The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 17 | Issue 6 | Number 5 | Article ID 5267 | Mar 15, 2019

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Indonesia’s 2019 Elections: Democracy Consolidated?

David Adam Stott

2018 was the 20th anniversary of Reformasi, thepeople-power movement that toppledauthoritarian leader Suharto, after 32 years inpower, and ushered in Indonesia’s democratictransition. The world’s largest Muslim-majoritynation has since made significant reforms to itspolitical system to become the world’s thirdbiggest democracy. The military has beenremoved from parliament and serving officersare banned from politics so that the military nolonger has a formal role in the political process.Wide-ranging decentralizing measures werealso introduced as an antidote to the stiflingcentralisation of Suharto’s New Order regime,and the country’s first direct presidentialelections were held in 2004.

Nonetheless, the first four post-SuhartoPresidents have been, to a lesser or greaterdegree, members of the political establishment.B.J Habibie (1998-99) was a Suharto protégéand as Vice President succeeded Suharto whenhis mentor stepped down. Abdurrahman Wahid(1999-2001) was not a member of Suharto’sinner circle but had succeeded his father asleader of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the largestnon-governmental Islamic organisation in theworld. Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-04) is thedaughter of Sukarno, Indonesia’s firstPresident who was ousted by Suharto. SusiloBambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014), the firstdirectly elected President, was a retiredgeneral who rose through the ranks underSuharto and served as a military representativein parliament where he participated inSuharto’s election to a seventh term asPresident in March 1998. Wahid was the onlyone of the four who did not serve in cabinetbefore ascending to the highest office, althoughMegawati’s cabinet experience came as Vice

President under Wahid.

Consequently, the 2014 election of JokoWidodo, popularly known as Jokowi, appearedto change Indonesia’s political landscape sincehe became the first post-Suharto President notto come from the existing political elite. Priorto standing for the presidency, he had been apopular governor of Jakarta, known for hisinformal style and transparent leadership, andhad been widely predicted to win in thepresidency in a landslide. However, his finalvictory over oligarch and Suharto son-in-lawPrabowo Subianto was much closer thanexpected and highlighted the extent to whichthe shadow of the Suharto era, and the powerof the oligarchs, still loomed over Indonesiaeven as a reformist candidate assumed thehighest office. The 2019 presidential electionsappear set to become a reprise of 2014 with thesame two contenders contesting it again.

Upon assuming office Jokowi faced highexpectations due to his extraordinary rise. Thispaper will consider the strength of democraticconsolidation in Indonesia, with particularreference to the last general election of 2014.Thereafter, it will present a brief assessment ofthe intervening four years of Jokowi’s first termexploring the political landscape ahead of theforthcoming elections. Since the 2014 electioncampaign Jokowi’s message has consistentlybeen one of economic growth, transparentgovernment and moderate Islam, centredaround improved infrastructure and socialwelfare. This paper finds cause for cautiousoptimism thanks to ambitious reforms inhealthcare and education, infrastructuredevelopment and sensible fiscal management.However, challenges remain, notably an

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increasingly assertive political Islam andsomewhat disappointing levels of economicgrowth.

Democracy Consolidated?

The outcome of the 2014 elections suggestedthe possibility that democratic stability inIndonesia had been consolidated. After the fallof the Suharto regime (1966-98) free and fairelections were successfully conducted in 1999,2004, 2009 and 2014, as Indonesia became themost free country in Southeast Asia.

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Indeed,Indonesia was the only state in Southeast Asiato be ranked ‘free’ in terms of both politicalrights and civil liberties by independentwatchdog Freedom House in its countryrankings for 2011, 2012 and 2013. However, in2014 it regressed to ‘partly free’ status due tonew restrictions on mass organisations andcontinuing harassment of minorities. DespiteJokowi’s reforms, in the 2019 rankingsIndonesia remains only ‘partly free’, with EastTimor considered the only ‘free’ country inSoutheast Asia.

Post-Suharto improvements in both politicalfreedom and civil liberties mean that Indonesiais now also one of the most-free Muslim-majority states, behind only Senegal andTunisia in Freedom House’s country rankingsfor 2019.2 Since the 1950s Indonesia hasaspired to play a leadership role both amongdeveloping countries, as one of the founders ofthe Non-Aligned Movement, and in ASEAN(Association of Southeast Asian Nations), as theregion’s biggest country and economy. Keyelements of the post-Suharto transition todemocracy have been the removal of themilitary from politics, a greater role for civilsociety in framing policy, a largely free mediaand the expansion of political parties. Althoughchallenges remain, in particular the protectionof minority rights, democratic reinforcement inIndonesia is especially symbolic regionallygiven ongoing military rule in Thailand, an

authoritarian revival in the Philippines andMyanmar’s still uncertain political transition.With these challenges in mind, the EconomistIntelligence Unit classifies Indonesia as a‘flawed democracy’, ranking it 65 out of 167states, based on 60 indicators measuring civilliberties, political participation, electoralprocess, functioning of government andpolitical culture.3 Other observers havecharacterised it as an illiberal democracy,citing the administration’s mainstreaming of aconservative and intolerant form of Islam alongwith its use of the security apparatus to silencedissent.4

Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit’sDemocracy Index

(https://infographics.economist.com/2018/

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DemocracyIndex/)

Indonesia’s first two direct presidentialelections, in 2004 and 2009, seemed to indicatethat democracy was indeed becomingconsolidated in the wake of the Suhartodictatorship. Both were won by Susilo BambangYudhoyono (hereafter SBY), who had earned areputation as a military reformist beforeretiring from the armed forces and enteringcabinet for the first time in 1999 under Wahid.SBY won two presidential elections standing forclean government and political reform, with aparticular emphasis on getting tough on thecountry’s endemic corruption. He promised topersonally direct the campaign againstcorruption, which set him apart from hispredecessors Habibie, Wahid and Megawati.During SBY’s first term, a succession of high-profile corruption prosecutions demonstratedthat his presidency was taking a differentcourse from any previous administration. Thispaid off with an increased mandate gained inthe 2009 parliamentary and presidentialelections.

Riding the wave of a global commodities boom,SBY was also able to preside over consistenteconomic growth of almost 6% annually duringhis decade in office. In this period Indonesiareplaced Malaysia as world’s largest exporterof of palm oil and increased its exports of otherresources such as coal, rubber, copper andgold.

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Largely driven by high demand fromChina, elevated prices for these and otherresources enabled SBY to deliver much-neededpolitical stability to Indonesia. The globalresources boom cemented support for both thePresident personally and Indonesia’s transitionto democracy. Post-Suharto electoral reformslimit the President to a maximum of two five-year terms in office, and thus SBY was unableto stand for re-election in 2014.

