indonesiajihadrevivaltrilogy5jun12

OPEN SOURCE CENTRE RESEARCH REPORT

04/06/2012

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


Indonesia: Jihad Revival Trilogy

This report contains summarised excerpts from a three-part manifesto, 'The Revival of Jihad in Indonesia', written by an individual using the pen name 'Abu Jaisy Al Ghareeb'. The manifesto was posted online on 1 March 2012 by Ghurobaa' Publishing in cooperation with the Al Busyro Islamic Forum.

At the time of reporting, two parts have been released: 'Lessons from the Past: A Reflection' and 'Combating the Treachery of the Oppressors'. Al Ghareeb has said that he will release part three after receiving feedback and suggestions from readers.

Part one outlines the mistakes made during recent jihadist operations, including the 2010 Aceh paramilitary training camp and 2010 CIMB Niaga Bank robbery. Al Ghareeb provides a short list of lessons learnt from the failure of these operations, including the need for greater communications security and a more flexible strategy.

Part two seeks to counter the intellectual and religious arguments used by some members of the jihadist community to delay undertaking jihad. Part two also highlights deficiencies in law enforcement agencies which restrict their ability to prevent jihadist operations.

The conclusion of the manifesto reaffirms that the primary enemy of the mujahidin remains the 'Crusader-Zionist alliance' led by the United States. However, the Indonesian state is also a legitimate target for attacks.

Please do not disseminate or cite this document without the prior permission of OSC. For further information contact [email protected]

mailto:[email protected]


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Table of Contents INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 3 PART ONE: LESSONS FROM THE PAST (A REFLECTION) .................................... 4 Jihad requires a strategy suited to battlefield conditions............................................ 4 The disruption of the Aceh training camp ................................................................... 4 The disruption of the Medan mujahidin cell due to the CIMB Niaga bank robbery .. 5 A short story about deradicalisation and the infiltration of a jihadist organisation .. 6 Lessons Learnt ............................................................................................................ 10 PART TWO: COMBATING THE TREACHERY OF THE OPPRESSORS .................. 11 The Demands and Consequences of Jihad ................................................................. 12 Dirty Tricks Used by the Oppressors .......................................................................... 15 Several Small Obstacles .............................................................................................. 16 What Must Muslims Do to Support Jihad? ................................................................. 17


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INTRODUCTION Amidst the difficult trials facing us, we see a glimmer of hope that the future of jihad in this nation, God Willing, will be bright if we are all able to learn from the failures of the past and continue to attack the enemy. In our efforts to wage war on the enemy, we will discover their weaknesses and strategies to defeat them.

We will attempt to do our part in reviving the Islamic community's desire to fight against the tyranny of the oppressors1. The blood of many mujahidin and Muslims has been spilt because of the oppressors' desire for power and worldly possessions.

This manifesto consists of three sections:

Part One: Lessons from the Past (A Reflection)

Part Two: Combating the Treachery of the Oppressors

Part Three: Resistance Strategy

We believe that this manifesto must be conveyed to the Muslim community for the following reasons:

1. An article such as this can be circulated quickly and anonymously because of increased activity on jihadist forums, Facebook groups and blogs.

2. We do not know how much longer we will survive in this world, so we are obliged to convey our ideas and the lessons we have learnt to the Muslim community. In this way, if we die future generations of jihadists can utilise what we have learnt.

This manifesto is based on experiences of jihad operations in Indonesia: in Ambon, Poso, the first Bali bombing, the Bima assassination2 and the recent Solo bombing3. We were involved in some of these operations. We have also spoken to people involved in other operations – including a number of fugitives and some who have been imprisoned. And we monitored media reporting on these operations.

We have deliberately chosen to use the identifier 'we' because this manifesto represents the combined knowledge of a number of individuals and shows that there is still a small section of the community who are promoting jihad.

We hope that this manifesto will be of use and we pray that God accepts this small deed of ours.

In exile, Muharram 1433H [November/December 2011]

Abu Jaisy Al Ghareeb 1 Jihadists and radical groups use the Arabic term thagut term to refer to governments which they consider illegitimate. 2 On 30 June 2011, Sa'ban Arrahman, a student from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)-linked school Umar bin Khattab, stabbed a police officer to death in Bolo Sub-district, Bima District, West Nusa Tenggara (NTB). 3 On 25 September 2011, Ahmad Yosepa Hayat, a member of a terrorist cell based in Cirebon attacked the Kapunton Bethel Evangelical Church (GBIS) in Solo, Central Java.


