Indb-VS (Re Cations (During (Prime Minister G&jiv Qandhi

CHAPTER: 3

INDO-US RELATIONS DURING

PRIME MINISTER RAJIV GANDHI (1985-1989)

With the assassination of Mrs. Gandhi on 31 October 1984, the Indian

politics was changed quickly as the ruling Congress Party chose Rajiv Gandhi

(Indira's son) as the leader of the Party and he was elected as Prime Minister within

hours of the death of his mother. He won a record of 415 seats in parliament in

general election in January 1985, his victory in this election was greater than the

victory of his mother and grandfather in the past.

In the beginning of his involvement in Indian politics as his mother asked

him for her assistance in 1980 after his younger brother Sanjay Gandhi's death in an

air crash on June 1980.

Before he became the Indian prime minister, Mr. Gandhi had spent four

years period of apprenticeship during 1980-84 under the guidance of his mother. For

that it could mean that he had an indirect experience of governance and conducting

foreign policy before he came into the office as prime minister. He had initially

experienced of functioning as General Secretary of the ruling Congress Party and

later became Mrs. Gandhi's political adviser and confidant on foreign and defence

policy matters. He had familiarized himself with the broad trends in international

relations by meeting, visits and discussions with his foreign counterparts in his

capacity as a senior party functionary.

Thus the criticism that Mr. Gandhi came into Indian politics without any

background and experience was totally wrong.

Rajiv Gandhi was much welcome in the United States when he was elected

as the prime minister of India. They were of the opinion that Rajiv would be

friendlier to the west than his mother was. They hoped that by upbringing and

1 Dennis Kux, Estranged Democracies; India and the United States 1941 -1991, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1994), p. 401. 2 J.N. Dixit, Across Borders : Fifty Years of India Foreign Policy, ( New Delhi: Picus Books, 1998), p. 169.

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education, Rajiv had developed pro-western orientation in his out look and being a

man of technological set of mind, he was a forward looking statesman.

Rajiv's Foreign Policy and His Prime Priority

Although, there was some changed in some aspects but the Indian foreign

policy during his period broadly remained unchanged. Nevertheless, Rajiv Gandhi

maintained a high profile policy scenario. He sought to combine the global thrust of

Nehru's foreign policy to the regional power thrust of Indira Gandhi. Overall, the

India's foreign policy during his period was intensified as well as enhanced India's

role in international community.

During his first year in office, Rajiv pressed for solution to the Sikh

problem in Punjab and proposed a variety of measures to modernize and reform the

Indian economy. Rajiv earned the nickname of "Computerjii" (Jii is a Hindi

honorific and a sign of affection added to name) because of his emphasis on using

modern technology to address India's problems. By his popularity, India was again

seemed to be moving towards the progress.4

As regard to the Sikh problem, it was on April 18 1985, the Lok Sabha

unanimously condemned the briefing on Sikh in India, organized by a US

congressional group in Washington as an attempt at direct interference in the

internal affairs of the country, which no sovereign nation would ever tolerate.

Speakers from all parties condemned this event. Khursheed Alam Khan, Minister of

state for External Affairs assured members that "whatever may be its relationship

with any country, India would not tolerate any attack on its dignity and territorial

integrity".5 He informed the House that the Indian Embassy in Washington had

conveyed to the US government its strong feeling over the issue. A protest has also

been sent to the US Embassy in New Delhi.

The US government in a statement issued in New Delhi on April 18, denied

that any US congressional hearing on Sikh or the Punjab situation had taken place in

Washington. (This misunderstanding was removed later) Despite Rajiv Gandhi

3 Bhabani Sengupta, Seminar( Monthly), New Delhi, January 1988, p. 46 4 Dennis Kux, n. 1 ,p. 401. 5 Asian Recorder, June 11-17, 1985. p.18360.

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claimed to possess videotape evidences of US training to Sikh terrorist of India in

the US state of Alabama.

The first priority of Rajiv's foreign policy was to readjust India's relations

with the two superpowers- the US and the Soviet Union, in the context of emerging

undercurrents in their interrelationship. The second priority was to deal with the

ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka and to cope with a more assertive Pakistan which was

actively encouraging secessionism in Punjab and to a lesser extent at that time, in

Jammu & Kashmir. His third priority was to ensure necessary technological and

resources in puts to sustain India's defence capacities to meet possible security

challenges emanating from transitions and new alliances in the international

strategic environment6, and to maintain close relationship with the Soviet Union.

He accepted the Soviet Union as India's chief foreign partner and made

friends with its new leader, Mikhail Gorbachev.7 At the same time, the Prime

Minister made it clear that India would strive for better relations with the United

States and other countries.

In order to balance the relationship between both the superpowers, Rajiv

told an American correspondent Dean Brelis, that he saw "strong relations" between

India and the Soviet Union but that did not mean "that we don't want to be friends

with the United States. We want to keep our option of individually open".9

To deal with his third and fourth priority, Rajiv, in many ways initiated a

series of changes in India's foreign policy in its political and economic dimensions.

1 le was inclined towards acquiring the most effective state-of-the-art technology and

adopting the latest management methods for India's development and modernization.

Rajiv, therefore, resulted in a desire on his part to go in for a more open and

expanded relationship with the USA. Washington also showed its willingness to

6 J.N. Dixit, n. 2 , p. 172. 7 Dennis Kux, n. 1, p. 401. 8 V.P. Dutt, India's Foreign Policy, (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 1987), p. 69. 9 B.K. Shrivastava," Indo-US Relations'. Search for mature and constructive ties" in Verinder Grover ( edited), International Relations and Foreign Policy of India, (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1992) p. 215

110

expand technological cooperation and to enter into a joint security relationship with

India.10

As a result, in December 1984, the American and Indian negotiators

successfully reached agreement on a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The

two sides then tackled questions of implementation, how specifically to deal with

US concerns about diversion of technology from agrees uses.

In May 1985, Ambassador Barnes and Foreign Secretary Romesh Bhandari,

who had replaced Rasgotra, signed the MOU implementation agreement. US

Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige, visiting New Delhi when the accord was

signed, hailed the event as providing a mechanism for speedier review of the export

of controlled items. Baldrige predicted a large increase in US computer sales and

cooperative technology agreements with India.

Mr. Malcolm Baldridge's visit to India was also "to convey to PM Gandhi

the President's interest in improved relations and explore with him ways and means

to strengthen bilateral trade and investment." He also aimed at acquiring information

about the "economic and administrative reforms which PM Gandhi is advocating

and how we can support this reforms". He welcomed the reforms leading to the

liberalization of imports, reduction of customs duties on capital equipment imports,

encouragement to technology and reduction of government limitations. He assured

India of the US support in the World Bank.

Though it was applicable to the equipment and technologies under the

control of the Commerce Department and not those of the State Department's Office

of Munitions Control, it succeeded in reaching civilian and military technology. It

was related to computers, communication equipment, instrumentation, composite

materials, high performance ferrous and nonferrous alloys and optics as well as a

great help in the industrial collaborations.14

,UJ.N. Dixit, n. 2, p. 173. 11 The Statesman. 10 March 1985. ^ New York Times, 17 May 1985, The Statesman, 18 May 1985. 1a India Today, 31 May 1985, p. 103. 14 Dilip Mukerjee " US Weaponry for India" Asian Survey, 27 (6), June 1987, pp. 601-602

111

Thus, it led to progress in Indo- US relations. However, some hesitation

was still witnessed on the part of the US. It continued its reservations regarding the

transfer of technology in cases where there was a risk of it reaching the Soviets.

The United States has also tried to prevent Soviet influence in India by

sending the Pentagon's Under Secretary for Policy, Dr. Fred Ikle to visit New Delhi

in May in order to reduce the Soviet influence by enlarge the scope of Indo-US

security cooperation. Ikle explored the possibility of technical cooperation in India's

development of a next- generation fighter aircraft, the so called Light Combat

Aircraft (LCA).

In keeping with the policy of creating indigenous defense production

capabilities rather than relying on imported equipment, India hope to produce the

LCA as its Air Force mainstay in the 1990s. Ikle also discussed way to speed up US

processing of Indian application for exports of defence- related equipment, at the

same time stressing Washington's concerns that India's system of internal control

needed strengthening to prevent diversion of items to the Soviet.15

The fruitful talk of Ikle with the Indian counterpart about the LCA and

follow on discussion later in May, involving Secretary of the Air Force Vern Orr,

signaled an important changed of US arms policy towards India. Washington was

agreeing in principle to cooperate with India's growing defense industry by

providing technical assistance and high technology components for the production

of advanced weapons systems. Although this type of cooperation was standard in

India's military supply arrangement with the Soviet and West European countries,

collaboration on the LCA would be a first with the United States after the limited

brief defense production arrangement twenty years earlier following the 1962 India

-China War.16

Ikle was keen to enhance the security cooperation, he urged US - India

military cooperation to see how the two countries "can work together much as we

try to work together with other major powers now to enhance our long- term security

aims".17

15 Dennis Kux, n. 1, p. 402. 16 Ibid. 17 , L ; J

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Another prominent visitor from USA to India during Rajiv's tenure was Mr.

Stephen Solarz, the Chairman of the House of Representative subcommittee on

Asian and Pacific Affairs. His first visit to India was in 1983 during Indira period

and the second visit was in 1985, in the wake of the Bhopal tragedy. He came again i y

in May 1986 to discuss the problems related to the renewal of arms aid to Pakistan.

Mr. Solarz visited New Delhi and Punjab in January 1989 to study the Sikh problem

and find a solution to it as well as to express US concern over nuclear proliferation

in South Asia.

Thus, the visits by Mr. Solarz during the beginning period of Rajiv Gandhi

and its environment showed that United States desire to improve its relationship

with India, India also welcomed the US moves and expressed its willingness to

improve its relations with USA. India's desire for a better relationship with the

United States was more enthusiastically reciprocated in Washington when President

Reagan invited Rajiv Gandhi to visit the United States in order to give a new twist to

Indo-US relations.

Rajiv visits to the United States (1985)

In the United States, when Reagan acknowledged that Rajiv Gandhi

accepted his invitation, he regarded this as the most important event during his

second term. The importance that the public opinion attached to this event was

reflected in the unanimous resolution that both the Houses of the Congress had

passed welcoming the visit of Rajiv Gandhi to their country.19

The psychological background to the visit was greatly reinforced when the

US Government announced the discovery of a plot to kill Rajiv Gandhi during his

forthcoming visit and the arrest of five Sikh terrorists in this connection. The tip off

had came from one Mr. Camper who was running an arms-training centre in

Alabama where these terrorists had enrolled themselves to acquire training for

executing their plans. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) making this

announcement revealed that the terrorists had also planned to kill the Haryana Chief

8 Stephen Solarz, At a Press Conference at USIS, New Delhi, 28 May 1986, American Centre, New Delhi. TrShnrRam Sharma, Indo - US Relations; A Brief Survey 1972-91, (New Delhi; Discovery Publishing House, 2003), p. 71.

113

Minister, Bhajan Lai, then in USA for medical treatment and guerrilla-type

operations against the Government of India by blowing up strategic sites, nuclear

power plants, bridges, government office, temples and shrines.20

Indian opinion was gratified at the obvious evidence of US commitment to

the unity and stability of India. Washington won many new friends with this action.

However, it has also to be noted that these disclosures raised some serious questions

too about the private camps in USA for training to use arms and explosives.