Compared with his first term, however, SBY’ssecond term in office disappointed many of hissupporters as political reform stalled and party

allies became embroiled in corruption scandals.Most notably, Democrat party treasurerMuhammad Nazaruddin was convicted ofreceiving bribes in relation to bids for the 2011Southeast Asian games, hosted that year byIndonesia. Nazaruddin exercised control overthe funding of public works, and wassubsequently ensnared in further corruptionscandals during SBY’s second term. ThePresident’s increasingly hands off approachsaw his popularity plummet as his publicapproval ratings gradually spiralled down from75% in November 2009, to 57% by January2011 and 30% in May 2013. 6 Althoughcorruption prosecutions did rise somewhat in2013, a general lack of progress ensured thatin 2013 Indonesia was still ranked 114 of 177countries by Transparency International in itsannual report on corruption perceptions.

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Thus,the elections of 2014 were to be something of alitmus test for Indonesia’s democratictransition.

The 2014 Elections

Indonesia is the world’s third largestdemocracy, and voter turnout was 78% and86% in the first two direct presidentialelections of 2004 and 2009 respectively.However, turnout fell to just under 70%, from atotal of 194 million eligible voters, in thepresidential elections of 2014. Even thoughpopulation growth means the total number ofeligible voters keeps increasing, falling voterturnout suggests that a degree of voter apathyis setting in as elections become normalised.Election rules state that only parties orcoalitions that gained a minimum of 25% of thevotes in the parliamentary elections, or thatcontrol 20% of seats in the People ’sRepresentative Assembly (Dewan PerwakilanRakyat , DPR), are able to nominate apresidential candidate and running mate forthe presidential elections. These rules virtuallyguarantee that even the largest political parties

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have to forge coalition partnerships withsmaller parties in order to field presidentialcandidates.

For most of the Suharto period only threepolitical parties were allowed to contestelections, which were heavily manipulated toensure victory for the President’s Golkar partyvehicle. The removal of such restrictions afterSuharto’s fall resulted in a rapid mushroomingof new parties (see table below). However, the2014 parliamentary elections indicated thatIndonesian politics is becoming increasinglyconsolidated among the established parties,especially compared with 2009, when 38parties contested the national elections butonly nine secured enough votes to berepresented in parliament. In 2014 only twoparties out of 12 did not meet the 2014threshold of 2.5% of the national legislativevote. Under election rules, these two partiesalso forfeit the right to contest the nextparliamentary elections scheduled for April 17,2019.

In essence, the 10 parties represented inparliament can be classified as either secularor religious parties with relatively smalldifferences between them in policies. Therehave been no parties of the left since theviolent eradication of the Indonesiancommunist party in 1965-66. A distinctivefeature of post-Suharto parliamentary politicshas been the existence of large rulingcoalitions, which has been enabled by therelative lack of ideological differences betweenthe parties. The current grand coalition is thelargest of all the post-1998 coalitions andconsists of the PDI-P, Golkar, NasDem, Hanura,PPP and PKB bringing together both secularand religious parties. Indeed, building andmaintaining this large coalition has been one ofJokowi’s most notable political achievements.

The biggest parties PDI-P, Golkar, Gerindra andDemocrat are all secular, while the smallerparties of PKB, PAN, PKS and PPP are all

Islamic parties. NasDem and Hanura are alsosecular in outlook but like Gerindra andDemocrat they were established solely asvehicles for their leaders to contest presidentialelections. The ruling Indonesian DemocraticParty of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi IndonesiaPerjuangan, PDI-P) is the most secular partywith Gerindra being the least so of thenominally secular parties.8 The PDI-P wasformed in 1973 when Suharto forced five non-Islamic political parties to merge into one, andoriginally consisted of three nationalist entitiesand two Christian parties. Since then its coreconstituency has been voters who wantIndonesia to remain a secular pluralist state, incontrast to neighbouring Malaysia whosenational constitution specifies Islam as the solestate religion, albeit with sharia laws usedmostly for Muslim family matters. During thelast decade of the Suharto period the PDI-Palso began appealing to lower-income votersalienated by rising inequality, and the party hasmaintained this support base in the Reformasiera.9 The other long-standing secular partyGolkar was established by Suharto as a vehicleto provide him with electoral legitimacy in the1971 legislative elections, the first sinceSuharto’s seizure of power in 1966. Golkar wasthe ruling party from 1971 until the first post-Suharto elections in 1999. Golkar underSuharto was not actually formulated as apolitical party but as a non-ideologicalcorporatist grouping that focused solely oneconomic development and political stabilityrather than any specific political agenda. Assuch, its identity was closely bound to that ofthe Suharto regime and all governmentemployees were strongly encouraged to votefor it as a sign of loyalty. Despite having torebrand itself in the competitive electoralpolitics of the Reformasi era, its party platformstill emphasises a central role for the state insocial and economic development and itmaintains its large party political networkacross the sprawling archipelago.

Unlike Golkar, Gerindra has remained outside

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of Jokowi’s grand coalition since the 2014elections. Instead, Gerindra has formed a closealliance with Islamic parties PKS and PAN asthe core opposition to Jokowi. In terms ofideological differences, Islamic parties are lesstolerant of pluralism than the secular parties.In particular, one issue that the Gerindra andthe Islamic parties in opposition have coalescedaround is the question of Muslim economicdeprivation in a country where ChineseIndonesians, around 90% of whom identify asChristian or Buddhist, are perceived to controlthe economy and a disproportionate amount ofthe national wealth.10 Chinese Indonesiansaccount for only 1.2% of the population butthey own many of the country’s largestconglomerates, and this has long made them atarget for Islamists and nationalists. Foreigninvestment, especially from Japan and China,has also been perceived by critics to benefitChinese Indonesian businesses at the expenseof indigenous Indonesians. Regarding Muslimeconomic deprivation, most lawmakers fromGerindra, PPP, PKS and PAN believe it exists inIndonesia, whereas most MPs from Jokowi’sr u l i n g c o a l i t i o n d o n o t b e l i e v e i texists.11 Opposition MPs look to neighbouringMalaysia as a prime example of positivediscrimination for indigenous Muslims. Since1971 Malaysia, also with a wealthy ethnicChinese minority and many similarities toIndonesia, has implemented wide-rangingaffirmative action policies designed to increaseindigenous Malay participation in the upperand middle class. In the 2010 census 87.2% ofIndonesia’s population identified as Muslimcompared to 61.3% in Malaysia’s 2010 census.

