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INDUS WATERS
A DISPASSIONATE ANALYSIS OF AN ISSUE
*Azhar Ahmad
No armies with bombs and shellfire could devastate a land so thoroughly as Pakistan could be devastated by the simple expedient of India’s permanently shutting off the
source of waters that keep the fields and people of Pakistan green
(David Lilienthal, 1951)
INTRODUCTION
After air water is perhaps the most crucial element for sustenance of life on this planet. Despite the fact that two thirds of earth’s surface is water, only a fraction (0.007%) of that is available for human consumption. Fresh water is a depletable commodity and is distributed unevenly around the globe; therefore, its availability is uncertain and difficult for some. The increase in population and industrial growth has placed tremendous pressure on this precious resource. It is said that about 25 million people are migrating annually around the world due to water scarcity, much higher than those migrating for any other cause including violence or terrorism. This has caused the humans to be possessive and protective about water.
The demand for fresh water continues to grow with the growth in human population. With approximately 90 million people born each year, 95% of population increase takes place in the developing countries. Increase in population proportionately increases the demand for food and other commodities which places additional strain on water for agriculture, industry and house hold uses1. According to UNESCO a billion people in the developing countries have inadequate access to water and 2.4 billion lack basic sanitation. A child born in the under- developed world consumes 30-50 times less water than one born in the developed countries. Global water consumption has risen six-fold during the last 100 years, at more than double the rate of population growth and is estimated to cross the 9 billion mark by 2050. Water tables are dropping steadily in several major food producing regions and ground water is being pumped out at a rate faster than the rate at which nature can recharge it2. The organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) calculates that by 2030 some 3.9 billion people, 47 percent of the global population, will be living in areas with high water stress, mostly in
1*Azhar Ahmad is a retired naval officer working as an independent researcher and analyst, based in Islamabad.? Igor A Shiklomanov, “World Water Resources: A New Appraisal and Assessment for 21st Century” (Johanesberg: Water International, Vol 25, Issue 1, 2000), p. 12.2 Kent H Butts, “The Strategic Importance of Water”, (Honolulu: Seminar -Water and Conflict in Asia?- Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 1999).
developing countries3. Greenhouse driven changes in river flows risk rippling through connected systems, touching farming, fisheries, sanitation works, and hydropower generation. Insufficient water supplies can impair agricultural production, endanger public health, strain established settlement patterns, and jeopardize livelihoods and social well-being. All this leads to a competition for water resources and consequently, friction and antagonism between the states. Historically, water disputes have not been violent; however, the depletion of fresh water, at such an alarming rate, is causing some analysts to predict that future wars will be fought on water instead of oil.
According to experts the Himalayan glaciers which provide sustenance to more than a billion people in South Asia, are melting at an alarming rate due to global warming and may lose four-fifths of their area by 2030. Water is one resource that cannot be generated, it can only be preserved. Farsighted nations try to conserve each and every drop of water available to them because they are aware of the fact that if this commodity is not prudently preserved and used, the human survival itself would be jeopardized. China has some 83000 reservoirs built for various purposes, of which 330 are major in size. India has more than 4000 dams, while in Pakistan we have only two major and just about a dozen smaller reservoirs4.
South Asia is one of the poorest regions of the world with a plethora of problems. It has high population growth rate which is taxing all its resources and water is no exception. According to a World Bank report, there are some 20 major river basins across the region. Of these the four largest are those of the Indus, the Ganges, the Brahmaputra and the Meghna (Barak), shared between the countries of the South Asia, as well as, China. Climatic changes, rapid population growth, industrialization, expanding urbanization, and fast growing water needs for irrigation and power generation are putting ever increasing strains on these rivers 5. To make matters worse, there is a perpetual animosity and lack of trust between the countries of the region, particularly, with the largest country India, which shares river waters with four countries of South Asia. India has different water-sharing arrangements with its neighbours. Pakistan and India share their waters on the basis of Indus Waters Treaty which was signed between the two countries with the mediation of the World Bank. However, recently, some questions have been raised on the efficacy of this treaty on both sides of the border putting doubts in the minds of the public.
In view of the foregoing, the objective of this paper is to study and create awareness about the water-sharing problem between Pakistan and India, with a view to highlight the importance of the issue and stimulate interest towards finding a workable solution.
3 David Michel, “A River Runs Through It: Climate Change, Security Challenges, and Shared Water Resources” (Washington DC: Troubled Waters, Stimson Center, 2009), p. 73.4 Farrukh S Goindi, “Water Crisis in Pakistan”, available at www.sanalist.org/kalabagh/a-18.hm (24 Feb 2011).5 M.A.Salman and Kishor Upreti, “Coflict and Cooperation on South Asia’s International Rivers: A Legal Perspective”, The World Bank Law, Justice and Development Series (Washington DC: Library of Congress, 2002).
GENESIS OF THE INDUS WATERS ISSUE
The Indus basin system of rivers comprises nine rivers. The system is named after the most important river of the system-Indus. Six rivers of the system namely the Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Sutlej and Beas, are placed in one group because their flows are shared commonly by Pakistan and India. The other three rivers, Kabul, Swat and Kurram, are placed in another group because their flows are commonly shared by Pakistan and Afghanistan. Although these rivers have their own tributaries and independent courses of flows, they are also treated as the tributaries of the Indus because they all culminate directly or indirectly in the Indus which eventually falls in the Arabian Sea (Annex 2). However, in common perception, the system is only referred to as the first group of six rivers since they flowed through the British India. The colonial administration understood the importance of the water resources of these rivers for economic development and exploited them for irrigation with the help of modern technology.
