Incidental learning as a function of anticipated task difficulty

Motivation and Emotion, Vol. 9, No. I, 1985

Incidental Learning as a Function of

Anticipated Task Difficulty I

Thomas Hill, 2 Jim Fultz, and Paul M. Biner University of Kansas

Three experiments were conducted to demonstrate the effects o f motivational arousal, due to anticipated task difficulty, on retention o f J'amiliar and unfamiliar incidental materials. Brehm, Wright, Solomon, Silka, and Green- berg (1983) have provided evidence that motivational arousal in immediate anticipation o f a task is a nonmonotonic function o f task difficulty, with difficult tasks producing a relatively higher level o f motivational arousal than easy or impossible tasks. It was predicted that increased motivational arousal would facilitate retention o f incidentally presented familiar materials (presumably more easily retained) and interfere with retention o f incidentally presented unfamiliar materials (presumably less easily retained). In Study 1, subjects anticipating either an easy or a difficult task were exposed to

familiar and unfamiliar first names. The predicted interaction between task difficulty and familiarity on recall o f the first names was reliably supported. In Study 2, an impossible task condition was added. The results indicated that an effective impossible condition had not been created. In a third study designed as a procedural modification o f Study 2, the predicted nonmonotonic interaction was found. Theoretical implications are discussed.

Difficult tasks require preparation. Although this statement may seem trivi- al, it suggests that the anticipation of an upcoming difficult task can be expected to yield motivational effects. Brehm, Wright, Solomon, Silka, and Greenberg (1983) have recently proposed an energization hypothesis of moti-

~These experiments were ably conducted by Ralph Young, whose help is gratefuly acknowledged. We would like to express our gratitude to Jack Brehm for invaluable suggestions concerning this research.

2Address all correspondence to Thomas Hill, Department of Psychology, University of Tulsa, 600 South College Avenue, Tulsa, Oklahoma 74104.

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0146-7239/85/0300-007]$04,50/0 © 1985 PIenum Publishing Corporation

72 Hill, Fultz, and Biner

vation predicting that motivational arousal in immediate anticipation of a task will vary as a function of task difficulty. As discussed by Brehm et al., motivational energization can be understood as an attempt to prepare for an upcoming task. The individual will mobilize just enough energy to perform the anticipated task, except when the goal object (i.e., the outcome associated with successful completion of the task) requires more effort than it is worth or when the task is impossible to perform. In sum, Brehm et al. propose that motivational arousal in anticipation of performing a task is a nonmonotonic function of task difficulty.

The research presented by Brehm et al. was primarily concerned with the exploration of individuals' perceptions of goal attractiveness as a function of motivational arousal prior to performing tasks of differential difficulty. In the general experimental paradigm used by these investigators, subjects were led to believe that they would be performing either easy, moder- ately difficult, or impossible tasks. The successful completion of these tasks was associated with either attaining a positive outcome (e.g., a dollar) or avoiding a negative outcome (e.g., electric shock). The primary dependent measure was subjects' evaluation of the respective outcome (goal object) while they were in immediate anticipation of task commencement. Previous research has shown that the magnitude of goal valence is a direct function of motivational arousal (Wright, 1982). As predicted by Brehm et al., subjects rated the attractiveness of a potential positive outcome or the unpleasantness of a potential negative outcome higher in the difficuk condition than in the easy or impossible task conditions.

However, Brehm et al. note that the use of goal attractiveness ratings as a measure of motivational energization introduces ambiguity to their con- clusions. In particular, purely cognitive interpretations cannot be ruled out. Although evidence that anticipation of a difficult avoidance task is accom- panied by physiological arousal has been obtained recently (Wright, t984), effects on other psychological processes have not yet been demonstrated. The present investigation is an attempt to obtain evidence for the energization hypothesis using performance on a learning task as a measure of motivation.

