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IBN TAYMIYYA'STHEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
Virginie LamotteInstitute of IsIamic Studies
McGiII UniversityMontreal
November 1994
A thesis submitted tothe Faculty of Graduate Studies and Researchin partial fuifiiment of the requirements of
the degree of Master of Arts
@ Virginie Lamotte1994
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•Page ii
ABSTRACT
AUTHOR:
TITLE:
DEPARTMENT:
DEGREE:
Virginie Lamotte
Ibn Taymiyya's Theory of Knowledge
Institute of Islamic Studies, McGiII University
M.A.
•
This thesis highlights a new Interpretation of the writings of Ibn Taymiyya. Previous
scholarship has stressed the legalistic, social or religious aspect, olten at the expense of
the philosophical content of Ibn Taymiyya's works. The explanatory insight of a study on
the theory of knowledge, hitherto neglected, is evidenced by its capability to demonstrate
the convergence of elementary, religious, intuitive and rational principles. The theory
iIIustrates the concems of a synthetic mind whose attempt was to broaden and not
restrict the domain of knowledge vis-à-vis the Divine. Knowledge is not man's privilege
and is available to ail of creation. Ali created entities have the capacity to know their
Creator. This thesis attempts to shed Iight on the mechanisms of the acquisition of
knowledge about the Divine in their modes of availability to the creatures and to man.
Tensions of the human predicament thus participate in the logical framework of the
discussion. The attempt is to define the domain of knowledge, ils components. and its
parameters in the quest for a perlect acquisition of knowledge.
•
Auteur:
Titre:
Département:
Niveau:
Virginie Lamotte
La Théorie de la Connaissance chez Ibn Taymiyya.
L'Institut des Études Islamiq..'es, Université McGiII
M.A.
Page iii
•
La Théorie de la Connaissance chez Ibn Tayrniyya met en lumière une nouvelle
interprétation des écrits du maître Ijanbali. Les études précèdentes ont souligné l'aspect
juridique, social ou religieux de ses oeuvres bien souvent au dépens du côté
philosophique de ces dernières. La valeur explicative d'une étude sur la théorie de la
connaissance, jusqu'à présent négligée, est la mise en évidence d'un esprit de synthèse
cherchant à élargir et non pas a restreindre le champ de la connaissance de Dieu.
L'espace du savoir n'est pas limité à l'homme et inclut tcute la création. Toute entité
créée à la capacité de connaitre son Créateur. Cette thèse tente d'élucider les
méchanismes d'acquisition du savoir aussi bien chez les créatures que chez l'homme par
rapport à Dieu. Certaines tensions de la condition humaine participent donc au cadre
logique de la discussion. Mis en perspective, l'objectif est de cerner le domaine de la
connaissance, ses composantes, et les paramêtres d'un acquis parfait du savoir.
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Pageiv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract Page ii
Résumé ..........................•.....................................................................................•......•......i i i
Acknowledgments v i
Technical Details ...................................................................•..........................................vii
Introduction: An Integrative Approach to K01owledge Page 1
Chapter One: The Nature of the Believer's (Mu 'min) Transcendent Universe.....•....•..8
1.1 Divine Self-Evidence ...•••.•.......................................................................1 0
1.11 Uncompromised Divine Unicity 13
1.111 Sacred Meaning of the Credo.....•..............................•.............................•.•1 9
I.IV Grievious Misconceptions of the Divine Reality 23
Chapter Two: The Nature of the Believer's (Mu 'min) Immanent Universe ........••....2 9
Il.1 The Nature of the Qur'iin 3 0
Il.11 The Qur'iin as a Particular and Discreet Source of Knowledge 3 3
11.111 The Human Valorization of the Divine Guidance 40
11.1V The Agent of Prophecy..........•.••••.•...••....................•.........••.....•...••••........•.4 1
Chapter Three: Fitra the Anti-Intellectual Element of Knowledge.•.............•....•..•.....51
111.1 Fitra: Innate Knowledge.••••.....••••.........•........................••.••.......•.••••.•••••.•..5 3
111.11 Firra of the World •..............•.••.......••••.......••..••........................................55
111.111 Human Particularity of Fitra 5 9
111.1V Modes of Knowledge Acquisition 6 3
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Page v
Conclusion: 74
Appendices:
Appendix 1: Glossary of Terrns 7 9
Appendix Il: Short Titles for Ibn Taymiyya's Works 85
Select Bibliography 87
Diagrams
Diagram 1: Gradient of Knowledge 5 0
Diagram Il: Quadrapartite Division of the Individual 7 1
Diagram 111: The Total Dimension of Knowledge 7 8
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Page vi
ACKNOWLEDGhIIENTS
Now that this thesis is finally written. 1would like to express my indebtedness to
a number of people, without whom the completion of this work would have been further
delayed. First and foremost, 1would Iike to acknowiedge my gratitude to my two thesis
advisors. Dr. U. Turgay and Dr. W. Hallaq.
Over the years at the Institute, Dr. Turgay has always proven to be a great source
of encouragement and support. Throughout the entire course of research, 1 have been
able to rell' on him for advice, guidance and ail around assistance, whether personal or
academic. 1have been fortunate to have benefrted from his kindness and patience.
To Dr. Hallaq, befell the painstaking task of reading, correcting and editing this
work. He has had to toil with several tedious rough drafts and by raising problems in my
writings, he has been responsible for awakening my understanding of Ibn Taymiyya. fiis
input has e!evated my work to a higher javel. 1am truly grateful for ail his time. effort
and guidance.
My special thanks to Salwa Ferahian for her assistance in providing me with the
necessary materials to complete my research. Her kindness and understanding meant a
great deal to me during the summer of 1994. 1 also thank Wayne St. Thomas for his
patience at my sometimes misguided requestsl Rnally. 1would Iike to recognize the help
of Violette Masse. She has made the past four years more enjoyable and has walked me
through McGiII's bureaucracy.
To ail the significant others, Samira, Annie, Paul, Boustan, Eric, you know what
you mean to me.
•
•
Page vii
TECHNICAL OErAILS
1. Transliteration. Ali transliterated Arabie words are italicized; with the notable
exception of anglicized Arabie nouns such as Sufism which are neither italicized nor
transliterated. Hence, Sufi is rendered as $ufi, yet Sufism remains Sufism. The
Institute of Islamic Studies transliteration system for Arabie has been followed:
the 'ain is transliterated by (') e.g. 'aql;
the hamzah is transliterated by (') e.g. Qur'iin
and the long vowel is indicated by a macron over the vowel e.g. Islam.
Il. Citation. Ali authors except for Ibn Taymiyya have been cited in the following
manner: the name of the author followed by the date of publication of the relevant teX!,
and the page number(s)- e. g. (Netton, 1992, pp. 34-35). This style of referencing is
used in the main tel.1 of the thesis and in the footnotes, with the exception of Ibn
Taymiyya's works for which short titles (see Appendix Il) are used. Ali titles of tel(ls
are italicized in the thesis teX! and the footnotes.
III. Short TItles. Short titles have been provided for Ibn Taymiyya's works; a Iist of
which can be found in Appendix II. The title is cited along with a page number e. g. (al
Jawiib al-$al;!ïQ, p. 162). The page number quoted refer to the pagination of the edited
•
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Page viii
Arabic text in the language of translation with the exceptions of al- WJsiriyya and
Majmû"ac aJ-RilsJïl wa al-MasJ'il where the page numbers refer to the pagination of the
arabic text itself.
IV. Translations - references made to translated works of Ibn Taymiyya are cited under
the arabic short title of the text, see Appendix Il and Bibliography. When a reference is
given as to a commentary or an annotation by the translator of the work, it is cited under
the translator's name e.g. Laoust, 1986, p. 37 n. 1.
V. Capital Lettering. Ali nouns and adjectives used interchangeably with AJJiih are
capitalized e. g, the Divine; nouns or noun phrases of a technical nature referring to the
nature of Allfih are not e, g. divine unity (taw1Jïd),
VI. Dates, Dates for the relevant events are given according to both Muslim and
Christian calendars where possible.
VII. Proper Names. None of the names of historiai figures mentioned in the thesis are
italicized e. g. Ibn Taymiyya. The names are transliterated with the notable exception of
Ibn Taymiyya e. g. a1-Ash'ari.
•
•
5i ma grand·mère, et à mon grand·pèrequi aurait sûrement pensé que c'était
"fium...pas mauvais..."
•
Introduction: An Integratlve Approach to Kncwledge
A study of Ibn Taymiyya's (661-728/1263-1328) epistemologyl is perhaps
best served by excising one religious conviction out of his syncretic view of the universe
and assigning to it a subjective position of primordiality. The belief is thatthe existence
of Alliih is self-evident2 and that it is in the realization and intemalization of His will
•2
O'Connor :.nd Carr define epistemology as the theory of knowledge concerned withthe notion of knowledge in a number of ways. "First and foremost it seeks to givean account of the nature of knowing in general...A second concern of epistemologyis with the sources of knowledge. with the inve.:igation of the nature and variety ofmodes of acquiring knowledge The third concern. with the scope of knowledge. isclearly related to the other two The fourth concern of epistemology has been. andfor many still is. to defend our criteria for knowledge against the attacks ofskepticism" (O'Connor & Carro 1982. pp. 1-2) cited in Netton (1992. pp. 34-35).The exhaustive application of the definition of epistemology is beyond the scope ofthe present thesis. The present work concerns itself with only two aspects of thedefinition provided above. It will address the second and third concern enunciatedin the definition. Whereas concerns one and four will be touched upon (only whennecessary) to create a c1earer understanding of the overall discourse.
Ibn Taymiyya's underlined or stated assumption is that the existence of AIlih isontologically self-evident. Yet. his theological discussions prove that the existenceof AIliih is not so readily obvious.
Page 1
faith and obedience to the injunctions of revelation. From this interweave emerges the
that the Islamic tradition lives. The fabric of Reality3 is unveiled by the interplay of•Introduction: An Integrative Approach to Knowledge Page 2
figure of a transcendent unitary God who chooses to covenant with His creation. The
doctrine of divine unity (CawQÏd)~ will be used as a point of departure in the
investigation of Ibn Taymiyya's allempt to conceive of the prefect believer (mu'min)
whose raison d'être is based on the centrality of the Divine-human encounter.
The notion of divine unity (tawQid) undergirds Ibn Taymiyya's entire system of
thought and punctuates every temps majeurs. By re-stating the necessary injunctions
of a moral order. he hopes to remedy the moral decay of the community brought forth by
confused times.5 This leads him to address the perennial questions of how should man
3 Reality. understood as the Sacred or Divine. is assigned a capital lctter to contrast itto reality (Iower case) which in this case is synonymous with the profanc.