The Indus, Jhelum and Chenab are known as the Western rivers of the system because they originate in the western region of Shivalik and Pir Panjal ranges and their flows work as drainage of the NW Himalayas. Ravi, Sutlej and Beas are called the Eastern rivers since they originate from the territory lying east of these ranges and function as natural drainage of the SE region6. The Indus Basin consists of three geographical regions: Himalayan region, Sub-Himalayan region and the Plains. The Indus Plain is a semi-arid and arid region. No agriculture is sustainable in this fertile plain without artificial irrigation except near foot-hills and river margins. The flat Indus Plains, with the perennial rivers flowing through it, is ideally suitable for the development of the largest contiguous canal irrigation system. According to experts no other area in the world has a similar natural advantage for the development of a canal irrigation system7. And hence, the British constructed one of the largest canal networks in the world.
Such a network was manageable under one central authority. However when under the ‘Government of India Act 1935’, the responsibility of the management of these river waters was transferred to the provinces, differences became visible. In 1939 Sind, then part of the Bombay province, objected to certain development schemes being planned by Punjab. Government of India formed a commission under Justice B N Rao to resolve the issue, but the provinces rejected the proposals of the commission and the matter was referred to His Majesty’s government in London. However, the process was stalled because of the partition. The partition plan divided the Indus basin between two sovereign independent states and thus the issue was internationalized. The partition was to be carried out in 73 days and the division of the Indus basin was left to be decided later. Sir Cyril Redcliff, Chairman of the Punjab Boundary Commission expressed hope that a solution will be found between the two states for some joint control8.6 Aloys Arthur Michel, “The Indus Rivers: A Study of the Effects of Partition” (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 34.7 Mohammad Tajuddin and Muzaffar Ali, “Two States in One River Basin System: Conflict to Cooperative Co-Existence”, in Kulwant Kaur (ed.), South Asia Dynamics of Politics, Economy & Security (New Delhi: Knowledge World), p.130.8 Leonard Mosley, “The Last Days of British Raj” (New York: Werdenfeld and Nicholson, 1962), p.190.
THE PAKISTAN-INDIA EQUATION
Of the 37 million acres of land irrigated by canals from the Indus and its tributaries, over thirty million acres fell in Pakistan-an area equal to the combined irrigated lands of Egypt and Sudan9. The partition severed the hydrologic unity of the Indus canals system. The uninterrupted flow of irrigation waters to the fields in West Punjab became dependent on the decision of another sovereign state, India. The boundary line between the two states was drawn right across the Indus basin, leaving Pakistan as the lower riparian state. Not only Radcliffe decided to give Muslim majority areas to India disregarding the basic principle employed for the division of Punjab, he also gave two important irrigation headworks to India, which fed canals in Pakistani Punjab, one at Madhopur on River Ravi (regulating waters to the Central Bari Doab canal) and the other at Ferozepur on Sutlej river (regulating supplies to Dipalpur canal)10. Pakistan felt its livelihood threatened by the prospect of Indian control over the tributaries that fed water into the Pakistani portion of the basin. Quite surprisingly, the issue of distribution of these waters was not referred to the Arbitral Tribunal set up to make awards in respect of division of assets and liabilities between the new provinces of East and West Punjab11. Under these conditions the Chief Engineers of East and West Punjab signed an agreement on 20 Dec 1947 to avoid the partition affecting the flow of waters in the canals. The agreement known as the “Standstill Agreement” bound India to allow pre-partition allocation of water in the basin up to 31 March 194812.
On 01 April 1948, the day the Standstill Agreement expired; India shut off water supplies from Ferozepur headworks to the Depalpur Canal and to the Pakistani portions of the Lahore and main branches of the Upper Bari Doab canal. This affected about 5.5% of the sown area and nearly 8 percent of cultivable command area in Pakistan at the beginning of the critical Kharif sowing season13. The city of Lahore was deprived of the main source of municipal water and, the supply of electricity from the Mandi hydroelectric scheme was also cut off. This Indian move to pressurize Pakistan into submission on Kashmir exposed the vulnerability and dependence of Pakistan. In the words of David Lilienthal, “No armies with bombs and shellfire could devastate a land so thoroughly as Pakistan could be devastated by the simple expedient of India’s permanently shutting off the source of waters that keep the fields and people of Pakistan green”14.
9 Abdul Sattar, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005: A Concise History” (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.73.10 Pervaiz I Cheema, “The Politics of the Punjab Boundary Award” (Heidelberg: Heidelberg Papers,2000), p.22.11 Mohammad Tajuddin and Muzaffar Ali, op. cit., p.130.12 Aaron T Wolf & Joshua T Newton, “Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution, The Indus Water Treaty”, (Institute for Water and Water Sheds, Oregan State University, 2008) available at www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu (28 May 2009).13 Asma Yaqoob, “International River Waters In South Asia: Source of Conflict or Cooperation?” (Islamabad: Regional Studies, Autumn 2004), p. 132.14 Abdul Sattar, op. cit., p. 73.
The situation triggered a serious water dispute to an extent that both the countries came to the brink of war. Pakistan’s PM Liaquat Ali Khan through a telegram on 15 April 1948 demanded Prime Minister Nehru ‘to take immediate action for restoring water supply’. The representatives of the two governments met in New Delhi on 3-4 May 1948 but failed to resolve the issue. The Inter-Dominion Agreement signed between Mr Jawaharlal Nehru (Prime Minister of India) and Mr Ghulam Muhammad (Finance Minister of Pakistan), under extreme duress by the later, was not a solution of the water dispute but it provided temporary modus vivendi for the supply of waters to West Punjab from the two headworks at Madhopur and Ferozepur. Both the parties agreed to hold further talks for the resolution of the differences.15.
