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Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2017 siemens.com/innovation Industrial Security Standard IEC62443: Security Functions for Industrial Control Systems Dr. Rainer Falk

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Page 1: Industrial Security Standard IEC62443: Security Functions ...mobil.dau.dk/Content/file_knowledge_item/170613... · Uncommon, hard to deploy, white listing Up to 20 years Can be criticalReal

Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2017 siemens.com/innovation

Industrial Security Standard IEC62443:

Security Functions for Industrial Control

Systems Dr. Rainer Falk

Page 2: Industrial Security Standard IEC62443: Security Functions ...mobil.dau.dk/Content/file_knowledge_item/170613... · Uncommon, hard to deploy, white listing Up to 20 years Can be criticalReal

Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2017

June 2017 Page 2 Corporate Technology

Our industrial society confesses a growing demand for IT-Security

IT Security trends are determined by drivers such as

• Industry infrastructures changes (Digitalization)

• More networked embedded systems

• Increasing device-to-device communication

• Need to manage intellectual property

And

• Increasing international organized crime

• Privacy

• Compliance enforcement

• Cyber war fare

• Cloud/Virtualization

• PDAs, Smart Mobiles

• Social Networks / data mining concepts

• ….

Page 3: Industrial Security Standard IEC62443: Security Functions ...mobil.dau.dk/Content/file_knowledge_item/170613... · Uncommon, hard to deploy, white listing Up to 20 years Can be criticalReal

Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2017

June 2017 Page 3 Corporate Technology

The threat level is rising –

Attackers are targeting critical infrastructures

Evolution of attacker motives, vulnerabilities and exploits

Hacking against physical assets Politics and Critical

Infrastructure

Cybercrime and Financial

Interests The Age of Computerworms

Code Red Slammer Blaster Zeus SpyEye Rustock Aurora Nitro Stuxnet

"Hacking for fun" "Hacking for money" "Hacking for political and

economic gains" States Criminals

Hobbyists Organized Criminals Hacktivists

State sponsored Actors Terrorists Activists

Backdoors Worms

Anti-Virus

Hackers

BlackHat Viruses

Responsible Disclosure

Credit Card Fraud

Botnets Banker Trojans

Phishing SPAM Adware

WebSite Hacking

Anonymous SCADA

RSA Breach DigiNotar

APT

Targeted Attacks

Sony Hack

Cyberwar

Hacking against

critical infrastructure

Identity theft

# of published exploits

# of new malware samples

# of published vulnerabilities

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Data

sourc

es:

IBM

X-F

orc

e T

rend a

nd R

isk R

eport

H

P C

yber

Ris

k R

eport

S

ym

ante

c Inte

llig

ence R

eport

Major loss of privacy

"Gläserner Bürger im Netz"

Ransomware

Page 4: Industrial Security Standard IEC62443: Security Functions ...mobil.dau.dk/Content/file_knowledge_item/170613... · Uncommon, hard to deploy, white listing Up to 20 years Can be criticalReal

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Office world versus industrial systems - Protection targets for security

Lifetime 3-5 years Lifetime up to 20 years and more

Industrial Systems :

Protection of Production resources

Office IT :

Protection of IT-Infrastructure

Page 5: Industrial Security Standard IEC62443: Security Functions ...mobil.dau.dk/Content/file_knowledge_item/170613... · Uncommon, hard to deploy, white listing Up to 20 years Can be criticalReal

Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2017

June 2017 Page 5 Corporate Technology

The CIA pyramid is turned upside down in

industrial automation and control systems

Availability

Pri

ori

ty

Integrity

Confidentiality

Confidentiality

Integrity

Availability

Industrial Automation and Control

Systems

Office IT Systems

Page 6: Industrial Security Standard IEC62443: Security Functions ...mobil.dau.dk/Content/file_knowledge_item/170613... · Uncommon, hard to deploy, white listing Up to 20 years Can be criticalReal

Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2017

June 2017 Page 6 Corporate Technology

Industrial systems and office world have

different management & operational characteristics

Regular / scheduled

Medium, delays accepted

Scheduled and mandated

High (for IT Service Centers)