Methodologically, the purpose of this investigation requires a measure of learning that has been shown to be responsive to differences in motivational arousal, and that is independent of task difficulty per se. A frequently used measure that meets these requirements is performance on incidental learning tasks. A number of studies by Zeigarnik (1927) and other students of Kurt Lewin have used incidental recall of interrupted and uninterrupted tasks to assess the presence of quasi needs that press toward task completion (see Van Bergen, 1968, for a review of the literature). Research by Pallak, Brock, and Kiesler (1967) and Pallak (1970) employed incidental learning as a measure of dissonance motivation. Finally, incidental learning as an in-

Incidental Learning and Task Difficulty 73

dicator of physiological arousal has been used in research on manifest anxiety (see Spence & Spence, 1966, for a review of the literature). SimiIar to the interactive effect of task difficulty and motivational arousal on performance of intentional learning tasks (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908), Spielberger, Goodstein, and Dahlstrom (1958) demonstrated high arousal (due to high manifest anxiety) to facilitate learning of incidental materials that are easy to retain, and to interfere with learning of incidental materials that are difficult to retain.

EXPERIMENT I

The purpose of this study was to demonstrate the effect of anticipated task difficulty on incidental learning of familiar (presumably easy to retain) and unfamiliar (presumably difficult to retain) materials. An experimental task was manipulated over two levels of difficulty (easy and difficult). While preparing for the upcoming task, all subjects were incidentally exposed to materials more or less familiar to subjects (more or less familiar first names). Thus, familiarity of the incidentally presented materials represented a within- groups factor. These materials were of no immediate instrumental value to successful task completion. As compared to the easy task, anticipation of the difficult task was predicted to facilitate retention of familiar materials (as indicated by increased subsequent recall) and inhibit retention of less familiar materials (as indicated by decreased subsequent recall). Overall, an interaction between manipulated task difficulty and recall of familiar as compared to unfamiliar materials was predicted.

Method

Subjects and Overview. Forty-five female introductory psychology students participated in the experiment in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Subjects were run in five groups of between 7 and 11 participants. Each subject received a test booklet. The test supposedly measured creativity. The task was to form words from scrambled letters and to arrange these words into grammatically correct sentences. The booklet presented 40 sets of scrambled letters and 20 sentences with blank spaces in which to write the deciphered words. Each sentence started with a blank space in which a first name presented by the experimenter was to be written. These first names represented the incidental materials that subjects were asked to recall later in the experiment. The first names were selected so that half of them were expected to be relatively familiar and easy to retain, and half of them were


expected to be relatively unfamiliar and difficult to retain. In each experimental session, subjects were randomly assigned to either an easy or a difficult task. The experimenter was blind to this manipulation.

Selection of First Names. Seventy-five students from an introductory social psychology class were asked to write down as many first names as they could in 30 seconds. It was expected that, given a "high drive" instruction (i.e., "as many as you can"), subjects would generate first names familiar to them, i.e., that could easily be recalled. This method appeared to be more appropriate than simply asking subjects to indicate their familiarity with var- ious first names. Subjective measures of familiarity are probably less reliable due to the many possible meanings of "familiarity" (e.g., names of close relative or friend, famous actor).

Overall, subjects wrote down 1,147 first names. The names were abbreviated to a commonly used diminutive (for example, David to Dave). The frequency of each name's occurrence on the list was calculated and the five most frequent male first names and five most frequent female first names were selected. This procedure led to the following list of first names (the numbers in parentheses indicate frequency of occurrence): John (56), Bill (30), Mike (28), Bob (29), Dave (30), Susan (44), Kathy (28), Mary (28), Jane (22), and Lori (21). These names represented the familiar incidental materials expected to be relatively easy to retain.

Because it was impossible to generate unfamiliar names in the same manner, names expected to be more difficult to retain were selected from the class roster of an introductory psychology class of 544 students. The reason- ing for this procedure was that the less frequently a first name occurs among peers (participants in the final studies were volunteers from an introductory psychology class), the less familiar a subject can be expected to be with that name, and the less likely would a subject be to retain that name when it was presented incidentally. Again, this objective method of determining unfamiliar names appeared to be more likely to yield appropriate first names than a procedure relying on subjective feelings of (un)familiarity.

Of the least frequent first names, the following were selected (numbers in parentheses indicate frequency of occurrence): Hal (1), Ted (1), Randy (1), Dean (1), Karl (2), Judy (1), Gloria (1), Vicky (1), Connie (1), and Aman- da (2).

Procedure. Upon arrival, each subject received a booklet containing the experimental materials. Subjects were asked to read through the booklet page by page, only turning to the next page upon instruction. On the first page, subjects read a short introduction. The purpose of the study was described as an investigation o f a newly developed creativity test that, osten- sibly, would be used as an admission test for the school of fine arts. Sub-


jects read that a second creativity test would follow the first one and that the study would take approximately 1 hour.