BACKDROP TO THE TREATY
Negotiations for a permanent solution of the Indus waters continued between the two governments without any headway. Neither side was willing to compromise on its respective position, and by 1951 they had reached a stalemate. Pakistan wanted to take the matter to the International Court of Justice but India insisted on bilateral solution suggesting formation of a commission of judges from each side to try and resolve the differences before referring the matter to a third party. During these times of mounting tensions David Lilienthal, the ex Chairman of the Tennesse Valley Project (and US Atomic Energy Commission), visited the region to write a series of articles for Colliers magazine. Lilienthal had a keen interest in the subcontinent and was welcomed by the highest levels of both Indian and Pakistani governments. Although his visit was sponsored by Colliers, Lilienthal was briefed by the Indian State Department and executive branch officials, who hoped he could help bridge the gap between India and the United States and also gauge hostilities on the subcontinent. Mr Lilienthal realized the importance of the Indus Waters issue between India and Pakistan and wrote an article suggesting third party mediation to resolve the conflict. A paragraph from the journal of Lilienthal is as follows16:
India and Pakistan were on the verge of war over Kashmir. There seemed to be no possibility of negotiating this issue until tensions abated. One way to reduce hostility would be to concentrate on other important issues where cooperation was possible. Progress in these areas would promote a sense of community between the two nations which might, in time, lead to a Kashmir settlement. Accordingly, I proposed that India and Pakistan work out a programme jointly to develop and jointly to operate the Indus Basin river system, upon which both nations were dependent for irrigation water. With new dams and irrigation canals, the Indus and its tributaries could be made to yield the additional water each country needed for increased food production. In the article I had suggested that the World Bank
15 Aloys Arthur Michel, op. cit., p. 205.16 David Lilienthal, “Another Korea in the Making? (Ohio: Colliers Magazine, 1951) quoted in Gulhati,
Niranjan D., The Indus Waters Treaty: An Exercise in International Mediations, (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1973), p. 93.
might use its good offices to bring the parties to agreement, and help in the financing of an Indus Development programme.
Eugen R Black, the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (The World Bank), and a close friend of Lilienthal, borrowed the initiative and proposed to help resolve the conflict. Both, Pakistan and India accepted the Bank’s offer for mediation and the process began afresh. Black very wisely insisted on tackling the issue from functional point of view leaving aside the political considerations. On his suggestion, a Working Group of Pakistani, Indian and World Bank engineers was formed. The declared mandate of the World Bank representatives was restricted to facilitation and consultation. Mr Black was very optimistic about the outcome of an engineering solution meant for optimum utilization of the Indus waters. However, his optimism was short-lived. He soon realized that neither side was willing to concede and a cooperative solution would be difficult to find and implement. After two years of intense negotiations, Black modified his role as facilitator and offered a new solution which envisaged giving three Western rivers to Pakistan and the three Eastern rivers to India. This solution was more in line with the Indian position and, therefore, unacceptable to Pakistan which had all along insisted on its historic allocations. The proposal antagonized the Pakistan side which threatened to withdraw from the dialogue17. However, the leaders on both sides of the divide realized the importance of this process and Black and his team kept giving them reasons to come back to the table by slight modifications in the proposals. Every time a stalemate would occur, Black and his team would come up with a new proposal and put the process back on rails. After extensive negotiations for almost nine years, the perseverance of the World Bank bore fruit and the Indus Waters Treaty was finally signed in Karachi on 19 Sep 1960, between the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India.
According to the Treaty the Eastern rivers were allocated to India, while Pakistan was allowed use of the Western rivers, subject to the provisions of the treaty. Pakistan’s objection to the loss of the waters of the Eastern rivers was accommodated by helping Pakistan to built ‘replacement works’ (Annex 1) that would allow the Western waters to be used in the areas where Pakistan was historically using waters from the Eastern rivers. World Bank arranged for complete funding for the replacement works through a consortium of countries including US, UK, New Zealand, Germany, and Australia. India also contributed an amount of £ 62.060 million for the replacement works18. The treaty also catered for a ten year transit period to allow Pakistan to construct replacement works, during which time India was bound to let the historical flows of the eastern rivers pass to Pakistan.
THE INDUS WATERS TREATY 1960
17 For details see “The Indus Waters Treaty: A History”, available at www.stimson.org/research-pages/the-indus-waters-treaty-a-history/ (28 February 2011).
18 Data received from Pakistan Commissioner for Indus Waters, 2010.
The treaty consists of a preamble, twelve articles and eight annexure. The preamble of the treaty expresses mutual desire of both countries to attain ‘the most complete and satisfactory utilization of the waters of the Indus system of rivers…in a spirit of goodwill and friendship….
Article’ I-Definitions- explains all the terms used in the text of the treaty and its annexure.
Article II-Provisions Regarding Eastern Rivers- states that all the three Eastern rivers shall be available for the unrestricted use of India except for domestic, non-consumptive and agricultural use as specified in relevant annexure. However, Pakistan may use the waters of these rivers once they have finally crossed into Pakistan.
Article III-Provisions Regarding Western Rivers- states that India is obliged to let flow waters of the three Western rivers to Pakistan without interference except for domestic, non-consumptive and agricultural uses specified in Annexure C and generation of hydro-electric power as set out in Annexure D. India is also allowed limited storages on these rivers as given in Annexure E.
Article IV-Provisions Regarding Eastern Rivers and Western Rivers- defines the general guidelines for the ongoing and future uses by the two parties in such a manner that no damage is done to the material interests of the other party. It also urges Pakistan to construct replacement works provided for in the treaty.
