EN BANC

[G.R. No. 68635. March 12, 1987.]

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTIONAGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAO LAURETA, AND OF CONTEMPTPROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE in G.R. NO.68635, entitled "EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE, vs. HON.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL."

R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM p:

In almost identical letters dated 20 October 1986, personally sent to Justices AndresR. Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, and Isagani A. Cruz, and a fourth letter, dated 22October 1986 addressed to Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, all members of the FirstDivision of this Court, (incorporated herein by reference), and in feigned ignoranceof the Constitutional requirement that the Court's Divisions are composed of, andmust act through, at least five (5) members, and in a stance of dangling threats toeffect a change of the Court's adverse resolution, petitioner Eva Maravilla Ilustrewrote in part:

"Please forgive us for taking the liberty of addressing you this letter whichwe do hope you will read very carefully.

"It is important to call your attention to the dismissal of Case No. G.R. 68635entitled 'Eva Maravilla Ilustre vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,' byan untenable minute-resolution although an extended one, dated 14 May1986 which we consider as an unjust resolution deliberately and knowinglypromulgated by the First Division of the Supreme Court of which you are amember.

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"We consider the three minute-resolution: the first dated 14 May 1986; thesecond, dated 9 July 1986; and the third, 3 September 1986, railroaded withsuch hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire history of the SupremeCourt under circumstances that have gone beyond the limits of legal andjudicial ethics.

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"Your attention is called to minute-resolution of 9 July 1986 which writes

finish to our case before the Supreme Court (. . . THIS IS FINAL') There isnothing final in this world. We assure you that this case is far from finishedby a long shot. For at the proper time we shall so act and bring this casebefore another forum where the members of the Court can no longer denyour action with minute resolutions that are not only unjust but are knowinglyand deliberately promulgated. The people deserve to know how themembers of the highest tribunal of the land perform in the task of decisionmaking by affixing their respective signatures on judgments that they renderon petitions that they themselves give due course.

"Please understand that we are pursuing further remedies in our quest forjustice under the law. We intend to hold responsible members of the FirstDivision who participated in the promulgation of these three minute-resolutions in question. For the members thereof cannot claim immunitywhen their action runs afoul with penal sanctions, even in the performanceof official functions; like others, none of the division members are above thelaw.

"In our quest for justice, we wish to avoid doing injustice to anyone,particularly the members of the First Division, providing that they had nohand in the promulgation of the resolution in question. That is why we arerequesting you to inform us your participation in the promulgation of theseresolutions in question. Even we who are poor are also capable of playingfair even to those who take advantage of our poverty by sheer power andinfluence. We shall then wait for your reply. If, however, we do not hearfrom you after a week, then we will consider your silence that you supportedthe dismissal of our petition. We will then be guided accordingly. (Emphasissupplied).

The letter also attacked the participation in the case of Justice Pedro L. Yap,Chairman of the First Division in this wise:

"As Division Chairman, Associate Justice Pedro Yap, as a copy of Resolutiondated 14 May 1986 we received indicate, did not even have the elementarycourtesy of putting on record that he voluntarily inhibited himself fromparticipating in the promulgation of this minute-resolution, although anextended one, which he should have done consistent with judicial decorumand the Canons of Judicial Ethics. After all he is the law partner of 'Atty.Sedfrey A. Ordoez, counsel for respondents, now the distinguishedSolicitor General . . . indicative that even at this stage of the proceeding inpoint of time, the Supreme Court still recognizes Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoezas counsel for respondents, even as he is already the Solicitor General. Fornot withdrawing from the case formally Atty. Ordoez has manifested hisunmitigated arrogance that he does not respect the Canons of ProfessionalEthics, similar to the actuation of his law partner, Associate Justice PedroYap, Chairman of the First Division of the Supreme Court, an act that furtheraggravates the growing wrinkles in the domain of judicial statesmanship,impressed as it is, with very serious and dangerous implications.

"(9) By 11 April 1986, date of the reorganization of the FirstDivision, Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez already became the Solicitor

General. With such amazingly magical coincidence, Dr. Pedro Yap, lawpartner of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez in the law firm Salonga, Ordoez,Yap, Padlan became the Chairman of the Division.

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"(11) So we see that on 11 August 1986 to 14 May 1986when some members of the Division were still busy putting theirrespective offices in order and had possibly have no idea about theMaravilla case.

Was it possible for Chairman Yap to have convinced the Divisionmembers that Maravilla petition is without merit, and since themembers the new ones knew nothing about the case, readilyagreed to the dismissal of the petition by a minute-resolution extended one. After all this was the case of the Solicitor General. Ifthis is what happened, then we are sorry to say that you weredeliberately 'had.'

After all, the 14 May 1986 untenable minute resolution althoughan extended one, does not bear the signatures of the Divisionmembers. The members should have signed the resolution, after all,the Supreme Court had given the petition due course, indicatingwhether they concur, dissent or otherwise abstain from voting."

The letter to Justice Herrera went on to state.

"We assume, of course, that you had studied the case thoroughly since youwere with the original 7-man First Division under the chairmanship of thenJustice Claudio Teehankee. We assure you that we will bring this case beforeanother forum to hold responsible the members of the Division whoparticipated in the dismissal of the case by the unjust minute-resolutions,knowingly rendered for intended objective that your conscience you areaware.

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"We leave the next move to you by informing us yourparticipation in the promulgation of the minute-resolutions in question.Please do not take this matter lightly for we know justice in the end willprevail. For if we do not hear from you within a week, we will consideryour silence as your admission that you supported the dismissal of thepetition. In this way, we shall then be guided accordingly. The momentwe take action in the plans we are completing, we will then call a pressconference with TV and radio coverage Arrangements in this regard arebeing done. The people should or ought to know why we were thwartedin our quest for plain justice.

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"Finally, in view of action that we are prepared to take in this case, that will

no doubt cause nationwide attention, and there should be anyone that willcause me harm personally, may we request you to show this letter to theauthorities concerned so that they will know where to look, when it becomesnecessary." (Emphasis supplied)

The aforesaid letters were included in the Agenda of the First Division of 22 October1986, were "Noted," and referred en consulta to the Court en banc.

On 28 October 1986, the Court en banc took up the background and history of thecase, found no reason to take any further action, and referred the case back to theFirst Division "as set forth in the latter's resolution of October 27, 1986." In thisResolution, the First Division traced the history of the case, clarified that Justice Yapassumed his position in this Court only on 2 May 1986; that when the resolution ofdismissal was issued on 14 May 1986, Justice Abad Santos was the incumbentChairman of the First Division, and that Justice Yap was unaware that Atty. Ordoezwas private respondents' counsel; that upon realization thereof, Justice Yapinhibited himself from further participation in the case; and that Justice Yap wasdesignated Chairman of the First Division only on 14 July 1986, after thecompulsory retirement of Justice Vicente Abad Santos on 12 July 1986. TheResolution of the First Division (incorporated herein by reference) concluded thus:

"The dispositions in this case were arrived at after careful study. Because acase is resolved against the interests of a party, does not mean that it is an'unjust decision' or that it has been 'railroaded.'

"This Division declares without hesitation that it has consistently renderedjustice without fear or favor. YAP, J., took no part."

