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Indefensible Missile Defense
Yousaf M. Butt, Scientific Consultant, FAS
& Scientist-in-Residence, Monterey Institute
Big Picture Issues - BMD roadblock to Arms Control, space security and East-West relations - Threat unclear: DNI “high confidence” no Iranian nuclear weapons' program - Not just Russia: China may be increasing ICBM force in response; India.... - China decreasing pressure on Pakistan to sign FMCT: impacts PAROS
Technical Issues - Irony: proposed EPAA system is simple to defeat. Pentagon's DSB concurs. - Capable of engaging Russian ICBMs so violates spirit (letter?) New START
1968 Garwin
& Bethe
Final ~500 SM-3s on ~43 ships sea and on land: Poland (III) and Romania (II)
Four Phases ending 2020 Four Phases ending 2020
Interceptor: SM-3 Block I SM-3 Block II after 2018
US/NATO “phased adaptive” approach: BMD-capable Aegis ships will increase from 24 (2012) to 43 (2018). ~500 interceptors on 43 Navy Aegis BMD destroyers & 2 (3?) ground sites Not a “limited” system: Obama plan more muscular than Bush version
Planned Evolution of the SM-3 MD Interceptor
Burnout Velocity ~3.3 km/sec Burnout velocity ~4.5-5.5 km/sec
~2018 →
Russian Concerns with EPAA: Upsets Strategic Parity after 2018
4 km/sec Assumed Block II
Plan: ~500 SM-3s on ~43 ships and on land: Poland (P-III) and Romania (P-II)
SM-3 Block II Can Engage Russian and Chinese Warheads
New START Implications for proposed new East Coast SM-3 site
General Cartwright -- “part of what’s in the budget is to get us a sufficient number of ships to allow us to have a global deployment of this capability on a constant basis, with a surge capacity to any one theater at a time.”
Ballistic Missile Flight
Intercept takes place in space vacuum: light decoys & warhead travel together
IR image from Kill Vehicle sensor at ~200 km distance: warhead and decoys
Basic scientific reason why midcourse BMD will never be able to reliably function in real combat conditions: because IR emissions & reflected radio waves from targets can be modified by an attacker to disguise, remove or deny critical information needed by the defense to identify attacking warheads.
Countermeasures/Decoys Problem
Countermeasures: intentional and natural Adversary can change appearance of warhead by radar absorbing materials, or surrounding it with a balloon. Problem discovered by the MDA more than 15 years ago, during the first two flight tests: IFT-1A and IFT-2, June 1997 and January 1998. Tests revealed that certain decoys looked enough like the warhead to make it impossible to reliably identify it. MDA concealed the problem and removed all the decoys that were identified as effective from all subsequent missile flight tests. Same flaw in GMD revealed by a chuffing solid rocket motor. (Jan 2010; ~$200m test) MDA has still not conducted a GMD test against the same combination of warhead and decoys used in the IFT-1A and IFT-2. Now presence (or not) of CMs in tests is classified There has NEVER been successful test of any missile defense system with decoys. Recent DSB report agrees: decoys' effect would be “dramatic and devastating!”
Lewis/Postol 2010
SM-3 Test Failures portrayed as successes (Lewis/Postol 2010)
SM-3 Test Failures portrayed as successes (Lewis/Postol 2010)
Missile Defense – Conceptual issues
MD (Aegis, GMD) simple to defeat, yet may mislead political leaders into riskier policies
•Even if it does work will force competitors to seek sneakier delivery methods: ICBMs are self-deterring – as they are traceable, nations are hesitant to actually use them
•BMD encourages proliferation as a way to keep up: China, India, Pakistan, etc, and Complicates negotiated reductions in offensive ballistic missile arsenals (START)
Complicates control of weaponization in space (inherent ASAT capabilities of SM-3)
Burnout Speed Approximate Max Altitude
(km/s) (Kilometers)
3-3.5 600-800
4.5-5.5 1400-2250
Block II SM-3s will be able to attack ~all satellites in LEO, as Block I did USA-193.
ArcLight: SM-3 Block II Based >2000 n. mi. Strike Weapon “ArcLight based on SM-3 Block II booster and a hypersonic glider... designed to carry a 100-200 pound payload more than 2,000 nautical miles. The weapon will be compatible with the Mark 41 vertical launch system and capable of launch from U.S. Navy warships and submarines as well as Air Force assets.” – Aviation Week
~3700 km range
Boost Phase Missile Defense
Advantages: slower moving target, hot exhaust easier to seek Concept: set of drones with interceptors would fly just outside region of interest and fire interceptors when ballistic missile is detected during boost-phase
May be problems with cueing interceptors and decision time short Drones vulnerable and legality of overflights questionable.
T. Postol
T. Postol
T. Postol
2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) "The United States now possesses a capacity to counter the projected threats from North Korea and Iran for the foreseeable future." "The United States is currently protected against the threat of limited ICBM attack, as a result of investments....in a system based on...midcourse defense." None of the various MD systems have ever been tested in a realistic setting. GMD program has “succeeded” in just 8 of 15 highly rigged attempts. No CMs. Exaggerating ability of MD creates serious risk that political leaders might be misled into mistakenly believing that missile defenses actually work, e.g.: "The threat is clear, the capability exist[s] and the costs are manageable," – NATO Secretary General Anders Rasmussen, GSN Newswire, October 14, 2010
New Developments in US/NATO Missile Defense DoD's Defense Science Board study concurs on difficulty of decoy problem: “If the defense should find itself in a situation where it is shooting at missile junk or decoys, the impact on the regional interceptor inventory would be dramatic and devastating!” + AEGIS radars inadequate GAO report April 2012: “...unexpected cost increases, schedule delays, test problems, and performance shortfalls..." HASC: Europe must pay their share. 25% of EPAA BMD funds held back East coast site, if it goes forward, will further erode relations w/ Russia ArcLight: why Russia is additionally concerned about Poland/Romania sites?
Conclusions - BMD roadblock to Arms Control, space security and East-West relations - Threat unclear: DNI “high confidence” no Iranian nuclear weapons' program - Not just Russia: China may be increasing ICBM force in response; India.... - China decreasing pressure on Pakistan to sign FMCT: impacts PAROS - Inherent ASAT capability
- BMD simple to defeat, yet may mislead political leaders into riskier policies
- Capability to engage Russian warheads so violates spirit (letter?) of New START
- ArcLight SM-3 Block II strike weapon – European sites problematic for Russia?
- Expensive
D=1/2 c ∆t