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PART ONE: LESSONS FROM THE PAST (A REFLECTION)

Jihad requires a strategy suited to battlefield conditions

Every battlefield requires a different strategy, and every strategy has unique characteristics. Based on our observations and experience, there are two schools of thought in Indonesia regarding battlefield strategy:

1. Attack the enemy where they are most vulnerable

Examples of this strategy include the August 2000 bombing of the Philippines Embassy in Indonesia, the December 2000 Christmas Eve bombings and the first Bali Bombing. These attacks were based on the same motivating factor, namely to defend the Muslim community and punish the oppressors.

2. Fight against the enemy where the Muslim community has agreed to establish a secure base of operations

This strategy is inspired by the camps established by the mujahidin in Afghanistan, the southern Philippines and Chechnya. The crowning achievement of this strategy was in Poso, Indonesia, where mujahidin moved in and out of the region and were able to conduct assassinations and bombings. This strategy received more support from underground jihadist organisations in terms of regular funding (albeit, in small amounts) from the 'top'. In comparison, those utilising the first strategy had to seek out their own sources of operational funding.

Which strategy is most appropriate for Indonesia? In this section we will attempt to learn lessons from past operations, because every operation has strengths and weaknesses. Furthermore, our strategy must be designed to combat the enemy's strategy – when their strategy changes, we must adapt our own strategy.

[The author details several historical security operations against jihadist movements in Indonesia including police responses to the 2002 Bali bombing and the 2009 Ritz Carlton-Marriot bombing.]

The disruption of the Aceh training camp

Preparations for the Aceh paramilitary training camp began in April 2009. We knew of this operation because we were invited to take part in it when it began. The first batch of participants was due to depart for the camp in July 2009, however, their departure was postponed after the Ritz Carlton–Marriot bombing. Nonetheless, recruitment and fundraising activities for the camp continued.

This was the first mistake in the Aceh program. While authorities were closely monitoring meetings and communication between groups, the brothers preparing the Aceh program carried on with their activities as though nothing had changed. As a result, their activities were easily detected.

There were other weaknesses in the preparations for the Aceh camp:


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1. Recruitment was too open and there were flaws in the selection process

At the time, we believed that because the program was only a training camp [participants] would not require any expertise. All that was needed was determination and the willingness to leave one's family. We did not give any thought to who would look after our families. As a result, wives who remained behind spoke too freely to friends about their situation, and unfortunately those friends were part of communities that did not agree with this kind of paramilitary training program. This information was sufficient for the authorities to locate the mujahidin.

2. Poor information security

We have learned that there were people who did not depart for the training camp but knew of the program's existence. This was a fatal mistake. Those who did not participate in the camp should not have known about it. We believe [the authorities] must have learned about the camp during the recruitment and fundraising stages or when others were departing for the camp.

3. Inappropriate use of communications equipment

According to one sheikh (who is well known to the authorities in his capacity as a jihadist preacher), he once received a telephone call from someone seeking funds for the Aceh camp. The call was made from a home land line belonging to a leader with impeccable jihadist credentials. The sheikh scolded the caller, saying: "Brother, it is not that I cannot help you, but if you do this and do not obtain what you need, it will be a disaster. It would only be slightly better if you got what you needed, even though your program will eventually be uncovered [by the authorities]."

The sheikh did eventually aid the program in his own way, but the caller's location was discovered and he was killed by the authorities. We need to understand from this incident just how dangerous communication devices can be when misused.

These mistakes were made at a time when the authorities were monitoring suspicious activity after the Jakarta hotel bombings. Those involved in the program appear to have been ignorant of this, and so continued contacting people, discussing funding and recruiting followers from communities which were being monitored.

4. Inappropriate location for the camp

Although the training camp was established in the Jantho mountains (in Aceh), there were people living nearby. Acehnese generally do not trust outsiders, especially Javanese, and they still bear the psychological scars of government military operations in the province. Furthermore, [training camp participants] needed to interact with local residents to obtain food, fuel and mobile phone credit.

The disruption of the Medan mujahidin cell due to the CIMB Niaga bank robbery

Next, we will discuss the disruption of the Medan mujahidin group who were preparing for an urban guerrilla war campaign by collecting funds and recruiting


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personnel. We were involved in this program because we have always believed that an urban guerrilla war is the most appropriate strategy for jihad in Indonesia.

In Medan, there were two broad categories of jihadists: the ideologues and the practitioners. Among the practitioners were two groups: those with short-term plans and those with long-term plans. The first sub-group was larger than the second.

The practitioner group focused on the short-term believed a guerrilla war must be launched immediately to avenge the deaths of brothers killed by the authorities. This group only considered immediate logistical and funding concerns, rather than longer term issues such as the need for recruitment and training. Most group members were local [Medan] residents who were able to easily interact with the local community.

