MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2019ME152Docket: Yor-19-54andYor-19-183Submitted OnBriefs: June26,2019andSeptember10,2019

Decided: October22,2019Panel: SAUFLEY,C.J.,andALEXANDER,MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HJELM,andHUMPHREY,JJ.

INRECHILDOFNICHOLASP.HJELM,J.

[¶1]Inthisconsolidatedopinion,weconsidertwoappealsadvancedby

NicholasP. inachildprotectionproceedingintheDistrictCourt(Biddeford)

involvinghischild.Inthefirstappeal,thefatherchallengesthecourt’s(Sutton,

J.)entryofajeopardyorderagainsthimongroundsthathisparentagehadnot

yet been established and that the evidence was insufficient to support the

court’sfindingofanaggravatingfactor.Inthesecondappeal,thefatherasserts

thatthecourt(Duddy,J.)erredbylaterenteringanorder,basedongenetictest

resultsbutwithoutconductinganevidentiaryhearing,adjudicatingthatheis

thechild’sfather.Weaffirmbothdecisions.

I.BACKGROUND

[¶2]TheDepartmentofHealthandHumanServicesinitiatedthischild

protectionproceedinginMayof2018,allegingthatthefatherhadneglectedthe

childandexposedthechildtoviolence,hadbeenconvictedofassaultingthe

2

mother when she was pregnant with the child, had been substantiated for

abusinganotherchild,andhadrefusedtoparticipateinariskassessmentor

any treatment for his history of abuse and neglect.1 See 22 M.R.S. §4032

(2018).TheDepartmentdidnotinitiallyseekapreliminaryprotectionorder2

butdidsoamonthafterfilingitsinitialpetition.See22M.R.S.§4034(1)(2018).

Thecourt(Duddy,J.)thenenteredapreliminaryprotectionorderplacingthe

childindepartmentalcustodyandtemporarilyrelievingtheDepartmentofits

obligation to furnish rehabilitation and reunification services to the father

becauseofanaggravating factorarising fromthe father’sabuseof theother

child.3 See 22 M.R.S. §§ 4002(1-B)(A), 4034(2), (4), 4036(1)(G-2),

4041(2)(A-2)(1)(2018).

1Thechildprotectionproceedingalsoinvolvesthechild’smother.Thecourt(Sutton,J.)entered

aseparatejeopardyorderastothemotherwithheragreement.Shehasnotappealedfromthatorderand is not a party to the father’s appeal. We therefore recount the facts andprocedure only asrelevanttothefather.

2WhentheDepartmentcommencedthisaction,thechildwasresidingwithagrandmother.

3“Ifthecourt’spreliminaryprotectionorderincludesafindingofanaggravatingfactor,thecourtmayorderthedepartmentnottocommencereunificationortoceasereunification....”22M.R.S.§4034(4) (2018); see 22M.R.S. § 4041(2)(A-2)(1) (2018) (allowing the court to enter a ceasereunificationorderatanystageofaproceedinguponfindinganaggravatingfactor).Anaggravatingfactorisdefinedtoincludecircumstancesinwhich“[t]heparenthassubjectedanychildforwhomthe parent was responsible to aggravated circumstances, including . . . [r]ape, gross sexualmisconduct,grosssexualassault,sexualabuse,incest,aggravatedassault,kidnapping,promotionofprostitution, sexual exploitation of a minor, sex trafficking or aggravated sex trafficking,abandonment,torture,chronicabuseoranyothertreatmentthatisheinousorabhorrenttosociety.”22M.R.S.§4002(1-B)(A)(1)(2018).

3

[¶3] At thesummarypreliminaryhearingheld inAugustof2018, the

fatherdidnotchallengetheawardofcustodyofthechildtotheDepartmentbut

statedtothecourtthat“thepurposeofthistrial,quitecandidly,istoprevent

thecease[reunification]fromhappening.”Whiletestifyingduringthehearing,

the father was asked, “[Y]ou’re the father of [this child]?” and the father

responded, “Yes.” In the resulting order, the court maintained the

Department’s custody of the child but found that the Department failed to

establish the existence of an aggravating factor. Accordingly, the court

discontinued the cease reunification provision that was contained in the

preliminary protection order and instead required that “[r]eunification will

moveforwardforthefather.”

[¶4] Two months later, in October of 2018, the court (Sutton, J.)

commencedacontestedjeopardyhearingontheDepartment’schildprotection

petition. See 22 M.R.S. § 4035 (2018). Prior to the hearing, the court

(Moskowitz,J.)hadenteredacasemanagementorderindicatingthattherewere

“[n]opaternityissues”inthematter.4Thefatherdidnotobjecttotheorder.

Nonetheless, on the morning of the first day of the hearing, the father

4 Similarly, inacasemanagementorderpreviouslyenteredpriortothesummarypreliminary

hearing,thecourt(Duddy,J.)didnotchecktheboxontheformorderthatwouldhaveindicatedthatparentagewasdisputed.

4

asserted—forthefirsttime—thatthecourtlacked“subjectmatterjurisdiction”

to determine jeopardy because his parentage had not been established in

accordancewith theMaine Parentage Act (MPA), 19-AM.R.S. §§1831-1939

(2018).Thefatherrequestedthatthecourtcontinuethejeopardyproceeding

pendingadeterminationofhisparentage.Despitethisnewposition,thefather

alsoexplicitlytooktheparadoxicalstancethatthecourtshouldnotdisturbthe

summary preliminary order and that theDepartment should be required to

continueprovidinghimreunificationservicesasthechild’sparent.