4 Ibn Taymiyya does not subscribe to a monovalent definilion of divinc unity(cawQid). He divides the nolion into three distinct fonns:
cawQid a/-ulühiyyacawQid a/-rubübiyyacawQid a/-asmii' wa a/-$ific
He assigns. however. more importance in his wClllngs to thc first two fonns ofcawQid and discusses them at length. more 50 in fact than the third concept which isbased on the exposition of a positive theodicy. References to these can be found inFaciiwii Shaykh al-Islam. vols l and II. and aI-Wiisiriyya. TawQid will be discussedin the following chapter.
•
5 During Ibn Taymiyya's Iifetime. the political climate was dominated by theMamluks. "it was characterized by tlle dictatorship of the ruler. the monopoly ofgovernment by the ruling family. the insecurity of the throne as a rcsult of therivatry between the ruling family and other aspirants. and the constant conflict andfrequent violence among rivais themselves" (Makari. 1983. p. 8).
The extemal threat was two fold. consisting of the aggression of the Tatar in the Eastand the offensive of the Crusaders in the West.
InternaI disillusionment was fostered by governmental corruption. the 'u/amifsacquiescence and collaboration with the ruling power. and the prevalcnce of $ufjnotions of non involvement. Together. these factors furthered a sentiment of apathyand passivity among the population. The existential realities favored theindividualization of society as opposed to a sense of solidarity.
For a full discussion of the historical background see Laoust. 1939. Essai sur IcsDoctrines Sociales cC Policiques de Taqi D-Din AQmad B. Taymiya. pp. 5-150;
interact with the world in which he lives and what is the proper relationship between
man and his Creator? Caught up in the turbulence of his time, Ibn Taymiyya feels the•Introduction: An In:egrative Approach to Knowledge Page 3
need '0 defend and universalize revelation, and utilize the traditions, which he considers
his heritage, to provide an answer to these questions.
During the Islamic middle ages, the classical taxonomy of Islamlc sciences
reunited the divergent branches6 of the traditionallreligious sciences and the
philosophicallrational sciences (or "foreign"). The former were rooted in the revealed
teX! while the latter advocated the primordiality of observation and human reason.7 The
curriculum of the traditionallreligious sciences included Iinguistics, the study of the
Qur'iin and the traditions (iJadith) ,dialectical theology (kaliim ) and jurisprudencE
(fiqh). It is within the corpus of this branch of knowledge that Ibn Taymiyya excels; he
Makari. 1983. Ibn Taymiyya's Elhics: The Social Faclor. pp. 7-21; Murad, 1968,Mi/.Jan of Ib~ Taymiyya to cite but a few.
•
6
7
Thc legitimacy of the rational sciences as an approach capable of yielding certainand acccptable knowledge was nothing short of controversial. From the orthodoxposition which refused to accept knowledge underived from the revealed texlS to thephilosophers and mystics for whom knowledge couId be grounded in extrarevelatory sources, the spectrum of opinions was far ranging. The polemic resultedin sharp divisions and culminated in the inquisition (mi/.Jna). U1timately, theorthodox position gained the upper hand, and the traditional sciences "had totalcontrol over the institutions of learning" (Makdisi, 1981, p. 75). Ibn TaymiyyaadoplS an intennediate position. He rejeclS the claims of the philosophers in thefield of metaphysics but acceplS the validity of the rational sciences in the field ofthe natura! sciences.
The philosophic/rational sciences were based en the Greek philosophers and inparticular Aristotle. The influence the Greek philosopher had on the Islamic Worldled to the recognition and acceptance of an Aristotelian taxonomy of the philosoohicsciences. In Arislol1e. Ross gives an account of the Aristotelian curriculum. Itcomprised the theoretical sciences, (i.e. mathematics, physics and theology). thepractical sciences, (i.e. ethics, politics. and economics), and the productive sciences(Ross. 1964, pp, 20 in conjunction with 62). The absence of metaphysics from thecurriculum is not as unexpected as it might seem. The conventiJnal opinion is toattribute to Aristotle's' editors the coinage of the tille of metaphysics. Andronicus ofRhodes is usually cr~"ited as being the, first to have used the tille. He m"'ll11 to referto a series of texlS wnich follow the Physics. (Saint-Hilaire, 1991, p. il; (Maciceon,1941, p. xviii).
shuns the philosophically Aristotelian based sciences and adopts a nominalist position
which refuses to give any credence to the idea that abstract concepts have a tangible•Introduction: An Integrative Approach to Knowledge Page 4
reality outside the mind (Laoust, 1979, p. , 9).
The guiding principle which governs his endeavors is his deeply felt desire to
create, as much as possible, a doctrine based on objectivity, devoid of personal
interpretations and innovations. The demands of objectivity and exactitude which he
places on human knowledge leads him to create a hierarchy of sorts. The apex, the
Qur'iin. AIIiih's uncreated word, represents the highest level of certainty,8 followed by
the Sunnah of the Prophet, and finally Consensus or Ijmâcof the Salaf (Laoust, 1979,
pp. 19-20). In this conceptualization, the religious law (ShariCah) acquires a
multifarious nature. Instead of being monolithic in its meaning and Iimited to a legal
understanding, it is morally and eschatologically conditioned and capable of a variety of
senses. These meanings are in tum grounded in the lundament that AIIfih must be served
in the fashion in which He prescribed.
ln the absencl' of a clear line of conduct vis-à-vis his society or AIIiih, man has
to tum to introspection. Ibn Taymiyya equates the Islamic notion of titra with a form of
a priori knowledge (Hallaq, 1991, p. 61). As titra is engrained in ail human beings.
and represents an innate disposition towards truth, the sincere individual can tum to
this latent potential for private inspiration (ilhâIn) and intuitive perception (dhawq).
•
8 The Qur'an is not intended to be a trcatise about Allah and his nature. The existenceof Allah in the Qur'iin is strictly functional. however. il is intended 10 provideknowledge and guidance for mankind. "Those onto whom We have given theScripture, who read it with the right reading, those believe in it. And whosodisbelieveth in it, those are they who are the losers" (Sürah II. AI-Baqarah. versc121); "The month of Ramadan in which was revcaled the Qur'iin. a guidance formankind. and clear proof of the guidance, and the Criterion (of right and wrong)"(Sürah II. AI-Baqarah. verse 185).
that Ibn Taymiyya chooses in order to ascertaln know:edge. It is an ail inclusive method
T~e primary intention of this thesis is to demonstrate the integrative approach•Introduction: An Integrative Approach to Knowledge Page 5
which aims to integrate what Ibn Taymiyya considers the purely Islamic heritage into a
comprehensive whole. Far from rejecling the mystical dimension 0' Islam.9 he makes it
an integral part of his epistemology. Knowlecl;,~ for Ibn Taymiyya acquires a
soteriological dimension, and it is the reunion of Shar'j principles with fi{ra that
constitutes on,; of the vital keys to salvation and hence to paradise itself. By, in effect,
creating the ar-:hetype of the perfect believer, he causes a relationship to be establistled
between the transcendent and the corporea1.
Ibn Taymiyya was a prolific writer, and the fabric of his thought. not to mention
his life. was influenced and invaded by twin factors of instability and change. It was
against a disruptive backdrop that Ibn Taymiyya Iived. taught and wrote; yet his
endeavor represents a striving for order in an environment of turmoi1. His feeling of
urgency vis-à-vis the pervading instability of the surrounding background leads him to
pronounce conflicting opinions on occasion. in an effort to address the immediacy of what
he perceives as a threat to the community at large. While keeping these contextual
circumstances in mind, the J?resent thesis does not pr3sume to present an unshakable
account of Ibn Taymiyya's epistemology, but a plausible one based on a number of his
writings.
•
9 It has long been assumed by traditional scholarship (Goldziher. 1981. p.240;MacDonald. 1903. p. 273) that as a I;lanbali. Ibn Taymiyya had to be the swomenemy of sulism. This opinion is based on an un-examined acceptance of the verdictof history and a number of writings by the master himself. Veto upon c10serexamination. Ibn Taymiyya's condemnation of sufism is specifically targetedtowards one group of $ufis; the advocates of monism. Studies by Laoust. 1939.Essai sur les Docuines Sociales cc ,Ooliciques de Taqi D-Din ~mad B. Taymiya andMakdisi. 1973. "Ibn Taimiya: A $uli of che Qadariya Order" have shown that notonly did he accept $ufi doctrines with the exception of waQdac al-wujüd. hefrequented $ufi orders and might have beionged to the $ufi lariqah of the Qadiriya.
A research such as this one lends itself to !wo methods of investigation. namely a
historical/horizontal approach or an ideational/vertical one.\ 0 Although relied upon•Introduction: An Integrative Approach to Knowledge Page 6
where necessary. the historical approach is not the central methodological instrument 01
this thesis. As an approach. it will be subordinated to the analytical study and will be
used only to clarily an intellectual engagement either by Ibn Taymiyya or by the
prevailing environment where necessary. The discussions the thesis ollers 01 discreet
historical relerences will occur in the lorm 01 lootnotes. such as the discussion 01 the
conneetion be!Ween the prominence 01 $ufi ideals and the political instability 01 the
Ummah. It is intended to delineate a spatial relerential. yet it does not purport to
speculate on the intrinsic importance of such malters. As mentioned above. this
investigation will be essentially based on an analysis of relevant passages authored by
Ibn Taymiyya. Subsumed under the generic title of "ideational approach" are
cosmological, ontological and anthropological speculations and each category 01
speculation can be used as a full lIedged, autonomous approach. For the purposes 01 this
investigation. however, the three aspects will be combined in an atlempt to recognize
their inter-dependence, as they contribute to the formulation of a terser, more focused
picture.
Emphasis will be placed on the arbitrary isolation of elementary conceptual
parameters as it is the valorization of these elementary principles which iIIicit and
construct knowledge. They, as essentials to the continuous elaboration of themes,
represent the creative units upon which paradigmatic configurations are superimposed.
•10 The concept behind the caption historicallhorizontal approach is onc of a Iinear
continuum. where historical evenlS contemporaneous with the author arc used asthe backdrop against which his thought is imbucd with meaning. Theideational/venical method relies only on the textuai evidence as the sole guarantorof the thought of the author. It is not time constrained nor docs it necessarily assumethat the ideas expressed in the text arc tainted by extemal factors. Il posits thefundamental imponance of the thought and the ideas exprcssed by the author.
ln other words, the re5ulting construct should represent an illustration of Ibn
Taymiyya's theory of knowledge and its mode of acquisition. This thesis will include
three chapters and each one will center on one or more elementary principles. Chapter
one will discuss A//fih. His nature, His will and His unity; chapter IWo will give an
account of the importance attributed to the Qur'iin and the agency of prophecy; and
finally. the last chapter will analyze the characteristic elements of intuitive/natural
intelligence (fi{ra) and reasonlintellect ('aqI).