The question of Muslim economic deprivationin Indonesia also highlights some of thedifferences among the Islamic parties. Forexample, most lawmakers from the PKB agreewith their secular coalition colleagues that suchdeprivation is not an issue, in contrast to theother Is lamic part ies . 1 2 PKB (PartaiKebangkitan Bangsa, National AwakeningParty) and PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional,

National Mandate Party) both stand formoderate Islam and both were founded in 1998as political space opened up after Suharto’sresignation. Although moderate they are rivalssince they represent Indonesia’s two largestIslamic organisations, the NU and theMuhammadiyah respectively (see below). PPP(Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, UnitedDevelopment Party) and PKS (Partai KeadilanSejahtera, Prosperous Justice Party) aregenerally less moderate, both having previouslysupported the implementation of sharia law ata national level in Indonesia. The PPP wasestablished in 1973 when Suharto forcedseveral Islamic parties to merge and it nowstands for economic nationalism with a majorrole for state-owned firms. The PKS was formedin 1998 and is ideologically located farthest tothe right of the Muslim parties despite havingdropped the implementation of sharia law fromits party platform. For example, the party isknown for its tough stance on pornography andnarcotics, and insists Indonesian Muslimsshould follow Islamic law (see below).

People’s Representative Assembly (DPR)election parties

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People’s Representative Assembly (DPR)election results13

Alongside this political consolidation amongparties, political trends in Indonesia since 2004have gradually shifted away from establishedparties towards a greater emphasis onindividual candidates. SBY exemplified thistrend as the party vehicle constructed aroundhim, the Democrat Party (Partai Demokrat,PD), was only founded in 2001 in order for himto contest the 2004 Presidential elections. Itwas founded as a secular centrist party, with anemphasis on economic liberalisation and a coreconstituency in the urban middle class. In the2009 parliamentary elections it secured themost votes of any party (almost 21%) but by2014 had fallen to only fourth (10.2%), closelyreflecting perceptions of SBY personally. Thisshift away from loyalty to a particular party isalso demonstrated by public opinion polls. Theproportion of voters who said they identifiedwith a particular party declined from 50% in2004 to only 15% in March 2014.14 SBY’ssuccess subsequently prompted two of hisformer New Order military superiors toestablish their own political vehicles to carrytheir own presidential ambitions. These are theHanura Partai (People’s Conscience Party) of

former Armed Forces Commander Wiranto,formed in 2006, and Gerindra of former SpecialForces Commander Prabowo, established in2008. With the retreat of the military fromparliamentary politics under Reformasi,Suharto-era military leaders such as SBY,Prabowo and Wiranto have had to form theirown parties to contest elections since generalsare no longer guaranteed power and influencein Golkar, Suharto’s former party, still less arethey guaranteed election.

The weakening of party loyalties has alsoreduced barriers to entry into national politicsfor popular individuals such as Jokowi, whobegan to attract wider media coverage onlyafter his 2010 landslide re-election as mayor ofhis hometown Solo in Central Java province.His subsequent election as governor of Jakartain 2012 propelled him to national attention, andhis achievements in office added to his lustre.These included introducing smartcards toprovide free access to education and healthcare for the poor, and establ ishing aprogramme to distribute school uniforms,shoes, books and bags to families most in need.He also kickstarted the long-delayed, andmuch-needed, construction of Jakarta’s MassRapid Transit network, and shook up therecruitment process for management positionsin city government. This was in markedcontrast to his predecessors as Jakartagovernor who achieved relatively little.

When he stood for election as mayor of Soloand later as governor of Jakarta, Jokowirepresented Megawati’s PDI-P party. Hismeteoric rise prompted fierce speculation thathe would not serve out his gubernatorial termto 2017 but would instead seek the presidencyin 2014. Elements within the PDI-P wereopposed to his candidacy as an outsider andnewcomer, most notably Megawati’s husbandTaufik Kiemas and daughter Puan Maharani,who sought to lead the party herself. There wasalso much speculation that party matriarchMegawati would like one last run at the

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presidency. However, by mid-2013 Jokowi hadsecured strong support from the party’s youthwing and, crucially, most party branches whoviewed him as the best chance for local PDI-Ppo l i t i c ians to win seats in the 2014parliamentary elections.15 Jokowi was finallydeclared the PDI-P presidential candidate on 14March, just before the onset of officialcampaigning for the legislative electionsbetween 16 March and 5 April. Megawati andher family had reluctantly embraced Jokowi’spresidential candidacy but had no intention ofsurrendering control of the party to an‘outsider’.16 Megawati has remained partychairperson.

Prior to the campaign period, Jokowi hadenjoyed a comfortable lead in opinion polls overthe other frontrunners, Prabowo and Golkarcandidate Aburizal Bakrie. Thanks to Jokowi’spersonal popularity, it appeared that the PDI-Pmight even repeat its high water markperformance of 1999 when it secured almost34% of the vote. However, a lacklustre anddisjointed campaign by the party resulted in amuch closer election (see table above). Onereason for this is the fact that Jokowi hardlyappeared in the PDI-P’s campaign TVcommercials which mostly featured Megawatiand daughter Puan Maharani. Jokowi onlybegan to appear regularly in the ads during thelast two days of official campaigning. Voterscould be forgiven for thinking that Jokowi wasnot standing on the PDI-P ticket, and thisundoubtedly cost the party votes. By contrast,Prabowo and his billionaire brother HashimDjojohadikusumo spent large sums on politicaladvertising and TV air-time. Other leaders andparties used their own media outlets topromote their candidacy. Golkar chairmanAburizal Bakrie owned two TV stations, TV Oneand ANTV, while Hanura vice presidentialcandidate Hary Tanoesoedibjo owned theMedia Nusantara Citra (MNC) Group, one ofSoutheast Asia’s largest media networks whichran 4 of Indonesia’s 11 free-to-air TV stations inaddition to magazines and national and

regional newspapers. Once campaigning wasunderway these media outlets halted theirpositive coverage of Jokowi and publishedstories portraying him in a negative light asJokowi was now a political rival of theirowners.17

After finishing a distant second in 2009 toSBY’s Democrats, in 2014 the PDI-P won aparliamentary election for the first time since1999 and its next challenge was to get itscandidate into the highest office for the firsttime since 2004 (see table above). However,their complacent campaign resulted in the PDI-P securing only 19% of the parliamentary vote,b e l o w t h e t h r e s h o l d o f 2 5 % o f t h eparliamentary vote or 20% of parliamentaryseats, forcing Jokowi and the PDI-P to securecoalition partners in order to contest thepresidential election. In the end, the PDI-Pcoalition comprised the PKB; the new NasDemParty of media tycoon Surya Paloh; andWiranto’s Hanura.

