000 white paper “Capturing theOperational Environment,” adversarieswill opt to avoid conventional maneuverbattles with U.S. forces, seeking to drawU.S. forces piecemeal into urban fights —which constrain precision guidedmunitions (PGM) employment andtruncates our intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance (ISR), limiting our standoffcapabilities. Additionally, the threat willemploy effective asymmetriccountermeasures to increasingly nullify ourtechnological prowess.

Adversaries understand the power ofadaptation and, as a result, willcontinuously change their tactics to try togain advantage over U.S. forces. Perhapsthe threat’s greatest success today is thethreat’s adroit use of mass media to attackthe U.S. national will. Ironically, thoughnot specifically predicted, much of recentyears’ activity and asymmetric threats havebeen presciently foretold by COE: fromunique environmental conditions andinfluences, operational restrictions andchallenges, to threat tactics and nichecapabilities.

The Operational EnvironmentAssessment

To help trainers analyze, thenincorporate the different variables of an OEinto conditions for training, includingrelevant threat capabilities, Training andDoctrine Command - Deputy Chief of Stafffor Intelligence (TRADOC DCSINT)publishes a series of operationalenvironmental assessments (OEA) to helpthe training base accurately and correctlyreplicate the appropriate trainingenvironment.


TRAINING NOTES

OEAs are assessments of OEs in specificgeographic areas. They help trainersreplicate conditions of a specific OE in atraining environment for mission rehearsalor deployment. They are an encyclopediclook at an environment, providing a fullview of all variables present in anenvironment, their interactions, and thepossible manifestations of those variables.OEAs also provide another helpful feature:predictive events based upon analysis ofconditions three, six and 12 months intothe future based on analyzed trends in thespecific OEs variables.

While intended to support missionrehearsal or contingency training, theseOEAs have in some cases providedsignificant insights that help deployedunits understand their particular OE.OEAs also serve as examples of how touse an analysis of the PMESII+PTvariables to gain a holistic understandingof any specific OE. Using the OEA,trainers can not only replicate today’sconditions, but tomorrow’s as well — allwithout using today’s news as a trainingaid (still a disappointingly commonpractice). Instead, using the future trendsanalysis of the OEA, we can anticipateand train for tomorrow’s challenges whilenot being tied to the present day threattactics and techniques.

Presently, DCSINT has produced OEAsfor OIF, OEF, North Korea, and Azerbaijan.Other OEAs are currently underdevelopment for other locations.

A Matter of Description: the Rangeof Environments Possible Using thePMESII+PT Framework

Although OEAs are instrumental inhelping trainers replicate an environment,today and in the future, it is not necessaryto have an OEA to create a trainingenvironment. A solid knowledge of theCOE framework empowers trainers todesign their own training environments. Todo this, trainers must simply define thePMESII+PT variables to create a relevantenvironment for the specific trainingconditions desired.

The environments capable of descriptionare widespread and limitless. From a

potential future environment to theenvironments of today’s conflicts andevents, the OE framework enables anyenvironment, whether real or imagined, tobe replicated or created. The mostdemonstrative examples of this capabilitycan be seen in COE framework’s ability toaccurately describe disparate, thoughrecent, world events. Events such as thetsunami rescue missions in Indonesia,Hurricane Katrina disaster relief efforts,and the Israeli/Hizbollah conflict can allbe described using the PMESII+PTvariables. To do this, a trainer needs tocapture descriptions of the individualvariables. Using the COE framework, allof these real-world conditions could alsobe combined to create an excruciatinglychallenging training environment.

To demonstrate the resilience of ourCOE, a dissection of a real world eventusing the PMESII+PT variables is inorder: specifically the Israeli/Hizbollahconflict (See figure 1). Although thisconflict was unique (state vs. paramilitaryor non-state actor), the tactics andtechniques used against the IsraeliDefense Forces by Hizbollah are not new.Indeed, the majority of the Hizbollahmilitia strategy and tactics are more thanadequately described by the FM 7-100series on COE OPFOR (FM 7-100.1, .2,.3), respectively. The uniqueness of theLebanese conflict arises from theconfluence of events and the Israelireaction to those events, not the threat’s(Hizbollah’s) courses of action or tactics.A look at how the variables are describedillustrates this point and the power of ourCOE framework of analysis.

