InreSearchWarrantIssuedtoGoogle,Inc.2017WL4022806(N.D.Ala.2017)

UnitedStatesDistrictCourt,N.D.Alabama,NortheasternDivision.

INRESEARCHWARRANTISSUEDTOGOOGLE,INC.CASENO.5:17–mj–532–HNJ

SignedSeptember1,2017

MEMORANDUMOPINIONANDORDER

HERMANN.JOHNSON,JR.,UNITEDSTATESMAGISTRATEJUDGE

*1TheUnitedStatesservedonGoogle,Inc.,asearchwarrantissuedbytheCourtpursuanttotheStoredCommunicationsAct,18U.S.C.§2703etseq.GooglecompliedwiththesearchwarrantastodatastoredintheUnitedStates,yetitrefusedtodiscloseresponsivedataandinformationstoredonaserverlocatedonforeignterritory.AccordingtoGoogle,theSCA'sprovisionsdonotapplyextraterritorially,anddisclosingthedatastoredonforeignterritorywouldconstituteanimpermissible,extraterritorialapplicationofthestatute.TheGovernmentfiledamotiontocompelGoogletodisclosethedatastoredonforeignterritory.Forthereasonssetforthbelow,theCourtGRANTStheGovernment'sMotionbecauseGoogle'sdisclosureofthedatawouldconstituteadomesticapplicationoftheSCA.[1]

I.BACKGROUND

CongressenactedtheStoredCommunicationsActasTitleIIoftheElectronicCommunicationsPrivacyActof1986.TheotherprovisionsoftheECPAupdatedpriorstatutesgoverningwiretaps,penregisters,andotheraspectsofelectroniccommunicationinterception,see18U.S.C.§§2510etal.,whiletheSCAaimstoprotectprivacybyregulatingaccesstostoredcommunications.18U.S.C.§2601etseq.[2]Section2701oftheSCAproscribesunauthorizedaccesstodatastoredbyelectronicscommunicationsproviders,and§2702prohibitselectronicscommunicationsprovidersfromdisclosingstoredcommunicationsdataexceptincertaincircumstances.18U.S.C.§§2701,2702.

Thedisputeatbarconcerns§2703,whichregulatesgovernmentaccesstostoredcommunications.Asothercourtshavedescribed,theSCAcontrolsgovernmentaccesstostoredcommunicationsinanascending,orpyramidal,structureofprotection.SeeMatterofWarranttoSearchaCertainE–MailAccountControlled&MaintainedbyMicrosoftCorp.,829F.3d197,207(2dCir.2016)(MicrosoftI),rehearingenbancdenied,855F.3d53(2dCir.2017)(MicrosoftII);InreSearchWarranttoGoogle,Inc.,No.16-4116,2017WL2985391,at*3(D.N.J.July10,2017).Administrativeandinvestigatorysubpoenaspermitgovernmentaccesstobasicsubscriberandtransactionaldata.18U.S.C.§2703(c)(2).Acourtmayordergovernmentaccesstoothernon-contentinformationupondemonstrationof“specificandarticulablefactsshowing...reasonablegroundstobelievethatthecontentsorrecords...arerelevantandmaterialtoanongoingcriminalinvestigation.”Id.at§§2703(c),(d).Subpoenasgivegovernmentalaccesstothecontentofprivatecommunications,solongasthegovernmentgivesnoticetothecustomerorsubscriber.Id.at§2703(b)(1)(B).Uponestablishingprobablecause,acourtmayissueawarrantcompellinggovernmentaccesstothepreviously-describedstoredcommunications,includingthecontentofsuchcommunicationssuchasemails,socialmedia,etc.Id.at§2703(a).TheSCAdoesnotrequiretheGovernmenttoprovidenoticetoawarrant'starget.Id.at§2703(b).

*2Inthecaseatbar,theCourtissuedawarrantpursuantto§2703commandingGoogletodisclosetheinformationandcontentassociatedwithseveralemailaccounts.Inresponse,GoogleprovidedthegovernmentwithdatastoredonserverslocatedintheUnitedStates,butGoogledeclinedtoproduceresponsiveinformationstoredonserverslocatedinDublin,Ireland.GooglearguesthattheSCAdoesnotapplyextraterritorially,andthustheissuedwarrantdoesnotapplytocommunicationsstoredinareasoutsideofU.S.control.

Google'spositionrestsupontheSecondCircuit'sdecisioninMicrosoftI.InMicrosoftI,theSecondCircuitheldthatthegovernment'swarrantatissuethereincouldnotcompelMicrosofttoproducecommunicationsandinformationstoredoverseasbecausetheSCAdoesnotapplyextraterritorially.829F.3dat222.Onrehearingenbanc,theSecondCircuitsplitfour-to-fouronreversingthepaneldecision.MicrosoftII,855F.3d

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at53.AftertheSecondCircuit'sdispositions,severalcourtsdisagreedwithMicrosoftandruledthatvariousproviders,includingGoogle,mustproduceinformationstoredinforeignterritoriesinresponsetowarrantsproperly-issuedundertheSCA.SeeInreSearchWarranttoGoogle,Inc.,No.16-4116,2017WL2985391(D.N.J.July10,2017);InreTwoEmailAccountsatGoogle,Inc.,CaseNo.17-MJ-1235,2017WL706307(E.D.Wis.Feb.21,2017),mot.amendwarrantdenied,No.17-MJ-1235,2017WL2838156(E.D.Wis.June30,2017);IntheMatteroftheSearchofInfo.Associatedwith[Redacted]@Gmail.comthatIsStoredatPremisesControlledbyGoogle,Inc.,CaseNo.16–mj–757,–––F.Supp.3d––––,2017WL2480752(D.D.C.June2,2017);IntheMatterofSearchofContentthatIsStoredatPremisesControlledbyGoogle,CaseNo.16-mc-80263-LB,2017WL1487625(N.D.Cal.Apr.25,2017);IntheMatteroftheSearchofPremisesLocatedat[redacted]@yahoo.com,StoredatPremisesOwned,Maintained,Controlled,andOperatedbyYahoo,Inc.,No.6:17–mj–1238(M.D.Fla.Apr.7,2017);InreSearchWarrantNo.16–960–M–01toGoogle,232F.Supp.3d708(E.D.Pa.2017).