The second practitioner group had a long-term plan focused on recruitment, training, and conducting [small-scale] urban operations. This group was more efficient in their work. They understood that it was increasingly difficult to recruit personnel, so every operation needed to be carefully planned and resources not wasted. However, this group consisted mostly of people from outside [Medan], including us, who could not interact easily with locals without causing suspicion.

Fa'i (robbery) operations undertaken by the second practitioner group usually only involved two to four people. As a result, police generally dismissed these robberies as being undertaken by normal criminal gangs. Meanwhile, the first group mobilised large numbers of better-equipped mujahidin for their robberies, which made police suspicious about the motives for the robberies.

After the first practitioner group undertook the Bank Niaga robbery in Medan [in 2010], it became clearer to the authorities that the mujahidin were involved. As a result [police counter terrorist unit] Special Detachment 88 (Det-88) was deployed to the region. The second group only became convinced of the first's involvement in the robbery after some of them sought out members of the second group and asked for information on escape routes. As brothers in faith, the second group was compelled to help the first, even though they were disappointed that the first group had acted excessively.

While the first group heeded the second's advice on an escape route, they did not heed advice on how to travel along this route. Instead of travelling in groups of two motorcycles over regular intervals, they travelled as a large group of six or eight motorcycles, which attracted attention from local residents. We all know what happened next: they were attacked and killed [by police] near the Dolog Masihul river. Even members of the second group had to flee to save themselves [from police operations].

A short story about deradicalisation and the infiltration of a jihadist organisation

[This sub-section is a reposted message from an online forum. The author claims to be a former member of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and discusses a number of issues which he believes show how the organisation has lost its jihadist spirit or, even worse, has been infiltrated by intelligence agencies. This section refers to an


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individual identified as Mr M on a number of occasions as being an agent of deradicalisation efforts. It is not clear who Mr M is.]

According to discussions [I have had] with members of JI, former members and those still on the run from police, the destruction of JI schools has its roots in old issues. These issues are as follows:

1. The unique characteristics of JI Territorial Command (Mantiqi) II

[JI's Mantiqi II is described as being the main recruitment base for JI4. The author claims that JI's wariness of the authorities has affected its recruitment ability and has led some younger members to become disillusioned with the organisation.]

2. The condition and needs of JI schools

[The author describes how JI's schools have suffered greatly from counter-terrorism operations.]

3. The presence of leaders who wish to maintain the status quo

There are at least three major incidents which serve as examples of this phenomenon:

(a) The refusal to send mujahidin to Ambon

After studying the conflicts in Maluku, Ambon and other nearby areas [taking place in the early 2000s], [former JI emir] Abdullah Sungkar issued a directive to Mantiqi II to deploy all jihadist resources needed to assist the Muslim community in Ambon. This directive reached Indonesia, but was not immediately heeded by the Mantiqi II leadership. In fact, they busied themselves discussing whether or not they should implement the directive. They then sent the letter back to the Malaysia headquarters and requested a fatwa council be convened to determine whether or not jihad was permissible in Ambon. This deeply angered Sungkar.

The directive was then sent to two other JI teachers, one of whom is currently in an international prison [probably Hambali5] and another who is being sought by police [possibly Zulkarnaen6]. These two were among the best in the community: two young Muslim men who had proven their patience and obedience. These two entered Indonesia and gathered together the remaining JI members who were not part of the JI structure, trained them and took them to wage jihad in Ambon at a time when no one else was helping the Muslims there.

4 At JI's peak, the organisation possessed at least three territorial commands: Mantiqi I (Mainland Malaysia), Mantiqi II (Sumatra, Java and Nusa Tenggara), Mantiqi III (Sabah, Tarakan, Sulawesi and Southern Philippines). West Malaysia and Singapore were cited as a fourth area of operations, but not recognised as a full Mantiqi. Mantiqi I and the fourth area were identified as being funding centres, Mantiqi II was the main focus of the organisation and Mantiqi III was a paramilitary training base. For further information see Abas, Nasir. 2009. Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah: Pengakuan Mantan Ketua JI, Abdika Press. 5 Former senior Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) leader. Arrested in Thailand in August 2003. Currently in US detention. 6 Zulkarnaen aka Aris Sumarsono aka Daud. Fugitive since 2002, believed to be a key member of JI's central command and head of its military section. For further information see Witular, Rendi A. 2010. 'Next in line: Potential leaders of underground jihadist movement'. Jakarta Post, 11 August.


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It was only after a great number of Muslims took part in the fighting in Ambon that those who had initially rejected Sungkar's directive coyly supported the jihad. With regards to these people, one brother who was housed in the same cell block as Mukhlas7 at Kerobokan Prison in Bali, said "Mukhlas said, 'Dear God… these guys are fighting over bread crumbs.'"