Article V-Financial Provisions- provides mechanism for Indian contribution of Pound Sterling 62,060,000 for the replacement works. It also defines the amount to be paid by Pakistan in case of extension in the transition period.
Article VI-Exchange of Data- describes the type of data to be exchanged between the two parties on monthly basis.
Article VII-Future Cooperation- highlights the common interest of the parties in the optimum development of the rivers by mutual cooperation. It also binds each party to keep the other informed of intended works on the waters.
Article VIII-Permanent Indus Commission- provides detailed mechanism for the establishment of a high powered commission to oversee the implementation of the treaty and to ‘promote cooperation between the parties in the development of the waters and related issues’. The Commission is to meet regularly, at least once a year, alternatively in India and Pakistan. Each Commissioner is to be granted diplomatic status by the other country as per the treaty.
Article IX-Settlement of Differences and Disputes- defines ‘difference’ and ‘dispute’ and explains the procedure for resolution of the same. This includes referral to Neutral Expert or Court of Arbitration.
Article X-Emergency Provision- allows Pakistan to use this article in case it is unable to procure materials and equipments necessary for the completion of replacement works by a given
date, due to some large scale international hostilities arising out of causes beyond its control. In such a situation the World Bank would notify each party about it and they would enlist the good offices of the World Bank to decide if there was a need for any modification in the treaty.
Article XI-General Provisions- affirms that the treaty governs the rights and obligations of each party in relation to the other with respect only to the use of the waters of the rivers and matters incidental thereto. Provisions of the Treaty will not be construed as in any way establishing a general principle or precedent. The parties agree not to invoke the treaty for anything not expressly recognized under the treaty.
Article XII-Final Provisions-states the name of the treaty, date of effect, scope of its modification and its continuity until terminated by another treaty.
ANALYSIS OF INDUS WATERS TREATY
The signing of the treaty on 19 September 1960 in Karachi was a big international event. Pakistan’s President Mohammed Ayub Khan, .Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, and the Vice President of the World Bank W.A.B. Iliff signed the treaty. The representatives of Australia, Germany, New Zealand, UK and USA were also present on the occasion. This signature resulted in the formal settlement of a serious water dispute between the two riparian states in a peaceful manner. The importance of the treaty was recognized by the World Bank in its press release of 19 September according to which the signing of the treaty ‘marks the end of a critical and long-standing dispute and opens the way for development of water resources in the Indus basin, on which depends the livelihood of some 50 million in India and Pakistan’19. The leaders of Pakistan and India expressed their satisfaction and hope for better relations in future. Ayub Khan said, ‘the treaty was an event of great historic significance for the two countries concerned…..and for the whole world20. Nehru said, ‘we are going to have many benefits out of this agreement but important than the material advantages are the psychological and emotional benefit’21. The international press acclaimed it as proof that even a seemingly insolvable international conflict might be resolved if the parties were sincere to find a solution and there was a neutral mediator to steward the negotiation for a success.
The people of Pakistan and India generally welcomed the treaty. It was considered a great opportunity for the promotion of better bilateral relations. But it was criticized by the extremist in both the countries. In the opinion of the Indian extremists New Delhi had surrendered its rivers to Pakistan. The Indian contribution for the replacement works was also perceived as an unfair burden. In Pakistan some resentment was expressed, justifiably, on the loss of the three Eastern rivers.
The treaty was the result of the sincere desire and effort by both the parties in association with the World Bank to come to a diplomatic solution of the problem. It was the culmination of a complex negotiation process lasting almost nine years, from 1951 to 1960. The negotiations continued in sessions; whenever, any deadlock emerged, and there were many, the World Bank
19 IBRD Press Release, No. 618, quoted in N.D.Gulati, op. cit., p. 339.20 The Dawn (Karachi) 20 September 1960.21 The Hindu (Madras) 20 September 1960.
found out a way to resolve it by new ideas or by consulting the political leadership of the two countries. The World Bank worked not only as a facilitator and mediator in the negotiation but also as an organizer of funds for the actualization of the settlement of the water dispute. The credit of the treaty should also go the statesmanship of Ayub and Nehru, who saved the negotiation whenever a stalemate emerged and to the persistence of the World Bank to resolve the old dispute22.
From Pakistan’s point of view the settlement plan as envisaged under the Indus Waters Treaty had some advantages as well as shortfalls23:
Advantages
1. After the completion of the Indus Basin Replacement Works Plan, each country became independent of the other in the operation of its water supplies.
2. Indus basin irrigation system which was mostly based on run-of-the-river system got reliable storage facilities to make the system more reliable under seasonal variations.
3. Each country became responsible for planning, construction and administering its own facilities in its own interests and free to allocate its supplies within its own territories.
4. This provided strong incentive to each country to make the most effective use of water, since any efficiency accomplished by works undertaken by either country for storage, transfer and reduction of loses, accrues directly to the benefit of that country.
5. The independence afforded by the treaty and assurances against interference by either country reduced chances of disputes and tension.
6. As a result of the treaty, storage projects increased the canal water diversions from 67 MAF to 104 MAF.
7. The Hydrology of the Indus River Basin enabled availability of 80% of total water during monsoon period. With storage of water available in reservoirs and supplies, water availability would also be assured during the drought period (winters).
8. Permanent Indus Commission was set up to adjudicate any future disputes (which survived two wars) providing on-going machinery for consultation and conflict resolution through inspections, exchange of data and visits.
Drawbacks
22 Mohammad Tajuddin and Muzaffar Ali, op. cit., p. 149.23 Formulated in light of interview and data received from Mr Jamait Ali Shah, Pakistan Commissioner for
Indus Waters, (Islamabad: 09 Nov 2009).