On 3 November 1986, petitioner again addressed similar letters to Justices Narvasa,Herrera, and Cruz, (incorporated herein by reference), excerpts from which follow:

"It is rather amazing that when we wrote you our previous letter, we neverdreamed that you would rush, as you did rush for assistance en consultawith the Honorable Court en banc. The unfortunate part of it all is the factthat the Court en banc had to promulgate its resolution dated 28 October1986 which to us when considered in its entirety, is just as untenable as theFirst Division extended and unsigned minute-resolution of 14 May 1986.

"Evidently you misunderstood our point of inquiry, to wit: 'Did you or did younot approve the dismissal of our petition under

"1) The 14 May 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.

"2) The 9 July 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.

"3) The 3 Sept. 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.

"That was all we asked. The other matters contained in our letter wereintended merely to give you the highlights of our case. This is what we

wanted to know to properly guide us when we finally bring our case to theother forum of justice.

"Did it ever occur to you that when you and the other members of the FirstDivision referred our letters to the Honorable Court en banc en consulta itwas all your fault that the Court en banc had to promulgate its unsignedextended minute-resolution that unfortunately exposed the distinguishedmembers of the newly reorganized Supreme Court and, at the same time,convicted themselves as guilty of distorting facts involved in our petition?

"This, we are sure, will come as a shock to you. We will show you why

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"This is just a sample of what we will expose to the nation before the otherforum of justice where we will soon bring this case beyond the reach of thenewly reorganized Supreme Court. We are prepared to expose many moreof this kind of judicial performance readily constituting travesty of justice.Ponder upon this well because it is our very firm conviction that the peopledeserve to know how the distinguished members of the highest tribunal ofthe land perform their duties in this most sensitive area of decision making.

"Anyhow, whether you referred our letter to the Court en banc (en consulta)or not, the situation remains the same. At the proper time, as we said, wewill bring this case before another forum of justice where the members ofthe First Division, in fact the Honorable Court en banc may no longer denyour action by mere untenable and unjust minute resolutions. Better believe itthat we intend to hold responsible members of the First Division who tookpart in the promulgation of the untenable and unjust extended minute-resolution that is not even signed by any of those who promulgated it;therefore, to us, is clearly bereft of judicial integrity from its very inceptionon 14 May 1986.

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"Thus, we will bring this case before another forum of justice as Eva MaravillaIlustre against the distinguished members of the First Division, in factagainst the entire membership of the newly organized Supreme Court(because of its en banc unsigned extended minute-resolution that is withoutjudicial integrity, dated 28 October 1986). But do not be mislead (sic) for weare not alone in this fight. Other lawyers, not just by their mere sympathyfor me personally and my case, but by their firm conviction that judicialstatesmanship must be maintained at all times in the highest tribunal ofjustice in the land, that they have offered their free legal services when thelegal confrontation begins.

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"Paragraph 4, found on page 3 of the en banc resolution projects the mostfantastic, most unbelievable picture of Division Chairman Justice Yap. Itstates

"'. . . When the resolution of dismissal on May 14, 1986, JusticeYap was unaware that Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez was privaterespondent's counsel.

"The Honorable Court en banc must think everybody stupid to swallow thisstatement hook, line and sinker. For Justice Yap we say: Tell that to themarines. But more than this, we leave this matter to the conscience ofJustice Yap.

"Ignoramus that we are, unschooled in the domain of law and procedure,but we are learning a few as we prosecute our case within legitimate limits,we state here that both resolutions that promulgated by the Court enbanc of 28 October 1986 and that promulgated by the First Division dated27 October 1986, are nothing but a desperate attempt, when both areconsidered in their respective entirety, to maneuver without success, somesemblance of justification on the untenable and unjust 14 May 1986extended and unsigned minute-resolution that is bereft of judicial integrity.

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"Thus, if the members of the First Division and those of the Honorable Courten banc think for one minute that because of their respective 4-page minutebut extended resolutions apparently impressive for their lack of merit,deliberately unsigned that exposed their lack of judicial integrity, that we willnow give up the fight, just forget it. Ignoramus that we are, better believe itwhen we say we are prepared to carry the fight before another forum ofjustice. When we do, we shall call for a press conference with TV and radiocoverage, so that we can present to the entire nation our quest for justiceagainst the steam-roller of power and influence and, at the same time, to callthe attention of the people to the manner in which the members of thehighest tribunal of the land perform their respective individual and collectivefunctions in the domain of this most sensitive area of decision making.

"Allow us to restate our previous and now, our present inquiry, to wit:.

"Did you or did you not approve the dismissal of our petition under

"a) The 14 May 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.

b) The 9 July 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.

c) The 3 Sept. 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.'" (Emphasis supplied).

True to her threats, after having lost her case before this Court, petitioner filed on16 December 1986 an Affidavit-Complaint before the Tanodbayan, totallydisregarding the facts and circumstances and legal considerations set forth in thisCourt's aforecited Resolutions of the First Division and en banc. Some Members ofthis Court were maliciously charged with having knowingly and deliberatelyrendered, with bad faith, an unjust, extended Minute Resolution "making" heropponents the "illegal owners" of vast estates. Some Justices of the Court of Appealswere similarly maliciously charged with knowingly rendering their "unjust

resolution" of 20 January 1984 "through manifest and evident bad faith," whentheir Resolution had in fact and law been upheld by this Court. Additionally, SolicitorGeneral Sedfrey A. Ordoez and Justice Pedro Yap of this Court were also maliciouslycharged with having used their power and influence in persuading and inducing themembers of the First Division of this Court into promulgating their "unjust extendedMinute Resolution of 14 May 1986."

All the foregoing, in complete disregard of the Resolutions of this Court, as thetribunal of last resort, 1) upholding the challenged judgment of the Court ofAppeals; 2) dismissing the Petition on the ground that the doctrine of res judicatawas clearly applicable not only as to the probate of the Will of the decedent but alsoas to the heirship of petitioner, among others, and their right to intervene andparticipate in the proceedings; and 3) finding that there was no attempt whatsoeveron the part of Justice Yap nor Solicitor General Ordoez to unduly influence themembers of the First Division.

The Complaint before the Tanodbayan (incorporated herein by reference) wasallegedly filed "in my quest for justice, something that has been closed to me by theSupreme Court forever" and specifically charged:.

"CHARGE NO ONE

Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez and Justice Pedro Yap of 1) 'persuading, inducing,influencing the members of the newly organized First Division . . . intopromulgating their unjust, extended minute RESOLUTION of 14 May 1986,knowingly with deliberate intent with such unusual hurry/promptitudeunequalled in the entire history of the Supreme Court based on insignificantissues and deliberately evading/prevaricating the more important substantialones raised in my petition, in violation of Section 3, sub-letter (a) of RepublicAct No. 3019, as amended, . . .; and.

"(2) Under the same Section 3, subletter (e) of the same Republic Act . .. for causing me and the other heirs of Ponciano Maravilla undue injury byusing their power and influence as Solicitor General and Associate Justice,respectively. . . .

"CHARGE NO. TWO

"Associate Justices Luis Javellana, Vicente Mendoza and Serafin Cuevas,members of the then FOURTH SPECIAL CASES DIVISION, IntermediateAppellate Court

1) For knowingly rendering their unjust RESOLUTION dated 20 January1984 in the exercise of their functions through manifest and evident badfaith in CA-G.R. No. SP-13680, entitled 'Francisco Q. Maravilla, et al. v. Hon.Antonia Corpus Macandog, et al. 'in violation of Article 204 of the RevisedPenal Code;"

2) For causing me and the other heirs such 'undue injury' by deliberately,knowingly rendering their unjust RESOLUTION dated 20 January 1984 . . . in

violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, Section 3 (e) thereof.