Afterthepartiesatbarfailedtoresolvetheirdispute,theresultingimpasseledtothegovernmentfilingthemotiontocompel.

II.ANALYSIS

Asthefollowinganalysisportrays,theSCAdoesnotapplyextraterritoriallybecausethestatutedoesnotcontainanyindicationthatCongressintendedforeignapplicationofthestatute'sprovisions.However,theSCA's“focus”centersonaccesstoprivatecommunications,andinparticulargovernmentaccesstosuchdataviaproviderdisclosureonUnitedStatesterritory.BecauseGoogle'sdisclosurewilloccuronUnitedStatesterritory,thegovernment'swarrantentailsadomesticapplicationoftheSCA,notanextraterritorialapplication.

TheSupremeCourtestablishedatwo-partframeworkinconsideringastatute'sextraterritorialapplication.Asaninitialmatter,thereexistsapresumptionagainstextraterritoriality:“[a]bsentclearlyexpressedcongressionalintenttothecontrary,federallawswillbeconstruedtohaveonlydomesticapplication.”Morrisonv.NationalAustraliaBankLtd,561U.S.247,255,130S.Ct.2869,177L.Ed.2d535(2010).Theinquiryensues“whetherCongresshasaffirmativelyandunmistakablyinstructedthat[a]statutewilldoso.”Id.at261,130S.Ct.2869.“Whenastatutegivesnoclearindicationofanextraterritorialapplication,ithasnone.”Id.at255,130S.Ct.2869.

Therefore,thefirstpartoftheframeworkdetermines“whetherthepresumptionagainstextraterritorialityhasbeenrebutted—thatis,whetherthestatutegivesaclear,affirmativeindicationthatitappliesextraterritorially.”RJRNabisco,Inc.v.EuropeanCmty.,–––U.S.––––,136S.Ct.2090,2101,195L.Ed.2d476(2016).Ifthefirststepdoesnotdislodgethepresumptionagainstextraterritoriality,thentheframework'ssecondstepdiscerns“whetherthecaseinvolvesadomesticapplicationofthestatute”by“lookingtothestatute's‘focus.’”Id.“Iftheconductrelevanttothestatute'sfocusoccurredintheUnitedStates,thenthecaseinvolvesapermissibledomesticapplicationevenifotherconductoccurredabroad;butiftheconductrelevanttothefocusoccurredinaforeigncountry,thenthecaseinvolvesanimpermissibleextraterritorialapplicationregardlessofanyotherconductthatoccurredinU.S.territory.”Id.

A.TheSCADoesNotApplyExtraterritorially

*3Asforthefirststepintheframework,thecourtwillnotdepartfromthelargelyunanimousfindingbytheothercourtsconsideringthisissuethattheSCAdoesnotapplyextraterritorially.[3]Thegovernmentarguesthat§2703contemplatesprovisionofahybridwarrant-subpoenavehiclethatgrantscourtsinpersonamauthorityoverrecipients,andthisinpersonampowerelidesanyterritoriallimitationsupontheSCA.Googlerespondsthat§2703adoptstherestrictionspertinenttoatraditionalwarrant;astraditionalwarrantspurportedlyaffordonlyinremauthorityoverplacesandthings,CongresslimitedSCAwarrantsterritoriallybydefinition.Regardlessoftheparties'disputeovernomenclature,theSCAfostersnoprovisionsrebuttingthepresumptionagainstterritoriality.

Section2703expresslyrequireswarrantsfortheproductionenvisionedhere,notsubpoenas.ThegovernmentseeksthecontentofemailsandothercommunicationsstoredbyGoogle,andasdescribedpreviously,theSCAaccordsthewarrantpowerforaccesstosuchcontent.Therefore,thegovernmentfaltersbyreferringtocasesexaminingthescopeofsubpoenapower—ratherthanthescopeofauthoritypursuanttowarrants—issuedinotherstatutorycontextsthatrequireproductionofdocumentsstoredinforeignlocations.

Indeed,thatsubpoenasmayapplyextraterritoriallyinotherstatutorycontextsdoesnotindicatesuchdevices—orwarrant-subpoenahybrids—applyextraterritoriallyundertheSCA.Thatis,totheextentsomeformsof

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subpoenassubjecttheirrecipientstoacourt'sinpersonamauthority,Congressmaystilllimitcourts'exerciseofsuchpersonaljurisdictioninothercontexts.C.f.,RepublicofPanamav.BCCIHoldings(Luxembourg)S.A.,119F.3d935,942,946–47(11thCir.1997) (pursuanttotheFifthAmendment'sDueProcessClause,federalcourtsexercisepersonaljurisdictionoveranydefendantwithsufficientcontactswiththeUnitedStates,butCongressmaylimitsuchjurisdictionbystatutoryauthorization).[4]ThatCongresscompelsforeignaccessinonestatutorycontextgrantinginpersonamjurisdictiondoesnotdemonstratethesameauthorityappliesinothercontexts,includingtheSCA.

