Upload
gene-sevin
View
217
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
1/53
IInnddeeppeennddeennttAAsssseessssmmeennttooffTThheeAAiirrFFoorrcceeNNuucclleeaarrEEnntteerrpprriissee
AApprriill22001111
Report of theDefense Science Board
Permanent Task Force on
Nuclear Weapons Surety
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense forAcquisition, Technology and LogisticsWashington, D.C. 20301-3140
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
2/53
This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB).
The DSB is a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide independent advice to
the Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions, and recommendations in
this report do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of
Defense.
The Task Force completed its information gathering in November 2010. The report was
in security review from 17 Dec 2010 until 4 March 2011.
This report is unclassified and cleared for public release.
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
3/53
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
4/53
4
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
5/53
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
6/53
SummaryofRecommendations.................................................................................................................. 42
Logistics................................................................................................................................................... 42
OrganizationandGuidance..................................................................................................................... 42
TheInspectionRegime............................................................................................................................ 43
Operations..............................................................................................................................................
43
PersonnelandMorale............................................................................................................................. 44
PersonnelReliabilityProgram................................................................................................................. 44
AppendixA:TermsofReference................................................................................................................ 46
AppendixB:TaskForceMembers.............................................................................................................. 48
AppendixC: FindingsfromPriorReportsontheIncidents........................................................................ 49
U.S.AirForceBlueRibbonReview(BRR)onNuclearWeaponsPoliciesandProcedures(February
2008)....................................................................................................................................................... 49
DSBPermanentTaskForceReportontheUnauthorizedMovementofNuclearWeapons(February
2008).......................................................................................................................................................
49
InvestigationintotheShipmentofSensitiveMissileComponentstoTaiwan(May2008).................... 49
SecretaryofDefenseTaskForceonDoDNuclearWeaponsManagement(September2008).............50
AppendixD:Acronyms................................................................................................................................ 51
6
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
7/53
Tasking
SometwoyearsaftermajorchangestothestructureoftheAirForcenuclearenterpriseandthe
levelofattentiontotheAirForcetotheenterprise,theDeputyAssistanttotheSecretaryof
Defensefor
Nuclear
Matters
and
the
Secretary
of
the
Air
Force
tasked
the
Permanent
Task
Forcetoconductanindependentassessmentofprogresstowardsthegoalofreinvigoratingthe
AirForcenuclearenterpriseinsupportofthestrategicnucleardeterrentmission.TheTask
ForcebeganthetaskinAugust2010andcompletedthetaskinNovember2010.
Oneachvisittonuclearmissionrelatedactivities,itwascleartotheTaskForcethatthe
nuclearenterpriseleadershipateverylevelhadencouragedtheirpeopletobeopenandcandid
andtheirpeoplerespondedaccordingly.
7
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
8/53
SomeRootCausesandUnintendedConsequences
TheneedforincreasedattentiontotheAirForcenuclearenterprisewashighlightedbythe
August2007unauthorizedtransferfromMinotAFBtoBarksdaleAFBandtheinadvertent
shipmentofnuclearweaponcomponentstoTaiwanin2008.Whiletheseincidentsdemanded
urgentcorrective
action,
anumber
of
earlier
decisions
had
an
important
negative
impact
on
the
overallenterprise. Dealingwiththeseimpactsrequiredandwillcontinuetorequireabroader
enterprisesystemsapproach.
Theearlierdecisionsimpactinglogisticssupportcontinuetohavesignificantnegativeimpacts
onthatsupport.Forexample,priortoexecutionofthe1995BRACrecommendations,expertise
andexperienceforAirForcenuclearlogisticssustainmenthadbeenvestedintheSpecial
WeaponsDirectorate(SWD)attheSanAntonioAirLogisticsCenter(SAALC).TheDirectorate
hadservedtheenterprisewithexperienceandexpertiseforseveraldecades.WithBRAC
implementationofthedecisiontoclosetheSAALC,theSWDfunctionswerespreadamongsix
AirForceorganizationsbasedonperceivedcompatibilitywiththeirothermissionassignments.
Verylittle
of
the
special
expertise
in
the
SWD
was
preserved
in
the
system.
ManagementandmaintenanceoftheICBMreentrysystemcomponentsweretransferredand
consolidatedwithothermissilesystemcomponentsattheAirLogisticsCenterinOgden,Utah.
Amongthecasualtieswasspecializedmanagementfornuclearweaponcomponents.
Othernuclearrelatedcomponentsfellundergeneralcommoditymanagementsystemsinthe
AirForceandintheDefenseLogisticsAgency(DLA).Again,eliminationoftheSWDandits
specialattentionledtoapplyingstandardsupplychainprocessestoNuclearWeaponsRelated
Materiel(NWRM).Thispracticeincludedeliminatingstocklistingsforspecialcomponents
basedonascopeofdemandcriteriabeingusedforothersupplyitems.Asaconsequence,
satisfyingtheneedforthesecomponentscannowrequireatwoyearacquisitionprocess.
Therewerealsosignificantimpactsonoperationsthatrequiredsystemwidecorrectiveaction.
WiththedisestablishmentofStrategicAirCommand,theoperatingforceswerefirstassigned
toAirCombatCommandandthentheICBMforcewasreassignedtoAirForceSpaceCommand.
Theendresultwastwomajoraircommandsresponsibleforsegmentsofthestrategicnuclear
operatingforces.
Toregaintheneededfocusonlogisticssupportforthenuclearenterprise,theAirForce
leadershipelectedtofocusactivityattheAirForceNuclearWeaponsCenteratKirtlandAFB.
TheCenter,createdinMarch2006,hasauthorityoverICBMandnuclearwarheadsupport
activitiesatHillAFBandALCMsustainmentsupportactivitiesatTinkerAFB. Theintended
functions
were
to
encompass
much
of
the
former
function
of
the
SA
ALCs
SWD.
The
Center
alsoinheritedarangeofotherresponsibilitiestoincludeAirForcenuclearweapons
modernizationandlifeextensionprograms.
TheAirForcedecisioninOctober2006toconsolidatecruisemissilesfurtherexacerbateda
strainedstorageandintegratedmaintenancefacility.
Toregainfocusonthestrategicnucleardeterrencemission,theAirForcestoodupGlobalStrike
CommandwithresponsibilityforAirForcestrategicnuclearforces.
8
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
9/53
TheAirForceNuclearEnterprise
TheAirForceNuclearEnterpriseiscomposedoftheAirForcenuclearforces,supporting
logisticsstructure,commandandcontrolorganizations,weaponssustainmentand
modernizationactivities,andactivitiesofrelevantheadquarters,agencies,andcenters.The
enterpriseand
the
recent
changes
are
illustrated
in
the
following
figures
and
narrative.
Figure1:TheAirForceNuclearEnterpriseBefore2008*
Strategic ForcesPEO
A3 Operations
Air ForceInspection Agency
8thAir Force Air Logistics Centers20thAir Force3rdAir Force
Nuclear Bomb WingsICBM WingsWings Air Force NuclearWeapons Center
EngineeringSupport GroupMunitions Group
Munitions SupportSquadrons
WeaponsStorage Sites
WeaponsStorage Sites
WeaponsDepots
Air ForceSafety Center
Air CombatCommand
Air ForceMateriel Command
Air ForceSpace Command
US Air ForcesEurope
Secretary of theAir Force
Chief of Staff
* Not comprehensive, e.g. 55thWing, AF Global Logistics Support Center
Figure1aboveshowstheAirForcenuclearenterpriseasitevolvedfromthedisestablishment
ofStrategicAirCommandin1992to2008whentheAirForceleadershipinitiatedsignificant
organizationalchanges.Beforethechanges,nuclearforceswereassignedtothreemajorair
commandsandsupportinglogisticsresponsibilitieswereassignedtoAirForceMateriel
Command. TheprincipalstaffoversightinHeadquartersAirForcewasanelementwithinDCS
Operations(A3).
Inadditiontothenuclearbombermission,AirCombatCommandwasresponsiblefortwo
conventionalbomberwingsandsome20fighter,reconnaissance,commandandcontrol,
electronicwarfare,andotherwings.TheywerealsothegainingcommandforAirForceReserve
andAirNationalGuardunits.InadditiontothethreeICBMwings,AirForceSpaceCommand
wasresponsibleforacquiring,launching,andoperatingmilitaryspacesystems,andproviding
thesupportinggroundsystems.Consequently,intermsofpeopleandresources,nuclear
operationswerenotpredominantineithercommand.Further,inadditiontothethreenuclear
bombwings,8th
AirForcewasresponsibleforconventionalbomberoperationsandcyber
operations.
ThreeCONUSmajoraircommandshadresponsibilitiesforweaponsstorageandmaintenance
onoperatingbases.Withintheoperatingwings,thewingcommanderwasresponsibleand
accountableforallactivityontheoperatingbaserequiredtomeetmissionrequirements.Inthe
9
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
10/53
caseofthedualwingbase(Minot),thebombwingcommanderwasresponsibleforstorage
andmaintenanceforboththeICBMandbomberassets.
Twologisticscentersprovidedtheprincipalsupportoftheenterprise.TheOgdenALC
supportedICBMforcesandtheOklahomaCityALCsupportedbomberforces.TheAirForce
NuclearWeaponsCenteratKirtlandwasestablishedin2006toprovidemorefocusedoversight
ofthe
CONUS
weapons
storage
sites
along
with
other
nuclear
systems
support
responsibilities.
InEurope,themunitionssupportsquadronsprovidedmaintenanceinsupportofNATO.Fighter
WingsalsosupportedtheNATOmission.
ThesupportingairrefuelingforcesweretransferredtoAirMobilityCommandon
disestablishmentofStrategicAirCommand.Therewereandareotherelementsofthenuclear
enterprisenotshownonthechartsuchasthe55th
WingatOffuttAFB,butthoselistedwere
principalelementsofthestructurethathaddaytodaynuclearforcesandsupport
responsibilities.
Figure2:TheCurrentAirForceNuclearEnterprise*
Figure2aboveshowsthecurrentAirForcenuclearenterprise.Neworganizationsareshownin
red.Inaddition,A10staffagenciesfocusingonnuclearmattershavebeencreatedatAirForce
MaterielCommand
and
Air
Education
and
Training
Command
headquarters.
The
most
significantchangeincommandofforcesisthecreationofAirForceGlobalStrikeCommand
(AFGSC)andassigningallAirForcestrategicnuclearforcestothatcommand.
Thetwoprincipallogisticschangesaretheassignmentofweaponsstorageandmaintenance
responsibilitiesattheoperatingbasesforCONUSnuclearforcestotheAirForceNuclear
WeaponsCenter(AFNWC).Otheradditionalresponsibilitieshavealsobeenassignedtothe
AFNWC.Theconventionalbomberforces(B1B)remainassignedtoAirCombatCommand.
