In the Shadow of Hegemony Strategic Choices

In the Shadow of Hegemony:Strategic Choices

Wei Zongyou*

A problem that frequently arises for states in international politics is that

of how to deal with one particular states rapid growth in power and

subsequent hegemonic ambitions. The standard solution provided by the

realist theory of international relations (IR) is that of other states increas-

ing their power (internally balancing) or allying with others (externally

balancing) in order to counter the rising power and ensure their own security

and survival. Kenneth Waltz, one of the founders of structural realism,

contends that in an international system characterized by anarchy where no

overarching government exists to enforce laws, balancing, not bandwagon-

ing, is the behaviour induced by the system.1

When examining historical and current cases, however, there are many

instances where states facing the threat of a rising hegemon or global empire

do not adopt a balancing strategy. In many cases, they avoid responsibility,

do not get involved in the conflict, or bandwagon with the potential

hegemon. Why does this happen? What are the motives behind a countrys

actions? What factors play an essential role in a states decision-making

process? How do different strategic choices affect a countrys future survival

and prosperity and what are the resulting gains and losses? This essay

addresses questions such as these.

The essay is split into four parts. The first part analyzes Waltzs balance

of power theory, examines his main ideas and views, and raises logical

problems and historical inconsistencies in relation to the theory. The second

part lays out the essays hypothesis and theoretical assumptions and

reveals parameters of state conduct. In the third part, the Warring States

period of Chinese history is taken as a case-study to test this hypothesis.

The fourth and final part is a research summary that draws certain

conclusions.

Criticisms of Waltzs Balance of Power Theory

In his Theory of International Politics, Waltz established the foundations

of the structural realism upon which he constructed his balance of

* Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]

1 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill PublishingCompany, 1979), pp. 1256.

Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2006, 195229

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power theory. He asserts that international politics operates in an anarchical

system where there is no overarching government and where power is the

ultimate arbiter. Each country exists in a Hobbesian state of nature and

faces tremendous pressure in the competition to survive. This competitive

pressure engenders different types of state behavior: on the one hand, it

requires members of the international system to imitate the actions of the

most successful states, which leads to socialization and like units; on the

other, a rapid increase in one states power prompts others to augment

theirs in response to it and, if this is insufficient, to ally with other states in

order to contain the latent hegemon. Once a balance of power occurs,

hegemonic ambitions disappear. In this sense, the anarchical international

system resembles Adam Smiths invisible hand of the marketplace. Under

such conditions, structural constraints emerge and patterns of behavior

develop that either reward or punish different state actions. As self-

interested state actors continue to pursue selfish goals under the pressure of

this invisible hand, one unexpected by-product is a balance of power.2

Waltzs balance of power theory posits that states are more inclined to

practice balancing than bandwagoning strategies, and that the phenomenon

of states balancing against others is actually a unique aspect of the anarchical

international system. He writes [s]econdary states, if they are free to choose,

flock to the weaker side.3 He confidently asserts that [b]alance-of-power

politics prevail wherever two, and only two, requirements are met: that the

order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive.4

Although Waltzs balance of power theory possesses certain strengths as

regards simplicity and clarity, it is sorely lacking in explanations. The theory

does explain why certain historical European powers with hegemonic

ambitions (e.g., France under Louis XIV, the Napoleonic Empire, the

Weimar Republic and Nazi Germany) ultimately failed and were destroyed,

but only on a superficial level. While, to some extent, it explains the

subsequent return to a balance of power on continental Europe, a deeper

analysis reveals that each campaign against the rising hegemonic power

involved state actions of a nonbalancing nature. Some states, for instance,

attempted to remain neutral and stay out of the conflict, while others sided

with the rising hegemon. In todays post-Cold War global environment, the

United States (US) has clearly become the dominant power and a hegemonic

force. Waltzs theory would predict other states attempting to counter US

supremacy, thereby leading to a new balance of power in international

politics. But this has not been the case; on the contrary, many states have

chosen to participate in American power and primacy. Moreover, when

reviewing the history of non-European regions, it is clear that balances of

2 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 8893.3 Ibid., pp. 1267.4 Ibid., p. 121.

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power have not frequently occurred. Also, that the existence of hegemonic

states or empires is possible within the realm of international politics. During

Chinas Warring States (475221 BC) period the ultimate result of the seven

powers competition was not seven powers co-existence, but the creation of a

unified empire after the state of Qin had destroyed the other six.

Scholars and academics continue to question and criticize Waltzs balance

of power theory. Among them, the assessments of Stephen Walt, Randall

Schweller, and Paul Schroeder are representative examples.

Walt points out that when a state weighs its alliance options, it is risk-

evaluation and the level of threat rather than power that constitute the

deciding factor. If, for instance, one state regards another as a direct threat

to its survival, it will endeavor to create a balance, whether or not the state in

question possesses advantages of power and influence. If, on the other hand,

one state does not regard another as a threat to its survival in any way,

shape, or form, it will not typically adopt a balancing strategy, even if the

state in question possesses advantages of power and influence. After a

thorough analysis of the US/Soviet alliance in the Middle East during the

Cold War, and the alliance between Southeast Asia and Europe during the

1930s, Walt draws three conclusions: first, that states balance against

threats, not simply power; second, that balancing strategies heavily

outnumber those of bandwagoning in international politics; and third,

that bandwagoning is a strategy only weak states pursue, usually under

special circumstances and on a temporary basis. It is not a general strategy.5

Schweller tries to bring the concept of the revisionist state back into the

language of realism. He does not believe that the world consists of identical

states that all seek to maintain the status quo, but that there are state quo

states and revisionist states. The former are supporters of the current

international system and intent upon preserving their own status and

position within the system. They are satisfied states. The latter are losers

under the current arrangement, or sometimes outside of it, and want to

revise the existing system.6 Status quo states balance against states and

alliances they perceive as a threat to their own security and/or the security of

the system as a whole; they are security-maximizing states. Revisionist

states, on the other hand, are primarily concerned with destroying the

current order and making additional gains. Many, therefore, choose to

bandwagon with revisionist great powers bent on constructing a new

international system; they are power-maximizing states.7

5 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp.212, 2933, and 14852.

6 Randall L. Schweller, Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1994), pp. 878.

7 Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitlers Strategy of WorldConquest (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1998), Chapter 1.

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Schweller points out that Walzs analyzing the situation solely from a

status quo-state perspective amounts to turning a blind eye to the band-

wagoning actions of revisionist states, and as such, to the strategy of

bandwagoning itself. On a more fundamental level, Waltz neglects to make a

theoretical examination of bandwagoning.8 Schweller goes on to say that

balancing usually comes at a heavy cost, while bandwagoning can often lead

to unexpected gains. But revisionist states intent upon destroying the

current system are willing to pay the higher cost of balancing that would

allow them to act. Based on his analysis, however, Schweller concludes that

bandwagoning is actually more prevalent than balancing in international

politics.9

Historian Paul Schroeder criticizes Waltz from a historical reality

perspective, arguing that his theoretical generalizations are incompatible

with events during the past few centuries of European diplomatic history.10

Schroeder points out that balancing has not been a strategy commonly

practiced in major international conflict since 1648 AD, while bandwagon-

ing has been widespread among small and great powers. The main reason

for states not pursuing a balancing strategy is its high cost. Most states

under most circumstances simply cannot bear the burden, and opt for a less

costly strategy. Schroeder believes that when under threat, a state has a

number of strategies from which to choose: balancing, hiding, transcending,

and bandwagoning. Balancing is actually the least common strategy

adopted, and is usually a last resort, while bandwagoning and hiding are

far more common.11

In response to his critics, Waltz points out that theory is not meant to

mirror reality. Forcing more empirical content into a theory would . . . turn

a general theory into a particular explanation. Only when moving from

international political theory to foreign-policy application one has to

consider such matters as statesmens assessments of threats, but they do

not thereby become part of the theory [Waltzs italics].12 Waltz recognizes

that in a realistic environment, states may indeed pursue a strategy of

bandwagoning, [v]ery weak states cannot make themselves secure by their

own efforts. Whatever the risks, their main chance may be to jump on a

bandwagon pulled by stronger states. In addition, [s]tates sometimes

blunder when trying to respond sensibly to both internal and external

pressures, so there may be times when the system itself breaks down.

8 Randall L. Schweller, New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, Not Refuting,Waltzs Balancing Proposition, American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (1997),pp. 9289.

9 Randall L. Schweller, Bandwagoning for Profit, pp. 89104.10 Paul Schroeder, Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory, International Security, Vol. 19,

No. 1 (1994), p. 115.11 Ibid., pp. 11724, 13347.12 Kenneth N. Waltz, Evaluating Theories, American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4

(1997), p. 916.

