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Report of Investigation
into the Collision between
CSCL HAMBURG and LIAN HUA FENG
in the position 30 36.2N 123 10.5E
on 5 March 2008
Purpose of Investigation This incident is investigated, and published in accordance with the IMO Code for the
Investigation of Marine Casualties and Incidents promulgated under IMO Assembly
Resolution A.849(20). The purpose of this investigation conducted by the Marine Accident
Investigation and Shipping Security Policy Branch (MAISSPB) of Marine Department is to
determine the circumstances and the causes of the incident with the aim of improving the
safety of life at sea and avoiding similar incident in future.
The conclusions drawn in this report aim to identify the different factors contributing to the
incident. They are not intended to apportion blame or liability towards any particular
organization or individual except so far as necessary to achieve the said purpose.
The MAISSPB has no involvement in any prosecution or disciplinary action that may be
taken by the Marine Department resulting from this incident.
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Table of Contents
Page
1 Summary 1
2 Description of the vessels 3
3 Sources of evidence 7
4 Outline of events 8
5 Analysis of evidence 20
6 Conclusions 26
7 Recommendations 28
8 Submissions 29
Summary 1.1 At about 2101 on 5 March 2008, a Hong Kong registered container ship CSCL
HAMBURG collided with a Chinese registered bulk carrier LIAN HUA FENG near
Zhoushan Islands in East China Sea at approximate position 30 36.2N 123 10.5E
(Figure 1).
Figure 1 The position of collision and the planned routes of the vessels CSCL Hamburg and Lian Hua Feng
1.2 CSCL HAMBURG and LIAN HUA FENG were in converging course when
approaching to an alteration point of the planned route by CSCL HAMBURG in
approximate position 30 32.25N 123 10.55E with the 3rd Officers on navigational
watch on both vessels. At the time of the accident, the weather condition was fine,
the wind was north-easterly at force 3 and the visibility was about 8 to 10 nautical
miles (n.m.).
1.3 Large area of the port side abaft midships (hull structural and cargo hold transverse
bulkheads between container Bay 38 and Bay 42) and port quarter (near Bay 62) of
CSCL HAMBURG sustained serious hull damages. Four containers also fell onto the
forecastle deck of LIAN HUA FENG. LIAN HUA FENG lost her starboard anchor
and sustained damage on the bow and starboard side between No.2 and No.3 cargo
holds after the collision. No casualties and oil pollution were reported from both
vessels.
1
1.4 The investigation revealed that the following causes contributed to the collision:
CSCL HAMBURG was the vessel overtaking the other vessel LIAN HUA
FENG, the 3rd Officer of CSCL HAMBURG failed to keep clear of LIAN HUA
FENG which was the vessel being overtaken as required by the Collision
Regulations (COLREGS).
LIAN HUA FENG was the stand-on vessel and being overtaken by CSCL
HAMBURG. When the 3rd Officer on navigational watch of LIAN HUA
FENG found his vessel so close that collision could not be avoided by the
give-way vessel CSCL HAMBURG alone, he failed to take necessary actions
to avoid collision.
Both 3rd Officers relied on VHF radio communication and the unreliable
agreement of the intention of the other vessel rather than calling the master or
taking positive and early action to avoid collision.
2
2. Description of the vessels 2.1 CSCL HAMBURG
Port of Registry : HONG KONG, CHINA
Call Sign : VRBH6
IMO No. : 9224300
Type : Container Vessel
Year of Built : 2001
Gross Tonnage : 39,941
Net Tonnage : 24,458
Length Overall : 245.15 metres
Breadth : 32.25 metres
Summer Draft : 12.626 metres
Main Engine : HSD-MAN B&W 8K90MC-C
Engine Power : 36,480 kW
Service Speed : 25.2 knots
CSCL HAMBURG is a container ship classed with Det Norske Veritas (DNV). The
navigational bridge, accommodation and the main machinery space are situated aft. She has
totally 9 cellular cargo holds and has a maximum container carrying capacity of 1,584
Twentyfoot Equivalent Unit (TEU) below deck and 2,669 TEU on deck.
The navigational equipment consists of a magnetic compass, a gyrocompass, an automatic
identification system (AIS), a course recorder, two radars with Automatic Radar Plotting
Aids (ARPA), a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver and an echo sounder, etc.
The vessel was proceeding to Shanghai from Hong Kong at the time of the accident.