•Introduction: An Integrative Approach to Knowledge Page 7
•
Before elaborating on Ibn Taymiyya's theory of knowledge, his fundamental
methodological assumptions have to be highlighted. Ibn Taymiyya's doctrinal ideal
locates the essence of ail positivity in the historical beginning of Islam. The young
community under the guidance and leadership of the prophet was the most accomplished.
The ensuing generations progressively strayed from the initial ideals and betrayed their
beginning. This represents a crucial methodological component; eventhough. the pivotai
element remains the Qur'an. For Ibn Taymiyya. it is at once the ostensible fount and
explanatory principle of ail that can be termed Islamic. As a matter of principle. Ibn
Taymiyya altempts to revert ail things to a golden mean in an effort to explain, correct
or measure their degree of authenticity.
•
Chapter One: The Nature of the Believer's Transcendent Universe
The declared raison d'être of Ibn Taymiyya's theodicy is to infuse a notion of
purposiveness into divine behavior.11 Distressed by the appeal of a passive approach to
a belief in Allah which the philosophersl 2 championed, he vehemently advocates a
practical dimension to his conception of tawQïd (Oneness of Allah). He also aims his
•
1 1
12
F. Rahman (1979, p. 114) commenlS on the notion of purposiveness of divinebehavior, stating that the concept of Allah's implication in human desliny was acontroversial issue. It compromises the concept of Allah 's omnipotence anddissimilarity to His creation, as held by the Ash'arites, the Maturidites, andZahirites.
T. Michel in his article "Ibn Taymiyya's Critique of Falsafa" (1983, p. 4) (this articlein reproduced in Miche!'s translation of a/-Jawiib a/-$a/;Ji/;J) anributes to IbnTaymiyya a categorization of the philosophers. He assigns the term of "fa/iisifa philosopher" proper to the adeplS of the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic traditions,namely, al-Farabi (257-339/870-950), Ibn Sina (370-429/980-1037), Ibn Rushd(520-595/1126-1198) and Na~ir al-Din al-Tüsi (598-673/1201-1274). AISuhrawardi (549-587/1154-1191) and the followers of the Ishraqi schools arequalified by a different label, that of a/-mutafa/sifa which Michel translates as"would be philosophers". Hallaq (1993, p. 4 n. 3) rejeclS Michel's categories offa/asifa and mutafa/asifa, as he argues that Ibn Taymiyya's writings do not support asemantic difference between the two terms.
Page 8
criticisms at the mystics 13 who had adopted as a framework a hellenistically derived•Chapter One: Nature of the Believer's Transcendent Universe Page 9
philosophical dogma, Ibn Taymiyya's condemnation (aJ-Nabuwwiit. pp. n-79) of t!lis
approach is evident in his address to Abü I:lamid a1-Ghazâlï whom he believes to be at
the crossroads of both trends, He writes: "[al-Ghazalï's] statements are a bridge
between the Muslims and the philosophers...This is why in his works Iike the 11Jyii' he
teaches that the goal of ail action is only knowledge which is also the essence of the
philosophers' teachings. He magnifies the renunciation of the world which was his
greater pre-occupation than taw1Jïd which is the 'ibiida 14 of Alliih alone." This
indictment of a1-Ghazâlï clearly demonstrates that the purpose of human existence does
not lie in philosophical speculations about Alliih nor is it a passing away in the
witnessing of His divine lordship {taw1Jïd al-robübïyya wa al-fanii' fi-hi J. Philosophical
contemplation and mystical love of Him are targeted by Ibn Taymiyya as the two
"courants de pensée" responsible for the doctrine of wa1;ldat al-wujüd (unity of
being).15 According to him, through a process of infinite regress Alliih becomes one
with the world resulting in the inanity of both Alliih and His creation.
•
13
14
15
M. Ansari (1986. pp. 131-32) describes Ibn Taymiyya's crltlClsms of the Sufis in acategory based account. Ibn Taymiyya discerns three types of Sufis. the mashii'ikhal-Isllim. the ones who experiences fanli' (annihalation) and sukr (intoxication).and the adepts of wa{!dar a/-wujüd. To Sadr aI-Din aI-Quniiwi (d. 729/1329). IbnSab'in (614-66911217-1270). Tilimsiini (d. 690/1291) and Ibn 'Arabi (56063811165-1240), who expounded this doctrine. he addresses his strongestindictment. Michel gives a similar Iist with the exception of Sadr al-Din al-Quniiwi(1983, p. 3).
'Ibiida for Ibn Taymiyya is more than the act of worship or ritual: it is an a11encompassing response of obedience, love and servitude [0 the Commander. In a/Wiisitiyya. (a/- Wiisitiyya. p. 13). Ibn Taymiyya states:
.l..-J1 .j .:.L:...l ~ .;..l'il .l .l..-J1 .j .:1."..1
The author's translation is: "Your command is in the hcaven and the carth as yourmercy is in hcaven".
Ibn Taymiyya ascribes to Ibn 'Arabi the doctrine of wa{ldar a/-wujüd. Thisattribution seems historica11y incorrect, Ibn 'Arabi is not believed to have used theterm (Landolt. 1970. Simniini on wa{ldar a/-wujüd. p. 100). The relevancehowever. rests with the doctrine itself as it became a central and fundamental aspectof sufism. It postulates the existence of a single Being, outside of which nothine
•Chapter One: Nature of the Believer's Transcendent l'nivr .;e
1,1 Divine Self-Evidence
Page 10
The limited knowledge bestowed by Ailiih on human beings begins by having laith
in the Ineffable Reality. Hence. the point of departure is imiin (faith)(FaCiiwii Shaykh a/
ls/m. Volume II. pp. 1-14). Ibn Taymiyya does not debate the existence 01 Alliih as a
possibility, rather he posits it as eviden::e. It should be noted that his conception of the
term kiifir (unbeliever) dces not convey the meaning 01 atheist. one who denidS the
existence 01 Al/iih. but one who out 01 sheer vice, or perverse ingratitude reluses to
honour the Divine Reality.16 His position is derived Irom numerous Q'Jranic passages in
which the kiifir bi n; 'mac AlIiih (unbeliever in AlIiih's grace) is characterized by his
ignorance. malevolence and exaggeration (ghu/uww); "and when Our revelations are
recited unto them they say: We have heard. Il we wish we can speak ths like olthis. Lo!
this is naught but lables 01 the men 01 old" (Sürah VIII. aJ-Anfli/. verse 31). To ward
against the erring ways 01 the unbeliever. Ibn Taymiyya insists that the tarïqa (path) to
a knowledge of Alliïh is through a proper understanding of His caw1)ïd.
Ibn Taymiyya's pietist investigation 01 faith is founded on the beliel that lsliim
is the religion 01 unity, a subject which is synthesized in the wording 01 the double
exists. The One is absolutely indivisible and homogenous. yet He chooses to malceHimself known in His entirety through a multiplicity of forms and representations.Allah and creation being in fact one renders the notion of cause and effectuntenable. As the Knower and the known. the Creator and the created. AJJiih isexperienced by Sufis as absolutely transcendent yet absolutely immanent. (Ansari.1986. pp. 102-106) and (Glassé. 1989. p. 414).
•16 Ibn Taymiyya sees in the denial of man's indebtedness to Ailiih. the seed of
divisions. He endeavors to demonstrate that it was the most active factor in theemergence of schismatic doctrines. He gives accounts of heresies in passim in ail ofhis works. but there is an overall description of the sects' development in a/-Furqiinwhich can be found in a/-Rasii'il a/-Kubrii.
Shahada (shahfidacayn).17 Ibn Taymiyya asserts not only that Alliih exists but that He is•Chapter One: Nature of the Believer's Transcendent Universe Page 11
the only real existent. No one shares in His unicity and unity (caw1Jïd) and none can be
associated with Him (la sharika lahu). He flrmly subscribes and atlestto Muhammad's
role as the messenger (rasiil) and servant ('abd) of Allah (al- Wasirïyya. p. 37). The
"pure creed" (Shahada) (al-Iqciçfa'. p. 89) is more than the straight forward affirmation
of divine existence; it is also the admission that Allah is the only true reality. the One
Existent. He is the only dimension of the real, and He is perfection. He is mirrored in
His creation, in as much as the created beings participate in His essential self. Ta
accept this definition of the Divine demands an active integration of divine principles in
ail aspects of life on the part of the believer. 18 Alliih becomes the sole priority and the
only focus of the believer's {mu 'min) existence. The ail encompassing nature of Allah
renders the worship of any other deity (Banat-Allah = the daughters of Allah) 19
blameworthy and impedes the believer's atlainment of salvation. Ta acknowledge the
oneness of Allah is less an arithmetical definition than it is an organic one. It translates
into a moral imperative which is to be the driving force of the Iife of the "one who
submits· (muslim). To grasp the Divine as He defines Himself is not a mere national.
17 Lii iliiha iJ/ii AlIiih Mu(lammadu rasül Alliih - is the kalimah or the Muslimprofession of faith. which can be translatcd as; "there is no God except Allah.Mu\lammad is the Messenger of Allah."
18 To accept the principles enunciated by the double shahada mandales the adherence tofour moral actions which ensue from it: ~aliih (ri tuai prayer). zakah (alms). ~a wm(fasting) during the month of Rama#n and (lajj (pilgrimage) (Tanbihiit. pp. 279280 found in al- Wiisiliyya. p. 73).
•19 In al-Ikhlii~ (p. 53 cited by Michel. 1983. p. 6). Ibn Taymiyya draws a
rapprochement between the emanationist system of the philosophers and the worshipof pagan deities by the Arabs during Jahiliyya (age of ignorance). He claims thatthe procession of intelligences. souls and celestial spheres which directly orindirectly emanate from Alliih are false objects of divinity. and p:.rallels the cult tolhe daughters of Alliih for which he uses the term of al-ghanariq.
cerebral cognition; it actualizes a transformation, an inner conversion to one's true•Chapter One: Nature of the Believer's Transcendent Universe Page 12
disposition.
