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Page 1: In Conclusion

In Conclusion

Page 2: In Conclusion
Page 3: In Conclusion

U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission

Division of Enforcement

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, as The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its private publication or statement by any of its employees. Views expressed herein are those of employees. Views expressed herein are those of the presenter and do not necessarily reflect the the presenter and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or other members of the views of the Commission or other members of the staff of the Commission.staff of the Commission.

Page 4: In Conclusion

Today’s Topic

Financial Reporting and Issuer Financial Reporting and Issuer DisclosureDisclosure

Focus on Financial FraudFocus on Financial Fraud

Page 5: In Conclusion

Financial Fraud is:“… “… Intentional or reckless conduct, whether act Intentional or reckless conduct, whether act or omission, that results in materially or omission, that results in materially misleading financial statements…”misleading financial statements…”

“… “… it may entail gross and deliberate it may entail gross and deliberate distortion of corporate records, … falsified distortion of corporate records, … falsified transactions, … [or] the misapplication of transactions, … [or] the misapplication of accounting principles.”accounting principles.”

Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting; Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting; COSO, October 1987COSO, October 1987

Page 6: In Conclusion

Fraud is Different than Errors

““Fraudulent financial reporting differs Fraudulent financial reporting differs from other causes of materially misleading from other causes of materially misleading financial statements, such as financial statements, such as unintentional unintentional errorserrors.”.”

Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting; Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting; COSO, October 1987COSO, October 1987

Page 7: In Conclusion

Three Conditions are Usually Present:

Management has an Management has an incentiveincentive or is under or is under pressurepressure

The The opportunityopportunity exists for a fraud to be perpetrated exists for a fraud to be perpetrated

The fraudsters The fraudsters rationalizerationalize their fraudulent acts their fraudulent acts

Statement on Auditing Standards 99, October 2002Statement on Auditing Standards 99, October 2002

Page 8: In Conclusion

How Does it All Begin?

Page 9: In Conclusion

Answer:

Starts with “making the numbers”Starts with “making the numbers”

Then, “Managing the Numbers”Then, “Managing the Numbers”

Ends with “making up the numbers”Ends with “making up the numbers”

Page 10: In Conclusion

Rationalization includes: ““We need to make our projections…”We need to make our projections…”

““I’m getting pressure from the boss…”I’m getting pressure from the boss…”

““We need to meet Street expectations…”We need to meet Street expectations…”

““Our acquisition will fall through if we don’t…”Our acquisition will fall through if we don’t…”

Page 11: In Conclusion

And, Let’s Not Forget the Popular

““We’ll make it up next We’ll make it up next quarter…”quarter…”

Page 12: In Conclusion
Page 13: In Conclusion

But, even a simple mistake can be turned into a financial fraud

through “cover-up” efforts.

Page 14: In Conclusion

Annual Caseload by Fiscal Year

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

19951996

19971998

19992000

20012002

Fiscal Year

Page 15: In Conclusion

SEC Enforcement: FY 2002 598 total cases598 total cases Largest categories:Largest categories:

Financial fraud and issuer reporting (27%) Financial fraud and issuer reporting (27%) Offering fraud (20%) Offering fraud (20%) Broker-dealer (14%) Broker-dealer (14%) Insider trading (10%)Insider trading (10%) Market manipulation (7%)Market manipulation (7%) Investment adviser/company (8%)Investment adviser/company (8%)

Page 16: In Conclusion

Financial Reporting and Issuer Disclosure: Actions Filed

163 actions filed in FY 2002163 actions filed in FY 2002 Compared to:Compared to:

112 in FY 2001112 in FY 2001103 in FY 2000103 in FY 2000 94 in FY 199994 in FY 1999 79 in FY 199879 in FY 1998

Page 17: In Conclusion

Sources of Cases

Other AgenciesOther Agencies Self-ReportingSelf-Reporting Auditor ReportsAuditor Reports InformantsInformants

Page 18: In Conclusion

   Previous Cartoon      Next Cartoon    

                                                                                                                                                                                                                         

                                                                                                   

        

    

 

                                                                      

                      

 

                                                                                                                                                          

                                                              

Page 19: In Conclusion

Complaint Center500-800 complaints a week500-800 complaints a weekMany concern financial Many concern financial

misconductmisconductwww.sec.govwww.sec.gov

Page 20: In Conclusion

Commission Top Priority October 17, 2001: “Financial fraud and October 17, 2001: “Financial fraud and

reporting cases are our top priority” reporting cases are our top priority” FY 2002 – 216 New financial FY 2002 – 216 New financial

fraud and reporting fraud and reporting investigationsinvestigations openedopened

69% increase over FY 200169% increase over FY 2001

Page 21: In Conclusion

Resources

970 Staff Members970 Staff Members 2500+ Open 2500+ Open

InvestigationsInvestigations Half of resources on Half of resources on

financial fraudfinancial fraud

Page 22: In Conclusion

Common Fraud Schemes

Premature revenue recognitionPremature revenue recognitionExcess reserves to smooth earningsExcess reserves to smooth earningsImproper capitalized costsImproper capitalized costsChanging estimates “to make the numbers”Changing estimates “to make the numbers”Top-Side Journal EntriesTop-Side Journal Entries““Earnings Management”Earnings Management”

Page 23: In Conclusion
Page 24: In Conclusion

Traditional Fraudulent Revenue Schemes

Backdating of Backdating of contractscontracts

Fictitious invoicesFictitious invoices Shipment of Shipment of

unfinished productunfinished product Revenue after the Revenue after the

fiscal periodfiscal period

Revenue recognized Revenue recognized on products not on products not shipped or not yet shipped or not yet manufacturedmanufactured

Hidden “side letters” Hidden “side letters” giving customers giving customers rights to return rights to return productproduct

Page 25: In Conclusion

New Types of Cases LootingLooting SPE’sSPE’s Related party transactionsRelated party transactions Undisclosed compensationUndisclosed compensation Misleading “Pro Forma” releasesMisleading “Pro Forma” releases Round-trippingRound-tripping AccommodationsAccommodations Channel stuffingChannel stuffing Acceleration of revenue in multiple-element arrangementsAcceleration of revenue in multiple-element arrangements

