Independent Broad‑based Anti‑corruption Commission Committee€¦ · Anti‑corruption Commission (IBAC), which is the key anti‑corruption agency in Victoria. Previously, the

Parliament of VictoriaIndependent Broad‑based Anti‑corruption Commission Committee

Ordered to be published

VICTORIAN GOVERNMENT PRINTERNovember 2017

PP No 342, Session 2014‑17ISBN 978 1 925703 08 5 (print version) 978 1 925703 09 2 (PDF version)

A framework for monitoring the performance of the Independent Broad‑based Anti‑corruption Commission

PARLIAMENT OF VICTORIAIndependent Broad‑based Anti‑corruption Commission Committee

A framework for monitoring the performance of the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission iii

Committee functions

The IBAC Committee is constituted under section 12A of the Parliamentary Committees Act 2003.

1. The functions of the Committee are—

a. to monitor and review the performance of the duties and functions of the IBAC;

b. to report to both Houses of the Parliament on any matter connected with the performance of the duties and functions of the IBAC that require the attention of the Parliament;

c. to examine any reports made by the IBAC;

d. to consider any proposed appointment of a Commissioner and to exercise a power of veto in accordance with the Independent Broad‑based Anti‑corruption Commission Act 2011;

e. to carry out any other function conferred on the IBAC Committee by or under this Act or the Independent Broad‑based Anti‑corruption Commission Act 2011;

f. to monitor and review the performance of the duties and functions of the Victorian Inspectorate, other than those in respect of VAGO officers or Ombudsman officers;

g. to report to both Houses of the Parliament on any matter connected with the performance of the duties and functions of the Victorian Inspectorate that require the attention of the Parliament, other than those in respect of VAGO officers or Ombudsman officers;

h. to examine any reports made by the Victorian Inspectorate, other than reports in respect of VAGO officers or Ombudsman officers;

i. to consider any proposed appointment of an Inspector and to exercise a power of veto in accordance with the Victorian Inspectorate Act 2011.

1A. Despite anything to the contrary in subsection (1), the IBAC Committee cannot—

a. investigate a matter relating to the particular conduct the subject of—

i. a particular complaint or notification made to the IBAC under the Independent Broad‑based Anti‑corruption Commission Act 2011; or

ii. a particular disclosure determined by the IBAC under section 26 of the Protected Disclosure Act 2012, to be a protected disclosure complaint;

b. review any decision by the IBAC under the Independent Broad‑based Anti‑corruption Commission Act 2011 to investigate, not to investigate or to discontinue the investigation of a particular complaint or notification or a protected disclosure complaint within the meaning of that Act;

c. review any findings, recommendations, determinations or other decisions of the IBAC in relation to—

i. a particular complaint or notification made to the IBAC under the Independent Broad‑based Anti‑corruption Commission Act 2011; or

ii. a particular disclosure determined by the IBAC under section 26 of the Protected Disclosure Act 2012, to be a protected disclosure complaint; or

iv Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Committee

Committee functions

iii. a particular investigation conducted by the IBAC under the Independent Broad‑based Anti‑corruption Commission Act 2011;

ca. review any determination by the IBAC under section 26(3) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2012;

d. disclose any information relating to the performance of a function or the exercise of a power by the IBAC which may—

i. prejudice any criminal investigation or criminal proceedings; or

ii. prejudice any investigation being conducted by the IBAC; or

iii. contravene any secrecy or confidentiality provision in any relevant Act.

2. Despite anything to the contrary in subsection (1), the IBAC Committee cannot—

a. investigate a matter relating to particular conduct the subject of any report made by the Victorian Inspectorate;

b. review any decision to investigate, not to investigate, or to discontinue the investigation of a particular complaint made to the Victorian Inspectorate in accordance with the Victorian Inspectorate Act 2011;

c. review any findings, recommendations, determinations or other decisions of the Victorian Inspectorate in relation to a particular complaint made to, or investigation conducted by, the Victorian Inspectorate in accordance with the Victorian Inspectorate Act 2011;

d. disclose any information relating to the performance of a function or exercise of a power by the Victorian Inspectorate which may —

i. prejudice any criminal investigation or criminal proceedings; or

ii. prejudice an investigation being conducted by the IBAC; or

iii. contravene any secrecy or confidentiality provision in any relevant Act.

A framework for monitoring the performance of the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission v

Committee membership

Hon Kim Wells MPChair

Rowville

Mr Sam Hibbins MPPrahran

Mr Tim Richardson MPMordialloc

Hon Marsha Thomson MPDeputy Chair

Footscray

Mr Danny O’Brien MPGippsland South

Ms Jaclyn Symes MLCNorthern Victoria

Mr Simon Ramsay MLCWestern Victoria

vi Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Committee

Committee secretariat

Staff

Ms Sandy Cook, Executive OfficerDr Stephen James, Research OfficerMs Justine Donohue, Administrative Officer

Consultant

Professor A J Brown, Centre for Governance and Public Policy, Griffith University

Committee contact details

Address Independent Broad‑based Anti‑corruption Commission Committee Parliament of Victoria, Spring Street EAST MELBOURNE VIC 3002

Phone 61 3 8682 2815

Email [email protected]

Web www.parliament.vic.gov.au/ibacc

This report is available on the Committee’s website.

A framework for monitoring the performance of the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission vii

Contents

PreliminariesCommittee functions iiiCommittee membership vCommittee secretariat viChair’s foreword ixRecommendations xi

1 Background 11.1 Purpose 1

1.2 Performance monitoring for anti‑corruption agencies 21.2.1 Australia’s experience 3

1.2.2 International developments 4

1.3 The work of the Committee 7

2 Scope of the framework 92.1 Who is monitoring? 9

2.1.1 IBAC 10

2.1.2 The Victorian Inspectorate 16

2.2 What functions and activities should be assessed? 17

2.3 What types of measures (coverage and nature)? 192.3.1 The importance of outcome and impact measurement 20

2.3.2 IBAC’s reporting on outcomes and impact 24

2.4 Over what time frames? 26

3 Vital issues: role clarity and capacity 293.1 IBAC 29

3.2 The IBAC Committee 29

3.3 The Victorian Inspectorate 30

4 The framework 354.1 The framework in more detail 38

4.2 The implementation of the framework 434.2.1 Proposed foundation review 43

5 Concluding remarks 45

Appendix1 IBAC Operational performance indicators—July 2017 47

Bibliography 57

viii Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Committee

A framework for monitoring the performance of the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission ix

Chair’s foreword

I am pleased to present the fourth report of the Independent Broad‑based Anti‑corruption Commission Committee, A framework for monitoring the performance of the Independent Broad‑based Anti‑corruption Commission.

Under the Parliamentary Committees Act 2003 (Vic), the Committee has the function of monitoring and reviewing the performance of the Independent Broad‑based Anti‑corruption Commission (IBAC), which is the key anti‑corruption agency in Victoria. Previously, the Committee has exercised this monitoring function by reviewing relevant reports, conducting hearings on IBAC’s performance using reported outcomes and undertaking reviews and inquiries.

For more than a decade, there have been calls for oversight bodies to develop formal frameworks to monitor the performance of anti‑corruption agencies (ACAs) such as IBAC. Transparency International, for example, has been developing guidelines for monitoring the compliance of ACAs with best practice. Similarly, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the OECD and the European Partners Against Corruption have been involved in developing guidelines and assisting countries in this process.

Towards the end of 2016, after almost four years in operation, the Committee thought it timely to develop a framework for more systematic monitoring of IBAC based on best practice principles to enhance its current oversight work.

The Committee engaged Professor A J Brown of Griffith University as a consultant to assist in the development of an appropriate framework. The Committee greatly appreciated Professor Brown’s insights, expertise and invaluable contributions to the development of the framework presented in this report.

The Committee looks forward to further developing and implementing this pioneering framework in the coming year, confident that it will strengthen the Committee’s monitoring work and make an important contribution to Victoria’s anti‑corruption system.

I would like to thank my Committee colleagues, Hon Marsha Thomson MP (Deputy Chair), Mr Sam Hibbins MP, Mr Danny O’Brien MP, Mr Simon Ramsay MLC, Mr Tim Richardson MP and Ms Jaclyn Symes MLC, for their cooperative and bipartisan approach to the preparation of this report and to the related work of the Committee. Finally, the Committee thanks the Secretariat for their hard work, in particular the Executive Officer, Ms Sandy Cook; the Research Officer, Dr Stephen James; and the Committee Administrative Officer, Ms Justine Donohue.

I commend this report to the Parliament.

Hon Kim Wells MP Chair

A framework for monitoring the performance of the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission xi

Recommendations

RECOMMENDATION 1: That the Independent Broad‑based Anti‑corruption Commission Act 2011 (Vic) be amended to make the Committee’s proposed 4‑year performance monitoring and review cycle a responsibility of the Committee and part of the ongoing work of the Parliament of Victoria and the Victorian Government. That the review be carried out in the third year of the relevant parliamentary term. . . . . . . 28

RECOMMENDATION 2: That the Independent Broad‑based Anti‑corruption Commission Act 2011 (Vic) and Victorian Inspectorate Act 2011 (Vic) be amended to ensure clarity in the role of the Inspectorate:

(a) to monitor, on behalf of the Parliament, the legality and propriety of IBAC’s operations including assurance that IBAC’s exercise of its powers is compliant with applicable legislation—rather than to monitor IBAC’s broader performance;

(b) to contribute to the Committee’s oversight and performance review work, particularly in respect of matters falling within the Victorian Inspectorate’s monitoring roles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

RECOMMENDATION 3: That the Victorian Government support, and assist in the implementation of, the Committee’s proposed performance monitoring and review framework, as set out in this report.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

A framework for monitoring the performance of the Independent Broad‑based Anti‑corruption Commission 1

11 Background

1.1 Purpose

This report sets out a proposed performance monitoring and review framework, to be led and oversighted by the IBAC Committee, for ensuring the ongoing performance and accountability of IBAC in the discharge of its statutory responsibilities for the people of this State.

In Victoria’s public integrity system, the Parliament’s joint IBAC Committee is entrusted with the primary responsibility to ‘oversee’1 IBAC on behalf of the Parliament and the community. In particular, the Committee is empowered to ‘monitor and review the performance of the duties and functions’ of IBAC and to report to Parliament ‘on any matter connected with the performance of the duties and functions of the IBAC’ that require its attention.2 Under section 12A of the Parliamentary Committees Act 2003 (Vic), the IBAC Committee cannot investigate individual cases or review any findings, recommendations, decisions and determinations of IBAC relating to complaints, disclosures or investigations.

In 2016, the Committee resolved to develop ‘a framework for the regular and ongoing monitoring of IBAC … based on sound best‑practice principles’.3 Since the foundation of the Commission in 2012 until now, the Committee has discharged this responsibility by reviewing IBAC’s annual reports, conducting hearings on its performance using those reported outcomes and undertaking research and inquiries (including reviews of relevant legislation).4

As a result of further work by and on behalf of the Committee, this report provides:

• the key elements of the proposed framework for this regular and ongoing monitoring (as set out in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1);

• a range of more meaningful performance indicators for the Parliament, Government and IBAC to apply to judgements regarding IBAC’s performance and operational needs, as part of the framework (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2); and

• recommendations for embedding the framework in Victoria’s integrity system in an efficient and sustainable way.

Under the framework, the Committee proposes to initiate a 4‑yearly performance review cycle for IBAC, aligning with parliamentary terms, in addition to monitoring based on annual reporting or other ad hoc inquiries. The Committee

1 Independent Broad‑based Anti‑corruption Commission Act 2011 (Vic) s 1(2).

2 Parliamentary Committees Act 2003 (Vic) s 12A(1)(a) and (b).

3 Independent Broad‑based Anti‑corruption Commission Committee, Parliament of Victoria, The performance of the Independent Broad‑based Anti‑corruption Commission and the Victorian Inspectorate, 2015/16 (2016) 39–40.

4 Ibid 39.

2 Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Committee

Section 1 Background

1also recommends legislative amendment to institutionalise this monitoring cycle by way of a statutory requirement for the Committee to conduct this 4‑yearly review.

The Committee also recognises the statutory independence of the Commission and the importance of a performance monitoring and review framework that supports rather than hinders IBAC’s ability to properly discharge its vital functions. The Committee’s intention is thus that the framework be as consistent as possible with IBAC’s own statutory responsibilities, needs, operations and performance monitoring, and vice versa.

The purpose of this report is to assist not only the present Committee, but future Committees, the Parliament, the Government and people of Victoria by setting out a clear path for decision‑making regarding the performance of one of its most important integrity agencies. While effective performance monitoring is important for all public institutions, special challenges arise when—due to the Commission’s high level of independence from the executive—primary responsibility for performance assurance rests with a parliamentary committee rather than with its portfolio agency and minister.5 However, it is not automatic that a parliamentary committee will always have all the skills, resources and opportunities to fulfil this important role on behalf of the community in a forward‑looking and objective manner. A strategy is needed to ensure the Committee has an effective framework, appropriate legislative authority and adequate resourcing for doing so.

1.2 Performance monitoring for anti‑corruption agencies

Effective performance measurement and reporting systems are an essential component of transparent and accountable government.6 This is no less true for IBAC than for any other public institution. Indeed, the case for effective performance measurement and reporting is arguably greater for integrity agencies such as IBAC due to the special roles they play in ensuring public confidence in the public sector and the considerable powers extended to them by the people through the Parliament.

Since the 1990s, it has been acknowledged worldwide that effective frameworks for ensuring proper performance monitoring and evaluation of the work of anti‑corruption agencies (ACAs), such as IBAC, are increasingly important.7 This demand for monitoring and evaluation frameworks has originated from a mixture of sources—not only ‘top down’ from sponsoring governments and international donor agencies, but also ‘bottom up’ from civil society organisations and anti‑corruption agencies themselves.

