In Memory of Talcott Parsons || The Issue of Human Subjectivity in Sociological Explanation: The Schutz-Parsons Controversy

The Issue of Human Subjectivity in Sociological Explanation: The Schutz-Parsons ControversyAuthor(s): Paul TibbettsSource: Human Studies, Vol. 3, No. 4, In Memory of Talcott Parsons (Oct., 1980), pp. 357-366Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20008777 .

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HUMAN STUDIES 3, 357-366 (1980)

The Issue of Human Subjectivity in Sociological Explanation:

The Schutz-Parsons Controversy*

Paul Tibbetts, PhD

Department of Philosophy University of Dayton

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The Theory of Social Action (Grathoff, 1978) contains the extent

correspondence between Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons, an exchange which took place in 1940-41, just after Schutz had immigrated to the United

States. This was also three years after the publication of The Structure of Social Action (Parsons, 1937) and eight years after the appearance of Schutz'

Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt (1932; later translated as The

Phenomenology of the Social World [Schutz, 1967]). Accordingly, the

correspondence centers on Schutz's critique and Parsons' defense of themes

in the latter's The Structure of Social Action (hereafter abbreviated as S SA), with no reference by Schutz to any of Parsons' later writings.

However, though this exchange of letters is unfortunately restricted to

these relatively early writings of Schutz and Parsons, many ofthe themes and criticisms that were to preoccupy and haunt both these authors are already evident at even this early date. Accordingly, it is one of those irreparable losses to the sociological and philosophical literature that this

correspondence did not continue as the careers of these two authors went

their respective ways. In any case, the significance of this correspondence is

twofold: First, it is the only known written exchange between two of the

leading exponents of functionalism and phenomenology during this critical

period, with each theorist to later write his own chapter in American

sociology. Secondly, there is at times, a penetrating discussion of "cognitive,

subjective states," both as to the methodological status of such states and

concerning what, if any, role they are to play in sociological explanations of

human action. The exchange of letters is therefore significant from both the

history of ideas perspective and as regards epistemological considerations, as

we will see.

An earlier version of this paper was read at the American Sociological Association, New

York City, August 27-31, 1980.

357



358 TIBBETTS

Of particular interest to some readers will be the seemingly

disproportionate amount of time and concern devoted to "philosophical matters'' or, as we would phrase it today, to "conceptual issues" (e.g.,

regarding human subjectivity, the verifiability criterion, self-knowledge, the

relation between theory and observation, the definition of "facts" in

sociological inquiry, and so on). Concern with such issues will come as no

surprise to some readers, given that both authors were drawing upon one or

another segment of the German intellectual tradition from Kant to Weber to

Husserl.

THE BASIC ISSUES BETWEEN SCHUTZ AND PARSONS

It should be noted at the outset that Schutz was largely sympathetic with Parsons' Herculean attempt in the SSA to construct a theory of rational social action which avoided the limitations of both Utilitarianism and Positivism and which combined the insights of Pareto, Durkheim, Weber, and Marshall. Schutz obviously had great admiration for what he took to be a

scholarly masterpiece; accordingly, his lengthy comments were intended as

constructive, and not at all intended as critical, of Parsons' reconstructive

analysis of human action. Schutz even suggests in one place that the SSA "starts exactly where my own book ends." Schutz' remarks were therefore offered by a friendly critic, though as we will see Parsons did not always receive them in this spirit.

The exchange essentially begins with a nearly 60-page letter/ manuscript by Schutz in which he first summarizes what he takes to be the major themes and

arguments of theSSA, including a 40-page critique. Let us proceed directly to the latter. First, Schutz notes that in Parsons' account ofthe "unit act" (i.e., the ends, means, actor, situation, and normative orientations which define an

action), little is said regarding the role of motives, an omission which is

understandable to Schutz given Parsons' emphasis on the externally observable features of human action. Schutz'alternative approach (Grathoff, 1978, p. 33) is to distinguish between in-order-to motives and because

motives: where the former refer to the goals toward which the performed action is a means, the latter denote those motives which initiated the action in

the first place. For Schutz, Parsons was simply mistaken if he thought that motives were irretrievably subjective and therefore beyond "objective description." On the contrary, for Schutz both types of motives can be

subjected to ideal-typical analysis and, in turn, be employed as a "scheme of

interpretation" by an external observer. In fact, such ideal-typical analysis is

already at work for Schutz in everyday social interaction. Schutz then

remarks (Grathoff, 1978) that:

... all the normative values Parsons has analyzed in discussing the work of the four

sociologists under consideration... are interpretable as systems of in-order-to or because



THE ISSUE OF HUMAN SUBJECTIVITY 359

motives, to the extent that the subjective point of view of all these phenomena is retained

[pp. 35-36].