1. The Indus Waters Treaty was not considered the first-best by either side. From Pakistan’s perspective allocation of only 75% of water as against 90% of irrigated land violated the principle of “appreciable harm”. From Indian point of view allocation of 75% of water to Pakistan violated the principle of “equitable utilization”24.
2. Pakistan had to forego the entire perpetual flow of fresh waters of the Eastern rivers (24 MAF) which it used to historically receive for irrigation.
3. The traditional flood irrigation, the most ancient way of using river waters, on the Sutlej, Beas and to some extent on Ravi disappeared. As a result no cultivation was possible in the flood plains of these rivers thus rendering a large extent of area barren.
4. Due loss of regular flow in eastern rivers, silting has occurred in the channels and subsequent floods cause greater destruction in Pakistan, in addition to other environmental effects.
5. The upkeep of the new link canals and storages means a heavy additional burden on the cost of maintaining irrigation.
6. Storages are not substitutes of perpetual flow water as the storages have limited life. Pakistan is already feeling the effect of silting up of its major reservoirs.
CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES WITH INDIA
Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 has served both India and Pakistan for half a century. However, taking advantage of the provisions of the treaty, according to which India is permitted the use of water for domestic, non-consumptive (including navigation), agriculture (limited), storage (limited) and hydroelectric power, India has already initiated/ proposed some controversial projects (Annex 3) over the Indus system which have created tensions among the two neighbours. India, apparently is working on the policy of gradually undermining the treaty. It appears that lack of water and energy deficiency has forced India to increasingly manipulate Indus Waters Treaty to its advantage. In addition, New Delhi wants to use water as political leverage against Pakistan, keeping up ancillary issues to distract attention from the core issue of Kashmir. At the same time she also seeks to prove to the people of Kashmir that Islamabad is denying them jobs and opportunities which originate from state’s very own resources25.Some of
24 John Briscoe and Usman Qamar, “Pakistan’s Water Economy Running Dry- A World Bank Report”, (World Bank Oxford Press: 2005), avialable at http://wbwater.worldbank.org/water/publications/ pakistans-water-economy-running-dry (05 March 2011).
25 Moin Ansari, “Indian Aqua Bomb- The coming water wars in Kashmir”, available at http://www.zimbio.com, (28 December 2009).
the major disputes arisen between India and Pakistan since the signing of the treaty are summarised as under26:
Irrigated Cropped Area. Soon after the signing of the treaty, India was obliged to communicate to Pakistan the irrigated area from the Western rivers. India provided an exaggerated figure of 692,479 acres. After negotiations India agreed to reduce the figure to. 642,477 acres.
Salal Hydro-Electric Project. The Salal project is located 45 miles upstream of Marala on River Chenab. It has a small reservoir of 0.23 MAF. Information about the project was provided to Pakistan in 1974. The project is a run-of-river hydroelectric plant. Its stage-I of 345 MW was commissioned in 1987, whereas, the stage-2 was commissioned in 1995. Pakistan objected to the design which had six low-level outlets and overall height of spillway gates of 40 ft, in clear violation of the treaty. After a series of meetings the issue got resolved through an agreement arrived at between the two governments in April 1978. These outlets were plugged permanently and the height of the spillway gates was also reduced from 40 ft to 30 ft. Pakistan wanted the height restriction of 20 ft, reduced height of 30 ft was conceded as a compromise. However, the manipulative storage of the dam got reduced from 230,000 acre ft to a manageable figure of 58000 acre ft after plugging of the low level outlets.
Baghliar Hydroelectric Power Project.Baglihar hydroelectric project is located on River Chenab, 80 km upstream of Salal project. It is also a run-of-river hydroelectric plant in Southern Doda district of Indian-held Kashmir. The project was conceived in 1992, approved in 1996 and construction started in 1999. It is a 317m long and 144.5m high concrete gravity dam with a gross storage capacity of about 0.321 MAF (of which about 0.29 MAF is dead storage capacity) and a power generation capacity of 450 MW. Pakistani team was granted permission to inspect the site in October 2003. Pakistan objected to the design of under-sluice type gated spillway (violation of para 8 of Annexure D to the Treaty). The presence of these under-sluices could cause a shortage of inflows at Marala headwork for about 20-25 days during lean months on mal-operation of dam by India. According to the treaty, the design should be based on ‘un-gated’ spillways. Also the project design should have been based on low-level weir since the run-of-the-river projects do not require a high head of 475 feet.
The Permanent Indus Commission could not resolve the objections; Pakistan invoked the relevant provisions of the Treaty for third-party arbitration (though after a considerable delay in trying to resolve the differences bilaterally). The World Bank appointed a neutral expert Mr Raymond Lafitte of Switzerland, on 10 May 2005. The
26 Formulated in light of interview and data received from Pakistan Commissioner for Indus Waters, (Lahore: 02 September 2010).
neutral expert gave his Final Determination on 12 February 2007. The decision of the neutral expert upheld Pakistan’s contention that the design by India is not in conformity with the design criteria as laid down in the Treaty. The expert asked for reduction in free board (from 4.5 meters to 3 meters), raising of power intake by 3 meters and reduction of storage (from 37.22 million cubic meters to 32.56 million cubic meters). However, no changes were made in the spillway design (perhaps if the third party was involved earlier this feature could also have been addressed). The changes as determined by the neutral expert were confirmed during the ‘Tour of Inspection’ by Pakistan’s Commission for Indus Waters in July 2008. India formally commissioned the Plant on 10 October 2008. To fill Baglihar Dam, India again violated treaty provisions by obstructing Chenab’s flow. Resultantly, Pakistan received only 19,351 cusecs on 9 October 2009 and 10,739 cusecs on 11 October 2009, when it should be receiving a minimum of 55,000 cusecs per day. India filled the dam in 10 days, instead of spreading it to 60-70 days, thus denuding agriculture sector of Pakistan from critical water during its sowing time. Total loss was approximately 321,000 MAF of water, bringing 405 canals and 1,125 distributaries to dead levels and affecting 13 million acres of agricultural land27.