[¶5] The court (Sutton, J.) sharply rejected the father’s argument and

denied his request for a continuance. The court characterized the father’s

argumentas“disingenuous”and“nothingmore[than]adelaytactic”giventhat

the father had not previously raised the issue of parentage and had, at the

summary preliminary hearing, “argu[ed] strenuously against a cease

reunificationordertoachild[whom]henowsayshe’snotthefatheroformay

notbethefatherof.”Thecourtthenproceededtoconductathree-dayjeopardy

hearing.

[¶6] Basedoncompetentevidencepresentedat the jeopardyhearing,

thecourtfound,byapreponderanceoftheevidence,that“[thefather] isthe

child’sbiologicalfather”andthatthechildisincircumstancesofjeopardytohis

5

healthorwelfarebasedonthefather’sabuseofboththemotherandtheother

child. See22M.R.S.§§4002(6)(A), (10),4035(2) (2018). Thecourt further

found,byapreponderanceoftheevidence,thatthefather’sabuseoftheother

childconstitutedanaggravatingfactorand,onthatbasis,againenteredacease

reunification order. See id. §§ 4002(1-B)(A)(1), 4036(1)(G-2),

4041(2)(A-2)(1).

[¶7] Soon after, the guardian ad litemmoved for an order of genetic

testingofthefatherandthechild.Thecourt(Cantara,J.)grantedthemotion.5

See 19-AM.R.S. § 1911; 22M.R.S. §§ 4005-F, 4036(2-A) (2018). Before the

genetic testingwasconducted, the father filed the firstappeal in thismatter

(the jeopardyappeal),arguing tous that thecourterredbyadjudicating the

issue of jeopardy before his parentage had been established and also

challengingthecourt’sfindingofanaggravatingfactor.See22M.R.S.§4006

(2018).

[¶8] While the jeopardy appealwas pending, the Department filed a

motionwiththetrialcourtseekinganadjudicationthatthefatheris,infact,the

child’sbiologicalparent.See19-AM.R.S.§§1851(6),1904(2),1915.Insupport

5 That same day, the Department petitioned to terminate the father’s parental rights. The

terminationpetitionremainspendingasofthedateofthisopinion.

6

ofitsmotion,theDepartmentsubmittedareportoftheresultsofthegenetic

testingthecourthadpreviouslyordered.Thegenetictestresultsrevealed,to

a 99.99% probability, that the father is the child’s biological parent. The

Department also filedwith us amotion to allow the trial court to act on its

motionnotwithstandingthependingappeal.SeeM.R.App.P.3(d).Wegranted

theDepartment’smotiontoallowthetrialcourttoact,andthecourt(Duddy,J.)

issued anorder, basedon thegenetic test results thathadbeen filedby the

Department,adjudicatingthatthefatherisabiologicalparentofthechild.The

courtdidnotconductahearingbeforeadjudicatingthefather’sparentage.The

fathertheninstitutedasecondappeal,challengingtheparentageadjudication

(theparentageappeal).

[¶9]Weaddressbothappeals.

II.DISCUSSION

A. ParentageDetermination:JudicialEstoppel

[¶10]Inthejeopardyappeal,thefatherchallengesthecourt’sjeopardy

orderprimarilyonthegroundthatthecourtwasrequiredtoadjudicatethathe

is a parent of the child before it could consider whether he presents

circumstancesofjeopardytothechild.6

6Thefatheralsochallengesthesufficiencyoftheevidencesupportingthecourt’sfindingofan

aggravatingfactorbasedonthefather’sabuseoftheotherchild.Thefatherdoesnotchallengethe

7

[¶11] We note initially that the father has erroneously framed this

argument as one that concerns the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

“Jurisdiction” is a concept reserved for “delineating the classes of cases

(subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling

withinacourt’sadjudicativeauthority.”LandmarkRealtyv.Leasure,2004ME

85,¶7,853A.2d749(quotationmarksomitted).Subjectmatterjurisdictionin

particular“referstothepowerofaparticularcourttohearthetypeofcasethat

isthenbeforeit.”Jensenv.Jensen,2015ME105,¶11,121A.3d809(quotation

marksomitted).ThepoweroftheDistrictCourttoadjudicateachildprotection

matterisindisputable.See22M.R.S.§4031(1)(A)(2018)(“TheDistrictCourt

has jurisdiction over child protection proceedings . . . .”); In re Austin T.,

2006ME28,¶7,898A.2d946;seealsoAdoptionofM.A.,2007ME123,¶¶6-7,

930A.2d1088(concludingthattheProbateCourt’ssubjectmatterjurisdiction

wasnotaffectedbytheassertedproceduralissues).

court’sfindingthathehadassaultedtheotherchild;hearguesonlythattheDepartmentfailedtoprovethatthechildwasone“forwhom[he]wasresponsible”pursuanttothestatutorydefinitionof“[a]ggravatingfactor.” 22M.R.S.§4002(1-B)(A)(2018);see22M.R.S.§4002(9)(2018)(defining“[p]ersonresponsibleforthechild”);supran.3.Therecordcontainsampleevidencetosupportthecourt’splenaryfindingofanaggravatingfactor,andwedonotaddresstheargumentfurther.SeeInre E.L., 2014 ME 87, ¶ 15, 96 A.3d 691 (applying the clear error standard of review to anaggravatingfactorfinding).