Common / widely used

3-5 years

Slow / restricted by regulation

Very high

Increasing

Very much varying

Uncommon, hard to deploy, white listing

Up to 20 years

Delays accepted Can be critical

IT- Infrastructure Production resources, incl. logistics

Application of patches

Availability requirement

Security testing / audit

Physical Security

Anti-virus

Component Lifetime

Real time requirement

Protection target for security

Office IT Industrial Systems

Page 7: Industrial Security Standard IEC62443: Security Functions ...mobil.dau.dk/Content/file_knowledge_item/170613... · Uncommon, hard to deploy, white listing Up to 20 years Can be criticalReal

Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2017

June 2017 Page 7 Corporate Technology

Security-by-Design is different from Safety-by-Design

Technical System

Safety

Prevention of threats to humans and

environment caused by technical systems

Humans / Environment Humans / Environment

IT Security

Prevention of consequences

of threats to a system (intentionally) caused by

humans and/or environment

Technical System

Page 8: Industrial Security Standard IEC62443: Security Functions ...mobil.dau.dk/Content/file_knowledge_item/170613... · Uncommon, hard to deploy, white listing Up to 20 years Can be criticalReal

Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2017

June 2017 Page 8 Corporate Technology

Caught between regulation, requirements, and standards

Product

Supplier

System

Integrator

Asset

Owner

designs and

deploys

operates and

maintains

develops and

supports

Design + hand over / maintain

a secure solution

Capabilities, documentation,

secure development, support

Secure operation, policies,

requirements

• ISO 27001/19

• IEC 62443-2-1

• NERC-CIP

• IEC 62443-2-4

• DIN VDE V0831-104

• BDEW WP

• IEC 62443-3-3

• IEC 62443-4-2

• BDEW WP

Solution design and deployment plays an essential role in designing compliant solutions

Page 9: Industrial Security Standard IEC62443: Security Functions ...mobil.dau.dk/Content/file_knowledge_item/170613... · Uncommon, hard to deploy, white listing Up to 20 years Can be criticalReal

Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2017

June 2017 Page 9 Corporate Technology

Component System Policies and procedures General

1-1 Terminology, concepts and

models

1-2 Master glossary of terms and

abbreviations

3-3 System security requirements

and security assurance levels

3-2 Security assurance levels for

zones and conduits

3-1 Security technologies for IACS

2-3 Patch management in the IACS

environment

2-2 Operating an IACS security

program

2-1 Establishing an IACS security

program

1-3 System security compliance

metrics

4-2 Technical security requirements

for IACS products

4-1 Product development

requirements

IEC 62443 (ISA-99)

Definitions

Metrics

Requirements to the security

organization and processes of the

plant owner and suppliers

Requirements to a secure system Requirements to secure system

components

2-4 Certification of IACS supplier

security policies

IEC 62443 Covers Security Management, System, and

Component Level for Industrial Automation Control Systems (IACS)

Page 10: Industrial Security Standard IEC62443: Security Functions ...mobil.dau.dk/Content/file_knowledge_item/170613... · Uncommon, hard to deploy, white listing Up to 20 years Can be criticalReal

Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2017

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IACS, automation solution, control system

IACS environment / project specific

Independent of IACS environment

develops control systems

designs and deploys

operates and maintains

is the base for

Control System

as a combination of components

Host devices

Network components Applications

Embedded devices

4-1 3-3

4-2 develops components

Product

Supplier

System

Integrator

Asset Owner

Service Provider

Industrial Automation and Control System

(IACS)

+ 2-4

3-2

2-1

2-4

Operational policies and procedures

Automation solution Basic Process

Control System (BPCS)

Safety Instrumented System (SIS)

Complementary Hardware and

Software

Maintenance policies and procedures

2-3

3-3

Page 11: Industrial Security Standard IEC62443: Security Functions ...mobil.dau.dk/Content/file_knowledge_item/170613... · Uncommon, hard to deploy, white listing Up to 20 years Can be criticalReal

Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2017

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IEC 62443-3-3 and 3-2 have to be addressed by both the System Integrator

and Product Supplier.