In spite of repeated requests by Pakistan Commissioner, India did not provide details of schedule for initial filling of Baglihar plant. The protest on reduction of flow was accordingly lodged against the Treaty violation with India. Pakistan has asked for compensation of lost waters however, due to India’s intransigence the issue remains unresolved. Pakistan is now demanding installation of telemetry mechanism at Chenab River to monitor water flows.
Wuller Barrage on River Jhelum. Wullar lake is located about 2 km north of Srinagar in Indian-held Kashmir on River Jhelum at about 5180 feet above sea level. The construction of Wuller Barrage at the downstream of Wuller Lake was started by India in 1985 without informing Pakistan in advance, a clear violation of the treaty. It was given the name of ‘Tulbul Navigation Project’. It has a length of 439 feet, with a gated weir, under-sluices and a 40 feet wide navigation lock. It will have a maximum discharge capacity of 50,000 cusecs. With the construction of Wuller Barrage, India would be able to create an additional storage capacity of 0.30 MAF. This would help it to store water up to 6 months during wet season and release discharges up to 4000 cusecs during the period from October to February28. In this way India would get regulation control of Wuller Lake, a natural lake on River Jhelum. The strategic significance of the site lies in the fact that a dam at this site can provide India the means to ruin the entire ‘triple canal project’ (Upper Jhelum Canal, Upper Chenab
27 “Water issues between India and Pakistan”, available at http://www.chatdd.com/blog/ (30 September 2009).
28 Study conducted by HQ Engineers 1 Corps quoted in Raheel Qayyum Brig, “Indian Premeditation as Upper Riparian” (Islamabad, NDC paper 2009), p. 63 .
Canal and Lower Bari Doab Canal). Wullar Barrage project was shelved by the British government even before partition because of the fear that dam of any size at this location would inundate vast tracts of land including Srinagar29. Strong protest was lodged by Pakistan and the work got suspended in 1987. According to sub-para 8 (h) of Annexure E of the Indus Waters Treaty, India is entitled to construct only such barrages on Main Jhelum and Main Chenab rivers which have incidental storage of no more than 10,000 acre feet, only after the design has been scrutinized and approved by Pakistan. Whereas, the Wuller barrage’s capacity is 300,000 acre feet, which is thirty times more than the permitted capacity. The work is still suspended and the matter is under resolution between the two governments. On suspension of the construction work, Pakistan did not take the case in the Court of Arbitration. Wuller is the only water related issue which is part of the composite dialogue.
Kishenganga Storage-Cum-Hydroelectric Project on River Jhelum. The information regarding the Kishanganga hydroelectric project was revealed in November 1988 when India started construction of a tunnel near Kanzalwan on the River Neelum to divert the waters into the Wuller Lake. The reservoir behind the dam has a full capacity of about 0.18 MAF with a power storage capacity of about 0.14 MAF. In the proposed scheme, the stored water of River Neelam (Kishanganga) is to be diverted through a 24 km long, 5.3m dia horse-shoe tunnel to produce 330 MW power. The power house located near Bunkot will deliver the water through a Tail Race into a nullah called Bonar-Madmati, another tributary of river Jhelum which outfall into Wullar Lake. Pakistan raised objections on two accounts: first, the design criteria of the project and secondly, the diversion of flow of one tributary to another against the spirit of Indus Waters Treaty. This will deprive Neelum-Jhelum hydroelectric project (an under-construction project in Independent Kashmir) with some critical discharges. In this way production capacity of Neelum-Jhelum link hydroelectric project is likely to be reduced from 11% to 16%. Despite sincere efforts by Pakistan, the two governments failed to resolve the matter bilaterally and Pakistan has gone to the Court of Arbitration for resolution of the issue.
Dul Hasti Hydroelectric Plant. Dul Hasti hydro-electric project is located in Kishtwar district, about 200 km north-east of Jammu and designed as a 390 MW plant being built on Chenab River. The project was initiated in 1983 by the then Prime Minister of India Mrs Indira Gandhi at a cost of Rs 34 billion. The first phase of the project was completed in 200730. The Dul Hasti hydroelectric project envisages the construction of 180.5 m long and 59.5 m high concrete gravity dam upstream of Baglihar hydro-electric project on River Chenab. A low level orifice type spillway has been provided with a capacity of the order of 8600 acre ft. The construction of
29 Raheel Qayyum Brig, op. cit., p. 65.30 Salal Hydroelectric Project, available at http://en.wikipedia.org (04 March 2011).
this project was started in 1991. Compared to Salal and Baglihar Projects, the effect of this project on Pakistan is not grave since stoppage of water can be of the order of 1-2 days only. However, it is imperative to discourage India from providing under-sluices type gated spillways in the body of the dam.
Burser Dam. Bursar Dam is considered as the biggest project among a host of others being built by India on two major rivers – Jhelum and Chenab – flowing through the state of Jammu & Kashmir into Pakistan and assigned to Islamabad under the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty. The proposed dam violates the Indus Waters Treaty as well as international environmental conventions. Besides causing water scarcity in Pakistan it would also contribute towards melting of Himalayan glaciers31. Pakistan’s Commissioner for Indus Waters has repeatedly asked his Indian counterpart to provide details of the proposed water storage and hydropower projects, including Bursar dam. However, India has taken the stand that it was aware of its legal obligations and it would let Pakistan know about the project details and relevant data six months before construction activities as required under the Treaty.