At that time, this disgusting situation had not affected JI schools, as it has today. Back then, JI schools were in their golden age, with the An Nur Pesantren (Islamic school) producing recruits such as Ubaid8, Urwah9, Mutsanna10 and others. The Darus Syahadah Pesantren was also in its most radical phase, bolstered by the euphoria surrounding the jihad in Ambon and Poso. But now we have seen what these schools have become…

(b) The refusal to transform Poso into a prototype base for jihad

The Badar Program in Poso, undertaken from 2000 to 2002, had four aims:

i. to protect the remaining Muslims in Poso

ii. to train and provide guidance for Muslims in Poso

iii. to destroy the crusader forces in Poso

iv. to establish a base for jihad in Poso.

Objectives (i) to (iii) were undertaken to full effect. The program to establish a base for jihad took place after Muslims in Poso were trained and instilled with a proper Islamic mindset and understood [the need] to establish an Islamic zone of influence to protect the Muslim community. At the time, the leaders of the program told JI headquarters (which by this time had relocated to Indonesia), to make the most of the jihad in Poso and consider it as a priority for the development of jihad in Indonesia (which I understood to mean a call to support the establishment of an Islamic state in Poso).

However, JI headquarters (which was dominated by Mantiqi II) responded by saying, "We will begin the process in Java, we will establish an Islamic state in Java." So, they were trapped not only by the burden of the community's resources, but also by regionalist sentiment and an unwillingness to live in exile for the sake of Islam (hijrah).

7 Mukhlas aka Ali Ghufron. Executed in 2008 over his role in the 2002 Bali Bombing. 8 Ubaid variant Ubeid aka Lutfi Haedaroh aka Abu Musa aka Jafar. In 2004 was arrested on terrorism charges and sentenced to prison. After being released in 2007, Ubaid joined Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) and was later arrested again, this time for involvement in the 2010 Aceh paramilitary training camp. See Saragih, Bagus BT. 2010. 'ICG: Police jumping the gun on Ba'asyir's links to Aceh group'. Jakarta Post, 11 May. 9 Urwah [aka Bagus Budi Pranoto]. Arrested in 2004 on terrorism charges and sentenced to prison. Released in 2007 and linked up with Noordin M Top. Killed by police in counter-terrorism raid linked to 2009 Ritz Carlton-Marriot bombing. See Saragih, Bagus BT. 2010. 'ICG: Police jumping the gun on Ba'asyir's links to Aceh group'. Jakarta Post, 11 May and Raiq, Ahmad. 2009. ''Keluarga Urwah dan Aji ke Jakarta Jumat'. Tempointeraktif, 23 September. 10 No further information.


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I believe that if JI's potential was focused on Poso, the organisation would have emerged victorious in the 2007 clash between the mujahidin and Det-88. I even believe that an Islamic state would have been established in Poso!

I believe this because I am a former JI member, I know that JI is a jihadist organisation, with a jihadist recruitment system, which is home to a large number of jihadists. But oh well, the character of Mantiqi II I described above has already penetrated the very being of its members, and they blindly submit to and obey [their leaders] (although this is a good thing in some ways).

(c) The refusal to assist fugitives and mujahidin in the war on terrorism

[The author's discussion here diverges from the subtitle provided, saying that the issue has been covered in Urwah's Risalah wa Nida'atnya (Treatise and Call) and Abdul Barr al Harby's Maka Pergilah Bersama Rabbmu (Go with your Lord).

The author makes several statements including that: (i) the Aceh camp was a blessing; (ii) he does not know who produced the Aceh training camp video, but understands the frustrations directed at JI expressed by those in the video; (iii) he is not a member of Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT); (iv) he respects Abu Dujanah11, but does not know why Dujanah did not take a clear stance on Noordin Top's operations.]

We must always hold out hope that the problems within JI will be resolved and that the organisation's ideology will be restored.

I do not wish to badmouth JI schools, but students in their final year at these schools are usually indoctrinated with materials on Muslim community spirit (kejamaahan) which are critical of jihad and the mujahidin in Indonesia. Actually, I have no problems with the teachings on kejamaahan because, God willing, they are still based on legitimate Islamic references. However, in reality [these schools] betray their own emir and have appointed a mysterious new emir (which I am almost certain is a puppet leader), controlled by members of the old guard such as Abu Fatih and Abu Rusydan.

[It is not clear who the author is referring to as the 'emir' and the 'mysterious new emir'.]

One thing I can say for certain is that Abu Rusydan's own secretary said that Rusydan met with [former Special Detachment-88 (Det-88) head] Tito Karnavian and [former JI member, turned deradicalisation figure] Nasir Abbas in Jakarta, just a few weeks before the Aceh camp was raided. So my concern, and that of several other brothers, is that the current emir of JI is a puppet controlled by the authorities.

[This is the end of the online forum post.]