Unlike in the first two direct presidentialelections of 2004 and 2009, contested by fiveand three candidate pairs respectively, in 2014there were only two candidates. OpposingJokowi was the controversial oligarch Prabowo.Even though his own election vehicle Gerindrahad secured only 11.81% of the parliamentaryvote, Prabowo successfully constructed acoalition of Suharto’s former Golkar Partybacked up by three Islamic parties: PAN -whose leader Hatta Rajasa became Prabowo’srunning mate - PKS and PPP. SBY’s DemocratParty also threw its weight behind Prabowo asthe election neared. As Mietzner (2014) notes,contributing to the wide-ranging support thatPrabowo secured was Jokowi’s announcementthat he would break from tradition and notguarantee ministerial positions to his coalitionpartners.18 With the support of the Muslimparties Prabowo was able to attack Jokowi’sreligious credentials, accusing him of being anethnic Chinese communist and forcing Jokowito make a last ditch pilgrimage to Mecca. This

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smear campaign made the final vote tally muchcloser than originally anticipated.19 With voterturnout at 70.2% Jokowi secured 53.15 % of thevote, and Prabowo 46.85%. Just six monthsearlier, opinion polls had indicated that Jokowihad a substantial lead over Prabowo.

In complete contrast to Jokowi, the British andSwiss educated Prabowo comes from theIndonesian establishment and has a murkypast. His father Sumitro was an influentialeconomist who held cabinet posts under bothSukarno and Suharto, and Prabowo himself wasa controversial figure during the late Suhartoperiod. His rapid rise up the military hierarchywas seen as closely linked to his marriage toSuharto’s daughter. Having held commandposts in both East Timor and West Papua,Prabowo was implicated in several cases ofhuman rights abuse, and also played anincendiary role in the riots and demonstrationsthat accompanied the fall of his father-in-law in1998. Prabowo was widely believed to beagitating to become Suharto’s successor, firstby capturing the post of Armed ForcesCommander held by Wiranto. Troops underPrabowo’s command acted as agentprovocateurs in kidnapping student activistsand stoking the 1998 riots that precipitatedSuharto’s fall, apparently in order to portrayWiranto as weak for not dealing more forcefullywith the protests. However, Suharto’ssuccessor B.J. Habibie faced down Prabowo’sdemand to be appointed Armed ForcesCommander and Wiranto kept his post. Sincethen Prabowo spent a period of exile in Jordan,was refused a US visa in 2000 over his humanrights record and returned to Indonesia to jointhe family business, before starting his politicalcareer.

Jokowi (left) meets Prabowo (right) inDecember 2016

The Economy

Jokowi won the presidency by pledging todeliver a large infrastructure program thatwould create jobs, raise people’s income andprovide annual economic growth of 7%. Duringthe two decades preceding the Asian financialcrisis of 1997-98 Indonesia’s annual economicgrowth averaged just over 7%, and returning to7% growth was a key target of Jokowi’spresidency. However, it has only averagedaround 5% since his inauguration, comparedwith just over 5.5% during the 2004–14presidency of his predecessor SBY. Therefore,instead of attacking Jokowi’s religiouscredentials, as in 2014, Prabowo is focusing onhis opponent’s economic track record, and isquietly confident that slower growth will helphim win this time. Nonetheless, Jokowi’s teamhas not performed so badly considering thatSBY benefitted from high commodities priceswhilst his successor has faced falling globalprices. Indonesia’s Central Bureau of Statistics(Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS) recently reported5.17% GDP growth for 2018.

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GDP growth in Indonesia since 2000.Source: Trading Economics

(https://tradingeconomics.com/indonesia/gdp-growth-annual)

Another 2014 campaign promise was toincrease foreign investment in Indonesia, whichhas lagged compared to the Suharto-era. Inparticular, Jokowi has targeted greaterinvestment in manufacturing and other valueadded industries to reduce the economy’sdependence on natural resource exports andattendant price volatility. BPS data from August2018 shows that manufacturing employs14.72% of the workforce, compared to 28.79%in agriculture, the biggest sector by laborforce. One of the biggest hurdles to doingbusiness in Indonesia has long been red tapeand the lack of coordination between thebureaucratic agencies. In order to promoteinvestment, the Jokowi administration hasrelaxed some rules on investment regardingforeign capital ownership levels and opened upmore business fields to foreign entry. However,the dominant ideology in Indonesia remainseconomic nationalism which Jokowi has alsopracticed when dealing with multinationalresource firms. In December 2018 thePresident announced that the state had becomethe biggest shareholder in PT FreeportIndonesia, which operates the huge Grasberggold and copper mine in West Papua, afterincreasing its stake from 9.36% to 51.23% in aUS$3.85 billion deal. The government hadpreviously announced that state firm Pertamina

will take over operations at Indonesia’s biggestoil block from Chevron in 2021. In 2018Pertamina took control of the country’s largestgas block from France’s Total and Japan’sInpex. The capacity of Indonesian firms tooperate such large assets has been questioned,and such moves could deter future foreigninvestment, especially since Prabowo has alsoattacked foreign ownership of natural resourceassets in both of his presidential campaigns.

Despite lower than anticipated levels ofinvestment, unemployment is at its lowest levelfor almost two decades (see below). Indeed,10.3 million new jobs were created between2015 and 2018, exceeding a 2014 campaignpromise to create 2 million new jobs annually.Moreover, low inflation has been kept under5%, resulting in more disposable income andhousehold spending. The poverty rate also fellto 9.82%, the first time since independence in1949 it has dipped into single figures, with thetotal number of poor decreasing by around 2million to 25.7 million since 2014, according toBPS data from September 2018. Much-neededinfrastructure upgrades are improving physicaland digital connections to previouslyinaccessible areas, and these factors have allcombined to boost Indonesia’s sovereign creditrating over the last four years to ‘stable’.20

Unemployment in Indonesia. Source:Bloomberg

(https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-11/jokowi-beats-10-million-job-

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target-in-indonesia-election-boost)

During 2018 Jokowi would have beenconcerned about the continuing slide of therupiah, which has lost around 11% of its valueto the dollar in 2018 and dipped to a low ofRp15,242 in October, its lowest value since ithit Rp16,800 in January 1998. It continued tofall for most of 2018 despite central bankinjections of around US$12 billion to stabilisethe currency. A weak rupiah is particularlyworrying as the amount of debt beingaccumulated by state-owned enterprises to payfor infrastructure upgrades since these loansare mostly denominated in dollars, whilerevenues are received in local currency. Afalling rupiah makes dollar-denominated debtmore expensive to service. Whilst the rate ofdecline was nowhere near as sudden andprecipitous as in 1997-98, when the rupiahnosedived from a pre-crisis rate of Rp2500 tothe US dollar to Rp16,800 in just four months,such instabil ity undermines investorconfidence. Bank Indonesia has responded byincreasing interest rates five times in recentmonths in order to dissuade capital flight and,in order to contain the rupiah’s fall, highertariffs have been imposed on some consumergoods. The central bank’s efforts seem to havepaid off as the rupiah appreciated in January2019 to reached its highest level since the endof June 2018. Higher tariffs also targetIndonesia’s trade balance, which had beenswinging between surplus and deficit with areported US$944 million deficit in Augustbecoming a US$230 million surplus inSeptember, and then a US$1.82 billion tradedeficit the following month. The Octoberfigures prompted Prabowo, in the heat of theelection campaign, to claim that he would stopall food and energy imports. By the end of 2018Indonesia had recorded a trade deficit ofUS$8.6 billion, the largest annual deficit for 44years.