Once an environment is described,whether real or artificial, the environmentdescribed can and should be modified to fitthe unit commander’s specific trainingobjectives. This is a key capability of theCOE framework: the ability to create anytraining environment imaginable, governedsolely by a unit’s training objectives.

This flexibility is embedded in the COEframework. Within COE, trainingobjectives play the dominant role in thecreation of the training environment. Forinstance, if a commander desired more non-


lethal effects to be trained, a trainer couldaugment existing OEA variables or createtheir own social, political, economic andpossibly infrastructure variables toaccommodate the training scenario. Suchan artificial combined environment couldchallenge both a unit’s lethal and non-lethalcapabilities in a realistic and synergisticmanner. Although this is a simplisticexample, the possibilities for adoption orcreation of a training environment are trulylimitless.

The recent revisions to the OE chapterof FM 3-0 (the adoption of the PMESII+PTframework) have only increased thecapability of the COE framework todescribe accurate, realistic trainingconditions for the Army and otherservices in a joint context. It is a powerfulframework, able to create challenging,realistic training environment for anyArmy contingency. Incorporation ofappropriate manifestations of the OEvariables, including a flexible, adaptiveOPFOR, capable of countering ornegating US military and technicalprowess, is a realistic and necessary facetin our training exercises. Future threats,though not yet fully described orcomprehended, are both lethal andcapable. Understanding the current OEframework and COE OPFOR operationsand tactics will enable Army units andtheir commanders to cope with myriadthreats and challenges that we face todayand in the future. The COE framework’simportance and relevance in our trainingmethodologies cannot be overstated.

Major George Stroumpos is an OperationalEnvironment Assessment Team Analyst at TRADOCIntelligence Support Activity (TRISA)-Threats, whichis located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is amilitary intelligence officer who has served in Iraqas well as with the 7th Infantry Division at FortCarson, Colorado, where he oversaw intelligencetraining efforts for three Enhanced SeparateBrigades (eSB) of the Arkansas, Oklahoma, andOregon National Guards.


Political (P): Hizbollah is a non-state actor that hasintegrated itself in to the legitimate Lebanese government.The militia maintains political control of 21 percent of theLebanese municipalities and holds 11 percent of theLebanese parliament seats, and two cabinet positions. Theorganization is a state within a state — meaning thatHizbollah can initiate any sort of unilateral action outside ofthe Lebanese government influence. Conversely, however,the Lebanese government cannot act without Hizbollah’sconsent and influence. As such, the Lebanese governmentwill be reluctant to interfere with Hizbollah activities and, attimes, actively seek to leverage its international standing insupport of the Hizbollah. National will is held exclusivelyby the Hizbollah organization. As an organization, the militiawill fight with a “kill or be killed” mentality, using everyresource at its disposal to thwart Israel. Moreover, itsregional relationship with Iran provides the organizationmaximum flexibility in maintaining its independence fromLebanon or any other state.

Military (M): The militia is essentially a stateless army,possessing a wide variety of military arms and capabilities.Their typical weapons are ATGMs and small arms.Additionally, Hizbollah has built a strong fire supportcapability with large quantities of rockets and launchers.They possess robust ISR capability, to include UAV and aredundant C2 capability. Internal weapons productioncapability and extra regional assistance in the form ofweapons and training has enabled the militia to assess,design and build a defense in depth: a series of mutuallysupporting positions and redundant C2. Hizbollah fields aforce of approximately 3,000 to 4,000 active fighters inSouthern Lebanon with a large reserve/auxiliary pool ofsupporters who provide intelligence, logistics support anda fighting augmentation capability for the main force.

Economic (E): Southern Lebanon is still a very fragileeconomy due to its recent occupation by Israel and its on-going reconstruction efforts. Hizbollah has inserted itselfinto Southern Lebanon by providing relief services andreconstruction assistance. The total lock on municipalitycontrol in the Southern part of the country prevents anyeconomic activity except Hizbollah sanctioned works andactivities. Providing the primary source of economic supportin the region, Hizbollah enjoys widespread popular support.The organization itself does not internally possess theresources for such activity and is heavily subsidized by boththe Iranian and Syrian governments.

Social (S): Lebanese society is fractious and extremelydiverse. Active religions in the Southern part of the countryinclude Christianity, Sunni and Shi’a Islam. Shi’a Muslims

comprise the majority religious concentration followed bySunni and Christian Druse populations. Among groupsthere is a tenuous relationship and mutual suspicion. Alarge degree of nationalist sentiment has reduced thesetensions, but they are present during periods of heavy stressand difficulty.

Information (I): Hizbollah maintains a large informationoperations establishment in Southern Lebanon. Theypossess active television, radio, newspapers and, since theycontrol the municipalities in the South, the militia alsocontrols the official sources of news, information andpropaganda. Their unique relationship with the Lebanesegovernment provides the militia with an internationalinformation operations capability as well. Domestically, thepolitical arm of Hizbollah has engaged in directhumanitarian support for decades, ensuring an enduringrelationship with the populace. Those that are not swayedare targeted or pressured through non-lethal means tosupport the militia. Domestically and internationally, theHizbollah militia possesses ample capability to shapeinformation operations against any regional or extra-regionaladversary with a high degree of prowess and skill. Theirmedia apparatus is well-suited to manipulating informationto achieve their strategic aims.

Infrastructure (I): Though urbanized, much of SouthernLebanon’s geography can be characterized by urban blight,congestion and poor infrastructure.

Physical Environment (P): The terrain is that of rollinghills with numerous urban built up areas and towns. Thesetowns are within mutual supporting distance of each otherand are densely populated. The Litani River separates thesouthern part of the country from northern Lebanon andprovides the only true physical obstacle separating the tworegions.

Time (T): Hizbollah has spent more than six yearsplanning and preparing for a defense in-depth of SouthernLebanon. The majority of their efforts have been investedinto this endeavor with the primary purpose of complicatingand stifling any sort of high-tech, combined arms operations.The goal of these efforts is to create a never-ending“quagmire” effect, causing the Israeli army to becomelocked into an extended, protracted conflict — costly interms of both money and time. Internationally, the pressureof time forces Israeli forces to seek a quick, succinct victory,since the international community, the press and Israelicitizens will not tolerate a long drawn out conflict in theregion. All aspects of the Hizbollah planning have takenthese vulnerabilities into account to create a prolongedconflict with little definitive resolution.

Figure 1 — COE Description of the Israeli/Hizbollah Conflict, 2006

Major Robert Rogers’ StandingOrders are viewed as questionable in origin,

colorful, but obsolete lessons from an erawhen the fastest message moved at thespeed of a horse and rider, and when thebow and arrow (a weapon from the dawnof man) was superior in many respects tothe matchlock, musket, and rifle. (The bowand arrow was silent, still operated in therain or when wet, fired faster, and ammoand parts were only as far as the nearesthardwood tree).

Upon closer examination, these 19orders, which were forged in frontiercombat around Fort Carillon/Ticonderoga,still provide relevant guidance for theplatoon or squad leader taking a patrolthrough the back alleys of Baghdad.

Translation follows:1. Don’t forget nothing. A military

mission has many component tasks. So wedon’t forget something we use the eight-step Troop Leading Procedures, the five-paragraph operations order (OPORD),standard operating procedures, and battledrills.

2. Have your musket clean as awhistle, tomahawk scoured, sixty roundspowder and ball, and be ready to marchat a minute’s warning. The self disciplineof each Soldier maintaining his weapon,equipment, supplies, and being physicallyfit to march at a minute’s warning are abig part of unit readiness. His leader’s dutyis still to inspect but the Soldier will beready and no time is lost on remedialaction. “...at a minute’s warning.” refersto a good intelligence and communicationnetwork.

3. When you’re on the march, act theway you would if you was sneaking upon a deer. See the enemy first.Camouflage, situational awareness, andnoise and light discipline are key in stealthymovement. By stealth you will be able to“see the enemy first.” You then have theadvantage and option to attack or evadeand bypass.

4. Tell the truth about what you see

ROGERS’ RANGERS STANDING ORDERS REVISITEDLIEUTENANT COLONEL (RETIRED) MICHAEL E. REICHARD

and what you do. There is an Armydepending on us for correct information.You can lie all you please when you tellother folks about the RANGERs, butnever lie to a RANGER or an officer. Thisis the collection of priority intelligencerequirements (PIR) and accurate SALUTE(size, activity, location, unit, time andequipment) reports. Report only what isactually seen, heard, smelled, or touched— no more, no less.

5. Don’t take a chance you don’t haveto. Know yourself and your unit’scapabilities and limitations, and employthem accordingly.

6. When we’re on the march we marchsingle file, far enough apart so one shotcan’t go through two men. This orderrefers to formation and order of movementon foot and in vehicles. Keep your interval,don’t bunch up, watch your sector, andcommunicate (hand/arm signals and radio).

7. If we strike swamps, or soft ground,we spread out abreast, so it is hard to

track us. No beeline movements (even inthe air). Try to deceive the enemy as to yourreal destination and intention(s).

8. When we march, we keep movingtill dark, so as to give the enemy the leastpossible chance at us. Time is a preciousresource, don’t waste it. Time, whenmeasured as daylight/darkness, the tides,or an approaching storm, has a profoundeffect on one’s ability to fight and navigate.Keep time on your side.

9. When we camp, half the party staysawake while the other half sleeps.Security first, always. Part of your squador platoon should always be ready to fight24/7.

10. If we take prisoners, we keep’emseparate till we have time to examinethem, so they can’t cook up a storybetween ‘em. Remember the five S’s:Secure, Search, Silence, Segregate, andSafeguard.

11. Don’t ever march home the sameway. Take a different route so you won’tbe ambushed. Don’t be predictable. Yourroutines, patterns, and habits can be usedagainst you. A convoy of four up-armoredHMMWVs leave FOB Able every two daystraveling northeast at 50 mph with aninterval of 150 meters between vehicles.Each vehicle has a mounted .50 cal withshield and a gunner, driver, and front-seatpassenger. The destination is Log Base Easy,which is 110 miles away. They spend an hourat LB Easy then make a return trip. Sooneror later, what do you think will happen?Returning from the objective your Soldierswill be also fatigued, and as they get closer tofriendly lines there is a tendency to thinkthey’re safe and they will lessen vigilance.DON’T let them get complacent!

12. No matter whether we travel in bigparties or little ones, each party has tokeep a scout 20 yards ahead, 20 yards oneach flank, and 20 yards in the rear sothe main body can’t be surprised andwiped out. Three hundred and sixty-degreesecurity is essential during all movementsand halts as well as while in assembly areasand in patrol bases. Get in that combat


TRAINING NOTES

Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division

Avenging Eagles: Forbidden Tales of the101st Airborne Division in World War 2.By Mark Bando. Detroit: Mark BandoPublishing, 183 pages, $33, hardcover.Reviewed by Randy Talbot, TACOM LifeCycle Management Command historian.

Mark Bando’s sixth book, AvengingEagles: Forbidden Tales of the 101stAirborne Division in World War 2, is anengrossing, gripping, fast-paced renderingof one of the most celebrated units in theU.S. Army. Bando is a historian worthy ofpraise, as Avenging Eagles shows the valueof oral history interviewing and recording.The use of official historical reports anddocuments combined with vignettes by actualparticipants in a narrative style make thisbook a great read. For Bando, this is theculmination of almost 40 years work as aninterviewer of nearly 1,000 “ScreamingEagles,” as recorder, reporter, chronicler,and author for the 101st Airborne.