Secondly, and consistent with the above remarks regarding motives, Parsons'

approach is, in effect, to construct a theoretical scheme employing only

"objective categories" by means of which an external observer can interpret human action. For Schutz such an approach totally ignores what is for him foundational to any adequate account of social action: the subjective

experiences of the actor. Nor was this a merely minor difference of focus between Schutz and Parsons. On the contrary, as Schutz (Grathoff, 1978) writes:

this problem of dealing with subjective phenomena in objective terms is the problem for

the methodology of the social sciences_The theory of social action... stands or falls

with the results of any analysis of the relation between the subjective point of view and the

terms which sociologists actually use in performing their concrete research work [pp.

36-37].

Schutz is here reacting to the claim in the SSA that all features of Parsons' unit act can in principle be analyzed from an outsider's point of view in terms

of objective categories defined by an abstract system of theoretical concepts. For Schutz, the subjective dimensions of an act cannot be neatly correlated with any finite set of externally observable features of an action. On the

contrary, such subjective factors as motives, intentions and attitudes require direct reference to an actor's own experience and therefore to first-person accounts. An analysis of the unit act which omits reference to the actor would therefore be like an account of the play Hamlet which neglected the leading character!

Summarizing this first criticism, Schutz (Grathoff, 1978) therefore raises what he considers to be the methodological issue dividing himself from Parsons:

... the only question Professor Parsons never asks is, what really does happen in the mind of the actor from his subjective point of view. His analyses only answer the question of how a theoretical scheme can be established which is capable of explaining what may

happen or what may be considered as happening in the mind of the actor. And so Parsons is not concerned with finding out the truly subjective categories, but seeks only objective categories for the interpretation of subjective points of view [p. 36].

Lastly, Schutz raises the issue of how the observer is to obtain an "honest

description and explanation" of social phenomena. Schutz's own answer is that the observer constructs schemata of ideal types within or against which observed actions are situated and interpreted. Such ideal-type schemata are not constructed purely a priori, however, prior to observation, nor are such

ideal-types purely arbitrary. On the contrary, for Schutz the elements within the ideal-typical analysis must satisfy four criteria: (1) the ideal type being posited must be relevant to the problem being investigated (such as the

analysis of being a stranger, a homecomer or a "well-informed citizen"; see

Schutz, 1964); (2) the vocabulary employed in the ideal-typical analysis must be "reasonable and understandable" to both the actor and to other non



360 TIBBETTS

sociologically trained social agents; (3) the analysis must be consistent with

the requirements of formal logic; and (4) the ideal-type must contain "only

scientifically verifiable assumptions" which are consistent with the body of our larger scientific knowledge. Schutz (Grathoff, 1978) then concludes that:

These postulates gives the necessary guarantees that the social sciences do in fact deal with

the real social world, the one and unitary life-world of us all, and not with a strange world

of fancy that is independent of and has no connection with our world of everyday life [p.

60].

This theme of the conceptual priority ofthe life-world to all abstract scientific

theorizing is a recurrent theme in all of Schutz's writings. To take but one

further example from a collection of Schutz's papers (Wagner, 1970):

Doubtless on a certain level real scientific work may be performed without entering into

the problems of subjectivity_[However,] this type of social science does not deal

directly and immediately with the social life-world, common to us all, but with skillfully and expediently chosen idealizations and formalizations of the social world_We can

[and should] always go back to the "forgotten man** ofthe social sciences, to the actor in

the social world whose doing and feeling lies at the bottom ofthe whole system. We, then,

try to understand him in that doing and feeling and the state of mind which induced him to

adopt scientific attitudes towards his social environment.

We undertake to study the process of idealizing and formalizing as such, the genesis ofthe

meaning which social phenomena have for us as well as for the actors, the mechanism and

the activity by which human beings understand one another and themselves [pp.

268-269].

Consequently, Schutz simultaneously argues for two theses which, from

Parsons' point of view, are seemingly incompatible: first, that the subjective dimension is an indispensable element in any sociologically adequate account

of human action and the motives behind such action and, second, that this

subjective element can be analyzed and interpreted objectively by means of

ideal-typical analyses.

PARSONS' RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE

Initially, Parsons expresses two basic reservations. First, that where Schutz

appears more interested in "philosophical questions" concerning

epistemology and methodology, Parsons' own concern is with constructing a

generalized system of scientific theory and therefore with what he terms

"theoretical systematization." Second, Schutz is evidently more concerned

with such abstract philosophical issues for their own sake (such as 'what really

goes on inside people's heads9) than with matters pertaining to empirical evidence and validity. As Parsons (Grathoff, 1978) writes:

I regard it as perhaps the most important singular merit of my book that it has not treated

considerations of theory and methodology simply in terms of abstract generalities, but




always in terms of their relation to specific and definite problems of the interpretation of

empirical phenomena and generalization about such phenomena.