Page 26: In Conclusion

Growth in Enforcement Investigations

In 1998, we had 1733 investigationsIn 1998, we had 1733 investigations In 2002, we had 2402 investigationsIn 2002, we had 2402 investigations

39% increase in investigations39% increase in investigations

Page 27: In Conclusion

Growth in Financial Fraud Actions In 1998, we brought 79 financial In 1998, we brought 79 financial

fraud/reporting actionsfraud/reporting actions

In 2002, we brought 163 financial In 2002, we brought 163 financial fraud/reporting actionsfraud/reporting actions

106% growth in financial fraud actions106% growth in financial fraud actions

Page 28: In Conclusion

Growth in Actions Involving Fortune 500 Companies In 1998, 4 of the 79 financial fraud actions In 1998, 4 of the 79 financial fraud actions

(5%) involved Fortune 500 companies(5%) involved Fortune 500 companies

In 2002, 29 of the 163 financial fraud In 2002, 29 of the 163 financial fraud actions (18%) involved Fortune 500 actions (18%) involved Fortune 500 companiescompanies

625% growth 625% growth

Page 29: In Conclusion

Actions Brought in the Last 12 Months Michael Kopper and Andrew Fastow Michael Kopper and Andrew Fastow

(Enron)(Enron) WorldComWorldCom RiteAid and its senior managementRiteAid and its senior management Adelphia Communications and its senior Adelphia Communications and its senior

managementmanagement MicrosoftMicrosoft Senior management of Waste ManagementSenior management of Waste Management Amazon.comAmazon.com XeroxXerox

Page 30: In Conclusion

Still More PricewaterhouseCoopersPricewaterhouseCoopers Ernst & YoungErnst & Young Top officers of TycoTop officers of Tyco Homestore.com officersHomestore.com officers DynegyDynegy KPMGKPMG HealthSouthHealthSouth

Page 31: In Conclusion

FINANCIAL REPORTING AND ISSUER DISCLOSURE:

Themes and TrendsThemes and Trends

Page 32: In Conclusion

Financial Reporting & Issuer Disclosure: Themes and Trends

1.1. Coordination with criminal authoritiesCoordination with criminal authorities

Page 33: In Conclusion
Page 34: In Conclusion

Close Cooperation with ProsecutorsCorporate Fraud Task ForceCorporate Fraud Task ForceUS Attorneys want the casesUS Attorneys want the casesState authorities want the casesState authorities want the casesPlenty of cases to go aroundPlenty of cases to go around

Page 35: In Conclusion

Criminal Cases –FY 2002

17 Federal districts brought 17 Federal districts brought criminal securities fraud casescriminal securities fraud cases

More than 259 people and entities More than 259 people and entities chargedcharged

Page 36: In Conclusion
Page 37: In Conclusion

Enron Michael J. Kopper held various executive positions at Michael J. Kopper held various executive positions at

Enron, most of the time reporting directly to Andrew Enron, most of the time reporting directly to Andrew Fastow, Enron’s CFO.Fastow, Enron’s CFO.

In August 2002, the Commission filed a settled action In August 2002, the Commission filed a settled action against Kopper in which he agreed to disgorge and against Kopper in which he agreed to disgorge and forfeit $12 million, to be permanently enjoined from forfeit $12 million, to be permanently enjoined from violating the federal securities laws, and to be barred violating the federal securities laws, and to be barred from acting as an officer or director of public companies. from acting as an officer or director of public companies.

On the same day, Kopper pleaded guilty to conspiracy to On the same day, Kopper pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and money laundering, agreed to commit wire fraud and money laundering, agreed to forfeit $4 million (included in the $12 million above), forfeit $4 million (included in the $12 million above), and to cooperate with the government's continuing and to cooperate with the government's continuing investigation.investigation.

Page 38: In Conclusion
Page 39: In Conclusion

Enron Commission filed enforcement action against Andrew Commission filed enforcement action against Andrew

Fastow, former CFO of Enron, alleging violations of Fastow, former CFO of Enron, alleging violations of anti-fraud, periodic reporting, books and records, and anti-fraud, periodic reporting, books and records, and internal controls provisions of federal securities laws. internal controls provisions of federal securities laws.

Commission seeks disgorgement of all ill-gotten gains, Commission seeks disgorgement of all ill-gotten gains, including all compensation received subsequent to including all compensation received subsequent to commencement of the alleged fraud, civil money commencement of the alleged fraud, civil money penalties, a permanent bar from acting as a director or penalties, a permanent bar from acting as a director or officer of a public company, and an injunction from officer of a public company, and an injunction from future violations of the federal securities laws.future violations of the federal securities laws.

Commission brought action in coordination with DOJ’s Commission brought action in coordination with DOJ’s Enron Task Force, which filed a related criminal Enron Task Force, which filed a related criminal complaint against Fastow.complaint against Fastow.

Page 40: In Conclusion

EnronCommission complaint alleges:

• Fastow involved with three transactions -- RADR, Chewco, and Southampton – that were part of an alleged scheme to hide his and Michael Kopper's interest in and control of certain entities in order to keep those entities off Enron's balance sheet.

• Fastow secretly nominated certain of the owners of these three entities, funded certain of their investments through undisclosed loans, collected undisclosed fees, and demanded and received under-the-table payments, including payments to himself and his family members disguised as yearly $10,000 non-taxable gifts.

• Purpose of scheme was self-enrichment and to mislead analysts, rating agencies, and others about Enron's true financial condition.

Page 41: In Conclusion

EnronCommission complaint further alleges:

• Fastow participated in two additional transactions that were essentially sham sales - best described as secret asset-parking arrangements.

• Fastow and others backdated documents to avoid diminution in Enron's investment in the stock of a technology company. Specifically, Fastow and others created documents that purported to lock in the value of Enron's investment in that company back in August of 2000, when that company's stock was trading at its all-time high price.

• Throughout the period of his alleged fraudulent conduct, Fastow sold millions of dollars worth of Enron securities.

Page 42: In Conclusion
Page 43: In Conclusion

Adelphia Communications

Commission filed charges against Adelphia, its Commission filed charges against Adelphia, its founder (John J. Rigas), his three sons, and two founder (John J. Rigas), his three sons, and two other senior executives, alleging one of the other senior executives, alleging one of the most extensive financial frauds ever to take most extensive financial frauds ever to take place at a public company.place at a public company.