11 Former head of JI's special forces. Arrested in 2007. See ICG, 'Indonesia: Tackling Radicalism in Poso', 22 January 2008.


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Lessons Learnt

We can draw several lessons from what we have learned so far:

1. The tools used by security agencies to track the location of mujahidin are the same as they have always been: mobile phones, email, fingerprints, vehicle chassis, and CCTV recordings from crime scenes.

2. Initial evidence in an investigation can consist of: recorded telephone and text message conversations on mobile phones, photos at events where intelligence agents are present, illegal goods (weapons, explosive materials, sensitive documents, etc), and items used and recorded by CCTV in an operation.

3. Infiltration and monitoring of suspicious groups has become more intense as time has gone on, and now even includes internet forums and groups.

4. Differences in opinion over the legality of jihad, fa'i and other operations in Indonesia have been exacerbated by provocative statements made by [state-backed] infiltrators or by idiots within our own ranks.

5. The [mainstream] community is the eyes and ears of the authorities.

6. Not all members of the jihadist community can keep secrets or understand the risks of leaking them.

7. Not all members of the jihadist community understand the equipment and individuals used by the authorities to locate the mujahidin.

8. Multiple operational cells can be exposed if members of one cell are not sufficiently prepared and do not have the necessary equipment to face the authorities after an operation has taken place.

9. What we have achieved to date is far from what we would like to achieve.

10. The Muslim community's awareness of the need for jihad is minimal. Even where this awareness does exist, it is far from what is required by the mujahidin.

11. Our strategy is still too rigid in its application.


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PART TWO: COMBATING THE TREACHERY OF THE OPPRESSORS In this section, we will talk about performing righteous deeds (jihad), what is holding us back from undertaking jihad, whether or not we are part of jihad operations, what form jihad will take in the future, what our enemies are like and so forth.

One of us previously wrote an article on the urgency for jihad, which was posted on the Al Busyro forum12. We quote from this article in the sub-section on 'The Urgency for Jihad and How the Muslim Community Should Respond' with a number of additions and omissions were necessary.

Before delving further into this topic, we would like to clarify that when we refer to the 'community', we are not referring to the broader Muslim community. Instead, we are referring to those Muslims in Indonesia who understand true monotheism (tauhid) and understand that jihad is the responsibility of every individual (fardhu 'ain).

We all agree that jihad is the responsibility of every Muslim. However, differences emerge when we ask whether or not a jihadist operation may be undertaken where there is an enemy who is vulnerable to attack. This difference has emerged from the opposing perspectives on whether operations should be focused on offensive jihad (to seize power) or defensive jihad (to protect Muslim communities).

Let's look at the state of the community in Indonesia. Jihadist operations which have taken place to date (Ambon-Poso, the Christmas Eve 2000 Bombings, Bali I and II, the Cirebon and Solo Bombings) fall into the defensive jihad category. As a result, if anyone says that these operations were a mistake, premature, ill-conceived, lacking in political awareness, etc, then they probably believe that jihad is only permissible in order to topple governments.

While it is true that the ultimate goal of jihad is to seize power, we must not forget the community needs concrete examples which show that there are people out there willing to defend Islam, strike fear into the heart of the enemy and protect the community from oppression and cruelty. Defensive jihad operations also function as a means for conducting field tests and developing the mujahidin's fighting ability and strategies. So, in order to undertake an offensive jihad, defensive jihad operations must be undertaken as frequently as possible.

After we understand that the jihadist operations in Indonesia up until now have been defensive in nature, we should all agree to support jihad and the mujahidin, rather than make slanderous comments against a particular operation which then give rise to an excessive response from those supporting the operation. Remember, in jihad – especially defensive jihad – every word and deed which weakens jihad is a major sin.

Regardless of whether or not jihadist operations take place, the oppressors will always do everything in their power to combat such operations. If a defensive jihad operation takes place, then this will create additional work for the oppressors –

12 Password protected web forum for Indonesian jihadists. Front page can be accessed at: http://www.al-busyro.org/vb/


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because while they were previously only focused on preventing an attack, they then have to respond to the attack and take action against the perpetrators.

As the enemy will take increasingly aggressive action against jihad and the mujahidin after an operation has taken place, then we should close ranks, strengthen our sense of brotherhood, promote solidarity, and cast aside problems of the past, trivial debates and suspicions.

Moreover, we should also not let the arrest of mujahidin dampen our spirits and cause us to retreat. Do not let our concerns and disappointment over the disruption [of an operation] prevent us from undertaking further operations. We should consider these setbacks as a lesson which will help us to do better.