To bolster this view. Ibn Taymiyya unequivocally states that the transcendent
reality that infuses ail things is most obviously manifested in Sürah al-Ikhlfi~:20 AJlfih
is one. unique(al-$amad), He does not beget nor is He begolten. None came before Him and
none is born of Him. He is ulterly dissimilar to creation. Ibn Taymiyya writes that the
comprehension it imparts on the reader is equivalent to a third of the QU"'fin (a 1·
Wfisipyya. p. 40). As the uncaused cause of ail beings. al-$amad. He is "the supremely
independent • sell-sufficient being endowed with ail the altributes of perfection in which
ail else turns in need (lor existence. lile. guidance. help, forgiveness)" (Michel. 1984,
p. 6). Hence, Allah is best characterized by al-$amad, a name which appeals to a
dimension 01 reality bGyond history or time. The emphasis Ibn Taymiyya places on
grounding his works on a lirm definition 01 God's ra wQid constitutes an attempt to distill
a lormula in which and through which Allah is elevated to a unique status free of the
limitations inherent to human beings (whether mental or physical). In proper I;fanbali
fashion. this amounts to an acl of worship and cannot be assimilated to an investigation
or an exploration into the divine nature. His metaphysics is less intended to prove the
existence of the Ineffable. !han it is bent on removing Him lrom human contamination.
Allah is to be separated lrom His creation, indeed dissociated lrom the cosmos and its
occupants. The mu'min must accept the proper ontological value assigned to Allah and
must come to appreciate !hat He is the only one in possession of normative positivity in
•20 M. Pickthall's rendition of it is: "Say: He is Alliih the One! Alliih, the cternally
Besought of ail! (Al·$amad) He begetteth not nor was begotlen. And there is nonecomparable unto Him." He mentions in his commentary that Sürah al-Ikhlii$m~aning "sincerity" is also known as "al·Tau/lïd" and is generally credited as theexpression of the essence of the Qur'iin. A notion which is obviously shared by IbnTaymiyya.
His absolute fullness. As such, He is tha unknowable whose polar position places Him
beyond human intelligibility. Ibn Taymiyya wants to say that whereas He exists utterly
and absolutely (al-wujüd al-Ijaqq), everything else emerges to existence by virtue of His
perlect self and command (amr).
•Chapter One: Nature of the Believer's Transcendent Universe Page 13
Lli Uncompromised Divine Unjcitv
H. Laoust points out in his commentary on al-Wlisi[ïyya (al- Wlisip~vya p. 37) that
Ibn Taymiyya more or less explicitly holds to three concepts of tawQïd:21 tawQïd al
rubübïyya. tawQid aI-ulühïyya. tawQïd al-asmli' wa-al-$ifiïc. The subject of tawQïd al
ruoübïyya is AI/lih, not the believer. and the affirmation of His unicity, as it implies an
acquiescence and assertion of His divine unity and divine lordship. He is al-MiïIik or al-
Rabb (Sovereign Lord) and al-KhiïIiq (Creator) which concretely defines AI/iih's nature
and relationship vis-à-vis the universe. There is no creature (makhIüq). who does not
owe ils existence to AI/iih. AI/iih is the creator (al-Khiiliq) of ail on earth as weil as in
the heavens. He is the supreme lord (al-Rabb) of the Universe and He alone (aI-
Wasipyya. p. 72). Ibn Taymiyya links the other worldly concept of rubübiyya to a human
dimension through his usage of the Cubüdïyya. The term cubüdiyya confers to the initial
pronouncement a moral dimension as it highlights creation's dependence upon. and
enslavement by the divine entity. In his treatise aI-ijisbah. Ibn Taymiyya grounds his
exposé in the fundamental principle that ail social interaction (wilayat) must reflect
man's adoration and total servitude to the Divine. Once again, his argumentation is
•
21 As a concept which undcrgirds Ibn Taymiyya's entire system of thought. the notionof cawQid permeates most if not ail of his works. Specific references to the first twotypes of unity can be found in volumes one and three of Faciiwii Shaykh al-Isliim(Faciiwii Shaykh al-Isliim Volume 1. pp. 20-36. pp. 37-39 and Faciiwii Shaykh alIsliim Volumc III. pp. 101-104). These references are also given by Laoust in :11Wislfiyya (al- Wisifiyya. p. 37 n. 1). A definition of cawQid al-rubübiyya is alsogiven in Memon's translation of al-Iqci#' (al-IqCiç/ii'. p. 327). Finally. of the lastcatcgocy of cawQid. al- Wisifiyya is in itself a perfect representation (al- Wiisifiyya.pp. 37-63).
lirmly entrenched in the word 01 the Qur'Jn (al-lfi"bah p. 26). .4.11Jh ordains a complete•Chapter One: Nature 01 the Believer's Transcendent Universe Page 14
surrender to His reality. Whether man or demon, ail must worship and adore Him
unconditionally.22 Ibn Taymiyya has a !wo-lold objective when he defines divine
lordship as astate (!JJl) and as an action. The initial intention is to emphasize once more
the immutability, eternity and oneness 01 the divine dimension and secondly to affirm the
dissimilarity of AllJh from what He creates. AllJh does not re-create Himself, and yet
ail of the universe ensues from Him. It results in a creation stigmatized by a degree of
privation. To Him only belongs full and absolute existence, His will (as enunciated in
the Qur'iin) is the determining factor against which creation's degrees of excellence are
measured. In such a contex!, the value and fullness of existence becomes a relative
matter. Unable to equal Alliih, creation can, nonetheless, strive to achi'3ve its own
created perfection as it is conceived and demanded by Alliïh.23 ln this process, creation
must remain vigilant and avoid elevating the impertect to a status where it would
compete with Allah as a parallel deity. From Ibn Taymiyya's perspective, the failure to
do so results in shirk fi rubübïyatihi;
(assigning a share to others in the lordship of Gad), whereby govemance(of the universel is ascribed ta others alongside of Gad (i.e. the creationof other Gods;24, as is indicated by the Koranic verse (34:22);25 butthis verse makes it abundantly clear that these (people) carry no weight
•
22
23
24
25
Sürah U. AJ-Dhiïriyiïl. verse 56 which M. Pickthall renders as "[ created the jinnsand humankind only that they might worship me".
This panicular understanding of perfection and ilS availability to ail of creationeasily tics in with the concept of filra as will be iIlustr3ted 1ater in this thesis. [tconstitutes a fund3lllen131 concept in the comprehension of Ibn Taymiyya's theory ofknowledge in which the believer has the capacity to mature or develop into theperfect mu'min.
Author's own clarification and emphasis.
"Say (0 Mul;lammad): Cali upon those whom ye set up beside Alliïh! They possessnot an atom's weight either in the heavens or the earth, nor have they any share ineither, nor hath He an auxiliary among them" (Sürah XXXIV, Sabiï, verse 22).
at ail, not even the weight of a particle, nor do they participate with Godin anything, nor yet assist Him in the management of His dominion (alIqriçJii'. p. 28/).•
Chapter One: Nature of the Believer's Transcendent Universe Page 15
As in the relationship between the effect and its cause. creation being an effect. it
cannot partake in the Divine and to believe otherwise is a delusion which leads the
believer away from the straight path (~jrii{ aI-mustaqim). As aI-Rabb. Alliih is the
beholder of Infinite power and the guardian of the secrets of creation. Through the
exercise of His exclusive preserve. namely the act of creation. He hence, unveils his
omnipotence rendering the IWO notions correlative.
Ibn Taymiyya's insistence on proving the unparalleled status of the creative act
is not simply a theological position. It has another dimension, one riddled with polemical
overtones. As a "dialogical thinker" (Michel. 1984. p. vii), he intends to discredit the
philosophers and by extension the monists whom he believes obscured the fundamental
separateness of Allah and the universe. In the emanationist vision, the world proceeds
from a series of emanations. Allah is the immediate cause of the First Intellect,
however, His direct involvement in the process of creation is henceforth non-existent as
everything progresses down a Iinear gradient from the First Intellect to the Active
Intellect from which emerges the world of generation and corruption.26 Ibn Taymiyya
writes that "the would-be philosophers-Aristotle and his followers--hold that He does
not do any1hing, will any1hing, know any1hing, or create any1hing. For what, then,
should He be thanked? Or for what is He praised or worshipped?" (Jiimi' aI-Rasa'il. p.
•
26 Netlon (1992. pp. 50-52) refers 10 al-Farabi's cosmology as a c1assie emanationistsystem in whieh he assigns to the active intellect (a/-'aql al-fa"iil) the action ofbridging the supra- and the infra-lunar worlds or the transcendant and corporealdimensions. Michel argues that Ibn Taymiyya never accuses the Neoplatonistphilosophers of making the active intellect one and the same with the Creator(Michel. 1983. pp. 6-7). The reason for what seems to be unseemly is aceording toMichel due to the fact that Ibn Taymiyya c1aims the philosophers utterly deny the actof creation. rendering the accusation superfluous.
104 cited by Michel, 1983, p. 7). From a monist perspective, as mentioned above, the
essence of Allah is undifferentiated from substance and matter. This point is illustrated
by Ibn Taymiyya's appraisal of the monist representation of the issue; "the real nature
of the belief of the $ufi renegades like Ibn 'Arabi and Ibn Sab'in is that this world has
been necessarily and pre-etemally existent. It has no maker other than itself. They say
that existence is one, and the real nature of their view ;$ that there is not in existence a
creator as another existent being"(al-Ikhla$. p. 56 cited by Michel, 1984. pp. 12-13).
ln both cases. therefore. the true act of creation is compromised and Allah ceases to be
"the transcendent One. who stands outside the universe but who is in constant interplay
with its destiny through His freely chosen activity as creator. commander and judge"
(Michel. 1984. p. 22). This depiction highlights Ibn Taymiyya's belief in a two-faceted
Alliih: one hinges on His relationship with creation. and consists of His manifestation in
the world through His signs: and the other is Allah as He is in Himself. His innïya.
which remains utterly incomprehensible. His strength and potency are derived from
this double dimension. In His absolute knowledge. He is at once the possessor of the
secrets which secure the ordering of the universe and the arbiter who guards against
mankind's conceit.
•Chapter One: Nature of the Believer's Transcendent Universe Page 16
•
Taw1)ïd al-ulühïyya completes the definition of Alliih. The subject of this second
taw1)ïd is the believer on whom is conferred not only the responsibility to adore Allah
but also the obligation to serve Him in the fashion which He commands. The reunion of
these two principles of subservience in turn defines Ibn Taymiyya's concept of 'ibiïda
(Laoust. 1986. p. 37 n. 1). The acceptance of the notion of taw1)ïd al-ulühïyya is an
admission that Alliih is al-I;faqq (the Truth) (al- Wiisifïyya. p. 87) and al-Amir (the
Commander) (al-Wasipyya, p. 57). Once again. one connotes astate while the other is
representative of an action. Alllih enjoins and entrusts man to strive for the good and as
a result of this moral imperative, the eminciation of regulative ideas from the Divine•Chapter One: Nature of the Believer's Transcendent Universe Page 17
•
must be uttered for the process to become purposeful. In other words, to be meaningful,
real morality has to be cast against the divine command as it is expressed in the Qur'an.