8

[¶12]Instead,whatthefatheractuallyargues—althoughitisnotentirely

clear—is that the court lacked authority, as a matter of law, to consider

jeopardyastohimintheabsenceofapriorparentageadjudication;orthatthe

court’s findinginthe jeopardyorderitselfthatheisthechild’sparent isnot

supported,asamatteroffact,bysufficientrecordevidence;orboth.SeeInre

ChildrenofShirleyT.,2019ME1,¶19n.9,199A.3d221(statingthatwereview

thecourt’sunderlyingfactualfindingsforclearerrorandaddressissuesoflaw

denovo);seealso22M.R.S.§4002(7)(2018)(defininga“[p]arent”as“anatural

oradoptiveparentoraparentestablishedunder [theMPA],unlessparental

rightshavebeenterminated”).

[¶13]Neitherargumentispersuasive.

[¶14] First, the child protection statutes make clear that jeopardy

proceedingsarenotdependentonparentagestatus,7andthefatherhasoffered

7TheChildandFamilyServicesandChildProtectionAct,22M.R.S.§§4001to4099-H(2018),

whichencompassesjeopardyproceedings,appliestoparentsaswellastocertainnonparents.E.g.,id.§4033(3-A)(statingthatapreliminaryprotectionordermayremoveachildfromthe“parents,legal guardian or custodians”); id. § 4034(3), (4) (allowing a child’s “parent, custodian or legalguardian” to waive the right to a summary preliminary hearing and consent to a preliminaryprotectionorder);id.§4034(4)(statingthatthecourt’sroleinthesummarypreliminaryhearingistodiscernwhether“returningthechildtothechild’scustodianwouldplacethechildinimmediateriskofseriousharm”);id.§4035(2-A)(creatingarebuttablepresumptionofjeopardyfortheactionsofa“personseekingcustodyorcontactwiththechild”ora“parentorpersonresponsibleforthechild”);id.§4036(1)(C)(statingthat,inachildprotectionorder,thecourtmayrequire“[t]hatthechild,thecustodians,theparentsandotherappropriatefamilymembersaccepttreatmentorservicestoamelioratethecircumstancesrelatedtojeopardy”);id.§4036(1)(F)(providingthatthecourtmayorder theremovalof thechild “fromhiscustodian” ina jeopardyorder);seealso id.§4002(9-C)(defining“[r]emovalofthechildfromhome”toincludethehomeof“theparent,legalguardianor

9

noauthority—fromthechildprotectionstatutesorelsewhere—tosupporthis

contention that an affirmative adjudication of parentage (or other relevant

nonparent status) is necessary before a court may undertake the jeopardy

proceedings.Rather,adeterminationthatthepersonissomeoneagainstwhom

thecourtmayissueajeopardyordermaybebasedonevidencepresentedat

thejeopardyhearingitself.See22M.R.S.§4035(1),(2)(A),(B)(providingthat

thecourt“shallmakeafreshdeterminationofthequestionofjeopardy”based

onevidenceadmittedatthejeopardyhearingand“shallmakefindingsoffact

ontherecorduponwhichthejeopardydeterminationismade”).

[¶15]Astothecourt’sfindinginthejeopardyorderthatthefatheristhe

child’sparent, the court concluded, in essence, that the fatherwas judicially

estoppedfromassertingthatheisnotthechild’sparentorinsistingthatthe

Departmentprovehisparentage.Thecourt’sconclusionwascorrect.

[¶16]Judicialestoppelapplieswhen

(1)thepositionassertedinthesubsequentlegalaction[is]clearlyinconsistentwithapreviouspositionasserted;(2)thepartyinthepreviousaction[has]successfullyconvincedthecourttoaccepttheinconsistent position; and (3) the party [has] gain[ed] an unfairadvantage as a result of [his or her] change of position in thesubsequentaction.

custodian”);id.§§4032(2)(G),4034(5)(affording“parentsandcustodians”therighttocounselinachildprotectionproceeding).

10

LinnehanLeasingv.StateTaxAssessor,2006ME33,¶25,898A.2d408.The

doctrine rests on the principle that, after a party successfully asserts one

position during a legal proceeding, that party is barred from asserting a

contrarypositionatalaterstageoftheproceeding.NewHampshirev.Maine,

532U.S.742,749(2001).Inthisway,judicialestoppel“prohibit[s]partiesfrom

deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of themoment.”

Id.at750(quotationmarksomitted);seeMe.Educ.Ass’nv.Me.Cmty.Coll.Sys.

Bd.ofTrs.,2007ME70,¶¶16-17,923A.2d914.

[¶17] Throughout the proceedings leading up to the jeopardy

determination,thefatherconsistentlyandexplicitlymaintainedthatheisthe

child’s father, and he sought and sometimes obtained relief in the form of

rehabilitationandreunificationservicesbasedsolelyonhisstatusasthechild’s

parent.8Thisisrevealedinanumberofaspectsofthesummarypreliminary

hearingprocess:

• Inacasemanagementorderenteredpriortothehearing,thefatherdidnotchallengethecourt’sindicationthatpaternitywasnotdisputed;

8Althoughrehabilitationandreunificationservicesmaybeavailabletocertainindividualsother

thanparents,suchasachild’scustodian,see22M.R.S.§4036(1)(C), inthismatter,thefatherhasneverasserted—totheDistrictCourtortous—thatheisentitledtoreceivereunificationservicesonanybasisotherthanhisstatusasthechild’sparent.Rather,ateveryturnleadinguptothejeopardyhearing, he has relied on his parentage, and the record contains no suggestion that the father’sinvolvementinthisproceedingisasanythingotherthanaparent.