"CHARGE NO. THREE

"Associate Justice Vicente Abad Santos (retired) then Chairman of the FirstDivision of the Supreme Court as of 14 May 1986, and Associate JusticeIsagani Cruz, Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera and Pedro Yap, . . .

1) For knowingly and deliberately rendering their unjust, extendedMINUTE RESOLUTION of 14 May 1986 dismissing my petition in G.R. No.68635, . . . with manifest and evident bad faith to make the clients of Atty.Sedfrey A. Ordoez, now the distinguished Solicitor General, the 'illegalowners' of the vast estates of my aunt Digna Maravilla . . .;

"2) Under Section 3, sub-letter (e) Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, .. . for deliberately causing us heirs of Ponciano Maravilla undue injury bydepriving us of our rights over my aunt's vast estates because of theirmanifest and evident bad faith in knowingly promulgating their unjust,extended minute RESOLUTION of 14 May 1986, deliberately intended tomake the clients of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez, now the Solicitor General, the'illegal owners' of my aunt Digna Maravilla's estates when, under the law,these Ordoez clients are not entitled to own these vast properties whetherunder testate or intestate succession or mixed succession." (Emphasissupplied).

Atty. Laureta himself reportedly circulated copies of the Complaint to the press,which was widely publicized in almost all dailies on 23 December 1986, without anycopy furnished this Court nor the members who were charged. The issue of theDaily Express of 23 December 1986 published a banner headline reading:

"ORDONEZ, 8 JUSTICES FACE GRAFT CHARGES"thereby making it unjustly appear that the Justices of this Court and the otherrespondents were charged with "graft and corruption" when the Complaint wasactually filed by a disgruntled litigant and her counsel after having lost her casethrice in this Court.

On 26 December 1986, the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) dismissed petitioner'sComplaint and decreed in the dispositive portion of his Resolution (hereinincorporated by reference) that:

"WHEREFORE, all the premises considered, this Office resolves to dismissthe complaint against Justices Pedro Yap, Isagani Cruz, Andres Narvasa,Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, Vicente Abad Santos, and will continueevaluating the complaint against Justices Serafin Cuevas, Luis Javellana andVicente Mendoza, Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoez, and the privaterespondents."

The aforestated Resolution indicated at the bottom of the last page:

"Copy Furnished:DEAN WENCESLAO LAURETACounsel for the Complainant919 Prudencio StreetSampaloc, Manila.

In the Resolution of this Court en banc, dated January 29, 1986, it required:"(1) Petitioner Eva Maravilla Ilustre to show cause, within ten (10) daysfrom notice, why she should not be held in contempt for her aforecitedstatements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and/orofficial actions of the Justices concerned, which statements, unlesssatisfactorily explained, transcend the permissible bounds of propriety andundermine and degrade the administration of justice; and

"(2) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta, as an officer of the Court, to show cause,within ten (10) days from notice, why no disciplinary action should be takenagainst him for the aforecited statements, conduct, acts and chargesagainst the Supreme Court and the official actions of the Justices concerned,and for hiding therefrom in anonymity behind his client's name, in an allegedquest for justice but with the manifest intent to bring the Justices intodisrepute and to subvert public confidence in the Courts and the orderlyadministration of justice." (pp. 383-384, Rollo).

(1)

In her Compliance-Answer filed on February 9, 1987, wherein Eva Maravilla Ilustreprays that the contempt proceedings against her be dismissed, she contends, inessence, that: (1) "there was no intention to affront the honor and dignity" of theCourt; (2) the letters addressed to the individual Justices were private in characterand were never meant for anybody, much less the Supreme Court en banc, "there(being) a constitutional mandate affording protection to privacy ofcommunications;" (3) if her statements in those letters were really contemptuous,the Court "should have immediately taken disciplinary proceedings" against her,and not having done so, the Court has "forfeited" that right and is now "estopped"from doing so; this citation for contempt is a "vindictive reprisal" for her having filedthe complaint before the Tanodbayan, "an action that lacks sincerity, taken not inthe spirit of judicial statemanship;" (4) she instituted the complaint before theTanodbayan "in my honest belief that I lost my case before the Supreme Court notbecause of lack of merit or of its own merits, assisted by attorneys who offered theirservices in the prosecution of my case;" (5) the newspaper publicity of this case"was no fault of mine; neither is it the fault of my former counsel Dean WenceslaoLaureta," who prevailed upon her to call off the press conference with TV and radiocoverage; that she is not a "disgruntled litigant" who thrice lost before the Court,rather, she has challenged the validity of the resolutions of the Court "containingdistortion of facts, conjectures and mistaken inferences" particularly, in that (a)there is no res judicata (b) the Court of Appeals in its decision declared that thejudgment of the trial Court had long attained finality, so that it can no longer be setaside, (c) her "opponents," clients of Atty. Ordoez, are not entitled to own her

aunt's "vast properties" whether under the law of testate or intestate succession ormixed succession," (d) that the statement in this Court's Resolution that the Courtof Appeals had denied intervention is an "unadulterated distortion of the facts;" (b)the statement in the en banc Resolution that some Justices of the Court of Appealswere similarly maliciously charged with knowingly rendering their "unjustresolution" of 20 January 1984 is a bit "premature, a prejudgment over a case overwhich this Court does not have jurisdiction;" (7) Atty. Laureta is not her counsel inthe case before the Tanodbayan; (8) before the latter body, she has "established notonly probable cause but has also proved the collective culpability (of the Justicesconcerned) as charged;" (9) and that her 53-page Motion for Reconsideration beforethe Tanodbayan is made an integral part of her Answer.

(2)

In his own Answer, Atty. Laureta maintains substantially that: (1) he is notrespondent Ilustre's counsel before the Tanodbayan and that she has consultedand/or engaged the services of other attorneys in the course of the prosecution ofher case, like Atty. Edgardo M. Salandanan and Atty. Vedastro B. Gesmundo; that hejust learned from other sources that respondent Ilustre was planning to bring hercase to the Tanodbayan with the assistance of other lawyers who offered her theirlegal services; (2) it was he who dissuaded her from calling her intended pressconference and from circulating copies of her complaint "not only in theperformance of duty as an officer of the court, but also as a former president ofManila III Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and as a professionallecturer in Legal and Judicial Ethics in some Manila law schools in his desire toprotect and uphold the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court as the highesttribunal of the land." He should, therefore, be given "a little bit of credit for what hedid" instead of taking this disciplinary proceeding against him; that Ms. Ilustre is nota "disgruntled litigant" who "lost her case thrice in this Court;" (3) he did notprepare respondent Ilustre's letters to the individual Justices, "appearances to thecontrary notwithstanding;" that these letters were "never, at any time, consideredas constituting contempt of court" in the resolutions of this Court, otherwise, "itwould have taken immediate disciplinary action as it is doing now;" the Court haslost its right to consider the statements in the letters as constituting contempt andit is now "estopped" from proceeding with this disciplinary action; (4) by doing so,this Court has "unmistakably revealed the intent and character that underlie itspresent action as a vindictive judicial vengeance, inconsistent with the spirit ofjudicial statesmanship by hiding behind the well-recognized fact that the SupremeCourt is supreme in the domain of the administration of justice;" (5) "there was nodisregard intended to the Resolution of the Honorable Court, as the tribunal of lastresort, relative to its upholding the judgment of the Court of Appeals;" he is justdoing "his duty as an officer of the court to put the records in this regard in theirproper light;" particularly (a) that the judgment of the trial court had attained itsfinality long ago, (b) the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable, otherwise, this Courtwould not have remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for review, (c) theobservation in the First Division's extended Resolution of 14 July 1986 that JusticeYap was unaware that Atty. Ordoez was private respondents' counsel "defies everyvestige of human understanding;" that Justice Yap had forthwith inhibited himself

from participating in the case is not borne out by the record of this case. Justice Yaphad "never voluntarily entered on the record his inhibition" when he should havedone so when respondent Ilustre's petition was taken up; Justice Yap's partner, Atty.Ordoez, continued to be recognized by this Court as counsel for private respondentseven as he was already the Solicitor General; (b) finally, "appearances to thecontrary notwithstanding, he has not committed acts unworthy of his profession.The truth of the matter is, he should at least be credited in whatever small way forhis acts and efforts taken by him to protect and uphold the honor and dignity of theHonorable Court."

We find the explanations of both Ms. Ilustre and Atty. Laureta unsatisfactory. Theirclaims that they had done nothing that could constitute an affront to the honor anddignity of this Court dissipate in the face of attendant facts and circumstances and"defy every vestige of human understanding," to use their own language. Indeed,they should not "think that they will win a hearing by the sheer multiplication ofwords." (Mathew 6:7).

Respondents' reliance on the "privacy of communication" is misplaced. Lettersaddressed to individual Justices, in connection with the performance of their judicialfunctions become part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for theentire Court. The contumacious character of those letters constrained the FirstDivision to refer the same to the Court en banc, en consulta and so that the Courten banc could pass upon the judicial acts of the Division. It was only in the exerciseof forbearance by the Court that it refrained from issuing immediately a show causeorder in the expectancy that after having read the Resolution of the Court en bancof October 28, 1986, respondents would realize the unjustness and unfairness oftheir accusations.

The Court is far from "estopped" in initiating these proceedings. The Chief Justicehad promptly announced his Statement, dated December 23, 1986, that "theSupreme Court will take appropriate steps on the matter upon its resumption ofsessions on the first working day of the year."

There is no vindictive reprisal involved. The Court's authority and duty under thepremises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from thescurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard themorals and ethics of the legal profession.

We are not convinced that Atty. Laureta had nothing to do with respondent Ilustre'sletters to the individual Justices, nor with the complaint filed before theTanodbayan. In the Motion for Reconsideration, dated June 11, 1986, filed by Atty.Laureta in the main petition, he stressed:

"10. The composition of the First Division was reduced to five members.Strangely enough, about one month later, the Honorable Court promulgatedits extended resolution with such promptitude in the entire history of theSupreme Court unequalled in a manner of speaking. . . ."

In the Manifestation and Motion, dated June 25, 1986, filed by Atty. Laureta (p.311, Rollo), the same phrases were incarnated:

"the promptitude with which the Resolution of 14 May 1986 waspromulgated (par. 9, Motion for Reconsideration, p. 5) unequalled in theentire history of the Supreme Court in so far as petitions given duecourse is concerned . . ." (Emphasis given).

Those same terms are reproduced verbatim in the letters ostensibly authored byrespondent Ilustre addressed to the individual Justices whom respondents havecharged. Thus:

"We consider the three minute resolutions . . . railroaded with suchhurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire history of the Supreme Courtunder circumstances that have gone beyond the limits of legal and judicialethics" (Ltr. to Justice Narvasa, p. 2; ltr. to Justice Herrera, p. 2; ltr. to JusticeCruz, p. 2).

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"with such unusual hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire history of theSupreme Court" (Ltr. to Justice Narvasa, p. 5; ltr. to Justice Herrera, p. 5; ltr.to Justice Cruz, p. 5)."

The same terminologies are reiterated in the Complaint and in the Motion forReconsideration filed before the Tanodbayan (p. 2).

Further, in his Manifestation & Motion, dated June 25, 1986, Atty. Laureta stated:

"counsel for petitioner personally inquired from Division Clerk of CourtCorazon Serevo the following:

(1) When was the above-entitled case deliberated by the First Division?

(2) Are there recorded minutes of such deliberation?

(3) Who among the members of the Division voted for dismissal of thepetition to be promulgated by resolution and who did not, if any?

(4) Who prepared the Resolution?" (p. 312, Rollo).

Atty. Laureta's obsession to receive the answer to his queries surfaces again in thesecond letters dated November 3, 1986 to the individual Justices under thesupposed signatures of respondent Ilustre, thus:

"Evidently you misunderstood our point of inquiry in our first letter. It is avery simple inquiry, to wit Did you or did you not approve the dismissal ofour petition under.

1) The 14 May 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No

2) The 9 July 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No

3) The 3 Sept. 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No."

(Emphasis original) (Ltr. to Justice Narvasa, p. 1; to Justice Herrera, p. 1; toJustice Cruz, p. 1).

Additionally, the disparaging remarks like: exertion of "undue" and "powerfulinfluence" by Atty. Ordoez and Justice Yap; "distortion of facts, conjectures andmistaken references"; "untenable minute resolution although extended"; "unjustminute resolution" repeated by Atty. Laureta in his several pleadings, echoed andre-echoed in the individual letters to the Justices, as well as in the Complaint andthe Motion for Reconsideration before the Tanodbayan, reveal the not-too-hiddenhand of Atty. Laureta.

The foregoing is bolstered by the reports received by the members of the Court thatcopies of the complaint filed with the Tanodbayan were distributed to the editors ofthe metropolitan newspapers in envelopes bearing the name of respondent Laureta,who was heard over the radio speaking on the same complaint, and that he wasfollowing up the complaint and the motion for reconsideration of the order ofdismissal of the Tanodbayan.

Furthermore, respondent Laureta as his co-respondent Ilustre's lawyer had controlof the proceedings. As stressed by this Court in an early case, as such lawyer,"Whatever steps his client takes should be within his knowledge and responsibility.Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics should be reminded him that '(a)lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doingthose things which the lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with referenceto their conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If aclient persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their relation.'" (InRe: Contempt Proceedings in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, 31SCRA 1, 23) Respondent Laureta manifestly failed to discharge such responsibility.For all intents and purposes, he appears to have encouraged and abetted his clientin denigrating the members of the First Division of this Court, by baselesslycharging them with rendering an "unjust" resolution with "deliberate bad faith,"because of his stubborn insistence on his untenable arguments which had beenrejected as without merit by the Court's First Division, whose Resolution wasupheld by the Court en banc. Worse, the dissemination in the print and broadcastmedia in bold captions falsely depicting the Justices as "FAC(ING) GRAFT CHARGES"instead of the baseless rantings of a disgruntled litigant appear to have been timedto place them in a bad light at the height of the Christmas season.

We come now to the specific accusations of respondents.