It results in a ceaseless struggle to serve the Truth (al-lfaqq). and in effect becomes the
raison d'être of man's normative existence. This raises the key notion of anteriority. In
a system where the apex is the generative cause of ail creation, anteriority becomes
correlative with self-sufficiency. The moral function acquires value once the
consciousness of the Divine Reality in the individual has been awakened, emphasizing
again that in such a vision, dependence is wholly unilateral. Creation is totally
subordinated to Alliih, the telos.
Taw1)id al-rubübiyya is the basis for taw1)id al-ulühiyya, yet Laoust (al
Wasipyya. p. 37 n. 1) indicates that Ibn Taymiyya refuses to consider a believer one who
proclaims Allah 's divine lordship but refrains from practicing the obligations which a
belief in taw1)id al-ulühiyya entails. Moreover, to associate with Alliih another is to
commit the sin of "shirk fi ulühiyatihi (making others share in the divinity of Alliih) by
praying to others as in worship or for a need...The harm emanating from these is greater
than the benefit accruing therefrom, as Alliih has made our worshipping Him alone and
our seeking of assistance from Him alone the source of ail good" (al-Iqtiçla'. p. 282).
Laoust writes that between the two notions a reversibility exists. Here is his statement
to this effect:
La reconnaissance d'un seul Dieu implique l'unité d'un seulculte...Admettre, une pluralité de dieux, c'est introduire la multiplicité etl'associationnisme dans la vie morale. Inversement, on ne sauraitadmettre l'unité de la toute puissance, et en même temps, vouer un culte àun autre qu'à Dieu; détoumer vers un prophéte, un saint, à plus forteraison vers un chef de confrérie ou un souverain temporel, une partie duculte que l'on doit exclusivement à Diou, c'est en arriver, à son insu, aassocier a Dieu une autre divinité et, a sa tlJute puissance, une puissanceétrangère (Laoust. 1939, pp. 472-73).
The proper harmonization of the !WO concepts of WWQid leads, however, to the fostering
of a deep seeded consciousness of Allah in the individual self. In an ideal system, this•Chapter One: Nature of the Believer's Transcendent Universe Page 18
awareness is creatively and organically responsible for the founding of an ethical social
order. Ibn Taymiyya jeels it is necessary to emphasize the notions of service and
submission in the apprehension of the Divine if one is to become a moral being. In
such a context, the divine law (shar'J, the scriptural expression of His command, is
paramount. Observance and compliance to the divine injunctions are the keys to the
emergence of a unified self which can integrate its awaited place into the macrocosmic
scheme. Ibn Taymiyya's theology is one where moral Imperatives are stressed, and the
complete fulfillment of the law represents the attainment of a higher self.
Taw1)id al-asmii' wa al-$ifijt consists in the affirmation of ail of Allah's
particulars and the negation of broad generalizations;27 it is an exercise in what Laoust
terms "a positive theodicy" (al-Wiisiriyya. p. 37 n. 1). It is an attempt to perceive the
unity of Alliih in the exhaustive details provided by the Qur'iin about the Ineffable since
Allah has entrusted His prophets and messengers with the positive task to portray Him
through the medium of an explicit affirmation of His attributes (ithbiit muf3$$l'l) ..nd
through the recourse to a general negation (nafy mujmalJ of ail analogy which would
equate the Divine with His creation (Ibn Tümart. p. 174). The divine names and
attributes represent a substantiated verbal reality of the divine t~nscendence and must
be accepted on laith.28 The letter of the te::! embodies the textual meaning to the effect
•
27
28
The implication of such a method is a refutation of the philosophers' approach. Aswill be explained, the philosophers' approach is based on the notion of a simpleexistent. Their proof of Al/ah 's transcendence consislS in a negation of the divinepaniculars and the assertion of an expurgated concept of Al/ah.
Ibn Taymiyya's refusai to question the discription that Al/ah gives of Himself in theQur'an and Sunnah is in perfect consonance with standard l;lanbaU teachings. IbnQudiima (d. 620/1223), in his Ta/;Jrim (para. 73), advocated "a faith which accordswith the leller of the text which is indubitable and whose veracity is inconslCstable,
that it requires no further specification or elucidation.29 ln this context the path to a
knowledge of AIliih is to believe absolutely, without recourse to an intellectual•Chapter One: Nature of the Believer's Transcendent Universe Page 19
argumentation(cakyïf). Fo' the individual who abides by the Sunnah. to question.
interpret without deviation(cahrïf), elaborate or refute(ca'{ïl). the description(wa?f)
AIlfih has given of Himself throLigh the medium of the Qur'iin and through His messenger
Mu/;1ammad is beyond human capability and hence intolerable. Since Al1iih is omniscient
and incomparable. His word cannot be subjected to argumentation and the description He
gives of Himself cannot be altered in meaning. It is pointless and dangerous of man to
deny (nafy) the description Al1iih has given of Himself. Hence the Sunnah min:fed do not
ascribe errcneous meanings (caPri!) to the sacred words. nor do they extrapolate on the
intended meanings of the names (asmii') and the signs (ayac) sent by Allah to His
creation. The way in which Alliih has described Himself is pro~r to His divine nature
and cannot be shared in by the created (al-Wiisipyya, p. 38). He is unique and hence his
description is also unique. Man must accept it faithfully as incomparable. true and
sacred.
1III Sacred Mean;ng of the Credo
Ibn Taymiyya places an obvious importance on the sacred word. on the
pronouncement of the credo in its elocutionary mode. The I;fanbalï entrenchment behind
and whose meaning is known best to Him who ullered il, and in which we believeaccording to the meaning He intended for il,.. and we thus joined the requirement offaith with a refusai to concur with the proscribed anthropomorphism." G. Makdisistates that Ibn Taymiyya received the $ufi cloak from Ibn Qudama's nephew (G.Makdisi. 1973. p. 123).
•29 Ibn Taymiyya is aware of the opacity of certain Quranic passages and acknowledges
the difficulty with which the Interpreter of the text is faced if the Qur'an is toaddress ail the questions that might arise out of what might be conceived as a societyin flux. He accepts the Jegitimacy of a recourse to other canonical statemenlS and toan educated persona! judgment in an effon to understand ilS meaning.
the alciom of bila kayfa.30 the nonfigurization of Alhih. heed the Quranic statements on
Allah as fully exhausted by their letter. The attitude behind the avowal of bila kayfa is•Chapter One: Nature of the Believer's Transcendent Universe Page 20
less related to the knowledge which transpires from the tex! than an interdiction of any
qualification or specification of scriptural elements beyond that which is clearly
stipulated by the tex! and in terms other than those of the tex!. The word as a
devotional instrument is of essential importance and its function has to be protected. Ibn
Taymiyya believes that once a religious statement leaves the devotional mode of
signification, it becomes emptied of its literai meaning, opening the door to vain
speculation about the nature of the Divine. This method has allowed the philosophers and
the mystics to raise inappropriate questions. Inappropriate in the sense that Ibn
Taymiyya feels that they refer to realities that lie beyond the realm of words, and are
thus constitutive of the exclusive preserve of Allah. His mistrust of theological and
philosophical speculations is grounded on the Qur'an31 itself which dismisses it as self
indulgent guesswork about notions that human reason cannot fathom. Speculation
acquires an intrinsic value solely when the required knowledge is not readily available,
leaving Ibn Taymiyya to re-assess the place speculation occupies in the hierarchy of
knowledge. Speculation is doubled with the notion of the necessity seen in a particular
knowledge. If pursued for ils own sake, speculation is at bes! of trille value and at worst
deluding in nature. Nevertheless, if a necessary science can only come to fruition
30 The ~anbali school was not the only one to have recourse to this slogan, al-Ash'ariand bis followers advocated the classical theologieal position of "ask not how" as acentral tenet. For additional information on al-Ash'ari's theological positions rererto: Fakhry, 1983, A Hiscory of Islamic Philosophy; and Fakhry, 1991, EchicalTheorie! in Islam.
•31 The Qur'iin dismisses it as [.anna; to thi~k without cenain knowledge. 10 surmise.
As a verbal noun it translates as guess work. opinion. thought without certainknowledge. One such example is Sürah VI, AI-An'iim. verse 116 .. If thou obeyedstmost of those on earth they would mis1ead thee far from Alliih's way. They follownaught but an opinion, and they do but guess".
through a recourse to speculation, then speculation is indeed of a necessary nature. This
intellectual investigation can proceed only if there is no immediate way to achieve the
same knowledge (al-Fitro. p. 52). Once again the primacy of the text and reliance on its
excellence is asserted as fundamental and as the key to becoming a Muslim with whom
Alliill is pleased. The apprehension of Alliill consists of the understanding of the Qur'fïn
from within and not as the philosophers and the mystics tried to do through the
imposition of a man made system of intellection. 5ince Alliih chooses to make Himself
known through revelation, unlike the God of the Philosophers who can be discovered
through the use of reason, faith is the criteria for knowledge. Ibn Taymlyya specifically
argues against the improper reliance on speculation and reason. It would be wrong to
believe that IsIiim condones the use of speculation as a means to reach a certain
knowledge of Alliih. Had Alliih wanted to elevate reason above revelation, He would have
rendered the recourse to it a duty and an obligation on the part of the believer. On the
contrary, the first obligation of the Muslim is to affirm his faith in the Divine through
the pronouncement of the double creed (shahiidatayn) (al-Firra. p. 52).
•Chapter One: Nature of the Believer's Transcendent Universe Page 21
•
The instrument used in the acquisition of certain knowledge becomes the point of
contention between Ibn Taymiyya and his opponents. The notion that the metaphysical
reality exists prior to its conceptualization combined with the belief in its
responsibility for the origination of ail things including knowledge is of fundamental
consequence. It suggests an uppermost limit endowed with absolute knowledge, what
might be called Allah and his spiritual domain. Allâh then decides to share the
knowledge of Himself with His creation through the artifice of revelation. As the direct
testimony from the Divine about the Divine, it is the most perlect instrument of
knowledge given to mankind and it must not be unmade by ignorant discourse. Ibn
Taymiyya is convinced that the rational man who forgets Alliih torgets himself;3~ and•Chapter One: Nature of the Believer's Transcendent Universe Page 22
the threat this forgetfulness represents for the believer is an invalidation of reason as
the ultimate and most adequate medium for a vision of the Divine. The mind. or reason
is an instrument of the enslavement to the Iimits of humanity and it cannot partake of
Alliih's spiritual dominion (i.e. His knowledge). Logically then. the dissimilarity of the
Divine to the rest of creation renders the acquisition of knowledge about Alliih through
analogical inference an impossibility (Hallaq. 1991. p. 53). As an impertect faculty.
reason cannot behold the Divine and thus cannot sit in judgment of revelation. Ibn
Taymiyya envisions a downward transfer of knowledge; Alliih occupies the uppermost
Iimit of the descending scale of knowledge. while the ignorant man resides at the other
nadir. Inside the Iimits exist various stages which correspond to stations in the
integration of the self. these coincide with the prophetie and the mu'min components.