It seems to be an altogether legitimate requirement of criticism of a scientific work that the

critic should show the importance of his criticism on this level [of empirical relevance, p.

67].

Parsons then goes on to note specific instances of each of these points in

Schutz's writings. E. g., where (on Shutz's account) the distinction between

science and commonsense is absolutely fundamental, for Parsons such a

distinction is but "a matter of refinement." Rather than there being some sort

of ontological chasm between commonsense and scientific assertions, such

that the former is governed by an internal logic essentially different from that

of the formal deductive reasoning associated with the latter, for Parsons there

is but a single logic of explanation. Accordingly, the only reliable criterion of

knowledge for Parsons concerning social action and interaction is

"verifiability by scientific procedure" rather than by any appeal to

commonsensical intuitions and first-person protocol reports. Parsons' claim

that scientific verifiability is sufficient as a criterion of valid knowledge also

leads him to reject Schutz's attempted distinction between a subjective as

against an objective account of truth. As Parsons (Grathoff, 1978) notes:

it is not statement in scientific form but verifiability by scientific procedure which is the

relevant criterion [of empirical knowledge].

I doubt, furthermore, whether there is any such thing as a tenable subjective concept of

truth which adequately describes the logic of common-sense action but which is different

from that of science [p. 76].

Consequently, Schutz's proposed antithesis between the subjective and the

objective dimensions of human action could for Parsons entail a

corresponding dualism on the methodological level between phenomenologi? cal and more "scientific" modes of inquiry. For Parsons, as suggested earlier, there is but a single body of empirical knowledge, namely, knowledge empirically verified by external observers using categories derived from an

abstract formal scheme. Parsons is not, of course, so much denying that there is a subjective, experiential dimension to human action as rejecting the claim that a special, phenomenological method over and above that of scientific observation is required to investigative this dimension. As Parsons had earlier

written in the SSA (1937):

Our immediate intuitions of meaning may be real and, as such, correct. But their

interpretation cannot dispense with a rationally consistent system of theoretical concepts.

Only in so far as they measure up to such criticism can intuitions constitute knowledge [p.

589].

In response to this and related assertions in the SSA, Bauman(1978) rightly remarks that:



362 TIBBETTS

The Subjective point of view* becomes, therefore an analytical device. Accordingly,

understanding becomes a matter of scientific analysis. The Subjective point of view* in

Parsons* version, as in HusserFs, means eviction of the empirical subject_The task of

understanding has been by the same token finally freed from'intuitionist misconceptions* which insisted that understanding can be reached only in the mystical unity with the

subject, and therefore cast the understanding* humanities beyond the bounds of science

[pp. 135-136].

For Parsons, then, Schutz's dualism between the subjective and the objective dimensions of human action, though perhaps consistent with Cartesian

philosophy, runs directly counter to the verifiability criterion of meaning and

of reliable knowledge. I will return to this point later.

Schutz's reply to all of this is to reiterate his own commitment to the

centrality of the subjective point of view in the action scheme. Regarding the

concept of rationality, for example, Schutz (Grathoff, 1978, p. 101) rejects the

Parsonian account that "an action is rational only if the actor acts for reasons

understandable and verifiable by positive empirical science" and that unless

rationality is defined in this way, then, on Parsons' account, there would

simply be no rationality at all. Schutz (Grathoff, 1978, p. 104) goes on to note

some ramifications of Parsons' verifiability bias, particularly Parsons'

inadequate account of the following: (1) the specifically social categories of

action and mutual interaction, (2) the problem of the frames of reference by which one agent interprets the actions of another, (3) the element of

temporality in human action by means of which past and anticipated acts are

distinguished, (4) the interpretive schema which even the scientific observer must employ in his description and analysis of the significance of an action, and (5) the interrelation between intersubjectivity and socially constructed

values. These and related points lead Schutz (Grathoff, 1978) to the

conclusion that:

... you have to go a few steps further in radicalizing your theory in order to arrive at a

more general concept which, on the one hand, permits an application to problems actually

beyond the reach of your theory and, on the other hand, to a more consistent formulation

of your basic ideas, above all of the concept of subjectivism [p. 105].

