Implicit and Explicit Mechanisms of Counteractive Self - Faculty

Chapter 1B

lmplicit and Explicit

Ayelet Fishbach

IIndividuals face a self-control problem whenthe attainment of their overriding long-term in-terests comes at the expense of short-term butinfluential outcomes. For example, the bore-dom that is often associated with studying longhours is a price students have to pay in order toattain academic success, and the discomfortthat is often associated with diering or under-going a medical checkup is a price people oftenhave to pay in order to mainrain good health.In many cases, individuals fail to pursue theirgoals because those goals do not seem suffi-ciently important, or because they feel theylack the means thar are required to achievethose goals. Self-control problems represent aspecial type of motivational confl ict. Individ-uals may want to pursue their goals. They mayalso have the prerequisite knowledge, skil l ,and opportunity. Nevertheless, short-term out-comes may tempt those individuals to actagainst their long-term interests. For example,a dieter may want to lose weight and know

Counteractive Self-Gontrol

what is required to achieve this goal. Neverthe-less, the smell of baking cake may lead thisperson to break the diet. Similarly a studentmay want to study for an important exam,know how to study for the exam, and possessthe required materials. Nevertheless, a beauti-ful spring day may be sufficiently tempting toprevent the student from studying for the examand achieving the academic goals he or shehas set. As these examples demonstrate, self-control problems arise when the pursuit ofhigh-order goals with long-term benefits doesnot coincide with the pursuit of low-ordergoals (i.e., desires and temptations) with short-term benefits.

Self-control phenomena have been studiedby theoreticians and researchers across differ-ent behavioral science disciplines, includingeconomics (e.g., Becker, 1960; O'Donoghue &Rabin,2000; Thaler & Shefr in, 1981), pol i t icalscience (e.g., Elster, 1.977;Schell ing, 1984), andpsychology (e.g., Ainslie, 2001; Baumeister &

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Vohs, 2004; Kuhl & Beckmann, 1985; Mischel& Patterson, 1976; Rachlin, 2000). In recentyears, there has been an upsurge in interest inself-control failures, the antecedents of suchfailures, and their maladaptive psychologi-cal consequences (e.g,, Baumeister, Bratslavsky,Muraven, & Tice, 1.998; Baumeister &Heatherton, 199 6; Baumeister, Heatherton, 6{Tice, 1.994; Loewenstein, 1995). Surprisingly,there has been a relatively small amount of re-search on the strategies individuals employ toovercome temptation. Walter Mischel's seminalresearch on delay of gratif ication has demon-strated that the cognitive strategies childrenemploy when facing a conflict between imme-diate and delayed rewards (e.g., distraction, ab-stract representation of the immediate reward)determine their abil ity to wait for the larger de-layed reward (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999;Mischel, 1974; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez,1,989). However, beyond the delay-of-gratif ication paradigm, there has been litt le sys-tematic research on self-control strategies, theconditions that give rise to the use of thosestrategies, and the consequences of their use forthe pursuit of one's goals.

To address these issues, we have conducted aprogram of research oL counter a ctiu e contr o l-namely, on how people protect their high-ordergoals against the influence of low-order tempta-tions. Based on counteractiue control theory(CCT-Fishbach & Trope, 2005; Trope &Fishbach, 2000), this research assumes thatwhen low-order temptations threaten the attain-ment of high-order goals, people proactively em-ploy counteractive control designed to offset theinfluence of low-order temptations on theirbehavior. Counteractive control is often an in-tentional process of committing to high-ordergoals and eliminating tempting alternatives. Forexample, dieters may deliberately plan to im-pose real and mentalsanctions on themselves forfailure to follow their self-imposed dietary con-straints. Counteractive control may also be anunconscious process. For example, the tempta-tion to have fatty food may automarically bringto mind thoughts about the goal to lose weight,which in turn may alter the dieter's motivation toorder this food in a restaurant. The present chap-ter describes a program of research on these de-liberative and implicit counteractive controlprocesses.'We start with a general description ofthe process of counteractive control. Next, wedescribe research on specific counteractive con-trol strategies, what activates rhem, and how

III. MOTIVATIONAL PROCESSES AND DIFFERENCES

they help people overcome temptation. 'We endwith a review of research bearing on the goal-directedness and flexi bil i ty of counteractive con-trol processes.

COUNTERACTIVE CONTROL

In order to accomplish high-order goals, indi-viduals need to resist the momentarily salient,yet lower-prioritS desires or temptations withwhich these goals are in conflict. CCT assumesthat temptations are defined within a given sit-uation and with respect to the overriding goalsat hand. This context-specific definit ion oftemptations suggests that any personal goalcan potentially constitute an interfering temp-tation with respect to another higher-level goal.For example, while "working out" may be per-ceived as interfering with the pursuit of higher-order academic objectives, this activity may initself represent a goal that is disrupted by otherlow-order enticements, such as the consump-tion of unhealthy food. Thus the immediatecost of studying is that one has to give up on aworkout, whereas the immediate cost of keep-ing in shape is that one has to give up on one'sfavorite foods.