US dollar to Indonesian Rupiah exchangerates between 3 March 2009 and 28F e b r u a r y 2 0 1 9 . S o u r c e .(https://apjjf.org/admin/site_manage/details/XE.com)

In reality, Indonesia’s public finances remain inreasonable shape, thanks to low governmentdebt, legally restricted to 3% of GDP in a fiscalyear, and over US$100 billion in foreigncurrency reserves. In his August 2018 state-of-the-nation address to the People’s ConsultativeAssembly (MPR), Jokowi lauded his economicachievements and drew particular attention tohis government’s progress in funding welfareand public infrastructure. Regarding theformer he cited the Indonesia Smart Card(Kartu Indonesia Pintar, KIP), which by 2017had been received by 20 million children toenable them greater access to education, andNational Health Insurance (Jaminan KesehatanNasional, JKN) which was launched in 2014 toprovide universal coverage to the wholecountry by 2019. KIPs provide Rp1 Million(US$70), Rp750,000 (US$55), and Rp450,000(US$30) annually for students at senior high,junior high and elementary schools respectivelyto buy uniforms, bags and stationary. JKN aimsto integrate various existing national anddistrict-level health insurance schemes toprovide all citizens with access to public healthservices, as well as from private organisations

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that have joined the scheme. However, due tosoaring costs some medical treatments are nolonger being provided for free under the JKNscheme. Nonetheless, Jokowi noted in hisaddress that, “The government has graduallyincreased the number of (JKN) beneficiariesfrom 86.4 million in 2014 to 92.4 million in May2018”, and that Indonesia’s “HumanDevelopment Index has increased from 68.90 in2014 to 70.81 in 2017.” 21

The various education and health cardsintroduced by Jokowi. The family head getsthe KKS, school children get the KIP, andall family members get the KIS. Source.(http://suarasulutnews.co.id/)

In order to fund these expanded social welfareprogrammes in health and education, as well asinfrastructure upgrades, one of Jokowi’s firstbig moves as president was the politically riskycut in the country’s fuel subsidy, a decisionlong avoided by his predecessors. France’srecent experience with Yellow Vests movement,which began in November with protests againstrising fuel prices, illustrate the risk Jokowi wastaking. However, the subsidy consumed up to afifth of the national budget at times. Jokowireduced it from approximately Rp276 trillion to

Rp65 trillion, allowing him to divert these fundsto his infrastructure and social welfareprogrammes.

The 2019 Elections

In policy terms, both Jokowi and Prabowo arestanding on a similar platform of cleangovernment and the need to enhance legalcertainty in order to promote investment.Jokowi is hoping his ambitious social welfarepolicies and reforms will carry him to a secondterm, emphasising his record on job creationand poverty reduction. In order to furtherappeal to lower income voters, Jokowi has alsobeen touting the expansion of a card schemethat provides free food to the poor and needy.Prabowo too has been campaigning on apopulist platform of lower food and fuel pricesthat will likely revive fuel subsidies andthreaten Jokowi’s social welfare andinfrastructure programs. The opposition haspledged to cut business and individual incometaxes, increase the salaries of civil servants,doctors and police officers, and reduceagricultural imports to protect Indonesianfarmers. Prabowo has also attacked thegovernment’s economic management byhighlighting the falling rupiah, soaring publicdebt and widening trade deficit, which Prabowohas promised to reverse by boosting self-sufficiency in energy and food.

In response, Jokowi has postponed furtherplanned cuts to fuel subsidies. On October 11he signed off on an average 7% price increasefor diesel fuel only to cancel it just an hourlater after considering its effect on low-incomeearners and his own prospects for re-election.22 Introducing price freezes forelectricity and fuel prices until the end of 2019were among a set of policies aimed at curbinginflation as he seeks re-election and to sidestepattacks by the Prabowo camp on his economictrack record. This is despite the fact thatinflation is running at historically low levels by

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recent Indonesian standards (see graph below).

Inflation in Indonesia from February 2009to February 2019. Source: TradingE c o n o m i c s(https://tradingeconomics.com/indonesia/inflation-cpi)

Campaigning for the 2019 elections officiallybegan on 22 September across a l l ofIndonesia’s 34 provinces. Prior to that localelections were held on 27 June with more thanhalf of the electorate of 152 million registeredvoters tasked with choosing new leaders for 17provinces, 115 regencies and 39 cities. Withmore than half of Indonesia’s population, theisland of Java is viewed as the key electionbatt leground and results there wereencouraging for the President and his PDI-Pparty. In particular, West Java and Central Javaare key provinces for the 2019 presidentialelection, controlling nearly 40% of eligiblevotes and considered barometers of publicopinion. The results in West Java were mostclosely watched given that it is a conservativearea of 47 million and Indonesia’s mostpopulous province. As West Java also has thecountry’s second highest employment rate afterneighbouring Banten, and the highest totalnumber of unemployed, the result there is seenas a judgment on Jokowi ’s economicstewardship, especially since Prabowo won59.78 % of the province’s vote in the 2014presidential election. Since that stinging defeatJokowi has made considerable efforts to woo

West Java, especially since the province is amajor business center. These efforts includesignificant investment in new infrastructure forthe province and making impromptu visits toIslamic boarding schools in much the same wayhe used local markets to rally support in hissuccessful campaigns for the presidency andthe Jakarta governorship. West Java’sadjacency to Jakarta has also made it easy forJokowi to make more visits to the province thanany other since his election, more even than tohis home province of Central Java.