Even though the administration took the view that these training centres

were functioning within the US laws, their activities and the obvious connection

between them and US intelligence agencies was disquieting. Subsequently, the PM

told the Rajya Sabha that India had urged upon the United States to take stricter

action and if necessary to change the law in order to curb the training of

international terrorist in that country.

In June 1985, a month after the signing of the MOU implementation

agreement and the Ikle trip, Rajiv Gandhi made an excellent impression on his

American hosts during an official visit to Washington from 1 1 - 1 5 June 1985 as

invited by President Reagan.

In order to welcome PM Rajiv on his arrival in Washington, President

Reagan likened the visit to the "voyage of discovery made by Jawaharal Nehru in

1949. Reagan assured Rajiv that he would discover that the US remained steadfastly

dedicated to India's unity and integrity. This statement was made in the background

of a few Sikhs shouting anti-Indian slogans in a park nearby.

Former US diplomat Dennis Kux, commenting on the visit of Prime

Minister Rajiv Gandhi, said "Rajiv Gandhi made an excellent impression on his

American hosts, the handsome young PM differed from the preachy arrogant Indian

stereotype. He was quiet, seemed to listen to what American leaders had to say,

spoke softly but directly and had a touch of humor...23 Even though Rajiv Gandhi

made it clear that he was not going to alter the basic thrust of his country's foreign

20 The Times of India. 13,15 May 1985, Also see The Hindustan Times, 15 May 1985. 21 Ibid, 24 July 1985. 22 Shri Ram Sharma, n.19, p. 71. 23 Dennis Kux, n.1, p. 403.

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policy (he had visited Moscow before going to Washington), his change of style

from his mother's made India look different. The US Ambassador to India at that

time, Harry Barnes, commented "this was a new start, good for India and good for

the USA.24

Though Mr. Gandhi did not intend to end the traditional ties with the Soviet

Union, he also wants to win the US cooperation. With this view, Mr. Gandhi and Mr.

Reagan discussed various international issues and reaffirmed their will to "enhance

their mutual understanding". They awarded special importance to nuclear

disarmament the South Asian regional situation and the bilateral issues.

The discussion and talks between Rajiv and Reagan during the visit were

looked upon as a get-acquainted meeting with each other trying to probe the mind of

the other to assess what pattern of relations could be expected in the future. An

official spokesman was quite candid in stating that the US did not look upon the

visit as a break through visit, or one from which dramatic new departures from the

existing relationship could be expected. They admitted that there had been Oft

difference between the two countries and they would continue to persist.

Mr. Reagan said "We put great value on India's friendship" he added "Our

sharing of democratic values serves as a bridge between us". PM. Rajiv responded

with equal warmth and accepted that "We look at the world from different angles".27

But rising above them are "beliefs we share in common, in the supremacy of

freedom, in the necessity of equality, in the sovereignty of the people's will".28 For

the future cooperation with US, Rajiv Gandhi stated that "We have so much in

common- so many ideals, so many visions of the world - let us work together to

build on these to make it a better world for everyone to live in".29

24 J.N. Dixit, n.2, p. 173. 25 Text of Indo-US Joint Statement, 16 June 1985, American Centre, New Delhi. 26ShriRamSharma,n-19 ,P-71. 27 Mr. Gandhi address before the National Press Club, June 14, 1985. Cited in Mirza Asmer Beg, In The Tug of War: Indo Soviet American Relations. ( Delhi: Gyan Sagar Publications, 1999), p. 51. 28 Ibid. 29

S. Krishnan & Donald C. Hausrath , A Common Faith : Forty Years of Indo-US Cooperation: 1947-1987. (Bombay: Vakil&Sons.Ltd., 1987), p. 100.

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The Discussion and Talks during the Visit

In the above context they discussed the considerable potential for the

expansion of bilateral programmes and cooperative ventures. Negotiations on a

bilateral tax treaty continued. They reaffirmed their belief in democratic values and

commented on the threat on peace and democracy faced due to the rise of organized

terrorism.30 In the talks among the officials of the two sides, the Indian officials

impressed upon the United States India's hope for more rigorous action by

Washington against terrorists using United States territory and facilities for hostile

activities in India.

During the visit he met Vice-President George Bush, Secretary of State

George Shultz, Treasury Secretary James Baker, Mr. Weinberger, Mr. Vessuj, Mr.

Donald Reagan, Mr. Carl Sagan, leading scientists of National Academy of Science T 1

and members of the chamber of commerce.

In this visit, he was the only Indian leader, besides Jawaharlal Nehru, to

address a joint session of the Congress.32

Rajiv Gandhi was accorded the honour of addressing a joint session of the

US Congress, a privilege which was not accorded even to Mrs. Gandhi during her

visits to the US Vice-President George Bush was in personal attendance to Rajiv

Gandhi during his trips to other parts of the USA. Rajiv Gandhi address to the

National Press Club in Washington went down well with the media, and with

American public opinion.

Senator Orrin Hatch described it as a "new beginning" for Indo-US

relations, which had "created a better and more open relationship between the two.34

Mr. Gandhi, after the thirty minute talks in the Oval office appeared impressed by

the "frank, forthright" and "humane" nature of Mr. Reagan.35

Text of Indo - US Joint Statement, 16 June 1985, n. 25. 31 Inderjit Badhwar & Madhu Trehan, "Indo-US Relations; A Fresh Look" India Today. 15 July 1985, p. 85. 32 Text of Indo - US Joint Statement, n. 25 33 J.N. Dixit, n.2, p. 173. 34 Inderjit Badhwar & Madhu Trehan, n. 31 p. 78. 35 Ibid., p.80

116

At the end, both President Reagan and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi said at

the conclusion of their talks that they had "hit off. Secretary of State George

Schultz maintained that the visit "has exceeded everything expected". The Indian

media, as usual, went into hyperboles, but perhaps the most credible summing-up

came from the Prime Minister himself when he said that after his "fruitful" talks.

With the American leadership, "we feel we can cooperate to reduce our differences

and to work together for the common ideals of freedom and democracy.36

Regarding the defence cooperation, the two countries also discussed arms

purchases by India from the United States. India had been diversifying its sources

for supply of military equipment which, apart from the Soviet Union, it had also

bought from West Germany, France, and Italy too much smaller extent from Britain.

Presumably, USA hoped that this might moderate India's objections to the arms

supply to Pakistan and at the same time enable it to have a foot in here in a more

substantial manner, while India wanted modern sophisticated weaponry, and more

so the know-how to produce it indigenously for its defence from various sources

which may be willing for such arrangement. However, there were various

difficulties obstructing the growth of such a relationship.

Washington was much more reluctant in sharing the knowledge for the

indigenous production of its armament, India was also apprehensive about US

reneging subsequently on its commitments on political grounds, as it had done in the

case of its commitment to supply enriched uranium for the Tarapur atomic power

plant. Moreover there was considerable resistance at the Pentagon establishment

level for a closer relationship with India, for India had occasionally defied- but

rarely complied and was never an ally.

As a former Indian defence minister told Prof. V.P. Dutt, 'even when

President Reagan and Secretary Weinberger had agreed to the sale of certain

equipment, there was resistance from the US defence bureaucracy for its actual

supply. All the same, the very fact that there, were serious discussions between the

Indian Defence Minister and US Defence Secretary on arms sales was an indication

of important development in Indo-US relations.37

36 Times of India, 16 and 18 June 1985 37 V.P. Dutt.li. 8 p. 127.

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Besides this impression which Mr. Gandhi make on the US public and

administration, the visit was a success due to the recognition of India's growing

economic, military and commercial strength. Secondly, the US appreciated the

political stability in India and its commitment to democracy. As the Deputy

Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Robert Peck stated "the smooth succession

following Mrs. Gandhi's assassination has reminded us of the resilience of India's 38

deeply-embedded democratic institutions".

There were also reports that the US was seeking an entry in the Indian

market to join some of the western states in meeting some of India's defence

needs.39 But later it was discovered that there was not much interest on the question

of Indian purchases of defence items. The Prime Minister himself had said, "We

have not discussed this in any great depth". Even the American official spokesman,

Barnard Kalb discouraged speculation about the arms deal. In his view, the Indians

were not on a shopping visit, nor were the Americans going to push such sales.

There was some discussion on arms sale but this was not the central issue.40

It was because some of the sales conditions were not acceptable to India,

one of them being that the terms of supply could be altered retroactively by the US.

Secondly, there were doubts about the reliability of the US as a supplier of spare

parts and other equipments. Apart from direct sale, the US concluded an agreement

with India on transfer of high technology which would enable it to import

technology for agriculture and industry as well as military purposes. It had also

expressed its readiness to consider specific military technology areas in which India

may be interested. The underlying US strategy was to reduce Soviet predominance

in the sale of military items to India. But India had to consider all implications

before deciding to include the US in its policy of diversification as regards military

purchases.

Rajiv Criticized over Reagan's Foreign Policy

However, during the visit, Mr. Gandhi was openly critical of Reagan

Administration's Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) or Star Wars programme, its

OQ

Inderjit Badhwar & Madhu Trehan, n. 31, pp. 82-83 39 The Hindu. 6 June 1985 40 Ibid, 15 June 1985

118

arms-supply to Pakistan, waiver to the Symington Amendment, and the Afghan

policy. Though issues of conflict were reduced to a "minimum position"41, there was

no hope of major breakthrough since Mr. Gandhi had retained the service of advisers

as well as the foreign policy of Mrs. Indira Gandhi.42 At the same time, the Reagan

Administration had also refused to change its foreign policy. During Mr. Gandhi's

visit, the US had clarified that it could not alter its "special relationship with

Pakistan", and that the military assistance would continue of the agreement ended in

1987.43

Prime Minister Rajiv also hammered at the theme of a nuclearising Pakistan

creating a qualitatively new security situation for India. He emphasized to the

President Reagan the urgent need for the United States to put greater pressure on

Pakistan to dissuade it from going ahead with its nuclear weapons programme. Mr.

Reagan, however, assured Gandhi that " we are doing all we can to discourage this

programme as also nuclear proliferation in the whole region" Rajiv also told

President Reagan that most of the arms Pakistan got were not of the type that could

be used against Afghanistan.46 He also expressed concern over the militarization of

the Indian Ocean and also described the NPT as a blatantly unfair document which

in his view should not be in existence.

Apart from this, The Indian Embassy at Washington also got a minor

irritant by the invitation of Mr. Ganga Singh Dhillon, a Khalistan propagandist, by

the National Press Club on the day Mr. Gandhi arrived and it described as "a gross

discourtesy".47

In the economic aspect, the Indian Prime Minister also explained the

importance of the public sector in the Indian economy without which it would have

been difficult to build up the country's economic and industrial infrastructure and

emphasized that there was no other option in the early years. He also deplored the

4 Francine R Frankel, "Play the India Card", Foreign Policy, Spring 1986, p. 149. 42 Ibid., p. 150 43 Madhu Chadda, "India and United States; Why Detente Won't Happen", Asian Survey, 26 (10), October 1986, p. 1128. 44 V.P. Dutt, n. 8, p. 126 45 Mirza Asmer Beg, In the tug of war: Indo - Soviet- American Relations. ( Delhi: Gyan Sagar Publications, 1999), p. 51 46 V.P. Dutt, n. 8 p. 126 47 Madhu Trehan," The Gandhis- Stealing the Show", India Today. 15 July 1985, p.87.