In response to temptations, individuals en-gage in self-control operations designed to pro-tect their long-term interests (Dhar &Wertenbroch, 2000; Gollwitzer, 1.999; Kivetz6( Simonson,2002; Kuhl, 1985; Metcalfe &Mischel, 1.999; Muraven 6{ Baumeister, 2000;Trope & Fishbach, 2000). Specifically, thepresence of temptations influences behavior intwo opposite directions. Directly temptationsact to decrease the l ikelihood of acting accord-ing to high-order goals. However indirectlStemptations elicit counteractive control opera-tions, which in turn act to increase the l ikeli-hood of acting in l ine with goals. For example,an invitation to go out on the night before animportant exam directly decreases the l ikeli-hood of studying, but it may further set into ac-tion counteractive bolstering of the value ofstudying, which increases the l ikelihood of en-gaging in this activity. On a cold winter night,the perceived attractiveness of going out issmall, and l itt le or no counteractive controlwil l be exercised. However, on a beautifulspring night, the greater threat to studying mayelicit more intensive counteractive control ef-forts. As a result, a student who is tempted togo out on a beautiful spring night may study at

18. lmplicit and Explicit Counteractive Selt-Control

least as much as a student who is not temptedto go out on a cold winter night. In itself, theattractiveness of going out acts to diminish themotivation to study. However, the counter-active control efforts elicrted by the anticipatedpleasure of this activity may prevent the antici-pated pleasure from actually affecting the timethat a student devotes to studying.

CCT assumes that counteractive control is aflexible, goal-directed process. Counteractivecontrol therefore depends on the value of thehigh-order goal and on the absence of alter-native means of overcoming temptation ancshielding one's long-term interests. It is onlywhen low-order motives are expected to inter-fere with the attainment of important goals,and when external controls over one's behav-iors are absent, that counteractive control pro-cesses are set into action and determine the at-tainment of high-order objectives.

Self-control dilemmas are often experiencedas an internal confl ict that is resolved by em-ploying a variety of metacognitive strategiessuch as precommitments (Green 6c Rachlin,1995; Rachlin & Green, 1972; Thaler, 199I),self-imposed penalties and rewards (Ainslie,1975; Becke4 19601, and the formation ofimplementation intentions (Gollwitzer, 1990;Gollwitzer 6{ Brandstaetter, 1.997). CCT ac-knowledges the contribution of these high-levelself-control strategies to the resolution of self-control dilemmas. However, CCT further pro-poses that self-control dilemmas may be re-solved outside of conscious awareness andwithout intentional planning. In this respect,CCT is consistent with past research on auto-matic goal pursuit ( - Aarts & Dijksterhuis,2000; Bargh E< Chartrand, 1999; Bargh 6<Ferguson, 2000; Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai,Barndollar, & Troetschel, 200L; Moskowitz,Gollwitzer, Wasel, 6c Schaal, 1999; Shah &Kruglanski, 2003), which has demonstratedthat individuals are sometimes unaware of theorigins of their goals, their choice of means,and the actual pursuit of these goals. CCT goesbeyond this research by proposing that implicitcounteractive control may be elicited by situa-tional cues and at the same time may act to off-set the influence of these cues on behavior (e.g.,Fishbach, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003;Fishbach & Shah, 2006; Gollwitzer, Bayer, &McCulloch, 2005; Moskowitz et al., 1999).lnwhat follows, we describe some of the deliber-ate and implicit counteractive control strategiesour research has explored.

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Deliberate Gounteractive Control

Self-lmposed Penalties

Individuals may attempt to ensure that theypursue their high-order interests by imposingon themselves penalties ("side bets") for fail ingto do so (Ainslie, 1975; Becker, 1950). Theseself-imposed penalties may then actually pre-vent individuals from deviating from their goalpursuits. We investigated this strategy in astudy that manipulated the short-term costs ofundertaking an activity that had long-termbenefits. The question we addressed in thisstudy was how short-term costs affect the mag-nitude of self-imposed penalties (Trope &Fishbach, 2000, Study 1). \7e offered parrici-pants an opportunity to take a diagnostic testthat required abstinence from food containingglucose for either a short period of t ime (6hours) or a long period of t ime (3 days). Theperiod of abstinence manipulated the costs ofcompleting the test. Participants were thenasked to indicate the amount of money theywould be wil l ing to pay as a penalty for fail ingto complete the test. In line with CCI rheychose to set higher penalties for failure to com-plete a long period of abstinence than a shortperiod of abstinence. Since in itself, a long pe-riod of abstinence increases the l ikelihood offailure and thus the l ikelihood of having to paythe monetary penaltS we concluded that par-ticipants used the penalties to ensure that theabstinence did not prevent them from attainingthe useful feedback.

Self-lmposed Reward Contingencies

Individuals may change choice situations bymaking a reward contingent on performing anactivity. We examined this strategy by assessingparticipants' interest in making a bonus con-tingent upon completing a rest (Trope &Fishbach, 2000, Study 2). Participants were of-fered an opportunity to take part in a study onthe risk of heart disease that included a cardio-vascular test, which was said to be highly diag-nostic but to involve either a low or high degreeof physical discomfort. The participants werealso offered an extra course credit for undergo-ing the test, and were asked to indicate whetherthey preferred to receive the credit before or af-ter completing the test. Delaying the bonusmade it contingent on completing the test. Aspredicted, those who expected the more painfultest showed a greater preference to receive the

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bonus after the test-that is, to make the bonuscontingent on actual completion of the test. Byself-imposing this contingency, participantsrisked losing the bonus, but they also moti-vated themselves to complete the more painfulcardiovascular test.