On the page following the introduction, an example of the experimental task was presented. The task was to decipher scrambled letters into words (e.g. solev-loves) and to arrange these words into grammatically correct sentences. Subjects read that in order to pass the test they would have to correctly complete 18 of the 20 sentences presented. For half of the subjects, the booklet explained that there would be 30 minutes to complete the task (easy task condition). For the other half of the subjects, only 10 minutes were allowed for the same task (difficult task condition).

Subjects were instructed to skip over the following page on which a list of 40 sets of scrambled letters was presented. This was done to lend further credibility to the cover story. Subjects then turned to the following page, which contained the 20 sentences to be completed. Each sentence started with a blank space. The experimenter explained that because of the gender speci- ficity of some of the sentences, he would present 20 first names, each of which was to be written in the first blank space of each sentence. The first names were shown to each group of subjects on an overhead projector. They were presented one at a time, with familiar and unfamiliar names alternating.

On the bottom of the page containing the sentences, subjects were asked to indicate their perception of the difficulty of the upcoming task on a 9-point scale (1 = not at all difficult, 9 = very difficult). This item served as a check on the experimental manipulation. This measure was taken before the recall of the incidental stimuli in order to enhance the salience of the difficulty manipulation.

After completion of the manipulation check, subjects were instructed to take 30 seconds to "mentally prepare themselves" for the upcoming task and to look over the 20 sentences in order to gain a "feeling for the gram- matical structure of each sentence." After 30 seconds, subjects were instructed to turn to the foIlowing page. This page contained instructions to recall and write down as many of the 20 first names as subjects could remember, supposedly as a measure of concentration. No time restriction was imposed on this recall task. After all subjects had indicated that they could recall no more names, they were asked to complete a questionnaire on the last page of the booklet. This final questionnaire asked subjects to report estimates of their probability of successfully completing the task within the given time limit, and general feelings about the experiment (e.g., enjoyment of the experiment, amount of effort required).

After probing subjects for suspicion, the experimenter disclosed the true purpose of the experiment. Subjects were then thanked for their partic- ipation and excused.


Results and Discussion

Because differential familiarity with the first names cannot be expected for foreigners, four subjects who identified themselves as nonnative En- glish speakers were excluded f rom the final analyses. This left a total of 41 subjects, 20 in the easy task condition and 21 in the difficult task condition.

Subjects' perception of task difficulty was successfully manipulated. The mean rating of difficulty was 5.95 in the difficult task condition and 4.10 in the easy task condition (t(39) = 3.29, p < .005). Subjects in the difficult task condition also rated the probabili ty of correctly completing 18 of the 20 sentences significantly lower than subjects in the easy condition (t(39) = 2.34, p < .05). The respective means on the 9-point scale (1 = not at all probable, 9 = very probable) were 5.90 for subjects in the easy task condition and 4.57 for subjects in the difficult task condition.

The number of correctly recalled familiar and unfamiliar first names represented the pr imary dependent measure.3 An analysis of variance was performed on the number of correctly recalled first names, with the two levels of manipulated task difficulty as a between-groups factor and familiar versus unfamiliar names as a within-groups factor. This analysis revealed a significant interaction (F(1, 39) = 8.07, p < .01) and a significant main effect for the repeated-measures factor (F(1, 39) = 6.15, p < .02).

As predicted, the means in Table I suggest that subjects in the difficult task condition recalled more familiar and fewer unfamiliar first names than subjects in the easy task condition. Planned comparisons revealed that the significant interaction was mainly due to the higher number of familiar names recalled by subjects in the difficult task condition as compared to subjects in the easy task condition (t(39) = 2.50, p < .02). With regard to the number of correctly recalled unfamiliar names, the two experimental groups did not differ significantly (t(39) = 1.08, n.s.).

The results of Experiment 1 supported the prediction that aniticipated task difficulty induces motivational arousal, as measured by performance on an incidental learning task. Recall of familiar first names was enhanced under conditions predicted to yield high motivational arousal, whereas the recall of less familiar first names, although not statistically significant, decreased.

3Some subjects reported first names that were not used as stimulus materials. Of the 97 subjects that participated in the three experiments described in this paper, 23 reported one or more incorrect first names (23.7%). Analyses of the frequency of incorrectly reported names by experimental condition revealed no reliable effects, and no consistent pattern across the three experiments emerged.