* Not comprehensive, e.g. 55thWing, AF Global Logistics Support Center
Strategic ForcesPEO
A10-ACS for StrategicDeterrence and Nuclear
Integration
Air Forcection AgencyInspe
8thAir Force Air Logistics Centers20thAir Force3rdAir Force
Nuclear Bomb WingsICBM WingsWings
Air Force NuclearWeapons Center
EngineeringSupport Group
Munitions Group
MunitionsSqua
Supportdrons
Air ForceSafety Center
Air ForceMateriel Command
Air ForceGlobal Strike Command
US Air ForcesEurope
Secretary of theAir Force
Chief of Staff
WeaponsStorage Sites
MunitionsWing/Group/Squadrons
10
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
11/53
Requirementsfordualcapableaircraft(DCA)havebeenadjustedinthenuclearenterprise
structureinEurope,buttheU.S.DCAmissionandrelationshiptoNATOhasnotchanged.
Theimpactandconsequencesofthisstructurearediscussedinsubsequentsectionsofthis
report.
11
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
12/53
BottomLines
NewLeadershipAttention
TheTaskForcevisitedthethreemajoraircommandheadquarters,theNuclearWeapons
CenterandotheractivitiesatKirtland,activitiesatHillAFBincludingtheOgdenAirLogistics
Center(OO
ALC),
four
of
the
six
strategic
nuclear
mission
wings
and
had
discussions
with
the
commandersoftheothertwowings.TheTaskForcealsovisitedaMunitionsSupportSquadron
(MUNSS)andtheDCAFighterWing.Afterextensivediscussionsandobservingoperationsand
logistics,theTaskForcebelievestheAirForceleadershipcanhavehighconfidencethat,with
fewexceptions,theoperatinganddirectsupportforcesunderstandtheirmissionandthe
demandsoftheirmission,andareaprofessional,disciplined,andcommittedforce.
TheAirForceleadershipinstitutedandhastodatesustainedasetofextraordinarymeasuresto
dealwiththeissueshighlightedbythe2007unauthorizedtransferofnuclearweaponsandthe
2008accidentalshipmentofnuclearweaponsrelatedmaterials.Whiletherearecontinuing
challenges,theextraordinarymeasureshavebeeneffectiveincorrectingmanyofthe
deficienciesin
the
operating
forces
and
in
rebuilding
the
culture
appropriate
to
the
nuclear
weaponsenterprise.
However,someofthesemeasures,appropriatetothesituationoverthepasttwoyears,are
notsustainableforthelongtermandarebecomingcounterproductiveinthattheycreatean
extraordinaryburdenontheoperatingforcesratherthanfocusingsharplyonareasstill
requiringadditionalattention.Thecurrentinspectionregimeisaprimeexample. Thereare
areasstillrequiringspecialattentionandtheinspectionregimeshouldbefocusedonthese
areas.Theseareasincludelogisticssupportandpersonnelsupportappropriatetothepriorityof
thenucleardeterrencemission.
Accounting
for
Nuclear
Weapons
Related
Materiel
(NWRM)
is
greatly
improved,
but
remains
challenging.ConsolidationofNWRM,adaptingtheDefenseLogisticsAgency(DLA)datasystem
forAirForceNWRM,andextraordinaryvigilanceattheoperatinglevelhasgreatlyimproved
thesituation.Thecurrentstateofprogressistheresultofwhathasbeenproperly
characterizedasaheroiceffort.Withtheprogresstodate,theleadershipcanhavehigh
confidenceinaccountingforandcontrollingtheNWRMthatareinthesystem.However,given
thestateofaccountabilityin2008andthemagnitudeofNWRM,theAirForceleadership
shouldnotyetassumethatNWRMaccountingisflawless.
Recommendation: TheAirForceleadershipshouldmaintainrealisticexpectationsregarding
thestateofaccountingforNWRM.
TheAir
Force
leadership
has
stated
clearly
that
sustaining
an
effective
nuclear
deterrent
force
is
firstpriorityandseveraltangibleactionsreinforcethatdeclaration. Giventhiscommitment,
theTaskForcehadextensivediscussionsatmultiplelocationstodiscovertheimpactof
reinvigorationontheoperatingforces. Thefollowingisawidelyheldsetofviewsatthe
operatingforceanddirectsupportlevelsregardingthecurrentstate.
Reinvigorationhasproduced:
12
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
13/53
o Increasedattentiontothenuclearenterpriseatseniorlevels.
o Areturntohighstandardsofprofessionalisminthenuclearoperatingforces.
o Morecoherentoperationalfocusunderasinglemajoraircommand.
o Neworganizationsdirectingmoreandmorefocusedattentiontothenuclear
mission.
Thepriority
one
declaration
by
the
senior
leadership
is
yet
to
be
reflected
in:
o Anenvironmentoftrustonthepartoftheleadershipappropriatetothededication
andprofessionalismoftheoperatingforces.
o Budgetandprogrampriorityimpactingthefieldedforces.
o Replacementorupgradeofoldsupportequipmentcentraltothemission.
o Directivesandtechnicalordersprovidingthelevelofdetailappropriatetonuclear
operations.
o Personnelpoliciesandactionsmoretailoredtothespecialdemandsofthenuclear
mission.
Eachoftheitemslistedasyettobereflectedisdiscussedinthisreportwithspecific
recommendations.One
of
the
issues
impacting
perceptions
in
the
operating
forces
is
the
gap
betweenthesenseoftimeurgencyinhigherheadquartersandthatinboththeoperating
forcesandthesupportingworkforceattheairlogisticscenters.Theperceivedbusinessasusual
approachinplanningandacquisitionisinconsistentwiththestateoflongtermneglectof
logisticalsupportforthenuclearweaponsenterpriseasexperiencedintheoperatingforces.
Thisisimportantfortheeffectivenessofthemissionandforthemoraleoftheworkforce.
Recommendations:
TheSecretaryandChiefofStaffoftheAirForceshoulddirectthat:
Theneedsofthenuclearenterprisetosustaintheforcearegivenpriorityandthechoices
forcorrective
action
are
oriented
to
long
term
sustainment
rather
than
the
lowest
near
termcostpath.
TheAirStaffandAirForceMaterielCommandshouldgive:
Fundingandprogramprioritytologisticssupportessentialtothenucleardeterrence
missioncommensuratewiththepriorityofthenucleardeterrencemission.
Urgentattentiontoreplacing40+yearoldwarheadandmissilemaintenancesupportand
testequipmentattheoperatingwingsandtheairlogisticscentersandtoreplacingthe
WeaponsMaintenanceTrucksattheMunitionsSupportSquadron(MUNSS)sites(Europe).
Divided
Authority
and
Accountability
Thecomplexityofthelogisticschaincanimpedethepaceofresolvingemergingorlong
standinglogisticslimitationsonsupportingtheoperatingwingsabilitytoperformtheirmission.
Auniquelogisticsandmaintenanceorganizationwasintroducedatthewinglevelinthe
strategicforcesaspartoftheincreasedfocusonthenuclearenterprise.Thisstructure,
centralizedundertheNuclearWeaponsCenter,wasappropriatewhentheoperatingforces
wereassignedasadditionalmissionstotwomajoraircommands.WiththeformationofGlobal
13
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
14/53
StrikeCommand,thisstructureisnowaddingcomplexityandconfusionwithoutcommensurate
addedvalue.
Thebifurcationattheoperatingbaselevelofresponsibilityforthemissionbetweenthe
operationalwingandthemunitionsorganizationiscontrarytoimportantprinciplesofAirForce
organizationwhichassignsmissionresponsibilitieswithinaclearchainofcommand.This
bifurcationis
creating
unintended
complexity
and
negative
perceptions.
Recommendation:TheSecretaryandtheChiefofStaffoftheAirForceshoulddirectthat
actionbeinitiatedtoassignallbaseleveloperationsandlogisticsfunctionstothestrategic
MissileandBombWingsreportingthroughthenumberedairforcestotheAirForceGlobal
StrikeCommand.
OversightandInspection
Arigorousinspectionprogramremainsessentialtosafe,secure,andeffectiveoperations.
However,excesseshavedevelopedthatarebecomingcounterproductive.Theinspection
programneedstobemoresharplyfocusedonareaswhereissuespersist.Thecontinuing
intenseand
across
the
board
level
of
inspection
and
exercise
activity
is
perceived
by
some
in
higherheadquarterstobeacontinuingneeduntilazerodefectculturecanbereestablished.
Whenoverdone,thelevelofinspectionandexercisesarecounterproductiveandleadtoan
unrealisticzeroriskmindset.
Thecontinuedlevelofoversightandthebroadlyappliedinspectionregimeiscreatinga
perceptionthatthehigherheadquartersleadershipbelievestheycanandmustinspectin
quality.Italsocreatesaclimateofdistrust.Itleadstoaperceptionintheoperatingforcesthat
theleadershipdoesnottrustthemtoperformprofessionally.Thisleadsthemtoquestionthe
motivesofthehigherheadquartersleadership.Furtheritiscreatingaleadershipmindset
wheresatisfyingaNuclearSuretyInspectionteam,forexample,cansupplant,oratleast
competewith,
focus
on
readiness
to
perform
the
assigned
nuclear
mission.
Recommendations:
TheSecretaryandtheChiefofStaffoftheAirForceshoulddirectthat:
Theintenseinspectionregimeissharplyrefocusedonareasofcontinuingconcernrather
thanservingasasubstituteforchainofcommandleadershipandmanagement.
Actionbeginforaphasedreturntoanormalschedulefortheoperatingforcesasingle
NuclearSuretyInspection(NSI)each18monthsandaNuclearOperationalReadiness
Inspection(NORI)each18months.DNSIsasneededtomeettheChairman,JointChiefsof
Staff
direction,
conducted
with
NSIs.
TheCommandersofGlobalStrikeCommandandAirForceMaterielCommandshoulddirect
thatfollowupreinspectionsandspecialinspectionsareconductedonlytoaddress
unsatisfactoryratingsorsignificantnegativetrends.Forotherdiscrepancies,thewing
commanderorthemunitionssquadron(MUNS)commanderisaccountableforclosingoutthe
discrepancies.
14
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
15/53
TheCommanderofUSAFEshoulddirectthatfollowupreinspectionsandspecialinspections
areconductedonlytoaddressunsatisfactoryratingsorsignificantnegativetrends.Forall
otherdiscrepanciesthewingcommanderortheMUNSScommanderisaccountablefor
closingoutthediscrepanciesincommunicationwiththeappropriateinspectionagency.
Enlisted
Personnel
Management
Theintersectionofmultipleissuesimpactingmunitions,missilemaintenance,andbomber
maintenancecareerfieldscallsforincreasedattentionandflexibilitytomeettheneedsofthe
operatingforces.
Thecareerfieldswhicharecriticaltomaintainingthestrategicnucleardeterrentseemtobe
largelymanagedinabusinessasusualfashionwithassignmentpoliciesthatdonottakefull
advantageofspecialexperienceidentifiersinmeetingthespecialneedsofthenuclear
enterprise.