However,Google'sargumentsregardingawarrant'spurportedinremnatureofjurisdictionsuffersimilarinfirmities.AsGoogleconfirms,warrantsissuedpursuanttoRule41,FederalRulesofCivilProcedure,donotapplyextraterritorially.SeeFed.R.Crim.P.41(b)(limitingout-of-districtwarrantstoparticularlocationsnobroaderthanUnitedStatesterritoryorplacesunderUnitedStates'control);AmendmentstotheFederalRulesofCriminalProcedure,129F.R.D.557,558(1990)(rejectinganamendmenttoRule41thatwouldhavepermittedextraterritorialwarrants,stating“TheCourtisoftheviewthatthe[proposedamendmenttoRule41allowingfortheissuanceofsearchwarrantswithextraterritorialeffect]requiresfurtherconsideration.”).However,Rule41(a)(1)clearlyprovidesthatit“doesnotmodifyanystatuteregulatingsearchorseizure,ortheissuanceandexecutionofasearchwarrantinspecialcircumstances.”Therefore,Rule41'sproscriptionagainstextraterritorialapplicationdoesnotencircleallwarrantsintoitsambit.Forexample,theForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceActof1978AmendmentsActof2008permitswarrantsforthesurveillanceofU.S.personsinforeigncountries.FISAAmendmentsActof2008,Pub.L.No.110–261§§703,704,122Stat.2436,2448–57(2008)(codifiedat50U.S.C.§§1881b,1881c(2017)).

*4Indeed,severalcourtspersuasivelyholdthatRule41(b)'sterritoriallimitsdonotapplytoSCAwarrantsexecutedoutsideoftheissuingfederalcourts'districts.Asthosecasescogentlydiscuss,theSCAinvokesthe“proceduresusedintheFederalRulesofCriminalProcedure”togoverntheissuanceofwarrants,18U.S.C.§2703(a),yetthisinvocationdoesnotincorporateRule41'ssubstantiveaspects,includinganynotionsregardingextraterritorialapplication.See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Berkos,543F.3d392,398(7thCir.2008)(“Thecommondefinitionof‘procedure’supportstheconclusionthat§2703(a)incorporatesonlythoseprovisionsofRule41thataddressthe‘specificmethod’or‘particularway’toissueawarrant....Rule41(b)dealswithsubstantivejudicialauthority—notprocedure—andthusdoesnotapplyto§2703(a).”);UnitedStatesv.Bansal,663F.3d634,662(3dCir.2011)(rejectingcontentionthatRule41(b)trumps§2703(a));UnitedStatesv.Kernell,No.3:08-CR-142(CCS),2010WL1408437(E.D.Tenn.Apr.2,2010),rept.andrecomm.adopted,No.3:08-CR-142(TWP),2010WL1491861(E.D.Tenn.Apr.13,2010)(“[T]heplainlanguageof18U.S.C.§2703(a)expressestheintentthatonlythe‘procedures,’(i.e.,theproceduralportions)as‘described’inRule41aretobe‘used.’ThisCourtfurtherfindsthatRule41(b)isnota‘procedural’provision,butisa‘substantive’provision,andthus,itisnotincorporatedunder18U.S.C.§2703(a).”);UnitedStatesv.McGuire,No.2:16–cr–00046–GMN–PAL,2017WL1855737,at*8(D.Nev.Apr.9,2017)(“Theplainlanguageof§2703allowsmagistratejudgeswithjurisdictionoveranoffenseunderinvestigationtoissuewarrantsseekingtheproductionofstoredelectroniccommunicationsfromserviceproviderslocatedoutsideoftheirowndistrict.”).

Inanyevent,thedelineationbetweeninpersonamandinremjurisdictionfaltersuponrecognitionthattheSupremeCourteradicatedanysubstantivedifferencebetweentheconcepts.Shafferv.Heitner,433U.S.186,206,97S.Ct.2569,53L.Ed.2d683(1977)(“rightscannotdependontheclassificationofanactionasinremorinpersonam,sincethatisaclassificationforwhichthestandardsaresoelusiveandconfusedgenerally”)(citationsandquotationmarksomitted).“Thephrase,‘judicialjurisdictionoverathing’,isacustomaryellipticalwayofreferringtojurisdictionovertheinterestsofpersonsinathing.”Id.at207,97S.Ct.2569(citationsomitted).Inpersonamjurisdictionproffersauthorityoverpersons,yetconceptuallyinremjurisdictionpositscontroloveraperson'srightsinathingorplace,notmerelyauthorityovertheplaceorthing.Id.at211,97S.Ct.2569(“Thefictionthatanassertionofjurisdictionoverpropertyisanythingbutanassertionofjurisdictionovertheownerofthepropertysupportsanancientformwithoutsubstantialmodemjustification.”).

Therefore,asaconceptualmatter,thepurportedexerciseofinremjurisdictionfashionsacourt'sauthorityovertherightsregardingstoreddata;suchinremjurisdictiondiffersinsubstantiallyfromtheauthoritypermittedbyinpersonamjurisdictionovertheholderofsuchrights.Inthisconception,thevehicleforthecompellingauthority—whethertermedinpersonamorinrem,orviaawarrantorasubpoena—matterslittle,asthereexistsnoterritorialbaselineforanyoftheconcepts.Indeed,asthecomparisonbetweenRule41andtheSCA'swarrantsprovisionsdemonstrates,Congressmayalterthereachofpurportedinremjurisdictionjustasreadilyasitconfiguresthereachofinpersonamjurisdiction.

