India in the Liberal Order

8/13/2019 India in the Liberal Order

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Summary: A host of attributes

should make India a staunch

supporter of a global, liberal

order. Yet since the days of its

rst prime minister, the country

has been ambivalent about

support for liberal/democratic

principles and institutions

abroad. This paper will briey

review well-known features

of India’s post-independence

historical record on the liberal

order. It will examine the under-

lying reasons that explain the

positions the country adopted,

focus on the incremental policy

shifts at the Cold War’s end, and

then discuss the country’s likely

support for such issues in the

future.

India in the Liberal Order

by Sumit Ganguly

November 2013

Analysis

Introduction

A host o attributes should make Indiaa staunch supporter o a global, liberalorder. Despite seemingly insurmount-able odds, it made a swif transitionto democracy rom the detritus o theBritish colonial empire in South Asia.1 India was also an early supporter othe United Nations Universal Declara-tion o Human Rights.2 At home, itadopted a largely liberal/democraticconstitution in 1950 and, aside rom abrie interregnum o authoritarian rule

(1976-1977), it has not only managedto sustain democracy, it has alsodeepened and broadened its scope,though its record is hardly unblem-ished.3 Yet since the days o its firstprime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, thecountry has been ambivalent aboutsupport or liberal/democratic prin-ciples and institutions abroad.

Afer the Cold War, India’s policy-makers have conronted a unda-

mental tension: on one hand, theyfind themselves saddled with a colo-1 On the sources of India’s successful transition to

democracy, see Maya Tudor, The Promise of Power

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

2 Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of

Empire and the Ideological origins of the United Nations

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

3 For various assessments, see Sumit Ganguly, Larry

Diamond, and Marc Plattner, eds. The State of India’s

Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,

2007).

nial legacy that still calls or a robust

deense o the principle o sovereignty.On the other, as a constitutionallyliberal democratic state, some withinits political leadership believe that theycan ill-afford to remain oblivious torepression and the rampant violationo human rights abroad.4 Accordingly,as India’s material capabilities growand its leadership becomes more confi-dent about its domestic circumstances,it may well shed its long-held reserva-tions about any possible diminution o

the principle o sovereignty.5

Tis paper will briefly review well-known eatures o India’s post-inde-pendence historical record. It willexamine the underlying reasons thatexplain the positions the countryadopted, ocus on the incrementalpolicy shifs at the Cold War’s end,and then discuss the country’s likelysupport or such issues in the uture.

India in the Post-Colonial EraIn the immediate afermath o inde-pendence, Nehru emerged primus inter

pares when it came to matters o India’soreign and deense policies. Few

4 I am indebted to my student, Jason Grant Stone, for

highlighting this tension.

5 For a useful discussion, see C. Raja Mohan, “Balancing

Interests and Values: India’s Struggle with Democracy

Promotion,” The Washington Quarterly , Summer 2007,

30:3, pp.99-115.



2

Analysis

within the nationalist movement had had much exposure

to international affairs and so his dominance o the oreignpolicy process was all but inevitable. As is well known,he was one o the principal architects o the non-alignedmovement (NAM). Since the vast majority o the leader-ship o the NAM and its membership had emerged rom theshadow o colonial rule, they quickly enshrined the prin-ciple o non-intererence in the internal affairs o states in itscharter. Teir motivations were entirely understandable; asstates that had just shed the yoke o colonial rule, they werekeen to jealously guard their nascent sovereignty. More tothe point, given that both the United States and the SovietUnion were not reticent about intervening abroad to bolster

and secure their interests, the adoption o this unyieldingstance on the issue o sovereignty was quite understandable.

Yet, it needs to be underscored that India’s oppositionto oreign intervention in the domestic affairs o stateswas ar rom consistent. It was an early critic o the U.S.involvement in Vietnam but had chosen to exerciseconsiderable restraint when the Soviet Union ruthlesslysuppressed the Hungarian uprising in 1956. In consider-able part, this inconsistency could be traced to Nehru’s ownpolitical belies. As his voluminous writings both beoreand afer India’s independence reveal, despite his unwav-

ering commitment to liberal democracy at home, he haddistinctly socialist leanings, which led him to exculpate theshortcomings o the Soviet bloc.