OfspecialinterestarethenumbersandassignmentofMasterSergeants(MSgtE7)andSenior
MasterSergeants(SMgtE8)incriticalcareerfields.Onaverage,ittakesabout16yearsto
produceaqualified
MSgt
and
19
years
to
produce
aqualified
SMSgt.
Hence,
there
are
long
termconsequencesrelatedtothemanagementofthisresource.
Recommendation:TheHeadquartersAirForceA1shoulddirectspecialattentiontoproviding
theneededqualifiedpeopletotheoperatingforcesinthecareerfieldsthatarebothfragile
andcriticaltothenuclearmission.
The
Personnel
Reliability
Program
TheDoDguidanceonthePersonnelReliabilityProgram(PRP)hasimprovedsignificantlysince
2004.Incontrast,thepracticeintheAirForcehascontinuedtodeteriorate.
Recommendation:The
Secretary
and
the
Chief
of
Staff
of
the
Air
Force
should
direct
an
immediateadjustmenttoAirForceguidance/practicestoremovePRPbasedrestrictionsand
monitoringdemandsthatexceedthoserequiredbyDoDdirection.
15
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
16/53
NewSeniorLeadershipAttention
Focus
TheAirForceleadershipatmultiplelevelshastakendecisiveactiontocorrectdeficiencies,
reinvigorate,andfurtherstrengthentheAirForcenuclearenterprise.Theseactionsinclude
changesin
priorities,
organization,
authorities,
and
processes.
There
is
aclear
message
from
the
SecretaryoftheAirForceandtheChiefofStaffthattheyconsidernucleardeterrencetobethe
AirForcesfirstprioritymission.ThisisreflectedintheAirForcestatementofprioritieswith
ContinuetostrengthentheNuclearEnterpriseasthefirstpriority.Itisalsoreflectedinthe
AirForceCoreFunctionswithNuclearDeterrenceOpsasthefirstlistedfunction.These
actionshavegenerallyproducedtheintendedresultsintheoperatingforces.Theyhavebeen
lesssuccessfulinprovidinglogisticsandpersonnelsupportcommensuratewiththemission
priority.
Changes
in
Organization
Threeorganizational
changes
were
intended
to
bolster
both
the
fact
and
perception
of
restoringthepriorityaccordedthenuclearenterprise:
CreatinganAssistantChiefofStaffforStrategicDeterrenceandNuclearIntegration
(A10)inHeadquartersAirForce(HAF),
TheformationofAirForceGlobalStrikeCommandasamajoraircommandresponsible
for AirForcestrategicnuclearforces,and
CreatingandstrengtheningtheAirForceNuclearWeaponsCenteratKirtlandAFB,New
Mexico,andasetofsubordinateorganizations,responsiblefornuclearsustainmentto
includeactivitiesinsideCONUSweaponsstorageareas(WSAs)andforabroadrangeof
additionalnuclearenterpriseresponsibilities.
Air
Force
Global
Strike
Command
TheformationofAirForceGlobalStrikeCommandhasproducedanearlyuniversallypositive
responseinthenuclearoperatingforces.Thepotentialnegativeaspectisthefactthatwhile
themissionresponsibilitiesofthecommandaredeclaredfirstpriority,ithasbeencommanded
byalieutenantgeneralwhileallbutoneoftheotheroperationalandsupportcommandsare
commandedbyfourstarofficers.Thisiswidelynotedinthestrategicoperatingforces.
TheAirForceGlobalStrikeCommandcommanderandstaffhaveaclearunderstandingoftheir
responsibilitiesandaretakingabroadrangeofstepstoinclude:
Clarifyingandexpandingdirectiontomakeitmoreappropriatetothedemandsofthe
nuclearmission,
Dailyoversightofoperationsandmaintenancetoensurethereadinessoftheforce,and
Addressinglongneglectedlogisticsissues.
Thecommandistransmittingaclearsetofvalues:
Individualresponsibilityformissionsuccess,
Criticalselfassessmentofperformance,
16
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
17/53
Uncompromisingadherencetodirectives,
Superiortechnicalandweaponssystemexpertise,
Prideinnuclearheritageandmission,
Respectfortheworthanddignityofeveryairman,
Safetyinallthingslarge...andsmall.
TheTaskForceliststhissetofvaluesasacontrasttotheimplicationsofsomeotherapproaches
tostrengtheningthenuclearenterprisediscussedinthisreport.
Incontrasttotheskipechelonorganizationthatbrokechainofcommandresponsibilityfor
operationsandtraininginthebomberforceupto2008,8th
AirForceandAirForceGlobalStrike
CommandareclearlyresponsiblefordailyoperationsandtrainingintheB2andB52forces.
TheAFGSCCommandCenterinterfaceswith8th
AirForceand20th
AirForceandtheirunitsona
24/7basis.Thephilosophyismicroinformed,notmicromanagement. Authoritiesand
accountabilityareclear.
ImpactofOtherChangesinOrganization
Thechanges
in
organization
have
contributed
significantly
to
the
intended
increased
emphasis
onthenuclearenterpriseandthesewerevaluableinaddressingtheurgentissues.Atthesame
time,somehavethepotentialfornegativeimpactswhencontinuedbeyondtheperiodof
urgentneed.Extraordinarymeasuresappropriatetoanurgentsituationmaynotbe
appropriateorsustainableforlongtermmissionaccomplishment.
TheHeadquarters,AirForceA10organizationwasstooduponNovember1,2008toprovidea
singularfocusonnuclearmattersintheAirForceheadquarters.Thisorganizationhasserved
theintendedpurposeandhasbeeneffectiveinincreasedfocusonthenuclearenterprise.The
potentialnegativeimpactisthepossibilitythatkeyDeputyChiefsofStaffwithnuclear
enterpriseresponsibilitiescouldfeellessobligatedtoplacetheneededemphasisonthose
responsibilities.The
Task
Force
met
with
the
Air
Force
A1,
A3/5,
A4/7,
A8,
and
people
from
the
A9anddiscussedthisissue.Anysuchtendencyiscurrentlycounteredbythecontinuing
attentionoftheSecretaryandtheChiefofStaff.Itisnotclearthatthiswillcontinuetobethe
caseorthattheA10shouldbeapermanentfixture. Thecontinuedsuccessofthisoverlapping
arrangementisdependentonpersonalattentionandisnotanormalAirForceinstitutional
arrangement. Inanycase,itcreatesconfusioninsubordinateorganizationsastowhohasthe
responsibilitiesandauthoritiestoaddresstheirissues.
AsecondconsequenceismajoraircommandmirrorimagingofHAFasreflectedintheA10
functionsatAFMCandAirEducationandTrainingCommand(AETC).ThisisnotthecaseatAir
ForceGlobalStrikeCommandwhereallaspectsofthestaffarefocusedonthenuclear
enterprise.There
is
along
standing
arrangement
in
USAFE
that
concentrates
nuclear
expertise
andattentioninadirectorateintheUSAFEA3.Again,supportofthenuclearenterprise
requirestheattentionofthemajorstaffagencies.Thisissueisfurthercomplicatedby
responsibilitiesassignedtheAirForceNuclearWeaponsCenter(AFNWC)withthestatedintent
toclearuppreviouslyambiguouschainsofcommand.TheadvertisedfunctionoftheAFNWCis
sustainment,thatis,logisticssupportoftheoperatingwings.Thatisalsoakeyroleofthe
17
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
18/53
AFMC/A4.OurdiscussionswiththeA4andstaffandwiththeAFNWCleadershipmadeitclear
thatbothunderstandtheirresponsibilitiesforsustainingthenuclearenterprise.
InadditiontotheroleandauthoritiesoftheAFMC/A4andtheAFNWCCommander,thereis
theroleoftheAFMCA10.GiventhattheA10isacolonel,theA4isamajorgeneralandthe
Commander,AFNWCisabrigadiergeneral,theroleandauthorityoftheA10mustdepend
heavilyon
the
AFMC
Commander.
Again,
this
is
not
anormal
institutional
arrangement.
At
this
level,theA10positioncouldaddconfusionratherthanvalueinspiteofthequalityand
experienceofthepeopleintheA10.Thisisalsoqualityandexperiencethatisneeded
elsewhereinthenuclearenterprise.
TheAFNWChasbeenstaffedwithqualitypeoplewithimportantandrelevantobjectivesand
hasmadesignificantcontributionstorestoringanappropriatelevelofprofessionalisminthe
operatingforces.TheissuefortheAFNWC,theAFMC/A10,andtheAFMC/A4regardingthe
nuclearenterpriseisclarityinroles.Relatedtothatissueisthescopeofresponsibilitiesthat
AFMCI90204ascribestotheAFNWC.Itcouldbeinterpretedasdevolvingresponsibilitiesto
AFNWCthatwouldlogicallybeassignedtothemajoraircommandheadquarters AirForce
GlobalStrike
Command
and
Air
Force
Materiel
Command.
The
described
scope
of
those
responsibilitiesiswellbeyondareasonableexpectationforthecenter.Beforethe
disestablishmentofStrategicAirCommand,manyoftheseresponsibilitieswereshared
betweenStrategicAirCommandHeadquartersandAirForceLogisticsCommandHeadquarters
requiringasignificantpartoftheattentionofbothcommandersandkeystaff.
Arelatedissueisthecomplexchainofcommandfromthemaintenanceunitsinthefieldtothe
authorityandcapabilitytoaddresstheirneeds.Thechainofcommandfortheworkforceinthe
munitionssquadron(MUNS)keyplayersinthereadinessofthenuclearforces passes
throughfourlevelsenroutetoaccesstheauthorityandresourcestoprovidesupportneeded
toperformitsmission.Thechainisfromthemunitionssquadrontothegrouptothewingto
theAFNWC
to
the
System
Program
Office
(SPO).
Even
beyond
that
chain,
it
is
likely
that
action
byAFMC/A4willberequiredtoresourcesolutions.Inaddition,theStrategicForcesProgram
ExecutiveOfficehasyetanotherreportingchain.Thislongandcomplexchainofcommand
wouldbelessofaconcernifthemaintenanceoperationshadbeenwellsupportedbeforethe
neworganizationswerecreated.Asubsequentsectionofthereportwillprovideevidencethat
thishasnotbeenthecase.Hence,thereisaneedforrapidresponse.
Theorganizationalchangeshavehadtheintendedeffectofincreasedattentioninmanyofthe
rightplaces.Longstandingneglectinimportantareasisbeingaddressed.However,the
operatingforceshaveseenonlylimitedpositiveimpacttodateandsignificantnegativeimpact.
TheTaskForceheardexpressionsofdisappointmentfrommultiplelevelsmostnotably
amongthe
enlisted
force
maintaining
the
nuclear
weapons.