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Whenunmooredfromtheafore-mentioneddistinctions,theinquirydevolvestoanexaminationwhetherCongressaffirmativelyandunmistakablyintendedextraterritorialapplicationoftheSCA,contrarytotheprevailingpresumptionagainstsuchtreatment.Clearly,reviewoftheSCArevealsnorebuttalagainstthepresumption.Infact,courtshaveforbiddenextraterritorialapplicationofthewiretappingprovisionsofTitleIoftheECPA,thecompanionlawtotheSCA.SeeHuffv.Spaw,794F.3d543,547(6thCir.2015) (“Courtshaverepeatedlyappliedthegeneral‘legalpresumption’againstextraterritorialapplication”towiretaps);UnitedStatesv.Peterson,812F.2d486,492(9thCir.1987) (same);Stowev.Devoy,588F.2d336,341(2dCir.1978)(same);UnitedStatesv.Toscanino,500F.2d267,279–80(2dCir.1974)(“[T]hestatutesignificantlymakesnoprovisionforobtainingauthorizationsforawiretapinaforeigncountry.”),abrogationonothergroundsrecognisedbyInreTerroristBombingsofU.S.EmbassiesinEastAfrica,552F.3d157,167n.5(2dCir.2008);UnitedStatesv.Angulo–Hurtado,165F.Supp.2d1363,1369(N.D.Ga.2001)(same);UnitedStatesv.Bennett,538F.Supp.1045,1048(D.P.R.1982)(citingToscanino,500F.2dat279);BerlinDemocraticClubv.Rumsfeld,410F.Supp.144(D.D.C.1976);seealsoS.Rep.No.99–541,at12(1986),reprintedin1986U.S.C.C.A.N.3555,3566(theElectronicCommunicationsPrivacyAct,whichamendedtheWiretapAct,“regulatesonlythoseinterceptionsconductedwithintheterritorialUnitedStates”).

*5Indeed,CongresscouldnothaveenvisionedtheSCAapplyinginforeignterritorywhenitenactedthelawbecausefirmsoverwhelminglystoredprivatecommunicationsintheUnitedStates.SeeOrinS.Kerr,TheNextGenerationCommunicationsPrivacyAct,162U.PENN.L.REV.404–05(2014)(explainingthatCongressenactedtheSCAwhenmostcomputeruserswereUnitedStatescustomersusingservicesintheUnitedStates).Legislativehistory,inparticularthe1986HouseJudiciaryCommitteeReportontheSCA,confirmsthattheprovisions“regardingaccesstostoredwireandelectroniccommunicationsareintendedtoapplyonlytoaccessintheterritorialUnitedStates.”H.R.Rep.No.99–647,at32–33(1986).Furthermore,Congresstidedthe2001amendmentauthorizingtheissuanceofmultidistrictwarrantsasthe“NationwideServiceofSearchWarrantsforElectronicEvidence.”UnitingandStrengtheningAmericabyProvidingAppropriateToolsRequiredtoInterceptandObstructTerrorismAct(USAPATRIOTAct),Pub.L.No.107–56,§220,2001U.S.C.C.A.N.(115Stat.)272,291–92(codifiedat18U.S.C.§§2703,2711)(emphasisadded);H.R.Rep.No.107–236,at57(2001).Therefore,basedonthisreviewCongressdidnotintendextraterritorialapplicationoftheSCA.

Asafinalconsiderationonthisissue,thegovernment'sinvocationoftheSenate's2006ratificationoftheCouncilofEuropeConventiononCybercrimedoesnotalterthisfinding.TheCybercrimeConventionrequiressignatoriestocompelpersonstoproducedataintheirpossessionorcontrol.ConventiononCybercrime,Nov.23,2001,Europ.T.S.No.185,Art.18.1.a,availableathttps://rm.coe.int/1680081561.TheExplanatoryReporttransmittedwiththeConventioninterpretedthecustody-or-possessionprovisiontoincludesignatoryauthoritytocompelpersonstoproducedatathatmaybestoredoutsideofthesignatory'sterritory.ExplanatoryReporttotheConventiononCybercrime,Nov.23,2001,173,availableat,https://rm.coe.int/16800cce5b.ThegovernmentarguesthatSenateratificationoftheCybercrimeConventionindicatesthattheSCAalreadyprovidedtheafore-mentionedauthorityrequiredbytheConvention.

Thegovernment'sargumentsfailtoconvinceonthisscore.TheSenate'sratificationoftheConventiondoesnotevenmentiontheSCA.Furthermore,theSenatedidnotratifytheCybercrimeConventionuntil2006,morethan20yearsafterenactmentoftheSCA.TheSupremeCourtdisfavorssuchposthocinterpretationoflegislation.WatermanS.S.Corp.v.UnitedStates,381U.S.252,269,85S.Ct.1389,14L.Ed.2d370(1965)(“‘theviewsofasubsequentCongressformahazardousbasisforinferringtheintentofanearlierone.’”)(citingUnitedStatesv.Price,361U.S.304,313,80S.Ct.326,4L.Ed.2d334(1960);UnitedStatesv.PhiladelphiaNat'lBank,374U.S.321,348,83S.Ct.1715,10L.Ed.2d915(1963)).Indeed,theCybercrimeConventiondoesnotevenconstitutelegislation.TheConventionincitestheSenate'sadviceandconsentfunctionunderArticleIIoftheConstitution,notitslegislativefunctionpursuanttoArticleI.InreSearchWarranttoGoogle,2017WL2985391,at*9.Therefore,thePresidentandtheSenate'sconsiderationscannotrepresenttheinterpretationbytheentireCongressthattheSCAfulfillscertainoftheConvention'sconditions.

