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Indo-French Strategic Partnership - A Nouveau Eurasian Engagement

Indo-French Strategic Partnership - A Nouveau Eurasian Engagement?

Table of Contents

Executive Summary ........................................................... 1

Indo-French economic and strategic cooperation:

Engaging Europe bilaterally? .......................................... 2

Defence cooperation: A roadblock or gateway to

diversification of the Strategic Partnership? ............. 5

Conclusion ............................................................................ 8


Executive Summary The world is at a momentous period in creating history, when a likely trade war initiated

by one of the most capital-intensive economies has integrated the world against the US.

While the European Union and China have vowed to retaliate by imposing tariffs on

American-made goods, these developments especially underline the significance of

bilateral and multilateral relations between promising economies, thus facilitating a

global order exclusive of the US’ protectionist influence. The state-visit by French

President Emmanuel Macron to India between March 9-12 is a step in this direction. The

most important question with regard to this engagement is how two completely

different personalities such as that of Emmanuel Macron and Indian PM Narendra Modi

work through a strategic partnership that has the potential to exemplify an all-weather

alliance.

The visit by President Macron will highlight the three sectors of cooperation that have

been the cornerstone of Indo-French strategic partnership over the years. Nuclear

Cooperation, Space Cooperation and Defence Cooperation have been initiatives that

have guided the economics of the bilateral relationship between the two countries. At a

time of American protectionism, Chinese economic imperialism and the emergence of

Macron’s charismatic leadership as a representation of EU’s liberal victory over

nationalism, engagement with India assumes particular relevance.

China is contemporarily perceived to be engaging with India’s allies in the Indian Ocean

Region (IOR), for instance the Maldives and Sri Lanka, thus in a sense alienating New

Delhi to undermine the latter’s perceived ambitions to be a regional power. At such a

time, engaging with an European partner with a significant footprint both in the Indian

Ocean Region as well as Africa is likely to seat India in a power position that has the

potential to shape regional geopolitics with India as a pivotal and indispensable partner.

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Indo-French economic and strategic cooperation: engaging Europe bilaterally? India’s aim to participate in the Quadrilateral initiative with the US, Japan and Australia

as a counter-strategy to the regional influence of Beijing as well as its increasing naval

prowess particularly underlines the relevance of other alternate geopolitical strategies

such as a bilateral initiative between two relevant Democracies. Engaging with an

European power that might want to undercut the overt embrace between China and

Russia at this time only adds emphasis to the likely interest from Paris for alliance-

building. With Angela Merkel no longer commanding the power position as the Queen

of Europe, the investment banker-turned president likely has aims to claim the

European mantle for himself and propping up his bilateral engagements with successful

Democracies such as that of India will only add value to his foreign policy vision.

In 2017, when US President Donald Trump ordered the withdrawal of the country from

the 2015 Paris Climate Accords, India reaffirmed its commitment to fight climate

change, thus positively positioning itself by responding to a call by the French President

to aim toward sustainable development. The participation of President Macron in a

solar power summit as well as his inauguration of a solar power plant in Uttar Pradesh is

the genesis of an Indo-French initiative that would set the stage for a unique multilateral

initiative promoting global sustainable development. Apart from this initiative, Paris’

pledge to contribute toward the development of civilian nuclear energy with India by

building European Pressurised nuclear reactors in India is indicative of Paris’

commitment to engage effectively by contributing toward the country’s comprehensive

development.

At the same time, India’s historical ties with Africa and France’s deep engagement in the

continent is likely to be a common ground for building a mutually beneficial partnership

that will facilitate the region’s development and counter Beijing’s perceived debt-trap

as a precondition for economic assistance. The French naval bases in Djibouti, Abu

Dhabi and Reunion Islands, coupled with India’s engagement with Seychelles, Mauritius

and a number of other regional islands, also point toward the need and likely attempt at

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intensive maritime cooperation. Such cooperation is also liable to be perceived as a

mechanism that would stem Beijing’s naval expansion in the Indian Ocean Region.

Taken together, with India likely being seen as a significant partner for democratic

countries to stem Beijing’s perceived imperial ambitions in the world, a thrust from a

significant EU partner is a likely to be relevant shot in the arm for New Delhi. On the

other hand, at a time when Macron wants to position himself and France as EU’s key

player, engagement with an emerging and promising Democracy in the Asia-Pacific is

likely to add to Macron’s image as a young visionary.