Jokowi’s camp scored an encouraging victory inWest Java when Ridwan Kamil, a University ofCalifornia Berkeley-educated architect won theprovincial governorship despite opposition fromIslamists who tried to smear him. Kamil, theformer mayor of Bandung, gained a reputationfor progressive governance while transformingIndonesia's third-largest city with more greenspaces , better publ ic transport andbureaucratic transparency. His gubernatorialcandidacy was supported by four parties in theruling coalition, namely NasDem, PKB, PPP andHanura, on a platform of replicating hisreforms in Bandung by transforming West Javainto a ‘smart province’. The outcomes in thenext three most populated provinces of EastJava, Central Java and North Sumatra, areregarded as other major indicators ofpresidential election outcomes. In Central JavaPDI-P candidate Ganjar Pranowo secured ahealthy victory and another Jokowi ally,Khofifah Indar Parawansa won East Java.However, in North Sumatra Jokowi’s PDI-Pcandidate Djarot Saiful Hidayat, a formergovernor of Jakarta, lost to local man EdyRahmayadi who was born in neighbouring Acehprovince. Despite their defeat, oppositioncandidates also fared far better than expectedin both Central and West Java, helped by theclose coordination between Prabowo’s Gerindraand the PKS, its parliamentary coalitionpartner, in their selection of gubernatorialcandidates. The 2018 local election resultscould be significant insofar as recently elected

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governors can help mobilise support forpresidential candidates. For example, thegovernors of West Java, West Sumatra andWest Nusa Tenggara, were thought to beinstrumental in winning those provinces forPrabowo during the 2014 presidentialelection.23

Meanwhile, Jokowi’s predecessor SBY hasendorsed Prabowo for 2019, and since leavingoff ice has had a somewhat turbulentrelationship with the Jokowi government. SBYhas accused it of tapping his phone whileJokowi’s PDI-P party responded by implicatingSBY in the July 1996 attack on its headquartersin Jakarta. Jokowi ruled out Agus Harimurti,SBY’s eldest son, as his running mate earlierthis year, and SBY responded by trying to getPrabowo to select Agus as his running mateinstead. However, that failed too, with theselection of Sandiaga Uno, the deputy governorof Jakarta, who was apparently Prabowo’s fifthchoice. Nevertheless, SBY has continued toverbally back his former military colleague.However, without his son on the ticket it isclear that SBY’s Democrats would focus on theconcurrent parliamentary elections, promptingthe Gerindra secretary general to accuse theformer president of not campaigning forPrabowo. Moreover, while in 2014 Prabowocould draw on significant financial resourcesfor his campaign, rumours persist that he nolonger has the same funding in place this time.Hence, Sandiaga Uno was able to secure hisselection as running mate by making a largecampaign donation. Meanwhile, during his timein office Jokowi has worked hard to constructand maintain a powerful coalition of largepolitical parties, enhancing his chances ofwinning a second term.

Prabowo (left) and running mate SandiagaUno during the first presidential debate.Photo: Dimas Ardian/Bloomberg

Nonetheless, a coalition of Gerindra and theDemocrats, the third and fourth biggest partiesin parliament respectively, should certainlybolster Prabowo’s challenge for the presidency.The Muslim PKS also has a well-developednationwide network, which helped organise themass rallies against the Jakarta governor of late2016 (see below), and which has now beentasked with mobilising support for Prabowo’spresidential campaign. Jokowi continues toenjoy high approval ratings and a lead overPrabowo. As in 2014, Jokowi has maintained aconsistent lead in opinion polls, and approvalratings of between 60% and 70%. However, hispredecessor SBY was averaging around 80% inapproval ratings prior to the 2009 elections inwhich SBY won a landslide, so a Jokowi victorycannot be taken for granted. This is especiallyso since Prabowo has built a reputation as astrong campaigner who will probably cut intoJokowi’s lead in opinion polls. A January surveygave Jokowi a lead of 53.2% to 34.1% forPrabowo, with 12.7% still undecided. Supportfor the President is strongest among 18 to 24year olds, the largest demographic of eligiblevoters, although the 2014 elections werecharacterised by a relatively low turnoutamong young voters.24

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The Islamist Influence

The 2104 elections were marred by religioustensions and political smears, and identity-based campaigning is once again taking centrestage, to an even greater extent thanpreviously. The increasing role of Islam inIndonesian politics was highlighted by theouster and imprisonment of Jokowi’s friend andformer deputy governor of Jakarta, governorBasuki Tjahaja Purnama, popularly known asAhok, a Christian of Chinese descent. Afterbecoming governor in 2014 when Jokowi waselected president, Ahok was seeking re-electionin his own right when extreme Islamist groupsaccused him of blaspheming Islam during acampaign appearance in September 2016. Thisaccusation culminated in mass rallies againsthim and tenuous criminal charges. He wassentenced to two years in prison for blasphemyin May 2017.

Since Jokowi himself stands for moderate Islamand a pluralist Indonesia, the same hardlineIslamic leaders who brought down Ahok havealso publicly demanded the president’sresignation. To deflect such opposition Jokowichose conservative Muslim cleric Ma’ruf Amin,the long-serving chairman of the IndonesianUlema Council (MUI) and president of the NU,as his vice presidential candidate for the 2019campaign. This surprising decision indicatesthe extent to which the administration fears theIslamist influence for Ma’ruf has been centralto the recent erosion of religious freedoms inIndonesia. Under his stewardship, the MUI hasdenounced minority groups and Ma’ruf alsoplayed a key role in convicting Ahok afterdeclaring that Ahok had blasphemedIslam.25 Indeed, Ma’ruf was not Jokowi’s firstchoice but was apparently chosen to placateGolkar, PPP and PKB, who threatened to leavethe ruling coalition if other candidates wereselected. At the same time, Jokowi wanted toavoid choosing a party political figure from the

six coalition parties lest it provoke charges offavouring a particular party.26

Jokowi (left) and running mate Ma’rufAmin during the first presidential debate.Photo: Dimas Ardian/Bloomberg

Thanks to his nomination of its leader as hisrunning mate, Jokowi has won the support ofmany of NU’s claimed 40 million members, theworld’s largest non-governmental Islamicorganisation. Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’ssecond largest Islamic organisation with aclaimed 29 million members, largely supportsPrabowo. The major difference between the NUand Muhammadiyah relates to their attitudetowards the syncretic elements of traditionalbeliefs. NU promotes an interpretation of Islamthat combines other cultural and religioustraditions that predated the arrival of Islam inIndonesia, whereas Muhammadiyah representsa brand of Islam much closer to that of theArabian Peninsula. In general, the NUheartland is rural Java where many forms ofsyncretism still exist while Muhammadiyahmembers tend to belong to the urban middleclass. The NU and Muhammadiyah have had along-standing rivalry, and both Islamicorganisations have affiliated political parties. Inthe case of NU it is the PKB, a member of therul ing coal i t ion s ince 2014, and forMuhammadiyah it is PAN, likewise a member ofPrabowo’s coalition since 2014. Indeed,

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Muhammadiyah’s former leader, and Reformasiicon, Amien Rais has been a prominent critic ofJokowi from even before the 2014 presidentialelection campaign.

