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Immigration, Free Movement andEuropean Welfare States
Martin RuhsUniversity of Oxford
Swedish Network for European Studies in Economics and Business‘Migration and the European Welfare States’
Malmö, 19 October 2016
Structure
Labour immigration policies• ‘Openness’ vs ‘Rights’, esp. social rights • Policy variations across varieties of capitalism
National institutions and the politics of ‘free movement’• Role of national institutions (labour markets, welfare states) and social norms (citizenship norms) in determining national policy positions on free movement
The ethics of immigration policy and differential exclusion• Who is social policy for? • “mobile EU citizens” vs “non-‐EU migrants”
Labour immigration policies in high-‐income countries: Trade-‐offs between “openness” and “rights”,
especially social rights
(Ruhs 2013: The Price of Rights)
Can’t have both?
“…it is one thing to have free immigration to jobs, it is another thing to have free immigration to welfare, and you cannot have both. If you have a welfare state, if you have a state in which every resident is promised a certain minimum level of income or a minimum level of subsistence regardless of whether he works or not, produces it or not, well then it really is an impossible thing.” (Milton Friedman 1978)
“ …the relatively free movement of labor across national frontiers exposes the tension between closed welfare states and open economies and that, ultimately, national welfare states cannot coexist with the free movement of labor.” (Gary Freeman 1986)
Labour immigration policy
Regulating labour immigration:• Openness• Selection• Rights
Rights as instruments: costs and benefits
(Princeton University Press 2013/15)
6
Openness positively related to skill level targeted
7
Rights positively related to targeted skills
Trade-offs between openness and some rights
The United States: “Immigration yes, welfare no”
Daniel Tichenor about the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (1996):
“ …. a triumph for free market expansionists, who allied with pro-‐immigration liberals pro-‐immigration liberals to sustain unprecedented legal admissions with anti-‐immigrant conservatives to trim alien substantive and procedural rights. The outcomes of 1996 suggested that large-‐scale immigration would flow into the United States uninterrupted for the foreseeable future, and that those who arrived would enjoy fewer membership rights until they acquired citizenship.” (Daniel Tichenor 2002)
Labour immigration policy variationsacross varieties of capitalism
(work in progress)
11
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i.e. the conditions that migrants need to show that they can live and work in the host
country without (or with limited) support from the welfare state.
Taking account of the targeted skill level of the TMP suggests two more significant
differences between the modes of restricting openness under programmes in LMEs and
CMEs. Among programmes targeting lower and medium skills, LMEs are more likely to
restrict openness via involvement of trade unions in the admission process than CMEs.
Among programmes targeting higher skills, LMEs make relatively greater use of language
requirements.
Figure 6 Restrictions on openness of temporary labour immigration programmes in high-income
countries, by type of market economy (“variety of capitalism”) 2009
Note: The openness scores range from 0 (most restrictive) to 1 (least restrictive),
Openness
In addition to affecting the modes of immigration control, my data also provide some
support for the idea that the prevailing socio-economic institutions can influence the
openness of labour immigration programme in high-income countries. As discussed earlier
in this paper, we can expect liberal market economies, with flexible labour markets and
liberal welfare states, to be more open to labour immigration than coordinated market
economies (with social-democratic or conservative welfare states). Table A7 in the appendix
shows the results of a linear regression of openness of labour immigration programmes in
high-income countries on targeted skills, the variety of capitalism (‘coordinated’ vs ‘other’), and an interaction between the two variables. I estimate these equations for all
programmes and TMPs only. The results suggest no independent effect of the type of
economy on openness but the estimated coefficient of the interaction targeting higher skills
only and ‘coordinated market economy’ is statistically significant and negative (keeping in
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Np1_quota4
Np2_joboffer
Np3_lmtest4
Np4_secocc
Np5_fees
Np6_1condi~s
Ntradeunion
Np7_natage
Np8_1genms
Np9_1skills
Np10_lang
Np11_ssuff
Liberall-all (n=13) Coordinated-all (n=18)
Source: Ruhs (forthcoming)
12
24
Figure 7 Restrictions of migrant rights under temporary migration programmes, by type of welfare
state 2009
What might be the reasons why liberal welfare states impose greater restrictions on migrant
rights than other types of welfare state? My discussion in section 2 suggested that the
answer may lie with differences in terms of the extent to which the welfare state is
“contributory” i.e. the degree to which welfare benefits require a prior contribution. My
data confirm that there is a strong negative correlation between having a liberal welfare
state and the share of contributions in total social expenditure. However, a regression of
rights on targeted skills and share of contributions in total social expenditure does not show
a statistically significant relationship.
A potential second explanation may have to do with the way in which the openness of the
labour immigration programme is regulated. Specifically, it is important to investigate
whether and how restrictions of social rights after admission are related to the self-
sufficiency requirement that many countries use to restrict the admission of migrant
workers. As I have shown earlier in this paper, liberal market economies (with liberal
welfare states) are less likely to use the self-sufficiency requirement than coordinated
market economies. So there could be a trade-off between imposing a self-sufficiency
requirement as part of the conditions for admission and the social rights of migrants after
admission. A regression of rights on targeted skills, type of welfare state and the self-
sufficiency requirement as a way of restricting admission provides support for this
hypothesis (see Appendix Table 9). However, the data also suggest that the trade-off
appears to be limited to countries with liberal welfare states (see Appendix Table A10 which
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Nrightsequ
Npolitical~s
Neconomicr~s
Nsocialrig~u
Nresrights
Nfamilyrig~s
liberal (n=13) socialdemocratic (n=8) conservative (n=21)
Source: Ruhs (forthcoming)
Free movement in the European Union
(Ruhs 2016)
Free Movement in Europe: Unrestricted labour immigration and
equal access to the welfare state (for “workers”)
15
The changing politics of free movement:Milestones
• EU enlargement in 2004 (“A8 countries”)• EU enlargement in 2007 (“A2 countries”)• Economic crisis 2008-‐• Lifting of employment restrictions on A2 workers in 2014• ‘Brexit’ (201?)
16
Aim and approach
• Q: Why do some EU15 countries demand reform of free movement while others want to keep the current rules?
• Aim: provide conceptual framework and hypotheses for analysing roles of three types of nat. institutions and social norms in determining nat. policy positions on free movement:– Labour markets (focus on “flexibility”)– Welfare states (“contributory base”)– Citizenship norms (esp. “European-‐ness” of nat. identities)
National institutions + norms:Why and how do they matter?
Flexibility of labour markets affects scale and characteristics (incl. skills-‐mix) of labour immigration
Nature of welfare state shapes fiscal effects and perceived fairness of free movement
‘European-‐ness’ of national identity helps define boundaries of ‘national interest’ and the perceived ‘target population’ of (domestic) public policies
Hypotheses and framework
• Econ tensions and concerns about free movement greatest in countries that combine flex labour market with relatively non-‐contributory welfare state
• Whether these concerns lead to demand for reform depends on “European-‐ness” of nat. identity; greater European-‐ness makes demand for reform less likely
• Conceptualization of policy-‐making:– “rationalist” logic; “statist” approach – considers institutional variations – role of ideas in shaping policy-‐making
19
Notes: ”Employment protection” refers to OECD data on “Protection of permanent workers against individual dismissal” (EPRC). A higher protection score implies less labour market flexibility; “Social contributions” are based on OECD data on “actual social contributions”. “Social expenditure” includes public and private mandatory social expenditure. A higher share of social contributions in social expenditure is a proxy for a more contributory welfare system.
Figure 2: Employment protection and social spending through social contributions in selected EU15 countries and the United States, average for 2004-‐2011
Source: Ruhs 2016
20Source: Ruhs 2016
So, what can we expect?
• UK and Ireland; both flex labour markets and “non-‐contr.” welfare state – bur Ireland “more European”
• Many factors ‘trouble’ this “structural explanation”:– Actors: e.g. political parties– ‘Generosity’ of national welfare states–Wider fiscal and econ effects– Link between politics of free movement and other types of immigration (form outside EU)
– Link between immigration and other policies
The politics of free movement ….
• Why the debate and disagreement about need to reform free movement? – “current politics”; “media”; “ill-‐informed public” etc.– “structural differences” and institutional “exceptionalism”
• Need to analyse role of national institutions and social norms in explaining national policy preferences
• Broader question: Ø tension between nat. institutions/norms and other types of common EU migration policies? (e.g. ‘refugee crisis’)
The ethics of immigration policy and differential exclusion
The ethics of immigration policyand differential exclusion
Think about the ethics of:
• Restricting contributory vs non-‐contributory benefits; who is social policy for?
• Demanding equality of EU workers vs tolerating (much more) restricted rights of non-‐EU nationals
References
Ruhs, M (2013/2015) The Price of Rights: Regulating International Labor Migration, Princeton University Press, www.priceofrights.com
Ruhs, M. (April 2016) “Is unrestricted immigration compatible with inclusive welfare states? National institutions, citizenship norms and the politics of free movement”, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2625486 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2625486
Ruhs, M (forthcoming), “Labour immigration policies in high-‐income countries: Variations across political regimes and varieties of capitalism”
Immigration, Free Movement andEuropean Welfare States
Martin RuhsUniversity of Oxford
Swedish Network for European Studies in Economics and Business‘Migration and the European Welfare States’
Malmö, 19 October 2016
Source: Ruhs 2016
Source: Ruhs 2016