11

• At the hearing, the father testified, under oath, that he is the child’sfather;

• The father did not challenge the Department caseworker’s testimonythatheisthechild’sfather;

• Thefather,duringhisattorney’scross-examinationoftheDepartmentcaseworker,referredtohimselfasthechild’sparentwhenasking,“Andsoattheonsetofthiscase...,itwastheDepartment’splantoreunifybothparents”(emphasisadded);

• The father stated on the record that he requested a hearing for theexpresspurposeofchallengingonlytheceasereunificationprovisioninthepreliminaryprotectionorder, therebyarguing to thecourt thatheshouldreceivethebenefitofrehabilitationandreunificationservicesasthechild’sparent,see22M.R.S.§§4002(1-B),4034(4),4041(2018);and

• Thefatheropposedthecourt’sfindingofanaggravatingfactor,whichisdefinedonly“withregardtotheparent,”onthegroundthattheevidenceofhisabuseof theotherchildwasnotcredible,butwithoutassertingthattheDepartmentfailedtoprovethathewas“theparent”atissue,id.§4002(1-B)(emphasisadded).

[¶18] The father’s efforts at the summary preliminary hearing were

successful;thecourtfoundthattheDepartmentdidnotprovetheexistenceof

anaggravatingfactorandorderedtheDepartmenttocommencerehabilitation

andreunificationeffortsforthefather.

[¶19] It was not until the morning of the first day of the jeopardy

hearing—almostfivemonthsafterthechildprotectionpetitionwasfiled—that

thefatherfirstassertedthatthemattercouldnotproceedunlessanduntilhis

parentagewasestablished,thisdespitehissuccessfulassertionofrightsasthe

12

child’s father just nine weeks earlier at the summary preliminary hearing.

Additionally,evenduringthejeopardyphaseofthecase,thefathercontinued

toholdhimselfoutasthechild’sfatherinotherrespects:

• Hedidnotobjecttoacasemanagementorderenteredbythecourtpriortothejeopardyhearing,inwhichthecourtstatedthattherewere“[n]opaternityissues”inthematter;

• Hearguedatthejeopardyhearingthatthecourtshouldnotvacatethesummarypreliminaryorder,whichrequiredtheDepartmenttoprovidehimwith services thatwouldallowhim to reunifyparentallywith thechild;

• Hearguedat the jeopardyhearing that the court shouldnot allowtheDepartment to cease reunification efforts for him, and, oncross-examination, he challenged the recommendation that theDepartmentceasereunificationservicesforhim;

• Inhiswrittenclosingargumentforthejeopardyhearing,hearguedthatthe Department “failed to meet its burden of proving an aggravatingfactorjustifyingcontinuingtheCeaseReunification”;and

• As at the summary preliminary hearing, he opposed the finding of anaggravatingfactorbycontestingtheallegationthatheabusedtheotherchildandbyassertingthathewasnota“personresponsibleforthechild,”buthedid not argue that therewas insufficient evidence toprove the“parent”elementnecessaryforfindinganaggravatingfactor,id.

[¶20] Significantly, the father has never denied that he is the child’s

biologicalparent,andhehasneverassertedthathehasevidencetosuggestthat

someotherpersonisthechild’sbiologicalfather.Instead,hehasarguedonly

that the Department was required to prove his parentage, despite his own

13

admissions of parentage and his reliance on the fact of his parentage as a

predicatetothereliefhehassoughtatmultiplestagesofthischildprotection

proceeding. Withgoodreason, itwasapparenttothecourtthatthefather’s

last-minutenominalchallengetohisparentagewasanunwarrantedabout-face

thatwoulddelaythejeopardyhearingbeyondthestatutorydeadline;9unfairly

disadvantage the Department in the litigation; and otherwise groundlessly

impedetheprogressionofthiscase,whichinvolvesthesafetyofachild.

[¶21]Weagreewiththecourt’sconclusionthatallthreeprerequisites

fortheapplicationofjudicialestoppelarepresent,andthefatheristherefore

barredfromadvancinganychallengetohisparentageinthisproceeding.See

NewHampshire,532U.S.at755-56;Me.Educ.Ass’n,2007ME70,¶20,923A.2d

914;LinnehanLeasing,2006ME33,¶25,898A.2d408.Becausethefatherwas

estopped fromarguing to the trialcourt that the jeopardyhearingcouldnot

proceedintheabsenceofaparentagefinding,thecourtcommittednoerrorby

denying the father’s request to continue the jeopardy proceedings on that

basis.10

9Pursuantto22M.R.S.§4035(4-A),“[t]hecourtshallissueajeopardyorderwithin120daysof

thefilingofthechildprotectionpetition.”

10Intheend,therecanbenouncertaintyaboutthefather’sparentagebecause,forthereasonswediscuss below, he has since been affirmatively and properly adjudicated to be the father. See19-AM.R.S.§§1851(6),1904(1)(A),1915(1)(A)(2)(2018);supra¶8;infra¶¶31-40.

14

[¶22] The estoppel effect goes further because it also precludes the

fatherfromarguinginthejeopardyappealthatthetrialcourterredbyfinding

jeopardywithoutfirstfindingfromtheevidencethatheisthechild’sfather.

[¶23] Judicial estoppel also applies to the father’s parentage appeal,

despite the father’s assertion that it does not foreclose his challenge to the

parentageadjudicationinparticular.Morespecifically,thefathercontendsthat

genetic parentage can only be established when certain scientific and

documentarycriteriaaremet,11see19-AM.R.S.§§1851(6),1902-1904,1915,

and therefore it can never be established by testimony alone. This means,

accordingtothefather,thathecannotbejudiciallyestoppedfromchallenging

genetic parentage based on his conduct in the case, including his prior

testimony.