Part
of
the
problem
is
the
apparent
differenceintimelinessexpectations.Ithasbeentwotofouryearssinceorganizationalchanges
wereputinplace.Thefactsarethathigherheadquartershavebeenworkingtoaddressthe
issuesthatconcerntheworkforcewhosemissionissustainingtheweapons.Further,peopleat
thehigherheadquartersbelievetheyhavemadeimportantstridesinaddressingtheproblems.
Sincethesolutionstomanyoftheproblemsrequiredevelopment,amultiyeartimeframe
seemsreasonabletohigherheadquarters.Itseemslessreasonabletotheworkforcebecause
18
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
19/53
theyhavebeendealingwiththeproblemsforalongertime.OneSeniorMasterSergeant
expressedwhattheTaskForceperceivedtobeaviewheldbymanywhenhesaid:Theyhave
beenadmiringproblemsfortwoyearsthatwehavebeenlivingwithfortenyears.
Thedivisionofresponsibilityatthewinglevelisnotattherootoftheshortfallsinlogistics
support.Theseissueshavedevelopedoveraperiodofatleastadecadeandahalf.Further,the
TaskForce
found
no
evidence
that
the
current
division
of
responsibility
between
AFGSC
and
AFMCattheoperatingbaseiscreatingconflictortensionintheoperatingwings.Inpractice,
thewingcommanderandthemunitionssquadroncommanderrelateasthoughtheMUNSis
partofthewing.
Still,thecomplexityoftheorganizationandconfusionaboutrolesandrelationshipscan
complicateanddelayactiontoaddresstheissues.Figure3belowisoneviewofthe
organizationandrelationships.
Figure3:TheLogisticsIssueResolutionChainasSeenbytheWingCommander
Thisisnottheonlyviewsincetheactualflowofinformationandauthoritydependson
individualpersonalitiesandrelationships.Forexample,wingcommanderstreatthemunitions
squadronasanintegralpartofthewing.Theyseektoensurethatthesameinformationmoves
throughboththeoperationalcommandchaintoAirForceGlobalStrikeCommandandthe
logisticschaintotheAirForceNuclearWeaponsCenter.Further,itisnotclearthatthereare
separatechainstotheAFMC/A4andtheAFNWC.Still,theoperationalandlogisticschainsare
separatechainofcommandstructures.Bypassinganypartofthestructurewouldrequirea
subordinatecommandertobypasshisimmediatecommanderwhichisnotanormalmilitary
process.Inanycase,theICBMorbomberSPOisoftenthelocusoftheexpertiseneededto
addressissues.Hence,thesimplest,shortestpathtoinvolvetheSPOwouldseemtobe
desirable.
Amorecentralissueisthatthearrangementiscontrarytoatleasttwoprinciplesthatgovern
AirForceoperationalunitorganizationelsewhereintheAirForce.Thefirstisunityofcommand
atmultiplelevelsmaintenancegroup,missileandbombwing,andmajoraircommand.The
secondisclearaccountability.TheAirForcecultureisthatthewingcommanderhasbuck
stopshereaccountabilityfortheperformanceofallmissionassetsonhisorherbase.Thisis
nottrueofthecurrentorganizationinthestrategicnuclearwings.Thewingcommanderisnot
19
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
20/53
accountableforthemaintenanceandstorageoftheweaponsthatarecentraltothemission.
Withoutthataccountability,itisdifficulttoseehowthewingcommanderisaccountablefor
themostbasicdemandofhismission meetingnuclearalertandresponserequirements.
Thearrangementalsocreatesunintendedperceptionissues.AFGSCandthewingcommander
canbeperceivedasinferiorinscopeandresponsibilitytootheroperationalmajorair
commandsand
wings.
For
the
munitions
squadron,
the
chain
of
command
moves
them
from
beinganintegralpartoftheoperationalunittoanappendedsupportorganization.These
perceptionsarenotdesirableinwhatisdeclaredtobethefirstpriorityoperationalmissionof
theAirForce.
Recommendations:TheSecretaryandtheChiefofStaffoftheAirForceshoulddirect:
AnactiontoassignbaseleveloperationsandlogisticsfunctionstothestrategicMissile
andBombWingsreportingthroughthenumberedairforcestotheAirForceGlobalStrike
Command.
Areexaminationofthecontinuedutilityofthesetofspecialheadquartersorganizations.
ArevisionofthesetofresponsibilitiesascribedtoAFNWCinAFMCI90204tosharplyfocus
onthesustainabilityofthenuclearenterprisewithotherresponsibilitiesassignedto
HeadquartersAirForce,HeadquartersAirForceMaterielCommand,andAirForceGlobal
StrikeCommand.
20
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
21/53
OversightandInspection
Regardingthetwoincidentsthathighlightedtheneedforintenseattentiontothenuclear
enterprise,asstatedearlierinthereport,thechangesinpriorityandprocessesarehavingthe
desiredeffect.Theriskofanunauthorizedtransferofanuclearweaponisnownearzeroand
willremain
so
as
long
as
there
is
leadership
attention
and
clear
direction.
The
solution
has
been,forthemostpart,areturntotheprocesses,discipline,andculturethatservedthenation
wellformorethanhalfacentury.
ThereisalsointenseattentiontotheissueofaccountabilityandcontrolofNuclearWeapons
RelatedMateriel.IncreasedattentionhasimprovedtheNWRMsituationgreatly,butthe
conditionofthesystemin2008andthescope,magnitude,anddistributionofNWRMmakethis
acontinuingworkinprogress.Theleadershipcanhaveconfidenceintheorganizationand
attentiontoNWRM.Theleadershipcanalsohaveconfidenceinaccountingandcontrolof
NWRMthathasbeenidentifiedasNWRM.
Thisprogressisevidenceofthevalueofanextraordinarylevelofoversightandinspection
activityappropriate
to
address
the
urgent
need
identified
from
the
2007
and
2008
incidents.
Thetypesofinspectionsinclude:
NuclearSuretyInspection(NSI)
DefenseNuclearSuretyInspection(DNSI)
JointNuclearSuretyInspection(JNSI)
LimitedNuclearSuretyInspection(LNSI)
NuclearOperationalReadinessInspection(NORI)
MaintenanceStandardizationEvaluation(MSE)
OperationsStandardizationEvaluation
LogisticsCapabilityAssessmentProgram(LCAP)orTeam(LCAT)evaluation/inspection
NuclearStaffAssistanceVisit(NSAV)
NuclearSuretyStaffAssistanceVisit(NSSAV)
NSAVs/NSSAVswerenotintendedasinspections.Theyarelistedherebecausetheyhave
evolvedintoinspectionsbyanydefinition.Theonlydistinctionisthattheunitisnotgivena
formalgrade.Ingeneral,theSAVteamisnot,asintended,charteredtorespondtotheunit
commandersstatedneed.Instead,itassessesareasidentifiedbytheSAVteamorhigher
headquarters.AnNSAVoccurssixmonthspriortoaunitsscheduledNSI.InbothAirForce
GlobalStrikeCommandandUSAFE,theresultsarereportedtohigherheadquartersandunit
commandersarerequiredtorespondtowriteupsjustastheydowithanNSI.Several
commanders
expressed
the
view
that
NSAVs
have
become
the
higher
headquarters
staff
defenseagainstthepossibleembarrassmentofaunitintheircommandfailinganNSI.
Asnoted,theTaskForcesawandheardconvincingevidencethatthelevelofoversightand
inspectionshasbeensuccessfulandhasservedtheintendedpurposeintheoperatingforces.
Further,thereisnoquestionabouttheimportanceofarigorousinspectionprogram.But,the
currentintenseandpervasiveregimeseemstohavebeeninstitutionalizedastheaccepted
approachtoproducingqualitywork.Anunintendedconsequenceoftheincreasedoversightis
21
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
22/53
theworkloadinthewingsboththeoperatingandlogisticswings. Aparticularlycompelling
exampleisMinotwithtwooperationalwings. Table1belowportraystheimpactonthe
leadershipandpeopleperformingthemissionatMinot.
Table1:DaysofSpecialEffortatMinotAFB
Year High Level ofSpecial Effort-Major Inspection,
Congressional Visit
Significant Level ofSpecial Effort -Major Exercise,
HigherHeadquarters Visit
Medium Level ofSpecial Effort White SpaceIncluding Week-ends & Holidays
2008 190* 98 72 69 total
2009 204 192 73 65 total
2010thru
Aug
168 114 75 25 total
*
For
all
categories,
there
are
multiple
activities,
sometimes
three
or
four
on
many
of
the
days.
Thewhitespacesituation(thelastcolumn)atBarksdaleandinUSAFEunitsissimilarinimpact
tothatportrayedinTable1.Therearefewdays,toincludeweekendsandholidays,whenthe
wingcommanderscanfocusonjusttheirmissions.TheTaskForcenotedasimilarlevelof
inspectionandexerciseactivityatthe2nd
BombWingatBarksdaleandinthe748th
Supply
ChainManagementGroup(SCMG)atHillAFB.Therearemultiplecausesofthisexcessive
activity:
Multipleheadquartersandcenterswithoverlappingresponsibilitiesandlackofclarity,
Continuedfocusonpastproblems,and
Wingandgroupcommanderspreoccupationwithdealingwithinspections.
TheTaskForcedidnotattempttorankorderthecauses.Inthecaseofthethirdcause,theTask
Forcenotedthat,atonewing,thecommanderexpressedthegoalofagenerationexercisea
month.Totheextentthereisexcessiveunitgeneratedexercises,theunitcommandersreceive
asteadydrumbeatofexhortationstodomoreselfinspection.Selfinspectionisclearly
importanttoquality.Still,selfinspectionshouldreducetheneedforhigherheadquarters
inspectionratherthanbecominganothersubjectforevaluationandexhortationduring
inspections.
Acommoncomplaintinboththeoperationalandlogisticsunitsisthattheinspectionsareso
frequentthattheunithasneitherenoughtimenorresourcestocorrectdeficiencies.Inthis
case
the
resource
issue
is
people.
The
same
people
who
prepare
for
inspections
are
occupied
bytheinspectionandmustcarryoutthecorrectiveactionaftertheinspection.Theirperception
isthattheyareonanactivitywheeldrivenbyinspections,notbythedemandsoftheirmission.
TheTaskForcesawevidencethatthisperceptionisjustified.
Aperception(andfrustration)amongUSAFEunitsisthatLCAPinspectionsareunnecessarily
duplicativesincenuclearmaintenanceisthoroughlyinspectedduringanNSI.USAFEmunitions
22
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
23/53
supportsquadronscannotunderstandtherequirementforaseparatenuclearlogistics
inspectiongiventheextentoftheNSI.
Furthermore,thelevelofinspectionandexerciseintensityishavinganadverseeffectonthe
readinessoftheB52wingsastheyinterferewithaircraftmaintenanceactivityatthesame
timethewingsareexperiencingsignificantshortagesinexperiencedcrewchiefsandrapid
turnoverin
other
experienced
maintenance
people.