Therefore,basedontheforegoinganalysis,§2703oftheSCAdoesnotapplyextraterritorially.

B.TheGovernment'sWarrantFallsWithintheSCA'sFocus

BecausetheSCAdoesnotapplyextraterritorially,thesecondstepoftheinquiryrequirestheundersignedtodetermine“whetherthecaseinvolvesadomesticapplicationofthestatute”—ratherthananextraterritorialapplication—by“lookingtothestatute's‘focus.’”RJRNabisco,136S.Ct.at2101.“Iftheconductrelevanttothestatute'sfocusoccurredintheUnitedStates,thenthecaseinvolvesapermissibledomesticapplication

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evenifotherconductoccurredabroad.”Id.Beforeconductingthisinquiry,themeaningof“focus”inthiscontextrequiresfurtherelaboration.Inparticular,theSupremeCourt'sconstrualofastatute's“focus”delineatestheinquiryfromdiscerningastatute'spurpose,andGoogle'sargumentsonthissecondprongoftheanalysisrestsupontheSCA'spurpose,notitsfocus.

*6AsestablishedbytheSupremeCourt,astatutethatdoesnothaveextraterritorialreachmaystillapplyinaparticularcasebecausethe“conduct”subjecttothestatute'sfocusoccursdomestically.Id.InMorrison,theCourtportrayedastatute's“focus”asencompassingparticular“territorialevent[s]”or“relationship[s],”orthe“objectsof[a]statute'ssolicitude.”Morrison,561U.S.at266–67,130S.Ct.2869.Therefore,thissecondsteprequiresadeterminationwhetheradispute'sconduct,event,relationship,or“objectofsolicitude”—whichispurportedlyregulatedbyastatute'sfocus—occursintheUnitedStates.

Critically,theSupremeCourthonesinonastatute'stexttoascertaintheconduct,event,relationship,orobjectofsolicitudeconstitutingitsregulatory“focus,”andtheCourtdistinguishesthistextualfocusfromotheraspectsofastatute'sinterpretation.Thus,inMorrisonitself,theCourtconstruedthe“focus”oftheSecurityandExchangeAct's§10(b)(codifiedat15U.S.C.§78j(b))afterrejectingextraterritorialapplicationofthatprovision.561U.S.at266–70,130S.Ct.2869.Section10(b)regulatesthepurchaseandsaleofsecuritiessoastoaddressfraudulentactivities,yettherespondentsinMorrisonarguedthatthestatuteappliedtoEuropeansecuritiestransactionsbecausesomeofthedeceptiveconductatissueoccurredinthestateofFlorida.Id.at266,130S.Ct.2869.AlthoughtheCourtacknowledgedthat§10(b)servestopunishanddispeldeceptiveconduct,thestatutoryprovisionaccomplishesthispurposebyregulatingtheobjectofitssolicitude—securitiespurchase-and-saletransactions—andinparticular,domestictransactionsofthatnature.Id.at267–69,130S.Ct.2869;seealsoRJRNabisco,136S.Ct.at2100(Section10(b)'s“focusisondomesticsecuritiestransactions,andwethereforeheldthatthestatutedoesnotapplytofraudsinconnectionwithforeignsecuritiestransactions,evenifthosefraudsinvolvedomesticmisrepresentations.”).Therefore,theCourtruledthattherespondentscouldnotrelyupon§10(b)toaddressEuropeansecuritiestransactionsthatallegedlyresultedfromdomestic,fraudulentactivity.Id.

ThesameanalysiscoheresinRJRNabisco.Inthatdecision,theCourtreviewedwhethercertainprovisionsoftheRacketeerInfluencedandCorruptOrganizationsAct(RICO)(18U.S.C.§§1962(a)–(d),and1964(d))appliedextraterritorially.RICOproscribespatternsofracketeeringactivitycommittedthroughperpetratingconductthatviolatespredicate,criminalstatutes.RJRNabisco,136S.Ct.at2096–97.DespitetheallegationsomeoftheracketeeringactivityoccurredintheUnitedStates—andinfactsomeofRICO's§1962provisionsappliedextraterritorially—theCourtruledthat§1964(d)'sprivatecause-of-actionremedyonlyappliedtodomesticinjuries.136S.Ct.at2106–09.Therefore,althoughRICO'spurposeinvolvescountermandingracketeeringactivityintheUnitedStatesandabroad,andsomeofthealleged,racketeeringactivityoccurredinEurope,§1964(d)'sprivatecause-of-actionprovisionfocusesupondomesticinjuriesasitsproscribed“event”or“objectofsolicitude,”notallinjuriesresultingfromallegedracketeeringactivity.136S.Ct.at2111.