Tat said, Nehru was also passionately committed to thedevelopment o multilateral institutions and their possiblerole in the preservation o world peace. o that end, Indiabecame an early advocate and supporter o United Nationspeacekeeping operations. Indeed, it was one o the prin-cipal contributors to the United Nations peacekeepingoperations in the Congo6 and subsequently in the UnitedNations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Gaza Strip.7 Its

policymakers elt at ease with UN peacekeeping endeavorsbecause these required the explicit consent o memberstates.8 Tis Indian tradition o involvement with andsupport or peacekeeping continues today. However, Indianpolicymakers remain adamantly opposed to transorming

6 Rajeshwar Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjold: The Congo Crisis (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1976).

7 Major-General Indar Jit Rikhye, Trumpets and Tumults: The Memoirs of a Peacekeeper

(New Delhi: Manohar, 2002).

8 Rohan Mukherjee and David M Malone, “Global Responsibilities: India’s Approach,”

Jindal Journal of International Affairs, 1:1, October 2011, 182-203.

a peacekeeping operation into a peace enorcement effort

without suitable UN authorization.9

Tough India continued to uphold the principle o sover-eignty when its vital interests were at stake or when deephistorical legacies were implicated, it did not hesitate todeviate rom its adherence to this norm. Tree episodesclearly illustrate the country’s willingness to depart rom theproessed commitment to the standard.

Te first, o course, was India’s decision to intervene in thecivil war that enguled East Pakistan in 1971, leading tothe flight o nearly 10 million reugees into India. ToughIndia’s policymakers couched the intervention in the

language o humanitarian intervention, or all practicalpurposes, it resorted to orce to break up Pakistan — itslong-standing adversary. In effect, the ideational languagenotwithstanding, straightorward realist concerns animatedIndia’s choices and actions.10

Te second involved India’s decision to support the Viet-namese invasion o Cambodia to unseat the genocidal PolPot regime in January 1979. Not only did India reuse the join the chorus o global condemnation but actually wenton to recognize the new regime o Heng Samrin. Onceagain, India’s decision to ignore the expectations o sover-

eignty stemmed rom straightorward strategic concerns.It was politically close to the Soviet Union, it has excel-lent relations with Vietnam, and had ew ties worth thename with the Association o South East Asian States.11 Consequently, it was unlikely to pay substantial costs oradopting a avorable stance toward Vietnam. Furthermore,since it did lead to the ouster o an utterly squalid andbrutal regime, it could again cast its decision in the light oupholding undamental humanitarian concerns.

Te third occasion occurred in 1987 and involved itsrelations with Sri Lanka. Faced with growing domestic

discontent in its southern state o amil Nadu aboutthe maltreatment o the amil minority in Sri Lanka

9 For a discussion of the evolution of the India’s views on UN peacekeeping, see Richard

Gowan and Sushant K. Singh, “India and UN Peacekeeping: The Weight of History and the

Lack of a Strategy,” in Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, and Bruce Jones

eds. Shaping the Emerging World: India and the Multilateral Order (Washington, DC:

Brookings Institution Press, 2013).

10 For a detailed discussion, see Sumit Ganguly, Conict Unending: India-Pakistan

Tensions Since 1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).

11 Mohammed Ayoob, India and Southeast Asia: Indian Perceptions and Policies (London

Routledge, 1990).