We should not allow a repeat of incidents such as those mentioned in Urwah's Risalah dan Nida'at or Abdul Barr al Harbiy's Pergilah Bersama Rabb-mu. Similarly, we should prevent a recurrence of the situation after the Aceh training camp was raided, where many donors to the project withdrew their support [from other activities]. We should respond – as the Taliban did with Al Qaida after the 2001 World Trade Center attack – and remember that God will hold us accountable for how we have treated jihad and the mujahidin.

The Demands and Consequences of Jihad

[Throughout the following section, the author refers to quotes from the Qur'an, sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, and the opinions of scholars to support their argument. These references have been removed in the interest of brevity, but can be seen in the vernacular version attached to this report.]

What we would like to discuss here are dubious statements made about matters which are mashlahah (of public benefit) or mafsadah (detrimental to the public good). Arguments utilising these concepts are often used to delay jihad and avoid the obligation to assist in jihad being undertaken by the mujahidin. We believe that this is the greatest obstacle that is preventing Muslims from conducting jihad and supporting the mujahidin.

Our discussion here will largely draw on an article previously posted online13. This is because we agree with the texts and ulema on which its arguments are based.

Many Muslims accept that jihad is an obligation under the sharia (Islamic law)14. They also agree that jihad is currently an obligation for every individual Muslim who is able to undertake it according to stipulations outlined in sharia (male, adult Muslims who are in good physical and mental health and who are able to undertake jihad or provide funds).

However, some Muslims do not agree with how jihadist operations are currently conducted. They argue that the concept of mashlahah demands that jihad be delayed until a later date. Undertaking jihad now is detrimental to the public interest because

13 See http://diarysangterroris.blogspot.com/2009/11/4-mengabaikan-pertimbangan-maslahat-dan.html 14 The body of sharia is determined by religious scholars after examining the text of the Qur'an, the sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad (hadith) and the consensus of religious scholars ('ijma).


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it results in Islamic activists being arrested, Islamic propagation activities and schools being closely monitored [by the authorities], a decline in support for Islamic movements and Muslims being too scared to implement Islamic teachings. As a result, they claim that jihadist operations are not permitted under sharia, and must be halted.

Let us examine their claims and determine whether or not they are true.

Islam regulates every aspect of a Muslim's life. Consequently, a Muslim must believe that everything demanded by God of His servants is in their best interest. Sharia will never contradict the public interest, therefore it must be used to determine what is in the public interest.

Once we agree that sharia determines what is in the public interest, we must also understand that delaying any command of sharia under the pretence of protecting mashlahah or preventing mafsadah leads us into a state of ambiguity – categorised as mashlahah mursalah. This is because according to sharia, there are three categories of 'benefits':

• Mashlahah Mu'tabarah – a benefit which is recognised by sharia and thus must also be recognised as such by the community.

• Mashlahah Mulghah – a benefit which is recognised by human beings, but which is not supported by sharia, and thus must be rejected by the community.

• Mashlahah Mursalah – an ambiguous benefit, namely, one which is recognised by human beings, but which is not definitively either mashlahah or mafsadah.

The mashlahah mursalah category has been the source of heated debate between ulema as it – at least on the surface – appears to claim that God does not know about or has forgotten to mention something which is beneficial for His servants. Furthermore, because matters which fall into this category are determined almost exclusively by rational human thought, this could lead to disorder, as some ulema may declare something to be mashlahah while others declare it to be mafsadah, or vice versa. So, drawing on the opinions of Islamic legal experts, the following conditions must be met before an ambiguous benefit can be used as the basis for a ruling:

• The benefit gained must truly be in the interest of sharia's aim to protect the religion, life, intellect, honour and wealth of Muslims (in that order).

• The benefit must truly be able to be realised, not just be theoretically possible.

• The benefit must comprehensively serve the interests of the entire Muslim community.

• The benefit must not contradict a clear benefit outlined by the sharia.

• The benefit must not bring about an equally detrimental effect or worse.

Now, let us examine the claim that jihadist operations do more harm than good. A number of sharia principles help us to weigh up between the cost and benefits of a particular deed.


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1. If a ruling is based on a sharia source (the Qur'an, hadith, consensus of the ulema or by analogy (qiyas)), then any cost must be ignored

Some argue that there is a risk of losing preachers, potential converts and restricting the potential of Islamic propagation as a result of jihad. However, these risks have existed since the time of the Prophet, and therefore they are not legitimate arguments against jihad.

2. Only a cost (mafsadah) which exceeds what is normally acceptable in a particular situation can annul a law

Some laws under sharia do contain an inherent element of danger, but if this is still within acceptable limits, then the law must still be implemented.

As an example: 'enjoining good and forbidding evil' (amar ma'ruf nahi mungkar) is an act of worship and a law under sharia which contains an element of danger and risk. If this risk is that [the person implementing this command] could be assaulted, ridiculed or hated by people promoting evil, then this is an acceptable risk and the law must still be implemented. If the risk is that [the person implementing this command] could be killed or imprisoned, then the command may be ignored or delayed, because this risk is beyond what is normally acceptable in this case.