Jokowi’s decision to choose a high-profileMuslim cleric as his running mate has alteredthe campaign of the rival Prabowo camp.Instead of attacking Jokowi’s religiouscredentials, as in 2014, the opposition isinstead focusing on Jokowi’s economic trackrecord. Despite Ma’ruf’s nomination, Jokowistill represents a more moderate Islam thanPrabowo although the President hasdisappointed many of his supporters whoexpected him to stand up for greater religioustolerance and pluralism during his first term.Indeed, pandering to conservative Islam is arisky strategy by Jokowi that may furtherconsolidate Islam within the politicalmainstream while alienating liberal voters.Prabowo’s candidacy is supported by hardlineIslamic interests who support the introductionof Islamic law in Indonesia. Prabowo won justfive of Indonesia’s 34 provinces in the 2014elections. However, West Java, Banten, WestSumatra, West Nusa Tenggara and Gorantaloare among the most conservatively Muslim andthe first two, are also among the mostpopulous. Indeed, the aforementioned victoryin North Sumatra was among several successesfor conservative Muslim interests in last June’sregional elections. Jokowi’s candidate DjarotSaiful Hidayat, a former Jakarta deputygovernor to Ahok, was defeated in the race forthe North Sumatra governorship by a smearcampaign similar to that which brought downhis former boss.

The Indonesian Constitution provides forreligious freedom but only six religions areformally allowed to exist - Islam, Protestantism,Roman Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism andConfucianism - all of which have long standingcommunities of adherents within thearchipelago. However, a public opinion pollconducted by the Indonesian Survey Circle

(LSI) across all 34 provinces between 28 Juneand 5 July 2018 revealed that 13.2% of Muslimssupported converting Indonesia into an Islamicstate, up from 4.6% in 2005.27 None of themainstream Islamic organisations and politicalparties currently agitate for this change,although the PKS did previously stand forconverting Indonesia into an Islamic state andhas vocally supported the implementation oflocal sharia by-laws on a piecemeal basis.

Indeed, Buehler and Muhtada (2016) found thatfrom 1998 to 2013 some 422 by-laws andregulations based on sharia had beenpromulgated across Indonesia, with an increaseafter 2005.28 These by-laws were enacted bypoliticians at provincial, regency and municipallevels, and it appears that their support forsuch by-laws was driven more by politicalexpedience than religious zeal. Governmentheads from both secular and Islamic partiesadopted these regulations, with 68% beingimplemented during their first term in office.As local government heads are limited to onlytwo terms in office, this suggests that manylocal politicians lose interest in sharia by-lawswhen they no longer have to compete for re-election.29 In this way the introduction ofcompetitive local elections in Indonesia has ledto new openings for Islamic activists to wieldinfluence as local politicians look for new waysto mobilise support. Aside from Aceh, the onlyprovince allowed to implement Islamic lawprovincewide due to its peace agreement withthe central government, most sharia by-lawshave been issued in the predominantly Muslimprovinces of West Sumatra, West Java, EastJava, South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi.

Local sharia by-laws usually only apply toMuslims, and often prohibit them fromgambling and consuming alcohol.30 Many shariaby-laws also relate to Ramadan, particularlythose prohibiting the sale of food and drinkduring the day when Muslims are supposed tofast between dawn and dusk for one month.Some of these by-laws also require Muslim

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women to wear headscarves when receivinglocal government services, and others dictatethat reading the Quran in Arabic is necessaryfor Muslim politicians, civil servants, couplesregistering their marriage and students seekingentrance to university.

The traditionally liberal NU, still Indonesia’slargest Muslim organisation, admits that it haslost a lot of ground to hardline Islamists sinceits former leader Wahid was President(1999-2001).31 In particular, the party has beenslow to react to the rise of social media, whichhas been expertly mobilised by smaller andmore nimble radical Islamists. In addition,Saudi Arabia has invested billions of dollars inbuilding mosques in Indonesia, and elsewherein the region, to spread its own brand of Islam,adding to the perception that tolerant andliberal Islam is under retreat.

Conclusion

2018 was the 20th anniversary of Reformasi, thepeople-power movement that overthrew theSuharto dictatorship and transformedIndonesia into the world’s third largestdemocracy. The country has since madeconsiderable progress in democraticconsolidation, most notably in the removal ofthe military from politics, a blossoming of civilsociety, an opening up of media space and theexpansion of political parties. Freedom Houseranks Indonesia as the freest country inASEAN, although it is still only considered‘party free’ due to the lack of protections forminorities and an opaque legal system thateven brought down the popular governor ofJakarta. Although such issues continue to castdoubt on the quality of Indonesia’s democracy,a relatively high voter turnout, a plethora ofpolitical parties and direct presidentialelections are all cause for cautious optimism.Under direct Presidential elections first held in2004 voting trends have gradually shifted awayfrom dominance by established parties towards

a greater emphasis on individual candidates.The incumbent President is the first to comefrom outside of Indonesia’s political elite.Jokowi’s meteoric rise owes much to hisreputation as a task-focused, practical leaderwho overcame humble beginnings.

However, Indonesia is also the world’s mostpopulous Muslim country and in the 2014elections the conservative Islamic vote largelysided with his opponent Prabowo, who is againseeking the highest office in 2019. Withcampaigning already underway prior to theApril presidential and parliamentary electionsJokowi has been targeting a greater share ofthe Islamic vote by touring the conservativeIslamic strongholds he lost to Prabowo in 2014.Jokowi has also chosen conservative clericMa’ruf Amin as his running mate, in order toappeal to an increasingly assertive Islamistconstituency. Ma’ruf is also widely seen as aclean candidate who will not sully Jokowi’sunblemished reputation. Nevertheless, Jokowihas taken a calculated risk by cozying up toconservative Islamic elements that couldpotentially alienate his support base ofprogressive voters. Even though the post ofVice President in Indonesia is not a particularlypowerful one in itself, there is always thepossibility that the deputy could assume thepresidency, as happened in 2001 when VicePresident Megawati replaced AbdurrahmanWahid.

Since the 2014 election campaign Jokowi’smessage has consistently been one of economicgrowth, transparent government and moderateIslam, centred around improved infrastructureand social welfare. He has delivered someambitious reforms in expanding access toeducation and moving towards universal healthcoverage by slashing fuel subsidies, a cut longavoided by his predecessors as too politicallyrisky. However, by re-introducing pricecontrols for electricity and fuels, the Presidentseems determined to prevent Prabowoattacking his record on the economy. While

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J o k o w i h a s r e d u c e d p o v e r t y a n dunemployment, kept inflation down and giventhe poor greater access to healthcare andeducation, he has failed to deliver on hispromise of 7% annual GDP growth. As such, hefeels vulnerable to attacks by the oppositionand is taking defensive measures to burnish hisIslamic credentials, solidify his ruling coalitionand delay measures that could increase thecost of living.