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Waltz, however, firmly believes that if a state violates the basic rules of

international politics, it will be punished accordingly, albeit not

immediately.13

Waltzs response generated even more reviews. In their analysis of the

post-Cold War international political environment and its new settings,

William Wohlforth, G. John Ikenberry, and Thomas Risse each criticize

Waltzs theoretical viewpoints from the points of view of realism, liberalism,

and constructivism.14 Certain scholars, furthermore, are dissatisfied with

Waltzs exclusion of foreign policy from his balance of power theory.

Hans Mouritzen, for example, argues that Waltz uses examples based on the

results of international politics (such as the ongoing balance of power

between states) and the actions of individual states (such as adopting a

balancing strategy) to endorse the theory, which they do, but only from a

status quo-state point of view. Waltz neglects to take into account

the obvious influence of foreign policy on state strategy, so pushing the

fairly common strategy of bandwagoning out of the explanatory bounds

of his IR theory, into the realm of foreign policy theory, or going as far as

to classify it as an exception. In so doing, he makes his own theory

watertight.15

Strategic Options in the Shadow of Hegemony

Logically speaking, when the international system is in a state of anarchy

with no overarching government to enforce laws, self-help becomes the

primary means by which states survive. The pressures of conflict and an

inherently unstable system make the strategy of balancing against states that

have hegemonic ambitions and rapidly growing power seem reasonably

sound. States that persistently fail to play the game according to these rules

will eventually be eliminated. However, states operating in the international

jungle arena are not isolated billiard balls that choose strategies based

solely on their own circumstances. Strategic decisions are made in an

environment of interdependence among different states, and not in a

laboratory setting where large numbers of factors and variables can be

controlled. For example, the length of time before a threat materializes,

the ability of various actors to recognize this threat, the historical

interactions between different states, and their power differentials all

influence a states strategic behavior. Moreover, as the decision-making

actors are limited by their own experience, history and knowledge, they

13 Ibid., p. 915.14 See G. John Ikenberry, ed.,Meiguo Wudi: Junshi de Weilai, (America Unrivaled: the Future

of the Balance of Power), trans. Han Zhaoying (Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe, 2005).15 Hans Mouritzen, Kenneth Waltz: A Critical Rationalist between International Politics and

Foreign Policy, in Iver B. Neumann and Ole Waever, eds, The Future of InternationalRelations: Masters in the Making? (New York, NY: Routledge, 1997), pp. 789.





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cannot accurately predict what other states will do. For all these reasons,

it is extremely difficult for a states foreign policy to be completely rational

at all times, which is why it will often seek a satisfactory rather than

maximum outcome.

In amalgamating the viewpoints of the various scholars earlier discussed,

this essay argues that when facing a hegemonic threat,16 states in the system

have three strategic options from which to choose: balancing, bandwagon-

ing, and withdrawing. In selecting the balancing strategy, a state, either on

its own or with others, opposes the hegemonic threat through warfare,

political coalitions, and military alliances. In selecting the bandwagoning

strategy, a state forms political and military alliances with the hegemon or

potential hegemon, thus joining its camp. In selecting the withdrawing

strategy, a state joins neither side, and attempts to stay out of the conflict.

There are various ways of pursuing a withdrawing strategy. They include: a

states distancing itself from the hegemon and its allies, thereby hiding

from the threat; or adopting a wait and see attitude in order to join in the

conflict at the most opportune moment; or assuming the isolationist stance

of keeping a safe distance and completely ignoring the struggle. In other

words, withdrawing encompasses the strategic options external to balancing

and bandwagoning that have been raised by various scholars.17 Taking into

account the high costs associated with balancing and the advantages of

bandwagoning or withdrawing in order to eliminate short-term threats, from

a systemic perspective, the latter two strategies are much more common than

that of balancing.

In the next section, the main research questions and theoretical viewpoints

of this essay will be laid out. Its focus will be on analyzing why states choose

to adopt certain foreign policy strategies, and the factors and variables that

influence their decision.

Structural-Level Factors

At the structural level, two factors play an important role: the anarchical

nature of the international system and its polarity.

Anarchical nature of the international system

In Waltzs analysis, anarchy is a constant within IR. This fundamentally

means that the international system lacks an overarching authority structure

16 In this essay, a hegemonic threat is used to portray the hegemons or potentialhegemons with rapidly growing power who pose a threat to the system as a whole as well asto the various units in it. It is not intended to depict the unitary threat one state posesto another.

17 See Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitlers Strategy of WorldConquest, Chapter 3; Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies inInternational Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 156; John J.Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York, NY: W. W. Norton &Company, 2001), Chapter 5.

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capable of enforcing laws. Alexander Wendt, however, points out that

anarchy is more of a variable than a constant. An anarchical system not only

signifies the absence of a central governing institution, but also that it is

instrumental in constructing a common structural identity or structural

culture. Different structural identities lead to different structural cultures

and the creation of different types of anarchical system. Under a

Hobbesian system, states view each other as enemies, and interaction

between them is normally characterized by warfare; under a Lockean

system, states view each other as opponents, so warfare is a possible course

of action in state-to-state relations but not the norm; under a Kantian

system, states view each other as friends, and warfare is not the method of

resolving conflict.18

These three types of anarchical system affect a states foreign-policy

strategy in the following fashion. First, within a Hobbesian system, the

prisoners dilemma is dominant because states see each other as enemies.

In the face of a hegemonic threat, constructing a balancing coalition is

not an agreeable option because treachery, whereby a hegemon divides and

conquers, is likely to occur. Second, within a Lockean system, creating a

balancing coalition against hegemonic threats is less risky because states see

each other as opponents rather than enemies. Owing, however, to differing

perceptions of what constitutes a threat there is no effective means of

enforcement. Balancing coalitions, therefore, often encounter collective-

action problems, that result in inefficiency that could result in defeat at the

hands of a hegemon.19 Third, within a Kantian system, states do not

threaten each other because they see one another as friends, thus creating

a secure community that does not call for internal balancing behavior.20

When an external source threatens this secure community, all Member

States collectively adopt a balancing strategy to oppose it.

Polarity

A systems polarity is defined by the apportionment of power among its

various Member States, according to Waltz. The most common basis

of calculation is that of the proportion of great powers in any one

system.21 Different polarities have different affects on a states strategic

behavior.

18 Alexander Wendt, Guoji Zhengzhi de Shehui Lilun, (Social Theory of International Politics),trans. Qin Yaqing (Shanghai, China: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 2000), pp. 31383.

19 Regarding collective-action problems and its effects on balancing behavior, see WeiZongyou, Jitixingdong de Nanti yu Zhiheng Baquan (Balancing Hegemonic Threats:Collective-Action Problems), Guoji Guancha (International Review), No. 4 (2003),pp. 2127.

20 Thomas Risse makes a similar point. See Thomas Risse, Ziyou Anquan Gongtongti deMeiguo Quanli, (US Power in a Liberal Security Community) in G. John Ikenberry, ed.,America Unrivaled, p. 267.

21 Kenneth N. Waltz, The Emerging Structure of International Politics, InternationalSecurity, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1993), p. 73.





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In a uni-polar system, power is concentrated at the top, resulting in a

hierarchical order. In the face of such a large power differential, states do

not choose a balancing strategy lightly, as the chances of success are slim

and likely reprisals in the form of retaliation from the hegemonic power

would be at a cost too high to bear. On the other hand, pursuing a

bandwagoning strategy could bring unexpected benefits from the hege-

mon.22 Then again, if a state were to pursue a withdrawing strategy, it could

avoid any potential conflict with the hegemon, and put some distance

between it and them. This could well lead to an isolationist position in which

the state focuses on its own interests and needs, on the pretext of avoiding

contamination by an evil hegemonic force, thereby protecting its own

prestige while projecting an image of justness.

In a bi-polar system, the ultimate goal of two opposing super powers and

their respective foreign policies is adoption of a balancing strategy that will

prevent either from gaining hegemonic strength. Both sides rely not only on

their internal strength, but also on help from friends and allies in this

regard.23 This opens the way for other Member States of the system toward

a bandwagoning strategy. At the same time, it is in the interests of both

super powers to provide incentives that attract potential bandwagoners to

their respective camps, as the ultimate aim of both powers is to be victor in

this battle for hegemony. Middling and small powers that have no interest in

this conflict are likely follow the withdrawing strategy, so as to ensure their

own survival and independence. All three strategies, therefore, are employed

in a bi-polar system. Balancing is the default strategy of both super powers,

while other members of the system will pursue that of either bandwagoning

or withdrawing.

In a multi-polar system, the strategies of bandwagoning and withdrawing

are far more common than that of balancing. Multi-polar systems are

characterized by a relatively diffuse division of power wherein no one state

can single handedly become the hegemon. If one state starts to manifest

hegemonic ambitions, it can be easily defeated by the others, which makes

the costs of balancing significantly lower.24 This does not mean, however,

that balancing becomes the default option, as there are many factors that are

not conducive to such a strategy. Under multi-polarity, there are too many

poles to permit any of them to draw clear and fixed lines between allies and

enemies and to be certain of what is happening in the system . . .Hence, there

22 For thoughts, see William C. Wohlforth, Danjishijie Zhong de Meiguo Zhanlue,(US Strategy in a Unipolar World) in G. John Ikenberry, ed., America Unrivaled,pp. 98118.

23 Kenneth N. Waltz, The Emerging Structure of International Politics, p. 73.24 This relates to what Barry Posen and others argue as defense prevails. For more, see Barry

Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (New York, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984).

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is a tendency to pass the buck.25 In a multi-polar system, balancing

strategies also face the collective-action problems mentioned earlier, where

every state acts on the incentive of a free ride in the hope that others will do

the balancing while they sit back and relax. When every state has such a

mindset, the result is that no state, or only a small number, balances against

the potential hegemon.

Polarity nonetheless has only an indirect effect on a states strategic

behavior. The polarity of a system shapes and influences it rather than

causing it to choose one strategy over another. This is why even when

systems have similar polarities, different states may pursue all three

strategies of balancing, bandwagoning and withdrawing.

Interactive-Level Factors

Power balance

Power balance and polarity are two different concepts. Power balance

indicates the power differential between two or more states and their overall

capabilities (particularly military power), their relative sizes, and their

strengths and weaknesses. It is classified as an interactive level variable.

Polarity, on the other hand, describes how power is organized within the

system. Juxtaposed, power balance affects a states strategic behavior

more directly than polarity. This is true for the following reasons. Firstly,

there is a difference between the strategies adopted by greater and smaller

powers. From an IR perspective, although states may not differ much in

functionality, they do substantially in capabilities. This leads to exten-

sive divergence as regards which strategic option a state chooses. When

facing a hegemonic threat, for example, great powers react differently from

small powers. As Robert Rothstein argues, the strategies of small powers

differ in many aspects from those of great powers: first, small powers are

rarely able to resolve a threatening situation alone and often require outside

help; second, because they occupy only a small secure space, smaller powers

must act with extreme caution. Sometimes, a small power has no alternative

but to adopt a strategy that will resolve its short-term needs, even if this

endangers its long-term security and stability.26 A great powers interests,

however, are not confined to the survival of its own territory, but overspill

into other regions and the security and stability of the system as a whole.

When a hegemonic threat is perceived as endangering the entire system or

other regions of importance to a great power, it will rise up in opposition

25 Ted Hopf, Polarity, the OffenseDefense Balance, and War, American Political ScienceReview, Vol. 85, No. 2 (1991), p. 476.

26 Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York, NY: Columbia UniversityPress, 1968), pp. 246.





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and adopt a balancing strategy. Great powers will also often balance for

reasons of prestige and reputation.

For great powers, the costs of bandwagoning far outweigh the benefits

because their interests are likely to contradict or clash with those of the

potential hegemon. Bandwagoning, therefore, is not a desirable strategy. But

this is not the case if the great power is a revisionist state that is dissatisfied

with the current system. As Schweller argues, if the revisionist power does

not have the strength to destroy the current international order alone, it will

be happy to bandwagon with a stronger prospective hegemon and share in

the creation of a new global political system. Italy has historically taken this

road.

For small powers, the costs of balancing are simply too great. Just one

failure or miscalculation could mean destruction. Furthermore, small

powers have narrow, limited interests that are generally confined to their

own territory. Any overspill is minimal. As they are seldom overly

concerned about prestige, withdrawing and bandwagoning are their most

commonly adopted strategies.

Second, there are differences in the strategies adopted by the potential

hegemonic force and its opposition in relation to discrepancies in their

relative power. When other factors are similar, and the power differential

between the potential hegemon and its opposition is small, then the incentive

to adopt a balancing strategy increases significantly, and it becomes more

widespread. If, however, there is a significant power disparity between the

two sides, balancing is less likely to occur. Under these circumstances,

adopting a balancing strategy would amount to state suicide. Many states,

therefore, tend either toward treachery or free-riding, and withdrawing and

bandwagoning are also frequently adopted.

Geopolitics

Geopolitics refers to a states location and the circumstances surrounding its

survival, and is classified as an interactive-level factor. It affects a states

strategic behavior primarily through determining the effectiveness of its

power projection capabilities. Kenneth Boulding, Patrick OSullivan and

other scholars point out that in the process of transmitting power, there is a

gradual diminishment effect, where distance is inversely proportional to the

amount of power actually projected. For example, the greater the distance of

power projection, the higher the costs and the less power it actually sends to

the target; conversely, the closer the object of power projection, the lower

the costs and the more effectively projected power.27 States will hence be

particularly aware of increases in their neighbor states power, while not

27 Patrick OSullivan, Dili Zhengzhi Lun: Guoji Jian de Jingzheng yu Hezuo, (Geopolitics),trans. Li Yiming et al. (Beijing: Guoji Wenhua Chuban Gongsi, 1991), pp. 112, 703;Kenneth N. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York, NY: Harperand Brothers, 1962).

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paying too much attention to those of more distant states. Furthermore, due

to their close proximity, neighboring states are more likely to have similar

interests and needs, which could increase the possibility of cooperation, but

could also mean a higher probability of conflict. This could then result in

what Walt describes as states balancing against powerful neighbors while

ignoring the strongest states in the system as a whole.

When other conditions are similar, geopolitics influences a states strategic

behavior in the following fashion: when a state is far from the hegemonic

conflict or possesses some form of unique geographic feature (such as vast

oceans or great mountains) that provides effective defense, then the costs

associated with power projection against it become extremely high. It is

consequently more likely to withdraw and observe the situation from afar.

For great powers facing a threat from neighboring states, the most common

strategy is balancing, while for small powers in similar circumstances, the

risks of balancing are too great. Unless they receive strong support from

outside sources, most small states will bandwagon.

Unit-Level Factors

This section primarily analyses the viewpoint of state actors. All four

variables discussed earlier: the anarchical system, polarity, power balance

and geopolitics, must filter through the perception of the decision-makers

prior to their influencing a states strategic behavior. Perception, at times,

can be a correct understanding of certain events or things, but it is often a

flawed or mistaken awareness. Robert Jervis calls this misperception. He

points out that it does not matter whether a perception is correct or not,

once formed, it will have lasting impact on a states strategic behavior. Once

a person develops an image of the otherespecially a hostile image of the

otherambiguous and even discrepant information will be assimilated to

that image . . . If they think that a state is hostile, behaviour that others might

see as neutral or friendly will be ignored, distorted, or seen as attempted

duplicity.28 Jervis concludes: the roots of many important disputes about

policies lie in differing perceptions.29 In his analysis of the European

political and alliance situation from 1865 to 1940, Thomas Christensen notes

that the perception of decision-makers has a huge influence on the future

foreign policies of a state. If leaders misperceive the distribution of

capabilities, they may stand aside at crucial junctures in a conflict, overreact

to insignificant threats, or even assist the wrong side in a war. If leaders

mistake stronger states for weaker ones, they may even join the side of the

28 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 68.

29 Ibid., p. 31.





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mighty, thereby behaving more like bandwagoners than balancers.30 During

the Cold War, its inherent bias against Communism and fears of a domino

effect strongly influenced US foreign policy, and lead to many avoidable

conflicts and crises.

When other conditions are similar, if decision-makers perceive the

potential hegemonic force as overtly aggressive, they are likely to adopt a

balancing strategy, because making concessions to states with an insatiable

appetite will only lead to further greed and additional desires. Unless a state

opposes them, it will eventually be destroyed. On the other hand, if decision-

makers perceive the potential hegemon as benevolent or not overtly hostile,

they are likely to adopt a withdrawing or even bandwagoning strategy. The

reasons are simple: by not confronting the rising hegemon, a state can avoid

antagonizing it and stirring up subsequent conflict; it can also react to the

changing situation and possibly reap additional profits.

In the above discussion, this essays theoretical viewpoints and assump-

tions have been laid out. They can be summarized as follows: first, when

facing hegemonic threats, there are three general strategies that a state can

adopt: balancing, bandwagoning or withdrawing. Second, states generally

react in a finitely rational manner when confronting hegemonic threats.

After analyzing the five variables identified as influencing a states strategic

behavior, either individually or jointly, it has been determined that, contrary

to Waltzs belief, balancing does not become the default strategy. Many

states continue to pursue balancing, but bandwagoning and withdrawing are

more widespread and commonly used strategies. Third, different anarchical

systems result in different structural reasoning. In a Hobbesian system, the

prisoners dilemma makes balancing difficult to achieve, so bandwagoning

and withdrawing become the prevalent strategies; in a Lockean system,

balancing faces collective-action problems while the other two strategies of

withdrawing and bandwagoning are also commonly adopted. Whether or

not balancing against a hegemonic threat can succeed depends largely on the

ability to resolve these collective-action problems. In a Kantian system,

threats come from external rather than internal sources, and when faced

with such external threats, states band together in secure communities as a

means of balancing. Fourth, under conditions of similar polarity, states of

comparable power attempt to balance each others hegemonic ambitions,

while states of considerable power disparity, as well as weaker states that

have no strong source of external support, have more of a tendency to

bandwagon. Fifth, states possessing particular geographic features, such as

island-states protected on all four sides by vast oceans, or hidden states

protected by great mountains, or those far from the source of conflict, can

for a certain period of time adopt a withdrawing strategy. It makes no

30 Thomas J. Christensen, Perceptions and Alliances in Europe, 18651940, InternationalOrganization, Vol. 51, No. 1 (1997), p. 68.

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difference whether or not they are great or small powers, their geographic

advantage affords them this option. Sixth, if a potential hegemon is

perceived as benevolent, the chances of other states balancing against it

decrease significantly, while bandwagoning and withdrawing are more

widespread strategies; if a potential hegemon is perceived as aggressive and

evil, then the likelihood of balancing rises astronomically.

ChinaAnnexation Wars during the WarringStates Period

Collapse of the Zhou Hierarchy and the Seven PowersCo-Existence Period

In the early Western Zhou dynasty (C.1100C.771 BC), the Zhou Imperial

Court established its central authority and internal hierarchy within the

dynasty through enfeoffment and the patriarchal clan system. The Spring/

Autumn period, however, saw the rise of feudal lords with individual

. . . kingdoms becoming more powerful until the dynasty was shattered31

that rendered the Zhou imperial court powerless. The initiation of all

interactions, whether ritual or war, began to be undertaken by feudal lords

without deference to the imperial court. In the following Warring States

period (475221 BC), the Zhou imperial courts impotence reached its nadir.

The King of Zhou was little more than a figurehead, incapable of curbing

the ambitions of the various feudal lords that now barely acknowledged his

existence. In the preceding Spring/Autumn period (770476 BC), these lords

had, in the midst of wars with one another, rhetorically evinced symbolic

respect for the Zhou imperial court. Commencement of the Warring States

period, however, marked the end of even this token respect. Kingdoms

engaged in warfare as they saw fit with no liaison whatever with the Zhou

Court. Each lord and kingdom acted as an independent political entity

subject to no outside authority. Their aim was to survive, expand, and

defeat whichever kingdom got in the way. The goal was no longer that

of hegemony among lords,32 but of eliminating any opposing kingdom.

In Schwellers words, they were not status quo but revisionist powers

intent on overthrowing the existing order and establishing a new hierarchy

with themselves at the center of power. Meanwhile, the ailing Zhou imperial

court system slid into collapse. The eminent Qing dynasty scholar Gu

31 Liu Zehua, Zhongguo de Wangquan Zhuyi (Chinas Hegemonism) (Shanghai: ShanghaiRenmin Chubanshe, 2000), p. 3.

32 It should be pointed out that hegemony (ba) during the SpringAutumn and WarringStates periods is different from the concept of hegemony used today. The former means toseek domination under the hierarchical order of the Zhou dynasty while still paying tributeto the Zhou Imperial Court. In this sense, competition for hegemony is for the power toregulate the internal relationships among kingdoms.





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Yanwu describes vividly the changing order as the Spring/Autumn period

gave way to that of the Warring States:

During the SpringAutumn period, ritual and trust still existed but the seven

warring states no longer cared about ritual and trust; during the Spring

Autumn period, lords still respected the Zhou Court, but the seven warring

states no longer respected the Zhou Court; during the SpringAutumn period,

lords still made sacrificial offerings, but the seven warring states no longer did

that; during the SpringAutumn period, a lords family name and family tree

were still emphasized but the seven warring states no longer cared about that;

during the SpringAutumn period, lords still sang Zhou poems which

represented the authority of the Zhou dynasty, but the seven warring states

no longer did that; during the SpringAutumn period, lords still openly

presented symbolic notice to the Zhou court but the seven warring states simply

ignored the Zhou court. State-to-state relations became unsettling and shi

[educated and policy advisors] often switched loyalties. All of this happened

within 133 years.33

Waltzs contention is that under an anarchical order, competitive pressure

compels a state to pursue successful strategies and to emulate the behavior

of other successful states, thereby socializing itself into the system. This

contention is endorsed by events in the early days of the Warring States

succession to the SpringAutumn period, which marked the start of

hundreds of years of inter-kingdom war. A new inter-kingdom order

emerged in which seven major powers co-existed. This is what history terms

the Seven Powers of the Warring States period. Among the seven, Chu had

the biggest territory, followed by Qin, Zhao, Qi, Wei, Yan, and the smallest,

Han. The seven kingdoms persistently attacked other smaller lords in order

to expand territory and achieve hegemonic status, but also conducted

widespread political, economic and military reforms, their intention being

to . . . promote what is beneficial and abolish what is harmful, enrich their

respective kingdoms and strengthen their military power. The resultant

internal stability facilitated due preparations for future wars within the

ongoing hegemonic competition. Examples of reforms generated by the

competitive wars between the Seven include those of Li Kui in Wei, Gong

Zhonglian in Zhao, Wu Qi in Chu, Shen Buhai in Han, Zou Ji in Qi, and

of Shang Yang in Qin. These, and others reforms gained strength for each

kingdom and sustained the period of the Seven Powers co-existence. The

emergence of the seven Warring States and the downfall of the Zhou

Imperial Court indicate the existence of a multi-polar system during this

period in Chinese history.

33 GuYanwu,Rizhilu, Vol. 13, quoted fromYang Hua, Xianqin Liyue Wenhua (Ritual Culturein the Pre-Qin Era) (Wuhan,: Hubei JiaoyuChubanshe, 1996), p. 229.

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The Rise and Fall of Wei

Among the seven warring states, Wei was the first to rise and declare wang

(King) status. The Weis poor geographical location in the middle of China,

surrounded by potentially hostile neighbours and facing war from four

sides was a severe handicap to its hegemonic ambitions. Weis bold, far

reaching internal reforms, however, helped it to be the first kingdom to

emerge as a hegemonic force. Reforms, for instance, under Wei Wenhous

(Duke Wen of Wei) governance (445396 BC) included the banning of

nepotistic appointments and making those based on merit the law. Wei

Prime Minister and eminent legalist Li Kui instituted wide-ranging reforms

that lead to establishment of a centralized government that consolidated

both the economy and the military. The Wei was indeed a rising power.

Wei embarked on a series of expansionist wars with overtly hegemonic

intent. Aware of its inferior military might, Weis strategy was to ally with

the Han and Zhao kingdoms, both of whom had the same feudal lord as

Wei, rather than advance alone. But Weis rapid rise to power appeared as a

threat to the Han and the Zhao kingdoms, taking into account that of the

three, Wei persistently took the biggest share of the spoils. Zhao broke away

from its alliance with Wei, whose encroachments were also putting the three

bigger powers the Qi, Qin, and Chu kingdoms on the alert. Matters came to

a head in the two famous battles of Guiling and Maling.

The Battle of Guiling

The Battle of Guiling was fought in 353 BC. At its root was the

dissatisfaction of Zhao, the kingdom that benefited least from the

expansionist wars initiated by Wei, which prompted it to gain extra profit

by attacking, Wei* Weis tributary kingdom.34 This intensified the conflict

between Zhao and Wei,35 and in 354 BC, Zhao again attacked Wei*, forcing

the tiny kingdom to pay tribute. This incensed Wei, which sent its army, lead

by the well-known military leader, Pang Jun, to attack the Zhao capital

Handan. Zhao, facing destruction, called on Qi and Chu for help.

It was obvious to the Qi and Chu kingdoms that if Wei annexed Zhao, its

greater power would enable it control of all central Chinaan intolerable

prospect. As Wei had already annexed territories belonging to Qi and Chu,

the competition between the two had become a typical zero-sum game.

The most rational move for Qi and Chu, therefore, was to assist Zhao in

order to prevent Weis further rise. As Wei, however, had previously

defeated Qi and Chu on a number of occasions, engaging in direct combat

34 In Chinese, the names of these two kingdoms are different but their English spelling is thesame. Henceforth, Wei refers to the kingdom referenced as one of the seven warring stateswhile Wei* refers to the smaller, tributary kingdom that owed allegiance to Wei.

35 See Zhongguo Junshi Shi, Di Er JuanBinglue, Shang (Chinese Military History,Vol. 2Military Strategies, Part I) (Beijing, China: Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 1986),pp. 98102.





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with it would be risky. Qi and Chu also had their respective motivations for

helping Zhao and checking Wei. Qi was well advised to help Zhao, because

Weis annexation of it would directly imperil Qi interests. It was key Qi

official, Duan Ganpeng, which raised the strategy of delaying joining in the

Wei/Zhao battle until both sides were worn out. His reasoning was that Qis

entering the war too early would enable Zhao to retain its capital but inflict

negligible damage on Wei. The duke believed the better option would be to

wait a while and then attack the southern Wei city of Xiangling. This seemed

a relatively safe alternative, because even if the Zhao capital city were to be

taken by Wei, the remaining Wei forces would be too exhausted to defend

Xiangling. Handan may be lost, but Qi would benefit from a late entering

policy by beating Wei.36 The Chu kingdom had similar motivations. On the

one hand, Chus not entering the war could bring no benefit and would be

costly if Wei were to annex Zhao, because it would then become powerful to

the extent that it no longer feared the bigger Chu kingdom. The possible

joint Wei/Qi attack on Zhao was hence not in Chus interests. Chu advisors

suggested sending reinforcements to Zhao, sufficient to strengthen Zhao

resistance and prolong the battle, as a show of support. At the point where

both Wei and Zhao troops were exhausted, Chu could then move in and

profit from the strife, and possibly annex Wei. Another possibility was that

of letting Zhao and Wei battle it out before moving in and defeating Wei as

a united Qi/Chu/Qin force.37

Qis and Chus reluctance to send reinforcement troops to Zhao resulted,

in 353 BC, in the Wei armys capture of the Zhao capital, Handan. It was at

this expedient moment that Qi entered the war. The Qi kingdom had

appointed Tian Ji as army commander, and eminent military strategist Sun

Bin as military advisor on the attack on Wei to save Zhao. Chu, meanwhile,

appointed Jingshe to lead its army in the offensive. This joint Qi/Chu

campaign, particularly the direct military threat it constituted to the Wei

capital city of Daliang, forced Wei to order a retreat. As the Wei army

marched homeward through Guiling, Qi troops ambushed and defeated it.

In the midst of battling against Qi and Chu, Wei also suffered attacks from

the Qin kingdom, which won the battle of Yuanli, and captured the Wei

territory of Shaoliang.38 The Battle of Guiling, thus seriously depleted Weis

overall strength.

36 Liu Xiang, ed., Zhanguo Ce: Qi Yi (Comments on the Warring States: Qi, Part I) (Shanghai:Shanghai Guji Chubanshe, 1985), p. 314.

37 Liu Xiang, ed., Zhanguo Ce: Chu Yi (Comments on the Warring States: Chu, Part I),pp. 4834.

38 Mu Zhongyue and Wu Guoqing, Zhongguo Zhanzheng Shi (Chinese War History) (Beijing:Jincheng Chubanshe, 1992), p. 276.

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The Battle of Maling

Wei was weakened but not sufficiently so to make it relinquish its hegemonic

ambitions. In 352 BC, Wei allied with Han to defeat a Qi army, forcing Qi to

make peace. One year later, in order to concentrate its power and counter

Qin expansion, Wei returned the captured Zhao capital Handan, and made

peace with Zhao on the Zhang River, thereby halting Wei eastern military

incursions. After making peaceful settlements with Qi and Zhao, Wei

focused its power westward toward the Qin Kingdom. After recapturing its

lost territories, Wei attacked the Qin city of Dingyang, a severe blow that

forced lord Qin Xiaogong (Duke Xiao of Qin) to meet Wei Huiwang (King

Hui of Wei) at Tong in 350 BC, and pay friendly respects and, for the time

being, accept Weis hegemony. In 344 BC, Wei Huiwang (King Hui of Wei)

after officially declaring himself King, accordingly built a palace, ordered

clothes in red imperial cloth, created a nine-banner family tree, and matched

his seven-star flag with his new, self-imposed status.39 Soon after, Wei

forced lords of the small kingdoms of Song, Wei*, Zou, and Lu to

participate in the Fengze Meeting, also attended by Qin heir-apparent,

Prince Shaogong. Wei power reached its peak at this time.

In 342 BC, using the Hans refusal to attend the Fengze Meeting as an

excuse, Wei attacked its former ally. Unable to withstand, the Han kingdom

asked Qi for help. War once again broke out between Qi and Wei,

culminating in the Battle of Maling. Upon receiving the Han request for

help, the Qi adopted tactics similar to those employed during Zhaos similar

plight. It waited on the sidelines while Wei and Han troops fought it out

until both sides were exhausted, and then sent in a massive army to attack

Wei. The rationale behind this decision was that, If Han and Wei are not

weakened by the war and we participate on the Han side, Wei will weaken us

and Han will benefit. As Wei is determined to defeat Han, Han has no

choice but to come to us for help. If we were to enter the war late, we could

save Han and also avoid aggression from Wei because both armies would be

tired out; we could thus strengthen, gain profit, and win high reputation.40

This wait-and-see strategy exacerbated the huge power imbalance between

the Wei and the Han that resulted in the Hans defeated in five major battles.

In 341 BC, the Han once again asked for Qi help. By this time both the Wei

and the Han had suffered heavy casualties, so Qi took the opportunity to

gain both profit and reputation with the minimum of effort. Echoing its

earlier Zhao strategy, Qi eventually entered battle as Hans ally, again with

Tian Ji and Tian Ying as chief military commanders and Sun Bin as chief

military advisor. Sun Bins brilliant strategies won Qi a major victory at

the Battle of Maling, in which a hundred thousand elite Wei soldiers

were annihilated. This constituted a mortal blow to Weis military strength.

39 Liu Xiang, ed., Zhanguo Ce: Qi Wu (Comments on the Warring States: Qi, Part V), p. 442.40 Liu Xiang, ed., Comments on the Warring States: Qi, Part I, p. 316.





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Upon Weis defeat at Maling, the Zhao and Qin allied with the Qi with the

intent of carving Wei up. Attacks from the front and the rear lost the Wei

Kingdom a large amount of territory. In 340 BC, Wei was again defeated by

Qin and its heir Yin was captured. Weis depleted might gave it no choice

but to make friendly overtures toward Qi and also cede territory to Qin in

the hopes it would desist in military aggression toward the Wei Kingdom.

From this point, Wei entered into a rapid, irreversible decline.

The strategies employed in the two main battles that caused Weis

downfall reveal the following: First, that Zhaos and Weis bigger neighbors,

the Qin, Qi, and Chu Kingdoms, opposed Weis hegemonic ambitions and in

no way considered and alliance with it. They were unanimous in their intent

to check the rise of the Wei. This demonstrates that when the power

disparity is not overwhelming, bigger powers will consider acting to contain

anothers attempt at hegemony. Second, from the Qi and Chu responses to

the Zhao and Han calls for help, it seems fair to conclude that while neither

was unwilling to stand by while Wei annexed Zhao and Han, they were also

reluctant to pay too high a price for containing Wei. The Qi and Qu both

decided to wait until the strength of Wei and Han/Zhao had begun to flag

before entering the war, thereby gaining the maximum advantage. This

demonstrates that no matter how much bigger powers may oppose and seek

to balance out a rising hegemon, they may nonetheless avoid responsibility

and delay active participation in opposing it. Third, that during the two wars

between Qi and Wei, the Qin Kingdom, most powerful state in the west, also

chose to wait-and-see until it became apparent who the winner would be,

at which point Qin entered the war to its maximum advantage. The Chu

strategy, in turn, was similar to that of Qin.

When faced with complex conflicts, and if circumstances permit, even big

players in the system will adopt a wait-and-see approach because there are

many sound reasons for doing so. Fourth, these two battles also show that

when facing a hegemonic threat, states, for a variety of reasons such as

geographic location and power status, choose from among a number of

possible strategies. In dealing with the Wei hegemonic ambitions, some

states opted for balancing, while others chose to withdraw or bandwagon.

There was no default strategy as the states concerned used all three strategies

as the circumstances dictated.

The Rise of Qin, and the Hezong and Lianheng Movements

The rise of Qin

The Qin Kingdom was in the west, neighbor to the Shu and Di peoples, and

regarded as less civilized by those in central China than themselves. Until the

early Warring States period, Qin was relatively backward as regards its

political, economic and cultural affairs and regarded as inferior by the six

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other powers.41 But after reforms implemented by Qin Xiangong (Duke

Xian of Qin) and Qin Xiaogong (Duke Xiao of Qin), Qin power began

to grow. When Qin Xiaogong (337311 BC) took the throne, he appointed

Shang Yang, the foremost legalist, to guide reforms. They included

cultivating farmland, establishing a county system, rewarding military

accomplishment, and implementing a strict legal code. The reforms helped

to consolidate Qin power. During the Guiling and Maling battles previously

mentioned, Qins shrewd move in belatedly intervening brought it more

territory and other benefits at Wei expense. Qin forced the weakened Wei to

cede to it western portions of the Yellow River, thereby giving Qin access to

an extremely favorable geographic position. The balance of power between

the two gradually shifted in Qins favor until Qins power, especially in the

military field, exceeded that of Wei.42

When Qin Huiwenwang (King Huiwen of Qin 337311 BC) became king,

he continued Shang Yangs reform policies, notably the solicitation and

appointment of officials based on merit rather than family connections. The

Qin government hailed and rewarded military accomplishment; families, no

matter how wealthy, that had achieved none were held in contempt. Qins

increasing power lead, in 325 BC, to its becoming the third kingdom, after

Wei and Qi, to name itself King. The Qin then focused on eastern and

central China in its bid for hegemony.

Qins hegemonic ambitions became obvious during the late years of Qin

Xiaogongs rule. In 340 BC, reformer Shang Yang told Qin Xiaogong, Qin

and Wei are natural competitors, the Wei like an illness in Qins belly.

Sooner or later, either Wei will annex Qin or Qin Wei. Shang Yangs

suggested strategy was that of Qin first weakening Wei, forcing it to move

east, thereby winning Qin the west bank of the Yellow River and the most

advantageous geographic position. Qin could then pursue an expansionist

route eastward and eventually become the new hegemon.43 Qins strategic

approach in later years was exactly that of Shang Yangs design.

Qins repeated incursions on Wei territory, and Qin Huiwenwangs

declaring himself King, exposed its hegemonic ambitions. This was a great

cause for concern among the six other kingdoms. Hence, new approaches

geared toward collectively containing Qin emerged in the form of the

hezong policy. Qin, under Prime Minister Zhang Yis guidance, responded

by actively pursuing a lianheng policy. This marked a new period of

warfare, competition, alliance, and betrayal among the Warring States.

41 Sima Qian, ShijiQin Benji (Historical Recordthe Kingdom of Qin) (Beijing: TaihaiChubanshe, 2002), p. 30.

42 Lin Jianming, Qinshi Gao (History of Qin) (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1981),p. 196.

43 Sima Qian, ShijiShangjun Liezhuan (Historical RecordThe Story of Master Shang),p. 632.





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The origins of the Hezong and Lianheng movements

Qins rise posed dual challenges to the other six kingdoms. One was a geo-

political challenge. Qins rise was quite different from that of Wei because

Qin had a much larger population and territory (especially after Wei gave

Qin its seven hundred li territory west of the Yellow River44), and so was a

major power. Another point of departure from Weis rise was that of its

being surrounded with neighboring potential enemies, while the Qin

Kingdom in the relatively isolated western parts of China bordered the

three main powers Chu, Han and Wei on just one side. All of Qins other

neighbors were small kingdoms or tribes that in no way challenged it. Hence,

any move to expand eastward did not unduly expose the Qin flanks. Also,

Weis ceding of the Yellow River territories to Qin made the kingdoms to the

east vulnerable to Qin attack as they had no natural defensive barriers. Qins

eastward military expansion was thus as easy as picking fruits out of a bag.

Wei and Han, Qins two closest neighbors did not have the military strength

necessary to counter Qin, especially the Wei Kingdom, which was at its

lowest ebb at this point. In effect, the combined strength of Wei and Han

could not match Qin power, which, overall, presented a serious geo-political

challenge to the four other kingdoms.

Second, Qin encroachments posed a cultural challenge. Other than Chu in

the south, all other six kingdoms originated in the Zhou imperial court

system and shared the rituals and musical traditions associated with the

Zhou dynasty. Qin was only marginally affected by the central plains

culture, having been far more greatly influenced by the less refined traditions

of the small kingdoms and tribes that were its western neighbors.

Consequently, most central and eastern kingdoms looked down upon Qin.

The Qin rise, therefore, not only constituted a military threat but also one to

the other states cultural identity. The book, Zhanguo Ce (Comments on the

Warring States), mentions the strong aversion to the Qin kingdom on the

part of the central kingdoms, as well as of the southern kingdom of Chu,

which acted as an outsider during the SpringAutumn period, based on

differences in cultural identity. An example of this cultural disdain is that of

the famous shuoke (lobbyist), Su Qins persuading Chu to join the coalition

against Qin because: Qin is a tigerwolf (beast) state and has ambitions to

dominate the world. Qin is public enemy number one in the world, and those

wanting to win Qin favor by giving it land are only helping the enemy.45 To

Su Qin, Qin was a coarse, vulgar kingdom, uncivilized, greedy, and alien to

those whose cultures had originated in the Zhou Dynasty. The king of Chu

agreed, Qin, a tigerwolf kingdom, is not trustworthy.46 Xinling, the

44 According to MengziLianghuiwang Zhangju Shang (MenciusWords of King Lianghui),This 700 hundred li territory now belongs to Qin.

45 Liu Xiang, ed., Comments on the Warring States: Chu, Part I, p. 503.46 Ibid., p. 503.

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famous Wei lord, persuaded the king of Wei not to join Qin in its attack on

Han because: Qin is backward and has a greedy heart, is untrustworthy and

does not respect rituals and ethics. As long as there is benefit to be had, Qin

would not hesitate to harm its relatives and brothers, as would not a savage.

All people know this.47 These comments were obviously based on a

fundamental bias toward the Qin, and as such were greatly exaggerated.

They nonetheless indicate that many lords during the Warring States period

regarded Qin as an alien kingdom that posed a threat to the Chinese central

plains culture, regardless of the cultures inexorable decline in the other

kingdoms.

This double-headed Qin challenge gave rise to the hezong concept. Hezong

had two strands, according to historical records. One took a geographical

perspective, based on Qins being in the west, while Han, Zhao, and

Wei were at the center, Yan was in the north, Chu in the south, and Qi was

in the east. The locations of these six Warring States enabled them to form

a vertical link from north to south, also known as a hezong, in opposi-

tion to the Qin.48 The second hezong strand was that of an alliance

among the weaker powers, Han, Zhao, and Wei as well as Yan and Chu, in

order to contain the common enemy, the powerful Qin. This signified a

belief in the weaker powers uniting to attack one powerful kingdom49

strategy, one that seems consistent with that of balancing, as described

in this essay.

As Wei shared a border with Qin, it was periodically attacked by the

powerful kingdom and needed to unite with Han and Zhao in resisting Qin

expansionism and ensuring its own security and survival. With this intent,

Wei began to consolidate its relationship with Han and Zhao, pro-actively

pursuing a hezong policy. In 325 BC, Weihuiwang (King Hui of Wei) met

with Hanweihou (Duke Wei of Han) (332312 BC) and respectfully

acknowledged him as king. Later the same year, the King of Han paid a

visit to Wei and both kings brought their heirs to meet the new Duke of

Zhao (who later became the King of Zhao, named Zhaowulingwang). These

three, originally Jin vassal, lords after a half centurys worth of battles and

mutual distrust, thus once again formed a coalition. Wei also actively

pursued a closer relationship with Qi and met with Qiweiwang (King Wei of

Qi) on a number of occasions. In 323 BC, a Wei military leader named

Gongsun Yin, who had originally been a Qin military officer, established the

five-king alliance,50 which was the first to recognize the lords of Yan, Zhao

and the smaller kingdom of Zhongshan as Kings. The three kings

47 Liu Xiang, ed., Zhanguo Ce: Wei San (Comments on the Warring States: Wei, Part III),p. 869.

48 Liu Xiang, ed., Comments on the Warring States: Qin, Part I, pp. 789.49 See HanfeiziWudu.50 Liu Xiang, ed., Zhanguo Ce: Zhongshan Ce (Comments on the Warring States: the Kingdom

of Zhongshan), pp. 11704.





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subsequently banded together in an alliance with those of Wei and Han to

counter the rising power of Qin.

Upon initiation of the hezong movement, Zhang Yi, the Qin prime

minister, launched the lianheng strategy counter to it. Although diame-

trically opposed to hezong, lianheng also had a two-fold geographical/

alliance perspective. Lianheng denoted coalition and coordinated actions

among Qin in the west and all kingdoms in the east, thereby forming a

horizontal or heng51 link. From an alliance perspective, lianheng was the

manner in which Qin persuaded one of the six other kingdoms to break out

of its coalition with Qin enemies; it was a policy of divide and conquer

whereby the one powerful kingdom attacks all the weaker powers.52 The

policy was one of luring one of the other six kingdoms into the Qin camp by

means of perceived shared-interests and potential rewards. The concept of

lianheng bears obvious similarities to the strategy of bandwagoning, as

described in this essay.

The purpose of Zhang Yis lianheng policy was to disrupt the hezong

movement. This would clear the way for Qin to conquer the other states, one

by one, and finally achieve hegemony. In 323 BC, Zhang Yi met with chief

officials from Qi and Chu, and tried to isolate Wei by sabotaging its

diplomatic efforts at hezong. The same year, Chu attacked Wei and occupied

eight of its cities. Qin had occupied the Wei cities of Quwo and Pingzhou in

322 BC, and had attacked Han and taken the Han city of Yan in 319 BC.

Wei bent under this persistent Qin encroachment and appointed Zhang Yi as

the new Wei new prime minister, swearing allegiance, for the time being, to

Qin.53 Zhang Yis divide and conquer policy of lianheng thus achieved its

first success.

Qins aggressive behavior and Zhang Yis strategy of forcing Wei to pay

tribute to Qin and then making others follow suit was not well received by

the other Warring States.54 In 319 BC, Weihuiwang died and Weixiangwang

(King Xiang of Wei) became king. Qi, Chu, Yan, Zhao, and Han collectively

mobilized and supported the appointment as prime minister of a hezong

advocate, Gongsun Yan, who ousted Zhang Yi and sent him back to Qin.

The next year, Gongsun Yan helped organize the first anti-Qin coalition

composed of five kingdoms (Chu, Yan, Zhao, Han, and Wei) with

Chuhuaiwang (King Huai of Chu) at its head. However, this highly

publicized event had very little actual effect. Although Chu was leader, it

sent no troops to the planned military campaigns against Qin. Yan from the

north also failed to send troops. Only the three kingdoms of Wei, Han and

Zhao actually attacked Qin. As the five powers failed to unite and cooperate

51 Liu Xiang, ed., Comments on the Warring States: Qin, Part I, p. 79.52 See HanfeiziWudu.53 Lin Jianming, History of Qin, p. 239.54 Sima Qian, ShijiZhang Yi Liezhuan (Historical Recordthe Story of Zhang Yi),

pp. 6445.

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effectively, their forces were easily defeated by Qin troops. The following

year, Qin defeated a large Han army at Xiuyu and slaughtered eighty

thousand soldiers. Thus the much heralded five kingdom assault campaign

against the Qin ended in failure.

The struggles between Lianheng and Hezong, and the fall of Chu and Qi

The failure of the five kingdom assault campaign and Qins victory at

Xiuyu shifted the power disparity further in Qins favor. The Qin discerned

intrinsic difficulties and irresolvable problems in the hezong strategy. The

Qinhuiwang (King Hui of Qin) once said, feudal lords cannot act alone just

like a chicken cannot survive alone,55 but as Zhang Yi also pointed out, if

parents and children have disputes over financial interests, how could five

different kingdoms not? From that point of view, Su Qins hezong policy

could not succeed.56 Zhang Yis analysis bears striking resemblance to the

Hobbesian anarchical system, whereby the kingdoms pursuing the hezong

policy faced the prisoners dilemma. Even brothers have disputes over

economic interests, so it should come as no surprise that six kingdoms each

with its own needs and ambitions, find it extremely difficult to trust one

another.

The current favorable conditions strengthened the Qin resolve to expand

eastward. In 316 BC, when its southern neighbor, Bashuguo, fell into

internal turmoil, Qin quickly took the opportunity to annex it as a means of

strengthening its flanks, thereby doubling its territory.57 As Bashuguo

bordered Chu and was upstream of a major Chu river, Qin gained strategic

offensive river access to Chu. In this sense, taking Bashuguo meant Qin

could now take over Chu and then the world.58 This move further

strengthened Qin and its strategic positioning.

Faced with the increasing power of Qin and its obvious attempts to

expand eastwards, owing to self-interest, the six other kingdoms failed to

cooperate and counter Qins ambitions, preferring to engage in their own

private warfare, thereby draining one anothers military strength. In 314 BC,

when Yan fell into internal turmoil, Qi attacked it and killed the Yan king.

Athough Yan eventually drove out the Qi army, it was seriously weakened.

The kingdom of Zhongshan took this opportunity also to attack Yan and

regained some territory.59 While Qi, Yan and Zhongshan were busy fighting,

Qin pursued its plans to expand eastward. It soon occupied the Wei cities of

Jiao and Quwo and in a battle at Anmen, defeated a Han army. Worn down

55 Liu Xiang, ed., Comments on the Warring States: Qin, Part I, p. 92.56 Sima Qian, Historical Recordthe Story of Zhang Yi, p. 644; also see Liu Xiang, ed.,

Zhanguo Ce: Wei Yi (Comments on the Warring States: Wei, Part I), p. 793.57 Bai Shouyi, ed., Zhongguo Tongshi, Di San Juan (A History of China, Vol. 3) (Shanghai:

Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1994), pp. 51920.58 Chang Ju, Huayang Guozhi (History of Huayang).59 Yang Kuan, History of the Warring States Period, p. 328.





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by Qins unrelenting attacks, the Han and Wei had no choice but to

bandwagon with Qin. The three formed an alliance.60

Qin having annexed Bashuguo and subdued Han and Wei, of the

remaining major kingdoms only Qi in the east and Chu in the south could

match its power. Qis victory over the Yan made it powerful enough, in

alliance with Chu, to take the city of Quwo from Qin. Qinhuiwang (King

Hui of Qin) wanted to attack Qi,61 but Qi and Chus having long ago formed

an alliance62 presented an obstacle, and Qi was also geographically distant

from Qin. If the Qin sent troops to attack Qi, Chu could strike them from

the rear, putting Qin under attack from both front and back. So Qin

adopted the lianheng policy toward Chu, manipulating it in an attempt to

break the Qi-Chu alliance.

The Qin Prime Minister, Zhang Yi, used six hundred li of territory as an

incentive for Chu to break its alliance with Qi. It was a ploy that worked in

the same way as did that of Chuhuaiwang (328299 BC). Chu took the bait

and broke away from the Qi alliance, leaving itself isolated and vulnerable.

Qin subsequently attacked it, and took over 600 li of territory in the

Hanzhong area, thereby linking the old Bashuguo lands with Qins original

territory. This provided a strong material base and strategic position for

Qins eastward expansion strategy.

Chus weakened state left only Qi with sufficient strength to check Qin.

But at the time Qin attacked Chu, Qi united with Wei and Han, two

kingdoms that constantly fell under Qin assault, and initiated a war against

Chu and Qin. Armies from the three kingdoms first attacked and defeated

Chu in 301 BC and in 298296 BC attacked Qin and occupied its [capital?]

of Hanguguan, forcing Qin to negotiate a peace deal in which it returned

former Han and Wei territories. This development indicates that although

Qin was powerful, when other kingdoms united they were able to counter its

hegemonic ambitions. The problem was that other kingdoms were not

sincere in their efforts to cooperate, and often engaged in military action

based on little more than petty jealousies. Some were even willing to

bandwagon with Qin.

In order to continue its eastward expansion strategy, gradually conquering

the middle lands between Qin and Qi, and also break the new alliance

between Qi, Han and Wei, Qin began making overtures to Qi. A recent

internal power struggle, meanwhile resulted in Qi Prime Minister Meng

Chang, who had advocated containing Qin, being dismissed and replaced

60 Sima Qian, ShijiWeishijia (Historical Recordthe Family of Wei), p. 534; Sima Qian,ShijiHan shijia (Historical Recordthe Family of Han), pp. 53940.