This differs from jihad, because from the very beginning jihad has always carried a high degree of risk: loss of wealth, loss of life, capture, retaliation from the enemy and so forth. However these are acceptable risks in the case of jihad, and therefore cannot be used as reasons to annul or delay jihad.

3. The cost of something can never result in the complete annulment of an obligation under sharia

For example, the death or arrests of Muslims may be used as a reason for temporarily delaying jihad, but cannot be used as a reason to deny jihad altogether.

4. The danger facing a small number of Muslims must be balanced against the danger facing the majority of Muslims

For example, attacking an enemy which is using Muslims as human shields – possibly resulting in Muslims accidently being killed – may be necessary in order to prevent enemy forces claiming victory in larger battle.

5. Cost and benefit must be calculated on the basis of all Muslims who may be affected

Some Muslims take an 'egotistical' stance [by rejecting jihad in their region], ignoring the plight of Muslims in other countries. They forget that if the enemy is victorious in one country, this will position the enemy to eventually threaten their own region.

6. The greatest cost of all is casting religion (monotheism) aside

Perhaps jihadist operations have not yet provided meaningful material benefits, but their spiritual benefits are clear for all to see – the realisation of monotheism, the clear division between Muslims and hypocrites, as well as the open rejection of


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international infidel systems (democracy, capitalism, globalisation, etc). These benefits cannot be obtained on the same scale through other Islamic activities, such as propagation, education, political and community activities.

7. The process of determining the cost and benefit of something should be left to the ulema who understand the matter at hand

As with other issues in Islamic law, jihadist operations must integrate two streams of knowledge: knowledge of sharia and knowledge of practical warfare. Only ulema who understand the theory of jihad and are directly involved in it are fit to issue religious rulings on jihad.

8. The opinion of group leaders in determining the costs and benefits of a matter takes precedence over the opinion of others

For groups in the process of conducting a jihadist operation, the opinion of the [cell] commander must take priority over all other opinions – whether they are from other members of the group or from the outside.

9. People who determine the cost and benefit of something are only responsible for the effects which are apparent during the planning phase, not what happens after an operation is undertaken

If, after an operation is undertaken, the results are not in accordance with initial estimates [likely referring to civilian or Muslim casualties], the commander is not at fault. Occasionally, the best laid plans can go astray due to unforeseen circumstances in the field. This has been the case since the time since the Companions of the Prophet, and it is the reality of jihad.

Dirty Tricks Used by the Oppressors

Before we discuss the dirty tricks used by the oppressors, we must first understand that the oppressors in Indonesia are part of the international Zionist-Crusader alliance at war with the mujahidin. They have wilfully chosen to side with the forces of evil for money and trade opportunities. As a result, don't be surprised if the strategies used by each of the countries in this alliance are similar. Their current strategy is focused on two approaches: hard power (military might) and soft power (intellectual and media efforts to weaken the mujahidin).

We must counter this strategy by remaining steadfast in support of jihad through various levels of participation. If you are only able to provide money to the families of mujahidin or detainees, then you should do this because it will at least show the oppressors that the community supports jihad and that the mujahidin are not alone. The same goes for our comrades who actively disseminate news on jihad and the mujahidin via the internet – keep doing what you are doing because this is also a part of jihad. In fact, if you are able to do nothing else except visit jihadist websites, then do this, because the traffic generated on these sites will strike fear into the hearts of the oppressors by showing them how many people could potentially be 'terrorists' (ie mujahidin).


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These are just examples of the different levels of participation in jihad, utilise whichever you are able to.

Several Small Obstacles

There is one issue which always ends up becoming a reason for people to restrict their involvement in jihadist activities: security. In the midst of counter-terrorist operations, monitoring and surveillance targeting 'radical' activists, many are excessively cautious and fearful. After finding out that the oppressors are monitoring study groups, websites, Facebook groups and forums, many activists abandon them, citing security concerns. However, if we know how to utilise these activities and understand their limits, we can use them to terrorise the enemy by creating a constant sense of concern that new, more intelligent and more powerful mujahidin are emerging.