Bursar Dam would be constructed near Hanzal Village (near Kishtwar) in Doda District of Jammu & Kashmir on the 133-kilometre-long Marusudar River, the main right bank tributary of the Chenab River. Reportedly, it will store 2.2 MAF and will generate 1020 MW of electricity and is likely to be completed in 6-7 years at an estimated cost of 43.78 billion rupees. Its construction would be a serious violation of the treaty as its storage of 2.2 MAF is much beyond the permissible limits. The proposed dam would have 829 feet height; in comparison the Tarbela and Mangla are only 485 feet and 453 feet respectively, whereas the Baghliar dam is 475 feet. The Bursar project is basically a storage facility, which will regulate the flow of water to all the downstream projects i.e. Pakal Dul, Dul Hasti, Rattle, Baglihar, Sawalkot and Salal32. More than 4900 acres of thick forest would be submerged and the whole population of Hanzal village would be displaced. According to experts the project is located in Kishtwar High Altitude National Park (about 2 million acre feet) which is an environmentally protected area. Spreading over an area of 400 kilometres, the park contains 15 mammal species including the musk deer and Himalayan black and brown bear and some rare birds for which an environmental impact assessment study is necessary.
WATER REGULATION BY INDIA
Pakistan and India have a chequered history of regional water disputes. Indus Water Treaty 1960 did manage to give some momentary respite to both the countries. The water
31 Khaliq Kiyani, The Dawn (Karachi) 22 February 2011. 32 Khalid Mustafa, The News (Islamabad) 26 February 2011.
regulation capability of India has a direct bearing on socio-economic spheres inside Pakistan. India can use its ability to regulate the water during the peak requirement periods of Rabi and Kharif crops season, thereby causing a substantial loss to the agricultural sector. Also the reduction in water can cause a serious shortfall of water in dams, which would result in lowering the hydropower production capacity of these units. This action combined with loss to agricultural sector can cause an irreparable economic and political damage to Pakistan. It is not yet possible for India to regulate the waters of the Indus River because of difficult terrain through which it passes. Indian water regulation capability on other rivers is briefly enumerated as under33:
1. Construction of Wuller Barrage (Tulbul Navigation Project) on Jhelum will allow India to store water for up to six months during wet season and release discharge of up to 4000 cusecs during the period from Oct to Feb (Rabi sowing season).
2. Total planned live storage capacity of Salal, Baghliar and Dul Hasti dams at River Chenab amounts to 230,600 AF. This provides India the ability to stop water for days and also to create flood situation by releasing excess water at Marala.
3. India can maintain dry conditions downstream River Ravi for indefinite period except minor seepage flow of 1500 cusecs. However, by releasing excess waters from Madhopur Headworks in conjunction with Thein Dam it can easily create flood conditions damaging the flood-cum-defence bunds along River Ravi, which have been designed for only 300,000 cusecs.
4. India has achieved almost total control of the waters of Sutlej and Bias. It only releases water from these rivers during floods when it exceeds the storage capacity. India can create exceptionally high flood conditions on these rivers with a designed storage capacity of 11.68 MAF.
FUTURE PROSPECTS
The history of water dispute resolution, in contrast to that of conflict, is much more
impressive. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations has identified more
than 3600 treaties relating to international water resources, dating between 805 and 1984, the
majority of which deal with some aspect of navigation. Since 1814 about 300 international
treaties have been negotiated to deal with non-navigational issues of water management: flood
control, hydropower projects, and allocations for consumptive or non consumptive uses in
international basins. Accounts of conflict related to water indicate that only seven minor
skirmishes have occurred in this century and that no war has yet been fought over water. In
contrast, 145 water-related treaties were signed in the same period. War over water seems not to
be strategically rational, hydrographically effective, or economically feasible. Shared interests
along a waterway seem to consistently outweigh water’s conflict-inducing characteristics.
33 Raheel Qayyum Brig, op. cit., pp 19-20
Furthermore, once cooperative water regimes are established through treaties, they turn out to be
impressively resilient over time, even between otherwise hostile riparian states and even as
conflict is waged over other issues. These patterns suggest that the most valuable lesson to be
learned from the history of international water disputes is that this is a resource whose
characteristics tend to induce cooperation, inciting violence only as an exception34.
The Indus Waters Treaty has served Pakistan and India for over fifty years. Both the
countries owe their green revolution of the 60s and 70s to this treaty. Regardless of the rhetoric
of the few against the treaty, the treaty is internationally accepted as a success story. The treaty is
not the ideal solution for the dispute, which should have been an integrated joint development of
the Indus system but, given the circumstances after partition and animosity between the two, it
was perhaps the closest possible realistic solution. There will always be issues which require
deliberation and clarification and they may be resolved in a spirit of mutual cooperation and
goodwill. It may be noted that both the countries are facing shortage of water. India with a larger
population and faster industrial growth may be affected more. It is therefore, in the benefit of
both the countries to realize the cooperative potential of this resource and exploit it to common
good of the people on both sides of the divide.
The treaty has served the two countries well in the past and all efforts must be aimed at taking mutually beneficial decisions. Efforts to undermine the treaty by particular interest groups be discouraged by saner elements on both sides and the media should create awareness in the general masses of the rationality of having the treaty and the importance of cooperation in utilizing the water resources. Suggestions to improve certain aspects of the treaty could always be welcomed but these should be left for better days when the two neighbours have achieved a détente. This is perhaps the only instrument between the two countries that has stood the test of time. Even during full-fledged wars and hostilities between Pakistan and India the treaty has remained enforce and effective.