Likewise,theMorrisondecisionrelieduponEEOCv.ArabianAm.OilCo.,499U.S.244,255,111S.Ct.1227,113L.Ed.2d274(1991)(ARAMCO),todepictthiscrucialdistinction.Morrison,561U.S.at266,130S.Ct.2869.InARAMCO,theplaintiffsuedtherespondentU.S.companyfordiscriminatoryemploymentpracticesinSaudiArabia.TheCourtruledthatTitleVIIoftheCivilRightsActof1964(42U.S.C.§2000e,etseq.)didnotapplyextraterritorially.ARAMCO,499U.S.at250–59,111S.Ct.1227.Moreimportantlyforthepresentdispute,althoughTitleVII'spurposeencompassestheeradicationofemploymentdiscrimination,theCourtfoundthatthestatute's“focus”centeredupondomesticemployment,notforeignemploymentwherethediscriminatorypracticesoccurred.Id.at247,255,111S.Ct.1227;seealsoMorrison,561U.S.at266,130S.Ct.2869(inARAMCO,“neither[theforeign]eventnor[theforeign]relationshipwasthe‘focus'ofcongressionalconcern,...butratherdomesticemployment”).[5]

*7Inaddition,MorrisoncitestoFoleyBros.,Inc.v.Filardo,336U.S.281,69S.Ct.575,93L.Ed.680(1949),insupportofitsrulingsonthispoint.561U.S.at266,130S.Ct.2869.InFoleyBros.,theCourtconsideredwhetherthefederalEightHoursLawappliedextraterritoriallytoworkplacesinIranandIraq.TheCourtdeterminedthatthestatutedidnotapplytorestrictworkhoursinforeignlocations.FoleyBros.,336U.S.at285,69S.Ct.575.Critically,theCourtdeclaredthatviatheEightHoursLawCongressaddresseda“concernwithdomesticlaborconditions”(thatis,thestatute'spurpose)byfocusingupon“hoursofwork.”Id.at286,69S.Ct.575.

Basedupontheforegoinganalyses,MorrisonandrelatedcasesportraythatCourtsshoulddiscernastatute'sfocustextually,whereasastatute'spurposeestablishesabroaderlensofperspective.Astatute'spurposerepresentstheaim,end,orgoalalegislativebodyendeavorstoaddress.SeeBLACK'SLAW

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DICTIONARY(10thed.2014)(defining“purpose”asan“objective,goal,orend”);WilliamC.Burton,LEGALTHESAURUS424(2ded.1992)(defining“purpose”as“aim,ambition,...aspiration,...goal,...principle,...objective,....”).Astatute'sfocusrepresentstheconduct,events,relationships,or“objectsofsolicitude”Congresscentersupontoeffectthepurposeofthestatute.SeeBurton,LEGALTHESAURUSat230(defining“focus”as“arena,center,centerofactivity,centerofattention,...centerofinterest....”);WEBSTER'SIINEWRIVERSIDEUNIVERSITYDICTIONARY492(1994)(defining“focus,”interalia,asa“centerofinterestoractivity”).

Withthisexplanation,theerrorsinGoogle'sargumentsmanifest.Google'sargumentthattheSCA's“focus”istheprivacyprotectionfaltersbecausethatconcernisnotthestatute'sfocus.Rather,theSCAlaudablyservestoprotectprivatecommunicationsandpreventinvasionsofprivacy,andthisconcernconstitutesthestatute'spurpose,[6]TheSCAeffectsthispurpose,however,byfocusinguponvariousformsofconduct,events,relationships,and“objectsofsolicitude,”whichcoalescesunderthebroadcategoryofregulatingaccess.Solongastheaccessoccursdomestically,thentheSCAproperlyappliestotheconductoreventatissue.

InterpretingtheplainlanguageoftheSCA'stext,theSCA'spurposerevolvesaroundprotectingprivatecommunications,buttheSCA'sfocusrestsuponeffectingthepurposebycontrollingaccesstoprivatecommunications.Thestatuteitself,andeventhelargerECPAof1986ofwhichitisapart,barelymention“privacy.”SeePub.L.99–508,100Stat.1848,1848–73(1986)(codifiedasamendedat18U.S.C.§2510,etseq.,18U.S.C.§2701,etseq.,and18U.S.C.§3121,etseq.)(onlythetitleoftheECPA,andonedefinitionalprovisionregardingradiocommunications(§101(a)(16)(B)),containstheword“privacy”).Furthermore,theECPA'swiretappingandpenregisterprovisionsclearlyfocusupontherightsandproceduresregardingaccesstoprivatecommunicationsthroughinterception.

*8AsfortheSCAitself,theSCA'sofficialtitleincludes“access”asanoperativeterm:“StoredWiredandElectronicCommunicationsandTransactionalRecordsAccess.”Pub.L.99–508atChap.121(1986)(codifiedasamendedat18U.S.C.§2703)(emphasisadded);seegenerally,INSv.NationalCtr.forImmigrants'Rights,Inc.,502U.S.183,189,112S.Ct.551,116L.Ed.2d546(1991) (“[T]hetitleofastatuteorsectioncanaidinresolvinganambiguityinthelegislation'stext.”);BrotherhoodofR.R.Trainmenv.Baltimore&OhioR.R.,331U.S.519,528–29,67S.Ct.1387,91L.Ed.1646(1947)(The“headingisbutashort-handreferencetothegeneralsubjectmatterinvolved....Forinterpretivepurposes,theyareofuseonlywhentheyshedlightonsomeambiguouswordorphrase.”).Furthermore,theSCA'stextincludesseveralreferencestoitsfocusuponaccess.Section2701,whichproscribes,astitled,“[u]nlawfulaccesstostoredcommunications,”prohibitsunauthorized“access”toelectroniccommunicationsfacilities.Section2702limitsaccesstocustomercommunicationsbyregulatingproviders'disclosureofsuchinformation.