Self-imposed penalties and self-imposed con-tingencies for receiving a reward change thechoice situation. By adopting these strategies,individuals precommit themselves to acting ac-cording to their long-term interests (Brickman,1987). Individuals may precommit themselvesmore directly by eliminating action alternativesand thus making their decision to act irrevers-ible (Ainslie, 1.975; Green 6< Rachlin, 1996;Rachl in & Green, 1972; Schel l ing,1978,1984;Strotz, 1956; Thaler, 1.991.;Thaler & Shefrin,1981). For example, people may choose toeliminate the presence of cigarettes, alcohol, orhigh-calorie food in order to increase the l ikeli-hood of pursuing a healthy l ifesryle. By adopt-ing this strategy, people eliminate their futurefreedom of choice, which they ordinarily seekto maintain (Brehm, 1,966), in order to securethe attainment of high-order interests.

Bolstering the Value of an Activity

Other counteractive control strategies changethe meaning of choice alternatives. People mayselectively process information about these al-ternatives in order to increase the value of ad-hering to high-order goals and decrease thevalue of low-order temptations (e.g., Kuhl,1986; Mischel,1.984). The value of high-ordergoals is increased by l inking the attainment ofthese goals to self-standards. Failure to pursuethese goals is then construed as a violation ofimportant values and a threat to people's senseof self-worth (Bandura, 1989). In addition,people may bolster the value of attaining theirgoals by elaborating upon whar makes attain-ment of these goals important and emotionallygratifying (Beckmann & Kuhl, 1985; Fishbach,Shah, & Kruglanski , 2004; Kuhl , 1984).

In a study that tested for counteractive eval-uations (i.e., individuals' tendency to bolsterthe importance and perceived interest of an ac-tiviry that serves a high-order goal but has im-mediate costs), participants were offered totake a rest of the influence of glucose intake onrheir cognitive functioning (Trope & Fishbach,2000, Study 3). As in our previous studS thetest was described as requiring abstinence fromfood containing glucose for either a long or a


short period (3 days vs. 6 hours). 'We thenfound that participants evaluated the test morepositively when it required a long period of glu-cose abstinence than when it required a shortperiod of abstinence. Furthermore, this studyalso assessed participants' intention to take thetest. A series of path analyses conducted onbehavioral intentions revealed that, in itself, along versus short period of abstinence directlydecreased participants' interest in taking thetest. But indirectly, a long versus short periodof abstinence elicited bolstering of the value ofthe test, which in turn increased participants'interest in the test. These direct and indirect ef-fects canceled each other out, suggesting thatcounteractive bolstering of the value of a costlytest prevented the physical discomfort of thetest from diminishing participants' interest inundergoing the test.

The counteractive control processes de-scribed thus far proactively change the motiva-tional givens of choice situations, thereby in-creasing the l ikelihood of adhering to long-term interests. These processes are deliberateand may require some level of consciousawareness, intentionality and processing re-sources. As such, they may depend on cognitiveload, t ime pressure, mood, fatigue, and priorself-control efforts (see also Baumeister et al.,1998; Mischel, 1,996; Muraven & Baumeister,2000; Trope & Neter, 1994; Vohs 6< Heather-ton, 2000). In the rest of this section, weexplore the possibil i ty that deliberate counter-active control strategies are supplemented andeven supplanted by more implicit forms ofcounteractive control, which are elicited auto-matically and are less susceptible to depletedmental resources.

lmplicit Gounteractive Control

Individuals may engage in counteractive con-trol without realizing that they are trying toovercome temptation. They may be aware ofthe presence of a temptation and consciouslytry to bolster the value of their higher-ordergoal, without recognizing the relationship be-tween the temptation and the bolstering re-sponses. For instance, students may not fullyrecognize the relationship between an en-hanced evaluation of an upcoming exam andthe presence of their favorite television show,which poses a temptation to give up studying.Individuals may thus see their biased evalua-tions as reflecting the inherent value of differ-

18. lmplicit and Explicit Counteractive Self-Control

ent choice alternatives rather than as a mecha-nism that directs their choice among thesealternatives. In these cases, the temptations andthe overriding goals are processed consciously.It is possible, however, for the temptation toelicit counteractive control automatically with-out conscious awareness. The studies describedbelow were designed to test this possibil i ty.

I m p I i c it Co u nte ractive Activati o n

CCT proposes that when a temptation is madesalient, individuals may respond by directingtheir attention to the overriding goal. Consis-tent with this proposal, we found that studentswho were asked to describe their favorite socialactivit ies subsequently elaborated on the valueof studying, and as a result were more l ikely tostudy for their exams (Trope & Fishbach, 2000,Study 5). A similar process of goal activation bytemptation may take place more implicit lywhen people are unaware of the presentation oftemptation-related primes. Moreover, not onlytemptations elicit automatic goal activation(i.e., greater goal accessibil i ty); the presentationof goal-related primes can elicit inhibit ion ofconcepts related to temptations (i.e., weakertemptation accessibil i ty) (Fishbach er al., 2003;Shah, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2002).

These processes were explored in a series ofstudies that assessed (1) the activarion level of aconstruct representing a potential goal after asubliminal presentation of a construct repre-senting a potentially obstructive temptation,and (21 the activation of temptation constructsafter presentation of goal constructs (Fish-bach et al., 2003). These studies found thattemptation-related concepts facil i tated the acti-vation Ievel of goals (as indicated by faster lexi-cal decision times), whereas goal-related con-cepts inhibited the activation of temptations (asindicated by slower lexical decision times). Forexample, one of these studies used participants'self-reported goals and temptations to obraingoal-temptation pairs such as study-basketballor faithful-sex. lt was then found that goal-related keywords (e.g., study) were morequickly recognized following subliminal pre-sentation of temptation-related keywords (e.g.,basketball), whereas temptation recognitionwas inhibited by goal primes (Fishbach et al.,2003, Study 1). This was taken as evidence forimplicit counteractive control, because parrici-pants were unaware of the subliminally pre-sented goal and tempration stimuli.