They charge Associate Justices Vicente Abad Santos (retired) then Chairman of theFirst Division of the Supreme Court as of May 14, 1986, Andres Narvasa, AmeurfinaM. Herrera, and Pedro Yap for knowingly and deliberately rendering their "unjust,extended Resolution of May 14, 1986" dismissing their petition in this case withmanifest and evident bad faith to make the clients of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez (nowthe Solicitor General) the "illegal owners" of the estates of Digna Maravilla, therebycausing the heirs of Ponciano Maravilla (Digna's eldest brother) undue injury by

depriving them of their rights over the estates of Digna Maravilla (Charge No. Threebefore the Tanodbayan). They further charge Justice Yap (and Atty. SedfreyOrdoez) of having "persuad(ed), induc(ed) and influenc(ed) the members of thenewly organized First Division into promulgating their "unjust, extended minuteResolution of 14 May 1986" (Charge No. One before the Tanodbayan), whichResolution, (the "Division Resolution," for short) is herewith attached as Annex "A".

Preliminarily, respondents deny that respondent Ilustre lost three times in thisCourt. It cannot be denied, however, that, as stated in the Resolution of October 28,1986 of the Court en banc, this is the third time (in fact, the fourth, if we includeFernandez, et al. vs. Maravilla, L-18799, 10 SCRA 589 [1964]) that a controversyinvolving the estate of the late Digna Maravilla is elevated to this Court. The firstwas in G.R. No. L-23225 (37 SCRA 672 [1971], where this Court ruled:

"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decree of the court below denyingprobate of the 1944 will of Digna Maravilla (Exhibit 'A') is reversed and thesaid testament is hereby ordered probated. Let the records be returned tothe Court of origin for further proceedings conformable to law. . . ."

As stated in the en banc Resolution of October 28, 1986 (hereto attached as Annex"B", and hereinafter referred to as the "Banc Decision") while respondent Ilustrewas not a party in that case, upon remand of the case to the probate Court, she andother children of the deceased brothers and sisters of the testatrix filed two Motionsfor Intervention. Respondent Ilustre's participation in the estate involved, therefore,harks back to that first case.

The Court of Appeals resolved the issue of intervention in CA-G.R. No. 05394,entitled "Heirs of Pastor Maravilla, et al. vs. Hon. Ernesto S. Tengco, et al." in aDecision penned by Justice Venicio Escolin (hereinafter referred to as the "EscolinDecision") wherein it was categorically ruled that there was no point to allowingintervention on the part of respondent Ilustre, et als., "for failure to show any rightor interest in the estate in question." Thus:

"(2) As heretofore stated, private respondents, in their counter-petitionfor mandamus, seek this Court's resolution on the petitioners' motion forintervention in Sp. Proc. No. 4977. In their respective pleadings andmemoranda, the parties have lengthily discussed the issue of whether or notpetitioners may be allowed to intervene; and the same may as well bedetermined in the present case, if only 'to avoid or, at least, minimize furtherprotracted controversy' between the parties (PCIB vs. Hon. Escolin, 56SCRA 2661. A resolution of this issue should render moot and academic thequestion anent the disqualification of respondent Judge.

We agree with private respondents that petitioners' motions for interventionare devoid of merit, for failure on their part to show any right or interest inthe estate in question. There is no dispute that the last will and testament ofthe late Digna Maravilla had already been admitted to probate in a finaljudgment which the Supreme Court promulgated on March 2, 1971 (G.R.No. L-23225). In the said will, Digna instituted her husband HerminioMaravilla as

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The above testamentary provision for the universal heirship of HerminioMaravilla over the residue of the decedent's present and future propertylegally and completely excluded the petitioners, as collateral relatives of thetestatrix, from inheriting any part of the latter's estate through intestatesuccession or mixed succession. Having no forced or compulsory heirs,except her husband, the testatrix had the absolute freedom to institute thelatter as her sole, universal heir, and such freedom is recognized by Article842 of the Civil Code, which provides:

'ART. 842. One who has no compulsory heirs may disposeby will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person havingcapacity to succeed.

One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estateprovided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code withregard to the legitime of said heirs."

There is therefore no point in allowing the petitioners, who clearly appear tohave no interest in the estate, to intervene in the proceedings involving thesettlement thereof.

xxx xxx xxx"

The aforesaid Decision was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. L-46155 on November9, 1977 and has become final. That was the second case involving the estate filedbefore this Court.

Respondents' contention, therefore, that the statement in the Banc Resolution"that the Court of Appeals had denied intervention" is an "unadulterated distortionof the facts" is obviously erroneous and intended to mislead.

The "Escolin Decision" (in CA-G.R. No. 05394-R), which had become final, alsofinally foreclosed any claim that respondent Ilustre, and those who sought tointervene with her, may have had on the estate of Digna Maravilla. In unmistakableterms, what the Court of Appeals held in that Decision, affirmed by this Court, bearsrepeating:

"The above testamentary provision for the universal heirship of HerminioMaravilla over the residue of the decedent's present and future propertylegally and completely excluded the petitioners, as collateral relatives of thetestatrix, from inheriting any part of the latter's estate through intestatesuccession or mixed succession. . . ."

To circumvent that judgment, however, two years later, or on February 29, 1979,respondent Ilustre, with respondent Laureta as counsel, filed a complaint forpartition of Digna Maravilla's estate and for damages against the heirs of DignaMaravilla's husband, who had then passed away (docketed as Civil Case No. X-404),

before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, San Carlos City, Branch X,presided over by Judge Antonia Corpuz Macandog. That Court, after declaringdefendants therein (private respondents in the petition under review) in default,ordered "all properties of Digna Maravilla mentioned in this case to go back to theirtrunk of origin, the plaintiffs herein who are represented by Eva Maravilla Ilustreand Eva Maravilla Ilustre herself" (hereinafter referred to as the "MacandogDecision"). In addition, the judgment awarded damages to the respondent Ilustre, etals., (the plaintiffs therein), and the sum of P100,000.00 to their counsel,respondent Laureta.

A special civil action for certiorari was filed by the defeated parties (privaterespondents in the petition under review) before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. L-58014, praying that the lower Court's declaration of default in Civil Case No. X-404and all other actions or decisions taken thereafter be declared null and void and thatthe dismissal of the complaint be ordered. on January 21, 1982, this Court resolvedto refer the case to the Court of Appeals in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, questionsof fact being involved.

In a Decision dated January 14, 1983, the Court of Appeals (Fourth Division), 1 inAC-G.R. SP No. 13680 (hereafter called the "Busran Decision"), dismissed thepetition and denied certiorari slating in one breath that "the judgment subject ofassail had long become final" (at p. 13), and in another "for all we know, thejudgment below had already attained finality long ago." The reason relied upon wasthat petitioners therein had the remedy of appeal but instead availed of Certiorari,which is not a substitute therefor.

On motion for reconsideration, however, filed by petitioners (private respondents inthe petition under review), in that appealed case (AC-G.R. SP No. 13680), the sameCourt of Appeals (Fourth Special Cases Division) 2 in its Resolution of January 20,1984 (the "Javellana Resolution"), reconsidered and set aside the "Busran Decision"and entered another one:

"1. Annulling the order of default of the Hon. respondent Court dated 29April 1980 and its decision dated 11 August 1981; and

2. Dismissing private respondents' complaint in Civil Case No. X-404 andordering the Hon. respondent Court not to take further action therein."

Respondent Ilustre challenged that reversal in the present Petition for Review filedon October 22, 1984. This is the third case brought before this Court involving thesame estate. Review was denied in an extended minute Resolution by the FirstDivision of this Court in the challenged Resolution of May 14, 1986, for thefollowing reasons:

"The appealed Decision stands on firm legal grounds.

(1) The Order of Default of the Trial Court was issued in grave abuse ofdiscretion. The Answer was filed only one day late besides the fact that whenso filed, the Order of default had not yet been issued by the Trial Court.

(2) While appeal is, indeed, the remedy from a judgment by default,Certiorari may be resorted to when a party has been illegally declared indefault (Omico Mining & Industrial Corporation vs. Vallejos, 63 SCRA 300-301 [1975]),or where it is necessary to restore order to proceedings in theCourt below (Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 462-463 [1975]).

(3) More importantly, the judgment of the Trial Court, in Civil Case No. X-404 declaring that the Testatrix's collateral relatives have a rightful claim toher estate to the exclusion of the husband who was designated her sole anduniversal heir, nullifies the Will already probated by final judgment andoverturns the pronouncements of both the Appellate Court and this Courton the case.

There being former judgments on the issues which have become final,rendered by Courts having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties,the said judgments having been rendered on the merits, and there beingbetween the prior and subsequent action identity of parties, subject matterand substantial identity of cause of action, it is clear that the complaint belowin Civil Case X-404 is barred by the principle of res adjudicata, and whatevertranspired therein are null and void ab initio and without any legal effect.

To rule otherwise would upset the fundamental issue on which res judicatarests that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue morethan once, that when a right or fact has been judicially determined, thejudgment of the Court, so long as it remains unreversed, should beconclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate(Sarabia vs. Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 2 SCRA 54 [1961]).

ACCORDINGLY, the review sought for is denied and respondent Court'sjudgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 13080 is hereby affirmed.

SO ORDERED."

Respondents decry the fact that the First Division set aside the due course Orderand denied review in an extended Minute Resolution instead of in a signed Decision.They allege that said Resolution was "railroaded with such hurry/promptitudeunequalled in the entire history of the Supreme Court under circumstances thathave gone beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics," unduly "persuaded,induced and influenced" by Solicitor General Ordoez and Justice Pedro Yap.

Nothing is farthest from the truth. As explained in the "Banc Resolution".

"The petition for review was assigned to the then First Division of sevenJustices, which initially gave it due course because the resolution of theIntermediate Appellate Court had reversed a decision originally rendered bythe then Court of Appeals, and in order to have more time for further study.

Pleadings were submitted, the last being on May 3, 1985, which can beconsidered as the date when this case was submitted for resolution.

The First Division of seven (7) was not able to act on the case up to the

February, 1986 political upheaval. The last incident in the case was a motionfor the early release of decision filed by petitioner on November 19, 1985.

When this Court was reorganized in April of 1986, the membership of theFirst Division was reduced to five (5) Justices. Taking account of the motionof petitioner for early release of decision, the new First Division, thenchairmanned by Justice Abad Santos, realizing that the doctrine of resjudicata was clearly applicable not only as to the probate of the will butalso as to the heirship of petitioner, among others, and their right tointervene and participate in the proceedings resolved, on May 14, 1986 todismiss the petition through an extended resolution which at the same timerecalled the due course order. The new Division of 5 acted unanimously."

The recall of a due course Order after a review of the records of the case is acommon occurrence in the Court. Respondents speak as if it were only their petitionwhich has been subjected to such recall. They have lost all objectivity in this regard.They are hardly qualified, and cannot presume to speak of the "entire history" of theSupreme Court.

As to the participation of Justice Yap in the case, the "Banc Resolution" stated:

"Justice Yap clarified that he was on official mission to Switzerland for thePresidential Commission on Good Government after his appointment to theSupreme Court on April 11, 1986 and did not assume his position in theSupreme Court until his return on May 2, 1986. When the resolution ofdismissal on May 14, 1986 was issued, Justice Yap was unaware that Atty.Sedfrey Ordoez was private respondent's counsel.

On June 11, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which wastaken up by the First Division on July 9, 1986 with Justice Abad Santos stillthe Chairman. This time, Justice Yap, realizing that his former partner, Atty.Ordoez, had submitted the pleadings for petitioner, inhibited himself andJustice Edgardo L. Paras was designated under Special Order No. 21, datedJuly 9, 1986, to sit in the Division in his place. The motion for reconsiderationwas denied with finality on July 9, 1986.

Justice Yap was designated Chairman of the First Division on July 14, 1986.

On August 7, 1986, petitioner asked leave to file a second motion forreconsideration, which was denied on September 3, 1986, entry of judgmentof the May 14, 1986 resolution having been made on July 28, 1986. JusticeYap again took no part in the deliberation of the case."

But respondents continue to claim derisively that Justice Yap could not have been"unaware" of the appearance of Atty. Sedfrey Ordoez. They reacted by saying "tellit to the marines" (Letters of November 3, 1986 to Justices Narvasa, Herrera, andCruz, at p. 8, respectively). But that was the true and untarnished fact. With somany cases being handled by the Court, the appearances of lawyers duringdeliberative sessions very often escape attention, concentration being centered on

the issues to be resolved.

Respondents also fault the Court for "still recogniz(ing) Atty. Ordoez as counsel" fortheir opponents in the case. In the same "Banc Resolution," it was clarified:

"A copy of the resolution, dated May 14, 1986, was sent by the ReleasingClerks to Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez as his name still appears on the coverpage of the Rollo. It was not necessarily because the Supreme Court 'stillrecognizes him as counsel for respondents'" (at p. 4).

The fact of the matter is that even Atty. Laureta continued to recognize Atty.Ordoez as counsel as shown by his pleadings filed before the Court, whichinevitably contained the notation "copy furnished Atty. Sedfrey Ordoez." Nowithdrawal of appearance having been presented by Atty. Ordoez in the mainpetition, his name continues to be in the Rollo of the case and the personnelconcerned continue to furnish him with copies of Resolutions of this Court.

In respect of the charge that the Resolutions of the First Division of May 14, 1986,July 9, 1986 denying the Motion for Reconsideration with finality, and September 3,1986 denying leave to file a second motion for reconsideration since entry ofjudgment of the May 14, 1986 Resolution had been made on July 28, 1986, were"unjust" and were "railroaded," the Banc Resolution, adopting the DivisionResolution, explained:

"The aforesaid resolutions were by no means 'railroaded.' The pleadings filedby the parties, as in any other case, were included in the Agenda of the FirstDivision as soon as feasible. The Division acts promptly on all Agenda items,and the minutes of its deliberations are released as soon as possible afterAgenda day.

xxx xxx xxx

"The dispositions in this case were arrived at after careful study. Because acase is resolved against the interests of a party, does not mean that it is an'unjust decision;' or that it has been 'railroaded.'

This Division declares without hesitation that it has consistently renderedjustice without fear or favor." (at p. 4)

Respondents insist that the doctrine of "res judicata" is inapplicable. In their ownwords "the ordered probate of the 1944 Will of Digna Maravilla by judgment of theSupreme Court in G.R. No. L-23225 is conclusive only as to the genuineness anddue execution of said will, but not upon the validity of testamentary provision,particularly with the invalid designation of Herminio Maravilla as sole and universalheir of Digna Maravilla."