3

Analysis

and the dire conditions o beleaguered amils in the Sri

Lankan province o Jaffna, Indian Air Force (IAF) aircrafairdropped humanitarian assistance in key areas in SriLanka. Tese actions, though justifiable on humanitariangrounds, clearly violated Sri Lanka’s sovereignty. Onceagain, the imperatives o domestic politics coupled withIndia’s dominant position in the region led it to undertake amission that showed scant regard or the proessed commit-ment to the preservation o absolute state sovereignty.12

In addition to these three episodes, throughout the ColdWar, India was an early and consistent critic o the apart-heid regime in South Arica and had not evinced any

qualms about its efforts to bring about its end. wo actorsexplain India’s unremitting hostility toward the regime, itswillingness to impose multilateral sanctions, and also workin concert with the Arican National Congress (ANC),thereby intervening in the internal affairs o a sovereignstate. First, one o key the members o Indian nationalistpantheon, Mohandas Gandhi, had opposed all orms oracial discrimination in South Arica as his career as alawyer had evolved. Second, its policymakers had also seenthe dismantling o the apartheid regime in the country as anintegral part o the anti-colonial enterprise.13

Indeed Indian policymakers and public intellectuals couldreasonably argue that the United States and the Westernworld, despite a proessed commitment to the spread odemocracy, were comortable in their support or the scro-ulous apartheid regime, thereby demonstrating the limits otheir adherence to the principle o democracy promotion.Furthermore, the U.S. role in the overthrow o the elected,democratic regime o Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973,also gave Indian policymakers considerable pause about thestated U.S. commitment to global democracy.

The Cold War’s End and the Demands of a New Era

Te Cold War’s end came as a substantial shock to India’spolicymakers and required a dramatic re-appraisal o India’soreign policy nostrums.14 In the afermath o Nehru’s12 For a detailed discussion of this episode, see Sankaran Krishna, Postcolonial Inse-

curities: India, Sri Lanka and the Question of Nationhood (Minneapolis: University of

Minnesota Press, 1999).

13 David Black, “The Long and Winding Road: International Norms and Domestic Political

Change in South Africa,” in Thomas Risse-Kappen, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink,

eds. The Power of Human Rights; International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1999).

14 Sumit Ganguly, “India’s Foreign Policy Grows Up,” World Policy Journal, Volume XX, No

4, Winter 2003/04

death, his successors, most notably Indira Gandhi, while

maintaining the ideational rhetoric that had characterizedIndia’s oreign policy, increasingly adopted a more prag-matic approach. Te ideational rhetoric highlighted India’sconcerns about the lack o progress toward universal globaldisarmament, toward addressing North-South inequities inthe international order, and on the appropriate responsibili-ties o the industrialized and non-industrialized world onmatters pertaining to environmental degradation.

With the Cold War’s end and the concomitant collapse othe Soviet Union, India’s policymakers were not slow torecognize that the principal successor state, Russia, was

either unwilling or unable to play a similar strategic role inIndia’s security calculus. With this bulwark gone, India hadto recalibrate its ties with the sole surviving superpower,the United States, and also find ways to ashion a workingrelationship with its principal long-term adversary, thePeople’s Republic o China (PRC). Simultaneously, they alsorecognized that key global norms were likely to shif, andthat India would have to find ways to ashion appropriateresponses to these developments.

India conronted a number o emergent issues that effec-tively discredited its hitherto ideological vision o globalorder. With the United States now in a transcendent posi-tion in the global arena, no longer conronting the weighto Soviet power, it could act with impunity and also propa-gate values consonant with its interests. Te first suchconundrum that India conronted emerged during SaddamHussein’s invasion o Kuwait in 1990. India’s reaction tothe invasion was muddled. On one hand, it had had goodrelations with Hussein’s Iraq or two compelling reasons.First, it was a secular i highly repressive regime. For India’spolicymakers, especially afer the steady erosion o theidealism that had characterized the Nehru era, a secularArab regime, however authoritarian, was preerable to one

that was religiously oriented. Second, India also relied onIraq or a significant portion o its energy needs and hadsubstantial guest workers within the country.15 Under thesecircumstances, the country could ill-afford to take a partic-ularly robust stand against Hussein’s invasion o Kuwait.Accordingly, despite vigorous internal debate in the countryIndia’s minister o external affairs, Inder Kumar Gujral,

15 Mukund Narvenkar, “Looking West: 1: Iran and the Gulf,” in David Scott ed. The

Routledge handbook of India’s International Relations (London: Routledge, 2011),

pp.167-178.