The line of descendance in this vision is one towards growing ignorance and unawareness
of Alliih.33
The fideist position Ibn Taymiyya espouses was the objee! of denunciations from
influential contemporaries who saw in it the seeds of anthropomorphism.34 To the
•
32
33
34
Sürah LIX. AI-Ifashr. verse 19: "And be not ye as those who forgot AlIlih. thereforeHe caused them to forget their souls. Such are the evil-doers".
The continuum implied by a descending gradient from a state of unblemishedexcellence to one of imperfection is not the continuity of an invarianl essence. Taaffinn that it is. is to adopt the pantheistic position that there is an unvaryingsubstance unifying the multifarous expressions of creation. Ibn Taymiyya does nolfall prey to that vision. and although he does advocate a descending continuum. it istruly structured by a duality. Al/lih and creation are two separale enlilies unlikeeach other.
The Ifanbali school has often been the target of slanderous accusations ofanthropomorphism. To accept these as a true refiection of Hanbali doctrine is notappropriate as the charge of anthropomorphism was frequently atlached to politicaland social considerations. Like philosophy. it was a negotiable loken open 10atlacks or praise depending on the climale of the time.
anacks, he responds by levying his own accusations against the philosophers and mystics
for their respective beliefs in the notions of ra'ri/ (exaggerated transcendence) and•Chapter One: Nature of the Believer's Transcendent Universe Page 23
•
cashbih (to make comparisons).
!.IV Gdevoys Mjsconceptjons of the Divine 8eality
The (a'ril of philosophees. Iike that of al-Farabi. was founded on Aristotelian and
Neoplatonic principles. In Aristotle's t>ierarchy of existence. Allah. the Unmoved
Mover, occupies the uppermost peint of the scale. He is absolute being and as such,
perfect, immobile and etemal. He is also pure intellect and at one and the same time the
object and the subject of the intellection process. By virtue of His perfection, the only
activity worthy of Allah is the etemal contemplation of Himself. the source of ail
knowledge. The Neoplatonic dimension. according to 1. R. Netton is "epitomized in a
negative vocabulary which signais a dimension of knowledge where one records.
paradoxically. what cannot be known and cannot be truly articulated except in negatives
(Nenon. 1992, p. 40). The fusion of the two philosophical traditions form the
Saon after its inception. Damascene Hanbalism gained great authority and control ina city which had been traditionally influenced by ideals foreign to Isliim. Theinfluence of the l;lanba/i creed spread to Baghdad and acceded to full rccognitionduring the rule of the Caliph al-Qadir (991-1031) when he officially endorsed it(Lapidus. 1988. p. 172).
By the founheenth century. the Mamluks had taken over the reins of power andspread their influence over Egypt and Syria. To its opponents. Hanbalism was to becontained and kept from influencing the decision making of the state nowdominated by an Egyptian and Damascene intelligentsia with strong connections tothe $ufi movements (Little. 1973. pp. 311-327). Little argues that the periodicharassment (trials. detentions) of Ibn Taymiyya by Mamluk authorities had less todo with the man man with the doctrines he preached. Believed to he a menace. keyfigures tried to disc~edit him levying anthropomorphic charges against his credo.The accusation of anthropomorphism was used as an instrument of retaliation by theadepts of wa/ldM aI-wujüd against Ibn Taymiyya's vocal attaek on their heterodoxy.ln 70S. he was brought to trial and asked to defend aI- Wiisiriyya. this was the firstof what would become a long series of scrutinizing sessions. trials andimprisonments. Ibn Taymiyya's Iife came to an end while being in confinement(Laoust. 1986. pp. 9-36). (Murad. 1968. pp. 74·112).
emergence of a vacuous entity with which the First PrinciplelAllJh is equated. Ibn
Taymiyya plainly condemns the philosophers description of AllJh. He asserts that they
contradict themselves in their attempt to define the Divine. Their refusai to define Alliïh
through a recourse to His true positive attributes leads them to describe Him only in
terms of their own negative attributes (salbiya). AIIJh in their vision is neither this
nor that, yet the only entity which can effectively be described through the use of a
negative approach is nothingness (maCdüm). Ultimately. their methodology serves to
assimilate AIIiih to nothingness as the difference between the two no longer exists.
Having equated AIIiih with nothingness. they nevertheless still maintain that He exists.
The philosophers are therefore. in obvious contradiction with themselves (lbn Tümart.
pp. 177-78). To Ibn Taymiyya. it conjures up an image of a self·centered God, estranged
from creation. who neither wills, nor creates and who in His absolute knowledge. is
unaware of the particularia of His universe. It seeks to convey AIIJh as pure essence.
stripped of ail positive attributes (bi·shart nafy aJ-umür al-thubüti"yya), and in doing so
raises the fundamental issue of the relationship between dhiit (essence) and ~jfiir
(attributes).
•Chapter One: Nature of the Believer's Transcendent Universe Page 24
•
ln the Avicennian tradition, essence qua essence is self·sustaining and is in no
need for a connection to existence. Existence can be conceived as a super·added
attribute. unconnected to quiddity. The concepts of essence and existence can be co
joined in the mind or in an extemal reality. although. there is no necessary compulsion
for that to occur. In other words, essence strictly considered can exist in the absence of
a connection to either (Hallaq, 1991, p. 50). A similar mental exercise is practiced in
an effort to conceptualize the relationship between the notions of universal and
particular and the essence; not unlike existence they are considered separate attributes
which are affixed to the essence without being constitutive of il. Similarly to existence,
Ibn Sïna insists on the verity of an external reality for the concept of universal. His•Chapter One: Nature of the Believer's Transcendent Universe Page 25
•
postulate is grounded in the human capacity to abstract "that which is common to the
many in external reality" (Hallaq, 1991, pp. 50-51).
Ibn Taymiyya fully rejects the possible existence of universals outside the mind.
His arguments. based on an empiricist approach. clearly state that the extemal world is
inhabited by individuated particulars. ail of which are definite and unique. To conceive
of an external universal under which individuals could be subsumed is to give in to an
illusion created in the number of visible similarities, in spite of the fact that reality is
other as no Iwo entities can be absolutely identical. A truth based on the observation of
extemal existents can only be philosophically demonstrative, if it is grounded on the
exhaustive and absolute compendium of its constituent particulars. The multiplicity of
creation does not allow for such a possibility and thus does not sanction the elevation of
an empirical truth to the status of a philosophical truth.· Ibn Taymiyya thus concludes
that as absolute essence, the God of the philosophers is unthinkable and as absolute
existent, He is equated to a universal which has no extra-mental reality. In other
words; "the contemplation of Pure Essence. stripped of ail attributes••. is a mistake. and
absurd at that. Not only an Absolute Being devoid of attributes is unthinkable and
logically impossible. since it cannot subsist for a moment in the external world, it also
cannot be the Creator of the Iwo worlds and the object of man's devotion" (al-Radd • p.
518. cited in Memon. 1977. p. 33). Ibn Taymiyya condemns the philosophers for using
a human based methodology in their investigation of the Unseen.
When they hear the information of the Prophets about angels. the Throne.the Chair. the Garden. and the Rre. they start from the presumption thatnothing exists except that which they know. Then they become confusedand interpret the teaching of the Prophet according to what they [thinkthey) know. even though there is no proof for it and they cannot base theiroriginal denial on sound knowledge. Absence of knowledge is not knowledgeof an absence (al-Ikhlii$. pp. 82-83 cited in Michel. 1983. p. 10)•
Allah cannot be contained by the philosophers' simplistic definitions and categories.•Chapter One: Nature of the Believer's Transcendent Universe Page 26
emphasizing that the human dimension cannot be a point of departure in the
apprehension of the Divine. Ibn Taymiyya argues that the philosophers use a reason
based conceptual framework foreign to the scripture and from it emerges a gradient of
ascendance towards knowledge.35 It amounts to a debasement of the role of revelation in
favour of discursive reasoning. From Ibn Taymiyya's perspective. it is a sterile
exercise which cannot yield the intended cognizance.
Tashbih is to draw an analogy between Allfih and His creation. In the Qur'an.
Allfih is described by attributes which have a resonance in the created world, since the
manner in which He is designated is on occasion identical to the way in which man defines
himself and his universe,36 Allfih is coined in terms of attributes and notions which are
•
35
36
ln al-Farabï's philosophy. man comprehends the principles of being through themedium of intellection or by imagination. Faith in any concept is in turn clicitcdthrough cither demonstration/proof or by persuasion. The combination of thcseclements create three fields of knowledge to which is associated a hierarchy of beingas they shape the charncter formation of the individua!. Philosophy is the reunionof intellection and demonstration, external philosophy is the expression of thecombination of intellection and persuasion and finally religion is the outcome ofimagination and persuasion. Al-Farabi assigns the gift of philosophy to the elect,and to the most capable among them. he cntrusts the position of supreme ruler. Heconsiders religion to be an imitation of philosophy and as such. the religiousminded is relegated to the lowest stratum in the hierarchy. In between these twopoles. AI-Farabi inserts external philosophy, to it belongs the individual who hasleft the realm of religion but has not yet anained the exalted status of the elect(Nanji, 1990. pp. 53-55).
ln aI-Wiisiriyya, Ibn Taymiyya restates the common place humanization of Al/oh inthe Qur'iin:
vw.......,. .1 ... Jt<.5)~ ~I L.S:... ..fI
.;.~I Jo <.5".:-1 ~ t~1 .... .j ...,..~~I ~ ...I~I-JI ~ ~.:.JI Y'
The authorS translation of the above three Iines is as follows:But His hands are open (111- Wiisiriyya, p. 6).1 am with you, 1 hear and 1 see (al.Wiisiriyya. p. 6).He is the One who created the Hcavens and the Earth in six days and then sat on thethrone (al- WiisiiÏyya. p. 9).
verbally identical to the ones used to ascertain the human domain)7 The human defining•Chapter One: Nature of the Believer's Transcendent Universe Page 27
process l'ses a vocabulary endowed with a human referent and with the limitations that
human intellection imparts on the terms. Therefore, on the premise of an identical
terminology, the danger rests in the assumption that the knowledge imparted by human
categories translates into a corresponding knowledge about the Divine. Il equates AI/ah
with His creatures, and in effect strips Him of the perfection of His altributes. The
deception inherent in the process of analogy causes Ibn Taymiyya to be acutely aware of
the conceptual reality which underlies terminological conventions.