Itisusefultonote,onceagain,thattherigorouscorrectiveactiontodealwiththeunauthorized
transferhasbeeneffectiveandthecurrentsituationisnotinneedofanythinglikethelevelof
oversightindicatedinTable1. Also,asnoted,effectiveactiontoprecludearepeatofthe
Taiwanshipmenterrorisunderwayandmakingimpressiveprogressfromwhatiscorrectly
characterizedasasuperhumaneffort.Theyneedbetterdatasystemsandresources,notmore
inspections.
Thiscontinuedintenseandbroadscopesystemofinspectionsandhigherheadquartersvisits
canbeinterpretedasaphilosophyofinspectinginquality.Infact,theTaskForceheard
commentsfrom
some
higher
headquarters
flag
officers
indicating
the
view
that
inspecting
in
qualitywillbenecessaryuntilthecultureofspecialattentiontonuclearoperationsis
reestablishedattheoperatingwings.TheTaskForcesawandheardevidencethatthisculture
hasbeenlargelyreestablishedintheoperatingforces.Incontrast,thesupportingsystemhas
notyetfullyrecoveredthecapabilitiesandculturethatexistedintheSpecialWeapons
DirectorateattheSanAntonioAirLogisticsCenternorhasasatisfactoryleveloflogistics
supportbeenreestablished.Further,theTaskForcedidnotdetectasenseofurgency
commensuratewiththeoversightactivityshowninTable1anddescribedforotherunits.
Themostpositiveinterpretationofthecontinuedbroadandpervasivelevelofspecialoversight
andinspectionoftheoperatingforcesisthattheleadershipdoesnotyettrusttheoperating
forcesto
perform
effectively
under
the
authority
of
anormal
Air
Force
chain
of
command.
The
mostnegativeinterpretationwouldbethatsomelevelsoftheleadershiparemoreconcerned
withtherisktotheirprofessionalcareersthanwithsupportingtheoperatingforces.TheTask
ForceheardbothinterpretationsfromNCOsofallranksandfromcompanygradeofficers.
Regardlessoftheinterpretation,theTaskForceconcludesthatcontinuingthebroad,pervasive
levelofinspectionandexerciseshasbecomecounterproductive.Thepervasivenessofthe
inspectionactivitystandsinthewayofthewingsestablishingtheoperatingrhythmessentialto
aneffectiveoperation.Theoperatingforcesunderstandthedemandsofthemission.Theydo
notunderstandthedemandsoftheinspectionandexerciseregimes.Theyalsounderstandthey
mustdoeverythingpossibletoensurethattheydonotfailanNSIregardlessoftheimpactof
suchafocusontheoperationalmissionandsometimesregardlessoftheimpactontheunits
people.
Oneoftheconsequencesofthepervasiveinspectionimpactonunitoperationswas
characterizedattwolocationsasnuclearparanoia,theperceptionbeingthatgoodpeople
(particularlycivilianemployees)areavoidingassignmentsthatsubjectthemtotheinspection
andoversightregimethathasbecomeinstitutionalizedinnuclearoperationsandlogistics
activities.Nuclearparanoiamayalsobeimpactingtheattitudetowardsbeingidentifiedas
havingnuclearexpertisethoughtheevidenceofthiswasanecdotalandlimited.
23
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
24/53
TheTaskForcealsohearddiscussionoftheroleoftheAirForceInspectionAgency(AFIA).That
rolehasevolvedtobothacoreaugmentationtomajorcommandinspectionteamsandan
oversightandqualitycontrolroleonvirtuallyeveryNSI/DNSI.TheAFIAroleseemsappropriate
anduseful.Still,thecombinationofmajorcommandinspectors,AFIAinspectorsandobservers,
DTRAinspectorsandobservers,AFSafetyCenterobservers,combatantcommandobservers,
and,in
Europe,
NATO
observers
grows
the
inspection
teams.
It
is
not
unusual
to
have
eight
or
teninspectorsfromthemultipleagenciesobservingatechnicaloperationcarriedoutbytwo
technicians. InthecaseofaNSI/DNSIforaMunitionsSupportSquadroninEurope,itisnot
uncommontohave80to90inspectorsexaminingaunitwithatotalunitmanningoflessthan
150.
Further,thelevelofdetailintheinspection,thejudgmentaboutwhatismajorandwhatis
minor,andanumberofnewandseeminglyillogicalrulesraisecredibilityissues.Fourexamples
illustratethetrendtowardsexcess.
ArecentnewsafetyruledemandsthatnotechnicianinaWMTbecloserthanoneinch
fromawallwhenthefiresetcablesareexposedonanassetlestanunknownsourceof
electricalcurrent
leap
to
the
firing
set.
This
rule
applies
to
aWMT
which,
itself,
is
a
faradaycage,enclosedinalightningprotectedaircraftshelter.Thisisparticularly
difficulttocomplywithinaworkareadesignedforfourpeoplewhentheyarebeing
observedbymultipleinspectors,alldeclaringthattheymustactuallyseethetechnician
performeachstepoftheprocedure.
ThereisanAirForcerequirementfortheSupplyChainManagementGroupattheALC
tomaintaintwoyearsofpaperprintoutsofusagefactors.Sinceallthisinformationis
availableelectronically,theprintoutshavenopracticaluse.Thisrequirementproduces
about400,000pagesofprintouteachquarterdemandingstoragecabinetsforeight
quartersworthofvirtuallyworthlesspaper.StilltheLogisticsComplianceAssessment
Teamreligiously
checks
to
be
certain
that
the
full
eight
quarters
of
printouts
are
properlymaintained.Missingpaperdatacanbeamajorwriteup.Theunitsanswerto
whytheinspectorsdothatisbecausetheycan.
InspectionsoftechnicaloperationsinUSAFEareconductedontrainingassets(notwar
reserveassets).Theseassetshaveseenheavyuseandhavenumerousnicksand
scratches.Theinspectionteamtypicallyrequiresthatthetechniciangothroughthe
processofinspecting,assessingwithreferencetotechdata,andrecordingeachofthe
defects.Thisalonecanconsumemorethananhourattheoutsetofanoperationwhere
thetotaltaskexecutiontimeisnormallyabout30minutes.Itisdifficulttoexplaintothe
technicianwhyhehastorepeatedlydemonstrateduringasingleoperationthathe
knows
how
to
correctly
identify
and
characterize
defects
on
a
worn
training
munition.
ThisisanissueatthenuclearbomberbasesinCONUSaswell.
Thereisalsothematterofthemostbasictrust.Thecomplaintofseveraltechniciansis
thatiftheinspectorsdonotactuallyseethetechnicianperformaparticularstep
becausetheinspectorsareconversingamongthemselvesorotherwisedistracted,
inspectorswillnotacceptthatthetechnicianperformedthestep.Inatleastonecase,it
causedthefailureofanNSI.Thissortofattitudeisinterpretedbytheworking
technicianasevidencethattheofficialdirectiongiventheinspectoristoassumethat
24
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
25/53
thosetheyareobservingarenotdoingthetaskproperlyuntilproventotheinspector.
Sincethesearenuclearoperations,therearealwaysatleasttwotechniciansatwork
andthereisnoreasonablebasisforinspectorsautomaticdiscountingofthewordofa
trustedtechnicianteam.
Anadditionalpriceofthenumbersofobservers/inspectorsthatinsistonphysically
observingtechnical
operations
is
alevel
of
interference
and
artificiality
that
calls
into
questionthevalidlyoftheentireinspectionprocess.Asanexample,forUSAFE
operationsitcantakeanhourandahalfwhenusingtheproperproceduretoclearan
inspectionandobserverpartyintoanaircraftsheltertoobserveatechnicalorloading
operation.
Theissueofgroupsofinspectorsalsoappliestonontechnicaloperations.Inthecaseof
arecentNSIataMUNSSinEurope,therewerenineinspectorsexaminingthePRP
recordsofaunitwith142peopleonPRPwithonePRPmonitorintheunit.
Recommendations:
TheSecretaryandtheChiefofStaffoftheAirForceshoulddirectthat:
Theintenseinspectionregimeissharplyrefocusedonareasofcontinuingconcernrather
thanservingasasubstituteforchainofcommandleadershipandmanagement.
Actionbeginforaphasedreturntoanormalschedulefortheoperatingforcesasingle
NuclearSuretyInspection(NSI)each18monthsandaNuclearOperationalReadiness
Inspection(NORI)each18 months.DNSIsasneededtomeettheChairman,JointChiefsof
Staffdirection,conductedwithNSIs.ForthelogisticsunitssubjecttoLogisticsCapability
AssessmentTeaminspections,thenormalfrequencyshouldbe18months.
Thenumbersofinspectorsfrommultipleorganizationsistailoredtothesizeand
complexityoftheoperationsoftheunit.
Thenumbersofinspectorsphysicallyobservingtechnicalandloadingoperationsin
controlledfacilitiesistheminimumrequiredtoverifytheproperperformanceofthetask.
TheCommandersofAirForceGlobalStrikeCommandandAirForceMaterielCommand
shoulddirectthatfollowupreinspectionsandspecialinspectionsareconductedonlyto
addressunsatisfactoryratingsorsignificantnegativetrends.Forotherdiscrepancies,the
wingcommanderorAFMCMUNScommanderisaccountableforclosingdiscrepancies.
TheCommanderofUSAirForcesinEuropeshouldrestrictthetotalsizeandcomplexityofan
inspectionteamtothatwhichisappropriatetothesizeandcomplexityofthenuclear
operationsoftheinspectedunit.
25
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
26/53
OperationsandMaintenance
LogisticsandMaintenance
TheTaskForceelectedtovisittheOgdenALCsincemanyofthelogisticsissuesidentifiedon
visitstootherorganizationswerefocusedonthesupportforballisticmissilesandballistic
missilewarheads.
There
are
anumber
of
organizations
relevant
to
the
support
of
ballistic
missilesustainment.SomearelocatedatHillAFBandsomeatKirtlandAFB.Thereisavarietyof
reportingchannels directlytotheOOALC,totheAFNWC,ortoAFMCsAirForceGlobal
LogisticsSupportCenter.Table2listssomeoftherelevantorganizations.
Table2:LogisticsSupportOrganizations
Organization Reports to Location Function
ICBM Systems Division AF Nuclear WeaponsCenter
Hill AFB System Program Office
Engineering Support
498thNuclear SystemsWing (NSW)
AF Nuclear WeaponsCenter
Kirtland AFB KUMMSC Support
Munitions Sqds708
thNuclear Sustainment
Sqd (NSUS)498
thNSW Kirtland AFB Stockpile management of
DOE support to DoD
309thMissile Mx Group
(MMXG)
Ogden Air Logistics Ctr Hill AFB Depot repair for RS/RVMinuteman III Mk12/Mk21
748thSupply Chain
Management GroupAF Global Logistics
Support CenterHill AFB
component
Supply Support
NWRM management
Withtheexceptionofthe708th
NSUS,theissueswiththemaintenanceandlogistics
organizationsimpactingeitherthestrategicforcesorthoseinEuropeweresimilar:
Agingequipment
central
to
their
mission
with
little
or
no
urgency
in
plans
to
replace
the
equipment.