4

Analysis

went to Baghdad as a representative o the Non-Aligned

Movement (NAM) to seek a possible diplomatic resolutiono the crisis. His efforts, as is well known, accomplishedlittle.16

However, with a change o regime later in the year, the weakcoalition regime o Prime Minister Chandra Sekhar quietlyallowed the reueling o U.S. military aircraf in Bombay,thereby tacitly signaling India’s willingness to endorsethe Western view o the invasion. But once the reuelingbecame public knowledge, it became simply untenable orthe government to allow it to continue. Te inability o thegovernment to cope with hostile, lef-wing domestic pres-

sures revealed that the country had yet to orge a consensusabout how it intended to ashion a new grand strategy in a vastly altered global landscape.17

Dealing with Emergent Global Norms

In the afermath o the first Gul War, India’s policymakersconcluded that they could ill-afford to simply all back onthe nostrums that had guided India’s oreign policy duringthe Cold War. As a consequence, a vigorous domesticdebate ensued. Some within the policymaking establish-ment insisted that India should not abandon its historiccommitment to non-alignment and but should inuse it

with new meaning.18

Others, however, suggested a morepragmatic approach to the global order and also made clearthat non-alignment was now beref o meaning.19

Even as this debate was under way, policymakers conronteda key issue, namely the willingness o the internationalcommunity, and particularly the United States, now reedrom the constraints o dealing with Soviet expansionism,to orthrightly upbraid states on questions o human rights violations. In this context, despite constitutionally robustguarantees or saeguarding human rights, India’s recordwas ar rom exemplary. Its record was especially at ques-

tion as an indigenous, secessionist insurgency erupted in1989 in the portion o the disputed state o Kashmir that it

16 Barbara Crossette, “Confrontation in the Gulf; India, Shaken by Iraqi Move, Seeks a

Role for the Nonaligned,” The New York Times, September 10, 1990.

17 J.K. Baral and J.N. Mahanty, “India and the Gulf Crisis: The Response of a Minority

Government,” Pacic Affairs, Autumn 1992, 65:3, 368-384.

18 See for example, S.D. Muni, “India and the Post-Cold War World: Opportunities and

Challenges,” (1991) 31 (9) Asian Survey 872.

19 Sumit Ganguly, “South Asia After the Cold War,” The Washington Quarterly , Autumn

1992 (15:4, 173-84)

controlled. 20 Not surprisingly, India reacted quite strongly

to any U.S. or other international criticisms o its humanrights record in Kashmir, underscored the capacity o itsown domestic judicial institutions to deal with such allega-tions, and expressed strong reservations about any attemptto diminish its privileges as a sovereign state.21

Te human rights situation in Kashmir, which coincidedwith the renewed global emphasis on their protection,revealed a undamental tension in India’s oreign and secu-rity policies. Tough India’s political leadership continuedto emphasize their unwavering commitment to humanrights, they nevertheless took an unyielding position on any

orm o external pressure to address perceived shortcom-ings in this arena.

Nevertheless, it needs to be highlighted that the nationalgovernment was not oblivious to international criticism.Faced with a barrage o external admonitions, the CongressParty government o Prime Minister Narasimha Raocreated the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC)in 1993 under the aegis o the Protection o Human RightsAct. Even though some critics initially dismissed the NHRCas a sop to Cerberus, it quickly became evident that theorganization, regardless o its provenance, had acquired adegree o institutional autonomy and efficacy.22

The Responsibility To Protect

As the notion o protecting populations rom widespreadstate repression gained ground in the wake o Yugoslavia’scollapse in the early 1990s, India’s response urther illus-trated the tension between its desire to saeguard statesovereignty and its long-standing valuation o liberal normsFearing the setting o a possible global precedent thatcould adversely affect India in the uture, its policymakersexpressed grave reservations about the North Atlanticreaty Organization’s (NAO) decision in 1999 to militarily

intervene in the conflict.23

In the wake o the Kosovo intervention, Secretary-General Kofi Annan initiated a debate

20 For a discussion of the origins of the insurgency as well as the problems associated

with the initial phases of India’s counter-insurgency strategy, see Sumit Ganguly, The

Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace (New York: Cambridge University

Press, 1997).