The scrutiny to which Ibn Taymiyya subjects language is driven by his claim that
the use of multi-valent terms, which admit an array of proper and figurative meanings,
deceive people from the uniqueness of the Divine Dimension. Present in Ibn Taymiyya's
mind is the wa1)dat al-wujüd school of thought to which he ascribes the erroneous
doctrine of pure tashbih. As stated above, the wa1Jdat al-wujüd school of thought proceeds
in the affirmation of AI/ah 's union with the universe, His existential identification with
His creation. as the created multiplicity is but a reflection of His oneness.
Whether it is the pure ta'tif of the philosophers or the pure tashbih of the
mystics. Ibn Taymiyya claims it is an exaggeration (ghuluww) of the conception of Allah;
ta'tI7 is an exaggerated transcendence while tashbih is an exaggerated immanence. Ibn
Taymiyya reaffirms that without faith the human mind is incapable to fathom the Divine.
The aeeept:lOce of the literai ascnptlon of human characteristics ta Alliih by IbnTaymiyya led ta charges of anthropomorphism. He dismissed his detractors asmisguided in their understanding of his credo.
•37 ft ':/1 J:.UI .:.t ~ .:r:a. ~ J! l.:'..J1 .L... JI ~~ J.l-':!
The authork leanslation of the above is as follows: Our Lord descends ta the skyclosest ta the woeld each night. in the last third of the night (a/-Wiisiriyya. p. (2).
As it is the case with the philosophers and the adepts of "'abdac aJ-lI'll;ud, AlIJh ceases to•Chapter One: Nature of the Believer's Transcendent Universe Page 28
be dissimilar and distinct from the other creatures and appears to be just like another
being. .4.l/5h becomes either a figment of one's reason and imagination or He is
incarnated (1;wl1) as a human being. In cases of extreme exaggeration. Ibn Taymiyya
claims that these !wo groups have made All5h the existential fount of the creatures
themselves (wujiid al-makhliiqat) (Ibn Tiimart. p. 178).
To reiterate, All5h is one, yet His oneness internalizes a multiplicity of
attributes. The One is a totality to which the attributes contribute, synthesized in an
internai unity. The multiple expression of the Divine is real (iJaqiqi) in spite of the
human incapacity to understand and explain how. The attemptto usurp AllJh's secrets is
not only futile, it is an innovation (bidà ) and should not be tolerated.
Ultimately, to foliow the truth is to foliow a via media ($ir5{ aI-muswqim).
T. Michel defines the attainment of knowledge of the Divine Reality as the affirmation
of tanzih38 without ta '{il, and tamthi139 without tashbih (Michel, 1984, p. 3). The only
assurance, however, that one is keeping to that narrow path is through the observance of
the only reliable account which has been entrusted with man; namely, the Qur'5n and
the examplar of the prophet.
38 Michel defines tanzïh as "the proper expression of divine transcendence whichpreserves God's constant. active relation to creation" (Michel. 1984. p. 458).
•39 Michel defines tamthil as "the proper expression of divine immanence which avoid.
both essential identification of God with creation and His dependence upon it"(Michel, 1984, p. 458).
•
Chapter Two: The Nature of the Believer's Immanent Universe
Manifest in Ibn Taymiyya's religious belief is the focal importance with which
the divine fiat is vested.40 AIliih's creative activity leads to the disclosure of His
nature, which is but one of His modes of revelation.41 Still, whereas each creative aet
is an act of self-unveiling, it is only upon the disclosure of His will that revelation
forces a covenant. The enunciation of the divine will presupposes the hamessing of the
Creator and His creation in a mutual although unequal relationship. Once articulated, the
revelation of the divine will forces the object of its divulgence to respond. The
40 "The Originator of the Heavens and the Eanh! "'"ben He decreeth a thing, He saithunto it only: Be! and it is" Sürah Il. AI·Baqarah, verse 117.
•
41 The revelatory activity of Al/ah is multi-faceted and grounded in the concept ofkhalq. The primordial act of creation permeates ail levels of the generative world.from the emergence of the universe to the font of human reason ('aql). The creativeact is in effcct one and Inseparable from the revelatory act, since to create is me sinequa non condition to being known by the created. The following exampleiIlustrates a point which the Qur'an corroborates at length. In Sürah XVII. Banilsra'i1, verse 44. it is stated that "the seven heavens and the eanh and ail that istherein praise Him. and there is not a thinll but hymneth His praise; but yeunderstand not their praise. Lo! He is ever Clement, Forgiving".
Page 29
disclosure of the divine will confronts man with a binary choice which he cannot
consciously ignore. It represents the enslavement of man to Allah, as man can choose 10•Chapter Two: The Nature of the Believer's Immanent Universe Page 30
be guided by the divine injunctions or refuse to abide by them. In either case, the
objective is the destruction of a possible plane of reality outside of the divinely ordained.
or in other words. a deliverance from ignorance. The world becomes fully
comprehensible only in the event of a participation of creation in the true realityl2
divulged by Allah. The Divine-human encounter is not only central but fundamental to
the partaking of creation in His revealed reality. To consciously partake in this reality.
forces a process of becoming truly real on the part of the created. This awareness, in
tum, necessitates the articulation of the conformity of human acts to the divine will
through a literary agency and a human archetype. In other words. the correspondence of
human action to a sacred nomothetic discourse must be mediated through the written teX!
of the Qur'iin and the exemplar of the Prophet. as both provide the outer expression of
particular and discreet knowledge.
11.1 The Nature of lbe Qur'iin
Centuries after the Mi.;na43• the orthodoxy44 had won and managed to firmly
42 As previously mentioned (see Introduotion. footnote 2). Reality is used to convey adouble dimension: (1) AJliih's paradigmatic act of creation; and (2) the creation o.'an alternative plane of reference. th~ '·Thou encounter. which is at the center of ailmeaning. The 1-Thou encount~r not only forces an irrevocable verticalaccountability of man to AJliih. it also creates an horizontal dependence as man isforced into a divinely preordained relationship with his fellow man. It imposes amoral dimension on human existence.
•
43 Traditional sources usually cite al-Ja'd b. Dirham (executed for the heresy of histheological opinions in d. 12Sn43) and al-Jahm b. Safwiin (killed in a rebellion ind. 127n4S) as evidence for an interest in the createdness of the Qur'iin Ihatantedated the public debate which began at the beginning of the nineth century. TheMi/;lna. also referred to as the Inquisition. is nevertheless of importance as itsymbolizes the political crisis which engulfed the community over Caliph AIMa'mun's (813-833 A.D.) official endorsement of the dogma of the creation of theQur'iin. The notion became the benchmark of one of the few officially promulgateddefinitions of orthodoxy and provided the impctus to the force which was 10 takeover the ascendancy. The voice of opposition was that of Ibn l:Ianbal and his own
entrench as a vilal part of the Sunnite creed, the notion that the Qur'ân is the uncreated•Chapler Two: The Nature of the Believer's Immanent Universe Page 31
speech of Alltib (AllfLlj ghayr makhlüq). The man most responsible for the adoption of
that particular credo is Al:tmad Ibn /:lanbaI. Three centuries later. Ibn T~ymiyya
sanctions the views and arguments of the founder of his madhab (school). He aHirms
that Ibn /:lanbal's traditionalist doctrine of the uncreated nature of the Qur'ân is founded
on the position held to by the Companions of the Prophet, the salaf.45 Theirs (the salafj
is a negation of the possibility that the sacred word of the Qur'fin be an independent
entity. existing outside and alongside of Alliih (khalaqahu fi ghayrihi). The rational being
that if the word is net separate from Him and there is nothing of Him which is created.
inlerpretation of the question was eventually adopted by the Sunni majority. (Secfootnote no. 44 for a brief outline of the dynamies of orthodoxy). Seen from abroader perspective. lhe eontroversy is also indicative of a willingness on the panof the carly muslim theologians to apply the Greek-defined notions of essence andattributes to the concept of the Divine. For a full discussion on the anteeedenlS to thecontroversy over the ereatedncss of the Qur'iïn scc. J. M. Barral. pp. 504-525.
•
44
45
F. Rahman raises an interesting point on the nature of the orthodoxy in Islam. Hestates the following: "lt is indeed a curious and striking fact about religious historyof Isliïm. that at cach critieal point of ilS eareer the force that cornes to the forefrentand lakes over the situation is not the then forroalized established orthodoxy butrather something that presenlS ilSelf at every juneture as the raw material of theorthodoxy subsequently to be forroed. ln ilSelf this force is something ncndescriptand for want of a better designation is called by such terros as Ahl aJ-I;ladich or Ah1al-Sunna. But the Ahl a/-I;ladich or the Ahl al-Sunna is not the name of anypartleular group. sect or party. and if there is an 'orthodoxy' or a 'conservatism', thisis surely the one in ascendancy at the point of time concemed. lt develops not byself-propulsion. so to say. but by watching. adjusting and absorbing within ilSelfthat which moves within. lt is a synthetic activity" (Rahman. 1979, p. Ill).
The author will use the lerro salafism -- a rendering of the Arabie salafiyya -- totypify Ibn Taymiyya's rhird methodological component (Sec Introduction for areferenee to the first twc methodological elemenlS). As a generic terro, it represenlSan appeal for a retum to pure and pristine Islam through the actualizZlion of thesalutary example of pious epigones (the sa/af). Ibn Tayrniyya uses a regressivemethodology, as he endows the Qur'iïn with a notion of summum bonum. Theexemplar of the prophet followed by the one provided by the salaf sirnply representilS human valorization and in general a trickling down of the guidance. Thisrendition does not make any reference to the ninetheenth century Egyptian reforromovement of Mul)ammad 'Abdu (1265-1323/1849-1905). lt is used here to invokea theologica! position not a political orientation.
then logically, the Qur'5n cannot be created.46 As the speech of A/l5h, the Qur J5n is•Chapter Two: The Nature of the Believer's Immanent Universe Page 32
thus expressive of the divine essence and is ascribed a similar ontological status as is
His will, and His knowledge ('ilm). The word of Al/5h is an eternal attribute47 not in the
manner of an aniculated or spoken speech but as the divine logos of the Hellenistic and
Christian traditions. To the doctrine 01 the divine logos is customai'ily attached the
notion of temporality versus the notion of eternity. Whether in the Christian tradition
or in the post-Mi1Jna period, it became generally accepted to adjoin a temporal
dimension to the word "created" while the word "uncreated" became affixed with the
concept of eternity. Ibn Taymiyya denies this equation which forces the resultant of one
to be the affirmation of the other (uncreated --.. eternal)48. He attempts to qualily the
notion of eternity (qadim) in an effon to provide a theory consistent with the pious
ancestors' affirmation of the uncreated nature of the Qur'5n and their unwillingness to
46 Ibn Taymiyya quotes the following statement with approval (al-Ras'l'il. Volume 111.pp. 133-34):
~J~ .;,-> ~I ..,.L.....I ~ ~~I "-~ .l:.. ..,.L:JI ~ ~~I :JL:; ~~~ '" .,-&
~..... <:lI J l::~ "- :<ÎJ r'lS ,,1; .;,I.".LJI ~I ,j"J.;.. .1....1.. J ..;Jt.;J1 <ÎJ. v~~
The author's translation is: "'Amr bin Dinar said: For seventy years 1 have foundthe companions of the Prophet and those after him saying that Allah is the creator.and everything except Him is created. And the Qur'an is the speech of Allah. FromHim it emerged and to Him it returns.