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Using a similar sequential priming proce-dure, another study (Fishbach et al., 2003,Study 2) found that this temptation-elicitedgoal activation as independent of cognitiveload (memorizing a nine-digit number). Partici-pants under cognitive load and participantsunder no load were equally l ikely to activateconcepts representing a goal after being primedwith concepts representing temptation, andthey were also equally l ikely to inhibit conceptsrepresenting temptation after being primedwith goal concepts. For example, independentof load conditions, temptation primes (e.g.,drugs) facilitated the activation level of targetsrelated to religious goals (e.g., Biblel, whereasreligious primes inhibited the activation of tar-gets related to temptations.

Other studies (Fishbach et al., 2003, Studies4-5) found a direct l ink between implicit acti-vation patterns of this sort and successful reso-lution of a self-control dilemma. These studiesfound, for example, that dieters activated con-cepts related to dieting in response to fatty foodprimes. As a result, after being exposed to foodprimes, dieters were more l ikely to choose ahealthy snack over a fatty snack in a subse-quent choice task. It seems likely, then, that as aresult of counteractive control individuals asso-ciate temptations with concepts related to anoverriding goal, and these associative patternsmay then shield them against the detrimenta,effect of temptations.

lmplicit Counteractive Evaluation

Keeping an overriding goal at the forefront ofattention diminishes the value of acting accord-ing to short-term preferences. However, peoplemay also direcdy decrease the value of suc-cumbing to a temptation by attending to itsnegative affective aspects and by attending tothe posirive aspects of an overriding goal.These counteractive evaluations may take anexplicit form when, for instance, individualselaborate upon what makes the attainment ofsome goals important and emorionally gratify-ing (Fishbach 6c Trope, 2005; Kuhl, 1984;Trope & Fishbach, 2000). They may also beexpressed more implicit ly in the form of an im-pl ic i t evaluat ion.

'We used an evaluative priming procedure toinvestigate implicit counteractive evaluations( :. Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto,7992; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams,'1.995;Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes,

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1986). \7e predicted that counteractive evalua-tions would produce asymmetrical shifts insubjective value: Accessible goal-related con-structs would undermine the value of temp-tation, whereas accessible temptation-relatedconstructs would augment the value of thegoal.

In one study (Fishbach, Zhang, 6d Trope,2007, Study 1), we manipulated goal accessi-bil i ty by asking participants to unscramble sen-tences that included words related to achieve-ment (e.g., ambitious, excellentl or not ('Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Srull 6c Wyer,1,9791, 'Ve then measured the implicit evalua-tion of academic and nonacademic conceots ina second task that assessed rhe time for catego-rizing positive and negative target words aftersubliminal academic (e.g., study) and non-academic (e.g., mouiel primes. As expected,when achievement goals were accessible (vs.the control condition), subliminal nonaca-demic primes facil i tated rhe categorization ofnegative targets, whereas subliminal academicprimes facil i tated the categorization of positivetargets. For example, nonacademic primes fa-cil i tated categorization o( cancer, whereas aca-demic primes facilitated loue.

Another study (Fishbach et al., 2007, Study4) manipulated the accessibil i ty of temptations,this time in the domain of healthy eating. Par-ticipants, who were all weight watchers, evalu-ated pictures depicting unhealthy food items(e.g., chocolate cakes, ice cream) versus neutralpictures in the control condition. \We then mea-sured the implicit evaluation of unhealthy ver-sus healthy food concepts (e.g., pizza vs. salad),using a similar evaluative priming procedure.In the condition of accessible temptations, wefound a counteractive boost in the implicitvalue of healthy foods. Furthermore,

" gri"t.t

accessibil i ty of unhealrhy foods underminedthe implicit value of these foods. These resultsfurther demonstrate that when faced with self-control confl icts, individuals engage in implicitcounteractive evaluations that increase thevalue of the goal in response to temptation-related cues, and decrease the value of tempta-tion in response to goal-related cues.

lmplicit Dispositions toward Goalsand away from Temptations

While exercising self-control, individuals oftenchoose to keep tempting objects out of sightand lar from reach, while maintaining a close


proximity to other objects that are more closelyassociated with their long-term objectives(Ainslie, 1,992; Rachlin 6. Green, 1.972;Schelling, 1984; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981;'Wertenbroch, 1998). For example, foreseeingthe self-control problems that the presence ofcigarettes, alcohol, or culinary delights may in-duce, people sometimes choose to eliminatethese objects from their houses; or, foreseeingthe problems that a previous romantic partnermay impose, a person sometimes moves to adifferent city or job.

A series of studies by Fishbach and Shah(2006) examined a more implicit form of thesecounteractive tactics. The method was basecon the finding reported by Solarz (I960), ancthen by Bargh and his colleagues (Chen &Bargh, 1999; Duckworth, Bargh, Garcia, &Chaiken, 20021, that people are faster to pull alever toward them to indicate an approach ori-entation and to pull a lever away from rhem toindicate an avoidance orientation. Fishbachand Shah found that while participants tendedto automatically approach stimuli relared togoals (through faster pull ing responses), theyavoided temptation stimuli (through fasterpull ing and pushing responses). Interestingly,the participants' tendency to avoid temptationsincreased in direct proportion to their explicirevaluation that these temptarions were indeedattractive for them, and it had instrumenralvalue in offsetting individuals' original ten-dency to approach tempting stimuli. For exam-ple, successful (vs. Iess successful) student par-ticipants responded faster with pull ing (i.e.,approaching) when presented with academicstimuli (e.g., studying), and with pushing (i.e.,avoiding) when presented with nonacademicstimuli (e.9., partying). These tendencies in-creased with the perceived atrractiveness ofnonacademic temptations during a break in theacademic schedule, when they did not pose athreat for goal attainment (Fishbach & Shah,2006, Study 3).

Moreover, the tendency to automatically ap-proach goals and avoid temptations facil i tatedthe attainment of high-order interests. For ex-ample, in another study (Fishbach & Shah,2006, Study 4), reaction times for pull ing aca-demic goals (e.g., l ibrary, homeutork) andpushing nonacademic temptations (e.g., trauel,party) predicted student participants' gradepoint averages. Similarly participants whowere asked to pull ( i.e., approach) in responseto academic-related concepts, and to push (i,e.,


avoid) in response to nonacademic concepts,were planning to invest more time in theirhomework compared than were students whocompleted the opposite categorization task.These findings suggest that implicit approachand avoidance predispositions of this sort mayplay an important role in adhering to high-or-der goals.

Taken together, the studies described in thissection shed light on the counteractive controlstrategies people employ when they anticipatesituations that pit low-order temptationsagainst high-order goals. These strategieschange the motivational givens of the choicesituation in order to secure the attainment ofhigh-order goals. The greater the temptation toabandon the goals, the more l ikely people areto exercise counteractive control, and as a re-sult to remain committed to pursuing theirgoals. The research described in this sectionfurther demonstrates that counteractive boost-ing of high-order goals and the resulting resis-tance to temptation may be implicit processes.These implicit operations are important, sincethey enable people to successfully implementtheir goals under conditions of depleted re-sources and whenever there is an advantage forresponding quickly. Implicit counteractive con-trol of this sort produces an implicit inocula-tion against situations that pose a threat ropeople's long-term objectives. This implicit in-oculation mechanism may then free the indi-viduals to set high-level goals without havingto exert much effort in resisting immediatetemPtatlons.

THE FLEXIBILITYOF COUNTERACTIVE CONTROT

CCT assumes that counteractive control is aflexible, goal-directed mechanism that is setinto action when low-order temptations inter-fere with individuals' pursuit of their high-or-der interests. The research described in theearlier section supports this assumption byshowing that counteractive control processesare contingent on exposure to low-order temp-tations that interfere with pursuing goals. Inthis section, we explore two additional hy-potheses that follow the assumption thatcounteractive control is a flexible self-controlprocess. The first is that counteractiue controlis goal-dependent.That is, individuals wil l ex-ert more counteractive control when low-order

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desires threaten important rather than un-important goals. Once a goal is achieved,counteractive control wil l cease. The secondhypothesis is that counteractiue control issubstitutable. That is, counteractive conrrolwill be exerted when it is necessary for achiev-ing goals. 'When other, external means of con-trol are in place, counteractive control wil lcease.

Goal-Dependent Counteractive GontrolCCT assumes that counteractive control effortsare means to the end of attaining long-term in-terests. One could argue, however, that theseefforts have intrinsic value-that overcomingtemptations is challenging in and of itself(Atkinson & Feather, 1965; Brehm,

.Wright,

Solomon, Silka, & Greenberg, 1983; Brehm &Self , 1989; Wright & Brehm, 1984). One couldalso argue that temptations activate counter-active evaluations inflexiblS regardless of peo-ple's goals. Our findings that counteractivecontrol actually helps individuals attain theirgoals indirectly support the goal-directednessassumption of CCT. Several studies, describedbelow, provide a more direct test of this as-sumptlon.

Goal lmpoftance

If counteractive control is goal-dependent, thenit should depend on the importance individualsplace on the threatened high-order goal. Thishypothesis was originally tested in the study onthe self-imposed contingencies for receiving areward (Trope & Fishbach, 2000). Recall thatin that studS participants made a bonus con-tingent upon completion of a cardiovasculartest when the test was described as physicallypainful. This study also assessed the impor-tance participants placed on maintaining goodhealth, before the information about the car-diovascular test was handed out. 'We found tharonly participants to whom maintaining goodhealth was an important value preferred thebonus to be contingent on completing the pain-ful test. The rest of the participants, to whomhealth was a less important value, tendedto choose according to simple economicconsiderations-accepting the bonus beforerather than after completing the test. It seems,then, that short-rerm costs do not elicitcounteractive control unless they threaten cen-tral values.

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Goal Completion

If counteractive control is goal-dependent, thenit should be employed before rather than aftergoal completion. We tested for this hypothesisby assessing counteractive bolstering of thevalue of studying for an important exam beforeand after the exam, and as a function of prim-ing social motives that interfere with studying(Trope 6c Fishbach,2000, Study 5). Before anexam, bolstering the value of studying mayhave instrumental value in helping studentsprepare for the exam. After the exam, studyingis no longer a goal, and bolstering its value canonly reduce the dissonance created by what thestudents had to sacrif ice in order to pursue thisactivity (Aronson, 1997; Cooper & Fazio,1 984; Festing er, 1.9 57 ; Shultz & Lepper, 1,9 9 6).

Participants in this study were students 1week before or after taking a midterm exam inan introductory psychology course. A tempta-tion to abstain from studying was primed byasking half of the students to elaborate on theirsocial l ives. These questions were followed byquestions regarding the value and importanceof the exam, which assessed counteractive bol-stering of studying. Consistent with our predic-tions, we found that priming of competingsocial motives led students to bolster the im-portance of studying before taking the exam,but not after taking it. After the exam, socialpriming had no effect on evaluations, whichwere generally low. Moreover, a series of pathanalyses indicated that evaluative bolsteringenhanced students' performance on the upcom-ing exam. SpecificallS before the exam, socialpriming directly impaired performance on theexam, but indirectly this priming manipulationled participants to bolster the value of study-ing, which in turn predicted relatively highgrades on the exam. These opposite effects ofsocial priming canceled each other out, so thatoverall counteractive control prevented socialpriming from impairing grades on the exam.This pattern of results was not obtained 1 weekafter the exam, when counteractive bolsteringof the value of studying no longer had any in-strumental value. Consistent with the goal-directedness assumption, these findings suggestthat counteractive control is exercised onlywhen there is an important goal at stake.

Goal-Dependent lnplicit Counteractive Control

Is implicit counteractive control goal-dependent?Does it depend on the importance of the over-


riding goal? Recent studies have foundevidence for f lexibil i ty and goal dependency inautomatic evaluations (e.g., Ferguson & Bargh,2004; Mitchel l , Nosek, & Banaj i ,2003). Doesthis also hold true for implicit counteractivecontrol? To address this question, we examinedwhether an implicit devaluation of temptationsdepends on the presence of an accessible goal(Fishbach er al., 2007); as indicated earlier,only those who were primed with an achieve-ment goal expressed an implicit negative evalu-ation of nonacademic temptations along withan implicit positive evaluation of the goal.

In yet another studS we tested for individualdifferences in chronically holding a goa[. ]We

predicted that only committed individuals (e.g.,committed dieters) would express an implicitnegative evaluation of temptations (e.g., fatten-ing foods). This study assessed commitment todieting by using a subset of the RestrainedEating Scale (Polivy, Herman, & \7arsh, 1.978;Ruderman & Besbeas, 1.992), and it used anevaluative priming task similar to that of Fazioet al. (1995): lt assessed the speed of categoriz-ing negative and positive targets followingsubliminal presentation of concepts relatedto high-calorie food versus weight-watchingprimes. In support of the goal dependency as-sumption, subliminal food primes (e.g., candy,cakel facilitated the categorization of negative(vs, positive) targets, and subliminal weight-watching primes (e.g., diet, slim) facrlitated cat-egorization of positive (vs, negative) targets,but only for committed dieters. These effectswere not observed among participants whowere not trying to lose weight and therefore didnot exhibit an implicit negative evaluation oftemptations and positive evaluation of goals.Another study examined the effect of commit-ment to dieting on participants' implicit dispo-sit ions toward approaching weight-watchingconcepts and avoiding food-related concepts(Fishbach & Shah, 2006, Study 2). As ex-pected, participants showed faster responsetimes for pull ing (i.e., approaching) words re-lated to weight watching, and pushing (i.e.,avoiding) words related to high-calorie food,but only to the extent that they were concernedwith watching their weight.

Commitment to dieting may also moderatethe goal-activation-by-temptation effect. In astudy that tested for this idea, participantscompleted a subliminal priming lexical deci-sion task in which the targets were words re-lated to dieting and the subliminal primes wereeither related to hieh-calorie food or not


(Fishbach et al., 2003, Study 4). Participantsalso indicated how important weight watchingwas for them, and how successful they were atwatching their weight. It was then found thatthe more important weight watching was toparticipants, the faster successful (but not un-successful) self-regulators were to recognizediet-related targets following fattening foodprimes (but not control primes), In otherwords, only committed dieters who were suc-cessful at controll ing their body weight as-sociated food temptations with dieting. Thispattern suggests that successful, more than un-successful, self-regulators developed implicitcounteractive controls in direct proportion totheir goal commitment.

In sum, the present studies on goal depend-ency provide consistent support for the as-sumption that counteractive control is a goal-directed process-a means to the end of secur-ing the pursuit of long-term interests. Interest-inglS both implicit and more deliberate formsof counteractive control show goal depend-ency. Individuals seem to exercise implicit ordeliberate counteractive control only when im-portant goals are at stake.

The Substitutability of Self-Control

The assumption that counteractive controlsarc goal-directed suggests that they aresubstitutable-namely, that they are set into ac-tion only in the absence of alternative, externalmeans of control. Such alternatives often takethe form of social controls, such as familymembers, employers, and other social agentsthat impose incentives, social norms, and rulesdesigned to help individuals overcome tempta-tions. Media censorship, and laws prohibit ingsubstance abuse and gambling, are commonexamples of externally imposed controls. Or-ganizations may encourage and even requiretheir members to maintain their health by re-fraining from cigarette smoking, engaging inphysical exercise, and undergoing periodicalmedical checkups. At a more informal level, in-dividuals sometime crit icize their friends orfamily members for eating fattening food oroverspending.

These external means of control may be suf-ficient to maintain a high probabil ity of actingaccording to high-order goals, and may thussubstitute for self-control. For example, thepr€sence of social incenrives to complete a bor-ing dril l may render counteractive bolstering ofthis activity unnecessary. In general, CCT pre-

289

dicts that in the absence of external control,counteractive self-control wil l be exercised, be-cause it determines the l ikelihood of pursuingone's goals. However, in the presence of exter-nal control, counteractive self-control may be-come superfluous, as external control may besufficient to maintain a high probabil ity of act-ing according to high-order goals. Externalcontrol may thus substitute for self-control.

Take, for instance, the effects of externally im-posed controls on counteractive evaluation andactual choice of an option with long-term value.In the absence of externally imposed controls,self-control wil l be exercised and the option wil lbe evaluated more positiuely when it is expectedto have higher short-term costs.These prechoicecounteractive evaluations in turn wil l offset theimpact of the higher expected short-term costson actual choice of the option. Thus, by elicit inggreater counteractive control efforts, the higherexpected short-term costs of an option shouldindirectly act to increase the l ikelihood ofchoos-ing the option. In contrast, in the presence of ex-ternally imposed controls, self-control effortswil l not be exerted; as a result, the evaluation ofthe option wil l reflect its expected short-termcosts. That is, in the presence of externally im-posed controls, an option wil l be evaluate dmorenegatiuely when it has bigher short-term costs.However, externally imposed controls will pre-vent this evaluation from decreasing the l ikeli-hood of actually choosing the option. Thus, as isin the absence of externally imposed controls,the l ikelihood of choosing the option wil l not bediminished by its higher expected short-termcosts.

These substitutabil ity predictions weretested in a study that presented participantswith an opportunity to take a diagnostic test oftheir cognitive functioning at night (Fishbach& Trope, 2005, Study 3). The immediate costof taking the test was varied by scheduling thetest either at a convenient early-night t ime(9:00 P.v.) or an inconvenient lare-night t ime(1:00 e.v.).

.We further manipulated social

control by either offering or not offering a largepayment (approximately $20) for taking thetest. Two forms of counteractive control wereassessed. First, to assess self-imposed fines, par-ticipants were asked to indicare the amount ofmoney they were prepared to pay as a cancella-tion fee if they failed to complete the test. Sec-ond, evaluative bolstering was assessed by theperceived value of rhe test. Finally, participantswere asked to decide whether thev actuallv in-tended to take the test.

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Analysis of the self-imposed fines yielded theexpected pattern, indicating that the fines un-paid participants imposed on themselves werehigher when the test was scheduled at an incon-venient late-night t ime than when the test wasscheduled at a convenient early-night t ime. Incontrast, the fines paid participants imposed onthemselves were unaffected by the time of thetest. It appears that payment eliminated theneed to use the fines as a self-control strategy.In other words, externally imposed controlsubstituted for self-imposed penalties. Analysisof participants' evaluations of the test yielded asimilar pattern. Unpaid participants evaluatedthe test more positively when it was scheduledat an inconvenient t ime, whereas paid partici-pants evaluated the test more positively when itwas scheduled at a convenient t ime. Unlike un-paid participants, the evaluations by paid par-ticipants showed a more conventional effect oftemporary inconvenience-that is, a less posi-tive evaluation of the inconvenient test than ofthe convenient test. Paid participants appar-ently allowed the inconvenience of the test todiminish their evaluation of the test. As withself-imposed penalties, the promised paymentsubstituted for evaluative bolstering of the in-convenlent test.

In another study, external controls were in-stituted via social monitoring (Fishbach &Trope, 2005, Study 1). The study offered par-ticipants the opportunity to take a diagnostictest of their reading skil ls and assessed theirevaluation of the test. The immediate price oftaking the test was manipulated by describingthe test as involving reading boring versus in-terestinB short paragraphs. Social monitoringwas manipulated by having the experimenterpresent or absent while participants made theirdecision whether or not to complete the test. Asexpected, participants bolstered the value ofrhe boring (rather rhan interesting) test only inthe absence of an experimenter in the room.Similar results were obtained in a study thatprimed social controls (Fishbach & Trope,2005, Study 2). Participanrs were either primedor not primed with representations of otherswho expected rhe participants to study (e.g., aparent or a teacher). In addition, participantswere either primed or not primed with activi-t ies that would interfere with studying (e.g.,watching television, going to movies). Wefound that when external controls were notprimed, the priming (vs. no priming) of dis-tracting activiries elicited more positive evalua-


tion of studying. In contrast, when externalcontrols were primed, the priming of distract-ing activit ies elicited more negative evalua-tion of studying. Thus, consistent with thesubstitutabil ity assumption, priming socialcontrols eliminated counteractive bolsteringof studying, so that studying seemed less at-tractive when its immediate costs came tomind.

Overall, the results of these studies are con-sistent with the idea that self-control and exter-nal control are substitutable. An immediatetemptation steers people away from activitiesthat serve an overriding goal. In the absence ofexternal means of control, individuals exercisecounteractive control in order to overcome thistemptation, The presence of external controls(e.g., representations of others, social monitor-ing, and external rewards) secures the attain-ment of important goals regardless of immedi-ate temptations. As a result, in the presence ofexternal controls, individuals' evaluations ofactivit ies reflect, rather than counteract, thepresence of those costs.

c0NcLUsr0Ns

The research reviewed in this chapter has im-portant implications regarding goal activationand hedonic conceptions of human motivation.A simple goal activation rule would suggestthat activating a goal promotes its pursuit andinhibits activation and pursuit of confl ictinggoals (see e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 1.999;Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; Kruglanski et al.,2002; Shah er al., 2002). By this rule, activatingsocial goals (e.g., partying) should increase thepursuit of social goals and inhibit achievementgoals (e.g., studying). The research reviewed inthis chapter suggests that this is not always thecase. For example, we found that priming so-cial goals before an exam promoted rather thanweakened students' commitment to studyingand actually improved their performance onthe exam (Trope & Fishbach, 2000, Study 5). Itseems, then, that to predict how the activationof a goal affects behavior, it is necessary to takeinto account the relationship of that goal toone's high-order, overriding interests. 'When agiven goal (partying) interferes with the attain-ment of one's high-order inrerests (doing wellon an exam), activating the interfering goalpromotes the pursuit of these interests ratherthan the interfering goal.

'18. lmplicit and Explicit Counteractive Self-Control

Similar considerations apply to hedonic con-ceptions of motivation. A simple hedonic rulewould suggest that behavior is a function of thepleasure and pain with which it is associated.Attaching pleasurable outcomes to a behaviorshould increase its probabil ity, and attachingnegative outcomes to the behavior should de-crease its probabil ity. By this rule, nice weathershould increase the l ikelihood that a studentstudying for an exam will abstain from study-ing. SimilarlS the painfulness of a medical pro-cedure should decrease the l ikelihood that itwil l actually be undertaken. The research oncounteractive control suggests that behavioroften violates this simple hedonic rule. For ex-ample, we found that describing a medicalcheckup as more painful increased partici-pants' commitment to undergoing the checkup(Trope & Fishbach, 2000, Studies 1-3). Thusartaching pleasurable outcomes to a behaviormay reduce its attractiveness when the behav-ior is in confl ict with high-order goals, and at-taching painful outcomes to a behavior may in-crease its appeal when the behavior serveshigh-order goals.

These seemingly paradoxical exceptions tosimple goal activation and hedonic rules mayreflect the same counteractive control logic.'Without

counteractive control, an action be-comes less attractive when it is implicit ly or ex-plicit ly associated with high short-term costs.The sacrif ices that are associated with weightwatching, undergoing medical checkups, orstudying act to reduce the attractiveness of en-gaging in these activit ies. Counteractive con-trol, in both its implicir and deliberate forms,serves to increase the attractiveness of such ac-tivit ies in direct proportion to their short-termcosts. As a result, counteractive control helpsmaintain a high probabil ity of pursuing high-order goals, despite the short-term costs thismay entail. This enables people to set goals andformulate plans for achieving them, with asense of assurance that they wil l not be temptedto deviate from their plans in a way that theywill later regret.

Our research suggests that counteractivecontrol is a flexible, goal-directed process.First, people seem to exercise counteractivecontrol when situational temotations threatentheir abi l i ty to pursue impoitant rather thanunimportanr high-order goals. Second,counteractive control decreases following thepursuit of a goal-related activity. Before per-forming an activit% counteractive control can

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help people choose and carry out the activity,whereas after performing the activity, counter-active control has no instrumental value andcan only reduce dissonance and regret(Aronson, 1,997; Cooper 6c Fazio, 1984;Festinger, 1957). Third, counteractive controlis substitutable, People exercise self-controlwhen it is necessary for achieving their high-or-der goals. \7hen other means of control are inplace (e.g., social agents or material rewards),counteractive control becomes superfluous andceases.

The flexibil iry of counteractive control pro-cesses does not mean that they are necessarilybased on deliberate reasoning. Past self-controlresearch has been primarily concerned withhigh-level evaluative processes (Baumeisteret a l . , 1,998; Beckmann Ea Kuhl , 1985;Gollwitzer, 1990; Gollwitzer k Brandstaetter,1997; Mischel, 1.984; Mischel, Cantor, &Feldman, 1.9961.The present research adds tothis work by demonstrating more implicitforms of counteractive control that, l ike delib-erate counteractive controls, shield high-ordergoals from low-order temptations. We believethat counteractive controls, l ike any other men-tal operation, may become automatized afterbeing repeatedly and successfully employed inresolving self-control problems, As a result, in-dividuals may need to engage in very l itt le con-scious deliberation in carrying out some or allof the steps of counteractive control.

The research described in this chapter mayhelp shed new light on the processes of coun-teractive control, buf important questions re-garding the origins of counteractive controls,the relationships among different kinds ofcounteractive controls, and rheir consequencesremain unexplored. One such question is howimplicit controls develop. It seems plausible tosuggest that these controls develop over re-peated experiences at deliberate self-control at-tempts. AlternativelS implicit and deliberativecounteractive controls may develop in parallel,as two independent sets of distinctive controlsystems that complement each other. Anotherquestion concerns the relationship between dif-ferent counteractive control strategies, and spe-cif ically between deliberate and implicit con-trols. It is possible that different counteractivecontrol strategies can substitute for each otheror serve as a "backup system" in relation roeach other. Alternatively, it is also possible rhatonly a combination of counteractive controlstrategies enables successful pursuit of long-

292

term interests. 'We know very l itt le about theoperation and consequences of counteractivecontrol when individuals are stressed, fatigued,or emotionally aroused. Does unavailabil ity orunderuti l ization of counteractive controls pre-dict the self-control failures that have been doc-umented in the self-control l i terature (see, e.g.,Baumeister et al., 1.994, 1998; Muraven &Baumeister, 2000)? We also know very l itt leabout how individuals assess their abil ity tocontrol themselves, how perceived self-controlis related to the availabil ity and use of counter-active controls, and how perceived self-controlaffects specific outcome expectancies and indi-viduals' general sense of self-efficacy. Future re-search addressing these questions would helpadvance our understanding of self-control as aunique facet of human motivation.

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Implicit and Explicit Mechanisms of Counteractive Self - Faculty