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French President Macron and Indian PM Modi at the inaugural International Solar Alliance Conference

Indo-French Strategic Partnership - A Nouveau Eurasian Engagement? 4

Location of major French installations across India

Source: Embassy of France, New Delhi, India


Defence cooperation: A roadblock or Gateway to diversification of the Strategic Partnership?

While France continues to be a major arms supplier to India apart from bilateral

cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism and cyber security being the new vista

under consideration, a review of the existing defence cooperation presents a different

story. Open source data clearly indicates that the US and Israel have surpassed France

as the second and third largest defence exporters, respectively, over the preceding

years. With India’s defence budget continuing to be one of the largest in the world and

with a French share of 2.42 percent and India constituting roughly 5.15 percent of the

total French defence exports between 2012-16, the financial stakes involved for both

the countries remain significant. However, a trend analysis of the latest defence deals

between the two countries and past precedent underlines the continued challenges

faced by both the countries in the form of a relationship between the buyer and seller.

Issues of cost escalation and the absence of a definite strategy to fulfill time

commitments, thus delaying product delivery has been a bone of contention between

the two countries in the defense cooperation sector. Put together, these aspects are

indicative of the pervasive problems in defence trade between India and France.

Another example of sustained impediments in defense cooperation can be well-

understood through the case study of rejecting the initially-agreed upon 126 multirole

aircraft contracts by India, which was awarded to French aviation giant Dassault for its

Rafale jets. Finally, the deal was downsized to buying 36 aircrafts in fly away conditions

from France. The value of this revised deal continues to remain classified at the time of

writing, citing security and strategic concerns from the Indian government.

The subsequent delays in development and induction of the Scorpene submarines in the

Indian Navy also is an interesting case in point which is indicative of the continued

technological, administrative and logistical difficulties faced by the two strategic

partners in further bolstering their defence cooperation.

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In addition to this, the signing of the bilateral Logistic Exchange of Memorandum of

Agreement (LEMOA), which would enable Indian warships to seek logistical assistance

through French naval bases in the region, the actual potential for this remains limited.

Furthermore, the larger perception is regarding the LEMOA being part of the broader

Indian strategy to counter the increasing Chinese naval presence in the region. A review

of the defence market presents a different picture, however. In terms of defence trade

alone, China comprises roughly 14.72 percent of the overall French defence exports,

and France comprises roughly 10.98 percent of the overall Chinese defence imports.

Keeping the purely economic parameters in mind, it thus remains clear that there are

limits to Paris’ moves that may seem to antagonize Beijing and its interest in the IOR.

This may in the long run have a direct impact on defence trade in general and trade and

commerce in particular, wherein China surpasses India by a large margin.

That being said, with India continuing to invest significant political capital in its strategic

partnership with Russia, US and Israel at the moment, engaging Paris on the defense

front may be seen as merely an alternative to mitigate the impact of a potentially

growing China-Russia cooperation. Keeping that in mind, coupled with the relatively

better performance of the aforementioned countries in surmounting the complex maze

of procedures and channels with regard to Indian defence procurement, it remains likely

that the French share in the total defence pie is likely to remain limited in the short-to

medium-term.

That being said, the strategic partnership, in general, and bilateral relation, in particular,

remains unlikely to be significantly hampered in the long run. Instead, this loss in

defence share may result in further diversification of cooperation in other areas beyond

the existing defence, space cooperation and nuclear technology such as sustainable

development technologies as has been witnessed with the international solar summit

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Indo-French Strategic Partnership - A Nouveau Eurasian Engagement? 7


Conclusion

Keeping in mind the aforementioned factors, a probable strategic relationship between

the two nations that have the leadership potential to channelize a multilateral power

structure underscores the significance of the contemporary strategic partnership for

crystallizing a future international order. Additionally, engagement between one of the

experienced politicians in the world and a charismatic European leader would also

exemplify the ability of two world leaders to find similarities in differences to ensure

international cooperation. This is likely to be a reassuring signal for sustainable

development, economic progress and to prevent violent strife.

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Indo-French Strategic Partnership - A Nouveau Eurasian ...grid91.com/pdf/reports/Indo_French_Strategic_Partnership.pdf · Indo-French Strategic Partnership - A Nouveau Eurasian Engagement?