Table I. Mean Recall of Familiar and Unfamiliar First Names-Experiment I ~

Familiar Unfamiliar n

Easy task 4.90 5.00 20 (1.41) (1.26)

Difficult task 5.95 4.48 21 (1:28) 0.78)

~MSe for between-group effects = 2.63; MSe for within-group effects (repeated factor) = 1.58; numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.

E X P E R I M E N T 2

This experiment was designed to replicate and extend the findings of Experiment 1 through the addition of an impossible task condition. As discussed earlier, Brehm et al. suggest that individuals facing an impossible task will intend to do little or nothing and will therefore not energize in anticipation of the upcoming task. More specifically, it was predicted that when subjects anticipate a task that is so difficult that it appears impossible, motivational arousal will not occur. As in Experiment 1, an interactive effect of task difficulty and familiarity on retention of first names was predicted. It was hypothesized that incidental learning of familiar first names would increase and learning of unfamiliar names decrease when subjects are anticipating a difficult task, relative to subjects anticipating an easy or impossible task.

Method

Thirty female native English-speaking students f rom an introductory psychology class participated in the experiment in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. All data were collected in two experimental sessions. The final analyses were performed on data f rom all subjects.

The procedure for this experiment was identical to that of Experiment 1 with one exception: An impossible condition was added as a third level of the task difficulty manipulation. In this condition, subjects were informed in the experimental instructions that they would have only 2 minutes to complete the creativity task. Again, subjects were randomly assigned to the three levels of the between-group factor of task difficulty, and the experimenter was blind to this manipulation.



Overall, perception of task difficulty was successfully manipulated. The means for the easy, difficult, and impossible task conditions were 3.40, 5.50, and 7.00, respectively. This effect was reliable (F(2, 27) = i0.91, p < .0005). The difficult task was rated as more difficult then the easy task (t(27) = 2.71, p < .03), and the impossible task was rated as more difficult than the difficult task (t(27) = 1.94, p < .07), Subjects' ratings of probability of sucess were also affected by the manipulation of task difficulty (F(2, 27) = 4.46, p < .03). The means for the easy, difficult, and impossible task conditions were 6.50, 4.00, and 4.10, respectively. Subjects rated their probability of successfully completing the easy task higher than for the difficult task (t(27) = 2.64, p < .02) but rated the probability of completing the impossible task as slightly higher than for the difficult task. This difference, however, was not significant (t(27) < 1.00).

The primary dependent measure was again the number of familiar and unfamiliar first names correctly recalled. A 3(task difficulty) x 2(familiarity of first names) analysis of variance, treating familiarity as a repeated-measures factor, yielded a significant main effect for familiarity (F(1, 27) = 7.11, p < .02) and a significant interaction between task difficulty and the repeated factor (F(2, 27) = 3.86, p < .04).

As the pattern of means in Table II suggests, recall of familiar first names appeared to be a positive linear function of task difficulty, whereas recall of unfamiliar first names was a negative function of task difficulty. Dividing the overall interaction into its linear and nonlinear components revealed a significant linear interaction (F(1, 27) = 7.03, p < .02), whereas the nonIinear interaction failed to reach significance (F(1, 27) < 1.0). However, the separate simple linear effects for the familiar and unfamiliar names were not significant (F(I, 27) = 3.04, p < .10, and F(1, 27) = 2.27, p > .10, respectively).

Table II. Mean Recall of Familiar and Unfamiliar First Names-Exper imen t 2 ~


Easy task 5.00 5.40 10 (1.33) (1.96)

Difficult task 6.10 4.80 10 (1.91) (1.62)

Impossible task 6.30 4.30 10 (1.70) (1.25)

~ / S e for between-group effects = 3.48; MS~ for within-group effects (repeated factor) = 1.97; numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.