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erosion of concessional aid to and the erection of trade barriers against third world 48

imports.

At a News Conference held at the National Press Club on 14 June 1985,

Rajiv also criticized the 'Star War' project of the United States. He said, "We do

have reservation about the Star Wars project...and we are still not totally convinced

of its suitability for the world today. We felt firstly, that there can be no full proof

defensive system. Every time a defensive system has been developed, an offensive

system has been developed to overcome that defensive system. This is history and

cannot be changed... slowly, the point of human decision is being handed over to a

machine and as we all are aware, every single machine is capable of making a

mistake. There will be no time for any correction once this happens".4

Earlier, Rajiv Gandhi expressed India's "deep reservation" about

militarization of outer space which, he said, gave a new dimension to the arms race.

The Star Wars programme would make it difficult to achieve the ultimate goal of

disarmament".50 In spite of the opposition of many countries including India towards

the Star Wars programme, the Unites States decided to conduct test on Star Wars

Laser in early 1990s. The Reagan Administration unveiled plans in November 1987,

for 'Zenith Star' a 50 tonne, 80 feet carrier for Alpha laser that would cost hundreds

of millions of dollars to bulk and half a billion dollars to launch into space.51

For the question of US arms supplies to Pakistan in the face of the latter's

efforts to make a nuclear bomb. Mr. Rajiv had brought this question on several

occasions during the talks with the US leaders as this posed a double danger to India

the consequences of which would be incalculably high. The public opinion in the

country on this issue was very restive and there were growing pressures within the

country that India must go nuclear before the danger looms large on our door steps.

The Defence Secretary Weinberger tried to assure Gandhi that even though

the Reagan administration had in its budget estimates for 1987 -88 earmarked some

additional military aid for Pakistan (beyond the $ 3.2 billion package) it had made

Hindustan Times. 14 June 1985. 9 Asian Recorder. Vol.XXXI, No. 28, July 1-15, 1985, p. 18406 0 The Stateman. (Calcutta), June 14,1985. Also New York Times. June 14,1985. 1 New York Times, January 3, 1988

120

no open-ended commitment to Islamabad and that if the situation in South Asia were

to improve there need not be any continuation of arms supplies to Pakistan Reagan

also gave a similar assurance to Rajiv and hoped that India's active role in

Afghanistan could change this situation. This was too far fetched a view which did

not carry much weight with him. Nor had they any satisfactory response to Rajiv

Gandhi's contention that the US arms supplied to Pakistan could not be used in the

mountainous region of Afghanistan. In fact, they were suitable only for the Indian

terrain.52

For the Afghan question, since January 1985, the Reagan administration

had been suggesting to India that it should get more active in pursuing a political

settlement in Afghanistan and wanted India to play a more positive role in asking the

Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan.

US Secretary of State, George P. Shultz opined "We think India could

probably be rather more influential with the Soviet Union than perhaps India has

been." He admitted that tensions had arisen in Indo-US relations, as the latter had

supported Pakistan with arms.

For this, Mr. Gandhi told the member of the US Congress on 13 June 1985

that "We are opposed to both foreign presences and pressures. We stand for a

political settlement in Afghanistan that ensures sovereignty, integrity, independence

and non-aligned status, and enables the refugees to return to their homes in safety

and honour. Such a settlement can come through dialogue and a realistic consensus

among the parties concerned. We fully support... the initiative that the United

Nations Secretary-General has taken in this direction.5

Rajiv Gandhi affirmed India's longtime position on Afghanistan, saying

that: "there is a justification" for the presence of Soviet troops since they were

" invited by the Karmal regime". He also said that the Soviet Union's entry into

Afghanistan was not very different from the way the United States was invited into

Grenada and that the Soviet and American actions in both cases were "comparable"

except for the fact that " the United States has gone back" from Grenada. He also

52 Times of India. 22 June 1984 B. Banian, Indo-US Relations, ( New Delhi: Omsons Publications, 2004) p. 74 .

54 Ibid., p. 73

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criticized in a muted way, United States support for the Afghan rebels. He said India

was "opposed to both foreign presences and pressure". "The one is advanced as

justification of the other." He added, as an apparent allusion to the Soviet presence

in Afghanistan and the American aid to the Pakistan-based Afghan rebels.55

It seemed that Rajiv Gandhi made some suggestions to Gorbachev on this

issue during his visit to Moscow in May 1985 and the Soviet leader was believed to

have responded positively. The Prime Minister came back with the impression that

Moscow would be willing to pull out of Afghanistan provided the USA took some

corresponding step to ensure Afghanistan's sovereignty, integrity and non aligned

status and safe return of the refugees to their homeland.

This message Rajiv Gandhi conveyed to Reagan and sought the latter's

reactions. According to the press reports, the US response was also encouraging.

After consultation with his top advisers Gandhi evaluated the US suggestions and

decided to ask the Foreign Secretary, Romesh Bhandari to go to Moscow to convey

to the Soviet leaders the US response. If this mission succeeded the US - Soviet

talks scheduled to be held in Washington on some technical aspects of the Afghan

problems were likely to be influenced. And if the two super powers showed a

genuine desire to work for a political settlement, there was a chance that India might

step in and reinforce UN Secretary General's initiative. Rajiv realized the limitations

of his country to launch on this adventure, so he was very cautious to make any

more move in this direction.

Another important event of the visit was the call on Mr. Gandhi by the well

known scientist Carl Segam who was vigorously campaigning for an end of the

nuclear race. He had propounded a theory with which even a Pentagon appointed

group had concurred. It was the possibility of a 'nuclear winter' which would shut

out the sun and thereby lead to sub-zero temperature on the earth resulting in an end

to life and vegetation. The main purpose of the astronomer's visit was to present to

the Indian Prime Minister a statement signed about 80 Nobel prize winners and

others appealing a call by Indian Prime Minister and five other nations for a halt for

the testing and production of nuclear weapons.56

Hindu, 15 June 1985

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Unfortunately, the joint statement issued at the end of Rajiv Gandhi's visit

contained no mention of a couple of issues about which the two countries remained

worried; a potential nuclear arms race in the subcontinent and Afghanistan. On the

first issue, India was reported to have clearly pointed its finger to Pakistan as a

major source of proliferation threat to the whole region.

The Reagan administration, on the other hand, was reportedly content to

refer in general terms to South Asia being in imminent danger of nuclear

proliferation which apparently included India also. As for Afghanistan, Washington

had hoped for some modification which did not materialize, in India's strongly held

view equating Soviet' intervention' in that counter with 'interference' in the form of

external assistance from across the Pakistan border to the Afghan Mujahedeens.

Perhaps, both the countries were of the view that there were divergent

views between them as they decided to drop the topics from the communique

altogether rather than risk harming the promising climate in Indo-US relations.

The statement noted with concern the emergence of organized terrorism as

a threat to peace and democracy and urged all governments to take approprieite steps

to combat this new danger. Both the countries recognized this problem as a threat to

both individually.58 The document further hoped close cooperation and consultation

on the international dimensions of terrorist violence against India. This clearly

referred to the terrorist activities aided by Pakistan in the state of Kashmir. On this

score, the US side did not embarrass the Indian delegation by including Palestinian

Liberation Organisation (PLO) as a terrorist body. The US official policies regarded

PLO as the prime international terrorist organization.59

The Important Outcomes of the Visit

By all accounts Rajiv Gandhi's visit led to vastly improved atmospherics in

the climate of relationship between the two countries, even though important

differences in policy persisted.

Hindustan Times. 14 June 1985 58 D.C. Jha, "India and the United States: From Containment to Cooperation" in V.T. Patil and Nalini Kant Jha (ed)Jndia in a Turbulent World : Perspectives on Foreign and Security Policies (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers Pvt Ltd., 2003) p. 139) 69 Shri Ram Sharma, n. 19 , p. 76

123

In concrete terms, the outcome of Rajiv Gandhi-Reagan talks was the

enunciation of new initiatives announced by President Reagan himself in his

farewell speech on 20 October 1987. Briefly stated they were as follows

1. Extension of three year Indo-US initiative on science and technology.

2. Expansion in bilateral trade and reduction in trade barriers and check on

protectionism.

3. Cooperation in India's need for upgraded technology dealing with computer

science.

4. Pledging cooperation in stemming drug trafficking.

5. Expansion in defence cooperation with special reference to LCA.

6. Enhancement in the productivity in arid zone agriculture and water

management.

7. Utilization of Indo-US fund for cultural and scientific cooperation.

8. Planning exchange of visits by dignitaries and parliamentarians of the two

countries.

9. Commencing a programme for fellowship in research institutes of science

and technology 60

Another important outcome was the approval of a collaborative India-

World Band- USAID national social forestry project to help the conservation and

expansion of India's forest resources. ' It also led to a favorable turn in Indo-US

relations, because the shared perceptions of the two leaders, led to a "meeting of

minds", conductive to the solution of bilateral and global problems.62

The decision of Washington to provide high technology to India in a variety

of fields including the strategic areas of defence was also an important and

60 Ibid. 61 Text of Indo-US Joint Statement, 16 June 1985 , n. 25, New Delhi 62 Dewan Berindranath," Reagan-Rajiv Meeting - Issues-Real and Unreal" Democratic World. 14(23), June 1985, p. 5

124

beneficial outcome. The transfer of such technology had vast potential for a great

leap effect on the Indian economy. The agreement reflected a stage in evolution in

Indo-US relations. So far the administration for, strategic reasons, had placed severe

restrictions on the transfer of technology which made collaboration with India well

nigh impossible. The obvious fear, on the part of Americans was that "the know"

how would leak to the Soviet Union or its allies.

The US had high expectations of hi-tech trade with India. That was the

reason why Washington opted to get a MOU out of the way before Rajiv's visit. The

MOU provided assurances against diversion of American hi-technology from the

specific projects for which it was extended. India already had a credible reputation

in the maintenance of confidentiality, the assurances in the MOU the merely

formalized the belief and faith on both sides. Moreover, the basic infrastructure for

such an effort to succeed already existed as did other opportunities for interaction

between the corporate sectors of the two countries.

However, it reflected Washington's new found confidence in India's

potential as a trading and industrial partner that it planned to send out later

exploratory teams in the fields of telecommunication and electronics in which India

had a substantial modern sector.

The reason behind the US objective in developing scientific relations with

India was partly because Washington was convinced that greater scientific and

technological collaboration and increased trade would bring about changes

alignment. The US understood India's commitment to non-alignment and had no

quarrel with that. But Washington's efforts to interact more with India were based

upon the hope that a more balanced India's posture between East and West was a

reasonable and realistic long term project.64

As far as US-Pakistan relationship was concerned, it was clear that the US

arms policy towards Pakistan would not undergo any change. The Six-year & 3.2

billion military supply programme ending in 1987, would continue beyond that

period. The agreement provided for continuing the military sales programme and

Shri Ram Sharma, n. 19 , p. 76 Ibid.

125

conferred the right on Pakistan to purchase arms on a cash basis after the expiry of

the accord. The arms programme that was in operation had a salutary effect on the

US relations with Pakistan though a price had to be paid on this score in the form of

straining its ties with India. The arms supply relationship which was in a state of

atrophy was revived in 1981 and began to strengthen Pakistan's capacity to deal

with the Soviet threat arising from its presence in Afghanistan.