11 Curiously, and in a way that demonstrates the frailty of his position, the father rests his

contentionentirelyonhisanalysisofonlyoneofthewaystobecomeaparentpursuanttotheMPA—geneticparentage—wheninfacttheMPArecognizesfifteendifferentwaystobecomeaparent:(1)byadmitting to parentage in a pleading or under oath, 19-AM.R.S. § 1841 (2018); (2) by default,19-AM.R.S.§1842(2018);(3)byimplication,19-AM.R.S.§1844(2)(2018);(4)byaffordingfullfaithandcredittoadeterminationofparentagefromanotherstate,19-AM.R.S.§1845(2018);(5)bybirth,19-AM.R.S.§1851(1)(2018);(6)byadoption,19-AM.R.S.§1851(2)(2018);see18-AM.R.S.§§9-101to9-404(2018);(7)byarecordedacknowledgementofpaternity,19-AM.R.S.§§1851(3),1861-1873 (2018); (8) by presumption, 19-AM.R.S. §§1851(4), 1881-1883 (2018); (9) by anadjudicationofdefactoparentage,19-AM.R.S.§§1851(5),1891(2018);(10)byanadjudicationofparentagebasedongenetictesting,19-AM.R.S.§§1851(6),1901-1915(2018);(11)asaresultofarefusal to submit to genetic testing ordered by the court, id. § 1914(1); (12) through assistedreproduction as to a spouse, 19-AM.R.S. §§1851(7), 1922(2)(A) (2018); (13) through assistedreproductionwithawrittenagreement,19-AM.R.S.§§1851(7),1922(2)(B)(2018); (14)throughassistedreproductionafteralaberror,19-AM.R.S.§§1851(7),1929(2018);and(15) throughagestationalcarrieragreement,19-AM.R.S.§§1851(8),1931-1939(2018).

15

[¶24]Thefather’sargumentfallsshortofthemarkintworespects.First,

it is directly contradicted by the MPA, which expressly recognizes

circumstances in which a party to a genetic parentage dispute may be

“estop[ped] . . . from denying parentage” based on his or her conduct. Id.

§1912(1)(A).

[¶25]Second,thefather’sargumentconflatestherequirementsofproof

whenproofisnecessary,withcircumstancesinwhichnoproofisrequiredin

thefirstplacebecausetheputativeparent,throughhisorherconductduring

the judicial proceeding, becomes barred from denying parentage. See New

Hampshire,532U.S.at755-56;Me.Educ.Ass’n,2007ME70,¶¶16,20,923A.2d

914.Inthelattersituation,judicialestoppelobviatesanyneedtoevaluatethe

scientific orother evidenceofparentage thatwouldotherwisebe examined

according to theapplicableproofrequirements in theMPA. Instead, judicial

estoppelprecludesthefatherfromchallengingparentageinanywaygivenhis

prior conduct in the case, including his successful reliance on his own

assertionsofparentage toobtainreliefat thesummarypreliminaryhearing.

Thefatheristhereforeestoppedfromarguingintheparentageappealthatthe

courterredbyfailingtofollowaparticularprocessinmakingitsaffirmative

determinationofparentage.

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B. ParentageDeterminationontheDepartment’sMotion:TheMPA

[¶26] Although, for the reasonswe have just explained, the father is

judicially estopped fromdenying his parentage to the child,we nonetheless

take this opportunity to examine the MPA and reach his challenge to the

affirmative,evidence-baseddeterminationthatheis,infact,thechild’sparent.

Before doing so, however, we address a threshold issue regarding the

justiciabilityoftheparentageappeal.

1. JusticiabilityoftheParentageAppeal

[¶27]Althoughneitherpartyhasraisedthequestionofthejusticiability

oftheissuesraisedinthefather’sparentageappeal,weconsiderthequestion

suasponte.SeeChretienv.Chretien,2017ME192,¶5n.3,170A.3d260.

[¶28]Pursuantto22M.R.S.§4006,onlythreetypesofordersmaybe

appealedinchildprotectionmatters:ajeopardyorder,ajudgmentterminating

parentalrights,andamedicaltreatmentorder.AnyotherTitle22orderisnot

justiciable.22M.R.S.§4006;InreL.R.,2014ME95,¶¶5-9,97A.3d602;Inre

B.C., 2012ME 140, ¶¶ 12-14, 58 A.3d 1118. This presents the question of

whetheraparentagedeterminationenteredinachildprotectionactioncanbe

properlyappealed.

17

[¶29]Aswehaverecognized,anorderenteredinthecontextofachild

protectioncase,butwhichisnotitselfanorderenteredpursuanttotheChild

and Family Services and Child Protection Act, 22M.R.S. §§ 4001 to 4099-H

(2018),maybecognizableonappealdespitethelimitationscreatedbysection

4006. SeeInreChildrenofShirleyT.,2019ME1,¶¶1,15n.6,199A.3d221

(reviewingonthemeritsthedenialofamotiontotransferjurisdictionofachild

protectionmattertoatribalcourtpursuanttotheIndianChildWelfareActof

1978,25U.S.C.S.§§1901-1963(LEXISthroughPub.L.No.116-56));InreJacob

C.,2009ME10,¶¶10-14,965A.2d47(agreeingtoconsideranappealfroma

Title19-Aparentalrightsandresponsibilitiesjudgmentissuedinthecontextof

aTitle22childprotectionproceeding).Aparentagedetermination,evenwhen

itispartofachildprotectionproceeding,see22M.R.S.§§4005-F,4036(2-A);

seealso19-AM.R.S.§1834(3), isnotgovernedbyTitle22butratherbythe

MPA.Thefather’sparentageappealisthereforejusticiablebecauseitisfroma

finaljudgmentthatwasenteredpursuanttotheMPAandisnotitselfaTitle22

order. See14M.R.S.§1901(2018)(stating thatappeals fromDistrictCourt

decisionsmaybetakentotheLawCourt);19-AM.R.S.§104(2018)(providing

for appeals of District Court decisions entered pursuant to Title 19-A);