On this point, the "Javellana Resolution," in reversing the "Busran Decision" (AC-G.R. SP No. 13680), aptly held:

"The then Court of Appeals held that the questioned decision does not run

counter to the decision of the Hon. Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-23225admitting the will of Digna Maravilla to probate because the latter refers tothe extrinsic validity of the will, while the former concerns its intrinsic validity.We cannot agree with this observation because it is quite clear from thequestioned decision that the will was in effect declared not to have beenfreely and voluntarily executed by the deceased Digna Maravilla but was theresult of the evil and fraudulent machinations of her husband, HerminioMaravilla, and sets aside said will. The declaration that private respondents,as collateral relatives of the deceased Digna Maravilla, are entitled to herestate, is an indication that the Hon. respondent Court has nullified the will.Private respondents are not compulsory heirs and, in the absence of theirbeing named legatees or devisees in the will, they could only lay claim to theestate of Digna Maravilla if the latter died without a will, pursuant to Art.1003 of the New Civil Code, to wit:

'Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants,illegitimate children or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shallsucceed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with thefollowing articles.'

"However, assuming arguendo, that the matter complained of by privaterespondents referred only to the intrinsic validity of the will, still, it wasimproper for them to have instituted a separate action in a court other thanthat in which the probate proceeding was pending.

xxx xxx xxx

'It seems clear from these provisions of the law that whilethe estate is being settled in the Court of First Instance in a specialproceeding, no ordinary action can be maintained in that court, orin any other court, by a person claiming to be the heir, against theexecutor or against other persons claiming to be heirs, for thepurpose of having the rights of the plaintiffs in the estatedetermined. The very purpose of the trial or hearing provided for insection 753 is to settle and determine those questions, and untilthey are settled and determined in that proceeding and under thatsection no action such as the present one can be maintained."

Considering that the "Escolin Decision," as affirmed by this Court on November 9,1977 in G.R. No. L-46155, had become final, the "Javellana Resolution" aptlyobserved:

"3. The questioned decision of the Hon. respondent Court dated 12August 1981 (referring to the 'Macandog Decision') unsettles and reviewsissues which had long been laid to rest by the Hon. Supreme Court and thethen Court of Appeals."

But respondents ask: if res judicata were applicable, why did this Court, in G.R. No.L-50814, refer the case to the Court of Appeals? The answer is simple. The issue ofwhether the remedy of petitioners in that case was appeal and not certiorari had tobe resolved. If certiorari were proper, then the "Macandog Decision" had not become

final. If appeal, its finality would be the consequence. The "Javellana Resolution;"which reversed the "Busran Decision," held that Certiorari was proper when a partyhas been illegally declared in default. It follows that the "Macandog Decision" hadnot attained finality.

Still undaunted, respondents claim that the Court of Appeals "deliberatelyevaded/divaricated" two important issues: (1) that the judgment of the Trial Court(in CC No. X-404) had attained finality as in fact the Court of Appeals had held thatthe "judgment of assail had long become final," and (2) that Digna Maravilla'shusband could not be instituted as the sole and universal heir of the wife onindestructible ground of moral impossibility and could not inherit wife's vast estateon the ground of utter unworthiness."

The penchant of respondents for making misleading statements is again obvious. Itwas not in the "Javellana Resolution" that the Court of Appeals held that "thejudgment of assail (referring to the 'Macandog Decision') had long become final."That was in the "Busran Decision," which was precisely reversed by the "JavellanaResolution."

As to the alleged unworthiness of the husband to inherit from his wife, the"Javellana Resolution" pointedly observed:

"The last will and testament of Digna Maravilla which instituted her husband,Herminio Maravilla, as her sole and universal heir, was admitted to probate,pursuant to a final judgment of the Hon. Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-23225, 27 February 1971. This probate foreclosed all questions as to theage and mental capacity of the testator, the signing of the document by thetestator, or by someone in his behalf, and the acknowledgment of theinstrument by him in the presence of the required member of witnesseswho affix their signatures to the will to attest the act. In re Estate ofJohnson, 39 Phil. 156, 168). Yet, more than ten years later, the Hon.respondent Court would nullify the effects of the probate by declaring thatDigna Maravilla did not voluntarily and sanely execute the probated last willand testament, nullifying the institution of Herminio Maravilla as her sole anduniversal heir, and ordering the return of the properties of Digna Maravilla tothe trunk of origin."

The soundness of the legal conclusions arrived at in the "Escolin Decision" and"Javellana Resolution" commends itself. Only a disgruntled litigant and a defeatedlawyer would claim that those judgments were accepted "hook, line and sinker" bythis Court. The doctrine of res judicata is inescapably applicable. Thus it was that theFirst Division, in its challenged Resolution of May 14, 1986, found it unnecessary,after further study, to have a signed Decision and, instead, recalled the due courseOrder, which it had previously issued to give it "more time for further study" (p. 2,Banc Resolution, October 28, 1986). Contrary to respondents' claim, the Court isnot "duty bound" to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion toformulate Decisions and/or minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given,depending on its evaluation of a case.

But obdurately enough, respondents have seen fit to take their case to theTanodbayan charging the members of the First Division of this Court collectivelywith having knowingly and deliberately rendered an "unjust extended minuteResolution" with deliberate bad faith in violation of Article 204 of the Revised PenalCode 3 and for deliberately causing "undue injury" to respondent Ilustre and her co-heirs because of the "unjust Resolution" promulgated, in violation of the Anti-Graftand Corrupt Practices Act. 4

Respondents' action is brazenly unjustifiable. Nor can they plead ignorance. As aptlydeclared in the Chief Justice's Statement of December 24, 1986, which the Courthereby adopts in toto, "(I)t is elementary that the Supreme Court is supreme thethird great department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial powerto adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No otherdepartment or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust.'" It iselementary that "(A)s has ever been stressed since the early case of Arnedo vs.Llorente (18 Phil. 257, 263 [1911]) 'controlling and irresistible reasons of publicpolicy and of sound practice in the courts demand that at the risk of occasional error,judgments of courts determining controversies submitted to them should becomefinal at some definite time fixed by law, or by a rule of practice recognized by law, soas to be thereafter beyond the control even of the court which rendered them forthe purpose of correcting errors of fact or of law, into which, in the opinion of thecourt it may have fallen. The very purpose for which the courts are organized is toput an end to controversy, to decide the questions submitted to the litigants, and todetermine the respective rights of the parties.'" (Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs.Maritime Bldg., Co., Inc., 86 SCRA 305, 316-317)

Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204 of the Revised PenalCode as to "rendering knowingly unjust judgment" refer to an individual judge whodoes so "in any case submitted to him for decision" and even then, it is not theprosecutor who would pass judgment on the "unjustness" of the decision renderedby him but the proper appellate court with jurisdiction to review the same, eitherthe Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court. Respondents should likewise knowthat said penal article has no application to the members of a collegiate court suchas this Court or its Divisions who reach their conclusions in consultation andaccordingly render their collective judgment after due deliberation. It also follows,consequently, that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acton the ground that such a collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper.

The Chief Justice's Statement of the supremacy of the Supreme Court's judicialpower is by no means a "display of arrogance" as per respondents' puerilecontention, but a restatement of the fundamental principle of separation of powersand checks and balances under a republican form of government such as ours, viz.that the three co-equal branches of government, the executive, legislative andjudicial, are each supreme and independent within the limits of its own sphere.Neither one can interfere with the performance of the duties of the other. (Forbesvs. Chuoco, 16 Phil. 534 [1910]). As restated by the late Justice Jose P. Laurel in the

1936 landmark case of Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 134), ourConstitution "as 'a definition of the powers of government' placed upon thejudiciary the great burden of 'determining the nature, scope and extent of suchpowers' and 'when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, itdoes not assert any superiority over the other departments .. but only asserts thesolemn and sacred obligation entrusted to it by the Constitution to determineconflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the partiesin an actual controversy the rights which the instrument secures and guarantees tothem.'"