The results of Experiment 2 did not support the predictions. Unexpect- edly, incidental learning was affected in a linear fashion by manipulated task difficulty. However, it is still possible that subjects responded in a manner theoretically consistent with Brehm's proposition. Recall that energization should remain at a low level when (1) the task is perceived to be impossible due to its difficulty, or (2) the task requires more effort than is warranted by the outcome associated with successful completion of the task. Although subjects' ratings of task difficulty in the impossible condition were margi- nally higher than in the difficulty condition (t(27) = 1.94, p < .07), ratings of probability of success did not differ between the two conditions (t(27) < 1.00). In fact, the mean rating of probability of success in the impossible condition (_M = 4.0) was not lower than that for the difficult task condition (M = 4.1). Thus, it is conceivable that an impossible task condition was not effectively created. Moreover, the outcome associated with successful task completion was probably rather attractive. It is likely that being creative is a highly valued ability in our society. Brehm et al. postulate that people should be quite willing to expend considerable effort on a very difficult task to at- tain an attractive outcome, as long as the task is not perceived as impossible. Energization should be maximal under these circumstances, as the data suggest.

E X P E R I M E N T 3

Experiment 3 was designed as a procedural modification of Experiment 2. The modifications were aimed at (1) increasing task difficulty in the impossible task condition and (2) decreasing the attractiveness of the outcome associated with success on th~ task. First, the time constraints were further restricted for subjects assigned to the impossible condition, whereas the time constraints in the easy and difficult task conditions remained the same as in Experiments 1 and 2. Second, the socially valued nature of the task (creativity) was replaced with a neutral and ambiguous cover story. Together, these changes were expected to create an impossible condition where completing the task was not worth subjects' effort, and motivational energization would not occur.

Method

Twenty-six female native English-speaking students from an introductory psychology class participated in the experiment in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. There were two experimental sessions. All subjects were included in the final analyses.


The procedure for Experiment 3 was identical to that of Experiment 2 with two exceptions. First, subjects in the impossible condition were told that they would be allowed only 1 minute to complete the task. Second, in contrast to Experiments 1 and 2 where the experimental task was described as a creativity test, the task was introduced as a "Cognitive Structures Invento- ry." The stated purpose of the investigation was to detect correlations between this inventory and other similar inventories, with no mention of the test measuring any specific trait or ability. As in the previous two studies, subjects were led to believe that a second task would follow the experimental task. All subjects, therefore, expected the experiment to last 1 hour.


Task difficulty was successfully manipulated. An analysis of variance of the item asking for subjects' perceptions of task difficulty revealed a significant effect for the experimental manipulation (F(2, 23) = 6.08, p < .01). The means for the easy, difficult, and impossible task conditions were 4.25, 5.10, and 7.00, respectively. Simple comparisons revealed that the difference between the easy and difficult task conditions was not significant (t(23) = 1.11, n.s.), whereas the impossible task was rated significantly more difficult than the difficult task (t(23) = 2.47, p < .03). Subjects' assessment of their probability of success was not significantly affected by task difficulty (F(2, 23) = 1.21, n.s.). The means were 4.75, 4.20, and 3.00 for the easy, difficult, and impossible tasks, respectively.

The primary concern of Experiment 3 was to create an impossible task condition where completing the task was not worth the subjects' effort. Although the mean difficulty ratings in the impossible conditions of Experi- ments 2 and 3 did not differ (possibly due to a ceiling effect), the mean rating of subjective probability of success in Experiment 3 was lower than the respective mean in Experiment 2 (M = 4.10). This difference, however, did not reach statistical significance (t(16) = 1.19, n.s.).

The recall of familiar and unfamiliar first names again served as the primary dependent measure. The 3(task difficulty) x 2(familiarity) analysis of variance, treating familiarity as a repeated measure, revealed a significant interaction (F(2, 23) = 4.81, p < .02). No other effects reached statistical significance.

Because nonlinear effects were predicted for the recall of familiar and unfamiliar names, the interaction effect was divided into its linear and nonlinear components. This analysis revealed a signficant nonlinear interaction (F(1, 23) = 8.20, p < .01), whereas the linear interaction was not significant (F(1, 23) < 1.0). However, the separate nonlinear effects for the familiar

Incidental Learning and Task Difficully

Table IIL Mean Recall o f Familiar and Unfamiliar First Names -Exper imen t 3 ~


Easy task 4,87 5.25 8 (1.73) (1.75)

Difficult task 5.40 4.30 l0 (1.17) (1.34)

Impossible tast 4,87 5.87 8 (1.55) (2.10)

~'MSe for between-group effects = 4.05; MS~ for within-group effects (repeated factor) = 1,10; numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.

81

and unfamiliar names did not reach statistical significance (F(1, 23) < 1.00, and F1, 23) = 3.29, p < .10, respectively).