19-AM.R.S.§1844(4)(“Apartytoanadjudicationofparentagemaychallenge

18

theadjudicationonlybyappealorinamannerotherwiseconsistentwiththe

MaineRulesofCivilProcedure.”).

[¶30]Wethereforeproceedtothesubstanceofthefather’scontentions

intheparentageappeal.

2. MeritsoftheParentageAppeal

[¶31] In the parentage appeal, the father challenges the parentage

determination,which is based on genetic testing, by asserting only that the

courterredbyadjudicatinghisparentagewithoutfirstconductingahearing.

The father points to no specific provision of the MPA that mandates an

evidentiaryhearing,butheinsteadinferssucharequirementfrom19-AM.R.S.

§1913,whichprovidesforthe“admissibility”ofgenetictestresultsasevidence

of parentage. From that, the father also suggests that, because the MPA

prescribesscientificanddocumentarycriteriathatmustbemetbeforeacourt

may rely on genetic test results, a hearing was necessary to allow

cross-examination in order to challenge or otherwise test compliance with

thoserequirements.

[¶32] WhethertheMPAmandatesthetrialcourttoconductahearing

beforeadjudicatinggeneticparentagerequiresustointerprettheMPAdenovo,

which we do by first examining its plain language. See Guardianship of

19

PatriciaS.,2019ME23,¶12,202A.3d532.Ifthestatuteisunambiguous,we

considerthestatuteaccordingtoitsplainmeaning.Seeid.Onlyifthestatuteis

ambiguous—which,forthereasonsthatfollow,weconcludeitisnot—would

we then consider other indicia of legislative intent, such as the legislative

historyleadingtotheMPA’senactment.Seeid.

[¶33] A genetic test result is not, by itself, an enforceable and final

judicialdeterminationofparentage.19-AM.R.S.§§1851(6),1904(2).Rather,

apersonwhoisidentifiedasaparentinagenetictestresultthatcomplieswith

statutoryrequirementsis“rebuttablyidentifiedasthegeneticparentof[the]

child.” Id.§1904(1);see id.§1902. Parentageisthen judiciallydetermined

only after the court enters an adjudicationbasedon that genetic test result.

Id.§1851(6)(“Parentagemaybeestablishedby...[a]nadjudicationofgenetic

parentage under subchapter 6.”); id. § 1904(2) (“Identification of a genetic

parent through genetic testing does not establish parentage absent

adjudication under this chapter.”). The court’s obligation to enter an

adjudication based on genetic test results is circumscribed: if a genetic test

resultmeetsstatutoryscientificrequirements,id.§§1902,1904;isdescribed

inareportthatprovidescertainspecifiedinformation,id.§1903;andidentifies

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apersonastheparent,thecourt“shallfindthatpersontobethegeneticparent

andmayadjudicatethepersonasthechild’sparent,”id.§1915(1)(A)(2).

[¶34] When there is some legitimate question asserted about the

reliabilityofthegenetictestresults,theMPAsetsouttheprocessforrebutting

the identification of a person as a biological parent and for admitting other

evidence that bears on a genetically-based parentage adjudication. Those

statutorilyprescribedproceduresincludethefollowingelements.

• “[A] recordof a genetic testing expert is admissible as evidenceof thetruth of the facts asserted in the report unless a party objects to itsadmissionwithin14daysafteritsreceiptbytheobjectingpartyandcitesspecificgroundsforexclusion.”Id.§1913(1).

• A rebuttably identified genetic parent “may rebut the genetic testingresults,”although“onlybyothergenetictesting”thateitherexcludesthatpersonastheparentoridentifiesanotherpersonasthepossiblegeneticfather.Id.§1904(3).

• “Apartyobjectingtotheresultsofgenetictestingmaycalloneormoregenetic testing experts to testify in person or by telephone,videoconference,depositionoranothermethodapprovedbythecourt.”Id.§1913(2).

• “Testimonyrelatingtosexualrelationsorpossiblesexualrelationsofthewomangivingbirthatatimeotherthantheprobabletimeofconceptionofthechildisinadmissibleinevidence.”Id.§1915(2).

• “In a proceeding to adjudicate parentage, the court may . . . denyadmissibility of the test results at trial if the court determines that...[t]heconductofthepartiesestopsapartyfromdenyingparentage[or][i]twouldbeaninequitableinterferencetotherelationshipbetweenthe

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childandaparentorotherwisecontrarytothebestinterestofthechild.”Id.§1912(1).