Lowpriorityinspiteofthedeclarationoftheprimacyofthenuclearmission.Plansto
providetheneededsupporttoincludesuchseeminglymundaneneedsasconnecting
cablesrepeatedlyfrustratedbydemandstofindcheapersolutions.Hencetheusual
responseisstretchedordelayedprogramssuchasthereplacementfortheReentry
SystemTestSet(RSTS),a40+yearoldpieceofessentialtestgearwithacurrently
plannedreplacementdateof2017. TheTaskForcenotedthatittookonlyaboutthis
lengthoftimetodevelopandfieldtheF15andF16fighteraircraft.
Reductionsinmanpoweratthesametimeasincreasesinworkload.Figure4offersone
illustrationoftheincreaseinworkload.
26
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
27/53
Figure4:Re-EntrySystem/Re-EntryVehicle(RS/RV)EngineeringRequests
Therearemultiplereasonsfortheescalatinggrowthindemandforengineeringsupportfrom
theICBMSystemsDivision:
Continuedagingofsystemsbeingsupportedandsupportequipment.
Reducedexperienceintheunitsmaintainingtheequipment.
Inadequateandoutdatedtechnicaldatawithmanpowerasaprimereasonfortechnical
databacklog.
Anenvironmentofriskavoidanceleadingtoreferralsforengineeringjudgments
formerlymade
by
maintenance
supervisors.
Virtuallyallofthesecausesofincreasedworkloadandreducedefficiencyareevidentacrossthe
maintenanceandlogisticsactivitiesintheoperatingwingsandthelogisticswingsandgroups.
Recommendation:TheAirForceA1shoulddirectazerobaseassessmentofthelogistics
centerandoperatingunitengineeringandmaintenancemanpowerrequirementsconsidering
theagingoftheequipment.
Additionalrecommendationsrelevanttothisdiscussionarefoundinthefollowingsectionson
operatingwings.
Operations
Missile
Wings
Missileoperationscrewsarecommittedtotheirmission,butmostwerenotvolunteersfor
missileduty.Theyperceivealackofknowledgeofandrespectfortheirmissionfromwithinthe
largerAirForce.Thisperceptionisreinforcedbybothlargeandsmallsignals.Manyofthe
currentcrewsexperiencedthetraumaofhavingtheirStrategicMissileWingrenamedSpace
Wingandreplacingthedistinctivemissilebadgewithaspacebadge.Further,astheyattend
professionalmilitaryeducationatalllevels,theynotethatthereislittleinthecurriculumabout
27
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
28/53
theirmissionandtheyperceivethattheirclassmatesattachlittlevaluetothatmission.Asa
seeminglysmallbutstillirritatingmatter,asamissilecrewwatchesthecomputerdisplayfor
theirmissionbriefingbeforestartingeachperiodofduty,theyseetheofficialclassifiedAir
ForcescreensaverwhichfeaturesasingleweaponssystemanF22.TheyalsonotethatAir
Forcerecruitingadsandposters,defenseindustryadvertising,andotherformsofAirForce
publicrelations
activity
seem
to
ignore
the
ballistic
missile
mission.
This
combination
makes
it
difficultfortheleadershipintheoperationalforcestoconvincethecrewsthattheirserviceis
valuedcommensuratewiththedeclaredpriorityoftheirmission.
Recommendations:
TheSecretaryandtheChiefofStaffoftheAirForceshoulddirectthatAirForcepublic
relationsandpromotionalmessagesincludethenuclearforcesinportrayingtheAirForce
missionandfocus.
TheSecretaryoftheAirForce,theChiefofStaff,andcommandersatalllevelsshould
frequentlyreinforcetheprimacyofthenucleardeterrencemissionwithcommunicationsto
HeadquartersAir
Force,
the
Major
Air
Commands,
and
the
nuclear
operational
forces
and
logisticssupportorganizations.
OperationsBombWings
TheattitudeintheBombWingsisgenerallypositive.Theirmissiondemandsahighopstempo,
buttheyseemtodealwithiteffectively.Still,theefforttorefocusthewingsonthenuclear
missionischallenging itremainsdifficultforaircrewstobetrulyimmersedinthenuclear
mission.Nosinglewingcanmeettherapidreactionnuclearrequirement.Consequently,the
commitmentissharedonanadhocandpiecemealbasisbetweenBombWings.Thismaybe
thebestapproachgiventhecurrentforcedistribution,butitmakesitdifficultinaselectedpart
oftheunittomaintainahighdegreeoffocusonoperationalreadinesstoperformthestrategic
nuclearmission.
Inordertobereadytoassumethenuclearcommitment,crewsmustretainsomeleveloffocus
onthenuclearmissionwhiledeployedelsewhereforcommitmenttocontinuouspresence.In
spiteofseniorleadershipfocus,manycrewsvaluethesedeploymentsandtheconventional
missionabovethenuclearmission.Again,partofthisattitudestemsfromwhattheyperceive
asthewiderAirForceattitudetowardsthenuclearbombermission.Thisisexacerbatedbythe
widelyreportedinternaldebatesinthePentagonaboutthefutureofthebomberlegofthe
nucleartriad.TheinternalPentagondebateiswellknownintheoperationalbomberunits.As
inthecaseoftheMissileWings,B52crewsaresubjectedonadailybasistotheF22AirForce
classifiedscreensaverwhichreinforcestheirperceptionthatthefighteraircraftmission
dominatesAir
Force
attention
and
priorities.
And,
there
is
ageneral
perception
that
the
nuclear
missionisancillarytothecrewsotherdemandingmissions.Thiscombinationoffactorsisa
continuingobstacletoconvincingtheB52forcethatthenuclearmissionisfirstpriority.
Recommendation:TheCommander,AirForceGlobalStrikeCommandshoulddirectmoving
fromtheadhocapproachtomeetingthenuclearbombercommitmenttoaformalprogram
thatisinsulatedfromotherdemands.
28
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
29/53
Maintenance
and
Sustainment
Missile
Wings
and
Munitions
Support
Squadrons
(Europe)
Theworkloadformissileandweaponsmaintenancehasincreasedsignificantlywiththe
reductionsinmanpower,reductionsinexperiencedNCOsupervisors,failuresofsupport
equipment,andinadequatetechnicaldata.Theseconditionsarenottheresultof
reorganizationnor
will
further
reorganization
be
the
solution
to
the
need.
Withtheformationofnewhigherheadquartersorganizations,nearly48%oftheMSgtsand
SMSgtsintheNuclearWeaponsMaintenance(2W2)careerfield(nuclearmunitions
maintenance)areathigherheadquarterscreatingpoliciesfororinspectingthe52%that
provideNCOleadershipintheoperatingwings.Thisnumberiswellknownamongthe52%.
Table3showsthestaffpositionsmannedfromfieldresourcesasofAugust2010.Dueto
reducedoverallnumbers,thisisafragilecareerfieldandrequiresspecialattentiontoensure
theneededlevelofexpertiseandquantityofqualifiedpeopleintheoperatingforce.
Table3:MigrationofSeniorNuclearWeaponsMaintenance(2W2)NCOs
Organization
Current
Authorization
HAF/A10 1SMSgt
AFIA 2MSgt
AFGSC 1SMSgt;4MSgt
AFSC 2MSgt
DTRA 2MSgt
EUCOM 1MSgt
STRATCOM 2MSgt
USAFE/A3NM
1
MSgt
USAFE/IG 1MSgt
AFMC/IG 3MSgt
AFMC/A10 1SMSgt;1MSgt
AFMC/A4 3MSgt
AFNWC/LG 1MSgt
ICBMSYSTEMSDIVISION(HILL) 2MSgt
49THT&ESqd 2MSgt
708NSUS 1SMSgt;6MSgt
709NSS
1MSgt
710NSS 1MSgt
Recommendation:TheAirForceA1shouldinitiateaprogramtoensureaprioritybalance
suchthattheoperatingforceshavetheneededseniorNCOleadershipfromthe2W2career
fieldtoincludeimmediateactiontoaddressthemismatchbetweenseniorNCOssupervising
29
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
30/53
workintheunitsandseniorNCOsoverseeingandinspectingtheperformanceofoperational
andlogisticsunits.
ICBM
Warhead
Sustainment
TheslowresponsetoinadequatetechnicaldataincreasedtheICBMnuclearmunitions
maintenanceworkload.
Munitions
components
are
received
at
the
missile
wings
from
the
weaponsdepotandfromothersites.Beforeassemblingcomponentsforloadingona
Minutemanmissile,thetechnicianmustinspecttheconditionofthecomponent. The
inspectionfrequentlyrevealssmalldefects(nicksandscratches,mostlycosmeticinnature)that
arenotaddressedinthetechnicaldata.Ondiscoveringthesedefects,themunitions
maintenanceorganizationhasnochoicebuttodocumentthedefects,returntheassetto
storage,andsendthepaperworktotheICBMSystemsDivisionforanengineeringjudgment.
Sinceittakesaboutahalfdaytoprepareanitemforinspectionandanotherhalfdayto
documentthedefectsandreturntheitemtostorage,eachsuchincidentcostsadays
productivityforacrew.Thishadoccurred55timesMay2010throughAugust2010atthe15th
MUNS.
In52
of
those
cases,
the
engineering
judgment
ultimately
rendered
was
that
the
item
wasserviceable.Thismeans52daysofneedlesslostproductivityinasinglemissilewinginthe
periodnoted.
TheAFNWChasbeenworkingthissituationfortwoyears.Whiletheoptionsforcorrectingthis
deficiencyarewellunderstoodpreinspectionanddocumentationbeforeshipment,rapidly
changingthetechorders,and/oronsitejudgmentthereseemedtobetimeconsuming
obstaclestoanyofthesolutions.Withthisconditionasacontributor,munitionsmaintenance
peopleworkexcessiveshiftsandweekendstomeettheneedforwarheadsfordeployed
missiles.
Recently,theAFNWCidentifiedfourtechnicalorders(techorders)thatcovertheareasmaking
upover
two
thirds
of
the
cases
where
inadequate
tech
data
necessitated
engineering
assessment.Twoofthesetechordershavebeenexpandedandreissued.Atthetimeofthis
report,theothertwowerestillinwork.Thisactionshouldsignificantlyreducethisparticular
obstacletoefficientmunitionsmaintenanceinthemissilewings.
Analltoocommonresponsefromjuniorairmentoseniormastersergeantstoquestionsabout
theirfutureplanswasthattheyhadenoughoftheworkingconditionsandstateoflogistics
supportandtheywereleavingeitherthecareerfieldortheAirForce.Severaldeclaredthatit
wasntthelonghoursofworkthatbotheredthem;itwasthelonghourswhentheycouldnot
dotheirworkbecauseoftechorders,supportequipmentissues,andinspections.