61 Liu Xiang, ed., Zhanguo Ce: Qin Er (Comments on the Warring States: Qin, Part II), p. 133.62 Pei Monong, Chunqiu Zhanguo Waijiao Qunxing (Leaders and Heroes of the Spring

Autumn and Warring States Periods) (Chongqing: Chongqing Chubanshe, 1998), p. 501.

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with a Qin man, Wudafu Luli.63 Qiminwang (King Min of Qi) (300284 BC)

was keen to annex the neighboring small kingdom of Song, and on this basis

responded positively to Qins approaches. In 295 BC, Qi and Qin resumed

friendly relations. After successfully breaking the Qi alliance with Han and

Wei, Qin, true to form, sent troops to attack the two weaker states of Han

and Wei. In 294 BC, Qin defeated a Han/Wei coalition army at Yinque,

slaughtering two hundred and forty thousands soldiers64another heavy

blow to these two small kingdoms. From 292 to 289 BC, Qin continued its

relentless assault on Han and Wei. In 290 BC, Wei was forced to give up 400

li of territory in the eastern river area to Qin who also exacted 200 li of

territory in Wusui from Han.65 Qins lianheng policy was once again

tremendously successful.

Qins successful application of the lianheng strategy that so devastated the

kingdoms of Han and Wei further stimulated the kingdoms lust for

hegemony in central China. A turn of events occurred in 288 BC, when

Qinzhaowang (King Zhao of Qin) (306251 BC), no longer satisfied with the

title of King, formally declared himself Emperor (di) in the city of Yiyang.

The Qin Prime Minister Weiran, meanwhile, went to Qi and respectfully

referred to Qiminwang (King Min of Qi) (300284 BC) as the eastern

Emperor (di). Thereafter, the two kingdoms of Qin and Qi jointly attacked

Zhao. This action made plain Qins hegemonic ambitions as the Qi/Qin

coalition posed a major threat to Wei, Han, Zhao as well as Yan. The policy

of hezong was once again raised. By this time, however, Han and Wei had

been so greatly weakened that they were incapable of organizing a new anti-

Qin alliance. Yan, led by the very capable lord Yanzhaowang (King Zhao of

Yan), gradually returned to a position of power but was unable to manage

the situation alone. But at the same time, the Yan had not forgotten Qis

earlier invasion and occupation of its lands, and sought revenge.66

In Zhao, a new king named Zhaowulingwang (King Wuling of Zhao)

(325299 BC) took the throne, and began a series of bold military reforms

that strengthened the kingdom. Then Zhao took a chance during the Qin/Qi

and Han/Wei wars to annex the medium sized kingdom of Zhongshan in

the years 300296 BC. During this time, Zhao conquered large areas to its

northwest that had belonged to the Hu people, thus doubling its own

territory. The kingdom of Zhao was hence a formidable barrier to Qins

further eastward expansion during the mid-late Warring States period.67

63 Sima Qian, ShijiMengchangjun Liezhuan (Historical Recordthe Story of Master MengChang), pp. 6634.

64 Sima Qian, ShijiQin Benji (Historical Recordthe Kingdom of Qin), p. 32.65 Sima Qian, ShijiWeishijia (Historical Recordthe Family of Wei), p. 534; Sima Qian,

Historical Recordthe Family of Han, p. 540.66 Sima Qian, ShijiYanzhaogong Shijia (Historical Recordthe Family of Yanzhaogong),

pp. 45960.67 Gao Rui, Zhongguo Shanggu Junshishi (Ancient Military History of China) (Beijing: Junshi

Kexue Chubanshe, 1995), p. 415.





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Zhao was the most adept kingdom at implementing the hezong strategy

to counter Qin expansion. Li Dui, a capable politician from Zhao, began

communicating with Han, Wei and other kingdoms that felt threatened by

Qin. Discussions about a new anti-Qin movement proceeded.

Meanwhile, Su Qin, the eminent hezong advocate, arrived in Qi via Yan

and persuaded Qiminwang to give up the title of Emperor and cooperate

with Yan, Han, Wei, and Zhao in forming a new hezong to counter Qin

aggression. Qi, at Su Qins urging, reversed its decision to join Qin in

attacking Zhao and Qiminwang gave up the title of Emperor. The Qi also

authorized Su Qin to engage in diplomacy with the other kingdoms of Han,

Wei and Zhao with a view to forming an alliance against the Qin.

In 287 BC, a new five kingdom anti-Qin alliance was formed, comprising

the Qi, Han, Zhao, Wei and Yan. The motivation, however, for many

participants in this coalition was purely that of self-interest and had nothing

to do with the common good. For example, Qis participation was motivated

by the intent to annex the small kingdom of Song, weakening the Qin being

a lesser objective. Yans implicit goal was that of disrupting the relationship

between Qi and Qin and Han/Wei/Zhao. Yan used Song as bait for Qi,

whose aggressive moves toward it made Qi the new target of joint action.

Yan thus got revenge on Qi for its past invasion and occupation of it. The

ostensibly anti-Qin kingdom of Zhao was also pragmatic as regards the Qin

issue. There were Zhao political forces that actually advocated allying with

Qin in a joint attack on Qi. The Zhao Prime Minister, Li Dui, was also

amenable to collaborating with Qin in an attack on Wei, as this would fulfill

the Zhao desire to avenge past indignities suffered at Wei hands.68 Han and

Wei were primarily interested in countering Qin but had limited strength and

little influence. So it was that the various Warring States acted according

to their own self-interest, with no regard for common needs. There was

consequently common mistrust among the seven states. Throughout the

Warring States period, coalitions were temporary and alliances were

frequently switched; yesterdays friend could become todays enemy. Also,

each kingdom wanted to annex the rest (in this sense they could all be

considered revisionist states), which meant that mistrust and betrayal were

commonplace. These opportunistic tendencies restricted the likelihood of

successful cooperations. Every kingdom that participated in a coalition

became a prisoner, cognizant that the other members would not think twice

about using them as a free-ride or betraying them by making clandestine

deals with the enemy.

Due to the mistrust and suspicion between coalition partners, when the

combined five-kingdom army arrived at the cities of Rongyang and

Chenggao, it halted but did not engage in battle with Qin troops. Pressure

68 Liu Xiang, ed., Zhanguo Ce: Zhao Si (Comments on the Warring States: Zhao, Part IV),p. 727.

220 Wei Zongyou




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from the five-kingdom army forced Qin to abandon the title of Emperor

and return captured territory to the Wei and Zhao. This indicates that the

five kingdoms remaining united made them capable of deflecting Qins

hegemonic ambitions and ensuring their own security.

However, two years after this anti-Qin coalition, the legitimacy and

strength Qi had acquired as a member of the alliance emboldened the

kingdom to begin its own war against Song, and soon after annex the small

kingdom. Qi was also intent on taking the Huaibei region from Chu,

expanding westward into Han, Wei, and Zhao lands, and eventually

overthrowing and becoming ruler of the symbolic Zhou court, with the

power to force all remaining feudal lords, such as those from Zou and Lu, to

profess allegiance to Qi.69 Its hegemonic ambitions engendered Qi enemies

on all sides and caused concern and anger among the other kingdoms,

particularly those in central China. There was particularly bad blood

between Yan in the north and Qi, originating in Qis past invasion and

occupation of Yan. Yan initiated talks among itself, Zhao, Wei, and Chu

with a view to their uniting to counter Qi expansionism. Qis annexation of

Song directly threatened Han, Wei, and Zhao because of their close

geographic proximity to it. The Zhao Prime Minister, Li Dui, had long been

interested in the rich Song commercial city of Dingtao, which Zhao had

previously attacked under Wei70 auspices. Zhao, along with Wei, therefore,

responded positively to Yans call for an alliance. As internal struggles

among the six other kingdoms were beneficial to the Qin strategy of divide

and conquer, Qin voluntarily led the coalition against Qi.71 Thus, the nature

and target of the hezong coalition shifted from that of five-kingdom anti-Qin

to five-kingdom anti-Qi.

In 284 BC, the five kingdoms of Qin, Han, Zhao, Wei, and Yan completed

a series of diplomatic moves toward a five-kingdom army attack on Qi

which devastated the kingdom and from which it never really recovered.

This aided Qins eastward expansion strategy and achieved an important

breakthrough as it signified that the two kingdoms with sufficient power to

block Qin, Chu, and Qi, were greatly weakened. The central kingdoms of

Han and Wei, because of their

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