21 Jason Burke, “Indian Ofcers Names in Report on Kashmir Abuses,” The Guardian,

December 6, 2012.

22 Vijayshri Sripati, “India’s National Human Rights Commission: A Shackled Commis-

sion?” Boston University International Law Journal, 118: 1, 2000, pp.1-47.

23 Gaurav Kampani, “India’s Kosovo Conundrum,” Rediff on the Net, April 24, 1999,

http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/apr/24nato.htm





5

Analysis

about the legality and legitimacy o humanitarian interven-

tion. Soon thereafer, the United Nations Security Counciltook up the matter and embarked upon a series o debateson the question.

From the outset, India expressed its reservations aboutgranting the Security Council the requisite authority topermit humanitarian intervention. It asserted that not onlywould such authority undermine state sovereignty underthe expectations o the UN Charter but would renderthe rest o the UN membership powerless to disagree.Furthermore, in the same vein, they argued that the properauthority lay with the United Nations General Assembly

(UNGA).

24

Yet as the idea o humanitarian intervention gained groundin the wake o the report rom the International Commis-sion on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), whichdeveloped the concept o the “responsibility to protect”(R2P), Indian interlocutors started to shif ground whenaced with a very substantial international consensus.However, Indian negotiators ensured that the norm’spromoters make significant concessions limiting theapplication o the principle to our specific crimes (warcrimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and ethniccleansing), an omission o criteria or the use o orce andan insistence on UN authorization.25 Nevertheless, aferthe World Summit o 2005, as discussions continued onthe application o R2P principles, prominent Indian diplo-mats argued that they shared the view that mass atrocitiesshould be prevented. However, they also reminded the UNcommunity that any response to such a crisis should bepeaceul, and that resort to Chapter VII sanctions should bea last resort.26 Furthermore, they argued (and continue tohold the view) that the way to avoid conditions that wouldprompt a resort action under R2P principles was to helpstates develop the requisite capabilities to avoid rampant

human rights violations.27

24 Kudrat Virk, “India and the responsibility to Protect: A Tale of Ambiguity,” Global

Responsibility to Protect, 2013, pp.56-83.

25 Virk, 2013, p.79.

26 Ian Hall, “Tilting at Windmills? The Indian debate over the Responsibility to Protect

after UNSC Resolution 1973,” Global Responsibility to Protect 5, 2013, 84-108.

27 Hall, 2013, p.96. Also, personal interview with senior Indian Foreign Service Ofcer,

New Delhi, December 18, 2012.

India and the International Criminal Court

Notions o the constriction o state sovereignty have alsoanimated India’s approach to the creation o an Interna-tional Criminal Court (ICC). When the entity was createdin 1998, India chose to abstain rather than actually voteagainst its ormation. Since an opt-in provision was notincluded in the statute that created the court and grantedit inherent jurisdiction, India elt compelled to abstain. Itsdecision apparently stemmed rom three related concerns.Te first had to do with the capacity o the Indian judicialsystem to respond or mete out condign punishment ina prompt and speedy ashion. Te second arose rom itsawareness o the inability o its prosecutorial and judicial

systems to bring to task egregious violators o human rightsespecially in the ace o evidence o state complicity. Forexample, as one commentator has written in the afermatho what is widely seen as a pogrom in the western stateo Gujarat in February 2002, “ … it is only the proximateand direct perpetrators who, in a ew cases that survive arebeing tried; the chain o command, complicity and conniv-ance remain beyond the pale.”28 Finally, the Indian state alsoeared that the ICC could be subject to political bias andthereby place India and other vulnerable states in the dockwhile overlooking the maleasances o others.