Asfortheprovisionatissueinthiscase,§2703regulatesspecificallythegovernment'saccesstoprivatecommunications,anditdoessobyprescribingtheprocessbywhichprovidersmaydisclosedatatothegovernment.Hence,Congressexpresslydescribesthetermsbywhichthegovernmentmayaccessprivatecommunicationsbyrequiringproviderstodiscloseinformationpursuanttoawarrant,subpoena,orcourtorder.18U.S.C.§2703(a)–(d).Mostcritically,governmentaccessdoesnotoccuronforeignterritory.Rather,thegovernmentgainsaccesstoprivatecommunicationswhenaproviderdisclosesinformationanddatatothegovernment,andsuchdisclosureoccursdomestically,notinforeignterritorieswheretheprovidermaystoreinformationanddata.

Therefore,theconductrelevanttotheSCA'sfocus—givingthegovernmentaccesstoprivatedataviaproviderdisclosure(whetherintheformofwarrants,subpoenas,orbycourtorder)—occursinthecircumstancesatbardomestically.ThegovernmentdoesnotgarneraccesstoprivatecommunicationsuntilGoogledisclosesdatatothegovernment,andsuchdisclosureoccursintheUnitedStates,notinaforeignterritory.TheSCA'smechanismsexisttoprotectprivacy,but§2703focusesupongovernmentaccessviaproviderdisclosureasthemeanstoeffecttheprivacypurpose.

ThatGooglehastoretrievethedatafromserverslocatedoverseasdoesnotimplicatetheSCA'sfocusbecausethestatutedoesnotregulatethelocationofstoredprivatedata.ThestatutedoesnotevinceanyinterestinwhereGooglestoresdata,anditdoesnotprotectdataprivacybycontrollingproviders'territorialstorageofdata.Itprotectsprivacybyrequiringprobablecauseandotherstandardsforthegovernment'saccesstodata,andthegovernmentdoesnotgainaccessuntilGoogledisclosesdataatadomesticlocation.

Google'sprimaryrejoinderhonesinuponRJRNabisco'sphrase,“conductrelevanttoastatute'sfocus,”andimplicitlyupontheterm“relevant.”136S.Ct.at2101.Googleapparentlyconstruestheterm“relevant”asatermofart,andthus,anyactivitiesthatare“requiredby,andessentialtotheexecutionof,”astatute'sfocus

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shouldbeardispositiveconsiderationindeterminingwhetherconductoccursextraterritoriallyordomestically.AsGoogleargues,itsactivitiesinaccessing,retrieving,andcopyingdatafromitsforeignserversfactordecisivelyintheextraterritorialanalysisduetotheactivities'relationtodatadisclosure.

Googleerrsinitsargumentbecauseitascribesunduesignificancetoitsaccess,retrieval,andcopyingofdata.Properlyconsidered,RJRNabisco'suseoftheterm“relevant”distinguishescriticalactivitiesregulatedbyCongressfrominconsequentialactivitiesthatbearnegligibleimpactunderastatute'sregime.Therefore,thephrase“conductrelevanttoastatute'sfocus”referstothoseactivitiesthatcomprisetheevent,relationship,or“objectofsolicitude”Congressfocusesuponinastatute,notinconsequentialactivitiesthatneverthelessfacilitatecommissionofthoseactivitiesgermanetoastatute'sfocus.Properlydiscerned,theSCAfocusesupongovernmentaccessviaproviderdisclosure;relatedprovideractivities—suchasretrievingdatafromaforeignserverwhileperchedatalocationintheUnitedStates—facilitatesuchdisclosuresyetdonotrepresenttheSCA'sfocus.

*9Inafurtherobjection,Googlearguesthattheeventatissueinthiscaseoccursinforeignterritorybecauseexecutingthewarrantinvolvesasearchandseizureoverseas.However,thegovernmentsearchheredoesnotoccuruntilthegovernmentaccessesthedatadomestically,andaseizuredoesnotoccuruntilapersonisdispossessedofproperty,whichinthesecircumstancesoccurdomestically.Asanothercourtconsideringthisissuediscerned,“complyingwithanSCAwarrantdoesnotrequireaserviceprovidertoaccessandseizedatainthetraditionalsensethatlawenforcementmightaccessandseizephysicalproperty.”MatterofSearchofInfo.Associatedwith[Redacted]@gmail.com,2017WL2480752,at*10.Asthecourtdiscussed,a“‘seizure’ofpropertyoccurswhenthereissomemeaningfulinterferencewithanindividual'spossessoryinterestsinthatproperty.”Id.(citingUnitedStatesv.Jacobsen,466U.S.109,113,104S.Ct.1652,80L.Ed.2d85(1984)).“Merelycopyingadocumentortakingaphotographofmaterial—bothreasonableanalogsto[thecircumstances]whereGoogleaccessesandmakesanelectroniccopyofauser'sdata—isnota‘seizure’ofthatmaterialbecausethereisnomeaningfulinterferencewiththeowner'spossessoryinterestinit....”Id.(citing,interalia,Arizonav.Hicks,480U.S.321,107S.Ct.1149,94L.Ed.2d347(1987)(“[T]hemererecordingoftheserialnumbers[ofastereosystem]...didnot‘meaningfullyinterfere’withrespondent'spossessoryinterestineithertheserialnumbersortheequipment,andthereforedidnotamounttoaseizure.”);InreSearchWarrantNo.16–960–M–01toGoogle,232F.Supp.3dat719–21(lawenforcementaccessingelectronicdatapursuanttoanSCAwarrantisnota“seizure”inthetraditionalsense)).