The American argument was two fold, the US arms supply would not

disturb the given disparity in the military power as between India and Pakistan, so it

would not affect India's interest. Secondly, the American arms supply to Pakistan

would not be directed against India. The arms supply to Pakistan was meant to

strengthen Pakistan's defence border particularly. As a rejoinder the Indian objection

was that some of the highly sophisticated equipments sought by the Zia regime like

the Haw Kaye airborne radar system, the Harpoon missiles, the Mohawk battlefield

surveillance aircraft, the Vulcan Phalanse air defence equipment, the improved tow

missiles for anti-tank warfare, and the updated offensive capabilities of F-16 aircraft

could be used only against it in the sub-continental terrain.''"

The visit had also created an atmosphere of a cooperative and sympathetic

personal relationship between the two leaders. The Americans found Rajiv Gandhi

and his colleagues the kind of people with whom they could conduct frank and

honest discussions expressing both agreements and disagreements without rancour.

The US realized that if the two countries were to have a growing relationship

capable of maturing into a series of mutual understandings the capacity for an open

sympathetic discussion among the leaders was indispensable.66

As a matter of fact, the net results of the visit did not produce any major

Indo-US agreement. The talks definitely enriched understanding of each others view

point as each leader reiterated his country's policy with frankness and condour.

Neither side changed its professed stands in respect of several issues and there

remained differences between them. On many issues the two sides agreed to

disagree and there were some latent dangers too. Euphoria always leads to

disenchantment. Perhaps, once again to two sides were over expecting from each

65 Ibid., p.77-78

126

other. This was particularly true of what may be called public opinion. In the US the

general expectation appeared to be that Rajiv Gandhi was going to fundamentally

change the foreign policy and the economic policy of India. In India a widespread

but not necessarily well informed view was that the US would change its policy

basically towards this region.

Thus, the points of convergence between the USA and India were found to

be less than the points of divergence and hence the attempts made by both the sides

to gloss over them were bound to be only partially successful. The net gains of the

exercise were (i) a better understanding of each other's view point, and (ii) an

understanding to increase scientific and technological cooperation between the two

countries. The gains were largely theoretical; concrete results were few".

The challenges ahead after the visit

After the visit, then the challenge was to put more substance into the

bilateral relationship to accompany the substantially improved atmospherics. In the

State Department's view, this meant implementing the MOU in a way that

demonstrated to India and also to the Washington bureaucracy that the Reagan

administration was serious about making advanced technology available to India. In

1981, providing F-16s became the test of US credibility with Pakistan. With India in

the mid-1980s, the test of credibility came in US willingness to provide a highly

sophisticated Cray supercomputer model XMP-24 to the Indian Institute of Science

to help the country's weather research program.

One of the world's most advanced computers, superior to anything the

Soviet Union possessed, the Cray XMP-24 which India sought had the capability of

being used for nuclear weapon and ballistic missile development, .for deciphering

cryptographic codes, and for a host of theoretical tasks and military applications that

had little to do with India's stated objective of aiding agriculture through enhanced

tracking of global weather patterns. Since the United States had not sold a computer

as powerful as the Cray XMP-24 outside the circle of close allies, its export to India

was a difficult decision, raising security questions about the Soviets and concerns

about the computer's possible use for nuclear weapons and missile guidance

67 Dennis Kux, n. 1, p. 404.

127 «tt'*; ••if?

development.68 The Cray provided a genuine test of the Reagan administration's

seriousness about improving relations.

In September 1985, the Science Adviser to the Defense Ministry, Dr.

Arunachalam, a key figure in India's defense industry, visited a number of US

defense plants as part of the continuing exploration of possible US collaboration in

the LCA. In the end, the Indians expressed interest in procuring the General Electric

404 engine as the initial power plant for their next-generation fighter. Used in the F-

18, the GE 404 was one of the most advanced US aircraft engines. Early approval in

principle by the Pentagon and the White House for its sale to India was a tangible

sign of the more forthcoming US stance on security cooperation with India.69

Around this time, Harry Barnes completed his tour in New Delhi, where he

was succeeded by another career diplomat, John Gunther Dean. Barnes' quiet

determination, energy, and bureaucratic skill, as well as his good rapport with

Indians, helped the two countries take advantage of Mrs. Gandhi's opening toward

the United States. Getting a skeptical Washington to respond to the Indian overture,

developing the science and technology initiative, and shepherding the difficult

negotiations for the high technology MOU were substantial achievements given the

considerable residual sentiment against India in the Washington bureaucracy.

Another striking success by Barnes was obtaining legislation to set aside $100

million from the dwindling pool of US-owned PL 480 rupees to fund science,

technology, and education programs.70

During part of Harry Barnes' tenure, India had one of its most effective

envoys in Washington, K, Shankar Bajpai. The son of the Indian Agent-General to

the United States during World War II, Bajpai had the unusual experience of

returning as ambassador to the house where he had lived as a teenager. Bajpai was

fully at home in Washington, able to represent the Indian position forcefully without

ruffling American sensitivities. '

Ibid., p. 407 The Statesman. 26 September 1985. Dennis Kux, n. 1, p. 407. Ibid.

128

During his tour, Bajpai worked to broaden Indian Embassy contacts beyond

the normal diplomatic realm of the State Department and the National Security

Council. He focused, in particular, on developing relations with the Defense

Department and the Treasury, two agencies not notably well disposed toward India

in the early years of the Reagan administration, but increasingly important in

bilateral relations.

In Octoberl985, Rajiv returned to the United States to attend the 40th

anniversary of the United Nations. Like a number of other leaders, he met with

President Ronald Reagan in New York. Although impressive in private sessions, this

time more differences surfaced in his meeting with President Reagan, be it the

question of nuclear disarmament or the nuclearisation of Pakistan. President Reagan

told Rajiv Gandhi that he did not think Pakistan was engaged in a nuclear weapons

programme.

But, on the other hand, he also told him to start talking to General Zia on

this issue before it was too late. The implications were clear. The US did not wish to

take any fundamental reappraisal even though there were clear indications of

Islamabad's pursuit of nuclear weapons. Probably Washington also wanted to

transfer responsibilities in this regard and make it an Indo-Pak issue.

On the other hand Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Cuba, his air-dash to Moscow in

October soon after meeting President Reagan and his foreign policy pronouncements

were said to have created a measure of disenchantment in USA. One official US

source, even, said the honeymoon was over.7

On his return to New Delhi, the Prime Minister told the press that the

Americans had no cause to be upset. India had built its good relations with the

Soviet Union over the past 30 years. It was not possible to build up similarly good

relations with the United States in six months. The two countries, he stressed to

American leaders, still were at odds on important issues like apartheid, disarmament,

and Pakistan.75

Ibid., p. 408 V.P. DutL, n. 8 , p. 128 Ibid. The Statesman. 25 November 1985

129

As Rajiv's comments made clear, underlying policy differences between

India and the United States remained even if there were improvements in style and

form since Rajiv succeeded his mother as prime minister.

Another New Area of Cooperation

In mid-March 1986, the US Attorney General, Mr. Edwin Meese III and the

Head of the US Drug Enforcement Administration (USDEA), Mr. John C. Lawn

visited New Delhi. Their visit brought to the forefront a new area of Indo-US

cooperation- narcotics. Mr. Meese and Mr. Lawn held talks with Mr. Rajiv Gandhi

and other Indian officials. The visit resulted in the establishment of a joint working

party, comprising of Indian and US officials, to check the flow of drugs from India

to the US.76 It would further this cause which the contingent from the USDEA in the

Embassy had been unable to do, due to its limited scope. The working group

conducted training programmes and information on the chemical composition of

drugs and their identification was shared by India and the US. It also took measures

to stop drug-trafficking and treating and rehabilitating the drug-addicts.

Thus, the visit and the consequent establishment of the working group led to

Indo-US cooperation in this humanitarian mission.

Indo - US Defence Relations: New Phase

A new phase in the Defence relations between India and the US was

initiated by the visit of US Defence Secretary, Mr. Caspar W. Weinberger in

October 1986. Mis trip underscored US interest in expanding contacts and dialogue

in security area.78 Mr. Weinberger stated that he had come to inform India of the US

"desire for basically reduced tensions wherever we find them". He emphasized that

"friendship for India is perfectly compatible with the continuation of our friendship

for Pakistan and China". He also presented the US offer of providing weapon

systems to India and even expressed the possibility of "co production agreements".79

Kessinqs Contemporary Archives, 33 (2), February 1987, p. 34947 77 "Indo-US joint committee meets", Minute of Sixth Indo-US Joint Commission on Economics, Commercial, Scientific, Technological and Cultural Cooperation, on 6th February 1986, Department of State Bulletin, April 1986, pp. 81-82 78DennisKux, n. 1, p. 408. 79

Caspar W. Weinberger, "Press Briefing after meeting with Rajiv Gandhi in New Delhi", 11th October 1986 ( Reprints), American Centre, New Delhi, pp. 1-2

130

He reiterated that the US would be necessitated to ensure that it did not "slip into the

hands of the Soviets".80

However, there was much to the satisfaction of India, he expressed his

confidence in the Indian desire "to protect any technologies that they were given or

that were transferred to them and not have them go out into unfriendly hands".

Mr. Weinberger described his tour to India as "a wonderful visit". The US

State Department as well as some Indian newspapers termed it a "a new phase in

indo-US defence ties". However, the Indian officials commented that, "the

atmospherics were very good" but it was merely "clearing" of the "cobwebs".

During Weinberger's four days in India, the Secretary met top Indian

leaders to continue discussions about possible US cooperation in Indian defense

production. For his talk with Prime Minister Gandhi, Weinberger was upbeat about

the improvement in relations and the possibility of proceeding with the sale of the

Cray supercomputer and the GE-404 engine.

However, it was disappointed as no concrete decision was taken on military

cooperation between India and the US. The supply of GE-404 engines for light

combat aircraft (LCA) project and the Supercomputer had also reportedly been

shelved.84

During this visit the Indian government made efforts to reassure the US

officials that they could trust India as the keeper of the secrets of all its

collaborations. It also laid bare the complete picture of its defence requirements and

acquisitions in the recent past to emphasize upon the point that there was no undue

reliance on any one source and no effort was spared to ensure diversification of

source of supply.

After negotiations with the Indian government, agreements were reached on

the transfer of engines and electronics for the L.A. project, radar and telemetry

80 Ibid., p. 4 81 Ibid., p. 6 op l

Dilip Bobb "Indo-US Ties: The Hard Sell, India Today. 15 November 1986, p. 101 83 Dennis Kux, n. 1,p. 408. 84 Syed Ziallah "Message Behind the Weinberger Visit" Democratic World.15 (43), 26 October 1986,p.10

Mirza Asmer Beg, n.45, p. 127

131

systems for testing missiles, anti-tank weaponry, night vision equipment and armour

piering projectiles, super alloys, fire control and transmission mechanism for the

main battle tank.

A few days after the visit, in Pakistan, the Secretary of Defense managed to

set relations back when he unexpectedly announced that the United States was in

favour of providing Pakistan with the Boeing 707 Advanced Warning and Control

System (AWACS) as part of a new multi-year military and economic aid package

that was being discussed with Pakistan. Despite an informal understanding with the

Indians to avoid springing surprises on each other, Weinberger said nothing about

the AWACS during his stay in New Delhi.87

Thus, the cordiality generated and the good "atmospherics" were dissipated

when on 16 October, Mr. Weinberger announced that Pakistan would be provided an

"airborne early warning platform" to counteract the air space violations by

Afghanistan. The reaffirmation of the US Secretary of Defence of the US readiness

to provide "complete support to build Pakistan's defence capability", aroused Indian o p

suspicions about the sincerity of the proposals presented during his visit to India.