The means shown in Table III follow the predicted pattern. However, subjects in the impossible task condition seemed to recall more unfamiliar first names than familiar first names. To ensure that the overall interaction was not due to the reversal of means in the impossible task condition, a 2(easy vs. difficuit task condition) x 2(familiarity) analysis of variance was performed, using the error term derived from the overall analysis. This analysis yielded a significant interaction between task difficulty and the repeated- measures factor (F(1, 23) = 4.38, p < .05). Thus, the effect found in Ex- periment 1 was replicated.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The major hypothesis of the present investigation was that motivational arousal in immediate anticipation of task commencement is a nonmonotonic function of task difficulty. Although this relationship has previously been supported by Brehm et al. (1983) using goal attractiveness ratings, effects on other psychological processes have not been demonstrated. The results concerning the differential recall of familiar versus unfamiliar first names lend more direct evidence for the presence of motivational arousal in immediate anticipation of a task, and the hypothesized nonmonotonic relationship between task difficulty and motivational arousal.

Several aspects of this investigation are worth noting. In all three studies, the number of familiar names recalled in the easy task condition was not higher than the number of unfamiliar names correctly recalled. This pattern is inconsistent with the expected difference in difficulty to retain these names when they are incidentally presented. It is possible that some of the first names, intended to be unfamiliar, were actually familiar and easy to retain.

82 Hill, Fuitz, and Biner

Alternatively, a position effect or a "novelty effect" could have increased the overall likelihood of these names being recalled. To explore these possi- bilities, the frequency of recall for each of the first names was calculated in the easy conditions of all three experiments. This analysis revealed that two of the unfamiliar names were consistently recalled by more subjects than most of the familiar first names. In the easy condition of Experiment 1, Amanda and Hal were the two most frequently recalled first names, tn the easy condition of Experiment 2, Amanda was the most frequently recalled name and Hal was the fourth most frequently recalled name. And in the easy condition of Experiment 3, Amanda and Hal were again the most frequently recalled first names.

Both of these first names are unique. Hal was the first unfamiliar name presented to subjects in the experiment, and Amanda was, unfortunately, not abbreviated to the diminuitive form Amy. To further explore the possibility that the reversed pattern of recall in the easy task conditions was primarily due to these two names, an analysis of variance was performed, treating the first names as the units of analysis and the number of subjects recalling the respective name as the dependent measure. The three replications of the easy task conditions in studies 1, 2, and 3 were treated as a random effect, yielding a 2(familiar vs. unfamiliar) by 3(easy task condition in studies 1, 2, and 3) mixed-model analysis of variance. When including Amanda and Hal in this analysis, the average frequency of recall for unfamiliar names in the easy condition was higher (the average unfamiliar name was recalled by 52o7o of the subjects) than the average frequency of recall for familiar names (48O7o) (F(1, 2) = 25.00, p < .05). When excluding Amanda and Hal from the list of unfamiliar names, the average frequency of recall for unfamiliar names was lower (44o7o) than for familiar names (F(1, 2) = 16.56, p < .07). Thus, it appears that these two names were indeed responsible for the reversal of the mean number of familiar versus unfamiliar first names recalled in the easy conditions. Furthermore, similar analyses show that these two names were also in large part responsible for the unexpected reversal of means in the impossible condition of Experiment 3. However, the pattern of results for each of the three studies (i.e., the significant interaction effects) was not affected by the exclusion of Hal and Amanda. So, with two exceptions, it appears that the first names selected to be relatively easy or difficult to retain were appropriate, and were affected by the task difficulty manipulation as predicted by the energization hypothesis.

Several alternative explanations for the findings should be considered. First, traditional achievement motivation theory (Atkinson & Feather, 1966; Heckhausen, 1977) predicts a relationship between task difficulty and motivation similar to the energization hypothesis. When the probability of successfully completing a task is perceived as close to .5, individuals are