Thereisamorefundamentalcauseofthissituation.Inthepast,thejudgmentsregardingthe
cosmeticdefectscausingsomeofthisproblemwererenderedbyexperiencedmunitions
maintenancepeopleintheWSA.Withthedriveforzerodefects,thisbecameunacceptableto
somelevelsofnuclearenterpriseleadership.Thefallacyisthegoalofzerocosmeticdefectsin
30yearoldweapons.Thisisneitherachievablenornecessary.Ifthestandardispeerreviewed
engineeringassessmentforcosmeticdefects,thenthesystemhascrossedthethresholdtozero
risk.Intheworstcase,therecouldbesomeslightriskthatafaultyjudgmentregardingasmall
30
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
31/53
nickorscratchcouldcauseawarheadtofailonreentry.Again,thisissuecontributestothe
perceptionofdistrustoftheprofessionalqualificationoftheworkforce.
Recommendations:TheCommander,AirForceNuclearWeaponsCentershould:
Directimmediateactiontoreestablishriskmanagementandtrustinthetechnicians
judgmentversus
risk
avoidance
on
cosmetic
defects
with
the
needed
technical
data
and
trainingprogramtosupportthatjudgment.
Provideonsiteengineeringsupportuntilprocessesareinplacetoseparatethecosmetic
defectsinRVcomponentsrequiringengineeringanalysis.
SupportequipmentforICBMmunitionsandmissilemaintenanceisoldandattheendofits
usefullife.TheReentrySystemTestSet(RSTS)wasdeliveredinthe1960sandincludes1950s
technology.ThereareplanstoreplaceitwithaFullOperationalCapabilitybutnotuntil2017.
GivenalltheotherneedsacrosstheAirForce,thedecisionhasbeenthatthisistheright
priority.However,thisisthetestsetthatverifiesMMIIIreentrysystems(Mk12,Mk12A,and
Mk21)andreentryvehicleintegrity.Maintenancetechniciansperceivethis2017replacement
dateas
amismatch
between
stated
mission
priorities
and
logistics
support
priorities.
Failuretoreplaceseeminglysimplepiecesofsupportequipmentsuchasconnectingcablesisa
majorirritantandobstacletoproductivity.Thesameistrueofsupportequipmentformissile
maintenance. Again,overthepasttwoyearsthishasreceivedattentionwithacontractthat
wastodelivernewcablesinlate2010.WhiletheTaskForceheardcomplaintsaboutthis
problemfromeachofthemissilewings,therewasnoindicationthattheworkforceknewthat
helpisontheway.Thisillustratestheneedforamoreproactiveapproachtoinformingthe
troops.
Vehiclesessential
to
transporting
and
removing/installing
missiles
and
post
boost
vehicles
in
thesilosprovideanexampleofacquisitiondecisionsthatseemtolackmeaningfulconsultation
withthepeoplewhoperformthemission.Atleastthisisaperceptionamongpeoplewhouse
thisvitalequipment.Thetractorsaremodern2003and2009models.Sincecabovertractors
arenolongerproducedintheU.S.forcommercialtruckinguse,thedecisionwastochangenew
procurementtotheindustrystandardtractors.Theproblemisthattheadditionallengthofthe
industrystandardtractorreducesmaneuverabilitymakingthemdifficulttoimpossibleto
maneuveronsomeofthelaunchsites.Thenewtractorswereprocuredasacommodityitem
withnoconsiderationofspecialdemandsofthenuclearsupportmission.
Further,whilethetransportererectortrailershavebeenupgraded,themostessentialpieceof
equipment,acomplex
hoist,
is
40
years
old
with
no
known
plans
for
replacement.
When
the
transportererectorswererefurbishedsome20yearsago,theenvisionedrefurbishment
includedanewhoist.Theaddedexpenseofthenewhoistledtodirectionthatacheaper
programbedeveloped.Thisisanotherexampleofalowestcost,stopgapapproachtosupport
equipmentessentialtotheAirForcesfirstprioritymission.Thereisstillnoprogramtoreplace
thehoists.
31
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
32/53
Munitions
Support
Squadron
(MUNSS)
AttheMUNSSsites,weaponsmaintenancemustbeperformedinsidetheprotectiveaircraft
shelter.Thecentralpieceofsupportequipmenttoprovidethismaintenancecapabilityisthe
WeaponsMaintenanceTruck(WMT).Thesetrucksweredesignedfora20yearlifemorethan
20yearsago.Whileitiscommonforsystemstobeusedbeyondtheirdesignlife,thewearand
tearon
these
trucks
has
far
exceeded
the
design
operating
environment.
For
example,
they
weredesignedtodelivertheneededcapabilityintheaircraftshelter,notforextensiveroad
travel.Inpractice,thesetrucksmusttravelsomedistancetoamainoperatingbaseforroutine
maintenance.Further,theWMTswereprocuredanddeliveredwithnoplannedsustainment
package.TheMUNSSsitesoftendependontemporaryWMTloansfromothersites.
TheTaskForceheardmostlypositivecommentsabouttheperformanceoftheengineering
detachment,Det1,responsibleformaintenance/sustainmentoftheweaponsvaultsand
portionsoftheWMT(hoist,electricalsystems).However,theoperatingunitsalsodescribed
howDet1wasundermannedforthesustainmentdemandsplaceduponit.Det1,underthe
498th
MunitionsMaintenanceGroupatRamstein,comprises21personnel,mostlyengineers,to
serviceall
of
these
aging
systems.
Themaintenanceissueisfurtherexacerbatedbythefailuretoplanforandprocurea
sustainmentpackageforthesesystems.Hence,partsandsupportcantakeanextendedperiod
forroutineneeds.Asanexample,aWMTfromoneofthesiteshasbeenunderrepairat
Ramsteinformorethanayear.Atthetimeofourvisit,itwasawaitingtirestocompletethe
work.Thesearestandardheavytrucktires.
ThecurrentplanistoreplacetheWMTswiththeSecureTransportableMaintenanceSystemin
2014.Aprototypehasbeeninexistenceforsometwoyears.WhenMUNSSpeopletaketheir
20yearoldessentialequipmenttoamainoperatingbaseforrepair,theynoticethefleetof
relatively
new
fuel
trucks
populating
the
flight
line
supporting
the
conventional
tactical
fighter
mission.
Anissuecommontoothernuclearoperationsisthelackofsupplypriority.Partoftheissueis
infrequentdemandforsomepartsandthefailuretoplanforasustainmentpackage.Butpart
oftheissueispriority.Itisnotdifficulttounderstandthatwhenthereiscompetitionforassets
betweentheforcesincombatandeveryoneelse,theprioritywillproperlygotoforcesin
combat.Stillthereshouldbeatleastsensitivitytotheneedsofthenuclearenterprisewhich
areoftensmallcomparedtoothers.Forexample,aninquiryaboutthestatusofanorderfora
smallnumberofnightvisiongogglesforthesecurityforcesassignedtothenuclearmissionwas
answeredbytheitemmanagerwiththeinformationthattheunitsneedwaspriority2with
more
than
200
priority
2
orders
ahead
of
these
security
forces.
Some
Common
Bottom
Lines
for
ICBMs
and
MUNSS
Thereareotherexamples,buttheexamplesabovedemonstratethreekeypoints:
Slowresponsetotechorderandequipmentissuessendsanegativemessageandaddsto
theworkloadofmunitionsmaintenancepersonnel,requiringextraordinaryeffortsto
sustainthemission.
32
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
33/53
Thelackofanailsyndromeisreal.Payingattentiontoallthebitsandpiecesofsupport
equipmentneededtosustainthemissionisasimportantasmajorpiecesofequipment.
Theprocessofdesigningandprocuringnewsupportequipmentwhetheritbelarge
tractorsortheneedforconnectingcablesshouldbemadeonthebasisoflongterm
effectivenessratherthantheimmediatecost.Decisionsshouldalsoincludeconsultingthe
peoplewho
use
the
equipment
to
support
the
mission
at
the
operating
units.
Consulting
peopleintheheadquartersisnotasubstitute.
Recommendations:
TheSecretaryandChiefofStaffoftheAirForceshoulddirectthat:
Theneedsofthenuclearenterprisetosustaintheforcearegivenpriorityandthechoices
forcorrectiveactionareorientedtolongtermsustainmentratherthanthelowestnear
termcostpath.
TheAirStaffandAirForceMaterielCommandgivefundingandprogrampriorityto
logisticssupportessentialtothenucleardeterrencemissioncommensuratewiththe
priorityof
the
nuclear
deterrence
mission.
TheAirStaffandAirForceMaterielCommandgiveurgentattentiontoreplacing40+ year
oldwarheadandmissilemaintenancesupportandtestequipmentattheoperatingwings
andtheairlogisticscenterandtoreplacingtheWeaponsMaintenanceTrucksatthe
MUNSSsites.
TheCommander,AFGSCandCommander,AFNWCshoulddirectagreatlyincreased
communicationsefforttokeeptheoperatingforcesinformedaboutactionsunderwayto
addresstheirsupportissues.
TheCommander,AFGSCshouldensurethatequipmentpeculiartosupportofnuclear
operationsis
treated
as
specialized
equipment
before
reverting
to
acommodity
approach.
33
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
34/53
U.S.AirForcesinEurope
USAFEnuclearforceshaveasetofspecialchallengestoinclude:
Theoperationsareunique.
o TheMunitionsSupportSquadronseachsupportandaresupportedbyadifferent
alliedair
force.
o ThereisakeyUSNATODualCapableAircraft(DCA)tasking.
TheunitsaresubjecttobothUSAFandNATOdirectives.Thesedirectivesaresometimes
inconflictduetovariedupdatecyclesorduetounresolvedconflicts.
TheunitsaresubjecttoUSAF,DTRA,andNATOinspectionsandinspectioncriteria.
Thereishighturnoverinessentialpersonnel,sometimeswithmostofthesenior
leadershipchangingoverashortperiod.
TheuniquenatureoftheNATODCAtaskingraisessomeissueswithreadinesscriteriaandwith
inspectionteams.TherequirementistobecapableofbringingarequiredDCAsquadrontothe
requiredreadinesswithinaspecifiedtime.Tomeetthisrequirement,itisclearthatthewing
mustsustain
certain
capabilities
at
constant
readiness,
e.g.,
security
forces,
systems
maintenanceandcontrol,andcommandandcontrolsystemsandcapabilities.Atthesametime
thereistimetobringothercapabilitiesfromalowerstateofreadinesstotherequiredlevel.
Theissueistheneedforcleardefinitionofwhatisrequiredonadailybasis.Thisleadsto
concernsaboutthedifferencebetweenwhatthewingcommanderbelievesisrequiredtomeet
theNATODCAcapabilityandtimingrequirement,andthedesireofanNSIteamtoassess
capabilitiesthatthewingdoesnotneedtokeepataconstantstateofreadiness.Additionally,
thewingmustcontinuouslymeetitsongoingcombatoperationsrequirementsleadingto
constantchangeinforcesassignedtomeettheNATOrequirement.
ThemismatchbetweenUSAFandNATOdirectivesandinspectionrequirementscanhavean
adverseimpact
on
NATO
strike
evaluation
(STRIKEVAL)
operations.
For
example,
USAF
directivespermittowinganuclearloadedaircraftonlyasalastresortinanemergencywhile
NATOrulespermitsuchtowingasneededtomeetthegenerationrequirements.Giventhe
distributionofaircraftandmunitionsatsomelocations,thiscanresultinNATOSTRIKEVAL
scenariosthataredifficultifnotimpossibletomeetwithUSAFdirectedlimitation.Insuch
cases,thewingcommandermustcomplyfirstwithUSAFdirectives.
TheimpactoftherapidturnoverinEuropeisexacerbatedbyatleasttwopersonnelpoliciesor
practices.Theneedistomaintainahighlevelofnuclearoperationsandmaintenance
experienceandcompetence.However,itatleastappearsthatassignmentstothekeyDCA
FighterWingaremadewithattentiontofactorsthancanoverrideattentiontonuclear
experience.There
is
areluctance
to
allow
people
to
extend
in
Europe
when
they
volunteer
and
theirexperienceisimportanttoDCAoperations.Partofthereasonforthereluctanceisthat
manyassignedtoanunaccompaniedtourataspecificbaseoverseasarepromisedthatatthe
endofthisunaccompaniedtourtheywillbeassignedtofighterunitsinUSAFE.Theendresultis
aflowofpeoplewhohavenonuclearexperienceintothekeyDCAwinginEurope.Thissame
setofpoliciesimpactstheMUNSSsites.Thisisparticularlyimportantatthesesitessincethey
34
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
35/53
aresmall(typicallylessthan150totalassigned)andsometimesareonedeepincritical
experience.
Recommendations:
TheCommander,USAirForcesinEuropeshould:
Directthe
USAFE
A3
to
provide
clarity
on
the
elements
of
the
DCA
mission
that
require
continuousreadinessandthosethatcanbebroughttotheneededlevelwithinthe
prescribedtime.
IdentifythedisconnectsbetweenNATOandUSAFdirectivesthatimpactnuclearoperations
andestablishaworkingbodywithNATOtoresolvethedifferences.
TheAirForceA1shoulddirectareexaminationorclarificationofthepolicyorpractice
opposingvoluntaryextensionsfornuclearexperiencedpeopleinEuropeandthecriteriafor
assignmentsfromnonnuclearmissionstotheDCAmissionunits.
35
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
36/53
GuidanceversusDirection
Acontinuingissueinthenuclearforcesistheadequacyofdirection.TheAirForcemovetothe
philosophyoftheAirForceInstructionversustheAirForceRegulationprobablyachievesits
intendedpurposeinotheractivities.Thephilosophyseemstobetodescribewhatistobe
done,to
give
guidance,
and
to
leverage
the
experience
and
talents
of
Air
Force
people
to
do
the
jobmoreeffectivelyandefficiently.Itwouldbedifficulttofaultthatpropositionwereitnot
contrarytothedemandsofthenuclearmissionwherethepremiumisondoingthingsexactly
rightandasprescribedeverytime.Thereislittleroomforadhocinnovationinthenuclear
operationsandmaintenancebusiness.
AcommonanswerbyseniorNCOsinthenuclearenterprisetoaquestionaboutthedifference
betweenaninstructionandaregulationisthatthefirstprovidesguidance(somesay
suggestionsorphilosophy),thesecondprovidesdirection.Oneofthedifficultieswithguidance
versusdirectionisdifferentinterpretationsbyunitsupervisors,staffassistanceteams,and
inspectors.Inthenuclearbusiness,roomforinterpretation,innovation,andincreased
efficiencyis
more
likely
to
be
an
obstacle
than
an
enabler.
One
such
innovation,
simultaneously
inventoryingthestoragefacilitywhilepreparingtheloadfortransporttotheflightline,wasa
factorintheunauthorizedtransferincidentin2007.Anotherfactorwasadifferent
interpretationofwhatconstitutedverificationofthepayloadinthecruisemissilesbeing
transported.Intheseareastheconceptofguidancehasnowbeenreplacedwithcleardirection
toincludeprocessesthatneitherrequirenorallowinterpretation.Inotherareas,clearer
directionisstillneeded.
GlobalStrikeCommandisintheprocessofprovidingthatdirection.Thecommandisnearing
completionofworktobringsome190documentsthatprovideguidanceanddirectionupto
thestandardneededinthenuclearenterprise.
Recommendations:
TheSecretaryandtheChiefofStaffoftheAirForceshoulddirectreviewoftheapproachto
guidingnuclearoperationstoensureitisdirectionwithadequatedetailviceguidancethat
leavesthedetailsopentointerpretation.
TheCommander,AirForceGlobalStrikeCommandshouldcompletetheongoingAFGSCwork
tosupplementAFIsasneededtoprovidecleardirectionfornuclearweaponsoperations.
36
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
37/53
EnlistedPersonnelManagement
ThereareanumberofintersectingissuesthatcouldleadtoaperfectstormincriticalNCO
leadershipandsupervisioninthemaintenancefields.Specifically,therearefourissues:
ThedrawonexperiencedMSgtsandSMSgtstomanoversightorganizations,
Highyear
tenure
(HYT),
InflexibleenlistedassignmentpoliciesandpracticesforallranksbelowE9,and
SomeMSgtsandSMSgtsdepartingforgreenerpastures.
ThedrawonexperiencedseniorNCOsisaddressedelsewhereinthisreport.Theissueinthe
operationalunitswithhighyeartenureisinflexibility.ThepurposeofHYTtopreventstagnation
intheseniorNCOpopulationisunderstoodandisnot,initself,anissue.Theissueisthatthe
operatingforcesassumetherewillbenowaiversandarereluctanttoaskforthem.Inasmall
careerfieldlikethe2W2field,asingle,experiencedMSgtorSMSgtmaybeunusuallyimportant
tothemissionforsomeperiodoftimeuntilareplacementisonboardanduptospeed.The
issueonenlistedassignmentpoliciesistheperceptionandperhapsthefactthatthesystem
doesnot
pay
adequate
attention
to
special
experience
identifiers.
Hence,
base
of
preference
or
someotherassignmentpolicyfactormaysendaC17crewchieftoaB52wingwithout
appreciationfortheverydifferentdemandsfortheB52crewchief. Thegreenerpastureinthe
fourthbulletaboveisalmostanywhereexceptthecurrentworkingconditionsanddemands.
TheendresultoftheseniorNCOassignmentissuesisthatinoneofthebomberwings,the
turnoverrateforMSgtsinthenuclearmaintenancecareerfieldinasingleyearwas70%. For
SMSgts,itwas100%.
Atthesamewing,turnoverrateinweaponsloaderswas30%.Crewchiefmanningwasat75%.
TheNuclearIssueResolutionandIntegration(NIRI)Boardisawareoftheconsequencesof
theseintersecting
issues
and
provides
the
following
assessment
of
critical
skills:
NuclearWeaponsMaintenance(2W2)atacriticalpoint
MissileandSpaceMaintenance(2M0)atalevelofconcern
AerospaceMaintenance/HeavyCrewChiefs(2A5)atalevelofconcern
Munitions,MissileMaintenance(21M)(amunitionsofficerAFSC)atalevelofconcern
ThemostoptimisticassumptionexpressedtotheTaskForcewasthat,overtime,thesecareer
fieldswillbemannedintheoperatingforcestothesamelevelastherestoftheAirForce
(85%).
Recommendation:TheAirForceA1shoulddevelopandimplementaprocessforspecial
managementof
nuclear
career
fields
those
in
which
small
numbers
create
special
challenges.
37
7/29/2019 Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise
38/53
ThePersonnelReliabilityProgram(PRP)
Thefollowingdiscussion,findings,andrecommendationsaresimilartothoseincludedinthe
2004PermanentTaskForce(thencalledtheJointAdvisoryCommittee)reportonAirForce
NuclearSuretyInspections(NSI).TheDoDguidanceonPRPhasimprovedsignificantlysince
2004.In
contrast,
the
practice
in
the
Air
Force
has
not
improved.
The
importance
of
this
programdictatesthatitbecoherent,wellmanaged,andreasonablyattainable. Theprogram
continuestosuffer,insomecasesincreasinglyso,fromfundamentaldeficienciesthatwork
againsttheprogramspurposeandimportance.
AccordingtotheDoD5210.42RegulationandAirForceManual103902,thepurposeofthe
PRPistoensurethateachpersonselectedandretainedforperformingdutiesassociatedwith
nuclearweaponsornuclearcommandandcontrolsystemsandequipmentisemotionallystable
andphysicallycapable,andhasdemonstratedreliabilityandprofessionalcapability.1In
identifyingpotentiallydisqualifyingordecertifyinginformationtheguidancestatesthatin
evaluatingcertaintraitsorconduct(suchasalcoholuse,druguse,medicalcondition,poor
attitude,lack
of
motivation),
certifying
and
reviewing
officials
shall
ensure
there
is
no
reasonabledoubtofanindividualsreliability...2Thisisahighbutattainablestandard.Earlier
languagecalledforreliabilitybeyondanydoubt anunattainablestandard.
DiscussionswithcommandersandPRPmonitorsmakeitclearthattherehasbeencontinuing
escalationinpursuitofabsolutegoals.Infact,whencommanderswereaskedspecificallyabout
theDoDdescribedstandardforPRPreliability,nonequotedtheDoDguidance.Thiscontinued
focusonabsoluteassuranceofreliabilityhasproducedimportantdysfunctionalaspectsinthe
programtoincludetheuseofsuspensionanddecertificationactionsasriskavoidance
measures. Riskavoidancepermeatesthestructureandpracticeoftheprogram.
Currentpracticesproduceanenvironmentofdistrust,implyingthatthepeopleselectedand
qualifiedfor
demanding
nuclear
duties
and
who
are
critically
important
to
the
mission
are
not
sufficientlytrustworthytoliveanacceptabledailylife.Itthenfollowsthattheymustconstantly
reestablishreliability. EventhepossibilityofPotentiallyDisqualifyingInformation(PDI)leadsto
temporarydecertificationuntilitisestablishedthattherehasbeennocompromiseof
reliability. Basedonthisfundamentallyflawedassumption,thePRPrepeatedlyreexaminesthe
historyofeachindividual.
Asoneexampleoftheconsequencesofthisattitude,personnelareautomaticallysuspended
fromPRPdutieswhenreferredbyAirForcemedicalauthoritiestooffbasemedicaltreatment
regardlessofthenatureofthereferral. Theindividualmustthenreporttobasemedical
authoritiestobereinstated. TheDoDguidancedoesnotrequireautomaticsuspensionbut
insteadrequires
follow
up
after
treatment.
Individuals
should
be
suspended
only