The Indian were genuinely upset by the prospect of Pakistan's acquiring the

AWACS. The sophisticated aircraft would substantial enhance the Pakistan Air

Force's capability, enabling it to track enemy aircraft at great distances. Launching a

vigorous counterattack, New Delhi agreed that the AWACS would be of limited use

against the Soviets, were not need against the Afghans, but would be enormously

helpful against India.

In Washington, Indian Ambassador P.K. Kaul, former Cabinet Secretary

and successor to Shankar Bajpai, protested the AWACS in meeting with Weinberger

and senior State Department officials adding to the chorus, visiting Indian Foreign

Secretary A.P. Venkateshwaran warned Washington in January 1987 that providing

the AWACS would trigger a "very destabilizing" arms race in South Asia, requiring

heavy Indian expenditures to match Pakistan's new capability.89

Dennis Kux, n. 1, p. 408. Syed Ziallah, n. 84, p. 9 Dennis Kux, n. 1, p. 409.

132

Even though aid to the Afghan resistance remained tremendously popular in

the United States, the idea of giving Pakistan the AW ACS encountered opposition

on Capitol Hill. With US- Indian relations improved, New Delhi's view carried

more weight than previously. In a first, members of the Indian immigrant

community staged a demonstration against sending the AW ACS to Pakistan during

House of Representative hearing by Representative Stephen Solarz of New York.

The Democratic Congressman, who was establishing himself as an expert on Asia,

opposed the AWACS because he did not believe Pakistan was sufficiently

responsive to US desires that it stop its nuclear weapons program.9

In the Senate, John Glenn of Ohio and other urged the Reagan

administration to go slow on AWACS unless Pakistan provided firmer assurances it

was halting its nuclear program. The opposition was strengthened by voices of

concern from the Republican right, from Senators Orrin Hatch of Utah and Gordon

Humphrey of New Hampshire, who urged that if AWACS were provided Pakistan,

this should be balanced in some way acceptable to India. '

In the face of congressional doubts, the administration wavered about the

AWACS, exploring a less expensive and less capable early warning aircraft to meet

the genuine air security concerns posed by Afghan air attacks inside Pakistan

territory. Islamabad, however, rebuffed US efforts to substitute a more modest

system, such as the E2C, insisting on the AWACS. With the Soviets bogged down

in a genuine war of national liberation in Afghanistan, the Reagan administration

had a strong policy incentive to pay Pakistan's price as part of the new multi-year

aid package.'

As if the possibility of the AWACS were not enough trouble for bilateral

relations, the sale of the Cray Supercomputer was encountering major obstacles

within the US government. Hardliners in Defense Department were digging in their

against selling the computer to India. The concerns were familiar; the possible

leakage of technology to the Soviets and possible use of the Cray for nuclear

weapons and missile development.93 Revelations about Soviet technology espionage

Ibid., p. 410 Ibid. Washington Post. 8 July 1986

133

in the United States heightened anxiety about sending sensitive technology to India.

"if they can steal it from Silicon Valley, they can steal in from Bangalore," a

Pentagon official told the Wall Street Journal.94

The debate over the Cray matched the State and Commerce Departments

(which favoured moving ahead with the sale) against Defense, Energy, and the

National Security Agency (NSA), which disliked the proposal. An unstated, but

nonetheless real, factor was the preference among some Defense Department

officials for Pakistan and a related reluctance to expand security relations with India.

Finally, in March 1987, the Reagan administration- after much delay- decided on a

compromise solution: it would approve the sale to India of a Cray model XMP-14

computer which had less capability than the Cray XMP-24 India wanted. US

specialists asserted the Cray XMP-14 could do sophisticated weather research work

but lacked the code cracking capabilities that aroused NSA concern.95

India was disappointed by this decision. One official source alleged the

Reagan administration had raised high expectations and then reneged by providing

the Cray XMP-14 rather than the more powerful Cray XMP-24.96

As India's Minister of State for External Affairs Natwar Singh put it during

an April 1987 visit to Washington, US-Indian relations were like the titles of two

novels of Charles Dickens, Great Expectations and Hard Times.97

However, New Delhi did not reject the US counter offer out of hand.

Foreign Secretary Venkateshwaran urged Prime Minister Gandhi to accept, arguing

it was in India's interest to buy the XMP-14 in order to gain entry into the US high

technology world. Rejecting the offer, Venkateshwaran warned, would freeze India

out of high technology cooperation with the US. In the end, Rajiv accepted this

reasoning and approved the purchase of the XMP-14.98

The Reagan administration itself had gradually reduced the level of

development aid to India in the mid-1980s from $ 100 million down to $50 million.

Dennis Kux, n. 1, p. 410. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p.411

134

During a period of tight development assistance budgets, AID headquarters in

Washington shifted funds from India to boost development aid programs in other

countries. Knowing how difficult a battle in Washington against the cuts would be,

Ambassador John Gunther Dean decided not to contest the reductions. Dean doubted

the benefit in terms of better relations with India would be worth the bureaucratic i 99

struggle.

The administration's handling of AWACS and the Cray- as well as

congressional sniping at India over bilateral assistance cooled off New Delhi's

enthusiasm about the prospects for enhanced relations. When members of parliament,

including some from Rajiv's own Cogress Party, lashed out at his government for

not being firm enough with Washington, the Prime Minister bent under the criticism.

He adopted a tougher stance, demonstrating Indian displeasure by abruptly canceling

a visit by External Affairs Minister N.D. Tewari a week before he was due in the

United States.100

Hitherto, it had been the Indian government's suspicion of the reliability of

the US as an arms supplier and foreign policy backer that had inhibited close Indo-

US defence cooperation. But in the second half of the eighties the US government

became more enthusiastic in its offers of defence technology and sale of weapons

including willingness to collaborate in the LCA project. The traditional aversion to

the public sector and to transfer of technology especially of the sophisticated and hi-

tech variety was put aside. This enthusiasm was probably linked to the expectation

that if the Indian government's dependence on the Soviet Union for its arms supplies

is reduced. It could result in a foreign policy more favourable to the US. It was in

this connection that Senator Gordon Humphrey, Chairman of the congressional task

force on Afghanistan met V.S. Arunachalam, the scientific adviser to Defence

Minister of India in April 1987 in New Delhi. Later on agreement on an cooperation

in high technology was signed on November 5, 1987.101

In response to the US initiatives, Rajiv Gandhi stated on November 11,

1987- "India was buying defence technology from the US but no comprehensive

Ibid. Asian Recorder. XXXIII (48) November 26-December 2 , 1987, p. 19756

135

defence treaty on deal with it was under consideration". He added that "A

continuing dialogue between India and the US was indispensable".

However, a new hindrance was created in the path of this growing

relationship when the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee decided to recommend a

ban on the transfer of high- technology and cuts in bilateral assistance to both India

and Pakistan if the two failed to reduce tension in the region and curb the nuclear

arms race. However, the subcommittee also recommended a six year waiver in order

to permit the proposed 4 billion security assistance package to Pakistan to be

approved.103

The Indian Ambassador in Washington P.K. Kaul, met the US Assistant

Secretary of State Michael Armacost at the State Department on December 2, 1987

to lodge India's vehement remonstrance at the Senate action. What basically hurt

India most was the fact that the legislation sought to condition the transfer of high-

technology to India on the two South Asian countries entering into an agreement on

nuclear safeguards.

The Indian government conveyed to the US embassy in New Delhi on

December 4, 1987, its adverse reaction to the US Senate Panel's Amendment on

nuclear proliferation. The then Minister of State for External Affairs Natwar Singh

stated categorically in the Rajya Sabha on December 7, that "Indo-US relations

would be adversely affected unless the clause seeking to equate India and Pakistan

in the US Senate subcommittee recommendation were deleted."

Consequent to India's protests, the US Senate on December 12, 1987

reversed this controversial amendment to the US Foreign Assistance Act that would

have made on Indo-Pak agreement on nuclear non-proliferation a precondition for

continued US aid to India.

Later on Washington agreed to sell India a ringlaster gyroscope essential for

the development of the inertial guidance system for a new Indian designed light-

Satish Kumar (ed.), Yearbook on India's Foreign Policy 1987-88. ( New Delhi: Sage, 1988), p. 72 103 Statesman Weekly. 5 December 1987. 104 Satish Kumar, n. 102 105 Asian Recorder. XXXIV(4) January 22-28, 1988, p. 19848

136

weight fighter plane. US- Indian defence cooperation also included the provision of

US radar components for the Indian surface-to-surface missile that was tested in

January 1988. In return the US naval vessels were allowed to visit Indian ports and

US defence officials were given unusual access to Indian defence facilities.

The next US Defence Secretary, Mr. Frank Carlucci visited New Delhi in

the first week of April (4), 1988, to discuss regional issues and to put together a US

Arms Package. This included sophisticated equipment and fly by wire technology to

allow India to build the light combat Aircraft, planned as the principal fighter

aircraft of the Indian Air Force in the late 1990s, and for which the US

administration had already granted use of F - 404 engines from General Electric.1

During his visit, a request was made by India for US assistance and technical

designs for the development of its third aircraft carrier, which was to be nuclear-

powered and expected to be launched in 1995.' 7 Though no concrete results

emerged, the visit was significant in that it was the second time during the Reagan

Presidency that a Secretary of Defence had visited India. It indicated that the US was

anxious to work out a compromise in its 'global perceptions' and India's 'regional

aspirations'.108

When the Indian Minister of Defence, K.C. Pant, visited Washington in

July 1989 for talks on security issues he clarified that the US attitude towards

providing the technology for LCA project had been positive.109 He, however, added

that India had rejected a US suggestion for joint exercises in the Indian Ocean.

The US had for long desired to forge a cooperative relationship with the

Indian Navy, the largest among the Indian Ocean littoral states, keeping in mind the

strategic importance of the Indian Ocean. Writing in the Washington post, two

former US Naval officers, Elmo Zumwalt Jr. and Worth Bagley, pointed out- " for

decades to come, the Indian ocean will be a critical arena... in the absence of an

effective United Nations force, the Navies of the Free world are going to have to

provide protection for their sea lanes and power to prevent terrorism and

revolutionary accesses for the foreseeable future ....In a decade or two, the United

106 Asian Recorder. XXXV(4) October 1-7, 1989, p. 20793 107 The Times of India. 26 August 1988 108 Dilip Mukerjee "Carlucci Visit - A Long term Angle, The Times of India. 4 April 1988. 109 Asian Recorder. XXXV(4) October 1-7,1989, p. 20793

137

States is going to need the support of democratically ruled India to maintain

adequate free world control in the Indian Ocean".110 In such scenario, India received

positive items such as sea-launched missiles, deep-sea sensors and other related

naval defence systems also figured in the discussions. With the approval of the US

government, General Electric sold LM 2500 gas turbine engines for the Indian Navy.

In late 1989, the US offered to co produce with India an advanced fighter

jet engine. This offer was made as part of an overall US presentation to India for the

coproduction of the T.F.S. trainer jet. It was one of the most significant US defence

proposals to India as the trainer jet is capable of dual use and can carry upto 7200

pounds of ordinance and can handle air-to-air side winder missiles. A subsequent

letter of Agreement permitted the Aeronautical Systems Division of the US Air

Force, Wright Patterson AFB, to participate jointly with India's DRDO. The goal

was to link the research, development, test and evaluation activities of the two

organizations, including access by Indian engineers to Wright Patterson's testing and

computer facilities.111 Hence, the US involvement with the Indian military in the

aerospace sector appeared to be promising by the close of the eighties.

On the Indian side, even before the Soviet central government began to

crumble. New Delhi had made it clear to Washington that it is ready to upgrade

military ties. Help in military training is being welcomed and even joint military

exercises which may contribute to this purpose are not excluded. The only

reservation is that training should not create a dependence on any particular military

hardware or software.

Rajiv Gandhi: Decline of Political Reputation & Domestic Matters

After two year of being prime minister of India, there was a sign of

declining in Rajiv's political reputation as by 1987 the glow had begun to wear off

due to the ineffective politician (under his government) in handling pressing

domestic matters. Although Rajiv pledged democratic reforms for the Congress

Party, he failed to deliver on his promise to hold internal party elections. Reverting

110 Washington Post, 17 November 1989 111 G. Jacobs. "US-South Asia Military Relations: Challenges for the 1990s", Asian Defence Journal, February 1989, p. 6 Tl2 Dilip Mukherjee, "New Delhi and Washington: Rocky Road to Rapproachment" The Times of India, 3 September 1991.

138

to his mother's style of tightly centralized control, Rajiv frequently shuffled

ministers at the central and state level, more with an eye to maintaining personal

political power than improving efficiency or rewarding achievement.

In foreign affairs, Rajiv like his mother and grandfather, retained effective

control of policy, unlike them he lacked a sure touch in dealing with substantive

issues. Shuffling foreign ministers four times during his four years as Prime Minister,

Rajiv earned a reputation in the Ministry of External Affairs as a well intentioned

intellectual lightweight. Rajiv continued, nonetheless, to make a favourable

impression abroad. His handsome presence and well- mannered approach helped

retain a star quality in international gatherings and travels even though his reputation

was dimming at home.

In policy terms, Rajiv continued the course Indira mapped out after

returning to office in 1980. In addition to seeking better balance in India's

nonalignment through improved relations with Washington, Rajiv showed

increasing willingness to assert India's primacy in the subcontinent based on its size

and increasing military power. In 1987, India began a major initiative by sending

several thousand troops against the insurgency mounted by Tamil separatists in the

neighboring island republic of Sri Lanka to India's south. Although the Sri Lanka

government agreed to the intervention, the action - under which 50,000 Indian

troops were eventually deployed - provided a dramatic signal of greater Indian

readiness to flex its muscles regionally.

Uncertain how the United States would respond, New Delhi was relieved

when Washington gave its blessing to the venture. Paradoxically, in light of the

accommodating US reaction, the Indo-Sri Lankan accords made gratuitous reference

to "outside powers" seeking to gain a foothold on the island and to foreign radio

broadcasts from Sri Lanka. Since the Voice of America had been using a transmitter

in Sri Lanka for many years, the criticism of the United States was thinly veiled.115

113 Bhabani Sen Gupta, Rajiv Gandhi: A Political Study, ( New Delhi: Konark, 1989), see for a discussion of Rajiv's leadership in domestic affairs. 114 Dennis Kux, n. 1, p. 412. 115 Ibid.

139

About the same time Indian troops intervened in Sri Lanka, worrisome

developments regarding Pakistan's efforts to develop nuclear weapons surfaced. In

late July 1987, Arshan Parvez, a Canadian national of Pakistani origin, was arrested

in Philadelphia and charged with trying to bribe US customs officials to permit the

export of certain prohibited material essential for Pakistan's nuclear program. The

incident underscored fears that Pakistan, despite their protestations to the contrary,

were pressing ahead with their covert effort to develop a nuclear capability. The

news also played into the hands of those critical of providing the AWACS aircraft to

Pakistan- a proposal already under fire as a destabilizing system. After the Parvez

episode, the AWACS was effectively shelved.116

The administration was, in any case, having increasing difficulty in dealing

with the Pakistan nuclear issue. The Congress modified the legislative approach to

the Pakistan nuclear issue in 1985, adopting an amendment by Senator Larry

Pressler (Republican, South Dakota), that required annual certification by the

President that Pakistan did not have a nuclear device in order to continue economic

and military aid. By establishing a line that Pakistan could not cross if it were to

receive US aid, the amendment, in effect, gave Pakistan a choice: either hold off

crossing the bomb threshold or forgo US aid. Although President Reagan continued

to provide the certification, US officials were uncomfortable - caught between

mounting evidence about the Pakistan nuclear program and the desire to maintain

the pressure on the Soviets in Afghanistan.1"

Besides these issues, there were some other international developments that

came in the way which caused irritation and tension. India criticized US military

action against Libya and the External Affairs Minister, B.R. Bhagat visited Tripoli to

express solidarity with the Libyan leaders. Washington expressed its annoyance by

saying that the US cooperation in helping India to tackle the problem of terrorism

would be conditional. Another incident was related to Nicaragua where American

intervention was viewed by several other states as unjustified. On 22 October 1986

India's representative in the cessation of American intervention and intimidation

against Nicaragua.'18

116 Ibid. 117 Ibid. 118 Patriot, 24 October 1986

140

Also India played a leading role on 11 March 1987 at the UN Human

Rights Commission in blocking an attempt by the US to subject Cuba to special

scrutiny for alleged absence of fundamental rights. When the Commission endorsed

the Indian mission proposal to shelve the US resolution expressing deep concern

over alleged human rights violations and calling on Cuba to release all political

prisoners, the US administration blamed India for causing such an embarrassing 119

situation.

Question of Secessionist Forces and Punjab Situation

Fears were expressed in India that the US or at least a section of its

intelligence apparatus was out to destabilize the country by encouraging secessionist

forces in various parts of the country particularly in Punjab. This was apparent from

what often happened in the Congress. In June 1987, a debate took place in the House

of Representatives in which 8 Congressmen belonging to the Republican Party and

the other seven to the Democratic Party took part. Many of them showed little

understanding or knowledge of the issues involved in the Punjab situation and

voiced criticism of the Indian government.120

They were clearly told by the Indian spokesmen that they had not cared to

see the unfortunate events in Punjab in correct perspective. The primary issue there

was terrorism. They were supported with clippings of foreign press coverage of the

events in Punjab with most of the stories emanating from different towns in the state.

They were told to recall the days when the US was also faced with the spectrum of

secession for which they had to pay a heavy price. In Punjab, a small faction of Sikh

community sought to impose its will over the rest by force. That could not be

allowed.121

A section of US Congressmen interpreted the violence that broke out after

Mrs. Gandhi's assassination as religious and ethnic outburst and 17 of them wrote

on 5 August 1987 a letter to their ambassador to the UN to raise this issue before the

UN Human Rights Commission at its next meeting. The Congressmen said, they

were concerned about the violation of those human rights which the Indian

119 Telegraph. 15 March 1987 120 Hindustan Times. 13 July 1987

141

Constitution had provided as inalienable rights. The question was raised in the

Parliament on 25 August where it was called a 'disquieting development' amounting

to interfering in our internal affairs.

In the US, President Reagan tended to have developed a tunnel vision about

the threat of expanding Soviet influence in India. His concept of American policies

towards the Indian subcontinent was mostly determined by his pre-conceived notion

about Moscow's intentions. That was the reason why India failed to figure as a 1 99

sizeable factor in America's strategic designs. So, the Americans said, the main

obstacle to desirable state of affairs had been their perception of an India

unjustifiably and unwisely tilting towards Moscow.

In some American political circles it was felt that there was a calculated

move in New Delhi to hound out friends of America both from the bureaucracy and

from the Prime Minister's inner circle and they were being replaced by pro-Soviet

elements. As an example it was stated that the exit of P.C. Alexander, as principal

adviser to the Prime Minister, was the handiwork of pro-Soviet elements, who were

out to influence the new young Prime Minister. The immediate effect of this change 191

was a sudden fall in Rajiv Gandhi's popularity and standing.

Rajiv's Second Visit to the United States

In 20 October 1987, Rajiv Gandhi made a second official visit to

Washington. The trip underscored Rajiv's belief that expanded dialogue was useful

despite continuing policy differences. As Rajiv had clearly stated that his main

object in meeting Reagan would be to tell him to realize how dangerous situation,

American supply of arms to Pakistan was creating in South Asia. He also pleaded

with his American host not to provide Pakistan with an aerial early warning system

to which would not be useful on the Afghan border as proposed but as an offensive

weapon against Indian border

Despite lower key and briefer than the 1985 visit, Rajiv still touched the

major bases during his stay- talks and lunch with President Reagan and meeting with

122 Ibid., 20 August 1987 123 Ibid.

142

Vice President Bush, Acting Secretary of State John Whitehead, NSC Chief Frank

Carlucci, and Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger.124

Mr. Rajiv told the Unites States that Pakistan was engaged in a

'clandestine' programme to build a nuclear weapon which it concealed because it

was controlled by its military. India, in contrast, conducted its nuclear programme in

the open, under civilian operation and devoted to peaceful power production.

In this context an incident that occurred with Michael Armscost, the US

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs may be stated to serve as a warning to

the state officials. During his trip to Pakistan a few months ago, it was reported that

Armscost, promised to keep the most recent exposure of Pakistan's surreptitious

nuclear equipment acquisitions at a 'low key' if Islamabad merely would allow him

to have a reassuring look at its Kohuta nuclear enrichment centre. Armscost's offer

to temporize was given an abrupt 'no'. He felt much humiliated and beat a hasty

retreat.125

During the visit, Rajiv confirmed his decision that India would accept the

Cray XMP-14 supercomputer. He received, in turn, an implicit US promise to

provide additional computers in line with "India's need for upgraded capability and

the growing mutual confidence that implementation of our agreement will provide."

According to the White House, the President and Rajiv also "agreed to expand

defense cooperation, proceeding along the lines which have already established in

working together on aspects of the Light Combat Aircraft, and in other areas.126

After the two hour meeting, both Indian Prime Minister and American

President expressed satisfaction of what they had discussed and agreed to do. It

included at least three items of US military equipment: (a) the air combat

maneuvering range, a ground based system in which pilots simulate bombing targets

and then grade them on their accuracy. This was something India had long been

interested in acquiring to improve its training programme but up to now the US navy

had stood in opposition, (b) a missile range instrumentation system, similar to

Dennis Kux, n. 1, p. 414. Statesman, 22 October 1987 Dennis Kux, n. 1, p. 414.

143

USA's own set up at cape Canaveral for tracking missile test by telemetry and (c) an

anti-tank missile.' 7

There were also discussions on joint Indo-US efforts to bring the Arjun

tanks to the finishing stage and also working out cooperation on the already

approved US General Electric engines for India's light combat aircraft. Rajiv

Gandhi also received long-awaited assurance that India would get supercomputer for

its weather reconnoitering. The White House was careful to state that two

governments would consult regularly to ensure that the US super computer exports

reflected the rapid pace of advancing technology in India and that whatever India

needed was to upgrade its capability.

India and USA disagreed on Afghan crisis. The government of India

thought that the Najibullah regime in Kabul enjoyed wide support and would remain

stable even after withdrawal of Soviet troops. The US administration disagreed. The

Indian government gave legitimacy to the Kabul government by extending medical

aid, by establishing with it a full diplomatic relationship and by inviting the Afghan

premier Najibullah to visit New Delhi. The US administration did not agree with

these presumptions and considered the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul not a

legitimate government.

A vital difference between the approaches of the two countries was with

regard to the likely emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan after

Soviet withdrawal. India viewed a serious danger in this menace but realized that

being under the influence of a powerful communist state, the Afghan people would

be more interested in exercising their right to self-determination not in the name of

religion which was in a wrong way being practiced as a state religion but out of their

consideration to solve their economic problems. The US held a different view. In

Iran where the principle of self-determination had been fully exercised and

Ayatollah Khomeini enjoyed massive support, the US was opposed to it on grounds

of its being a fundamentalist governed state. The American perception was that it

was going to be a replica of the Khomeini type of fundamentalism in Afghanistan.129

Statesman, 22 October 1987 Shri Ram Sharma, n. 19, p. 83.

144

As regards the achievements of Rajiv Gandhi's visit it revealed a type of

realism that would henceforth govern the relations of the two countries. It did not

mean that the relations of the two countries. It did not mean that the irritants of the

sort that had so far affected the mutual ties disappeared or that the two countries

would have no reason to complain against each other's attitudes on important issues.

But it did mean that the two countries would not be deflected from the course of

cooperation, in various spheres, that they had laid down two years ago during the

first visit of Rajiv Gandhi.

On one crucial issue, arms aid to Pakistan there was no illusion in India.

The US decision was that it had to choose between its nuclear non-proliferation

goals and its compulsions to use Pakistan as a convenient conduit to pump arms to

the Mujahaddin rebels in Afghanistan. Washington was also well aware of

Islamabad's determination to have a nuclear weapon option. Washington had to

select one or the other but its efforts to have both created queer situation. Gandhi

could not change Reagan administration's mind in this concern about the dangers of

nuclear spread, express the hope that nuclear competition in the region would be

avoided and urge India and Pakistan to intensify their dialogue to resolve

outstanding issues and to deal with the threat of nuclear proliferation in the region.

The administration did not deviate from its long standing practice of

equating India with Pakistan. The Prime Minister was successful in persuading the

US Congress to view more cautiously the arms aid to Pakistan. His efforts made it

far more difficult for Pakistan to obtain resumption of US aid which was cut off by

the Congress on 30 September because the administration could not provide the 1 ~\ 1

assurance that Islamabad was not developing nuclear weapons.

In assessing relations after his trip, the Prime Minister was upbeat, except

for his comments on the Pakistan nuclear program. Rajiv asserted, "if the US really

exerts pressure, I have no doubt that Pakistan will change its attitude toward the

nuclear weapons programme."132 Turning to US- Indian defense cooperation, the

Prime Minister stated, "We have seen progress on that confidence -building exercise.

Ibid., pp. 83-84 The Hindu, 23 October 1987

145

We have completed everything we had targeted to do. Now we have got to start a

new phase." Overall, Rajiv declared, "We had ups and downs and our differences.

But these two years have seen a very substantial improvement in our relations."133

By 1988, the taint of corruption, acknowledged to be widespread within the

Congress Party, for the first time threatened to touch the Prime Minister. When

former Finance and Defense Minister V.P. Singh quit the Congress Party over

Rajiv's alleged failure to investigate scandals in a billion-plus dollar contract

procuring Bofors howitzers from Sweden, the Prime Minister's image as a reformer

suffered.

V.P. Singh started building an anti - Congress coalition - the National

Front - that spanned the Indian political spectrum from right to left. Presenting

himself as Mr. Clean, Sigh lambasted Rajiv and his Congress Party colleagues for

corruption and neglect of India's economic and social problems. Rajiv also failed to

make progress in containing Sikh violence and unrest in the Punjab. The breakdown

of law and order continued amidst charges that Pakistan was aiding Sikh terrorists

from across the border. Restiveness in Kashmir in the north and a resurgence of

disturbances in Assam in the northeast added to domestic disarray and a general

sense of rising instability. Rajiv appeared to be floundering.

Regionally, with fits and starts and continued friction over alleged

interference in Kashmir and the Punjab, the Prime Minister pursued more normal

relations with Pakistan. This effort strengthened after the death of Zia ul- Haq in a

mysterious plane crash in the summer of 1988 and the democratic election of

Benazir Bhutto as Prime Minister - the first genuinely free polling in Pakistan since

the December 1970 elections. To the South, in November 1988, India flexed its

muscles once more as Rajiv ordered an Indian Army battalion flown to the Maldives,

a thousand miles from India's southern tip, to squelch a coup attempt. Although

India was responding to a request from the small island republic's legitimate

government, this striking projection of power far into the Indian Ocean- in some

ways more dramatic than sending troops into Sri Lanka - underlined India's

growing military capability and its willingness to use this power in a big brotherly

fashion.

146

The treatment of Nepal, nestled uncomfortably in the Himalayas between

India and China, was another example of India's increased disposition to lean on its

smaller neighbors. When the Nepalese irked New Delhi by procuring some arms

from China, Rajiv responded by imposing restrictions on the flow of imports into the

landlocked kingdom. India seemed intent on demonstrating to the Nepalese that

failure to heed Indian policy sensitivities would have a cost. As Ambassador John

Hubbard, whom Reagan appointed as US envoy to replace John Gunther Dean in the

summer of 1988, declared, India is now "the biggest kid on the block and she's

beginning to feel her oats."134

The United States was cautious about reacting publicly to India's increased

assertion of power, a development which caused worry and suspicion among India's

subcontinental neighbours. In the case of the dispute with Nepal, Washington

maintained a discreet public silence. The intervention in the Maldives won

Washington's approval and was closely coordinated with the United States, from

whom the Maldives first sought intervention before turning to New Delhi. A US

navy ship helped the Indians vector in on the escaping mercenaries and their

hostages - a good example of US - Indian cooperation that did not infringe on US

interests.135

At the same time, Washington and New Delhi continued the expanded high

level dialogue, especially in the security area. Frank Carlucci, replaced Weinberger,

as Secretary of Defense, visited New Delhi and Islamabad in April 1988. Although

no Secretary of Defense had traveled to India during the first 39 years of

independence, two Secretaries came in less than two years. During his stay in India,

Carlucci announced further agreement for cooperation in developing the Light

Combat Aircraft, approving use in the LCA of a highly advanced gyroscope,

something the Pentagon had previously been unwilling to permit.

An important backdrop for the gradual improvement between Washington

and New Delhi was the changing and less confrontational US - Soviet relationship

as Gorbachev's policy of perestroika took hold, and increasing signs that Moscow

Dennis Kux, Q. 1, p. 415. Ibid. New York Times, Washington Post, 7 April 1988. Cited in ibid., p. 416

147

genuinely wanted out from Afghanistan. On the margins of US- Soviet talks, Rajiv

let the Russians know that India also wanted Moscow to leave and occasionally

served as an unofficial channel between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Rajiv also continued trying to mend relations with China, especially after

Gorbachev initiated an effort to reduce the frictions between Moscow and Beijing.

In December 1988, Rajiv became the first Indian Prime Minister to visit China since

his grandfather traveled there in 1956. Although the long-standing dispute over the

Himalayan borders remained unresolved, the two Asian giants pledged to work

harder to improve relations so as to negotiate a border settlement and to ensure that

in the meantime the situation along the disputed frontier remained calm.

George Bush: New US President

Before the 1988 US elections, P.V. Narasimha Rao, whom Rajiv had

reappointed as foreign minister, called on President Reagan and had a friendly

breakfast with Secretary George Shultz during the UN session in New York. The

amicable talks underscored the change in Indo-US relations during the eight years

Ronald Reagan occupied the White House. The two terms of the Reagan presidency

saw a gradual warming between Washington and New Delhi. Although neither

country substantially altered their basic and often conflicting policies, either globally

or toward the subcontinent, Indo-US relations paradoxically improved.

After Mrs. Gandhi was all smiles during her 1982 visit, Washington perked

up. When Rajiv Gandhi succeeded his mother, the United States saw new

opportunities with India. Washington eased barriers to technology transfer and

approved some advanced technology cooperation with India's defense industry.

Although the bilateral rhetoric became more positive, adding substance to the better

atmospherics was not easy. Basic policy differences continued and a legacy of

mutual distrust remained. Despite skepticism about how far the improvement in

relations could carry, however, neither capital gave up the effort. During Reagan's

eight years in office high-level dialogue greatly increased. The Vice President,

Secretary of State, two Secretaries of Defense, and three other cabinet members

148

visited India; Indira and Rajiv paid Reagan three visits to Washington. Mutual

understanding increased at the top levels of government.

By 1988, both the United States and India seemed more realistic about what

they could and could not expect from each other. Even though the bilateral

framework remained fragile and progress toward substantive cooperation was

uneven, there were smiles not frowns in New Delhi when Vice President George

Bush, a friend of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, defeated the Democrats in the

November 1988 elections.

On 20 January 1989, George Bush took over charge from Reagan as the 41st

President of the United States of America. Bush came to power on the crest of

popularity wave left behind by the Reagan regime. But to enter the White House, he

had other qualifications as well. His career report card for claim to the office of

American presidency has been quite noteworthy and impressive. Apart from having

enjoyed two terms of Vice-Presidentship under Reagan, he had been a US

representative at the UN (1971-72), Head of unofficial embassy in Beijing (1974),

Director of Central Intelligence Agency (1976-77). However, Bush was unreflective n o

by nature; he was an incrementalist, more reactive than assertive.

President George Bush was familiar with the issues in South Asia from his

eight years as Vice President, as well as from his earlier service at the United

Nations, and his tenure as Director of CIA. Most others in his administration,

however, had limited previous exposure to India and the subcontinent. Although

Washington had at first no need to undertake initiatives in South Asia, the dramatic

shifts in Soviet policy greatly affected the US stance toward the region.

End of the Cold War

In 1988, the final year of the Reagan administration Mikhail Gorbachev

signaled his intention to withdraw Soviet military forces from Afghanistan. As

Moscow began to implement this step - part of the Soviet leader's unexpected

decision to end the Cold War between Moscow and Washington- the United States

began to look at South Asia through a different set of lenses. The departure of Soviet

138 Prakash Chandra, International Relations, ( Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd, 1994), pp. 59-60)

149

troops drastically reduced Washington's interest in the guerrilla conflict between the

Kabul regime and its Islamic opponents. Although the United States continued to

funnel arms aid through Pakistan to the Mujaheedin to parallel continuing Soviet aid

to Afghan government forces, Pakistan ceased to be a "frontline" state.

Once the Red Army pullback began, support for maintaining so large a US

military and economic assistance program for Pakistan declined - only partially

offset by Pakistan's transition from a military dictatorship to a democratically

elected government under Benazir Bhutto. In congressional testimony in 1989, the

Bush administration altered its justification for military aid, especially for providing

Pakistan with additional F-16s. Defense and State Department witnesses no longer

urged these aircraft as a way to meet a Soviet threat but justified them to help boost

Pakistan's self-confidence in the transition to democracy and - doubtless the

strongest argument- in offer not to lose out to French competition.139

Beclouding Benazir Bhuto's positive political image was continuing

concern about Pakistan's clandestine efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability.

In October 1989, President Bush provided the Waiver required by the Pressler

Amendment to permit economic and military aid to continue, but as direct Soviet

participation in the Afghan War was winding down, there was less reason for Bush

to expend political capital with Congress for Pakistan's benefit.1 °

A year later, in October 1990, in the middle of the Persian Gulf crisis,

although not directly related to it, the shoe finally fell. With the Soviet military

departed from Afghanistan and mounting information regarding the scope of

Pakistan's nuclear program, the administration concluded it could no longer defer

taking action. The President decided he would not certify that Pakistan did not

possess a nuclear weapon, and, as a consequence - in keeping with the Pressler

Amendment- stopped US military and economic assistance. Press reports attributed

the decision to Islamabad's refusing to roll back its uranium enrichment program- a

key element in its covert effort to develop a weapons capability.141

M The Statesman. 10 March and 4 August 1989 140 Ibid., 12 June and 14 October 1989 141 Ibid., 20 October, 4 November, and 22 November 1990.

150

Whatever the reason, Bush's action caused much satisfaction in India.

Uneasy about Pakistan's nuclear aspiration, New Delhi had believed the United

States was applying insufficient pressure against Islamabad to stop the move toward

weapons. In addition to the nuclear dimension, the Indians were pleased that the

flow of US arms aid to Pakistan had - for the time being at least - ended.

Relations at the last phase of Rajiv's period till his lost of 1989 general elections

As the Bush administration got under way, Rajiv Gandhi was preparing to

face the Indian electorate with his five-year term as Prime Minister nearing its end.

His overall record was mixed - considerable economic progress, much less in

dealing with India's domestic difficulties. The central government's heavy-handed

management of Sikh separatist unrest failed to calm the Punjab where terrorist

intimidation rather than law and order became the norm. As if the crisis in the

Punjab and unrest in Assam in eastern India were not sufficient trouble, Rajiv began

to face major turbulence in Kashmir.

Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, the popular Kashmiri nationalist leader

ousted in 1953, returned to power in the 1970s after he and Indira Gandhi reached a

political accord. With the Sheikh at the helm in Srinagar, the state's position as part

of India seemed secure. Although chronically poor economic conditions stirred

discontent, pro-Pakistan or pro- independence elements appeared to be an

unthreatening minority. After the Sheikh died in 1982, however, the situation

gradually began to unravel. The blatant rigging of state elections by Abdullah's son,

the then Chief Minister, and allegations of widespread corruption sparked serious

disorders in Kashmir.

Reports of alleged human rights violations by India, especially in the

Punjab, began to draw criticism in the US Congress. Active lobbying by supporters

of the separatist movement and disapproval of harsh Indian tactics by human rights

groups, such as Amnesty International and Asia Watch, stirred Congressional

interest. One of the most outspoken and persistent critics was Republican Wallly

Herger of California, whose district included Yuba City, the home of many Sikh

151

immigrants, including Didar Singh Bains, an outspoken supporter of Khalistan- the

name of the Sikh homeland- and the largest peach grower in the United States.142

During 1989, Herger introduced legislation to eliminate US economic aid to

India entirely because of human rights violations. Congressional perception of India

as a country unfriendly to US policy helped Herger come within four votes of

winning in the House of Representatives. The ban on aid t India was narrowly

defeated 204-208, but only after Congressman Stephen Solarz saved the day by

mounting a last minute counterattack.143 With the assistance program already

reduced to just over $ 20 million annually, the measure had mainly symbolic

importance. That it nearly carried underscored India's lingering public relations

difficulties in the US Congress despite the gradual warming in official relations that

had occurred since 1982.

To help combat this chronic image problem and to improve relations with

Capitol Hill, Indian Ambassador P.K. Kaul, the former cabinet secretary, whom

Rajiv sent as successor to K. Shankar Bajpai, proposed that India hire a lobbyist

familiar with the byways of political Washington. Despite the fact that Kaul was one

of India's most senior civil servants, having served as secretary to the Ministries of

finance and defense, as well as cabinet secretary, he could not convince his fellow

mandarins- colleagues in the prestigious Indian Administrative Service, the elite

career cadre that filled India's most important civil service positions- that hiring a

lobbyist was an appropriate way to spend Indian government money.144 India's rival,

Pakistan, had no such reluctance in seeking support for its cause in Washington;

during most of the 1980s, Pakistan was represented by Denis Neill, regarded as one

of the more skilled Washington lobbyists.145

In 1989, the impetus for better bilateral relations through an enhanced

dialogue seemed to slacken. Bush and Secretary of State Baker had nothing against

better US- Indian relations, but their attention turned elsewhere, especially toward

the startling whirl of events in Eastern Europe as Gorbachev allowed the Soviet

Union's former satellite states freedom to discard communism and to end their

142 Ibid., 22 March 1989. 143 Dennis Kux, n. 1, pp. 428-429. 144 Ibid.

152

security ties with Moscow. With the Soviet Union disengaging itself around the

globe from former battlegrounds with the United States- Angola, Ethiopia, and

Nicaragua, as well as Eastern Europe and Afghanistan- the Cold War wound down.

The goal of trying to wean India away from the Soviet Union thus had a much

reduced strategic relevance in Washington.146

In terms of defense and security cooperation, Defense Minister K.C. Pant

paid a friendly official visit to the United States in July 1989- the first time an Indian

defense minister had come to Washington since Y.B. Chavan's trip in May 1964. In

September, senior Indian official and non-official security specialists also held

informal talks with their counterparts at Fort McNair in Washington. The

discussions were organized by the National Defense University's Institute of

National Strategic Studies (NDU/INSS) and India's Institute of Defense Analysis

(IDA), a think tank affiliated with the Indian Ministry of Defense. Although the

United States had informal exchanges of this sort with many countries, the fall 1989

meetings were the first ever with India. A year later, the US group traveled to India

for similar discussions in Pune (Poona), establishing what Washington and New

Delhi hoped would develop into an ongoing dialogue on security matters. 4

The most significant item of defense cooperation remained the US Air

Force collaboration on the Light Combat Aircraft. Progress on the LCA was slow,

but continuing. No new projects came to fruition, however, nor did there appear to

be any serious consideration about major military procurement initiatives. In the

absence of push from the political level, the Pentagon's traditional reluctance to

expand high technology sales to India again became apparent. Even though the

MOU was supposed to facilitate technology transfer, the export review process

began to drag once more.

Congressional concerns focusing on India's space program added to the

problem. The fact that in April 1989 India was on the verge of launching an

intermediate-range rocket, the Agni, prompted Senator Jeff Bingaman, a Democrat

from New Mexico, to call the development "profoundly disturbing to the countries

Ibid., pp. 429-430.

153

of the region and indeed to the world community" and to urge the US government to

end "cooperation with their space program."148

The licensing for export of a $ 1.2 million Combined Acceleration

Vibration Climatic Test System (CAVTS), a sophisticated rocket testing device that

simulated the heat and vibration of reentry into the earth's atmosphere, became an

issue. Although Washington initially leaned toward approval, after India

successfully tested the Agni in June, the Bush administration reversed field. The

United States refused to approve the export on the grounds that CAVTS could aid in

developing a nuclear missile system.1

The export of a second supercomputer, discussed during Rajiv Gandhi's

1987 visit, also encountered serious delays. When India asked for a Cray XMP-22,

twice as powerful as XMP-14, US export review authorities reargued the pros and

cons of selling a supercomputer to India. Defense, ACDA, and Energy expressed

unhappiness about proceeding because the Cray XMP-22 could help develop a

nuclear weapons capability; State and Commerce urged approval of the license for

the $ 50 million sale.150 It was only in December 1990 over two years after the

Indians broached the subject that President Bush finally ruled in principle in favor of

the export license. Opponents of the sale gained some satisfaction, however, when

Bush required the negotiation of supplementary controls to guard against the

computer's use in nuclear weapons development.

As the general elections drew nearer, Rajiv Gandhi had little time to worry

about bilateral relations with Washington. Rajiv's once lustrous image as a bright

young reformer was replaced by that of a bumbling successor to his mother, equally

autocratic but politically less astute or effective. His standing was further tarnished

by continued refusal to investigate corruption charges surrounding the purchase of

Bofors guns from Sweden. The Congress Party appeared to be in considerable

difficulty at the polls.152

149 Ibid: 150 Ibid., p. 431 151 Ibid. 152 Ibid.

154

The opposition, led by Rajiv's former finance and defense minister, V.P.

Singh, forged an unlikely electoral alliance. Its components were the right-wing

Hindu fundamentalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Singh's centrist National Front,

comprising his Janata Dal and several regional parties, and the left-wing

Communists. Hurt by Rajiv Gandhi's flagging popularity, the public's growing

discontent with corruption in the Congress Party, and V.P. Singh's image as a "Mr.

Clean," the Congress lost more than half its seats in the December 1989 election.

Although Congress still emerged as the largest party with 193 seats, this constituted

a massive decline compared with its result in the general election of 1984. Therefore,

Rajiv lacked sufficient allies to form a new government.153

The Janata Dal won 141 seats in the Lok Sabha. The BJP had been the main

beneficiary of the recent surge in Hindu communal feeling and was able to secure 88

seats. The Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M, which is well-established in

West Bengal and Tripura, but enjoys only limited support elsewhere) together with

the Communist Party of India, won 51 seats. Once all the votes had been counted,

the balance of forces was such that almost any combination of parties was

theoretically possible, but in the end, the National Front was able to form a minority

Government (in the first history of India) with the support from both the BJP and the

communist parties. V.P. Singh was elected leader of the Janata Dal parliamentary

party and thus became Prime Minister in early December.1 4

In assessment, Indo-US relations during Rajiv's period or even since his

mother period indicates that though both the countries wanted to cultivate better

relations, their strategic and defence perspectives differed and their policies with

respect to nuclear proliferation could not be reconciled. However, at times, certain

"positive forces" succeeded in prevailing over the "adverse" ones. The two were

able to build-up on their economic ties, especially with respect to US investment and

trade in India. Cooperation was also witnessed in the fields of cultural exchanges,

science and technology and the control of the spread of narcotics.

David Taylor, "India" (History), in Lynn Daniel.(ed) Regional Survey of South Asia 2004. 1st ed, (London and New York: Europa Publications, 2003), p. 156. 154 Ibid., p. 157. 155 K. Shankar Bajpai "New Delhi and Washington - The Reagan Effect" The Times of India, 21st January 1989.

155

Through the various visits made by the leaders of both countries may not

have all succeeded in creating cordial relations, but the continuous process of high

level contacts indicates the desire for better relations on the part of both the nations

as well.

Through Mrs. Gandhi succeeded in removing some misunderstandings in

their relations but cordiality generated during the Prime Ministership of Rajiv

Gandhi was greater, since he represented a new generation and provided an

"additional impetus"156 to the relations. During his term, the US came forward with

economic assistance for developmental programmes and the two countries

cooperated most effectively, after the further liberalization of trade and investment

environment. American interest was also generated in the diversity of cultures of the

two democracies. It resulted in the tremendous success of the Festival of India and

the Festival of America in the eighties. Joint projects in the field of science and

technology were encouraged and transfer of technology was initiated. However, the

US continued to hesitate in the transfer of technology which it feared could reach the

Soviets via India.

Thus, we can say that Indo-US relations during Rajiv Gandhi's period had

shown a mixed record.

156 Henry Kissinger, "Interview", India Today, 28 February 1985, p. 92.

156