hypothesized as highly motivated to achieve and to avoid failure. Subjective probability of success has traditionally been the primary independent varia- ble in this area (usually manipulated via the presentation of normative in- formation regarding the probability of success of a reference group), and task preference or persistence at a task have been the major dependent vari- ables. Although Brehm et al. have provided evidence that the effects of perceived task difficulty on goal attractiveness wilI occur in the absence of significant differences in subjective probability of success (Wright's first experiment), this explanation cannot be ruled out with certainty in the present investigation. However, considering the present findings regarding probability of success, this interpretation does not provide a very likely alternative. Although significant differences in subjects' assessment of their probability of success were found in studies 1 and 2 (but not in study 3), the means in the easy and difficult task conditions (reported in the respective results sections) were close to the midpoint of the scale (i.e., p = .50). Because of the relatively weak effect of manipulated task difficulty on probability of' success in all three studies, traditional achievement motivation theory does not readily apply to the present findings. But a definitive solution to this issue will probably require an experimental paradigm in which probability of success and difficulty of an instrumental task can be manipulated independently.

However, Kukla's more recently introduced concept of "intention to exert effort" (Kukla, 1972), supposedly varying as a function of an individual's perception of task difficulty, could provide for predictions similar to the energization hypothesis-in particular, if one assumes that motivational arousal is a direct function of intended exertion of effort and that it will occur prior to task commencement. Given these assumptions, the energization hypothesis and Kukla's formulation are theoretically hardly distinguishable and may actually adequately describe the same psychological phenomena. However, the empirical work derived from Kukla's model (Kukla, 1974; Lat- ta, 1976) has focused on performance as a function of task difficulty, and need for achievement as a personality construct. In these studies, performance on arithmetic problems or simple symbol-digit substitution tasks were interpreted as a measure of the intention to exert effort, and no evidence for motivational arousal was provided. Nevertheless, Kukla's model could hypothetically also predict motivational arousal in anticipation of performing a difficult, but not easy or impossible, task, and further theoretical clarifi- cation is needed to distinguish the energization hypothesis from this approach.

Another alternative explanation can be derived from the research on test anxiety (e.g., Spielberger et al., 1958; Spence & Spence, 1966). It is conceivable that tasks of differential difficuIty arouse different levels of anxiety. If so, incidental learning could be interpreted as a measure of anxiety


rather than (approach) motivation. However, there is no empirical or theoretical support in the test anxiety literature for a nonmonotonic relationship between task difficulty and test anxiety. Furthermore, it would be expected that subjects who are test-anxious (in the difficult condition) would report less enjoyment of the expeirment. However, there were no significant effects of task difficulty on reported enjoyment in any of the three studies, and a consistent pattern of means across experimental groups was not apparent. 4 Therefore, test anxiety does not provide a likely alternative explanation for the present findings.

In sum, the results o f this investigation add important support to the Brehm et al. energization model. The findings provide evidence for the presence of motivational arousal in anticipation of difficult, but not easy or impossible, tasks. Furthermore, the present study suggests some interesting future lines of research. The linear effect of task difficulty on incidental learning found in Experiment 2 suggests the possibility of manipulating the attractiveness of outcomes in future research. Although an integral part of the Brehm et al. model, it has not been demonstrated that, at high levels of task difficulty, the attractiveness of outcomes will determine whether or not individuals mobilize motivational energy. A demonstrat ion of this effect would be particularly interesting because it cannot be predicted f rom the research on manifest anxiety or traditional achievement motivation theory.

Another interesting implication of the present study stems f rom the treatment of arousal (relevant or irrelevant drive) in traditional S-R reinforce- ment theory (e.g,, Hull, 1943; Spence, 1956). Learning theorists in this tra- dition have typically manipulated drive via deprivation of needs. From the Brehm et al. energization model it follows that drive may be manipulated through task difficulty. I f so, the high drive predicted in anticipation of a difficult task may "spill over" and increase the motivat ion to perform subsequent tasks. This possibility warrants further theoretical and empirical investigation.

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Brehm, J. W., Wright, R. A., Solomon, S., Silka, L., & Greenberg,J. (1983). Perceived difficulty, energization, and the magnitude of goal valence. Journal of Experimental Social Psy- chology, 19, 21-48.

4The means for the respective items contained in the final questionnaire (1 = high enjoyment, 9 = low enjoyment) in Experiment 1 were 4.35 and 4.19 for the easy and difficult task conditions, respectively, In Experiment 2, the means were 3.40, 4.90, and 3.40 for the easy, difficult, and impossible task conditions, respectively. In Experiment 3, the means for the easy, difficult, and impossible task conditions were 4.88, 5.20, and 4.63, respectively.


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Incidental learning as a function of anticipated task difficulty