There are several points worth noting about the oppressors' capabilities with regards to monitoring groups and activities:

1. The enemy's capabilities are extremely limited, because they rely on worldly tools, while we rely on God.

2. The oppressors will not arrest you just for participating in open training programs or stockpiling weapons. In fact, providing shelter for a fugitive (according to our observations and experience) will not result in any charges being laid. Likewise, taking part in training seminars and posting jihadist materials will not result in arrest because:

a. The authorities operational funding is limited;

b. Prisons would be filled with preachers rather than criminals. Furthermore, the preachers would then be actively seeking recruits in prison, thus creating even more problems for the oppressors!

c. Until now, there have been no significant promotions or rewards conferred to [police officers] who have arrested Islamic activists involved in the theoretical side of jihadist operations. Without money or promotions as motivation, they will not take action. This is their greatest weakness: they are working for worldly gain.

d. The oppressors are still not sufficiently prepared to handle societal unrest, even though they have the equipment to do so.

3. In order to deal with those involved in the theoretical side [of jihad] the oppressors prefer to use the soft power approach.

4. People generally only pay attention to external appearances, so pay close attention to how you present yourself.

5. Do not be concerned with [security agencies] monitoring study groups, Facebook accounts and forums – even without these activities they would still monitor us.


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We will elaborate more on what can and can't be done with regards to these points in the next section.

Security concerns or fear should not become an obstacle to or limit our desire to become involved in operations. We must respond intelligently to developments. The enemy's strategy will have weaknesses, and we will not be able to uncover these weaknesses if we do not stand against them. Nothing is perfect in this world, so we should take advantage of the enemy's weaknesses which we discover in the field.

What Must Muslims Do to Support Jihad?

There are two primary resources which must be readied or strengthened by the Muslim community in order to assist the mujahidin after an operation has been carried out: wealth and a strong sense of Islamic brotherhood.

Wealth is required in order to support operational costs for mujahidin, as well as their families, while they are on the run. Until now, the main problem faced by mujahidin on the run from the authorities is funding for transport and supplies. [When they run out of money] they are forced to return to their families and, based on our observations, 90 per cent of arrests are made at the family homes of mujahidin.

Islamic brotherhood is needed in order to provide shelter or escape routes for mujahidin on the run. This brotherhood is what is needed most by mujahidin, because the success of a guerrilla war is measured by the ability for mujahidin to remain free after conducting an attack so that they can plan for future operations. If they are easily arrested after undertaking an operation, then it is only the authorities which stand to benefit from public support.

Thus, we call on Muslims who long for the victory of Islam to prepare themselves to welcome the mujahidin, who will strike fear into the hearts of the oppressors.

We call on preachers to prepare their followers to take part in this battle: tell the community that it is time for us to become soldiers in war, not its victims. It doesn't matter whether you take part in operations, assist the mujahidin or just support their actions.

We want the community to make preparations not just by going up into the mountains for training camps, but also by practicing methods to provide safe haven for mujahidin, collecting information on potential targets, taking stock of the supplies needed for operations (explosives, weapons, etc), and perhaps practicing assassination (ighytiyalat) operations. However, we are also pleased to see the large numbers of people supporting the mujahidin on Facebook groups and internet forums.

Jihad today [in Indonesia] is following the global jihadist trend of seeking to cause as much damage to the enemy as possible while also showing the community that there are people willing to defend them, even though these are few in number.


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Our enemy today is the international Zionist-Crusader alliance under the leadership of America. America has divided the world into 'us' (the US) and the 'terrorists' (mujahidin). Is it still not clear who our enemy is?

Isn't the near enemy more important? Do you still believe that jihad must be focused on seizing power in the country where it is taking place? Perhaps we will not seize power in our country, but if the oppressors here are weakened by the war against the mujahidin, we could proclaim that we are part of Al Qaida, and that will be sufficient enough for the world to consider Indonesia a part of 'Al Qaida's territory', which will strike fear into the Zionist-Crusader alliance. If we deal out a small punishment to the oppressive government in this country for its tyranny and treachery, will people say our jihad is premature? We only wish to defend the Muslim community and show the enemy that we are still able to resist and that we still have our honour. If, with God's permission, the enemy is then weakened by our acts, and the Muslim community becomes aware of the obligation to wage jihad, then this is a reward from God for the community. We are only obliged to carry out our obligation to wage jihad, because this is the only way we will obtain glory for Islam and the Muslim community.

The main reason why the oppressors have become more aggressive in persecuting Muslims is because Muslims are not fighting back. The more that jihad is delayed, the further this persecution will spread.

We will further discuss the various strategies for jihad we can utilise in Indonesia in the next section. We will write this section separately because we would like to receive feedback on the first two sections, and because the third section will contain technical details, the conditions for undertaking an operation as well as tips and tricks we have picked up in the field.15

We pray that God will forgive us for our mistakes and shortcomings, and that this small effort on our part will be accepted by Him and be of use to the community.

In exile, Rabiul Awwal 1433 H [January/February 2012]

Abu Jaisy al Ghareeb

15 The author has invited readers to leave comments on http://jaisyulghareeb.wordpress.com/ or send via email to 'Japri' at [email protected]

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