US Attorney for SDNY filed related criminal US Attorney for SDNY filed related criminal charges against several of the same defendants.charges against several of the same defendants.

Commission’s investigation is continuing.Commission’s investigation is continuing.

Page 44: In Conclusion

Adelphia Communications SEC complaint alleges that Adelphia, at the direction SEC complaint alleges that Adelphia, at the direction

of the individual defendants:of the individual defendants: Fraudulently excluded billions of dollars in Fraudulently excluded billions of dollars in

liabilities from its consolidated financial statements liabilities from its consolidated financial statements by hiding them on the books of off-balance sheet by hiding them on the books of off-balance sheet affiliates; affiliates;

Falsified operations statistics and inflated earnings; Falsified operations statistics and inflated earnings; and and

Concealed rampant self-dealing by the Rigas Concealed rampant self-dealing by the Rigas Family, including the undisclosed use of corporate Family, including the undisclosed use of corporate funds for Rigas Family stock purchases and the funds for Rigas Family stock purchases and the acquisition of luxury condominiums.acquisition of luxury condominiums.

Page 45: In Conclusion

Adelphia Communications The Commission is seeking:The Commission is seeking:

Officer and Director bars Officer and Director bars Disgorgement of all ill-gotten gains, including:Disgorgement of all ill-gotten gains, including:

Compensation received during the fraud Compensation received during the fraud Property unlawfully taken from Adelphia through undisclosed Property unlawfully taken from Adelphia through undisclosed

related-party transactionsrelated-party transactions Severance payments Severance payments

Permanent anti-fraud injunctions Permanent anti-fraud injunctions Civil penalties from each defendant, including Adelphia. Civil penalties from each defendant, including Adelphia.

Penalty against company sought because Adelphia failed early Penalty against company sought because Adelphia failed early on to cooperate with the Commission's investigation and on to cooperate with the Commission's investigation and actually allowed the fraud to continue until the Rigas family actually allowed the fraud to continue until the Rigas family lost control over the company's conduct. lost control over the company's conduct.

Page 46: In Conclusion

Financial Reporting & Issuer Disclosure: Themes and Trends

1.1. Coordination with criminal authoritiesCoordination with criminal authorities

2.2. Emphasis on personal accountabilityEmphasis on personal accountability Greater use of O&D barsGreater use of O&D bars Disgorgement of compensationDisgorgement of compensation

Page 47: In Conclusion

Officer and Director Bars

Officer and Director bars sought in all Officer and Director bars sought in all categories of casescategories of cases::

FY 2002: 126FY 2002: 126FY 2001: 51FY 2001: 51FY 2000: 38FY 2000: 38

Page 48: In Conclusion
Page 49: In Conclusion

Rite Aid Former CEO, CFO, Vice Chairman charged with fraud in Former CEO, CFO, Vice Chairman charged with fraud in

connection with wide-ranging accounting fraud scheme connection with wide-ranging accounting fraud scheme that enabled the company to overstate its income in every that enabled the company to overstate its income in every quarter from May 1997 to May 1999. quarter from May 1997 to May 1999. Former CEO also charged with engaging in Former CEO also charged with engaging in

undisclosed related-party transactions and fabricating undisclosed related-party transactions and fabricating Board minutes to facilitate the fraud.Board minutes to facilitate the fraud.

Commission is seeking:Commission is seeking: Fraud injunctionsFraud injunctions Officer & Director bars Officer & Director bars Disgorgement of bonusesDisgorgement of bonuses Civil penaltiesCivil penalties

Page 50: In Conclusion

Rite Aid Commission also brought settled cease and desist Commission also brought settled cease and desist

proceedings against the company for reporting and proceedings against the company for reporting and books-and-records violations, and against the former books-and-records violations, and against the former COO for fraud and causing the company’s violations.COO for fraud and causing the company’s violations. Rite Aid cooperated in the investigation, including Rite Aid cooperated in the investigation, including

declining to assert its attorney-client privilege and declining to assert its attorney-client privilege and voluntarily providing Commission staff with full voluntarily providing Commission staff with full access to an internal investigation conducted by Rite access to an internal investigation conducted by Rite Aid's counsel. Aid's counsel.

The value of this cooperation was considered in The value of this cooperation was considered in determining the appropriate resolution of this matter.determining the appropriate resolution of this matter.

Parallel criminal charges were filed against the three Parallel criminal charges were filed against the three former officers and directors. former officers and directors.

Page 51: In Conclusion

Disgorgement of Stock Options and Other Compensation

FY 2002: Sought from 28 FY 2002: Sought from 28 individualsindividuals

FY 2001: Sought from 18 FY 2001: Sought from 18 individualsindividuals55% increase in FY 200255% increase in FY 2002

Page 52: In Conclusion
Page 53: In Conclusion

Tyco International

Commission alleged that 3 former top Commission alleged that 3 former top executives of Tyco -- L. Dennis Kozlowski, executives of Tyco -- L. Dennis Kozlowski, the former chief executive officer and the former chief executive officer and chairman of Tyco's board of directors, Mark chairman of Tyco's board of directors, Mark H. Swartz, the former chief financial officer H. Swartz, the former chief financial officer and a director, and Mark A. Belnick, the and a director, and Mark A. Belnick, the former chief legal officer -- failed to disclose former chief legal officer -- failed to disclose multi-million dollar low interest and interest-multi-million dollar low interest and interest-free loans they took from the company. free loans they took from the company.

Page 54: In Conclusion

Tyco International Commission’s complaint alleges:Commission’s complaint alleges:

Kozlowski and Swartz covertly caused the company Kozlowski and Swartz covertly caused the company to forgive tens of millions of dollars of those to forgive tens of millions of dollars of those outstanding loans without disclosure to investors.outstanding loans without disclosure to investors.

Kozlowski and Swartz engaged in other undisclosed Kozlowski and Swartz engaged in other undisclosed related party transactions. related party transactions.

Belnick failed to disclose the receipt of more than Belnick failed to disclose the receipt of more than $14 million of interest-free loans from the company.$14 million of interest-free loans from the company.

Kozlowski, Swartz and Belnick sold their shares of Kozlowski, Swartz and Belnick sold their shares of Tyco stock valued at millions of dollars while their Tyco stock valued at millions of dollars while their self-dealing remained undisclosed.self-dealing remained undisclosed.

Page 55: In Conclusion

Tyco International Commission is seeking disgorgement of all ill-gotten Commission is seeking disgorgement of all ill-gotten

gains, payment of civil money penalties, enjoining the gains, payment of civil money penalties, enjoining the defendants from future violations of the federal defendants from future violations of the federal securities laws, and officer and director bars. securities laws, and officer and director bars. Disgorgement sought from Kozlowski and Swartz Disgorgement sought from Kozlowski and Swartz

includes all compensation they received subsequent includes all compensation they received subsequent to their fraudulent acts and omissions, including to their fraudulent acts and omissions, including salary, bonuses, stock options and grants, and any salary, bonuses, stock options and grants, and any advances that have not been repaid.advances that have not been repaid.

Commission seeks disgorgement by all 3 defendants Commission seeks disgorgement by all 3 defendants of all loans not properly repaid to Tyco as well as of all loans not properly repaid to Tyco as well as losses avoided from sales of Tyco securities losses avoided from sales of Tyco securities subsequent to their fraudulent acts and omissions.subsequent to their fraudulent acts and omissions.

Page 56: In Conclusion
Page 57: In Conclusion
Page 58: In Conclusion
Page 59: In Conclusion
Page 60: In Conclusion

Disgorgement of Stock Options and Other Compensation

Waste Management (BuntrockWaste Management (Buntrock)): Injunctive action : Injunctive action charging founder, Buntrock, and five other former top charging founder, Buntrock, and five other former top officers with fraud in systematic scheme to misrepresent officers with fraud in systematic scheme to misrepresent financial results. Company acknowledged that it had financial results. Company acknowledged that it had misstated its pre-tax earnings by $1.7 billion over a five-misstated its pre-tax earnings by $1.7 billion over a five-year period. year period. Commission is seeking O&D bars, Commission is seeking O&D bars,

disgorgement of options, bonuses, performance-disgorgement of options, bonuses, performance-based compensation and proceeds from stock based compensation and proceeds from stock sales, and civil penalties.sales, and civil penalties.

Page 61: In Conclusion

Financial Reporting & Issuer Disclosure: Themes and Trends

1.1. Cooperate and coordinate with criminal Cooperate and coordinate with criminal authoritiesauthorities

2.2. Emphasis on personal accountabilityEmphasis on personal accountability

3.3. Effort to speed up our investigationsEffort to speed up our investigations

Page 62: In Conclusion

“Real Time” Enforcement

Take actions to stop fraud and other Take actions to stop fraud and other investor harm expeditiously;investor harm expeditiously;

Trading suspensionsTrading suspensionsTROs and orders freezing assetsTROs and orders freezing assets

Bring cases in pieces (e.g., issuer, then Bring cases in pieces (e.g., issuer, then officers, then auditors)officers, then auditors)

Page 64: In Conclusion

WorldCom 6/25/02 Co. admits it capitalized 6/25/02 Co. admits it capitalized

$3.8 billion of expenses to meet $3.8 billion of expenses to meet estimates during last five quartersestimates during last five quarters

2001 reported earnings of $2.3 2001 reported earnings of $2.3 billion billion

Actually lost $662 millionActually lost $662 million SEC files case in less than 24 hoursSEC files case in less than 24 hours

Page 65: In Conclusion

WorldCom

Within 48 hours, Commission obtained a Within 48 hours, Commission obtained a court order preventing destruction of court order preventing destruction of documents, prohibiting extraordinary documents, prohibiting extraordinary payments to current and former officers, payments to current and former officers, directors and other employees, and appointing directors and other employees, and appointing a corporate monitor.a corporate monitor.

Page 66: In Conclusion

WorldCom

Nov. 26, 2002–partial settlementNov. 26, 2002–partial settlement Full injunctive reliefFull injunctive relief Extensive review of governance Extensive review of governance

and internal controlsand internal controls Employee trainingEmployee training Penalty reservedPenalty reserved

Page 67: In Conclusion

WorldCom

SEC has charged four WorldCom SEC has charged four WorldCom employees and officersemployees and officers

Criminal charges also filedCriminal charges also filed Restatement to exceed $9 billion Restatement to exceed $9 billion Commission’s investigation is continuing, Commission’s investigation is continuing,

along with investigation of U.S. Attorney’s along with investigation of U.S. Attorney’s Office for S.D.N.Y. Office for S.D.N.Y.

Page 68: In Conclusion

Financial Reporting & Issuer Disclosure: Themes and Trends

1.1. Coordination with criminal authoritiesCoordination with criminal authorities2.2. Emphasis on personal accountabilityEmphasis on personal accountability3.3. Effort to speed up our investigationsEffort to speed up our investigations

4.4. Hold companies accountable for non-Hold companies accountable for non-cooperationcooperation

Page 69: In Conclusion
Page 70: In Conclusion

Xerox Commission alleged undisclosed accounting Commission alleged undisclosed accounting

actions that accelerated revenue recognition actions that accelerated revenue recognition of equipment by over $3 billion and of equipment by over $3 billion and increased pre-tax earnings by $1.5 billion increased pre-tax earnings by $1.5 billion over a four-year period. over a four-year period.

Company settled to a fraud injunction and Company settled to a fraud injunction and other relief.other relief.

The Commission’s investigation is The Commission’s investigation is continuing. continuing.

Page 71: In Conclusion

Xerox Goal: show growth in the face of competitive Goal: show growth in the face of competitive

challengeschallenges Commission alleged scheme was orchestrated by Commission alleged scheme was orchestrated by

senior managementsenior management Accelerated recognition of revenue into current Accelerated recognition of revenue into current

periods at the expense of futureperiods at the expense of future 1997-2000 accelerated revenue by over $3 billion and 1997-2000 accelerated revenue by over $3 billion and

increased earnings by $1.5 billionincreased earnings by $1.5 billion One-offsOne-offs Cushion reservesCushion reserves

Page 72: In Conclusion

Xerox Settled for $10 million penalty, Settled for $10 million penalty,

restatement and special review of restatement and special review of accounting controlsaccounting controls

Penalty reflects, in part, sanction Penalty reflects, in part, sanction for lack of “full” cooperation in for lack of “full” cooperation in the investigationthe investigation

Page 73: In Conclusion

Financial Reporting & Issuer Disclosure: Themes and Trends

1.1. Coordination with criminal authoritiesCoordination with criminal authorities2.2. Emphasis on personal accountabilityEmphasis on personal accountability3.3. Effort to speed up our investigationsEffort to speed up our investigations

4.4. Hold companies accountable for non-Hold companies accountable for non-cooperationcooperation – but credit meaningful – but credit meaningful cooperation.cooperation.

Page 74: In Conclusion
Page 75: In Conclusion

Homestore Commission filed charges against John Commission filed charges against John

Giesecke Jr., Homestore's former chief Giesecke Jr., Homestore's former chief operating officer; Joseph J. Shew, its former operating officer; Joseph J. Shew, its former chief financial officer; and John DeSimone, chief financial officer; and John DeSimone, its former vice president of transactions, for its former vice president of transactions, for fraudulently inflating Homestore’s revenues fraudulently inflating Homestore’s revenues by causing the company to overstate its by causing the company to overstate its advertising revenues by $46 million (64%) advertising revenues by $46 million (64%) for the first three quarters of 2001. for the first three quarters of 2001.

Page 76: In Conclusion

Homestore Commission announced that it would not bring Commission announced that it would not bring

enforcement action against Homestore because of its enforcement action against Homestore because of its swift, extensive and extraordinary cooperation. swift, extensive and extraordinary cooperation.

Cooperation included reporting discovery of possible Cooperation included reporting discovery of possible misconduct to the Commission immediately upon the misconduct to the Commission immediately upon the audit committee's learning of it, conducting thorough audit committee's learning of it, conducting thorough and independent internal investigation, sharing and independent internal investigation, sharing results of that investigation with the government, results of that investigation with the government, terminating responsible wrongdoers, and terminating responsible wrongdoers, and implementing remedial actions designed to prevent implementing remedial actions designed to prevent the recurrence of fraudulent conduct. the recurrence of fraudulent conduct.

Page 77: In Conclusion

Financial Reporting & Issuer Disclosure: Themes and Trends

1.1. Coordination with criminal authoritiesCoordination with criminal authorities2.2. Emphasis on personal accountabilityEmphasis on personal accountability3.3. Effort to speed up our investigationsEffort to speed up our investigations4.4. Hold companies accountable for non-Hold companies accountable for non-

cooperationcooperation

5.5. Conduct of gatekeepers scrutinizedConduct of gatekeepers scrutinized

Page 78: In Conclusion
Page 79: In Conclusion

Frank E. Walsh, Jr. (Tyco) Commission filed a settled civil action alleging that Frank E. Commission filed a settled civil action alleging that Frank E.

Walsh Jr., a former Tyco director, violated the federal securities Walsh Jr., a former Tyco director, violated the federal securities laws by signing a Tyco registration statement that he knew laws by signing a Tyco registration statement that he knew contained material misrepresentations.contained material misrepresentations.

According to the complaint, the registration statement filed in According to the complaint, the registration statement filed in connection with Tyco's acquisition of The CIT Group Inc. connection with Tyco's acquisition of The CIT Group Inc. incorporated and attached an Agreement and Plan of Merger incorporated and attached an Agreement and Plan of Merger stating that no one other that Lehman Brothers and Goldman, stating that no one other that Lehman Brothers and Goldman, Sachs was entitled to an investment banking or finder's fee for Sachs was entitled to an investment banking or finder's fee for representing Tyco in the transaction. representing Tyco in the transaction.

At the time that he signed the registration statement, Walsh At the time that he signed the registration statement, Walsh knew that he had been promised a $ 20 million finder's fee for knew that he had been promised a $ 20 million finder's fee for having arranged a meeting of the companies' CEO's to discuss a having arranged a meeting of the companies' CEO's to discuss a possible merger.possible merger.

Page 80: In Conclusion

James A. Fitzhenry Fitzhenry was a Senior Vice President, General Fitzhenry was a Senior Vice President, General

Counsel and Secretary for FLIR Systems, IncCounsel and Secretary for FLIR Systems, Inc Commission found that in connection with FLIR’s Commission found that in connection with FLIR’s

1998 year-end audit, Fitzhenry signed management 1998 year-end audit, Fitzhenry signed management representation letters to FLIR’s auditors that he representation letters to FLIR’s auditors that he understood contained material misrepresentations understood contained material misrepresentations regarding $4.1 million in sales.regarding $4.1 million in sales.

In settlement, Fitzhenry agreed to:In settlement, Fitzhenry agreed to: Cease and desist from violating the lying-to-the-Cease and desist from violating the lying-to-the-

auditors rule of the Exchange Act, andauditors rule of the Exchange Act, and 5-year prohibition on appearing or practicing 5-year prohibition on appearing or practicing

before the Commission under Rule 102(e).before the Commission under Rule 102(e).

Page 81: In Conclusion

KPMG LLP Commission sued KPMG LLP and four KPMG Commission sued KPMG LLP and four KPMG

partners – including the head of the firm’s department partners – including the head of the firm’s department of professional practice – in connection with the audits of professional practice – in connection with the audits of Xerox Corp. from 1997 through 2000. of Xerox Corp. from 1997 through 2000. The Commission's complaint alleges that the The Commission's complaint alleges that the

defendants' fraudulent conduct allowed Xerox to defendants' fraudulent conduct allowed Xerox to inflate equipment revenues by approximately $3 inflate equipment revenues by approximately $3 billion and inflate pre-tax earnings by approximately billion and inflate pre-tax earnings by approximately $1.2 billion in the company's financial results for the $1.2 billion in the company's financial results for the relevant yearsrelevant years..

Commission’s action charges the firm and four partners Commission’s action charges the firm and four partners with fraud, and seeks injunctions, disgorgement of all with fraud, and seeks injunctions, disgorgement of all fees and civil money penalties. fees and civil money penalties.

Page 82: In Conclusion

Financial Reporting & Issuer Disclosure: Themes and Trends

1.1. Coordination with criminal authoritiesCoordination with criminal authorities2.2. Emphasis on personal accountabilityEmphasis on personal accountability3.3. Effort to speed up our investigationsEffort to speed up our investigations4.4. Hold companies accountable for non-Hold companies accountable for non-

cooperationcooperation5.5. Conduct of gatekeepers scrutinizedConduct of gatekeepers scrutinized

6.6. Compliance with GAAP not always Compliance with GAAP not always enoughenough

Page 83: In Conclusion
Page 84: In Conclusion
Page 85: In Conclusion

Edison Schools Only three months after initiating inquiry, Only three months after initiating inquiry,

Commission instituted settled cease-and-desist Commission instituted settled cease-and-desist proceeding against Edison Schools.proceeding against Edison Schools.

Commission found that Edison, despite technical Commission found that Edison, despite technical compliance with GAAP, inaccurately described compliance with GAAP, inaccurately described aspects of its business in its SEC filings, in violation aspects of its business in its SEC filings, in violation of the securities laws.of the securities laws. Specifically, Edison failed to disclose that a Specifically, Edison failed to disclose that a

substantial portion of its reported revenues consist substantial portion of its reported revenues consist of payments that never reach Edison. Funds are of payments that never reach Edison. Funds are instead expended by school districts to cover costs instead expended by school districts to cover costs of operating schools managed by Edison. of operating schools managed by Edison.

Page 86: In Conclusion

Edison Schools In settling the action, Edison agreed to:In settling the action, Edison agreed to:

Cease and desist from committing violationsCease and desist from committing violations Add to its management a Director of Internal Audit Add to its management a Director of Internal Audit

to report to the Audit Committee to report to the Audit Committee Create an Internal Audit Department appropriate Create an Internal Audit Department appropriate

for the company's size and business. for the company's size and business. PrinciplePrinciple: If a company makes filings with the : If a company makes filings with the

Commission that mischaracterize its business, or omit Commission that mischaracterize its business, or omit significant information, technical compliance with significant information, technical compliance with GAAP will not insulate it from enforcement action.GAAP will not insulate it from enforcement action.

Page 87: In Conclusion
Page 88: In Conclusion

PNC Financial Services

Accounting or alchemyAccounting or alchemy

Page 89: In Conclusion

SPEs:PNC Financial Services

Get weak loans and investments Get weak loans and investments off booksoff books

Avoid recognizing further lossesAvoid recognizing further losses Keep possibility of gainKeep possibility of gain Use SPE’s Use SPE’s

Page 90: In Conclusion

PNC Financial Services

Insurance company puts in 3% of equity for Insurance company puts in 3% of equity for all common stockall common stock

Looks like IC controls businessLooks like IC controls business PNC gets preferred for weak loans PNC gets preferred for weak loans SPE buys 30 year zero bond Treasury = SPE buys 30 year zero bond Treasury =

preferred after 30 yearspreferred after 30 years

Page 91: In Conclusion

PNC Financial Services

Not GAAPNot GAAP IC did not really put in 3%IC did not really put in 3% PNC really has the risk and rewardsPNC really has the risk and rewards Fed and SEC blow whistleFed and SEC blow whistle EPS – before restatement $1.91EPS – before restatement $1.91 Restated: $1.38Restated: $1.38 SEC charges fraudSEC charges fraud

Page 92: In Conclusion

PNC Financial Services

GAAP is not alchemyGAAP is not alchemy Even if GAAP, must evaluate material Even if GAAP, must evaluate material

accuracy and completeness of presentation accuracy and completeness of presentation of financial statementsof financial statements

Must disclose risksMust disclose risks

Page 93: In Conclusion
Page 94: In Conclusion

Financial Reporting & Issuer Disclosure: Themes and Trends

1.1. Coordination with criminal authoritiesCoordination with criminal authorities2.2. Emphasis on personal accountabilityEmphasis on personal accountability3.3. Effort to speed up our investigationsEffort to speed up our investigations4.4. Hold companies accountable for non-Hold companies accountable for non-

cooperationcooperation5.5. Conduct of gatekeepers scrutinizedConduct of gatekeepers scrutinized6.6. Compliance with GAAP not always enoughCompliance with GAAP not always enough7.7. Facilitating another company’s reporting Facilitating another company’s reporting

violations may create liabilityviolations may create liability

Page 95: In Conclusion

Accommodations:Ashford -- Amazon Resolve disputeResolve dispute Amazon will pay $600,000 to AshfordAmazon will pay $600,000 to Ashford Ashford will credit Amazon with providing Ashford will credit Amazon with providing

11,500 customers11,500 customers Ashford asks Amazon to split the deal into Ashford asks Amazon to split the deal into

two letters, one referring to 3000 customers two letters, one referring to 3000 customers and another for the balanceand another for the balance

Page 96: In Conclusion

Ashford -- Amazon Ashford charged with fraudAshford charged with fraud Amazon charged with being a cause of Amazon charged with being a cause of

Ashford’s reporting violation because Ashford’s reporting violation because Amazon knew or should have known that Amazon knew or should have known that the reason Ashford wanted to split the deal the reason Ashford wanted to split the deal was to allow Ashford to improperly defer was to allow Ashford to improperly defer expensesexpenses

Moral – do not be an accompliceMoral – do not be an accomplice

Page 97: In Conclusion

Financial Reporting & Issuer Disclosure: Themes and Trends

1.1. Coordination with criminal authoritiesCoordination with criminal authorities2.2. Emphasis on personal accountabilityEmphasis on personal accountability3.3. Effort to speed up our investigationsEffort to speed up our investigations4.4. Hold companies accountable for non-cooperationHold companies accountable for non-cooperation5.5. Conduct of gatekeepers scrutinizedConduct of gatekeepers scrutinized6.6. Compliance with GAAP not always enoughCompliance with GAAP not always enough7.7. Facilitating another company’s reporting violations Facilitating another company’s reporting violations

may create liabilitymay create liability8.8. Auditor independence remains a critical Auditor independence remains a critical

element of sound financial reportingelement of sound financial reporting

Page 98: In Conclusion
Page 99: In Conclusion

Ernst & Young and Moret Ernst & Young Accountants

Moret affiliate has business Moret affiliate has business arrangement with Baanarrangement with Baan

Moret audits Baan Moret audits Baan Moret relies on US E&Y which also Moret relies on US E&Y which also

had business arrangement with Baanhad business arrangement with Baan

Page 100: In Conclusion

Ernst & Young and Moret Ernst & Young Accountants

E&Y case involved joint E&Y case involved joint business arrangement between business arrangement between E&Y and audit client E&Y and audit client PeopleSoft. PeopleSoft.

Page 101: In Conclusion
Page 102: In Conclusion

PricewaterhouseCoopers and PricewaterhouseCoopers Securities Settled enforcement action against PricewaterhouseCoopers Settled enforcement action against PricewaterhouseCoopers

(PwC) and its broker-dealer affiliate, (PwC) and its broker-dealer affiliate, PricewaterhouseCoopers Securities (PwCS), for violations PricewaterhouseCoopers Securities (PwCS), for violations of the auditor independence rules. of the auditor independence rules.

The auditor independence violations arise from:The auditor independence violations arise from: PwC's use of prohibited contingent fee arrangements PwC's use of prohibited contingent fee arrangements

with 14 different audit clients for which PwCS provided with 14 different audit clients for which PwCS provided investment banking services, and investment banking services, and

PwC's participation with two other audit clients, Pinnacle PwC's participation with two other audit clients, Pinnacle Holdings Inc. and Avon Products Inc., in the improper Holdings Inc. and Avon Products Inc., in the improper accounting of costs that included PwC's own consulting accounting of costs that included PwC's own consulting feesfees

Page 103: In Conclusion

PWC and PWCS

PWC contingent fee arrangement with PWC contingent fee arrangement with 14 audit clients for which PWCS 14 audit clients for which PWCS provided investment banking servicesprovided investment banking services

For two clients, Pinnacle and Avon, For two clients, Pinnacle and Avon, PWC was also a cause of company’s PWC was also a cause of company’s GAAP violationsGAAP violations

Page 104: In Conclusion

PWC and PWCS Remedies

$5 million civil penalty$5 million civil penaltyC&D from violating the C&D from violating the

auditor independence rulesauditor independence rulesCensured for engaging in Censured for engaging in

improper professional improper professional conduct.conduct.

Page 105: In Conclusion

Section 10A -- Solucorp Company recognizes licensing revenue Company recognizes licensing revenue

before final dealbefore final deal Auditor finds backdated licensing Auditor finds backdated licensing

agreement agreement Auditor fails to determine whether act Auditor fails to determine whether act

illegal and fails to inform audit illegal and fails to inform audit committeecommittee

Page 106: In Conclusion

Andersen --Enron October 17, 2001 Enron announces October 17, 2001 Enron announces

problemsproblems Andersen destroys documentsAndersen destroys documents Andersen indictedAndersen indicted Clients fleeClients flee Engagement partner pleads guiltyEngagement partner pleads guilty Firm convictedFirm convicted

Page 107: In Conclusion

Andersen – WMI The Underlying Fraud

From 1992 to 1996, Waste From 1992 to 1996, Waste Management overstates earnings Management overstates earnings by $1.43 billion and understates by $1.43 billion and understates taxes by $178 milliontaxes by $178 million

Page 108: In Conclusion

Andersen Enjoined

Andersen and 3 partners Andersen and 3 partners enjoined from future fraudenjoined from future fraud

Andersen fined $7 millionAndersen fined $7 million

3 partners fined $30,000 to 3 partners fined $30,000 to $50,000 each$50,000 each

Page 109: In Conclusion

102(e) SanctionsAndersen and 4 partners Andersen and 4 partners

charged with improper charged with improper professional conduct professional conduct

Andersen censured Andersen censured

4 partners barred 4 partners barred

Page 110: In Conclusion

SEC Action First fraud injunction against a First fraud injunction against a

Big 5 firm in 20 yearsBig 5 firm in 20 years Record penalty against a Big 5 Record penalty against a Big 5

firm of $7 millionfirm of $7 million First case against Big 5 firm First case against Big 5 firm

Practice Director in 20 yearsPractice Director in 20 years

Page 111: In Conclusion

Andersen Indicted

Two months laterTwo months later SEC begins Enron inquirySEC begins Enron inquiry In October, Enron problems In October, Enron problems

surfacesurface Andersen starts destroying Andersen starts destroying

Enron documentsEnron documents

Page 112: In Conclusion

Special Study Pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 704 summarizes financial reporting Section 704 summarizes financial reporting

enforcement actions over the past five yearsenforcement actions over the past five years

Available on SEC website – www.Sec.GovAvailable on SEC website – www.Sec.Gov

Page 113: In Conclusion
Page 114: In Conclusion

What Preventive Measures can Management Take?

Page 115: In Conclusion

Preventive Measures for Mgmt.

First:First:

Full disclosure with your auditorsFull disclosure with your auditors Don’t wait for auditors to find problemsDon’t wait for auditors to find problems Vet novel or complex issues with Vet novel or complex issues with

national office technical expertsnational office technical experts

Page 116: In Conclusion

Preventive Measures

Keep audit committee informed at all timesKeep audit committee informed at all times Discuss significant accounting policies, Discuss significant accounting policies,

judgments and estimatesjudgments and estimates

Page 117: In Conclusion

Preventive Measures

Open discussions with Corp. Fin./OCAOpen discussions with Corp. Fin./OCA Pre-clearance program for novel and Pre-clearance program for novel and

unusual accounting questionsunusual accounting questions See SECPS Practice Alert No. 2002-1See SECPS Practice Alert No. 2002-1

Page 118: In Conclusion

Preventive Measures And, last but not leastAnd, last but not least

Assess the “tone at the top”Assess the “tone at the top” Aka – the “pressure from the top”Aka – the “pressure from the top”

Take a “fresh” look at your code of ethicsTake a “fresh” look at your code of ethics Ensure it is up-to-date and covers all lines of Ensure it is up-to-date and covers all lines of

businessesbusinesses Reminder: S-O to require disclosure of any change Reminder: S-O to require disclosure of any change

to or waiver of codeto or waiver of code

Page 119: In Conclusion

Earnings Releases

Perhaps the better approach is to issue Perhaps the better approach is to issue earnings in close proximity to the filing of earnings in close proximity to the filing of the financial statementsthe financial statements Accelerated filersAccelerated filers Caution: Pro forma earningsCaution: Pro forma earnings

Page 120: In Conclusion
Page 121: In Conclusion

Pro Formas: Trump Hotels

SEC’s first SEC’s first pro formapro forma financial reporting financial reporting case.case.

Commission found that Trump Hotels & Commission found that Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts violated Section 10(b) and Casino Resorts violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.Rule 10b-5.

Company was ordered to cease and desist Company was ordered to cease and desist from violating those provisions. from violating those provisions.

Page 122: In Conclusion

Trump Hotel – Pro Forma Financial data that is not GAAPFinancial data that is not GAAP

3Q ’99 Company trumpets results: 3Q ’99 Company trumpets results: “better than estimates;” result of “better than estimates;” result of improved operationsimproved operations

Disclose not counting $83 mil. one time Disclose not counting $83 mil. one time expenseexpense

Page 123: In Conclusion

Trump Hotel Do not disclose $17 million one time gain is Do not disclose $17 million one time gain is

included included Stock up 7.8%Stock up 7.8% Would not exceed estimates and would Would not exceed estimates and would

show revenue decline if excluded one time show revenue decline if excluded one time gaingain

Truth comes out: stock drops 6%Truth comes out: stock drops 6% Settled 10(b), 10b-5 C&DSettled 10(b), 10b-5 C&D

Page 124: In Conclusion

21(a) REPORT ON 21(a) REPORT ON COOPERATION:COOPERATION:

The “Seaboard Report”The “Seaboard Report”

Page 125: In Conclusion

21(a) Report on Cooperation

Framework for evaluating a proposed Framework for evaluating a proposed defendant’s cooperationdefendant’s cooperation

The carrot: Credit for extraordinary The carrot: Credit for extraordinary cooperationcooperation

The stick: Harsher remedies for lack The stick: Harsher remedies for lack of “full cooperation”of “full cooperation”

No promises -- Not an amnesty No promises -- Not an amnesty programprogram

Page 126: In Conclusion

21(a) Report on Cooperation

Wider range of outcomesWider range of outcomes Finer distinctions between wrongdoersFiner distinctions between wrongdoers Seaboard – No action against companySeaboard – No action against company Xerox -- $10 million penaltyXerox -- $10 million penalty Dynegy -- $3 million penaltyDynegy -- $3 million penalty

Page 127: In Conclusion

Four Principles

Self-policingSelf-policingSelf-reportingSelf-reportingRemediationRemediationCooperationCooperation

Page 128: In Conclusion

The Meaning of Cooperation Self-policingSelf-policing prior to discovery of misconduct prior to discovery of misconduct

Effective compliance proceduresEffective compliance proceduresAppropriate “tone at the top”Appropriate “tone at the top”

Self-reportingSelf-reporting misconduct upon discovery misconduct upon discoveryThorough review of nature, extent, Thorough review of nature, extent,

origins & consequencesorigins & consequencesDisclosure to public and regulatorsDisclosure to public and regulators

Page 129: In Conclusion

The Meaning of Cooperation

RemediationRemediationDismissing or appropriately Dismissing or appropriately

disciplining wrongdoersdisciplining wrongdoersInternal controls and procedures to Internal controls and procedures to

prevent recurrenceprevent recurrenceCompensating those adversely Compensating those adversely

affectedaffected Cooperation with law enforcement Cooperation with law enforcement

authoritiesauthorities

Page 130: In Conclusion

The Meaning of Cooperation:Internal Investigation

Independent counselIndependent counsel Forensic auditorsForensic auditors Share results with staffShare results with staff Waive work product, privileges Waive work product, privileges Secure cooperationSecure cooperation

Page 131: In Conclusion
Page 132: In Conclusion

Independent AccountantsEvery case raises the question:Every case raises the question:

Page 133: In Conclusion
Page 134: In Conclusion

Let’s Get Back to the Basics

Page 135: In Conclusion

Back to the Basics…Know your audit clientKnow your audit client Understand the key reports used by managementUnderstand the key reports used by management

Understand the budget processUnderstand the budget process

Understand the source of growthUnderstand the source of growth

Know your client’s industryKnow your client’s industry

Page 136: In Conclusion

Back to the Basics…

Don’t over rely on management’s Don’t over rely on management’s representationsrepresentations

Don’t get too comfortable with the clientDon’t get too comfortable with the client

Don’t engage in “Conversational Auditing”Don’t engage in “Conversational Auditing”

Page 137: In Conclusion

Back to the Basics…

““Professional skepticism is an attitude that Professional skepticism is an attitude that includes a questioning mind and a critical includes a questioning mind and a critical assessment of audit evidence.”assessment of audit evidence.”

Statement on Auditing Standards 99, October 2002Statement on Auditing Standards 99, October 2002

Page 138: In Conclusion

Professional Skepticism

Should be displayed by all members of the Should be displayed by all members of the team throughout the audit and review team throughout the audit and review engagementsengagements

Page 139: In Conclusion

Back to the Basics…

Vary the audit testing performedVary the audit testing performed

Prepare a detailed audit programPrepare a detailed audit program

Understand the client’s closing processUnderstand the client’s closing process

Don’t forget the general ledgerDon’t forget the general ledger

Page 140: In Conclusion

The Closing Process

Follow-up on all questionable items during Follow-up on all questionable items during the final analytical reviewthe final analytical review

Examine all consolidating financial Examine all consolidating financial statementsstatements Including, all post closing and top-side Including, all post closing and top-side

entriesentries

Page 141: In Conclusion

Back to the Basics… Open dialogue with audit committeeOpen dialogue with audit committee

Both proposed and passed audit adjustments as Both proposed and passed audit adjustments as a result of audit and the reviewsa result of audit and the reviews

Troubles encountered during audit or reviewsTroubles encountered during audit or reviews

Ongoing dialogue with “financial experts” on Ongoing dialogue with “financial experts” on committee may be necessarycommittee may be necessary

Page 142: In Conclusion

Back to the Basics…Issues encountered during the audit ---Issues encountered during the audit ---

Deal with the issue at handDeal with the issue at hand

Don’t try to “paper over” the problemDon’t try to “paper over” the problem

Management letter comment is not enoughManagement letter comment is not enough

Don’t make the client’s problem your ownDon’t make the client’s problem your own

Page 143: In Conclusion
Page 144: In Conclusion
Page 145: In Conclusion