For his part, Prabowo has so far run a relativelysubdued campaign compared to 2014 when heused smear tactics to dramatically close thegap to Jokowi in the final run up to thepresidential election. Rather than focus onJokowi’s religious credentials this time he hasattacked his rival’s economic track record.

Nonetheless, Prabowo has built a reputation asa strong campaigner so it is expected he willcut into Jokowi’s lead in opinion polls. Indeed,while Jokowi still enjoys a healthy advantage,some recent polls indicate Prabowo may benarrowing the gap. Like Donald Trump in theUnited States, Prabowo is standing as aneconomic nationalist and strong man, and isquietly confident that slower economic growthunder Jokowi will help him win this time.

Related Issues

David Adam Stott, Indonesia's Elections of2014: Democratic Consolidation or Reversal?(https://apjjf.org/2014/12/10/David-Adam-Stott/4087/article.html)

David Adam Stott is an associate professor at the University of Kitakyushu, Japan and anAsia-Pacific Journal contributing editor. His work centers on the political economy of conflictin Southeast Asia, Japan's relations with the region, and natural resource issues in the Asia-Pacific.

Notes1 Freedom House (http://www.freedomhouse.org) publishes an annual Freedom in the World(https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019/map) report, whichassesses the level of political freedoms and civil liberties in each country and assigns them ascore out of 100. For 2019 Indonesia scored 62, ahead of the Philippines at 61 and Malaysiaat 52 but behind East Timor which scored 70. Only Norway, Sweden and Finland scored aperfect 100.2 See Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2019(https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019/map).3 See The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index(https://infographics.economist.com/2018/DemocracyIndex/).4 Vedi R. Hadiz (2017), “Indonesia’s year of democratic setbacks: towards a new phase ofdeepening illiberalism?” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 53(3): 261-2785 International Monetary Fund (2012), Indonesia: Staff Report for the 2012 Article IVConsultation6 Marcus Mietzner, ‘Jokowi: Rise of a Polite Populist’, Inside Indonesia 116: Apr-Jun 2014(http://www.insideindonesia.org/jokowi-rise-of-a-polite-populist)

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7 See the Corruption Perceptions Index of 2013. (http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/)8 Diego Fossati & Eve Warburton, “Indonesia's Political Parties and Minorities”, ISEAS -YusofIshak Institute Perspective, 9 July 2018(https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2018_37@50.pdf)9 Marcus Mietzner (2012), “Ideology, Money and Dynastic Leadership: The IndonesianDemocratic Party of Struggle, 1998–2012”. South East Asia Research 20(4): 511–531.10 Figures from the 2010 census. Indonesian law requires that all citizens hold an identity cardthat identifies the holder as an adherent of one of six officially recognised religions - Islam,Protestant Christianity, Catholic Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism.11 Fossati & Warburton, 2018. The PPP, the other Islamic member of the ruling coalition, doesbelieve it exists however.(https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2018_37@50.pdf)12 Fossati & Warburton, 2018.(https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2018_37@50.pdf)13 Data from the Indonesian Election Commission (KPU) (http://www.kpu.go.id/index.php).14 Mietzner, 2014. (http://www.insideindonesia.org/jokowi-rise-of-a-polite-populist)15 Mietzner, 2014. (http://www.insideindonesia.org/jokowi-rise-of-a-polite-populist)16 Marcus Mietzner (2016), “The Sukarno dynasty in Indonesia: Between institutionalisation,ideological continuity and crises of succession”. South East Asia Research 24(3): 355–36817 Mietzner, 2014. (http://www.insideindonesia.org/jokowi-rise-of-a-polite-populist)18 Mietzner, 2014. (http://www.insideindonesia.org/jokowi-rise-of-a-polite-populist)19 He was accused of being a Christian of Chinese descent, rather than a Javanese Muslim,and was said to have links to Indonesia’s banned Communist Party.20 Indonesia-Investments, “S&P Affirms Indonesia's Sovereign Credit Rating at BBB-/Stable”,5 June 2018(https://www.indonesia-investments.com/finance/financial-columns/s-p-affirms-indonesia-s-sovereign-credit-rating-at-bbb-stable/item8826)21 Antara News, “Indonesia Enters High Human Development Category: President”, Tempo.co,16 August 2018(https://en.tempo.co/read/news/2018/08/16/055920873/Indonesia-Enters-High-Human-Development-Category-President)22 A similar 7% price increase for high-octane fuels used by higher income car-owners,announced at the same time, was not cancelled, however.23 Deasy Simandjuntak “The 2018 Indonesian Local Elections Results: 'Rehearsal' for PartyMachinery and Mobilization of Identity-Politics”, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 6 July 2018(https://www.iseas.edu.sg/medias/commentaries/item/7898-the-2018-indonesian-local-elections-results-rehearsal-for-party-machinery-and-mobilization-of-identitypolitics-by-deasy-simandjuntak)24 FT Confidential Research, “Indonesia's president unscathed by currency woes”, NikkeiAsian Review, 31 October, 2018(https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/FT-Confidential-Research/Indonesia-s-president-unscathed-by-currency-woes)25 Saskia Schäfer (2017), “Ahmadis or Indonesians? The polarization of post-reform publicdebates on Islam and orthodoxy”. Critical Asian Studies 50 (1):1-21

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26 John McBeth, “Turning to Religion: Indonesia’s Widodo Plays the Islamic Card”, GlobalAsia, 21 September 2018(https://www.globalasia.org/v13no3/cover/turning-to-religion-indonesias-widodo-plays-the-islamic-card_john-mcbeth)27 Faiq Hidayat, “Survei LSI: Pro-Pancasila Turun 10%, Pro-NKRI Bersyariah Naik9%”, detikNews, 17 July 2018(https://news.detik.com/berita/4119173/survei-lsi-pro-pancasila-turun-10-pro-nkri-bersyariah-naik-9)28 Michael Buehler & Dani Muhtada (2016), “Democratization and the Diffusion of Shari’aLaw: Comparative Insights from Indonesia.” South East Asia Research, 24(2): 261-28229 Buehler & Muhtada (2016).30 In 2014, authorities in Aceh province began fully enforcing sharia on everyone, includingnon-Muslims.31 Krithika Varagur, “Indonesia’s Moderate Islam is Slowly Crumbling”, Foreign Policy, 14February 2017(https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/14/indonesias-moderate-islam-is-slowly-crumbling/)