• “A report made under the requirements of this subchapter isself-authenticating”;ifthetestinglaboratorydocumentationestablishesa reliable chain of custody, the genetic test results are “admissiblewithouttestimony.”Id.§1903(2).[¶35] Despite the references to admissibility and testimony in these

provisions,theMPAdoesnotrequireahearingasapredicatetoanadjudication

ofparentage.TherelevantprovisionsoftheMPAinsteadcontemplatethatan

adjudication can be issued based on genetic test results alone, which are

self-authenticating.Id.Apartywhoseekstochallengethoseresultsisrequired

tofileatimelyobjectiontothetestresultswithinfourteendaysafterreceiptof

thetestresultsand,inthatobjection,heorshemuststatethe“specificgrounds”

forcontestingthegenetictestresults.Id.§1913(1).Ifaputativeparentfiles

suchanobjection,ahearinglikelyisnecessarybecausea“rebuttablyidentified”

parent may, for example, rebut his genetic identification as a parent with

properevidenceofcontradictorytestresults,id.§1904(1),(3),ormayseekto

discredittheresultsbypresentingcompetinggenetictestingexperttestimony,

id.§1913(2).Therefore,althoughahearingmayconstitutethebestpracticein

manyinstances,theMPAdoesnotcontainaprovisionrequiringthecourtto

holdacontestedhearingforalladjudicationsofgeneticparentage,norwould

22

sucharequirementbeanefficientmeansofresolvingadisputeinthefaceof

uncontrovertedscientificproof.12

[¶36] If a hearing were categorically required in every parentage

dispute,therewouldbelittlereasonfortheLegislaturetohaveimposedthis

discretestatutoryprocessrequiringaputativeparenttoaffirmativelyobjectto

genetictestresultsand, inthatobjection,articulatetheparticularbasisfora

challenge. SeeSears,Roebuck&Co. v. StateTaxAssessor, 2012ME110,¶8,

52A.3d 941 (“A statute should be interpreted to avoid surplusage, which

occurs when a construction of one provision of a statute renders another

provision unnecessary or without meaning or force.” (quotation marks

omitted)).Theobjectionprocedureinsteadallowsapartytheopportunityto

createafurtherfactualrecord,butthatprocessistriggeredonlywhentheparty

hasanevidentiarybasisonwhichtorebutthegenetictestresultsanddescribes

thatbasiswithspecificityintheobjection.19-AM.R.S.§§1904(3),1913(1).

12WhentheLegislaturerequiresahearinginamatter,itisfullycapableofsayingso,includingin

Title19-Amatters,andevenwithintheMPAitself. See,e.g.,19-AM.R.S.§1891(2)(C)(“Thecourtmay in its sole discretion, if necessary and on an expedited basis, hold a hearing to determinedisputed facts that are necessary and material to the issue of standing [to seek de factoparenthood].”);19-AM.R.S.§2009(6)(2018)(“Ifadownwarddeviationisproposed,thecourtshallholdahearingpriortoentering[achildsupport]order.”);seealso15M.R.S.§106(3)(2018)(“[T]hecourtshallconductahearingwithin30daysofthefilingof[a]motion[forinvoluntarymedication]....”); 18-CM.R.S. § 5-319(2) (2018) (“The court shall conduct a hearing to determine whetherterminationormodificationofaguardianshipofanadultisappropriate....”);22M.R.S.§4054(“Thecourtshallholdahearingpriortomakingatermination[ofparentalrights]order.”).TheLegislaturehasenactednosimilarprovisionwithregardtogeneticparentageadjudications.

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[¶37] The conclusion that a hearing is not always needed for an

adjudication of parentage is also consistent with portions of the MPA that

govern parentage adjudications other than by genetic testing. For example,

parentagemaybeestablishedbyanadmissioninapleading.Id.§1841(1).If

“thereisnoreasontoquestiontheadmission,andnootherpartycontestsit,

thecourtmayissueanorderadjudicatingthechildtobethechildoftheperson

admittingparentage.”13Id.§1841(2).Likethegeneticparentageprovisions,

section1841placestheobligationontheobjectingpartytoinitiateproceedings

necessarytoresolveafactualdispute.Intheabsenceofanassertionthatthere

existsa legitimate factualdispute, thepleadingalone isasufficientbasis for

adjudicatingparentage.

[¶38]Additionally,anacknowledgementofpaternitythatissignedand

recorded with the State Registrar of Vital Statistics is “equivalent to an

adjudicationofparentage.” Id. §1865(1). That statutory acknowledgement

processallowsanadjudicationofparentageintheabsenceofahearing,even

thoughaneffectiveacknowledgementofpaternity—likeagenetictestresult—

13 Parentage also may be established by testimony under oath to that effect. 19-A M.R.S.

§1841(1).Giventhefather’stestimonialadmissionofparentageduringthesummarypreliminaryhearingandtheabsenceofanysubsequentlyobtainedevidencecallinghisparentageintoquestion,thecourtcouldwellhaveadjudicatedparentagepursuanttosection1841(1),thusobviatingtheneedforanygenetictestingorapplicationofthedoctrineofjudicialestoppel.

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mustsatisfyalistofstatutoryrequirements.Id.§1862.Also,apartymaybe

adjudicatedtobeaparentwithoutahearingoranyinputatallifheorshefails

tosubmit tocourt-orderedgenetic testing. Id.§1914(1). Even thede facto

parentage statute, which requires the petitioning parent to meet threshold

fact-basedstandingcriteria,requiresthecourttoholdahearingonlywhen,in

thecourt’s“solediscretion,”ahearingisnecessary“todeterminedisputedfacts

that are necessary andmaterial to the issue of standing.” Id. § 1891(2)(C);

cf.Young v. King, 2019 ME 78, ¶¶ 11-13, 208 A.3d 762 (concluding that a

hearingwasrequiredtoresolvetheconflictingfactsastodefactoparenthood

standingthathadbeenproperlypresentedbytheparties).

