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Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

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Page 1: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Incentives and Organization and RegulationManagerial EconomicsJack Wu

Page 2: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Outline

•organizational architecture•moral hazard•ownership•vertical integration

Page 3: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Organizational Architecture

•distribution of ownership • incentive schemes•monitoring systems

Page 4: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Moral Hazard

•asymmetric information about action•conflict of interest

Page 5: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Moral Hazard in Employmentworker’s marginal cost

employer’s marginal benefit

worker’s marginal benefit

Quantity (units of effort)

Marg

. co

st/b

enefit

(cents

per

unit

)

efficient effort

Page 6: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Moral Hazard in Banking

•premium for deposit insurance is not experience-rated ▫riskier the investment, the greater the

expected benefit for the bank owners and the higher the expected loss for the Central Bank conflict of interest

•Central Bank cannot easily monitor actions of the bank

Page 7: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Resolving Moral Hazard

•incentive scheme▫conditional payment▫quota

•monitoring system▫incentives must be based on observables

Page 8: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Incentive vs Risk

Efficient scheme balances•benefits of more effort •costs of risk bearing

▫degree of risk▫risk aversion

Page 9: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Relative Performance

•employment -- promote the best worker

•sports -- gold, silver, bronze •examination – grade on a curve

Page 10: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Multiple Responsibilities

•strong incentive▫more effort on that dimension▫less effort on other dimensions

Page 11: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Non-Profit Organizations

•school’s objective ▫maximize profit▫maximize education of students

•other examples – hospital, museum•non-profit organization to tone down

profit incentive

Page 12: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Holdup

•Holdup = opportunistic behavior = action intended to exploit another party’s dependence

• unlike moral hazard, holdup can arise even if information is symmetric

Page 13: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Resolving Holdup

•avoid specific investments•write more detailed contracts•vertical integration (redistribute

ownership)

Page 14: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Complete Contract

• specifies actions and payments in every contingency

• degree to which a contract should be complete ▫ potential benefits and costs at stake▫ extent of possible contingencies

Page 15: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Ownership

Residual rights•control -- rights that have not been

contracted away•income -- remaining after payment of all

other claims

Page 16: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Vertical Integration

Combination of assets for two successive stages of production under a common ownership• upstream: away from final consumer

▫Dominion Resources acquired Consolidated Natural Gas, 1999

• downstream: closer to final consumer▫Phillips Petroleum acquired Tosco, 2001

Page 17: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Vertical Integration: Impact

Owner •gets rights to residual control and

residual income •reduces potential for holdup

Page 18: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Regulation

Page 19: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Regulation

•natural monopoly•potentially competitive market•asymmetric information•externalities•public goods

Page 20: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Natural Monopoly

Average cost minimized with single supplier• large scale/scope economies • relative to market demand

Page 21: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Marginal Cost Pricing Require

provider•set price

equal to marginal cost

•supply quantity demanded

demand

marginal cost

Page 22: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Average Cost Pricing Require

provider•set price

equal to average cost

•supply quantity demanded

demand

marginal cost

average cost

Page 23: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Rate of Return Regulation

•maximum rate of return on rate base•disallowed profit returned to users

Page 24: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Potentially Competitive Market

Economies of scale/scope are small relative to market demand • technology • market demand

Page 25: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Structural Regulation

Bar franchise holder from vertically related markets

▫prevent monopoly from extending market power

Page 26: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Moral Hazard in Medicinesupply

inflated demand

true demand

quantity (million hours a mth)

pri

ce (

$/h

our)

a

b

Page 27: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Resolving Information Asymmetry•mandatory disclosure •regulation of conduct•structural regulation

Page 28: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Emissionsmarginal cost to society

quantity (tons/year)

marg

. co

st/b

enefit

($/t

on)

35

8000

marginal benefit to society

Page 29: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Emissions Fee

user fee

quantity (tons/year)

marg

. co

st/b

enefit

($/t

on)

35

8000

marginal benefit to society

Page 30: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Accidentsmarginal cost to driver

quantity (units of care)

marg

. co

st/b

enefit

s

marginal benefit to society

Page 31: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Public Goods

•legal framework enables excludability▫copyright ▫patent

•trade-off▫incentive for knowledge creation▫economically efficient usage of information

Page 32: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Public Provision

For some public goods, practically difficult to enforce exclusion • national defense• clean air• fireworks

Page 33: Incentives and Organization and Regulation Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Congestible Facilities

•social marginal cost varies with usage•resolve through user fee = social

marginal cost▫time▫usage