For some time now an interest group in India has been questioning the efficacy of the treaty. This group advocates that the treaty besides placing undesirable restrictions on India does not cater fully to the needs of J&K population. It is also argued that the treaty has outlived its utility and needs to be abrogated or replaced with a new treaty. Pakistanis also have grievances which have deeper roots. To start with, at the time of partition, if Muslim majority areas of Gordaspur, which were originally meant to go to Pakistan, were not allotted to India, India would not have any claim on Kashmir and the issue of water would not even have arisen. However, even after partition it was India’s unwarranted stoppage of water in 1948 which initiated the
34 Aaron T. Wolf, “Trends in Trans boundary Water Resources: Lessons for Cooperative Projects in the Middle East”, paper delivered at a workshop at the International Development Research Centre, Ottawa Canada, 30 Oct 1998 available at http://www.idrc.ca/CONFLICT/ev-33233-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html (20 January 2011).
problem and the resultant mistrust. A number of Pakistanis are not happy to part with the three Eastern rivers under the treaty, as well.
Both the sides have grievances and some of them are not ill-founded. Nevertheless, we cannot live in the past; the two countries have suffered a great deal because of their hostility and mistrust and need to move on, for the sake of better future for their citizens. If we do not change our attitudes and continue to grow seeds of suspicion and hatred, the future generations will not forgive us. The Indus Waters Treaty has provided a platform for cooperation. It was brokered after a considerable effort of the World Bank and perhaps, sincerity of purpose, of the leadership from both sides. Not only that the treaty should stay, it should in fact be used as a basis for future cooperation. No document or instrument is final or eternal though. Once the two sides reach a certain level of understanding and cooperation there would be ample opportunities to improve the treaty in the interest of both. The treaty provides opportunity for future cooperation and joint management of the waters; and it is disappointing to note that since the signing of the treaty no projects have been undertaken under the provisions of “future cooperation”. It is no secret that the available waters of the Indus system are not being utilized judiciously by both sides. The water availability vis-à-vis the growing demand is on the decline and every drop of available water has to be utilized in the best and most economical manner. However, neither country, at this moment has enough resources to harness the full potential available. It is therefore, imperative for both states to combine their resources and expertise to benefit from the opportunity. This is not only important for the progress and prosperity of Pakistan and India but diffusion of tension among these two nuclear neighbours could be catalyst for the progress of the entire region.
A joint body may be formed either independently or within the ambit of the Permanent Indus Commission to work out modalities and scope of joint cooperation. The body composed of apolitical, technical experts should be tasked to find avenues for mutual cooperation. Guidance and help of international regimes specializing in this field may also be helpful. In Europe and elsewhere, water scarcity has promoted trans-boundary water cooperation instead of inciting war over this issue. The UN Convention on Uses of International Water Courses 1997 obliges states to conserve, manage and protect international water courses. Pakistan and India are not party to the said convention but the latter nevertheless offers a comprehensive framework for trans-boundary water cooperation. One of the impediments in cooperation and resolution of issues is India’s insistence on ‘bilateralism’. This is evident in India’s relations with all its neighbours. For the good of the Indian citizen and the region as a whole, India must show flexibility and magnanimity. Indus Waters Treaty is a great example of peaceful resolution of conflicts with the assistance of a third party. This success could have been emulated by the two countries in other areas of difference with little sincerity and compassion. No doubt the ultimate aim would be to coexist peacefully and cooperate without the help of others.
CONCLUSION
Water is essential for sustenance of life on the planet and therefore, nature has provided the commodity in sufficient amount. However, due to uneven distribution of water the entire mankind is not equally blessed. It is, therefore, our duty to preserve and use this ‘common heritage of mankind’ judiciously and with a cooperative spirit. Pakistan and India are blessed to have a number of large rivers being fed constantly from the Himalayas. The two countries have also inherited one of the largest irrigation networks in the world. Despite the foregoing, the per capita availability of water is decreasing in both the countries while the countries are locked in disputes over available resources. Indus Waters Treaty provides a mechanism and platform for the two countries to manage their waters in a spirit of goodwill and mutual cooperation. This is an opportunity to move from conflict to cooperation. This could act as a catalyst for peace and prosperity for the people and, who knows, the spirit carried in the treaty may bring the two neighbours closer to the resolution of other issues like Kashmir.
Annex 1
LIST OF REPLACEMENT WORKS COMPLETED UNDER THE TREATY
Link Canals
1. Trimmu Sidhnai2. Sidhnai-Mailsi
3. Mailsi-Bahawal4. Rasul-Qadirabad5. Qadirabad-Balloki6. L.C.C. Feeder7. Balloki-Sulemanke-II8. Chashma-Jhelum9. Taunsa-Panjnad
Barrages1. Sidnai2. Mailsi Siphon3. Qadirabad4. Rasul5. Chashma6. Marala
Dams1. Mangla on river Jhelum 2. Chashma on river Indus3. Tarbela on river Indus
Annex 2
MAP SHOWING INDUS AND ITS TRIBUTERIES
RIVER JHELUM
RIVER CHENAB
RASUL HWs
KISHAN GANGA HEP
URI HEP
WULLAR BARRAGE
MAHURA HEP
MANGLA DAM
AKHNUR REG
SALAL DAM
BAGLIHAR
HEP
DULHASTI
HEP
MARALA
HWs
KHANKI HWs
QADIRABAD HWs