As an officer of the Court, respondent Laureta, should realize that the cardinalprinciple he would grossly impair and violate is that of the independence of thejudiciary, which the members of the bar are called upon to defend and preserve. Theindependence of the judiciary is the indispensable means for enforcing thesupremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law.

To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and prosecution, a judge, moreso a member of the Supreme Court for official acts done by him in good faith and inthe regular exercise of official duty and judicial functions is to subvert andundermine that very independence of the judiciary, and subordinate the judiciary tothe executive. "For it is a general principle of the highest importance to the properadministration of justice that a judicial officer in exercising the authority vested inhim, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personalconsequences to himself. Liability to answer to everyone who might feel himselfaggrieved by the action of the judge would be inconsistent with the possession ofthis freedom, and would destroy that independence without which no judiciary canbe either respectable or useful." (Bradley vs. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335).

Indeed, resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc ordivision, speak for themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and arebeyond investigation or inquiry under the same principle of conclusiveness ofenrolled bills of the legislature. (U.S. vs. Pons, 34 Phil. 729; Gardiner, et al. vs.Paredes, et al., 61 Phil. 118; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) The SupremeCourt's pronouncement of the doctrine that "(I)t is well settled that the enrolled bill. . . is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed byCongress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in theprinting of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved bythe Executive [as claimed by petitioner-importer who unsuccessfully sought refundof margin fees] on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principleof separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democraticsystem the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicialdecree" is fully and reciprocally applicable to Supreme Court orders, resolutions anddecisions, mutatis mutandis. (Casco Phil. Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA347, 350. (Citing Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comelec, 3 SCRA 1).

The Court has consistently stressed that "the doctrine of separation of powers callsfor the executive, legislative and judicial departments being left alone to discharge

their duties as they see fit" (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677). It has thusmaintained in the same way that the judiciary has a right to expect that neither thePresident nor Congress would cast doubt on the mainspring of its orders ordecisions, it should refrain from speculating as to alleged hidden forces at work thatcould have impelled either coordinate branch into acting the way it did. The conceptof separation of powers presupposes mutual respect by and between the threedepartments of the government. (Tecson vs. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 286-287).

To allow litigants to go beyond the Court's resolution and claim that the membersacted "with deliberate bad faith" and rendered and "unjust resolution" in disregardor violation of the duty of their high office to act upon their own independentconsideration and judgment of the matter at hand would be to destroy theauthenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such collegiate acts and resolutions andto disregard utterly the presumption of regular performance of official duty. To allowsuch collateral attack would destroy the separation of powers and undermine therole of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable disputes.

Dissatisfied litigants and/or their counsels cannot without violating the separation ofpowers mandated by the Constitution relitigate in another forum the finaljudgment of this Court on legal issues submitted by them and their adversaries forfinal determination to and by the Supreme Court and which fall within the judicialpower to determine and adjudicate exclusively vested by the Constitution in theSupreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law.

In resume, we find that respondent Ilustre has transcended the permissible boundsof fair comment and criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration ofjustice in her letters addressed to the individual Justices quoted in the show-causeResolution of this Court en banc, particularly the underlined portions thereof; in thelanguage of the charges she filed before the Tanodbayan quoted and underscored inthe same Resolution; in her statements, conduct, acts and charges against theSupreme Court and/or the official actions of the Justices concerned and herascription of improper motives to them; and in her unjustified outburst that she canno longer expect justice from this Court. The fact that said letters are not technicallyconsidered pleadings, nor the fact that they were submitted after the main petitionhad been finally resolved does not detract from the gravity of the contemptcommitted. The constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy cannotbe used as a shield for contemptuous acts against the Court.

We likewise find that Atty. Laureta has committed acts unbecoming an officer of theCourt for his stance of dangling threats of bringing the matter to the "proper forum"to effect a change of the Court's adverse Resolution; for his lack of respect for andexposing to public ridicule, the two highest Courts of the land by challenging in badfaith their integrity and claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgments(Montecillo vs. Gica, 60 SCRA 234 [1974]); for authoring, or at the very least,assisting and/or abetting and/or not preventing the contemptuous statements,conduct, acts and malicious charges of his client, respondent Ilustre,notwithstanding his disclaimer that he had absolutely nothing to do with them,which we find disputed by the facts and circumstances of record as above stated; for

totally disregarding the facts and circumstances and legal considerations set forth inthis Court's Resolutions of the First Division and en banc, as the Tribunal of lastresort; for making it appear that the Justices of this Court and other respondentsbefore the Tanodbayan are charged with "graft and corruption" when the complaintbefore the Tanodbayan, in essence, is a tirade from a disgruntled litigant and adefeated counsel in a case that has been brought thrice before this Court, and whowould readily accept anything but the soundness of the judgments of the Courtsconcerned, all with the manifest intent to bring the Justices of this Court and of theCourt of Appeals into disrepute and to subvert public confidence in the Courts.

Atty. Laureta should be reminded that his first duty is not to his client but to theadministration of justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; andhis conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.For like the Court itself, "a lawyer is an instrument or agency to advance the ends ofjustice." (Surigao Mineral Conservation Board vs. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1 [1970];Castaeda vs. Ago, 65 SCRA 505 [1975]).

In assessing the penalty on respondent Laureta, the Court notes that "disciplinaryproceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal,they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by theCourt into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflictpunishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither aplaint nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Publicinterest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whetheror not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, inthe exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of theBar to account for his actions as an officer of the Court with the end in view ofpreserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honestadministration of justice by purging the profession of members who by theirmisconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with theduties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney." Viewed in thelight of the demonstrated persistence of grave misconduct and undermining publicconfidence in the honor and integrity of the Court and its members (at a time whenthe Court is exerting every effort to regain public confidence in our courts after thetrauma and debacle undergone by them in the past regime), the Court shall imposeupon him an indefinite suspension, leaving it to him to prove at some future andopportune time, that he shall have once again regained the fitness to be allowed toresume the practice of law as an officer of the Courts. (In re: Almacen, 31 SCRA562).

ACCORDINGLY, (1) respondent Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in contempt, andis hereby fined in the amount of P1,000.00 only, mindful that the power ofcontempt should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principleof punishment; and.

(2) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is found guilty of grave professional misconduct,

rendering him unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilitiesbelonging to the office of an attorney, and is hereby suspended from the practice oflaw until further Orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.

Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all Courts of the country for theirinformation and guidance, and spread in the personal record of Atty. WenceslaoLaureta.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Yap, J., no part.

Footnotes

1. Composed of Justices Busran (ponente), Coquia and Zosa, as members.

2. Composed of Justices Cuevas, Mendoza and Javellana (ponente).

3. "ART. 204. Knowingly rendering unjust judgment. Any judge who shall knowinglyrender an unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision, shall bepunished by prision mayor and perpetual absolute disqualification.

4. "SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or anyprivate party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the dischargeof his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evidentbad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. . . ."