In a brief final reply to these criticisms, Parsons admits that he has not studied

Der sinnhafte Aufbau der socialen Welt to the extent that Schutz obviously has regarding the SSA. However, even after their lengthy correspondence, Parsons felt little inclination to return to Schutz's major work. Parsons'

reasoning (Grathoff, 1978) is as follows:

Either, as I felt when I wrote the letters, the things which you are primarily concerned with

discussing are not of the first order of importance for my particular range of theoretical

interests or, on the other hand, I have failed to grasp their significance [p. 108].

For example, Parsons (Grathoff, 1978) saw little reason to "go into the kind

of analysis ofthe subjective point of view in relation to the time element which was the central theme of your analysis" [p. 108]. Similarly with regard to the

supposed significance of the "alter ego" in social interaction. Parsons




(Grathoff, 1978) then concludes with an overall appraisal of Schutz's

phenomenological account of the social world.

... when the level is reached where the sciences of action, as you said in your last letter,

deal exclusively with the objects constituted by and through acts of an actor without

considering the actor and his acts, that it ceases [for Parsons] to be a theory of action,

whatever else it may become [p. 109].

EVALUATION OF THIS EXCHANGE

The issues dividing Schutz and Parsons are, I think, most revealed in

Parsons' "Retrospective Perspective," an essay written in 1974, over three

decades after the original correspondence with Schutz had concluded.

Parsons reviews and elaborates on a number of issues, a few of which I have

singled out for discussion. First, there is the matter of the "subjective point of

view" and what role if any it is to have in sociological inquiry and explanation.

Moving beyond his earlier position, Parsons now argues that an actor's self

understanding of his intentions, motives, and objectives is not possible by any

supposed appeal to "immediate experience." For Parsons, not only self

understanding, but also our knowledge of external physical objects, as well as

an understanding of the motives of other actors requires a conceptual framework or set of interpretive categories within which such understanding is situated. It is Schutz's emphasis on a framework-independent

understanding of one's self which Parsons therefore flatly rejects. There is rio

direct access to any subject matter, not even to one's own subjective states.

It is interesting to note that Parsons now appears to have forgotten his earlier admonition to avoid entanglement with questions of epistemology and

methodology for he is himself adopting a quite definite epistemological

position as to what does and does not constitute empirical knowledge.

Epistemological considerations are not avoided by a positivist appeal to

scientifically rigorous forms of inquiry, for the legitimation of such inquiry itself presupposes the adequacy of some version of empiricism concerning "evidence," "fact," and "observation." In all fairness to Parsons, however, he

at least did not adopt one of the more simple-minded versions of empiricism

according to which reliable observation was merely a matter of opening one's

eyes and looking very carefully. On the contrary, Parsons (Grathoff, 1978, p.

68) had argued in his earlier correspondence with Schutz that "the role of th?

conceptual scheme is only analytically distinguishable from given experience. We always observe, i.e., we experience, in terms of a conceptual scheme."

Such a position is entirely consistent with the view developed in the SSA

(1937):

It is fundamental that there is no empirical knowledge which is not in some sense and to

some degree conceptually formed. All talk of pure sense data, raw experience or the

unformed stream of consciousness is not descriptive of actual experience, but a matter of



364 TIBBETTS

methodological abstraction. In other words, in Professor Henderson's phrase, all

empirical observation is in terms of a conceptual scheme. This is true not only of

sophisticated scientific observation but of the simplest common-sense statements of fact

[p. 28].

In any case, if Parsons thought that such a Kantian account of observation

was one whose merits could be ascertained scientifically and therefore

without reference to epistemological considerations, then he is clearly mistaken. For what is the entire scientific enterprise itself if not an

epistemological standpoint concerning the criteria of what constitutes

genuine as against spurious empirical knowledge claims and reliable methods

of inquiry? Without here venturing into the tangle of epistemological issues

surrounding the theory contaminated/theory neutral controversy regarding observation (see Grandy, 1973, for some of the classical statements on this

matter), my own conclusion is that Parsons simply failed to appreciate that all

scientific inquiry is invariably grounded in a theory of knowledge, whether

this be phenomenalism, perceptual realism, critical (Popperian) rationalism,

Kantianism, or whatever. If Parsons had been sensitive to such

considerations he might have been less inclined to dismiss out of hand

Schutz's criticisms as merely "questions of epistemology and methodology." This might in turn have occasioned a greater self-examination by Parsons of

the epistemological presuppositions and implications built into the

conceptual model of social action developed in the SSA.