World War II still holds a fascinationin the American psyche; maybe this isbecause life and warfare seemed lesscomplicated then than it does now. Withour nation once again engaged in a longwar with an uncertain conclusion, is thereanything new to learn from those who wentto war more than 60 years ago? What madethe Airborne troopers of World War IIsuffer such horrendous losses in combat,yet continue to fight and accomplish theirmissions? Bando’s work offers insight intothese questions as Avenging Eagles takesthe reader through the uncertain andchaotic beginnings of the division, itstraining, and eventual first exposure tocombat operations: Normandy.

Avenging Eagles is more than anotherhistory of this unit; it is a tribute to thetenacity, courage, and leadership abilitiesof the Airborne veterans, those whovolunteered for a new and untested conceptin American military history. Central tothis work is the “unsanitized version ofthe unusual, offbeat and unfortunate eventsof the 101st.” It is through these vignettesthat Bando reaches the heartbeat of hiswork, the “Soldier’s Story” — theincidents and experiences that combatveterans talk about amongst themselves,

frame of mind and be ready to fight at alltimes. Scouts to the front and flanks, advanceguard, main body, and rear guard. The mainbody never makes unexpected contact.

13. Every night you’ll be told where tomeet if surrounded by a superior force.Always make a contingency/five-point planand designate rally points.

14. Don’t sit down to eat without postingsentries. Establish priorities of work; numberone should be security. Then, post observationposts/listening posts (OP/LPs), assign team/squad sectors, position crew served weapons,and send out patrols.

15. Don’t sleep beyond dawn. Dawn’swhen the French and Indians attack. Knowyour enemy, learn their tactics and theirhabits.

16. Don’t cross a river by a regular ford.Use OCOKA (observation and fields of fire,cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain,avenues of approach), METT-TC (mission,enemy, terrain, troops, time, civilians), mapand aerial recons to spot danger areas. Don’tlet terrain force you into a position ofdisadvantage in respect to the enemy. Properlyutilize your intelligence assets.

17. If somebody’s trailing you, make acircle, come back onto your tracks, andambush the folks that aim to ambush you.You take your tactics and adapt them from whatyou have learned about the enemy and strikethem when and where they least expect it.

18. Don’t stand up when the enemy iscoming against you. Kneel down, lie down,or hide behind a tree. Fight smart use coverand concealment, individual, buddy, and teamfire and maneuver techniques, andmarksmanship to defeat your enemy.

19. Let the enemy come till he’s almostclose enough to touch, then let him have itand jump out and finish him up with yourtomahawk (hatchet?). Use your weapons andweapon systems in depth like they weredesigned to be used and include courage anddiscipline. Don’t falter, break, or run. Trainrealistically and often with your equipmentand unit. It builds skill and confidence. Withthe will and the skill you will WIN!

Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Michael E.Reichard completed 28 years of Regular Army andReserve service. As a civilian, he spent 18 years invarious assignments within Space Shuttle Launch andLanding Operations at Kennedy Space Center, Florida.As part of the Retired Reserve, he is attached to theUniversity of Florida Army ROTC Cadre.

not to outsiders. Second, the use of oralhistory interviews confirm many of thestories in this work, some that are hardto read, others teaming with “gallowshumor” from those who faced death themoment they jumped into a hail of bulletsand enemy fire. Finally, an underlyingtheme throughout Avenging Eagles centerson the impact of leadership on raw troopersabout to face the ordeals of combat for thefirst time. There is a commonality in theselection of stories and characters thatmilitary members and veterans canidentify with from their own service.

Calling training for the 101st tough isan understatement; it was at times crueland sadistic, but there was also a sense offear instilled in the 18 to 20 year olds.Failure to complete all phases of training— especially qualifying jumps — led to theembarrassment of dropping out andreassignment to the “leg” infantry. Leadersbelieved that self-sacrifice in training wouldcarry over to the battlefield. They trainedtheir men to believe they were gods, betterthan anyone else in the Army. Of course,this swagger led to many incidents ofSoldiers proving themselves against theother services, often with disastrous andnear riotous consequences.

Training hoped to instill a sense ofdiscipline in what was a “pick-up” team.All were volunteers and though many“washed-out,” still many more were sentpacking due to prejudice, something onetroop recalled cost the division a lot ofkillers needed for combat.

Training increases physical abilitiesand endurance. It also teaches combatskills for battlefield survivability.However, one officer chastised trainingsince there were no operational plans orregimental exercises, and “what we knewabout tactics wouldn’t fit on a postagestamp.” This officer believed that successand finally victory on the battlefield isattributed to the individual Soldier, notto leadership and their inability to teachthem survival skills — skills that wouldcost men’s lives in Normandy.

From the time that the paratroopersapproached their drop zones, things


BOOK REVIEWS


$26.95. Reviewed by Brigadier General(Retired) Curtis H. O’Sullivan.

In the preface to the book, formerCentral Command Commander in ChiefMarine Corps General (Retired) AnthonyC. Zinni points out the weakness in ournational and military decision making innot being sufficiently aware of the historyand culture of possible opponents. We needto be more aware of what motivates themso as not to be caught by surprise or expectthem to share the same values.

Americans have not been void ofexposure to Islam. We learned about theCrusades and the infidels in Sir WalterScott’s Waverly Novels. In high school,students learn about the wars with theBarbary pirates. In World War II, we landedon the shores of Algeria and Morocco. Ourreturn to the Islamic world at that timestarted a tide of engagement that has hit apresent peak.

There is a need now more than ever torealize that we have an enemy who doesn’tplay by the same rules. Why? The influenceof the Koran is a partial answer. The authordissects that holy book in an attempt toshow its applicability to current actions.There is perhaps an embarrassment ofriches here as well as a minimizing of theother factors that shape culture andconsequent conduct. The direction ofindividual and group behavior starts withthe environment — the shape of the terrainand its resources and the climate. Fromthese come ethnicity and social andeconomic institutions, which take suchforms as nationalism and imperialism.

The book analyzes Muslim warfarethrough the ages to better understandbehaviors in combat. This is intended tomake our leaders better informed andrealistic in dealing with matters of war,terror, and peace.

This is useful, but does not stand alone.There is a wealth of information on thesubject, of which the bibliography only tapsthe surface. There are several special valuesto this effort. It gives a good summary ofMuslim conflicts including naval actions.There could have been more maps, butthose provided are helpful. There also also10 tables and figures which clarify the text.

Overall, this is a book to be readselectively. There is much material notessential to the usual reader. I would

supplement it with more material onsociological motivation, but that’s a matterof individual need.

Cobra II: The Inside Story of theInvasion and Occupation of Iraq. ByMichael R. Gordon and Bernard E.Trainor. New York: Pantheon Books,2006, 603 pages, $27.95. Reviewed byLieutenant Colonel (Retired) RickBaillergeon.

There have been few recent books thathave caused the early stir and releaseanticipation that Cobra II did. Thisanticipation also brought a great deal ofhigh expectations for the book. I believeall this pre-release “hype” stemmed fromtwo factors. First, there is simply a largeamount of interest on any book involvingoperations in Iraq. This interest is peakedeven more, when a book claims to have theinside story on the invasion and occupationof Iraq. Second, was the superb reputationof authors Michael Gordon and BernardTrainor. In particular, their collaborationon the first Gulf War (The General’s War)was highly regarded by both readers andcritics alike. Thus, when you combinecurrent, emotional subject matter withauthors who have an established pattern ofexcellence, you have a book that will greatlyintrigue potential readers.

I, too, shared the anticipation and hadthe same high expectations as many others.After reading the initial chapters, I quicklyfound the volume was certainly worth thewait. More importantly, as I turned eachpage, I discovered the book was meetingmost of my expectations. There was nodoubt that Gordon and Trainor had craftedyet another excellent history.

In Cobra II, the authors seek to detailthe planning, preparation, and executionof the invasion and initial occupation ofIraq. They state their objective (in thebook’s forward) as, “Our mission was notto offer up a slice of the war, to cover theaction of a single unit, or to concentrateexclusively on the decision-making inWashington. Instead, we sought to preparea contemporary history of the entire conflictwith all of its complexity, to relate theplanning behind closed doors, thebloodletting on the battlefield, and the

started to go awry. Transport pilots missedthe drop zones; some due to evasive actionthat threw them off course, others in a hurryto get rid of their load and head back to base.Troopers were shot out of the sky, others werestuck in trees or butchered where they landed,many with their own weapons. Ordered notto fire their weapons in the drop zone areasand not to take prisoners for the first two days,many troopers found themselves in both amoral and ethical dilemma.

Every Soldier’s experience in combat isa highly personalized recollection of events;actions and reactions are unpredictable inthe chaos of battle. Many can be in an areawhere something happens but only a fewactually see it happen. This is veryindicative of the airborne trooper who mayhave fought alone for days, evading andescaping the enemy while trying to find hisway back to the lines. Many would not leavetheir buddies while others who wereevacuated found a way back to continue thefight. There was a bond of brotherhoodamongst the Normandy survivors — a bondthat exists to this day. Their bond hasbecome more than a legacy for generationsof warfighters following in their footsteps.It is the essential key element that kept themtogether, that saw them not only survive,but overcome some of the most intensecombat battles of World War II.

Avenging Eagles adds to that legacy byproviding past and present combatcommanders and leaders a primer onleadership, ethical conduct in wartime, andthe importance of the impact of their orders.Through their actions and reactions, theirbehavior, “boys will be boys” antics, andmoral courage and character, these storiesby the veterans of the “Screaming Eagles”do not paint them as angels, far from it.However, it is the willingness of World WarII veterans over the years to share theirmistakes and fears that adds to the“toolbox” of the current combat leader tolead his troops through the most difficulttimes in combat operations.

War, Terror and Peace in the Qur’anand in Islam: Insights for Military andGovernment Leaders. By T.P. Schwartz-Barcott. Carlisle, PA: Army War CollegeFoundation Press, 2004, 401 pages,

parallels among disparate battles, and toprovide a comprehensive account andrationale of the foreign policy strategy,generalship, and fighting.” Truly, this isan ambitious goal, especially consideringhow recent these events took place.However, I believe the authors succeededin most of their lofty aspirations.

Cobra II is organized into three sections.In section one, the authors go into succinctdetail into the planning and foreign policyjockeying that led to the invasion. Theyprovide readers with a solid background ofthe recent history between the United Statesand Iraq and then delve into the decisionsand personalities that led to the attack. Thesecond portion of the book focuses on thecombat operations of the attack. The finalsection of the volume touches on the initialoccupation of Iraq and Phase IV operations.

Trainor and Gordon have written a bookthat contains numerous strengths. Perhaps,the first that will immediately becomeapparent to readers is the exhaustive researchthe authors conducted in writing the book.This research includes dozens of personalinterviews they conducted with leaders andSoldiers at all levels and the use of variousunpublished military planning documents toadd detail. This research is reflected in asubstantial notes section and an appendixsection that holds dozens of planningdocuments previously unreleased. Mostreaders will agree that Cobra II is one ofthe best researched books they have read.

The second strength of the book is theability of the authors to discuss manycontroversial decisions and topics and provideanalysis. These include the reasons to invadeIraq, troop levels to initiate and conduct theinvasion, and the amount and detail ofplanning to conduct Phase IV operations.Additionally, Gordon and Trainor focus onthe civilian and military leaders and provideaccolades and criticism as appropriate.