All o these concerns suggest a certain lack o aith in therobustness o its own judicial institutions and their capacityto respond to blatant violations o human rights withinthe country. Given that regimes o every ideological stripewithin the past three decades have been implicated insubstantial human rights violations during their terms inoffice and that the judiciary has been unable to bring thoseresponsible to account or their actions, it is most unlikelythat India will show any particular willingness to shif itsposition on the ICC. It is possible to make this argumenteven though India, with some reservations, had voted insupport o United Nations Security Council Resolution

1970. Tis resolution, which had won unanimous consent,had reerred the Gaddafi regime in Libya to the ICC in thewake o the brutal crackdown on demonstrators in early2011.

Democracy Promotion

Despite a commitment to the preservation o democracyat home, India’s policymakers have been mostly loath to

28 Usha Ramanathan, “India and the ICC,” Journal of International Criminal Justice, 3,

2005, 627-634.



6

Analysis

promote democracy abroad. Tree actors explain India’s

unwillingness to take up the cudgel o democracy promo-tion. In considerable part, once again, its aversion toserve as a democracy monger stems rom a deeply rootedaversion to both colonialism and imperialism. Even 60years afer the end o British colonial rule, the memorieso colonial and post-colonial rationalizations or oreigninterventions remain alive. O course, in a related vein, theyalso remain acutely cognizant o the infirmities o theirown domestic democratic institutions and want to endoff possible external pressures and inordinate scrutiny othe various shortcomings. Finally, its hesitation also stemsrom its location in a deeply troubled neighborhood, which

is host to a number o authoritarian regimes capable odeploying varying levels o repression and brutality.

As the noted Indian political theorist and public intellectualPratap Bhanu Mehta has argued, quite cogently, India is inno position given the asymmetries o power, to promotedemocracy in its behemoth northern neighbor, the PRC.More to the point, he argues that India, which is host to thelargest ibetan diaspora in the world, has ollowed a defpolicy o both leveraging the ibetan issue with the PRCwithout directly inflaming tensions. Tis careul policy, heargues, demonstrates India’s commitment to the protec-

tion o human rights without engaging in grandstandingor making the issue a global cause.29 Despite India’s adroitbalancing act, on occasion, it has attracted the public ire othe PRC.30

India’s efforts at democracy promotion in the rest o itsneighborhood have generated mixed results. Te hardestcase, o course, has involved its dealings with Burma/Myanmar. Initially, because o historic ties between theIndian nationalist movement and Aung San, the athero the long incarcerated democracy activist and currentmember o Parliament, Aung San Suu Kyi, India had

shunned the military junta in the country. In the early1990s however, aced with the growing influence o the PRCwithin the country, at the insistence o the then ForeignSecretary, Jyotindra Nath Dixit, India started to make over-tures toward the military regime despite oreign disapproba-tion. Apart rom the question o the increasing involvement

29 Pratap Bhanu Mehta, “Reluctant India,” Journal of Democracy , 22:4, October 2011,

pp.97-109.

30 Dean Nelson, “China Angry over Dalai Lama Visit to Disputed Tibetan Border,” The

Telegraph, November 6, 2009.

with the PRC in the country, India also wanted to seek the

cooperation o the military regime to end the sanctuaries o various northeastern insurgent groups in Burma/Myanmar.

Indian interlocutors claim that despite their engagemento the junta, that various governments in New Delhi didnot abandon their quite diplomatic efforts to oster demo-cratic change within Burma.31 Other specialists on Burma,however, take a different view, claiming that India’s effortsto promote change have been too meager and anemicprimarily on the grounds that its developmental projectsare limited and its engagement with Burma’s civil societyinadequate. Nevertheless, even the critics o India’s poli-

cies grudgingly concede that in the uture, India may be ina position to accomplish more both in terms o democracyand development while simultaneously addressing its moreparochial interests.32 I the current trends toward democra-tization in Burma/Myanmar continue, India’s past policieso engagement while gently nudging the rulers to restoredemocracy may well be vindicated.

Historically, since Sri Lanka was a robust democracy despiteits periodic problems with its amil population, Indiahad no role in the preservation o its democracy barringthe provision o assistance to suppress a lef-wing rebel-lion in the 1970s. However, in the afermath o the highlysuccessul i utterly brutal and sanguinary end to the SriLankan civil war in 2009, India has aced a dilemma withthe country’s growing turn toward authoritarianism. India’sdilemma is rooted both in its domestic and regional politicsAt the level o domestic politics, no government, especiallyone that rests on a ractious coalition, can afford to ignorethe sentiments o a vocal amil population in southernIndia, particularly in the state o amil Nadu. Even i leadersin New Delhi lack a normative commitment to the protec-tion o human rights in Sri Lanka, they cannot remainoblivious to the cacophonous demands o the amil elec-

torate in the state about the plight o their ethnic kin in SriLanka. Yet this need to address a powerul domestic constit-uency must also be balanced with an external concern,namely the expanding role o the PRC in Sri Lanka.

Accordingly, India’s policymakers have again soughtto resort to a delicate balancing act. Faced with steady

31 Mehta, 2011, p.103.

32 Renaud Egreteau, “A Passage to Burma? India, development, and democratization in

Myanmar,” Contemporary Politics, December 2011, 17:4, pp.467-486.



7

Analysis

domestic pressure, they chose in March 2013 to reprimand

Sri Lanka at the United Nations Human Rights Council(UNHRC) in Geneva or its ailure to address legitimateconcerns about post-conflict reconciliation. Yet, shortlybeore this adverse UNHRC vote, India chose to increaseits share o oreign assistance to Sri Lanka. Tere is littlequestion that this decision was made to both sofen theblow o the upcoming vote while simultaneously attemptingto ensure that the PRC’s looming presence did not whollyeclipse its influence in the country.

However, even India’s costly vote did not appease one o theconstituents o the ruling coalition, the Dravida Munnetra

Kazhagam (DMK), which chose to withdraw rom thenational government accusing it o having voted or adiluted resolution.33 Te Sri Lankan case, as much as that oBurma/Myanmar, illustrates some o the dilemmas that anygovernment in New Delhi conronts as it seeks to balancecompeting interests and ideals.

When not aced with similar domestic and externalconstraints, India’s willingness to participate in efforts atdemocracy promotion has been somewhat more orth-right.34 In considerable part, such a strategy has beenevident in India’s attempts at democracy promotion inNepal. When King Gyanendra seized power in Nepal inFebruary 2005, India cut off all arms supplies to the countrydespite the presence o a significant Maoist insurgency withpossible ties to an Indian insurgent group in the north-eastern state o Assam. Subsequently, when democracy wasrestored in April 2006, India tripled its oreign assistanceto the country. One analyst has argued that India may havebeen keen on supporting the democratic peace process inNepal largely as a signal to its domestic Maoist insurgentsthat a return to the democratic political old could lead to areconciliation with the Indian state. Tis argument, thoughsuperficially appealing, is flawed.35As long as rebels have

abandoned their secessionist agenda and have eschewed theresort to orce, the Indian state has long evinced a willing-ness to discuss and accommodate the demands o variousinsurgent groups.

33 Express News Service, “India Votes Against Sri Lanka at UNHRC in Tamils Case, DMK

hits out at UPA,” The Indian Express, March 21, 2013.

34 For the details pertaining to the evolution of India’s policies see Sandra Destradi,

“India as a democracy promoter? New Delhi’s involvement in Nepal’s return to democ-

racy,” Democratization, 19:2, 2012, pp,286-311.

35 Jan Cartwright, “India Regional and International Support for Democracy: Rhetoric or

Reality?” Asian Survey , 49:3, May/June 2009, pp. 403-428.

What about India’s willingness to participate in efforts at

democracy promotion beyond the region? Here again, thecountry has demonstrated caution and reticence but inrecent years has taken some fitul, limited steps. Te effortsthat India has made in the realm o democracy promotion,or the most part, have been at U.S. prodding. Te initialinitiative came during the second Clinton administrationwhen during his maiden (and only presidential) visit toIndia, his administration proposed the creation o a centeror Asian Democracy. Apparently, this was viewed withsome skepticism in New Delhi because it smacked o anti-PRC overtones.36 Nevertheless, India’s policymakers wereunwilling to completely dismiss the notion o democracy

promotion in the wake o an emerging rapprochementwith the United States. o that end, India became one othe ounding members o the Community o Democra-cies Initiative in 1999. However, despite its initial commit-ment, India has not devoted significant diplomatic energyto give the nascent body much impetus. India’s reluctanceto expend much effort may stem rom its long-standingadvocacy or states in the global South, many o whom arenot democratic states. Despite this hesitation, in 2005 Indiacommitted itsel, at the urging o President George W. Bush,to support the United Nations Democracy Fund. DespiteIndia’s willingness to endorse these initiatives it appears

reluctant to grant these endeavors pride o place in theconduct o its oreign policy thereby suggesting that democ-racy promotion still lacks a substantial constituency withinits oreign policy establishment.

Conclusions

Te oregoing analysis shows that India’s role in two, keyemergent pillars o the liberal global order are limited andtentative. Te limitations stem in considerable part rom itscolonial legacies, its institutional weaknesses, the exigencieso its domestic politics, and the constraints o its existingmaterial capabilities. Te central question that arises romthis analysis is whether or not India might prove willing toact differently and assume a greater responsibility to provide various global public goods i it manages to bolster its mate-rial capabilities, steadily sheds it colonial hangover, andsucceeds in addressing its domestic institutional constraintsTus ar, India, unlike during the Nehruvian era, has ailedto spell out alternative global norms and institutional

36 Mohan, 2007, p.104.



8

Analysis

About the Author

Sumit Ganguly holds the Rabindranath agore Chair in Indian

cultures and civilizations and is a proessor o political science at

Indiana University in Bloomington. He has previously been on the

aculty o James Madison College o Michigan State University, Hunter

College o the City University o New York, and the University o

exas at Austin.

Te views expressed here are o the author’s own, and they no way

represent the official position o the ransatlantic Academy or the

German Marshall Fund.

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and the Aurea Foundation in 2013.

arrangements even as it has proven to be critical o key,

emergent liberal principles.During Nehru’s tenure in office, even though the countrylacked material power, it had actually attempted to setalternative global agendas especially in the realm o nucleardisarmament.37 Unortunately, its lack o material capabili-ties made these efforts at agenda setting, or the most part,largely chimerical. Subsequent governments in India madetoken gestures to his earlier efforts but they lacked bothconviction and commitment.

Might an economically resurgent India that also managesto improve the efficacy o its domestic institutions, sheds its

post-colonial anxieties, and thereby finds itsel on a moresecure ooting act differently in the international arena?Despite its present economic difficulties, much o which canbe traced to poor policy choices and the shortcomings o itsinstitutional capacities, there is no reason to wholly writeoff India’s possible rise.38 Whether or not renewed economicgrowth and improved institutional perormance will makeIndia’s policymakers change their stances and assume therequisite burdens to help provide key public goods thatcould contribute to the creation o a more liberal globalorder remains an open question.39

37 Sumit Ganguly, “India’s Nuclear Free Dream,” The Diplomat, April 29, 2010, http://

thediplomat.com/2010/04/22/india%E2%80%99s-nuclear-free-dream/

38 Ruchir Sharma, “India’s Economic Superstars,” Foreign Affairs, September/October

2013, 92:5, pp.75-85.

39 For an excellent discussion of India’s unwillingness to assume suitable responsibili-

ties in a series of extant and emergent global regimes, see Amrita Narlikar, “Is India a

Responsible Great Power?” Third World Quarterly , 32:9, 2011, pp.1607-1621; for a more

optimistic view, see Waheguru Pal Singh Sudhu, Pratal Bhanu Mehta, and Bruce Jones,

Shaping the Emerging World: India and the Multilateral Order (Washington, DC: The

Brookings Institution, 2013).

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Documents

India in the Liberal Order