Asthecourtexplained,“Google'sactionsthemselvesdonotresultinaninvasionoftheuser'sprivacyoraninterferencewiththeuser'spossessoryinterestinthedata[because]Googleisentitledtoaccessandtransferitsusers'datawithinitsnetworkatwillinaccordancewithitsuseragreementsand...§2701(c).”2017WL2480752,at*10(citingInreSearchWarrantNo.16–960–M–01toGoogle,232F.Supp.3dat720(“ElectronicallytransferringdatafromaserverinaforeigncountrytoGoogle'sdatacenterinCaliforniadoesnotamounttoaseizurebecausethereisnomeaningfulinterferencewiththeaccountholder'spossessoryinterestintheuserdata.”)).Thus,the“privacyinvasionoccurswhereGoogledisclosesthecompileddatatolawenforcement,andgovernmentagentssearchthosefilesforinformationrelatingtosuspectedcriminalactivity,allofwhichoccursdomestically.”2017WL2480752,at*10(citingInreSearchWarrantNo.16–960–M–01toGoogle,232F.Supp.3dat721).

Therefore,theCourtagreeswiththeoverwhelmingmajorityofcourtsthattheSCA's§2703focusesupongovernmentaccessviaproviderdisclosure,andsuchdisclosureoccursintheUnitedStateswhentheprovidersproducedataandinformationtothegovernment.SeeInreSearchWarranttoGoogle,Inc.,2017WL2985391,at*11;InreTwoEmailAccountsatGoogle,Inc.,2017WL2838156,at*4;IntheMatteroftheSearchofInfo.Associatedwith[Redacted]@Gmail.comthatIsStoredatPremisesControlledbyGoogle,Inc.,2017WL2480752,at**8–10;IntheMatterofSearchofContentthatIsStoredatPremisesControlledbyGoogle,2017WL1487625,at*4;InreSearchWarrantNo.16–960–M–01toGoogle,232F.Supp.3dat722.

CONCLUSION

Basedontheforegoingdiscussion,theCourtGRANTStheGovernment'sMotiontoCompelandORDERSGoogletocomplywiththesearchwarrantinsofarasitstoresanyresponsiveinformationinforeignterritories.

Footnotes

[1]

InitsReplytotheGovernment'sMotion,GooglearguedthattheCourtshouldsetanexpirationdateforthe

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©2017eDiscoveryAssistantLLC.NoclaimtooriginalU.S.GovernmentWorks.

non-noticeprovisionofitsOrdergrantingthesearchwarrant.Pursuantto18U.S.C.§2705(b),theCourtorderedGooglenottoinformthesubscribertargetedbythewarrantabouttheexistenceoftheGovernment'swarrantandassociatedactivities,untilotherwiseauthorizedbytheCourt.Googlearguesthatestablishinganindefinitedurationforanon-disclosureorderviolatestheFirstAmendment.TheCourtwillreviewGoogle'srequestinaseparateOrder.

[2]

The“ECPA”commonlyreferstothethreetitlesofthestatuteasagroup(TitlesI,II,andIIIofPub.L.99–508).TitleI“prohibitstheintentionalactualorattemptedinterception,use,disclosure,orprocurementofanyotherperson”tointerceptwire,oral,orelectronictransmissions;TitleIIistheStoredCommunicationsAct;and,TitleIII“addressespenregisterandtrapandtracedevices,”requiringgovernmententitiestoobtainacourtorderauthorizingtheirinstallation.Id.ThecodecodifiesTitleIandIIIat18U.S.C.§§2510–22.

[3]

See,e.g.,MicrosoftI,829F.3dat210;MicrosoftII,855F.3dat55,60(dissent,J.Jacobs);InreSearchWarranttoGoogle,2017WL2985391at*9;MatterofSearchofInfo.Associatedwith[Redacted]@gmail.com,2017WL2480752,at*7;MatterofSearchofContentthatisStoredatPremisesControlledbyGoogle,2017WL1487625,at*3.

[4]

CompareFed.R.Civ.P.4(k)(limitingfederalcourtstothepersonaljurisdictionauthorityofthestatecourtsofgeneraljurisdictionwheretheyarelocated),withthefollowingstatutesextendingfederalcourtpersonaljurisidictionnationallybyprovisionofnationwideserviceofprocess:9U.S.C.§9(2012)(confirmationsofarbitrationawards);15U.S.C.§22(2012)(antitrustsuits);28U.S.C.§1694(patentinfringement);id.§1695(derivativeactions);id.§1697(multidistrictlitigation);id.§2361(statutoryinterpleader);29U.S.C.§1132(e)(2)(2012)(ERISA).

[5]

CongressamendedTitleVIItoabrogateARAMCOandprovidefortheextraterritorialapplicationofthestatute.SeeCivilRightsActof1991,§109(a),105Stat.1077,codifiedat42U.S.C.§2000e(f)(“Withrespecttoemploymentinaforeigncountry,”theterm“employee”“includesanindividualwhoisacitizenoftheUnitedStates.”

[6]

LegislativehistoryindicatesthattheECPA'spurpose,includingtheSCA,relatesto

Thepurposeofthelegislationistoamendtide18oftheUnitedStatesCodetoprohibittheinterceptionofcertainelectroniccommunications;toprovideproceduresforinterceptionofelectroniccommunicationsbyfederallawenforcementofficers;toprovideproceduresforaccesstocommunicationsrecordsbyfederallawenforcementofficers;toprovideproceduresforfederallawenforcementaccesstoelectronicallystoredcommunications;andtoeasecertainproceduralrequirementsforinterceptionofwirecommunicationsbyfederallawenforcementofficers.

H.Rept.99–647at16.TotheextentGooglewouldequate“purpose”to“focus,”theHouseReportbolsterstheargumentthattheSCA'sfocusisgovernmentaccesstostoredelectroniccommunicationsviaproviderdisclosure.

EndofDocument.

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