Another key strength of the book is theskill in which the authors are able to movethroughout the levels of war during theirdiscussion of combat operations in Iraq.Gordon and Trainor translate decisionsmade at the strategic level and how theywere then fought at the operational andtactical levels. The authors’ treatment ofactions on the ground is particularlyeffective as they continue to shift fromactions between the Army and the Marines

as they raced to Baghdad. I must admitthat the focus at the “foxhole” level wassomething I wasn’t expecting and was anexcellent bonus.

I believe the biggest strength of the book(related to the authors’ ability to provideanalysis) is the volume’s epilogue. In it, theauthors address areas (both in the militaryand political realm) that they feel hinderedoperations on the ground and the subsequentPhase IV operations. You may agree ordisagree with the authors’ views, but they arewithout a doubt, thought-provoking.

Despite these and many additionalstrengths not covered in this review, therewas one area that could have beenimproved in my opinion, and that was thescope of the book itself. As highlighted inthe book’s title, the volume promises toaddress the occupation of Iraq. It is notthe fault of the authors, but due to thepublication date of the book, the occupationwas in its opening period. Thus, the authorsmerely whet the appetite of their readers inthis discussion. I contend that Gordon andTrainor should have postponed thistreatment for possibly a future book. Isimply felt this was taking on a little toomuch.

In summary, Cobra II is a superb book.There is no question that it has set thecurrent standard for books of this genre.This is especially true for books focusingon the planning and invasion of Iraq. Asis the case with many earlier histories, overtime many more sources will becomeavailable and consequently, more definitivehistories will be published. However, untilthat time, Michael Gordon and BernardTrainor have provided the reading publicwith a superb service. It is a book that willinform, bring about emotions, and simplymake people think “what if?” For me, thereis nothing more I can ask for in a book.

All American All the Way: The CombatHistory of the 82nd Airborne Division inWorld War II. By Phil Nordyke. St. Park,MN: Zenith Press, 2005, 868 pages, $35.Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel (Retired)Albert N. Garland and Patricia A. Weekley.

There is little question as to the author’sprimary objective: “This is the story of the82nd Airborne Division during World War

II, told in the words of those courageousmen who fought in some of history’s mostcritical battles.” Along the way tocompleting this massive book, the author,a retired high-tech industry official, pullstogether more than 900 oral and writtenstatements to give us a readable history ofthe division’s training and 171 combatdays. In order to be able to do that pullingtogether, Nordyke had to do a tremendousamount of research in mounds of materialand by visits to the division’s battlegroundsin Europe. This effort is amply documentedin his chapter notes and bibliography.

Unfortunately, while plugging away atthis task, Nordyke apparently becameenamored with his subject; this showsthroughout the book, from the beginningsat Fort Benning to the end of the war inEurope and the occupation of Germany andconfrontations with the Russians. Thus, atthe beginning, Nordyke believes ColonelJim Gaven, commander of the 505thParachute Infantry Regiment, provedhimself to be head and shoulders above anyother commander in the division, includingColonel Reuben Tucker, commander of the504th PIR. Tucker protested vigorouslywhen the 505th was chosen to make thefirst drop in Sicily in July 1943. From thistime on, Gavin could do no wrong.

Then, Nordyke believes the fightingqualities of the 82nd troopers were such asto be held “in awe” by any U.S. unit thatserved in combat with or near them, andeven by some German units that opposedthe division.

I am terribly sorry to say that, as amember of the 84th Infantry Division, I didnot hold “in awe” any of the airbornedivisions in Europe except maybe theirextra pay. My troops felt the same, but ifwe held anything in awe it was theCorcoran boots — the leather boots issuedonly to airborne Soldiers — while we hadto wear the worst boots any combat Soldierever had to wear.

These are but a few examples of what Imean to imply about Nordyke’s approach. So,if you like to read a lot of war stories whilelearning only a little history (i.e., OperationsGiant I and II), this book is for you. One finalpoint: To the day — I am not airborne — Ido not believe Colonel Tucker and his 504thSoldiers ever received the recognition theydeserved.


Documents

Infantry - United States Army