[¶39] These examples demonstrate that, although parentagemay be

determined by genetic testing that implicates underlying scientific statutory

criteriathat,inturn,couldprovidefodderforchallenginggenetictestresultsin

a fact-finding setting, a hearing on the matter is not always required. In

multiplesettingsgovernedbytheMPA,apersonmaybeadjudicatedaparent

intheabsenceofanykindofhearing.TheLegislaturehasnotdifferentiateda

parentage determination based on genetic testing from those approaches.

Additionally, as a more general matter, a court is given great latitude in

determiningwhetherahearingisnecessary,evenwhenamotionisbasedona

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factualpredicate.SeeM.R.Civ.P.43(e)(“Whenamotionisbasedonfactsnot

appearingofrecordthecourtmayhearthematteronaffidavitspresentedby

therespectiveparties,butthecourtmaydirectthatthematterbeheardwholly

orpartlyonoral testimonyordepositions.”);Randallv.Conley,2010ME68,

¶¶18-19,2A.3d328(“Wereviewthecourt’sdecisionnottoheartestimony

onlyforabuseofdiscretion.”(quotationmarksomitted)).

[¶40] Weconclude that theMPAplainlyandunambiguouslydoesnot

require a testimonial hearing in every case before a court may properly

adjudicate parentage based on a genetic test result.14 Here, despite the

opportunityallowedbysection1913,thefatherdidnotobjecttoorchallenge

14 EvenifweweretoconcludethattheMPArevealssomemeasureofambiguityonthepoint,

whichwouldallowustoresorttolegislativehistory,seeGuardianshipofPatriciaS.,2019ME23,¶12,202A.3d532,theresultwouldbethesame.InareportoftheFamilyLawAdvisoryCommission,onwhose recommendations the MPA was enacted, it was recommended that an adjudication ofparentagebasedonaparty’sadmissionorbydefault shouldnot require ahearing. FamilyLawAdvisoryComm’n,ReporttotheJointStandingComm.onJudiciaryapp.Bat3(Dec.2014);seeP.L.2015,ch.296,§§A-1toD-1(effectiveJuly1,2016);L.D.1017,Summary(127thLegis.2015).Itwouldbeabsurdtointerpretthegeneticparentageprovisions,whicharebasedonscientificevidenceofparentage, to suggest that genetic test results are less reliable thananadmissionordefault. SeeUrrutiav.InterstateBrandsInt’l,2018ME24,¶12,179A.3d312.

Moreover,commentstotheUniformParentageAct,onwhichtheMPAisalsobased,establishthatgenetictestresultswereintendedtobedecisiveinaparentagedispute:“Thissectionestablishesthecontrollingsupremacyofadmissiblegenetictestresultsintheadjudicationofpaternity.”Unif.ParentageAct§631cmt. (Nat’lConferenceofComm’rsonUnif.StateLaws2002);seeL.D.1017,Summary(127thLegis.2015).Although“errors(andsometimesfraud)mayoccurintesting,”whichcould require “other evidence of paternity [to be] presented in the proceeding,” genetic testingotherwise“canbeabsolute”;“iftestresultsareadmissible,thoseresultscontrolunlessothertestresults create a conflict rebutting the admitted results.” Unif. Parentage Act § 631 cmt. Thesecomments support an interpretation of the MPA that genetic test results that comply with thescientific requirements of the statute are dispositive—without the need for a hearing—absent atimelyobjectionandrebuttingevidence.

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thegenetictestresults.Rather,thefatherobjectedtothemotiononlyonthe

grounds that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate parentage

while an appeal was pending and that the District Court should vacate its

jeopardyorderandallowthepartiestolitigateparentagealongwithjeopardy

inanewhearing;hedidnotarguethatthegenetictestresultsthemselveswere

flawed. It is also significant to note that the father has never substantively

drawnthetestresults intoquestion inanyotherway;hehasneverasserted

thatthetestingprocessdidnotmeetthescientificordocumentarycriteriaset

outbystatute,see19-AM.R.S.§§1902-1904,orthatthegenetictestresults—

whichestablisha99.99%probabilityofhispaternity—areunreliableforsome

other reason. In the absence of any such challenge articulated in a proper

objection,andhavingbeenpresentedwithself-authenticatingtestresults,the

courtwasnotobligatedtoconductahearing.Seeid.§1903(1).Wetherefore

identifynoerrorinthecourt’sadjudicationofthefather’sparentagewithout

havingconductedahearing.

C. Conclusion

[¶41]Noneofthefather’schallengestothecourt’sordersispersuasive.

Given the stance the father had taken in this action up to the moment the

jeopardyhearingbegan,thecourtappropriatelydeterminedthatthefatherwas

27

judicially estopped from challenging his parentage of the child or the

Department’s obligation to prove his parentage. Later, after the court was

presentedwiththeresultsofacourt-orderedgenetictestdemonstratingthe

father’sparentage—andwithoutthefather’sstatutorilysufficientobjectionto

that report—the court did not err by adjudicating his parentage without

holdingahearing.

Theentryis:

Judgmentsaffirmed. ScottM.Houde,Esq.,Biddeford,forappellantfatherAaronM.Frey,AttorneyGeneral,andMeghanSzylvian,Asst.Atty.Gen.,OfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral,Augusta,forappelleeDepartmentofHealthandHumanServicesBiddefordDistrictCourtdocketnumberPC-2018-24FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY