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7/30/2019 Immigrants Human Rights Participation
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Migration, International Telecommunications, and
Human Rights1
Rob Clark, and Jason Hall2
World polity embeddedness has traditionally been measured by state and civil participation in formal
venues, including international organizations, multilateral agreements, and world conferences. In this
study, we highlight an alternative form of embeddedness found in cross-national social relations and
apply this framework to the human rights sector of the world polity. Specifically, we propose that
the international migrant community diffuses human rights values and practices via (1) local
performance and (2) cross-national communication. Using data from the World Values Survey, we
first show that immigrants are more likely to embrace, and actively participate in, the human rights
movement. Next, using network data that report country-to-country bilateral flows, we observe ahigh degree of correspondence between international migration and telecommunications, confirming
previous studies that trace telephone traffic to the flow of people. Finally, analyzing a balanced data
set of 333 observations across 111 countries spanning the 19752000 period, we use ordered probit
regression to assess the local and cross-national effects of migrants on a states human rights record.
We find that a countrys immigration level and its in-degree centrality in international telecommuni-
cations both positively affect its Amnesty International rating, and that these effects are robust to a
number of alternative specifications.
KEY WORDS: human rights; international telecommunications; migration; social networks;world polity.
INTRODUCTION
The postWorld War II era has been characterized as a period of global-
ization, in which national societies have become increasingly integrated across
economic, political, and cultural lines. One manifestation of this global era has
been the formal organization of individual and state actors in public space. In
particular, the creation of the United Nations after World War II marked a
transition toward international governance, as a Westphalian conception of
1 W th k E ili H f B t f ki dl h i h d t Edit t Thi ti l i t
Sociological Forum, Vol. 26, No. 4, December 2011
DOI: 10.1111/j.1573-7861.2011.01288.x
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state sovereignty began to attenuate, and states began to formally recognize
international standards. The number of international governmental organiza-
tions (IGOs) has doubled during the second half of the twentieth century,while international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) have increased
even more dramatically during this time, rising almost fivefold (Lechner and
Boli, 2005:130).
One consequence of this organizational emergence, according to neoinsti-
tutionalists, has been the mass diffusion of cultural models emanating from a
stateless world society (Meyer et al., 1997a), composed not only of interna-
tional organizations, but multilateral agreements and world conferences as
well. These world polity institutions have become renowned for spreading
cultural scripts to their constituent members and participants. In particular,international organizations have helped foster democracy (Paxton, 2002),
human rights (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005), same-sex rights (Frank and
Mceneaney, 1999), gender equity (Paxton et al., 2006), and environmentalism
(Schofer and Hironaka, 2005), as well as science (Schofer, 2004) and education
(Schofer and Meyer, 2005).
However, neoinstitutionalists do not typically examine alternative mecha-
nisms of diffusion that may operate in less conspicuous settings. In particular,
some scholars have begun to draw attention to the role of social networks in
diffusing cultural models (Koster, 2007; Sandholtz and Gray, 2003; Sun and
Barnett, 1994; Tsutsui and Wotipka, 2004; Wotipka and Tsutsui, 2008). We
build on this recent turn in the literature by examining the role of interna-
tional migration and telecommunications in spreading world polity scripts.
World polity institutions operate on a higher, symbolic level, disseminating
messages through official statements and evoking powerful images via public
ceremony and ritual, thereby shaping the hearts and minds of the world
citizenry in a highly abstract fashion. However, social relations may be criti-
cally important for translating these celebrated scripts into concepts that are
meaningful in local context, as well as sustaining their legitimacy in between
the many speeches, handshakes, and treaty ratifications that comprise the
world politys ritual enactments.
In this study, we examine the effect of international migration and tele-
communications on human rights, an important sector of the world polity that
has increasingly drawn attention from scholars adopting a neoinstitutional
approach (Cole, 2005, 2006, 2009; Hafner-Burton, 2005; Hafner-Burton and
Tsutsui, 2005, 2007). We first propose that members of the international
migrant community are more likely to embrace, and participate in, the human
rights movement. Using data from several waves of the World Values Survey,
we show that migrants are more likely to join human rights organizations,
volunteer to do human rights work and approve of the human rights move-
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are empowered with certain rights and protections that are applied equally
and universally. Our data from the World Values Survey show that immi-
grants are more likely to prioritize the preservation of individual freedom.Moreover, immigrants are less likely to express national pride and are more
likely to embrace a global identity, rather than express belonging to a more
restricted geographic territory (e.g., continent, country, region, locality). In
addition, human rights may be important to immigrants because, lacking the
full legal protection afforded to citizens, immigrants are perhaps more vulnera-
ble to human rights abuses themselves. Accordingly, we find that immigrants
rate the human rights performance of the country in which they reside more
negatively than do natives.
Second, we propose that migrants diffuse human rights values and prac-tices through (1) local performance and (2) cross-national communication. We
capture local diffusion using each states migration level, hypothesizing that
countries with larger immigrant populations improve their human rights
record significantly more than countries with smaller immigrant populations.
We capture cross-national diffusion using each states level of centrality in
international telecommunications. Past research indicates that international
telephone traffic closely mirrors the cross-national flow of people (Kellerman,
1990, 1992; Palm, 2002; Tang, 2003; Vertovec, 2004). Using network data that
report country-to-country bilateral flows, we examine this social dimension of
telecommunications, comparing bilateral flows in migration to that of tele-
phone traffic. We generally observe a high degree of correspondence, but with
significant regional variation. We also find that migrant inflows correspond
with outbound telephone traffic more so than inbound traffic, suggesting that
migrants tend to initiate calls and that the diffusion of human rights scripts is
best captured using a countrys level of in-degree centrality, as this indicates
the extent to which countries receive world polity scripts from migrants.
Next, we present results from our main analyses. Using a balanced sample
of 333 observations across 111 states spanning the 19752000 period, we use
ordered probit regression to estimate the impact of international migration
and telecommunications on a countrys Amnesty International rating, net of a
broad set of controls typically used in human rights research. We find that a
countrys level of migration (i.e., a states foreign-born population as a share
of the total) and its in-degree centrality in telecommunications (i.e., the num-
ber of minutes of inbound international telephone calls that a state receives)
both positively affect its Amnesty rating, producing effects that are robust to
a number of alternative specifications. We also show that a states out-degree
centrality in international telecommunications has no substantial impact on its
human rights performance, suggesting that the hypothesized causal mechanism
(i e receiving human rights scripts) is indeed operative Finally we show that
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WORLD POLITY DIFFUSION
Neoinstitutionalists studying the world polity propose that a world soci-ety has emerged, generating organizational models that nation-states adopt
for themselves (Meyer et al., 1997a). Traditionally, scholars from the world
polity school have noted the widespread adoption of formal scripts, resulting
in the institutional homogenization of nation-states. World polity researchers
point to the diffusion of a diverse set of models, including womens suffrage
(Ramirez et al. 1997), liberalized same-sex policies (Frank and Mceneaney,
1999), environmentalism (Frank, 1997; Frank et al., 2000; Meyer et al.,
1997b), science (Drori et al., 2003; Schofer, 2003), and formal schooling
(Meyer et al., 1992; Schofer and Meyer, 2005).More recently, however, world polity scholars have nuanced this position
and have shown that states that are highly embedded in world polity institu-
tions tend to adopt cultural scripts more quickly than those states that are
less centrally integrated. While previous studies have featured a number of
different indicators to represent world polity institutions, scholars most
commonly use some measure of international nongovernmental organizations
(INGOs) (Drori et al., 2003; Frank et al., 2007; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui,
2005, 2007; Paxton et al., 2006; Schafer, 1999; Schofer and Meyer, 2005;
Swiss, 2009), as they are widely considered to be the primary carriers of world
culture, setting global standards and principles (Boli and Thomas, 1997). More
generally, researchers frequently use both governmental and nongovernmental
organizations (IGOs and INGOs) to represent linkages to the world polity
(Beckfield, 2003; Boli et al., 1999; Frank et al., 2000; Sandholtz and Gray,
2003; Schofer, 2004). In addition, scholars have occasionally supplemented
IGO and INGO indicators with some measure of international treaties (Frank,
1997; Frank and McEneaney, 1999; Meyer et al., 1997b; Schofer and
Hironaka, 2005), as well as participation in world conferences (Cole, 2005,
2006). In short, world polity scholars have traditionally linked the spread of
cultural models to mechanisms associated with state and civil participation in
formal venues.
Nevertheless, there is good reason to suspect that cross-border social
relations may also play an important role in diffusing cultural models. For
example, simulation research shows that the expansion of communication
accelerates cultural change and produces cultural isomorphism across actors
(Greig, 2002). Indeed, scholars have begun proposing that social ties are
relevant for understanding cultural diffusion (Schofer and Hironaka, 2005:
3031). Moreover, studies have begun to provide empirical support for the
idea that cross-border social ties are an important set of relations for under-
standing cultural diffusion For example Sandholtz and Gray (2003) create a
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expose people to human rights norms. Tsutsui and Wotipka (2004) argue that
tourist flows create human networks that link people to global civil society.
They find that a countrys level of incoming tourism positively predicts itsmembership level in human rights INGOs, net of its total international organi-
zation memberships. Koster (2007) finds that a countrys level of social open-
ness, a composite measure that includes items such as outgoing telephone
traffic, average cost of telephone calls to the United States, international
tourism, foreign population, and Internet hosts and users, significantly predicts
its citizens level of willingness to help immigrants. Finally, past research has
linked a states position in the international telecommunications network to its
level of democracy, showing that central states are significantly more demo-
cratic than peripheral states (Sun and Barnett, 1994). In sum, these studiessuggest that, above and beyond the work accomplished by traditional world
polity institutions, cross-border social ties also represent an important set of
mechanisms for diffusing cultural scripts.
THE INTERNATIONAL MIGRANT COMMUNITY AND LOCAL
PERFORMANCE
In this study, we propose that the international migrant community
diffuses human rights values and practices via two mechanisms: (1) local
performance and (2) cross-national communication. To demonstrate the first
mechanism, it is important to establish how migrants differ from natives with
respect to attitudes and behaviors regarding human rights. Thus, in this sec-
tion, we draw from data covering several waves of the World Values Survey
(2006) to examine whether migrants are more likely than natives to endorse
human rights principles and actively participate in human rights institutions.
Table I presents seven questionnaire items and the responses to each item,
organized by nativity. The first two items are behavioral questions, asking
respondents to indicate (1) whether they are members of a human rights orga-
nization and (2) whether they participate in unpaid human rights work. In this
survey wave (19992004), nativity is indicated by whether respondents are citi-
zens in the country in which they currently reside. While 3.04% of citizens
indicate that they are members of a human rights organization, 4.36% of
noncitizens indicate that they are members. Likewise, while 1.39% of citizens
indicate that they participate in unpaid human rights work, twice as many
noncitizens (2.78%) indicate that they participate. The third survey item is an
attitudinal question asking respondents to indicate their level of approval for
the human rights movement. In this survey wave (19891993), nativity is indi-
cated by whether respondents were born in the country in which they currently
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immigrants on this item (3.73) is higher than that of natives (3.58), indicating
that, on the whole, immigrants express greater approval for the human rights
movement. In sum, these results suggest that migrants more actively embracehuman rights principles and participate in human rights activities.
Table I. Human Rights Practices and Attitudes, by Nativity
(1) Membership in human rights
organizations (19992004)
Noncitizens
(N = 1,653)
Citizens
(N = 39,264)0 = no 95.64% 96.96%1 = yes 4.36% 3.04%
(2) Participation in unpaid humanrights work (1999 2004)
Noncitizens(N = 1,653)
Citizens(N = 39,264)
0 = no 97.22% 98.61%1 = yes 2.78% 1.39%
(3) Approval of human rights movement(home or abroad) (19891993)
Not born incountry
(N = 97)
Born incountry(N = 10,615)
1 = strongly disapprove 2.06% 2.06%2 = somewhat disapprove 4.12% 4.54%
3 = somewhat approve 12.37% 27.10%4 = strongly approve 81.44% 66.29%Mean 3.73 3.58
(4) Human rights rating incountry (19941999)
Not born incountry
(N = 1,694)
Born incountry(N = 14,725)
1 = there is a lot of respect for individual human rights 1.89% 4.08%2 = there is some respect for individual human rights 23.61% 29.09%3 = there is not much respect for individual human rights 42.50% 44.50%4 = there is no respect at all for individual human rights 32.00% 22.32%Mean 3.05 2.85
(5) Maintain social order vs. respect individual
freedom (19941999)
Not born in
country(N = 3,702)
Born in
country(N = 55,515)0 = maintain order in society 50.22% 57.98%1 = respect the freedom of individuals 49.78% 42.02%
(6) World identity (19941999) Not born incountry
(N = 3,779)
Born incountry(N = 59,433)
0 = no 79.60% 91.02%1 = yes 20.40% 8.98%
(7) National pride (19941999) Not born incountry
(N = 2,901)
Born incountry(N = 59,016)
1 = very proud 37.54% 55.28%2 = quite proud 37.02% 31.24%3 = not very proud 17.10% 10.55%4 = not at all proud 8.34% 2.93%Mean 1.96 1.61
Source: World Values Survey (2006).
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rights practices in their country. While 4.08% of natives feel that there is a
lot of respect for individual human rights in their country, less than half as
many immigrants (1.89%) feel this way. Conversely, almost a third of immi-grants (32.00%) feel that there is no respect at all for human rights in their
country, while less than a quarter of natives (22.32%) feel this way. Accord-
ingly, the mean score for immigrants on this item (3.05) is greater than that of
natives (2.85), indicating that immigrants, on the whole, are more critical of
their governments human rights record than natives.
Another reason why human rights may be more salient and important for
migrants is that they embrace certain world cultural principles, such as indi-
vidualism and world citizenship. The fifth survey item asks respondents which
is the most important responsibility of the government: (1) to maintain orderin society or (2) to respect the freedom of individuals. Although immigrants
are almost evenly split on this issue (50.22% to 49.78%), natives prioritize
social order by a fairly wide margin (57.98% to 42.02%). Thus, consistent
with their attitudes and behaviors regarding human rights, migrants are more
likely to support norms that preserve the integrity of the individual vis-a` -vis
the state.
Migrants may also see themselves as world citizens who share a kinship
with all people, rather than as members of a particular race, ethnicity, or
nationality. In this way, transgressions committed against others are more
likely to be seen as a violation of human rights, rather than as justified on the
basis of some particularist ideology. Responses to the sixth and seventh items
suggest that migrants do adopt a more global identity. The sixth item asks
respondents to indicate which geographic group they belong to most: locality,
region, country, continent, or the world. We dichotomize this item into world
vs. other (world = 1). While less than 10% of natives (8.98%) express a
world identity, more than 20% of immigrants do so (20.40%). Finally, the
seventh item asks respondents how proud they are of their nationality. Over
half of natives indicate that they are very proud of their nationality
(55.28%), while less than 40% of immigrants feel this way (37.54%). Con-
versely, while over 25% of immigrants feel not very proud or not at all
proud (25.44%), about half as many natives feel this way (13.48%). Accord-
ingly, the mean score for immigrants on this item (1.96) is greater than that of
natives (1.61), indicating that immigrants, on the whole, feel less national
pride.
In Table II, we explore whether these differences between natives and
immigrants are statistically significant, net of controls, using a set of probit
and ordered probit models. We present results from seven models (one for
each survey item). Each cell reports the unstandardized coefficient with the
robust standard error in parentheses We control for each respondents coun-
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due to missing data for six of the nine countries included in the model. The
overall conclusion we draw from these models is that nativity is a significant
predictor of human rights attitudes and practices. The probit models for Items
1 and 2 reveal that citizens less actively participate in human rights institutions
than noncitizens, while the ordered probit model for Item 3 indicates that
natives express less approval towards the human rights movement.
The remaining items provide a clue as to why human rights are more
salient and important to immigrants. The ordered probit model for Item 4
indicates that natives are less likely to be critical of their governments human
Table II. Probit and Ordered Probit Models of Human Rights Attitudes and Practicesa
Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4 Item 5 Item 6 Item 7
Citizenship(0 = no; 1 = yes)
).130(.069)
).226**(.081)
Born in country(0 = no; 1 = yes)
).339*(.160)
).231***(.030)
).219***(.023)
).509***(.027)
).448***(.023)
Country 103 ).094(.056)
).192*(.076)
).086(.067)
.772***(.037)
.061**(.021)
).033(.028)
).338***(.018)
Gender(0 = male;1 = female)
.074**(.028)
.072(.037)
).022(.024)
.024(.018)
.001(.012)
).021(.015)
.054***(.010)
Age(15101 years)
.015**(.005)
).004(.007)
).004***(.001)
.001(.001)
).006***(.000)
).006***(.001)
).001(.000)
Age(squared) 103)
.123*(.054) .037(.070)Education level
(ordinal).382***
(.022).292***
(.029)).008(.015)
.089***(.009)
.149***(.011)
.140***(.008)
Income level(ordinal)
.027(.019)
).019(.025)
.040**(.015)
).036**(.012)
.017*(.008)
.051***(.010)
.001(.007)
States 33 33 9 10 39 40 41Observations 34,363 34,363 10,234 14,927 47,054 50,328 49,386Pseudo R2 .049 .032 .002 .016 .009 .026 .012
p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (twotailed tests).Notes: Each cell reports the unstandardized coefficient with the robust standard error in parentheses.a
Models for Items 1 and 2 include the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Belarus,Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Northern Ireland,Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, and theUnited Kingdom; model for Item 3 includes the following countries: Brazil, Chile, China, theCzech Republic, India, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, and Slovakia; model for Item 4 includes the fol-lowing countries: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania,Moldova, and Ukraine; models for Items 5, 6, and 7 consist of the following countries:Azerbaijan, Argentina, Australia, Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Belarus, Chile,China (Items 6 and 7 only), the Czech Republic, the Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland,Georgia, Germany, India, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mexico, Moldova, New Zealand,Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan (Item 7 only), Peru, Puerto Rico, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, South
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine, the United States, Uruguay, andVenezuela.
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express a world identity, while the ordered probit model for Item 7 shows that
natives are more likely to feel national pride. In short, the descriptive patterns
identified in Table I hold up in a multivariate context, as revealed by the anal-yses presented in Table II.
THE INTERNATIONAL MIGRANT COMMUNITY AND
CROSS-NATIONAL COMMUNICATION
To reiterate our core argument, we propose that the international migrant
community can significantly improve a countrys human rights performance
by diffusing values and practices that are consistent with the human rightsmovement. Locally, we capture the influence of migrants through the percent-
age of a countrys population that is foreign born. Cross-nationally, we sug-
gest that migrants diffuse human rights scripts when interacting with friends
and family via international telecommunications. In this way, migrants are
able to impact their society of origin, as well as their society of residence.
Contrary to the idea that international telecommunications are used
primarily to facilitate or conduct financial transactions, there is considerable evi-
dence that international telephone calls are predominantly social in nature. Past
research has shown the importance of migration and tourism in shaping interna-
tional telephone traffic (Kellerman, 1990, 1992; Palm, 2002; Tang, 2003; Verto-
vec, 2004). For example, the presence of immigrant populations within the
United States plays a significant role in determining telephone traffic flows to
and from the United States and the home country (Tang, 2003). Telephone calls
represent the social glue that connects migrant communities around the world
(Vertovec, 2004). While international telephone traffic has surged in recent
years, the increase among countries with strong migrant connections has been
especially pronounced (Vertovec, 2004). One factor contributing to the increase
in international telephone traffic, especially among migrants, has been the emer-
gence of prepaid telephone cards. Half of all telephone traffic accounted for by
prepaid cards is international, and they are primarily used by first-generation
immigrants. In fact, phone card distributors specifically target immigrant com-
munities within the United States (Vertovec, 2004). This suggests that, not only
do migrant flows drive international telephone traffic, but that migrants are the
ones that tend to initiate, rather than receive, these phone calls.
In this section, we examine these propositions more closely by comparing
bilateral migrant flows to bilateral flows in telecommunications. Our migrant
data come from the recent pioneering work done by the World Bank (Parsons
et al., 2007), whose network covers 226 countries circa 2000. Our telecommu-
nications data come from the ITU TGIs Direction of Traffic Database (Inter-
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ple. In doing so, we address the following questions: (1) Are migrant flows
correlated with telecommunications flows? (2) Do the data provide any indica-
tion as to whether migrants initiate or receive telephone calls? and (3) Is theresubstantial regional variation in these patterns?
Table III reports correlation coefficients for all 111 countries in our sam-
ple. For each country, we calculated the level of correspondence between that
countrys set of migrant outflows (i.e., migrants leaving that country for
another destination) and its inbound traffic in telecommunications (i.e., the
number of minutes of inbound international telephone calls that it receives
from each country partner), as well as its outbound traffic (i.e., the number of
minutes of outbound international telephone calls that it sends to each country
partner). We then replicated these correlations with each countrys set ofmigrant inflows. Each cell reports the average coefficient for all countries in
that region, and the final row reports the overall averages.
First, there does appear to be a positive association between migration
and international telecommunications. The data on migrant outflows suggest
that the correspondence is fairly high, ranging from .387 in Africa (inbound
traffic) to .896 in Latin America (outbound traffic), and the overall average
Table III. Correlations Between Migrant Flows and Telecommunications Traffic, by Region
Migrant Outflows Migrant Inflows
Inbound Traffic Outbound Traffic Outbound Traffic Inbound Traffic
Latin America & theCaribbean (N = 22)
.867 .896 .494 .365
Europe & the West(N = 23)
.849 .843 .554 .498
North Africa & theMiddle East (N = 15)
.710 .687 .354 .198
East Asia & the Pacific(N = 15)
.608 .628 .307 .262
Central & Sub-SaharanAfrica (N = 36)
.387 .510 .235 .225
Overall (N = 111) .651 .695 .378 .311
Notes: Latin America & the Caribbean (N = 22): Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti,Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad-Tobago, Uruguay,and Venezuela; Europe & the West (N = 23): Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and theUnited States; North Africa & the Middle East (N = 15): Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel,Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and the UnitedArab Emirates; East Asia & the Pacific (N = 15): Bangladesh, China, Fiji, India, Indonesia,Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, the Solomon Islands, SouthKorea, Sri Lanka, and Thailand; Central & Sub-Saharan Africa (N = 36): Angola, Benin,B t B ki F B di C th C t l Af i R bli Ch d C
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ranges from .651 to .695. The data on migrant inflows suggest a smaller degree
of correspondence, ranging from .198 in the Middle East (inbound traffic) to
.554 in the West (outbound traffic), with the overall average ranging from .311to .378. Clearly, in some cases, migrant flows mirror telecommunication flows
quite closely (e.g., Latin America and the West), while in other cases, the cor-
respondence drops off noticeably (e.g., Africa). Thus, we conclude that the
ability of telecommunications to capture the diffusion of world polity scripts
by migrants will vary considerably. Specifically, we hypothesize that the effect
of telecommunications on human rights will be weaker in those regions of the
world where the correspondence between migrant flows and telecommunica-
tions is weakest. In particular, we are most interested in the regional ordering
of the migrant outflow correlations (as we are more interested in a states abil-ity to receive human rights scripts from emigrants than in its ability to send
human rights scripts via immigrants), with Latin America ranked highest
(.867.896), followed by the West (.843.849), the Middle East (.687.710),
East Asia (.608.628), and Africa (.387.510). In sum, the propensity for emi-
grants to diffuse cultural scripts back to their country of origin would seem to
vary widely based on these correlations.
Finally, we use these data to examine whether or not migrants tend to ini-
tiate international calls. We are principally interested in this question in order
to learn how to best operationalize the diffusion of world polity scripts from
migrants. Our data suggest that migrants do tend to initiate contact. When
examining the migrant inflow correlations in Table III, we see that inflows are
more highly associated with outbound telephone traffic than inbound traffic
across all five regions. In separate analyses, our data show that a majority of
countries in all five regions feature higher correlations between migrant inflows
and outbound traffic than migrant inflows and inbound traffic. Almost every
country in Latin America (95.45%) and the West (95.65%) reports a stronger
outbound correlation, followed by the Middle East (80.00%), East Asia
(73.33%), and Africa (52.78%). The overall percentage of 76.58% indicates
that more than three-quarters of all states feature patterns where migrants
initiate telephone communication.
By contrast, the correlations for migrant outflows show no clear trend,
with Latin America, East Asia, and Africa featuring higher correlations with
outbound telephone traffic, and the West and the Middle East featuring higher
correlations with inbound telephone traffic. In separate analyses, our data
show that a majority of countries in Latin America (54.55%) and the West
(65.22%) feature higher correlations between migrant outflows and inbound
traffic, while the other three regions show a greater correspondence between
migrant outflows and outbound traffic (from 36.11% to 46.67%), and the
overall percentage is just below half (47 75%) In sum the lack of a clear
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TableIV.OrderedProbitModelsofAmnestyRating,
N=
333(111States)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
1.011***
(.107)
.915***
(.105)
.639***
(.131)
.993***
(.102)
.854***
(.111)
.633***
(.132)
1.067***
(.104)
.969***
(.105)
.674***
(.133)
.590***
(.136)
.601***
(.133)
.047
(.057)
).031(.079)
).038
(.068)
).096
(.075)
.032(.066)
).018
(.082)
).103
(.071)
).109
(.075)
).277***
(.072)
).081(.134)
).064
(.096)
.080
(.125)
).258***
(.072)
).046
(.123)
.118
(.124)
.042
(.136)
.513***
(.093)
.545***
(.131)
.535***
(.091)
.626***
(.130)
.506***
(.093)
.533***
(.126)
.590***
(.119)
.636***
(.136)
C
.105(.161)
).093
(.177)
.159
(.156)
.025
(.194)
).141
(.189)
).066(.184)
).141
(.187)
.013
(.188)
).182
(.185)
).215
(.186)
.039(.097)
.023
(.094)
).020
(.095)
.006
(.095)
.078
(.096)
ss
.123(.094)
).006
(.099)
.134
(.093)
.001
(.098)
).012
(.097)
on
.223
(.114)
.202
(.113)
.174
(.116)
.207
(.114)
.250*
(.112)
).424***
(.096)
).443***
(.094)
).407***
(.095)
).466***
(.097)
).459***
(.094)
Migration, International Telecommunications, and Human Rights 881
7/30/2019 Immigrants Human Rights Participation
13/28
TableIV.
(Continued)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
.187*
(.077)
.191*
(.074)
.204
*
(.087)
.196*
(.084)
.365***
(.075)
.343**
(.107)
.540**
(.181)
.567**
(.195)
.526**
(.178)
.174**
(.057)
.054
(.068)
.008
(.079)
).211*
(.096)
1.18
(1.18)
1.56
(1.25)
5.62
(2.63)
1.18
(1.18)
2.56
(1.81)
8.26
(3.56)
1.01
(1.01)
1.48
(1.29)
5.56
(2.64)
8.30
(3.49)
8.29
(3.44)
.122
.161
.183
.134
.163
.184
.122
.157
.178
.187
.188
2010
1947
1937
1985
1942
1935
2010
19
56
1946
1935
1933
.05;*
*p