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Figure 2 Photograph of CSCL HAMBURG shows the damages of the vessel marked by red circles after the collision
2.2 LIAN HUA FENG
Port of Registry : GUANGZHOU, CHINA
Call Sign : BRUM
IMO No. : 9230361
Type : Bulk Carrier
Built: Jiangnan Shipyard (Group) Co. Ltd., Shanghai of China
Year of Built: 2001
Gross Tonnage : 39,894
Net Tonnage : ` 25,925
Length Overall : 225 metres
Breadth : 32.26 metres
Maximum Draft : 14.017 metres
Main Engine : MAN-B&W5S60MC MK6
Engine Power : 10200 kW
Service Speed : 15.9 knots
LIAN HUA FENG is a bulk carrier classed with China Classification Society (CCS). The
navigational bridge, accommodation and the main machinery space are situated aft. She has
totally 7 cargo holds.
The navigational equipment consists of a magnetic compass, a gyrocompass, an automatic
identification system (AIS), a course recorder, two radars with Automatic Radar Plotting
Aids (ARPA), a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver and an echo sounder, etc.
The vessel was bound for Qinhuangdao from Zhangzhou, China.
5
Figure 3 Photograph of LIAN HUA FENG shows the damages of the vessel marked by red circle after the collision
6
3. Sources of Evidence
3.1 Master and duty crew members of CSCL HAMBURG;
3.2 Master and duty crew members of LIAN HUA FENG;
3.3 Zhou Shan MSA (Maritime Safety Administration) of The Peoples Republic of
China;
3.4 Marine Department of Hong Kong SAR, The Peoples Republic of China.
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4. Outline of events All times are local (UTC+8) ships time.
4.1 Account of CSCL HAMBURG
.1 On 4 March 2008 CSCL HAMBURG departed from Hong Kong to Shanghai.
.2 After departing Hong Kong, she was making an economic speed of about
19.5 knots at 86-87 revolutions per minute (RPM) to Shanghai. She was
scheduled to pick up pilot at Chang Jiang Kou Pilot Station at 0530 on 6
March 2008.
.3 At 2000 on 5 March 2008, 3rd Officer and the Able Seaman were on
navigational watch on the bridge. The voyage-planned course was 017T and
the steering course was 012T to counteract leeway and current set with
speed at 21.8 knots. The visibility was more than 8-10 n.m. with a slight sea
and no current.
.4 The ship does not require to install sound reception system onboard to enable
navigator in an enclosed navigational bridge to listen the environment and
sound signal outside the ship. The bridge doors were closed until the Master
was called by the 3rd Officer just before collision.
.5 Two radars (one X-band and one S-band radar with ARPA used for radar
plotting) were in operation and both were set on 12 n.m. range scale. The 3rd
Officer set the radars on 6 n.m. range scale when the other vessel was at short
distance before collision.
.6 There were about 4 to 5 fishing boats and other vessels in sight. The stern
light of the other vessel (later known as LIAN HUA FENG) with an unknown
heading and a speed of 15 knots, was sighted about 2 points on the port bow
and at a distance of about 6-7 n.m.
.7 At 2015, the 3rd Officer informed the Master that his vessel would be at the
marked position of one-hour notice to engine room on the working chart (see
Fig. 4) at about 2045. The 3rd Officer also informed the Master that there
were very few fishing vessels and the route was well clear.
.8 At 2030, the course recorder indicates the heading was changed from 013 to
022T to give a wide berth for a south bound vessel passing on port side
between LIAN HUA FENG and CSCL HAMBURG (see Fig 4).
8
Figure 4 The AIS position plot of the southbound vessel passing between Lian Hua Feng and
CSCL Hamburg at 2030
MMSI
Time of
Data
Ship
Name
Call S
IMO
ig
ati
n
English
translation Ship
Type
Destin
on
ETA
Longitud
.9 At 2035, the vessel position was plotted on the working chart and the GPS
position fix was on the planned route. The stern light of LIAN HUA FENG
was sighted with an unknown heading and the speed remained at 15 knots
bearing about 4 points on the port bow and at a distance of about 3 to 4 n.m.
.10 At 2042, LIAN HUA FENG was found proceeding at a constant speed of 15
knots at a distance of about 2 n.m.
.11 The 3rd Officer reported to the Master by telephone that the vessel was at the
position marked one-hour notice to engine roo