IACS environment / project specific

Independent of IACS environment

develops control systems

designs and deploys

operates and maintains

Control System

4-1

3-3

4-2 develops components

Product

Supplier

System

Integrator

Asset Owner

Service Provider

Industrial Automation and Control System

(IACS)

2-4

2-1

2-4 2-3

Design + hand over / maintain

a secure solution

Secure operation, policies, requirements

Capabilities, documentation, secure

development, support

3-2

3-3

Page 12: Industrial Security Standard IEC62443: Security Functions ...mobil.dau.dk/Content/file_knowledge_item/170613... · Uncommon, hard to deploy, white listing Up to 20 years Can be criticalReal

Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2017

June 2017 Page 12 Corporate Technology

Security levels provide for protection against different attack levels

Zones and Conduits

The targeted security level is determined by a threat and risk analysis

Zone Enterprise

Network

Zone Plant

Zone

Diagnosis

Conduit

Zone Control

SL4 Protection against intentional violation using sophisticated means,

extended resources, IACS specific skills, high motivation

SL3 Protection against intentional violation using sophisticated means,

moderate resources, IACS specific skills, moderate motivation

SL2 Protection against intentional violation using simple means,

low resources, generic skills, low motivation

SL1 Protection against casual or coincidental violation

Page 13: Industrial Security Standard IEC62443: Security Functions ...mobil.dau.dk/Content/file_knowledge_item/170613... · Uncommon, hard to deploy, white listing Up to 20 years Can be criticalReal

Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2017

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Security Standard IEC 62443-3.3 defines security requirements for industrial

control systems

FR 1 – Identification and authentication control

FR 2 – Use control

FR 3 – System integrity

FR 4 – Data confidentiality

FR 5 – Restricted data flow

FR 6 – Timely response to events

FR 7 – Resource availability

7 Foundational Requirements

3

3

3

1

2

1

3

Example Security Vector:

SL-x=(3,3,3,1,2,1,3)

Page 14: Industrial Security Standard IEC62443: Security Functions ...mobil.dau.dk/Content/file_knowledge_item/170613... · Uncommon, hard to deploy, white listing Up to 20 years Can be criticalReal

Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2017

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Example: System requirements (SR) and requirement extensions (RE) for

foundational requirement FR1 “Identification and authentication control”

Page 15: Industrial Security Standard IEC62443: Security Functions ...mobil.dau.dk/Content/file_knowledge_item/170613... · Uncommon, hard to deploy, white listing Up to 20 years Can be criticalReal

Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2017

June 2017 Page 15 Corporate Technology

Prevention and reaction are still needed

Security will remain moving target. There will be no final I4.0 security solution without a need for further measures.

Security for the digital model

Security for the physical instance, its digital twin and their interactions must take place in a concerted way.

Adaptive security architectures

Agile security profiles have to be adaptable in a dynamic way.

Fast configuration must include security.

More integrated security within applications

• …rather than just within the network (layers)

• Application based end-to-end security must be possible

Security within Industry 4.0:

Security by design & security by default

Page 16: Industrial Security Standard IEC62443: Security Functions ...mobil.dau.dk/Content/file_knowledge_item/170613... · Uncommon, hard to deploy, white listing Up to 20 years Can be criticalReal

Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2017

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Security has to be suitable for the addressed environment

Since security is not just a technical

solution, which can be incorporated

transparently, we need to consider how

humans can get along with this issue.

This needs, especially for automation

environments, actions for:

• awareness trainings

• help people to understand security

measures and processes

• provide user friendly interfaces and

processes

Awareness and Acceptance

Page 17: Industrial Security Standard IEC62443: Security Functions ...mobil.dau.dk/Content/file_knowledge_item/170613... · Uncommon, hard to deploy, white listing Up to 20 years Can be criticalReal

Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2017

June 2017 Page 17 Corporate Technology

Dr. Rainer Falk

Principal Key Expert

Siemens AG

Corporate Technology

CT RDA ITS

Otto-Hahn-Ring 6

D-81739 Munich

Germany

E-mail

[email protected]

Internet

siemens.com/corporate-technology