I therefore propose that a central reason why Parsons was unable to

understand what Schutz was trying to say was simply due to Parsons'

mistaken belief that, whereas he was doing scientific theorizing, Schutz was

merely engaged in epistemology and philosophy. Granted, Schutz'

phenomenology of the social world is not "scientific" if science is defined as

synonymous with what is observable and verifiable in some simple-minded

positivistic sense. Nor is it scientific if this is equated with the logical deduction of explanations from a formally constructed scheme of concepts and definitions. As suggested earlier, Schutz's response as a philosopher was

to raise questions concerning what exactly constitutes "objectivity," "observation," and "verification." A further specific question might by, "Why should the descriptions and explanations of an action by an external observer

be intrinsically any more reliable than those of the actor himself?" Then there

is the problem of which conceptual scheme of interpretation to adopt. In the

SSA, Parsons had himself considered and rejected both utilitarian and

positivistic models of rational behavior, the former because it made the

selection of ends an essentially random, arbitrary affair, the latter because it

left no room for voluntary actions. But just as utilitarianism and positivism were for Parsons seriously deficient in these and other respects, his own view

that human action can best be understood from the outside and in terms of a

formal theoretic model concerning means-ends relations is itself deficient

from a phenomenological point of view. Interestingly, Schutz (Wagner, 1970)




later suggested how a system of abstract concepts might be grounded in

experience:

The constructs involved in common-sense experience ofthe intersubjective world in daily life... are the first-level constructs upon which the second-level constructs of the social

sciences have to be erected.

How is it possible to form objective concepts and an objectively verifiable theory of

subjective meaning-structures? The basic insight that the concepts formed by the social

scientist are constructs of the constructs formed in common-sense thinking by the actors

on the social scene offers an answer. The scientific constructs formed on the second

level... are objective ideal typical constructs and, as such, of a different kind from those

developed on the first level of common-sense thinking which they have to supersede. They are theoretical systems embodying testable general hypotheses [pp. 274-275].

Ironically, in his correspondence Parsons tended to stress objective observation and formal theory construction to the relative neglect of first

person experiences, whereas in the SSA there are passages which read as

though they had been written by Schutz. E.g., in the SSA (1937) we find the

following:

There is a subjective aspect of human action. It is manifested by linguistic symbols to

which meaning is attached. This subjective aspect involves the reasons we ourselves assign for acting as we do. No science concerned with human action can, if it would penetrate

beyond a certain level, evade the methodological problems ofthe relevance of facts of this

order to the scientific explanation of the other facts of human action. This study will be

intensively concerned with them [p. 26].

This is not the place to attempt to document and account for the apparent inconsistencies between such passages in the SSA and the more positivistic

position taken in the correspondence here under review. Parsons might have shifted toward "scientific objectivity" in reaction to what he might have considered an excessive subjectivism on Schutz's part and by phenomenology in general. Whether Parsons was correct in this interpretation hinges on how one defines phenomenology and, in turn, such concepts as "objectivity," "verification," and so on. After reading and rereading this correspondence it is hard to believe that Parsons had any really adequate account of the

phenomenological alternative, as though phenomenology were just another

form of introspective psychology. As to the distinction between science and epistemology, then, the issue of

what to include and what best ignore in one's model of human action cannot be resolved by the simple expedient of appealing to what will or will not

satisfy "scientific criteria" of observation and validity. As I have suggested, such criteria are themselves not independent of one's prior epistemological presuppositions. In turn, and somewhat ironically, such presuppositions are not conceptually independent from one's model of human cognitive and

perceptual activity concerning how people experience the world around

them, how distortions creep into such experience, how conflicts in motives



366 TIBBETTS

and intentions are resolved, and from the general reliability of first person

protocol reports. But rather than this interrelation between: (1)

epistemological considerations, (2) a model of cognitive/perceptual processes, (3) a theory of human motivation and action, and (4) the criteria of

scientific validity issuing in a counsel of despair, it should rather suggest that

epistemological and empirical considerations are not so easily kept distinct, with the one left to the philosophers and the other to scientists. Parsons'

rather uncritical view on these matters was therefore largely responsible for

the failure of the correspondence to join where Schutz had wanted it to join: at

the level of the epistemological foundations of the scientific enterprise itself.

REFERENCES

Bauman, Z. Hermeneutics and Social Science. New York: Columbia University Press, 1978.

Brodersen, A. (Ed.). The Collected Papers of Alfred Schutz, Vol. II: Studies in Social Theory. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.

Grandy, R. (Ed.). Theories and Observation in Science. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973.

Parsons, T. The Structure of Social Action. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937.

Wagner, H. (Ed.). Alfred Schutz on Phenomenology and Social Relations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.

Schutz, A. The Phenomenology ofthe Social World. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967.



Documents

In Memory of Talcott Parsons || The Issue of Human Subjectivity in Sociological Explanation: The Schutz-Parsons Controversy