5 In IBAC’s case, the relevant portfolio minister is the Special Minister of State.

6 Public Accounts and Estimates Committee, Parliament of Victoria, Review of the performance measurement and reporting system (2014) 1.

7 Luis De Sousa, ‘Anti‑corruption agencies: between empowerment and irrelevance’ (2010) 53(1) Crime, Law and Social Change 5; Nikos Passas, ‘Anti‑corruption agencies and the need for strategic approaches: a preface to this special issue’ (2010) 53(1) Crime, Law and Social Change 1.

A framework for monitoring the performance of the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission 3


1Often, this is because the roles of ACAs are controversial—especially if they are successful in confronting deep‑seated or systemic corruption, or fail to do so, including because of weaknesses of institutional design or resourcing. Relatedly, questions of ACA performance can often be intensely political questions:

In order to be prepared to make their case heard in what is increasingly a hostile and disillusioned environment, ACAs are increasingly committed to take evaluation procedures seriously and devote some time to develop performance indicators and to learn how to communicate them. Having said so, ‘good’ performance is not necessarily important to determine their fate. They are created and terminated by a political decision and not always an informed one. Political decisions to terminate ACAs are often justified in terms of efficacy (or the lack of it), but without an assessment of concrete performance indicators.8

For these reasons, the Committee considers that it is important to have a framework for the monitoring of IBAC. A framework will also give broad guidance to the regular monitoring work of future Committees, enhancing their assessment of IBAC’s performance in a rigorous fashion that meets best practice.

1.2.1 Australia’s experience

Australia’s record is more positive, although not without its own, sometimes contentious, public debates over the performance of ACAs. In general, independent ACAs are now a well‑accepted component of most Australian public integrity systems.9 As part of this relatively settled place in the government architecture, it is widely accepted that:

• ACAs should be subject to equivalent (in some cases the same) systems of corporate planning, annual reporting, and performance monitoring and evaluation that apply generally in Australian government; and

• special‑purpose parliamentary oversight committees have the important lead role in balancing the independence of ACAs with the need for oversight by taking responsibility for performance monitoring (and other roles) in as depoliticised, or at least bipartisan, fashion as possible.10

8 Luis De Sousa, ‘Anti‑corruption agencies: between empowerment and irrelevance’ (2010) 53(1) Crime, Law and Social Change 5, 20. See also A Doig, D Watt and R Williams, ‘Measuring “success” in five African anti‑corruption commissions: the cases of Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia’, U4 Anti‑Corruption Resource Centre, Bergen, Norway (2005) < http://www.u4.no>.

9 See T Prenzler and N Faulkner, ‘Towards a model public sector integrity commission’ (2010) 69(3) Australian Journal of Public Administration 251; A J Brown, ‘The integrity branch: a ‘system’, an ‘industry’, or a sensible emerging fourth arm of government?’ in M Groves (ed), Modern administrative law in Australia: concepts and context (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 301.

10 See A J Brown et al, Chaos or coherence? Strengths, opportunities and challenges for Australia’s integrity systems, Final Report, National Integrity Systems Assessment, Griffith University and Transparency International Australia (2005) 82–3; R Wettenhall, ‘Integrity agencies: the significance of the parliamentary relationship’ (2012) 33(1) Policy Studies 65.



1The benefits of a more agreed, systematic approach to monitoring have been noted in Australia since at least 2005.11 Despite the availability of parliamentary oversight committees to lead this task, continued fragmentation, lack of coordination, and often lack of useful purpose in data gathering, has seen most evaluation remain ad hoc and often scandal‑ or crisis‑driven.12 ACAs such as IBAC are thus often subject to four different approaches to performance monitoring and evaluation:

1. Attempts to measure the overall impacts of integrity or anti‑corruption reforms, in terms of actual integrity and corruption levels in the public sector or community—a major research and evaluation challenge even by comparison with the measurement of other forms of crime or desired/undesired behaviour.

2. Evaluations of the utility, outcomes and needs of specific agencies, made by parliamentarians and/or governments—which, in the absence of systematic frameworks, can be knee‑jerk or ex post facto justifications for financial or political decisions already made.

3. Conventional, routine performance measurement processes of government (for example, Treasury, Finance, audit)—which may not touch on the most important issues.

4. Performance measurements imposed by anti‑corruption agencies on themselves, for management and annual reporting purposes, including to justify existing or requested resources.13

In suggesting a framework for Victoria, the Committee’s aim is to bring together, integrate and systematise the most useful elements of these different approaches.

1.2.2 International developments

Internationally, four main efforts provide insight into how a framework might best be developed for the Committee’s purpose of monitoring the performance of IBAC. First, the Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development (OECD) has developed general principles for assessing the effectiveness of integrity and anti‑corruption measures or policies—including with Australian input—but these have remained at a general level, rather than being tailored to institutional performance.14

11 A J Brown et al, Chaos or coherence? Strengths, opportunities and challenges for Australia’s integrity systems, Final Report, National Integrity System Assessment, Griffith University and Transparency International Australia (2005) 54–6, Recommendations 18 and 19; A J Brown, ‘Towards a performance measurement framework for integrity agencies: lessons from the national integrity system assessment’ (Paper presented at the National Conference of Parliamentary Oversight Committees of Anti‑Corruption/Crime Bodies), Sydney, 22–23 February 2006.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 OECD, Measures for promoting integrity and preventing corruption: How to assess? Report of OECD Public Governance Committee GOV/PGC (2004) 24 (October 2004) <www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/47/34406951.pdf>; OECD, Public sector integrity: a framework for assessment (OECD, 2005).



1Second, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has developed an assessment framework specific to anti‑corruption agencies.15 However, this is focused on capacity rather than performance assessment, in response to controversies over the adequacy of ACA resourcing.

The two more specific efforts that have informed the Committee are:

• The framework and catalogue of indicators for ACA performance assessment developed in 2011 by the U4 Anti‑Corruption Resource Centre (Norway), based on a review of 13 stand‑alone evaluations of anti‑corruption agencies (see Table 1.1).16

• The assessment framework developed by Transparency International in 2015 for comparing and strengthening the performance of ACAs in the Asia‑Pacific region (see Table 1.2).17

Table 1.1 Dimensions of performance assessment—U4 Anti‑Corruption Resource Centre

Dimensions of assessment (indicator catalogue) Number of indicators

Goals/ Impacts

Outcome Output Total

A. Goals/Impacts 9 – – 9

B. General management – 7 15 22

C. Knowledge production and management – 3 5 8

D. Enforcement – 11 2 13

E. Legislation – 2 2 4

F. Policy – 2 – 2

G. Prevention – 10 10 20

H. Inter‑agency cooperation – 3 2 5

I. International cooperation – 2 3 5

J. Civil society cooperation – 4 2 6

K. Business cooperation – 3 2 5

Total 9 47 43 99

Source: Based on J Johnson, H Hechler, L De Sousa and H Mathisen, How to monitor and evaluate anti‑corruption agencies: guidelines for agencies, donors, and evaluators (U4 Anti‑Corruption Resource Centre, Issue No. 8, 2011).

15 UNDP, Practitioners’ guide: capacity assessment of anti‑corruption agencies (UNDP, 2011).

16 J Johnson, H Hechler, L De Sousa and H Mathisen, How to monitor and evaluate anti‑corruption agencies: guidelines for agencies, donors, and evaluators (U4 Anti‑Corruption Resource Centre, Issue No. 8, 2011). See also OECD, Specialised anti‑corruption institutions: review of models (OECD, 2nd ed, 2013) 34–5.

17 J Quah, A J Brown, A McDevitt, J L Romero, M Thompson, R Nanayakkara, A Aminuzzaman, S Khair and T Vink, Anti‑Corruption Agencies Strengthening Initiative: research implementation guide (Transparency International, 2015).



1Table 1.2 Dimensions of performance assessment—Transparency International

Dimensions of assessment Number of indicators

ACA’s Detection and Investigation Function 9

ACA’s Prevention, Education and Outreach Functions 9

ACA’s Cooperation with other Organizations 5

ACA’s Accountability and Oversight 4

Public Perceptions of the ACA’s Performance 7

ACA’s Legal Independence and Status 7

ACA’s Financial and Human Resources 9

Total 50

Source: Adapted from J Quah, A J Brown, A McDevitt, J L Romero, M Thompson, R Nanayakkara, A Aminuzzaman, S Khair and T Vink, Anti‑Corruption Agencies Strengthening Initiative: research implementation guide (Transparency International, 2015).

Tables 1.1 and 1.2 set out the main dimensions used to structure each of these frameworks and the number of performance indicators offered by each. In the Committee’s view, they provide highly relevant starting points for a suitable framework in the Australian and Victorian context. There is considerable similarity between the approaches in terms of the key dimensions to be addressed and indicators suggested. There is also considerable overlap with many of the outcomes, outputs and performance measures already identified by IBAC and other Australian anti‑corruption agencies as relevant to their work, as discussed in the next section.

However, it is important to note that neither framework is designed to be used ‘off the shelf’ without adaptation to local purposes. Table 1.1 (U4) provides an ‘indicator catalogue’ from which evaluators may select possible performance measures, where relevant. In particular, it distinguishes between possible ‘output’ measures and ‘outcome’ measures, with the latter being especially important, as discussed in the next section. This approach thus offers useful detail but is specifically designed to be customised.

By comparison, Table 1.2 (Transparency International) provides a method for benchmarking between agencies and jurisdictions, including assessing ‘ACA performance’ relative to ‘enabling factors’ such as independence, powers and resources—another important factor discussed below. This approach is less adaptable, but can support comparison of performance across the region or world, which the Committee also acknowledges as a desirable objective.18 The Committee’s framework seeks to make best use of each approach.




11.3 The work of the Committee

To develop a framework for Victoria in light of these precedents, the Committee saw it as necessary to:

• clarify the purpose, implementation and timing of such a framework

• identify principles for selecting the content of the framework, including the broad dimensions that should structure the framework

• select the types of indicators that should be included

• be clear on the capacity and clarity of the roles of all agencies involved in performance assessment with regard to IBAC, and

• arrive at concrete steps for implementation.

The Committee was assisted in these tasks by Professor A J Brown, Program Leader in Public Integrity and Anti‑corruption in the Centre for Governance and Public Policy, Griffith University. Professor Brown is also a board member of Transparency International Australia and was a contributor to the Transparency International assessment methodology mentioned above. Professor Brown was commissioned by the Parliament to advise on the framework, and the Committee benefited greatly from its discussions with him, as well as his formal advice, on which this report is based.

The Committee also adopted the approach that its performance‑monitoring framework should be developed in stages, a process that would include discussions with IBAC. In particular, as discussed below, the Committee recognised the importance of taking into account IBAC’s own existing and proposed performance measures if the framework is to be appropriate and realistic. This includes performance indicators adopted by IBAC for monitoring and reporting on progress under its 2015–2018 Corporate Plan and future plans. The Committee therefore sees the refinement of the performance indicators in its framework as an ongoing process.

The Committee also gave careful consideration to what might be an optimum monitoring cycle for IBAC. The Committee assessed that there is need for an integrated program of:

• continued review of IBAC’s annual reporting, on many indicators;

• other more in‑depth inquiries into select functions of IBAC (for example, one function per year); and

• more comprehensive four‑yearly reviews of IBAC’s performance against a more complete framework of the kind summarised in Tables 1.1 and 1.2, to be conducted in the third year of the relevant parliamentary term.

Finally, the Committee gave considerable thought to the roles of the different individuals and organisations who would be involved in collecting or providing the data required for effective monitoring and reporting under the framework—including IBAC, the Victorian Inspectorate, the Committee, a range of



1government agencies, external experts and stakeholders. The involvement of all these individuals and organisations not only requires clear roles, but has resource implications for them.

The following sections of the report set out the main questions that the Committee addressed and the conclusions it reached, including the resulting framework and associated recommendations.


2

2 Scope of the framework

The Committee’s framework was developed in response to four key questions of scope:

1. Who is likely or intended to undertake the monitoring and evaluation, including the necessary data collection and analysis?

2. What functions and activities are being assessed?

3. What type and level of measures and indicators best fit the purpose?

4. Over what time frames is the monitoring predicted to best occur?

2.1 Who is monitoring?

This question is crucial because performance monitoring by the Committee does not occur in isolation of other bodies or monitoring and evaluation processes. Table 2.1 summarises selected dimensions of IBAC’s accountability obligations to a range of bodies. Further, in a constrained budgetary situation, the Committee itself is never likely to be afforded all the resources needed to conduct all the monitoring and evaluation activity required to implement any framework independently of other bodies.

Table 2.1 IBAC’s accountability to oversight bodies 2015–2016

Body Role Accountability activities

IBAC Committee • Monitors and reviews IBAC’s performance and functions

• Examines IBAC reports

• Scrutinises relevant existing and proposed legislation

• Conducts inquiries and reports to the Parliament of Victoria

• Makes recommendations to the Victorian Government regarding law and policy

• IBAC gave testimony regarding the Committee’s inquiries into integrity legislation and protected disclosures

• IBAC produced three reports, which were tabled in Parliament

Victorian Inspectorate

• Monitors IBAC’s compliance with the IBAC Act 2011 (Vic) and other laws

• Oversees IBAC’s performance under the Protected Disclosure Act 2012 (Vic)

• Receives and investigates complaints about IBAC(a)

• IBAC submitted two reports providing statistical data on its controlled operation activity

• The Victorian Inspectorate conducted two inspections of IBAC’s records on surveillance devices, interception warrants, and controlled operations.

Victorian Special Minister of State

• Receives reports on telecommunications interception warrants

• IBAC submitted reports on its use of information obtained by interceptions under warrant

continued


Section 2 Scope of the framework

2

Body Role Accountability activities

Victorian Attorney‑General

• Receives reports on:

‑ telecommunications interception warrants

‑ surveillance device warrants

‑ assumed identities

• IBAC submitted annual reports that provided statistical data

Public Interest Monitor

• Reviews IBAC applications for surveillance device and telecommunications interception warrants

• The Public Interest Monitor provided oversight by appearing at hearings for IBAC applications

Supreme Court and Magistrates’ Court

• Receives reports on IBAC surveillance device warrants

• Issuing judges and magistrates for all IBAC surveillance device warrants received reports from IBAC

Commonwealth Ombudsman

• Inspects IBAC’s use of stored communications warrants and telecommunications data

• IBAC’s telecommunications data records were inspected by the Ombudsman for compliance with the law

Commonwealth Attorney‑General

• Receives reports on IBAC’s:

‑ telecommunications interception warrants

‑ telecommunications data authorisations

‑ stored communications warrants

• IBAC submitted an annual report providing statistical data and other details as required

Source: Independent Broad‑based Anti‑corruption Commission Committee, Parliament of Victoria, The performance of the Independent Broad‑based Anti‑corruption Commission and the Victorian Inspectorate, 2015/16 (2016), Table 2.5, 19 (notes omitted), which was adapted from IBAC, Annual report 2015/2016 (2016) 50.

In turn, the most relevant bodies for performance monitoring, apart from the Committee, are IBAC itself, the portfolio agency and Government, and the Victorian Inspectorate.

2.1.1 IBAC

The most important performance monitoring is currently undertaken by IBAC itself. For example, when the Committee reviews IBAC’s performance, its primary reference is IBAC’s annual report and additional evidence from IBAC on that report.

Currently, the performance information presented by IBAC is structured according to its principal statutory functions, as framed by its first Corporate Plan (2015–2018) (see Figure 2.1). Table 2.2 summarises the dimensions and structure of performance measurement under this plan, although these have also been subject to ongoing refinement, as discussed below. Figure 2.2 sets out the same dimensions in a graphic form. This structure was originally comprised of 38 specific performance measures, including 22 indicators relating to operational activities (four of which were also identified for IBAC in the Government’s Budget Paper 3) and internal governance and corporate services.



2

Figure 2.1 IBAC Corporate Plan structure

4

Our strategic goals

In fulfilling our legislated functions, IBAC’s strategic goals over the next 3 years are as follows:

1. Exposing and investigating corrupt conduct and police misconduct 2. Preventing and informing corrupt conduct and police misconduct 3. Building our organisation 4. Ensuring accountability and independence

The following pages establish objectives and expected outcomes for the period 2015 to 2018, against each of the above strategic goals. The expected outcomes in the corporate plan inform our annual business plans (by function) and individual work plans and performance targets.

In addition, this corporate plan sets out the operating environment, our principal challenges and opportunities, key stakeholders, envisaged performance measures and budgetary outlook. In doing so, it identifies some of the challenges identified during the first two years of our operations, and the reviews and other measures deemed necessary to continue to develop our capacity and reputation.

IBAC Strategy

Corporate Plan 2015-2018

Functional Business plans & KPIs

Individual Work Plans & Targets

Budgets

Source: IBAC, 2015‑2018 Corporate Plan, June 2014, 4.

Table 2.2 Dimensions of IBAC performance assessment to 2017 (based on IBAC Corporate Plan 2015–18)

Functions and strategic goals

Objectives No. of outcomes

No. of performance

measures

1. Investigating and exposing corrupt conduct and police misconduct

1.1. Reporting of corruption to IBAC 3

121.2. High impact investigations 3

1.3. Intelligence that informs investigations and prevention 3

2. Preventing and informing

2.1. Public sector preventing corruption 37

2.2. Reporting of corruption in public sector 3

2.3. Public awareness of corruption risks and IBAC 42

3. Building our organisation

3.1. Capable and professional workforce 4

3.2. Robust governance frameworks and systems 3

164. Ensuring accountability and independence

4.1. IBAC compliance 3

4.2. Public confidence in IBAC integrity and performance 4 1

Total 10 33 38



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2

IBAC’s recent review of performance indicators

More recently, IBAC itself has reviewed its performance indicators and reduced its operational performance indicators from 22 to 19—made up of 16 indicators relating to ‘core’ functions and 3 indicators relating to legislative compliance (see Appendix 1). These also continue to incorporate the performance measures identified for IBAC in the Government’s Budget Paper 3, of which there are now six (2016–2017).

IBAC’s review reflects evolution in IBAC’s management systems, as a young organisation, as well as preparations for the development of IBAC’s second corporate plan (2018–2021). For example, the 22 operational performance indicators prior to July 2017 were overwhelmingly indicators of activity, and to a lesser extent output, with few indicators of outcomes or impact. The revised 16 ‘core’ operational indicators are now expressly classified by ‘activity’ (12 indicators), ‘reach’ (2 indicators) and ‘impact’ (2 indicators) (see Appendix 1).

Importantly, IBAC has identified that it expects its choice of performance indicators to continue to evolve to correspond both with its next corporate plan and with prospective legislative and operational changes.

Alignment between the Committee’s framework and IBAC’s performance measurement activities

The main lesson that the Committee takes from IBAC’s existing framework of goals, objectives and measures is the need to avoid duplication or conflict between the performance measurement activities being sensibly undertaken by IBAC and those required by the Parliament through the Committee. The Committee considers that its framework should align wherever possible with IBAC’s functions, objectives, performance measures and reporting under its own plan, given that:

• IBAC’s amended performance reporting and corporate plans will remain— appropriately—the primary structure for much, if not most, of the information available to the Committee on its performance in the future;

• there is no benefit to the Committee, IBAC or the community—and instead significant cost, risk and potential confusion—if the Committee were to request performance information from IBAC which unnecessarily conflicts with IBAC’s own monitoring and evaluation on identical or similar issues.

This alignment is also important given the substantial costs of compliance and reporting already imposed on IBAC by virtue of its special roles and powers, as shown earlier in Table 2.1. Given this level of oversight, a performance monitoring and evaluation framework that adds unnecessarily to IBAC’s compliance and reporting costs would not provide value for money to the Victorian community. On the other hand, a framework in which IBAC’s plans and processes are properly aligned with the needs of the Parliament and Committee, and vice versa, is more likely to result in quality information, common understanding of activities and performance and robust evaluation outcomes—even if the Committee also supplements this with additional elements (as recommended below).



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Fortunately, this framework has been developed just as IBAC is embarking on development of its next Corporate Plan and review of its performance measures. The Committee’s intent is that this framework and its performance indicators should be finalised in light of the latest, best advice from IBAC regarding its planning and performance measurement needs, as part of that process. Although IBAC’s development of its next corporate is an independent process, the Committee was pleased to receive IBAC’s advice that it concurs with this approach. Through ongoing consultation and the implementation steps described at the end of this report, the Committee considers that the proposed framework may well be of benefit to IBAC as it plans and refines its performance measures.

The portfolio department and Government

Conventionally, in Victoria, departments and their ministers are primarily responsible for the performance measurement system for a given department or a portfolio agency, including selection of performance measures and setting of targets.19 This is important for the Committee’s framework for two reasons.

First, under current arrangements, the Government may make its own decisions regarding IBAC’s performance and resources, irrespective of the Committee’s view. If the Parliament and people are to be well served by the Committee’s efforts to monitor IBAC’s performance, it is important that Government appreciate the Committee’s statutory role in this regard. The community would not be well served if any Government were to ignore or forget about the Committee’s advice to Parliament on IBAC’s performance and instead proceed with decisions based only on its own portfolio‑based processes.

Second, the only performance information formally required of IBAC by Government under Victoria’s normal performance measurement and reporting system is of limited value. These consist of the six performance measures identified for IBAC in the Government’s Budget Paper 3 (see Figure 2.3 for the four Budget Paper 3 indicators as at 2015–2016). Putting aside questions about whether this is the best way for IBAC’s budget to be allocated, these measures represent only a small proportion of what is needed in any meaningful performance monitoring framework. In the Committee’s view these types of ‘service delivery standards’ do not adequately capture IBAC’s real performance, taken as a whole, which is the task entrusted by statute to the Committee.

19 Public Accounts and Estimates Committee, Parliament of Victoria, Review of the performance measurement and reporting system (2014) 1.



2

Figure 2.3 IBAC’s Budget Paper 3 performance measures 2015–2016

10 The year in review

Performance measures

IBAC’s performance measures are set out in 2015/16 State Budget Paper No. 3 Service Delivery detailed below. Brief notes on major variances are included, while page references are provided for more detailed analysis of our performance.

Table 3: Budget Paper No. 3 performance measures

Unit of measure

2015/16 target

2015/16 actual Notes Page

(a) QuantityCorruption prevention initiatives delivered by IBAC

number 60 78 IBAC proposed a conservative target for this reporting period as we were commencing implementation of a new corruption prevention strategy and team structure. Despite these changes, outputs continued on par to previous reporting periods.

31

(b) QualitySatisfaction rating with IBAC’s prevention and education initiatives delivered to stakeholders

per cent 90% 99% IBAC continues to post an exceptionally high level of satisfaction with the prevention initiatives it delivered during the reporting period. This measure reflects continual improvements to activities of this nature.

31

(c) TimelinessComplaints or notifications assessed by IBAC within 45 days

per cent 90% 94% Conservative target was appropriate for a new organisation and uncertain complaints load. IBAC has rapidly developed its case management and processing capacity which has enabled the agency to exceed this target.

16

Proportion of IBAC investigations completed within 12 months

per cent 70% 86% IBAC was able to exceed its anticipated target this financial year due to:

• an increase in operational staff

• setting priorities that enable investigations to deliver optimum impact

• streamlining processes to better facilitate investigative activities

• an increased focus on staff skills and training.

18

Source: IBAC, Annual Report 2015–2016 (2016) 11.

For this larger evaluation to occur there must be a framework of indicators to help judge the substantive performance of IBAC against all its main intended outcomes, objectives and goals. A limited number of ‘service delivery standards’ are especially insufficient because integrity agencies do not undertake policy functions or deliver ‘services’ in the manner of most other public agencies. While in some respects IBAC’s independence, role and functions make it similar to the courts, or other regulatory agencies with investigation and enforcement powers, measurement of its performance comes with added, unique complications. For example:

• Anti‑corruption agencies deliver benefits to the community (exposure of corruption; corruption control; strengthened standards of integrity) which, like those delivered by courts (for example, justice), are inherently difficult to measure. However, anti‑corruption agencies also have the added problem that their methods for doing so (complaint and intelligence management;



2

covert and overt investigation; institutional evaluation and advice; training, education and research) are more diverse, more case‑dependent and far less amenable to being systematised than court caseload and hearing processes.

• Similarly, while anti‑corruption agencies share many of the challenges of the police and other investigatory agencies in discharging intelligence, detection and investigation functions, they have the added problems that the behaviours they investigate have a lower incidence (but a higher impact), are more difficult to reliably detect, or even estimate, and are more complex to remedy, than the vast range of crimes or regulatory breaches dealt with by other investigation agencies.

However, a range of Government agencies are likely to have access to important information relevant to judging IBAC’s performance more generally. A range of agencies might be better placed than IBAC or the Committee to collect and provide additional data.

For all these reasons, in the Committee’s view, it is important that the Government support the proposed framework and its implementation.

2.1.2 The Victorian Inspectorate

The Victorian Inspectorate has important roles in oversighting the integrity and compliance of IBAC with its legislative obligations. The Inspectorate also itself exercises considerable powers in support of its roles. In relation to IBAC, section 11(2) of the Victorian Inspectorate Act 2011 (Vic) gives the Inspectorate five functions:

• monitor the compliance of IBAC and its personnel with IBAC’s legislation (par a);

• receive and investigate complaints, or initiate investigations or assessments of its own motion, regarding ‘the conduct of the IBAC and IBAC personnel in the performance or exercise or purported performance or purported exercise of their duties, functions and powers’ (pars d and e);

• ‘[m]onitor the interaction between the IBAC and other integrity bodies’ for the purpose of ensuring compliance with relevant laws (par f);

• ‘[a]ssess the effectiveness and appropriateness of the policies and procedures of the IBAC which relate to the legality and propriety of IBAC’s activities’ (par c) (emphasis added); and

• ‘[o]versee the performance by the IBAC of its functions under the Protected Disclosure Act 2012’ (par d).

The Victorian Inspectorate’s functions thus give it a role in monitoring relating to at least 6 of the 10 objectives identified under IBAC’s current corporate plan, including 12 of IBAC’s 33 intended outcomes and 9 of IBAC’s 38 performance measures.



2

As a result, the Victorian Inspectorate constitutes a vital source of information for the Committee’s proposed monitoring framework. This is consistent with the Inspectorate’s view that it assists ‘the Parliament, and in particular the IBAC Committee and the Accountability and Oversight (A&O) Committee of the Parliament, to oversee the principal integrity agencies in Victoria’, in respect of those matters within the Inspectorate’s jurisdiction.20 Indeed, given the Inspectorate’s role, and the IBAC Committee’s oversight functions, a similar framework for monitoring the performance of the Inspectorate is also under consideration as part of the future work of the Committee.

For these reasons, explicit roles for the Inspectorate are suggested in the framework proposed in section 3 below (see also Table 4.1). These roles also take into account other monitoring by the Inspectorate relating to IBAC’s performance, since these should all be integrated within the overall monitoring and review framework proposed by the Committee.

This issue arises because the Inspectorate has an express role of overseeing the ‘performance’ of IBAC in one area (administration of the Protected Disclosure Act 2012’ (subsection (2), par d)), and because the Inspectorate currently has a broad interpretation of the term ‘compliance’ in par (a) and of its roles in assessing the ‘effectiveness and appropriateness’ of IBAC policies and procedures under par (c) of that section.21 The importance of clarity in these roles, and in the relationship between the Inspectorate and the Committee, is further discussed in section 4 of this report.

2.2 What functions and activities should be assessed?

The second question addressed by the Committee was what functions should be assessed. The answers determine the basic dimensions of the proposed framework.

As noted above (Table 2.2; Figure 2.2), IBAC’s 2015–2018 Corporate Plan is organised into four main functions:

• Investigating and exposing corrupt conduct and police misconduct

• Preventing and informing

• Building the organisation

• Ensuring accountability and independence.

20 Victorian Inspectorate, 2015–2016 Annual report (2016) 8.

21 Ibid 17.



2

Notwithstanding significant differences between the roles and powers of ACAs in different jurisdictions,22 IBAC’s functions remain broadly comparable with other ACAs in Australia and elsewhere. Accordingly, the functional areas identified by IBAC’s current corporate plan, and likely to be reflected in its next one (2018–2021), provide an important basis for the dimensions in the Committee’s framework for performance monitoring and review.

The key question is whether there are significant dimensions beyond the four functional areas in IBAC’s existing plan that should be reflected in an overarching performance monitoring framework.

Considering the range of dimensions and indicators discussed at the outset of the report (see Tables 1.1 and 1.2), the first area that the Committee believes should be added to the framework is the sufficiency of IBAC’s resources—including both financial capacity and legal capacity (for example, independence and powers).

Not surprisingly, IBAC’s own planning and reporting does not assess these issues, but rather takes matters of legal and financial capacity as largely ‘given’, having been determined by its legislation and budget allocation. The importance of IBAC’s financial environment is nevertheless emphasised in IBAC’s existing corporate plan. This noted that IBAC’s funding allocation was ‘inadequate’ to cover real staffing costs, given projected pay increases, and being asked to provide $2.6 million towards a Government review of the integrity system.23

In other contexts, formal planning requirements also emphasise this issue. For example, Commonwealth corporate planning requirements under section 16E(2) of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Rule 2014 require agencies to describe the ‘environment in which the entity will operate for each reporting period covered’ by its plan.24 This enables the nearest Commonwealth equivalent to IBAC, the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI), to frame performance expectations in the context of not only its operational and stakeholder environments but its ‘organisational environment’, including resource use, capabilities and jurisdiction.

In the Committee’s view, these are vital issues for consideration when monitoring IBAC. In this regard, the Committee notes that:

• the ‘enabling environment’ of ACAs has long been identified as a critical factor for their effectiveness;25

22 See OECD, Specialised anti‑corruption institutions: review of models (OECD, 2nd ed, 2013); J Quah, A J Brown, A McDevitt, J L Romero, M Thompson, R Nanayakkara, A Aminuzzaman, S Khair and T Vink, Anti‑Corruption Agency Strengthening Initiative: research implementation guide (Transparency International, 2015) 19–20, 28; G Kuris, ‘Watchdogs or guard dogs: Do anti‑corruption agencies need strong teeth?’ (2015) 34(2) Policy and Society 125.

23 IBAC Corporate Plan 2015–2018 (2015) 13.

24 Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity, 2016–17 Corporate Plan 4–5.

25 P Meagher and C Voland, Anti‑Corruption Agencies (ACAs): Office of Democracy and Governance Anti‑Corruption Program Brief (United States Agency for International Development, June 2006) 8–14.



2

• insufficiency of resources has been known to ‘seriously compromise’ ACAs’ ability to pursue their objectives, and to present a ‘threat’ to their effectiveness or survival;26

• the OECD has emphasised that any assessment of performance of specialist anti‑corruption institutions ‘needs to take into account the broader context in which they operate’, including not only financial resources but also the legal and political resources needed to protect effective ACAs from ‘politically motivated attacks’;27

• systematic assessment of the enabling environment, including the level of Government support for the Commission, is a fundamental purpose of the monitoring frameworks developed internationally.

For these reasons, the Committee’s proposed framework extends beyond IBAC’s current four functions, to encompass assessment of its operating context—in particular, sufficiency of legal and financial resources. This dimension is vital for evaluating the Commission’s performance relative to the resources provided to it by Government and the Parliament, including any limitations or reduction in resources (see Table 2.4 in Section 2.3.2).

2.3 What types of measures (coverage and nature)?

As the Parliament’s Public Accounts and Estimates Committee has identified, performance measures or indicators should not only cover all key aspects of the organisation’s objectives and functions but also:

• measures that are clear, meaningful and robust (including being sufficiently informative to ensure that changes to targets and variances between targets and results are meaningfully explained);

• targets that are challenging but achievable (as opposed to targets that are exceeded every year or never achieved); and

• objectives expressed in terms of outcomes achieved in or for the community, rather than simply activities and outputs.28

The need for clear, meaningful and robust measures is also reinforced by IBAC’s own performance measure review. For example, even at the level of the basic Budget Paper 3 measures, discussed earlier, this process of refinement has been underway. One such measure—the number of ‘prevention initiatives’ successfully delivered by the Commission—was recognised by the Public Accounts and Estimates Committee as insufficiently clear (‘What counts as an “initiative”?’).29 This measure has now been extended to specify that it includes ‘resources, publications and events’ (see Appendix 1).

26 J Johnson, H Hechler, L De Sousa and H Mathisen, How to monitor and evaluate anti‑corruption agencies: guidelines for agencies, donors, and evaluators (U4 Anti‑Corruption Resource Centre, Issue No. 8, 2011) 20–21.

27 OECD, Specialised anti‑corruption institutions: review of models (OECD, 2nd ed, 2013) 35.

28 Public Accounts and Estimates Committee, Parliament of Victoria, Review of the performance measurement and reporting system (2014) 2–3, 37ff.

29 Ibid 157.



2

Another basic step which is important for the Committee’s framework is a clear distinction between ‘delivery objectives’ (or, as IBAC identifies them, ‘core’ operational objectives) and ‘capability objectives’, such as those relating to internal governance and capacity in the organisation.30 While IBAC’s performance depends on both being met, the Committee’s priority focus is on the former over the latter.

2.3.1 The importance of outcome and impact measurement

A more significant challenge is moving beyond measurement of activities, processes and outputs to encompass better measurement of outcomes and impacts. Internationally, the heavy focus on activity reporting among ACAs dates from the era of ‘early’ ACAs such as Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) and Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), when counting the number of complaints, substantiated allegations, charges and convictions (activity and output) were the only available surrogates or proxies for estimating corruption levels and impacts.

Recently, it has become feasible with respect to institutions, target communities and the wider community to estimate changes in the levels of integrity, trust, ethical culture/climate, ethical leadership, corruption risk and actual corruption/wrongdoing. The importance of doing so has been highlighted by the OECD.31 These might be considered the ultimate intended impacts of anti‑corruption policies and agencies.

Victoria is not alone in addressing the challenge of finding appropriate outcome and impact measures in this field. Most performance reporting by Australian and international anti‑corruption agencies tends to be dominated by activity, process and output measures. For example, Figure 2.4 sets out the main performance indicators used by the Queensland Crime and Corruption Commission (QCCC). Even so, it is notable that the QCCC’s measures now include the proportion or number of investigations and assessments resulting in ‘significant outcomes’, not simply the number undertaken or the number undertaken within specific time frames.

Similarly, the QCCC’s current strategic plan identifies ‘public confidence in the performance and value of the CCC’ as both an objective and as one of its five key ‘measures of success’.32

30 Another example of the distinction can be seen in the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity’s current corporate plan, which divides its 2016–2020 strategic priorities between five ‘Capability Priorities’ (Maintaining professional standards; Investing in staff; Building operational capabilities; Reinforcing technology and facilities; and Engaging with enterprise risk) and five ‘Delivery Priorities’ (Applying resources to highest effect; Addressing the detection challenge; Preventing corruption; Leading and engaging; and Responding to government priorities)—see Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity, 2016–17 Corporate Plan (‘A More Proactive ACLEI’) (2016) 3.

31 See OECD, Integrity in government: towards output and outcome measurement, Paper GOV/PGC/ETH(2009)4, Public Governance Committee, Public Governance and Territorial Development Directorate, 5 May 2009 (OECD, 2009).

32 See Crime and Corruption Commission Queensland, Strategic Plan 2016–2020 <www.ccc.qld.gov.au>.



2

Figure 2.4 Crime and Corruption Commission Queensland—key performance measures

11

Reducing the incidence of serious corruption

hearing days held people charged with 104 criminal offences

corruption investigations finalised

recommendations for disciplinary action made

An effective witness protection service

44 people admitted to the witness protection program 100% of witnesses kept safe

5 11 57 63

About the CCC

20

Objective: Reduce the incidence of serious corruption in the public sector See pages 38–57

Performance indicator: Timely and effective investigations

SDS service standard

Target

Result

Status

Percentage of investigated matters finalised within 12 months

85

91

Other measures Target Result Status

Percentage of Corruption investigations resulting in significant outcomes 75 79

Median days to finalise a review matter 15 131

Number of Corruption assessment and monitoring activities resulting in significant outcomes 15 16

Completion of research report, Identifying corruption risks in Queensland Report

completed Report

completed

Completion of a research report examining police shooting at moving vehicles Report

completed Target not

met2

Delivery of a research report on the review of G20 (Safety and Security) Act 2013 to the Commissioner of Police

Report completed

Report completed

1. In 2015–16, 138 review matters were finalised within a median time of 13 days.

2. Due to the limited data available for analysis, the CCC Research Committee approved the extension of this project until 31 December 2016.

Source: Crime and Corruption Commission Queensland, Annual report 2015–16 (2016) 11, 20.

Another comparison can be found in the key performance indicators of the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI). Figure 2.5 presents ACLEI’s key performance indicators (equivalent, but more meaningful, ‘outcome’‑oriented statements than IBAC’s Budget Paper 3 measures), while Table 2.3 sets out ACLEI’s measures and methods for implementing them. Again, while the measures focus mostly on activities and outputs they also provide a useful framework for approaching this task in a manner that can also relate to direct evidence of outcomes and impacts.



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Figure 2.5 ‘ACLEI’s performance story’

8 ACLEI | 2016–17 CORPORATE PLAN

MEASURING PERFORMANCE

Performance frameworkThe LEIC Act prescribes how the Integrity Commissioner must report against his or her functions. In addition, the 2016–17 Portfolio Budget Statements (at pages 64 and 65) set out five key performance indicators which track how ACLEI is progressing toward meeting its outcome.

ACLEI’s performance story

2016–17 2017–18 2018–19 2019–20

KPI CONTRIBUTION

1 The corruption notification and referral system is effective

2 ACLEI’s investigations are conducted professionally and efficiently, and add value to the law enforcement integrity system

3 ACLEI monitors corruption investigations conducted by law enforcement agencies

4 ACLEI insights contribute to accountability and anti-corruption policy development

5 ACLEI’s governance and risk management controls are effective and take account of its operational role

Each year, these key performance indicators—using the qualitative and quantitative measures listed at Appendix D—tell the story of system improvement and milestone events, and demonstrate progress towards ACLEI’s outcomes.

The Integrity Commissioner must also provide evidence that the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 obligation has been met: to govern ACLEI in a way which promotes the ‘proper’ —that is, the efficient, effective, economical and ethical—use and management of public resources (Section 8, PGPA Act). Accordingly, ACLEI seeks to establish the link between the resources provided and the results delivered by asking the following questions.

• What did we do?

• How much of it did we do?

• How much did it cost?

• How well did we do it?

• Who was better off—how was the system improved?

• How did it contribute to our purpose?

• Did we go about it the ‘right’ way —professionally, accountably, honestly and respectfully?

• How can we use the results—to improve ACLEI’s approach, or inform future strategies, including resource allocation?

Reviewing performanceData is collected throughout the financial year and recorded in the Integrity Commissioner’s Annual Report and Performance Statements, which are public documents.

The Parliamentary Joint Committee on ACLEI also reviews the performance of the Integrity Commissioner’s functions and reports to both Houses of the Parliament. The Committee’s examination each year of the Integrity Commissioner’s Annual Report provides a valuable external view to inform ACLEI’s work.

Source: ACLEI, 2016–17 Corporate Plan (2016) 8.

Table 2.3 ACLEI Performance measures and methods

KPI [Objective] Measures – ACLEI knows it is meeting this measure when:

What methods will ACLEI use to demonstrate it meets this measure?

1. The corruption notification and referral system is effective

1.1 Law enforcement agencies notify ACLEI of corruption issues and related information in a timely way

1.2 Other agencies or individuals provide information about corruption issues, risks and vulnerabilities to ACLEI

1.3 Partner agencies indicate confidence in sharing information or intelligence with ACLEI

1.4 ACLEI prioritises credible information about serious or systemic corruption

1.5 ACLEI supports awareness‑raising activities in agencies within the Integrity Commissioner’s jurisdiction, including by participating in joint initiatives

• Interpreting trends in notifications and referrals; exception reporting if warranted

• Providing evidence of cooperative information‑sharing arrangements with other agencies

• Describing how prioritisation of corruption issues was aligned with the Integrity Commissioner’s assessment guidelines

• Reporting timeliness of assessments in the reporting period against a benchmark of 75% completed within 90 days of receipt

• Reporting on the number and type of awareness‑raising activities and joint initiatives undertaken, and any feedback received

• Describing how business processes have been reviewed or improved during the reporting year to improve efficiency and effectiveness

• Through peer review, understanding the extent to which ACLEI is effective as a capable, trustworthy strategic partner

2. ACLEI’s investigations are conducted professionally and efficiently, and add value to the law enforcement integrity system

2.1 Each investigation considers corruption risk and the broader impact on law enforcement outcomes

2.2 Operational resources are actively managed and targeted for maximum effect

2.3 Risks relating to the operating context of law enforcement agencies are taken into account and, in appropriate circumstances, mitigation strategies are agreed with the agency concerned

• Reporting observations made in investigation reports and by other means

• Describing how investigations were aligned to the Integrity Commissioner’s strategic focus

• Reporting the number of investigations commenced, concluded or reconsidered in the reporting period, assessed against workload, priorities and resources

• Monitoring the age and number of corruption issues carried forward each reporting period

• Assessing ACLEI’s process for assigning operational resources during the reporting period

• Describing how operational risk to agencies was managed

• Peer review will test perceptions about how law enforcement agency business risks and challenges are reflected in ACLEI’s decisions



2

KPI [Objective] Measures – ACLEI knows it is meeting this measure when:

What methods will ACLEI use to demonstrate it meets this measure?

3. ACLEI monitors corruption investigations conducted by law enforcement agencies

3.1 All agency corruption investigation reports provided to ACLEI for review are assessed for intelligence value and completeness

3.2 ACLEI liaises regularly with the agencies’ professional standards units about the progress of agency investigations

• Reporting trends in the number of agency reports received and reviewed annually

• Noting any agency investigations that ACLEI agreed should be discontinued

• Describing any actions or concerns raised as a result of reviews

• Demonstrating awareness of the status of agency investigations

• Describing and assessing the success of liaison and monitoring arrangements

4. ACLEI insights contribute to accountability and anti‑corruption policy development

4.1 When warranted, the Integrity Commissioner makes recommendations for improvement in corruption prevention or detection measures

4.2 Submissions that relate to corruption prevention or enhancing integrity arrangements are made to government or in other relevant forums

4.3 Targeted presentations about integrity are made to diverse audiences

4.4 The Integrity Commissioner’s Annual Report or other publications contain analysis of patterns and trends in law enforcement corruption

• Describing how the Integrity Commissioner’s activities (such as observations, recommendations, patterns and trends analyses, or policy contributions) were targeted to minimising corruption risk and aligned to ACLEI’s outcome

• Reporting on citations or the take‑up of recommendations in policy

• Reporting the number and type of presentations made during the reporting period

• Publishing analysis of patterns and trends relating to law enforcement corruption

• Peer review will collect information about the impact of ACLEI’s policy contributions and recommendations

5. ACLEI’s governance and risk management controls are effective and take account of its operational role

5.1 Systems are in place to ensure ACLEI officers act ethically, comply with legislative requirements and adhere to standards set by the Integrity Commissioner

5.2 Regular reviews and audits indicate effective governance, risk management and integrity

• Reporting how standards set by the Integrity Commissioner were maintained in the reporting period

• Describing control systems to maintain compliance and ethical standards, and reporting any breaches

• Reporting on complaints about ACLEI, including how they were handled

• Reporting on compliance with legislative requirements and external inspections, including any breaches

• Reporting the number, type and outcomes of reviews and audits during the reporting period, including any action taken

• Describing how ACLEI has reviewed or strengthened its control and governance processes during the reporting period

Source: Based on ACLEI, 2016–17 Corporate Plan (2016).



2

2.3.2 IBAC’s reporting on outcomes and impact

Under IBAC’s first corporate plan, relatively few measures gather direct evidence of outcomes as opposed to measuring the delivery and quality of activities and processes presumed to lead to these outcomes. In the Committee’s view, this reinforces the need for the performance and monitoring framework to place a clear focus on outcomes and impacts.

For example, while one of IBAC’s existing objectives does explicitly refer to ‘impact’ (Objective 1.2: ‘High impact investigations across our jurisdiction’), the relevant outcome in its first corporate plan (Outcome 1.2.1) was identified as one of highlighting impact by conducting targeted public examinations, with the number of these identified as the only explicit performance measure (former measure 14).

Similarly, another important IBAC outcome—‘successful and timely completion of investigations, including through criminal prosecutions’ (Outcome 4.2.2)—was only measured according to the amount and timeliness of investigation activity, rather than any measures of the number or proportion of investigations that resulted in significant substantive outcomes (for example, successful exposure of corruption, awareness‑raising, adoption of recommended reforms, prosecutions, convictions, or other sanctions or personnel outcomes). It is important to note that whether prosecutions, discipline or other sanctions result from an IBAC investigation is not within IBAC’s control, but is, rather, affected by a wide range of external variables. The use and interpretation of these measures needs to take this context into account.

By contrast, IBAC’s more recent review of its performance indicators has already identified a more substantive measure of investigation outcomes: the ‘number of recommendations made pursuant to section 159 of the IBAC Act [that are] actioned’ (see Appendix 1, Indicator 1.15).

Another example is the objective of ‘increasing the community’s understanding of how, and where, to safely report corruption and other misconduct’—as noted by the Committee in its 2016 oversight report.33 This objective was reflected in two outcomes in IBAC’s 2015–2018 Corporate Plan (2.1.3 and 2.2.3). IBAC’s previous evidence to the Committee indicated that measurement of these outcomes is achievable, even if it must be undertaken in a sophisticated rather than simplistic way (that is, it is not just about ‘brand recognition’ for IBAC).34 However, until now, there has been no framework for ensuring that it is undertaken.

Similarly, IBAC has established research partnerships to explore, for example, ‘whistleblowing’ environments and processes,35 and has used various mechanisms to track integrity issues in the Victorian public sector, such as the

33 Independent Broad‑based Anti‑corruption Commission Committee, Parliament of Victoria, The performance of the Independent Broad‑based Anti‑corruption Commission and the Victorian Inspectorate, 2015/16 (2016) ix, 15.

34 Ibid 15.

35 IBAC is a partner organisation to the Australian Research Council Linkage Project ‘Whistling While They Work 2’, led by Griffith University, which is currently conducting its Integrity@WERQ surveys nationally: see <www.whistlingwhiletheywork.edu.au>.



2

Victorian Public Sector Commission’s People Matter Survey. These mechanisms point to the feasibility of better measurement of ultimate impacts in much the same way as government investments of considerable resources in systematic research with respect to other aspects of institutional health and wellbeing do.

Additional measurement dimensions required

In the Committee’s view, an effective performance framework will include objectives and measures which go directly to these larger impacts, in addition to intended outcomes. In the framework proposed below in section 4, this is partly achieved by ensuring that IBAC’s progress towards each of its existing functional objectives is measured in terms of outcomes, as well as activities. However, the importance of assessing overall impacts justifies the addition of this as another, sixth and final, dimension of the Committee’s framework.

Accordingly, Table 2.4 presents two additional dimensions (strategic goals) that the Committee considers should be included in its performance monitoring framework in addition to the four functional goals already identified by IBAC’s corporate plan. The table also suggests additional objectives, outcomes and measures for these dimensions, along with examples of the data‑collection methods relevant to each.

These additional dimensions, objectives and measures form part of the framework proposed in section 4.

Table 2.4 Additional dimensions—IBAC Performance Monitoring Framework

Goal Objective Outcomes and Measures Possible methods

5. Impacting positively on levels of integrity/ corruption, and public trust

5.1 Maintained/ enhanced integrity levels and reduced corruption levels in the public sector

1 Level of ethical culture and climate in public sector organisations

Sector‑wide surveys (People Matter, Integrity@WERQ etc)

2 Levels of corruption/misconduct perceived by public employees

Sector‑wide surveys (People Matter, Integrity@WERQ etc)

3 Levels of corruption/misconduct perceived by public/consumers or other groups

Surveys/interviews

5.2 Public confidence in Victoria’s integrity system, including IBAC’s role

4 Citizen confidence in ability to report corruption

Public attitude/experience surveys

5 Citizen confidence in government response to corruption risks


6 Citizen confidence in IBAC’s performance


continued



2

Goal Objective Outcomes and Measures Possible methods

6. Resources, capacity and support

6.1 IBAC supported by sufficient legal capacity

7 Legal independence maintained/ enhanced at law

Comparative review, expert submissions

8 Legal independence respected in practice

Comparative review, expert and public submissions

9 Adequate jurisdiction and powers provided

Comparative review, expert and public submissions

6.2 IBAC supported by sufficient financial capacity

10 Efficient use of agency budget Comparative review, expert submissions

11 Effective use of agency budget including appropriate distribution/balance of budget across functions (e.g. investigation and prevention)


12 Sufficiency and stability of agency budget


Note: The final framework proposed in section 4 presents these in a different overall order.

2.4 Over what time frames?

The fourth question for the scope of the Committee’s framework is whether performance monitoring and review should continue on an annual basis (using IBAC’s annual reporting cycle) or whether the framework should be designed to also measure progress over longer periods.

While annual monitoring remains important, there are at least five reasons why a longer time frame has benefits for some outcomes and indicators:

• the practicalities of data collection and analysis on some measures may not be feasible on an annual basis;

• the scale and cost of some data collection might not be justifiable annually, but be justifiable on a three‑yearly, four‑yearly or five‑yearly basis;

• even where data is routinely available every year, it may only be over a longer period that trends emerge or that changes or impacts become measurable;

• a longer interval would align with providing a quality assessment of performance over the entire life of IBAC’s corporate plan (currently three years);

• higher quality engagement of stakeholders in the consultation and review process (for example, public hearings or other research on IBAC’s performance) may be achieved, and be more likely to assist in identifying strategic issues, if attempted every few years rather than via annual attempts to engage.



2

Experience in other jurisdictions confirms the benefits of an extended performance review cycle for bodies such as IBAC. In New South Wales, the relevant parliamentary oversight committee has never been under any statutory requirement to evaluate the Commission other than on an annual basis.36 However:

• even where data is collected annually, pilot studies using Transparency International’s ACA Strengthening Initiative methodology demonstrated that meaningful judgements were more easily and robustly drawn from results across at least three years;37

• in Queensland, the relevant parliamentary oversight committee was charged by statute from its inception, in 1989, with conducting not only annual reviews of the Commission and its performance, but also three‑yearly reviews.38

Indeed, it also became the experience of the Queensland Committee that a three‑year period was too short to support thorough evaluation of the Commission on many issues, leading the Committee to recommend a five‑yearly period for this statutory review.39 The extension to five‑yearly reviews was implemented in 2014.40

For Victoria, the Committee proposes a review cycle of four years, to align with four‑year fixed parliamentary terms. This acknowledges the evidence that three years may be too short. A four‑year cycle would enable the Committee appointed by each parliament to devote its third year of service to an in‑depth performance review as its main project of that year, after having first gained experience with two annual reviews and other inquiries.

A four‑year cycle would also enable the Committee to confirm the criteria and indicators applicable to the four‑yearly review in the first year of the Parliament, providing time for the resources to be found to support the necessary data collection in the second year, prior to most evaluation occurring in the third year, with implementation in the fourth year.

Further, as the Committee has noted previously, there is considerable benefit to be gained from benchmarking the performance of anti‑corruption agencies, between jurisdictions, in order to identify current best practice and pursue innovation.41 However, meaningful comparative measures are only likely to be

36 Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 (NSW) s 64.

37 J Quah, A J Brown, A McDevitt, J L Romero, M Thompson, R Nanayakkara, A Aminuzzaman, S Khair and T Vink, Anti‑Corruption Agency Strengthening Initiative: research implementation guide (Transparency International, 2015).

38 Criminal Justice Act 1989 (Qld) s 4.8(f).

39 See Parliamentary Crime and Misconduct Committee, Queensland Parliament, Report No. 79— Three‑yearly review of the Crime and Misconduct Commission (2009) 112; Parliamentary Crime and Misconduct Committee, Queensland Parliament, Report No. 86—Three‑yearly review of the Crime and Misconduct Commission (2012) 167.

40 Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld) s 292(f), as amended by the Crime and Misconduct and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2014 (Qld) s 67. The first five‑yearly review was completed in June 2016: Parliamentary Crime and Corruption Committee, Queensland Parliament, Review of the Crime and Corruption Commission (2016).




2

feasible if they reflect the experience of the agencies concerned over a number of years, rather than year‑by‑year performance against targets drawn entirely from Victoria and IBAC’s own experience. On a four‑year cycle, the time and resources needed to conduct such benchmarking would be more feasible.

The Committee also considers that a legislative amendment should be made to give statutory authority to this planning cycle through a provision similar to that applying in Queensland. A statutory requirement for periodic review helps place the decision to undertake an in‑depth review of the Commission above the party politics of the day and allows stakeholders to conduct higher quality information‑gathering and better plan their participation and contribution to the review process.

RECOMMENdATION 1: That the Independent Broad‑based Anti‑corruption Commission Act 2011 (Vic) be amended to make the Committee’s proposed 4‑year performance monitoring and review cycle a responsibility of the Committee and part of the ongoing work of the Parliament of Victoria and the Victorian Government. That the review be carried out in the third year of the relevant parliamentary term.


3

3 Vital issues: role clarity and capacity

Before setting out the proposed framework in detail, it is necessary to return to key issues identified earlier in the report regarding the roles and resources of the different individuals and organisations who would be involved in implementing this framework. The implementation of a more structured performance monitoring framework requires clarity in these roles and assurance that the necessary capacity exists to collect, analyse and evaluate the information involved.

3.1 IBAC

As noted earlier, IBAC would retain the major role in collecting the data needed under the framework, in line with its main interest in analysing this data for its own continual improvement purposes, as well as presenting it to the Committee. If the Committee’s framework is well integrated with the corporate planning and reporting activities of the Commission, then additional cost burdens will be significantly less for both the Commission and Committee than if this is not the case.

Nevertheless, the proposed framework is likely to place greater demands on IBAC to collect data in more robust ways than may have previously been required by its own reporting. The opportunity for substantial additional data collection on more complex performance issues on a four‑yearly cycle (especially research to support overall impact measurement) is also likely to add to the research burden of the Commission.

Consequently, the Commission’s additional costs of complying with the framework should be estimated and considered—noting the distinction between costs that the Commission should carry as part of improved processes and reporting and those that genuinely require additional effort.

3.2 The IBAC Committee

While the Committee is confident that the proposed framework will enhance the fulfilment of its statutory responsibilities in oversighting IBAC, it recognises that the Committee’s role in implementing the framework needs to be costed and effectively resourced. Such an approach properly takes account of the IBAC Committee’s comparatively limited resources and independent research and auditing capacity.


Section 3 Vital issues: role clarity and capacity

3

One benefit of the proposed four‑yearly cycle is the greater feasibility for the Committee and its staff to enlist additional resources from other parts of government, or for the Parliament to support the more in‑depth elements of the review of the Commission’s performance on a project basis. The Committee contemplates that this could include a combination of:

• secondment of monitoring and evaluation specialists from other relevant agencies, both to advise on finalisation of the framework and its full‑time implementation for a specified period; and

• support from other government data collection agencies to adapt their own cycles to support the Committee on an occasional/periodic basis (e.g. People Matter research).

Fortunately, the Committee’s roles in the process are also already clear, because the statutory responsibilities of the Committee as Victoria’s principal oversight mechanism for IBAC’s performance are clear. The main actions required, apart from those flagged here, are Government support for the implementation of the framework and legislative amendment to make clear that the Committee’s duty is to conduct a full review of IBAC’s performance on a four‑yearly basis, in addition to any other routine or annual reviews or inquiries (as reflected in Recommendations 2 and 3).

3.3 The Victorian Inspectorate

As noted in section 2.1, the Victorian Inspectorate has important statutory roles in oversighting the integrity and compliance of IBAC. The Inspector has described himself as, ‘in effect, as the eyes and ears of the Parliament’42 on these matters—and the Committee agrees, while noting, of course, that this Committee remains the Parliament’s overarching oversight mechanism for the performance of IBAC, and that the Inspectorate also reports to this Committee on its monitoring of IBAC.

The Victorian Inspectorate also has significant resources to support its roles. While the Inspector does not have a large staff, his full‑time equivalent staff of nine is nevertheless larger than most of his interstate equivalents, who possess at most between two and three part‑time staff.43

The Committee therefore sees a vital and natural place for the Inspectorate in data‑gathering, monitoring, evaluation and reporting on one main specific dimension of IBAC’s activities, and its associated outcomes and indicators. In the

42 Victorian Inspectorate (2016), 2015–2016 annual report (2016) 9.

43 Ibid 24. By comparison, the NSW Office of the Inspector of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) (himself only remunerated on a part‑time basis) has a part‑time assistant inspector, one part‑time legal advisor and one part‑time executive support officer: Office of the Inspector of the ICAC, Annual report 2015–2016 (2016) 9. The Parliamentary Inspector of the Crime and Corruption Commission of Western Australia has the support of part‑time acting inspectors when needed and one full‑time staff member: Parliamentary Inspector of the Crime and Corruption and Commission of Western Australia, Annual report 2015–2016 (2016) 3.



3

Committee’s view, this dimension is most clearly and directly the ‘Integrity and accountability’ of IBAC (IBAC’s fourth strategic goal, and the proposed fourth dimension of the Committee’s framework, below).

In the Committee’s view, however, there is some lack of clarity around the role of the Victorian Inspector. Currently, the Inspectorate interprets its compliance‑monitoring functions in a much broader way—as if the task of monitoring IBAC’s compliance with its legislation extends to whether IBAC is adequately performing its statutory functions in general. For example, the Inspectorate’s annual report describes it as having ‘a broad function under section 11(2)(a) of the IBAC Act’ (sic) to monitor the IBAC by ‘checking that the business IBAC has created and developed to perform its statutory functions enables the IBAC and its personnel to perform those statutory functions’.44

The Inspector has also described his role as ensuring that IBAC carries out its functions not only lawfully but ‘properly’,45 including the task of confirming that IBAC ‘is actually performing its functions’.46 However, such a role would extend beyond the task of ensuring compliance with legislation, which is the Inspectorate’s core business, to encompass a wide range of policy, operational and management issues.

It is true that the Inspectorate’s legislation also authorises it to ‘assess the effectiveness and appropriateness of the policies and procedures of the IBAC which relate to the legality and propriety of IBAC’s activities’ (Victorian Inspectorate Act 2011 (Vic), s 11(2)(c)). However, again, the Inspectorate’s annual report interprets this very broadly, to mean it may review any of IBAC’s policies and procedures to determine that IBAC is functioning ‘properly’, when on the Committee’s view this is a much wider question than whether IBAC is functioning legally and with propriety.

Elsewhere, the Inspectorate’s annual report also identifies its role as one of assessing ‘the legality and propriety of [IBAC’s] policies and procedures’.47 This appears to be an incorrect interpretation of the Inspectorate’s statutory role. A more accurate summation, in the Committee’s view, would be that the Inspectorate’s roles in monitoring IBAC’s compliance with its legislation extend to assessing whether IBAC has effective and appropriate procedures for ensuring that it conducts itself lawfully and with propriety.

By contrast, there is one function—but, in the Committee’s view, only one—over which the Inspectorate is given a clear duty and power to oversee IBAC’s ‘performance’. This is IBAC’s administration of the Protected Disclosure Act 2012 (Vic) (Victorian Inspectorate Act 2011 (Vic), section 11(2)(d)). The Inspectorate is not given this wider role on any other matter.

44 Victorian Inspectorate, 2015–2016 annual report (2016) 17. This is in error, as the relevant provision is in the Victorian Inspectorate Act 2011 (Vic), not the IBAC Act 2011 (Vic).

45 Ibid 8.

46 Personal communication, Victorian Inspector, 24 February 2017, in response to the Committee’s enquiries in preparation of this report.

47 Victorian Inspectorate, 2015–2016 annual report (2016) 9.



3

Clarity with respect to the Inspectorate’s role is important—not only because the Inspectorate would not want to operate beyond its duties or powers, but because any lack of clarity may cause confusion and duplication in the implementation of the Committee’s performance monitoring framework. For example, under the wide interpretation of its role above, the Inspectorate has also developed its own ‘activity modules’ for evaluating IBAC’s procedures in almost all areas, including:

• Complaints and notifications; …

• Referrals and reviews;

• Strategic and operational intelligence;

• Investigations;

• Liaison with other bodies;

• Prevention and education; and

• ‘Performance measurement’ itself.48

As a result, the Inspectorate’s attempts to evaluate IBAC appear to extend to many, if not all, the dimensions of IBAC activity under the framework presented by this report. Not only is it unclear that this is the Inspectorate’s role, but the Inspectorate has identified it does not have the capabilities and resources for such a broad task.49

The ability of the Inspectorate to contribute to the implementation of the framework, on those matters within its remit, is also thrown into some doubt by different interpretations of the Inspectorate’s relationship with the Committee. For example, while the Inspectorate has identified its role as being to assist the Committee, it also identifies its role as simply ‘complementing’ that of the Committee.50

Again, clarity in the relationship is of practical importance to an effective overall performance monitoring framework. Presently, the legislation is silent on the precise duties of the Inspectorate to assist the Committee in such an endeavour. While this is comparable to the legislation governing the equivalent inspectors in NSW, and to some extent Western Australia,51 it is also noteworthy that these jurisdictions have seen instances of high‑profile public conflict between their inspectors and the Commissions they help oversight.52 Nor have these jurisdictions yet tackled the challenge of the type of overarching performance monitoring now proposed for Victoria.

48 Ibid 17.

49 Independent Broad‑based Anti‑corruption Commission Committee, Parliament of Victoria, The performance of the Independent Broad‑based Anti‑corruption Commission and the Victorian Inspectorate, 2015/16 (2016) 37.

50 Victorian Inspectorate, 2015–2016 annual report (2016) 9.

51 See Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 (NSW) s 57B; Corruption and Crime Commission Act 2003 (WA) s 40.

52 See for example, N Chenoweth, ‘Sydney in secret: ICAC Inspector David Levine and those annoying leaks’, Australian Financial Review, 1 December 2016 <www.afr.com/news/politics/the‑icac‑inspector‑david‑levine‑and‑ those‑annoying‑leaks‑20161129‑gszsse>.



3

By contrast, Queensland’s legislation makes clear that the equivalent inspector—the Parliamentary Crime and Corruption Commissioner—exercises her functions ‘as required by the parliamentary committee’, is subject to the direction of the Committee on many practical tasks and must report to the committee when exercising own‑motion investigatory powers.53 No such public conflict has occurred in Queensland in recent years.

In the Committee’s view, there is a need to clarify these roles and ensure that the Inspectorate is able to play its proper role in contributing to the implementation of the framework. Amendment of the relevant legislation in a manner similar to Queensland would help ensure this is the case.

RECOMMENdATION 2: That the Independent Broad‑based Anti‑corruption Commission Act 2011 (Vic) and Victorian Inspectorate Act 2011 (Vic) be amended to ensure clarity in the role of the Inspectorate:

(a) to monitor, on behalf of the Parliament, the legality and propriety of IBAC’s operations including assurance that IBAC’s exercise of its powers is compliant with applicable legislation—rather than to monitor IBAC’s broader performance;

(b) to contribute to the Committee’s oversight and performance review work, particularly in respect of matters falling within the Victorian Inspectorate’s monitoring roles.

53 Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld) ss 314–314B.


4

4 The framework

Taking all the above issues into account, the Committee proposes a framework for the regular and ongoing monitoring of IBAC, based on assessing IBAC’s performance under six dimensions:

1. Investigating, exposing and addressing corrupt conduct and police misconduct

2. Preventing and informing

3. Impacting positively on levels of integrity, corruption and public trust

4. Ensuring IBAC’s accountability and integrity

5. Building the organisation

6. Resources, capacity and support.

As discussed earlier, these dimensions align with IBAC’s statutory functions and four strategic goals reflected in IBAC’s current corporate plan. Two of the dimensions listed above (3 and 6) are additional to those strategic goals (see Table 2.4 above):

• resources, capacity and support, under which the Committee proposes to assess whether IBAC’s operating context and environment, including the powers and resources provided to it, are sufficient to support good performance; and

• impact on integrity, corruption and public trust, focused on assessing whether the overall impacts intended from IBAC’s operations are being achieved.

In addition, IBAC’s current first strategic goal is extended from that of simply ‘investigating and exposing’ corruption, to also include the objective that, once exposed, corruption should also be ‘addressed’—for example, whether appropriate reforms, prosecutions, sanctions or other remedial outcomes are being (a) recommended or (b) achieved/implemented as a result of IBAC’s investigations. This accords with developments in IBAC’s own performance indicators and is another important element of measuring the ultimate impact of IBAC investigations, even if the outcomes may not always be solely within IBAC’s control.

Figure 4.1 sets out the basic dimensions of the Committee’s framework, by comparison with IBAC’s existing performance reporting framework set out earlier in Figure 2.2. It also shows the main roles and relationships involved in performance monitoring under the framework, relating to these six areas.


Section 4 The framework

4

In brief, the framework differs from the performance monitoring IBAC already undertakes by assessing IBAC’s performance in relation to six major goals/dimensions (as opposed to four under IBAC’s own plans) and by requiring data collection and assessment against 42 indicators. The framework will minimise duplication and make the most of what IBAC currently does. Although the framework will require more work to be undertaken than is presently the case, far more will be achieved than is possible under the current system.

Incorporating these dimensions, the purpose of the framework is to provide the Committee and the Parliament with a meaningful set of indicators to inform evaluation of IBAC’s performance over a reasonable period of time. As discussed in section 2.4, the Committee proposes that IBAC’s performance be assessed on a 4‑yearly cycle, with this process also being supported by routine annual reviews and such ad hoc inquiries on specific issues that the Committee may deem necessary from time to time.

The framework also seeks to balance ‘delivery’ objectives and ‘capability’ and integrity objectives, but with a focus on delivery given that other processes are in place via portfolio reporting for monitoring workforce capability and management issues. As noted earlier, many of IBAC’s early performance indicators related to ensuring internal capability, for example in the provision of corporate services and the management of human resources. This is likely to remain the case in IBAC’s own corporate plan and relevant business plans. By contrast, while the Committee’s framework needs to be able to identify if major issues of capability are affecting the overall performance of the Commission, it requires only select indicators to achieve this.



4

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4

4.1 The framework in more detail

Tables 4.1 and 4.2 below set out the framework in more detail. As shown in Table 4.1, the Committee proposes that IBAC’s performance be assessed against 14 objectives or primary outcomes, 10 of which are already contained in its current corporate plan.

In the Committee’s view, the framework will provide a strong basis for assuring the performance of IBAC if it includes sufficiently clear performance measures for each of these objectives or primary outcomes. Further, as concluded above, in each case these need to include outcome or impact measures in addition to activity or output measures.

Table 4.1 summarises the number of indicators proposed in the framework, against each objective (adding up to 42 performance measures or indicators in all). Table 4.2 sets out the actual indicators involved. These include:

• the 19 operational performance indicators identified by IBAC as useful in its ongoing work (Appendix 1);

• additional measures for the objectives in the added dimensions of the framework, outlined earlier at Table 2.4; and

• an improved balance of ‘activity’ and ‘outcome’ measures against most objectives/outcomes.

Where relevant, particular performance indicators have been selected or adapted from the international frameworks cited earlier in the report.

Table 4.1 also summarises which groups of performance measures (by objective/outcome) might be best applied only on the proposed 4‑yearly basis and which might also be applied year to year as part of ongoing monitoring, as well as cumulatively. It also provides an indication of which entities, agencies or stakeholders are considered to be most likely to assist the Committee with the performance information needed to apply the framework and assess IBAC’s performance over the period, including: IBAC itself; the Victorian Inspectorate; stakeholders such as clients, customers and civil society groups; and other sources including other agencies and independent researchers or experts.



4

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egrit

y,

corr

uptio

n an

d pu

blic

trus

t (5)

3.1.

M

aint

aine

d/en

hanc

ed in

tegr

ity a

nd

corr

uptio

n le

vels

in th

e pu

blic

sec

tor

–3

3–

–

–

3.2.

Pub

lic c

onfid

ence

in V

icto

ria’s

inte

grity

sy

stem

incl

udin

g IB

AC’

s ro

le2

24

––

4.

Ensu

ring

IBA

C’s

acco

unta

bilit

y an

d in

tegr

ity

4.1.

IBA

C c

ompl

ianc

e1

12

(2)

C

umu

––

4.2.

Pub

lic c

onfid

ence

in IB

AC

’s in

tegr

ity2

13

(10)

5.

Bui

ldin

g th

e or

gani

satio

n (3

)5.

1. C

apab

le a

nd p

rofe

ssio

nal w

orkf

orce

12

3(6

)

Cum

u

––

–

5.2.

R

obus

t gov

erna

nce

fram

ewor

ks a

nd

syst

ems

3–

3(7

)

Cum

u

–

–

6.

Reso

urce

s,

capa

city

and

su

ppor

t

6.1.

IB

AC

supp

orte

d by

suffi

cien

t leg

al

capa

city

3–

3–

C

umu

–

6.2.

IBA

C su

ppor

ted

by s

uffici

ent fi

nanc

ial

capa

city

3–

3–

–

–

Tota

l14

2715

42(3

8)

(a)

Info

rmat

ion

sour

ces

will

be

iden

tified

in th

e fo

unda

tion

phas

e of

the

impl

emen

tatio

n fr

amew

ork.

Not

e:

Bold

indi

cate

s ad

ditio

nal/

adap

ted

dim

ensi

ons.

‘Cum

u’ =

cum

ulat

ive.

‘VI’

= V

icto

rian

Insp

ecto

rate

.



4

Tabl

e 4.

2 IB

AC

perf

orm

ance

mon

itorin

g fr

amew

ork:

pro

pose

d in

dica

tors

Func

tions

and

st

rate

gic

goal

sO

bjec

tives

/prim

ary

outc

omes

Indi

cato

rs

Act

ivity

/O

utpu

tO

utco

me/

Impa

ctEx

istin

g (I

BAC)

Exis

ting

(Bud

get

Pape

r No.

3)

1. In

vest

igat

ing,

ex

posi

ng a

nd

addr

essi

ng c

orru

pt

cond

uct a

nd p

olic

e m

isco

nduc

t

1.1.

Rep

ortin

g of

cor

rupt

ion

to IB

AC

1–

Num

ber o

f com

plai

nts

and

notifi

catio

ns re

ceiv

ed1.4

2–

Num

ber o

f alle

gatio

ns a

sses

sed

[rec

eive

d] a

s pr

otec

ted

disc

losu

res

1.6

1.2.

Hig

h im

pact

inve

stig

atio

ns3

–N

umbe

r of a

llega

tions

ass

esse

d; b

reak

dow

n by

sec

tor c

ompl

aint

s or

no

tifica

tions

ass

esse

d by

IBA

C w

ithin

45

days

(by

pub

lic s

ecto

r cor

rupt

co

nduc

t, po

lice

pers

onne

l con

duct

and

pol

ice

pers

onne

l cor

rupt

con

duct

)

1.5,

1.7, 1

.8

4–

Num

ber o

f inv

estig

atio

ns c

ompl

eted

; bre

akdo

wn

by s

ecto

r

Prop

ortio

n of

IBA

C in

vest

igat

ions

com

plet

ed w

ithin

12 m

onth

s (b

y pu

blic

se

ctor

cor

rupt

con

duct

, pol

ice

pers

onne

l con

duct

and

pol

ice

pers

onne

l co

rrup

t con

duct

)

1.9,

1.10, 1.11

5–

Num

ber o

f ow

n m

otio

n in

vest

igat

ions

com

plet

ed; b

reak

dow

n by

sec

tor

1.12

–6

Num

ber o

f rec

omm

enda

tions

mad

e pu

rsua

nt to

sec

tion

159

of th

e IB

AC

A

ct a

ctio

ned

by s

ecto

r1.1

5

–7

Perc

enta

ge o

f inv

estig

atio

ns re

sulti

ng in

sig

nific

ant o

utco

mes

(in

clud

ing

expo

sure

of c

orru

ptio

n an

d its

impa

cts,

pro

secu

tions

, dis

cipl

ine,

sa

nctio

ns, c

hang

es to

sys

tem

s an

d pr

actic

es to

pre

vent

cor

rupt

ion,

or

othe

r cha

nges

/int

erve

ntio

ns)

1.3.

Inte

llige

nce

that

info

rms

inve

stig

atio

n, p

reve

ntio

n an

d po

licy

8–

Num

ber o

f rep

orts

(spe

cial

repo

rts,

str

ateg

ic re

sear

ch a

nd in

telli

genc

e re

port

s) p

ublis

hed

by IB

AC

1.3

–9

Act

ive

iden

tifica

tion

and

asse

ssm

ent o

f cor

rupt

ion

risks

faci

ng th

e V

icto

rian

publ

ic s

ecto

r (th

roug

h co

rrup

tion

notifi

catio

n as

sess

men

ts o

r ot

her r

esea

rch)

2. P

reve

ntin

g an

d in

form

ing

2.1.

Publ

ic s

ecto

r pro

activ

ely

prev

entin

g co

rrup

tion

10–

Num

ber o

f cor

rupt

ion

prev

entio

n in

itiat

ives

(in

clud

ing

reso

urce

s,

publ

icat

ions

and

eve

nts)

del

iver

ed b

y IB

AC

; bre

akdo

wn

by s

ecto

r 1.1

11Sa

tisfa

ctio

n ra

ting

with

cor

rupt

ion

prev

entio

n in

itiat

ives

del

iver

ed b

y IB

AC

1.2

–12

Qua

litat

ive

exam

ples

of c

hang

es to

pub

lic s

ecto

r pol

icie

s, s

yste

ms

and

prac

tices

to p

reve

nt c

orru

ptio

n re

sulti

ng fr

om IB

AC

reco

mm

enda

tions

, re

sear

ch, s

ubm

issi

ons

or re

port

s

1.16



4

Func

tions

and

st

rate

gic

goal

sO

bjec

tives

/prim

ary

outc

omes

Indi

cato

rs

Act

ivity

/O

utpu

tO

utco

me/

Impa

ctEx

istin

g (I

BAC)

Exis

ting

(Bud

get

Pape

r No.

3)

2. P

reve

ntin

g an

d in

form

ing

(c

ontin

ued)

2.2.

Rep

ortin

g of

cor

rupt

ion

in p

ublic

se

ctor

13–

Num

ber o

f age

ncie

s re

cord

ing,

trac

king

and

repo

rtin

g co

rrup

tion

issu

es/

risks

by

sect

or

14–

Num

ber o

f pub

lic s

ecto

r org

anis

atio

ns w

ith a

dequ

ate

syst

ems

for t

he

supp

ort a

nd p

rote

ctio

n of

pro

tect

ed d

iscl

oser

s (w

hist

lebl

ower

s).

–15

The

num

ber o

f rep

orts

of w

rong

doin

g am

ong

staff

not

act

ed u

pon

by

publ

ic s

ecto

r age

ncie

s

2.3.

Pub

lic a

war

enes

s of

cor

rupt

ion

risks

an

d IB

AC

16–

Num

ber o

f med

ia m

entio

ns o

f IB

AC

; bre

akdo

wn

by s

tate

and

regi

on1.1

3

17–

Num

ber o

f uni

que

web

site

vis

its1.1

4

–18

Leve

l of a

war

enes

s am

ong

publ

ic/t

arge

t pop

ulat

ions

of n

atur

e an

d ne

gativ

e co

nseq

uenc

es o

f cor

rupt

ion

3. Im

pact

ing

posi

tivel

y on

leve

ls o

f int

egrit

y,

corr

uptio

n an

d pu

blic

trus

t

3.1.

Enha

nced

/mai

ntai

ned

inte

grity

and

co

rrup

tion

leve

ls in

the

publ

ic s

ecto

r–

19Le

vel o

f eth

ical

cul

ture

and

clim

ate

in s

elec

ted

publ

ic s

ecto

r org

anis

atio

ns

–20

Leve

ls o

f cor

rupt

ion/

mis

cond

uct p

erce

ived

by

publ

ic e

mpl

oyee

s

–21

Leve

ls o

f cor

rupt

ion/

mis

cond

uct p

erce

ived

by

publ

ic/c

onsu

mer

s or

oth

er

grou

ps

3.2.

Pub

lic c

onfid

ence

in V

icto

ria’s

in

tegr

ity s

yste

m in

clud

ing

IBA

C’s

ro

le

22C

larit

y an

d co

nfide

nce

of o

ther

inte

grity

age

ncie

s an

d offi

cial

indi

vidu

als

and

orga

nisa

tions

re: I

BA

C’s

role

s an

d pe

rfor

man

ce (

incl

udin

g co

ordi

natio

n, c

olla

bora

tion

and

supp

ort)

23C

larit

y an

d co

nfide

nce

of n

on‑g

over

nmen

t ind

ivid

uals

and

org

anis

atio

ns

re: I

BA

C’s

role

s an

d pe

rfor

man

ce (

incl

udin

g ci

vil s

ocie

ty o

rgan

isat

ions

, m

edia

)

–24

Citi

zen

confi

denc

e in

abi

lity

to re

port

cor

rupt

ion

–25

Citi

zen

confi

denc

e in

IBA

C’s

per

form

ance

4. E

nsur

ing

IBA

C’s

ac

coun

tabi

lity

and

inte

grity

4.1.

IBA

C c

ompl

ianc

e26

–N

umbe

r of a

ccep

ted

reco

mm

enda

tions

from

repo

rts

rece

ived

from

ex

tern

al a

genc

ies

aris

ing

out o

f ins

pect

ions

and

inve

stig

atio

ns o

f IB

AC

’s

use

of it

s sp

ecia

l inv

estig

ativ

e po

wer

s an

d ov

ersi

ght o

f IB

AC

’s s

tatu

tory

fu

nctio

ns; b

reak

dow

n by

the

num

ber o

f rec

omm

enda

tions

dee

med

si

gnifi

cant

.

2.1,

2.2

–27

Num

ber o

f acc

epte

d ac

tions

aris

ing

from

reco

mm

enda

tions

from

ex

tern

al a

genc

ies

as a

resu

lt of

insp

ectio

ns a

nd in

vest

igat

ions

of I

BA

C’s

us

e of

its

spec

ial i

nves

tigat

ive

pow

ers

and

over

sigh

t of I

BA

C’s

sta

tuto

ry

func

tions

due

; bre

akdo

wn

by th

e nu

mbe

r of a

ccep

ted

reco

mm

enda

tions

im

plem

ente

d by

the

due

date

.

2.3



4

Func

tions

and

st

rate

gic

goal

sO

bjec

tives

/prim

ary

outc

omes

Indi

cato

rs

Act

ivity

/O

utpu

tO

utco

me/

Impa

ctEx

istin

g (I

BAC)

Exis

ting

(Bud

get

Pape

r No.

3)

4. E

nsur

ing

IBA

C’s

ac

coun

tabi

lity

and

inte

grity

(c

ontin

ued)

4.2.

Pub

lic c

onfid

ence

in IB

AC

’s in

tegr

ity28

–N

umbe

r of i

nves

tigat

ions

or e

nsui

ng a

ctio

ns c

ompr

omis

ed, a

band

oned

, di

smis

sed

or re

duce

d in

impa

ct d

ue to

pro

cedu

ral fl

aws

or in

com

pete

nt

inve

stig

atio

n by

IBA

C

29–

Num

ber o

f sig

nific

ant c

redi

ble

com

plai

nts

to IB

AC

, VI o

r oth

er o

vers

ight

bo

dies

rega

rdin

g le

galit

y, p

ropr

iety

or i

nteg

rity

of IB

AC

/sta

ff

–30

Con

fiden

ce o

f ind

ivid

uals

/gro

ups

deal

ing

with

IBA

C re

gard

ing

its

adhe

renc

e to

due

pro

cess

, im

part

ialit

y an

d fa

irnes

s in

use

of i

ts p

ower

s

5. B

uild

ing

our

orga

nisa

tion

5.1.

Cap

able

and

pro

fess

iona

l wor

kfor

ce31

–St

aff c

ompe

tenc

ies

met

; qua

ntity

of r

elev

ant t

rain

ing

and

skill

s de

velo

pmen

t; st

aff s

atis

fact

ion

with

trai

ning

–32

Staff

job

satis

fact

ion,

eng

agem

ent a

nd tu

rnov

er

–33

Staff

eth

ical

cul

ture

, clim

ate

and

lead

ersh

ip

5.2.

Rob

ust g

over

nanc

e fr

amew

orks

and

sy

stem

s34

–M

onito

ring

and

eval

uatio

n sy

stem

est

ablis

hed

and

oper

atio

nal

35–

Num

ber o

f hig

h‑ris

k ac

cept

ed m

anag

emen

t act

ions

aris

ing

from

ext

erna

l an

d in

tern

al a

udits

due

; bre

akdo

wn

by th

e nu

mbe

r im

plem

ente

d by

the

due

date

, and

num

ber o

f ove

rdue

hig

h‑ris

k au

dit a

ctio

ns fr

om p

revi

ous

perio

d.

36–

Act

ual v

ersu

s bu

dget

ed e

xpen

ditu

re

6. R

esou

rces

, cap

acity

an

d su

ppor

t6.

1. IB

AC

sup

port

ed b

y su

ffici

ent l

egal

ca

paci

ty37

–Le

gal i

ndep

ende

nce

mai

ntai

ned/

enha

nced

at l

aw

38–

Lega

l ind

epen

denc

e re

spec

ted

in p

ract

ice

39–

Ade

quat

e ju

risdi

ctio

n an

d po

wer

s pr

ovid

ed

6.2.

IBA

C s

uppo

rted

by

suffi

cien

t fin

anci

al c

apac

ity40

–Effi

cien

t use

of a

genc

y bu

dget

41–

Effec

tive

use

of a

genc

y bu

dget

incl

udin

g ap

prop

riate

dis

trib

utio

n/ba

lanc

e of

bud

get a

cros

s fu

nctio

ns (e

.g. i

nves

tigat

ion

and

prev

entio

n)

42–

Suffi

cien

cy a

nd s

tabi

lity

of a

genc

y bu

dget

Tota

l14

2715

4219

6



4

As indicated earlier, the Committee may adapt this framework in the future, especially to maintain its alignment to the greatest possible extent with IBAC’s next corporate plan (2018–2021). Similarly, IBAC’s next corporate plan may well be usefully informed by this framework.

The Committee expects that the indicators will be further refined and adapted in the course of finalising and implementing the framework, including in response to feedback from IBAC and other stakeholders. The collection of the necessary data may involve challenges, and in some cases may require the Committee to reach qualitative judgements based on the available evidence, where objective, quantitative evidence is either unavailable or impossible to gather. Inevitably, over time, experience in applying these measures will also lead to some being replaced by new, more insightful measures. However, by identifying these measures now work can commence on the planning and costing of the performance review cycle, including data gathering.

4.2 The implementation of the framework

Several practical steps are involved in implementing the Committee’s framework As noted earlier, the performance review by the IBAC Committee should coincide with a four‑year parliamentary cycle. As the Parliament expires in November 2018, towards the end of 2017 the IBAC Committee will commence a foundation review.

Whilst it may not be possible within this time frame to complete the extensive review outlined in the framework, the foundation review will be a major first step in this direction and enable the Committee to gain insights into the workability of the framework and its possible further refinement. As well as providing a more robust review than previously undertaken, these insights can inform further recommendations by the present Committee regarding the work of the IBAC Committee in the 59th Parliament.

4.2.1 Proposed foundation review

The proposed process for undertaking the foundation review is as follows:

1. The Committee appoints a small expert group to identify, refine and adapt, where necessary, the indicators that will be selected for the foundation study. It will also suggest brief but clear parameters on what information is necessary and feasible to be collected for each of the indicators. This will include consideration of an appropriate strategy for obtaining information from public stakeholders, external experts and other government agencies on specific indicators in the framework. The group is comprised of the Committee’s Executive Officer, an IBAC representative and a Government representative with experience in performance evaluation.

2. The expert group consults the Victorian Inspectorate and other stakeholders as necessary.



4

3. The Committee determines the resulting parameters—in effect, an agreed guide to the intended data collection—and formally requests funding from the Parliament to engage a performance auditor on a short‑term contract. The performance auditor assists the Committee in the collation and analysis of data and with drafting the Committee’s report.

4. The Committee obtains the identified information.

5. The Committee analyses the information provided by IBAC and other material received and integrates it into a report on IBAC’s performance, relative to each objective and indicator selected. With the assistance of the expert group and the performance auditor, the Committee also evaluates the experience of the review and prepares recommendations for improvements to the framework, indicators or data collection in the future.

6. The Committee reports on IBAC’s performance in a report tabled in Parliament and makes recommendations to IBAC, the Government and Parliament as needed. The report will also include an account of the performance review and any recommendations for improving the monitoring process.

Finally, as noted earlier in the report, in order to access important information relevant to judging IBAC’s performance, and to implement the framework more generally, the support of government agencies will be important.

RECOMMENdATION 3: That the Victorian Government support, and assist in the implementation of, the Committee’s proposed performance monitoring and review framework, as set out in this report.


5

5 Concluding remarks

The importance of the effective monitoring and review of the performance of anti‑corruption agencies is well established. Leading organisations such as the OECD, Transparency International, the UNDP, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the European Partners Against Corruption have not only called for this kind of oversight but have developed best practice principles to inform and guide it.

Towards the end of 2016, the IBAC Committee, having been in operation for almost four years, itself acknowledged that the time was right to develop a more systematic approach to oversight of the performance of IBAC.54 Until now, the Committee has fulfilled its functions under the Parliamentary Committees Act 2003 (Vic) by reviewing IBAC’s annual, and other, reports; conducting hearings on its performance using reported outcomes; and undertaking relevant research and inquiries (including in‑depth reviews of relevant legislation). This is comparable to the oversight and monitoring activities undertaken in other Australian jurisdictions.

The proposed framework will enhance the Committee’s oversight role by setting out systematic criteria for assessing the performance of IBAC across key dimensions of its legislative functions, including a comprehensive review every four years. However, the Committee understands that such a review needs to take account of IBAC’s own systems for performance monitoring and be sufficiently flexible.

The foundation review will allow the Committee, and relevant stakeholders, to gain valuable insights into the workability of the framework, and refine and improve it as needed. Specifically, this also means that the framework is sufficiently flexible to take into account IBAC’s plans to simplify and enhance its Corporate Plan for 2018–2021.

The Committee looks forward to implementing and fine‑tuning the framework as a vital aspect of its oversight work on behalf of Parliament of Victoria.

Adopted by the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Committee

55 St Andrews Place East Melbourne 3002

1 November 2017

54 Independent Broad‑based Anti‑Corruption Commission Committee, Parliament of Victoria, The performance of the Independent Broad‑based Anti‑corruption Commission and the Victorian Inspectorate, 2015/16 (2016) 39–40.


A1Appendix 1 IBAC Operational performance indicators—July 2017


Appendix 1 IBAC Operational performance indicators—July 2017

A1



A1

Authorised and published by the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission, Level 1, 459 Collins Street, Melbourne July 2017 © State of Victoria 2017 (Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission)

You are free to re-use this work under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 licence, provided you credit the State of Victoria (Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission) as author, indicate if changes were made and comply with the other licence terms. The licence does not apply to any branding, including Government logos.



A1

IBAC OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 3

Table of contents 1 Introduction 4

2 Document purpose 4

2.1 Overview 4

2.2 Limitations 4

3 Core functions 5

3.1 Summary 5

3.2 Background 5

3.3 Indicators description 5

4 Legislative obligations 6

4.1 Summary 6

4.2 Background 6

4.3 Indicators description 6

5 IBAC operational performance indicators 7



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1 Introduction Since becoming fully operational in February 2013, IBAC has tracked its performance and compliance with relevant legislation. During 2016 – 2017, we undertook a review of our performance framework with the objective of rationalising the quantity and improving the quality of the indicators used to monitor and report on IBAC’s performance.

2 Document purpose 2.1 Overview This document outlines the operational performance indicators for IBAC and is intended to inform external stakeholders on our performance measurement framework. The performance indicators contained within the report are designed to be read in conjunction with IBAC’s Annual Report and comprise our key measures of performance in:

1. delivering our core operational functions, and 2. meeting our legislative compliance obligations.

The indicators include the six Budget Paper No. 3 (BP3) measures that IBAC has responsibility for reporting against as part of whole-of-government performance reporting requirements. All indicators are reported annually and cover the financial year period.

2.2 Limitations • The indicators reflect IBAC’s current performance framework. It is expected these initial set of

indicators will be refined to align with our new Corporate Plan for 2018-21, once developed, and with prospective changes to the IBAC Act.

• Assessing performance against core functions is less straight forward than assessing day-to-day organisational performance, where assessment targets, thresholds and standards are more clearly defined. For this reason the core indicators have been broken down into activity, reach and impact categories, and are intended to be interpreted as a whole.

• The legislative obligations indicators are limited in scope to the nine Acts relevant to IBAC’s core functions.



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3 Core functions 3.1 Summary IBAC’s role is to prevent and expose, including through investigations, serious or systemic corrupt conduct and misconduct in the Victorian police and public sector. There are 16 core indicators that show the overall performance of IBAC’s work in Victoria. The indicators draw on the functions outlined in the IBAC Act (2011) and existing BP3 measures, and include a mixture of quantitative and qualitative measures.

3.2 Background IBAC contributes to exposing and preventing corrupt conduct and misconduct by informing the police and public sector, as well as the broader community, on the detrimental impacts of corruption and ways in which it can be prevented. This includes undertaking strategic research and reviews, and publishing an array of reports and other resources to assist the public sector to improve its capacity to prevent corruption. IBAC also contributes to exposing and preventing corruption and misconduct through its complaints handling, information gathering and investigative functions. IBAC assesses notifications, complaints and protected disclosures from the police, public sector and the community, and analyses intelligence, and prioritises the investigation of serious and systemic corrupt conduct. IBAC reports publicly and privately on the outcomes of its investigations, including recommendations to public sector bodies on ways to strengthen their policies, systems and practices to prevent corruption.

3.3 Indicators description The core indicators are categorised into three types: • Activity – Measures of core activities, providing an indication of performance in delivering

corruption prevention initiatives, processing complaints and notifications, and undertaking investigations. There are 12 indicators within this category, including six existing BP3 measures.

• Reach – Measures of strategic communication activities that indicate the extent of public exposure resulting from IBAC’s activities. There are two indicators within this category.

• Impact – Measures of action taken by public sector agencies and Victoria Police to improve policies, systems and practices to prevent corruption, providing an indication of the level of impact of IBAC’s activities. There are two indicators within this category.

Read together the core indicators provide an assessment of IBAC’s performance in delivering core functions.



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4 Legislative obligations 4.1 Summary There are three proposed indicators to report on IBAC’s compliance with relevant Acts and to track and demonstrate our commitment to achievement of performance against legislative obligations.

4.2 Background There are nine relevant Acts, with two defining the role and function of IBAC: • Independent Broad-based Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2011 • Protected Disclosure Act 2012. The other seven Acts relate to IBAC’s special investigation powers: • Victoria Police Act 2013 • Confiscation Act 1997 • Crimes (Assumed Identities) Act 2004 • Crimes (Controlled Operations) Act 2004 • Surveillance Devices Act 1999 • Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 • Telecommunications (Interception) (State Provisions) Act 1988. IBAC is also required to comply with a range of other legislation including the: • Financial Management Act • Audit Act 1994 • Equal Opportunity Act 1995 • Public Administration Act 2004 • Disability Act 2006 • WorkCover and Occupational Health legislation • Privacy and Data Protection Act 2014 within others.

4.3 Indicators description IBAC is expected to operate in a way that is compliant with relevant legislation. IBAC also strives to be an exemplar public sector body, working to improve its performance. The legislative obligations indicators are focused on the nine Acts that relate to IBAC’s unique role and functions. They are broken down into two sections covering both compliance and responsiveness to improvements:

1. Compliance under the legislation – Measures of compliance with obligations outlined in the nine relevant Acts as assessed by external agencies. There are two indicators that provide information about the proportion of reports with no recommendations and of those making recommendations, the proportion that are considered significant. The indicators provide an independent assessment of IBAC’s performance.

2. Responsiveness – Measure of completion rate in implementing improvement actions as a result of external reports. The indicator focuses on tracking whether IBAC is investing in improving its systems and processes in a timely way.



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5 IBAC operational performance indicators

Indicator level Indicator BP3

1. Core functions

Activity 1.1 Number of corruption prevention initiatives (including resources, publications and events) delivered by IBAC; breakdown by sector1

1.2 Satisfaction rating with corruption prevention initiatives delivered by IBAC

1.3 Number of reports (special reports, strategic research and intelligence reports) published by IBAC

1.4 Number of complaints and notifications received 1.5 Number of allegations assessed; breakdown by sector 1.6 Number of allegations assessed as protected disclosures 1.7 Complaints or notifications about public sector corrupt conduct (excluding police personnel conduct and police personnel corrupt conduct) assessed by IBAC within 45 days

1.8 Complaints or notifications about police personnel conduct and police personnel corrupt conduct assessed by IBAC within 45 days

1.9 Number of investigations completed; breakdown by sector 1.10 Proportion of IBAC investigations into public sector corrupt conduct (excluding police personnel conduct and police personnel corrupt conduct) completed within 12 months

1.11 Proportion of IBAC investigations into police personnel conduct and police personnel corrupt conduct completed within 12 months

1.12 Number of own motion investigations completed; breakdown by sector Reach 1.13 Number of media mentions of IBAC; breakdown by state and region

1.14 Number of unique website visits Impact 1.15 Number of recommendations made pursuant to section 159 of the IBAC

Act actioned by sector

1.16 Qualitative examples of changes to public sector policies, systems and practices to prevent corruption resulting from IBAC recommendations

2. Legislative obligations

Compliance under the legislation

2.1 Number of reports received from external agencies (Victorian Inspectorate and the Commonwealth Ombudsman) arising out of inspections and investigations of IBAC’s use of its special investigative powers and oversight of IBAC’s statutory functions; breakdown by number of reports containing recommendations.

2.2 Number of accepted recommendations from reports received from external agencies arising out of inspections and investigations of IBAC’s use of its special investigative powers and oversight of IBAC’s statutory functions; breakdown by the number of recommendations deemed significant.

Responsiveness 2.3 Number of accepted actions arising from recommendations from external agencies as a result of inspections and investigations of IBAC’s use of its special investigative powers and oversight of IBAC’s statutory functions due; breakdown by the number of accepted recommendations implemented by the due date.

1 The key segments of the Victorian public sector within IBAC’s jurisdiction, i.e. state government, local government and police.



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Level 1, North Tower 459 Collins Street, Melbourne Victoria 3000 GPO Box 24234 Melbourne Victoria 3000 Phone 1300 735 135 | Fax (03) 8635 6444

www.ibac.vic.gov.au


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Documents

Independent Broad‑based Anti‑corruption Commission Committee€¦ · Anti‑corruption Commission (IBAC), which is the key anti‑corruption agency in Victoria. Previously, the