47 This contention was first aniculated by Ibn I:Ianbal. He saw in it the way in whichhe could challenge the Mu'tazilite nolion which equated the speech of A lliih withan attribute of action. The Mu'tazilites' insistence on the createdness of the word ofAllEh. presumed an origination in lime. It debased Allah to something less thanHimself as it Iikened Him to His creatures. The implication is that there was a timewhen Allah did not speak. and hence it introduces a change in His fundamentalnature (Barral. 1985. p. 517).
•48
Ibn Taymiyya adopts his predecessors formula which guarantees Allah's freedom ofspeech: (al-Rasa'il. Volume III. p. 44)
.~ 1::'1~ <ÎJ J;" ~
The author's translation is: "AllEh does not make a mistake as a speaker when Hewills" .
Ibn Taymiyya's poslllon represents a disavowal of his own I:Ianbalite school. and are-examination of his famous predecessor's views (Ibn I:Ianbal).
assert its eternity. According to J. M. Barral (Barral, 1985, p. 524), Ibn Taymiyya•Chapter Two: The Nature of the Believer's Immanent Universe Page 33
advocates a restrictive understanding of the notion of eternity which allows him the
freedom to affirm the eternity of the divine logos in its species (jins). but not in its
particular materialization ('ayn). The attempt consists in a re-consecration and a
revitalization of the salars recognition and acceptance of the view that the Qur'an was
indeed uttered by Alliih in time and hence uncreated but not eternal.49
11,11 The Qur'iin as a Part;cular and Djscreet Soyrce of Knowledge
To understand the role played by the sacred text, it is necessary to introduce
briefly the concept of reason ('aqI).SO Reason or intellect,SI if taken to signily the
•
49
SO
SI
Ibn Taymiyya does not uphold the sa/af's positIon out of a nostalgic sense ofantiquarianism. Rather. he conccives of the exemple provided by thc salai as aparadigmatic construct. As a clear arehetype of actualized guidance. the salai as agroup, is seen by Ibn Taymiyya as a rcpository and a guarantor of continuity andtradition. In this. he assumes that tradition is not a static entity, but a flexible andpermanent claboration of themes and conceptions which are only putativelyoriginal. This position allows him to draw on the elementary principles whichguided the salai to issue a judgment. but also entitles him to give a personalrationale for his advocacy of it. This dynamie technique is what explains hiswillingness to moderate the concept of eternity.
The Arabic noun 'aq 1 is conventionally translated in English to mean"intelligence". It is not apparent to the author. however, that the Arabic 'aql makes asemantic difference between intelligence. intellect. or reason.
It is possible to argue that Ibn Taymiyya chooses to posit reason as a point ofdcparture of knowledge to avoid the threat of cireular reasoning. Were he to assertthe priority of revelation as the sour:e of ail knowledge about the Divine. hisargument would indeed become circular as the authenticity of revelation wouldhave to he based on itself. In fact. he claims that if reason as an intellectual process.were to find an internai contradiction in the teachings of the Qur'iin, it wouldindicate that the sacred text is not a revealed book. (Michel. 1984. p. 107). While.if reason is taken to Mean an intuitive fonn of apprehension. it has the capacity todiscern the divine signs as they are perceived by the faculty of sense perception.This implies a connection between the signs and a transcendent being who isunderstood to be their origi:1ator. In sum, the perception of the fonner givescredibility. legitimacy and authority to the latter.
Eisewhere. however. Ibn Taymiyya explicitly asserts that the Qur'iin aflinns that itwas revealed by Al/iih. and that it is the sign and the proof of its revelation.(Ma'iirij al-Wu~ül, pp. 79-80). This is precisely the circular argument mentionedabove. whereby the authenticity of the sacred text is advocated on the basis of itsown merits. A possible way out of this entanglement may rest with Ibn Taymiyya's
inclusion of ail natural channels of knowledge, represents a point of departure of•Chapter Two: The Nature of the Believer's Immanent Universe Page 34
knowledge in Ibn Taymiyya's epistemology. Ibn Taymiyya upholds the notion that human
beings are bom "free of particularized knowledge",52 even though they are endowed with
sound faculties of sense perception and intuitive disposition (tï{ra53.- an aggregate of
necessary knowledge)(Hallaq, 1991. p. 58). These inbom, in potentia, capacities are
fully actualized after birth. and can yield extensive knowledge. if as rational methods,
they are not corrupted. Their function is ta apprehend Alliih 's signs. as these alone yield
conclusive knowledge about the Divine. The most important knowledge attained through
the sound use of this particular form of reasoning is the preamble of revelation. It
triggers the human awareness of the existence of A,lliih as a self·evident truth, even
though. it does not force the realization of the contingent nature of the created's
existence. The relationshil= of dependency of the created on the Divine becomes apparent
with the articulation of a message through the medium of revelation. Accordingly, Ibn
Taymiyya approaches revelation as the sole source of normative ethical knowledge
The proper delineation of the relationship between Alliih and His creation relies
on more than an innate awareness of the Divine and the immediate knowledge that it
infuses in the created. Ibn Taymiyya argues against the human capacity ta acquire.
belief in the perfection and exalted status of the sacred text. He does not ehoose onemethod of proof over the other. but rather Ibn Taymiyya adopts an inclusiveapproaeh. Reason. in all of its fonns. will prove the authenticity of the text. yet thetext itself is so superior to human faculties that a cJaim about itself wiU not onlyconfinn the results of the other methods but legitimize their claim.
52 Man is not born free of aU knowledge. He is imprinted with a diffused sense of theDivine. His fitra. which can be equated with the notion of Isliim, eontains theintuitive knowledge of the existence of Alliih. It is latent and man needs to recaU itto inteUeetuaUy become aware of the Divine (sec Chapter Three).
•53 Fitra is a repository of non-inferred knowledge. as will be demonstrated in Chapter
Three. It can he defined. as above. as an aggregate of necessary infonnation. yet thel;Ianbalite schoal of thought prefers to refer to it as a fonn of innate knowledge.
through the use of reason, an understanding of the divine will. Lelt to its own devices,•Chapter Two: The Nature of the Believer's Im~'anent Universe Page 35
creation (mankind) cannot 1athom its obligation of gratitude along either the vertical
axis (Allah) or the horizontal axis (man). Ibn Taymiyya's theory is clearly based on
the assumption that obligation is intelligible and unveiled to the created's consciousness
only in terms of commands. They in turn are clearly enunciated in the sacred text
(Memon, 1977. p. 330). This reverence for the Qur'an iIIustrates the correlative
assumption of absolute knowledge by the Divine and the partial knowledge of its creation,
but it is at one and the same time. combined with the concept that human reason is also a
partial and Iimited capacity. Actions have an epistemic counterpart. and Allâh 's
knowledge is quite literally synonymous with His power. Man. as he is endowed with
restrictive capacities cannot hope to emulate the Divine in his acts. Hence, man's reason
as an instrument of knowledge cannot "sit in judgment [of revelationj54 and be the
arbiter of its Iimits and prescriptions· (Michel. 1984. p. 3). Ibn Taymiyya's vision
consists in assigning a status of non-Inference and self-evidence to the scriptural
truths: however. they have to be revealed to be recognized as such by the created, as
creation cannot arrive to them independently (Naqç1. p. 33).55
The sacred text56 represents Alliih's direct speech. and ·speech is either insha'.
i.e. commands about what should and should not be done as weil as what is permissible.
•
54
55
56
Author's insertion.
This argument is derived from N. Madjid's translation of Naqt/.. p. 33 in his doctoraldissertation. (1984. page 77). He states the following: "The Qur'an and Sunna are.in general and in every respect, the only proofs that would lead people to lnIth."
Ibn Taymiyya does not approach the Qur'an from a holistic perspective. He docs notscek to envision the sacred text as a concatenation of sequential subjeclS. where theunit of knowledge is the stringing together of ail the sequences of knowledge. Hecl,early partitions the Qur'an into three sub-headings: "one third rawQid. one thirdparables. and one-third commands. positive as weil as negative" (AI-Iqrilja'.p. 330).
and ikhbiir. i.e., accounts either about the Creator or the creatures" (Memon, 1977, p.
330). The knowledge which the Qur'iin intends to impart on creation is accessible•Chapter Two: The Nature of the Believer's Immanent Universe Page 36
through the proper exegesis of the text. Michel (Michel, 1984, p. 3) argues that Ibn
Taymiyya validates a proper and untainted reflection and commentary upon the
unambiguous (?iihir) signification of the Quranic text as an acceptable foray i'nto a
dimension of knowledge made available by Alliih through His discourse. The intent is to
consciously equate the unit of knowledge with a unitary expression. The word through
the idea or concept it evokes, signifies a single entity in its entirety. The relevance of
the?iihir lies in its immediate "sense" accessibility. It is the most direct. unobstructed
and evident access to knowledge. as it reflects a direct disclosure of the Divine. almost
its physical/verbal translation.
Proper exegesis consists in collating to the written words of theQur'iin. the true
meanings of the term in the way Allah has intended. Its fundamental objective
translates as an atlempt to seek out the analogue of the initially posite.:l meaning of the
term. It calls for a retum to the original signification and application of the word as the
sense embodies its pristine truth and simultaneously. knowledge. A correct
understanding of language is critical to an accurate comprehension of the text.
Yet language antedates the revelation of the Qur'iin. as Allah endowed mankind
with a mean of verbal communication at the time of His creative command.57 Language
is an instrument given to man by the Divine to compliment his natural makeup of
intelligence. Through the processes of the intellect. man is able to comprehend. speak
•57 Sürah XXX. AI-Rüm. verse 22: "And of His signs is the creation of the Heavens and
the Earth. and the difference of your languages and colours. Lo! Herein indeed areportents for men of knowledge".
and transform his God-given mode of communication. The Qur'ân, as an individual
manifestation of the divine discourse, does not provide the created with the signification
of the primary vocabulary it chooses to employ. The assumption is that the concept
laden words will be interpreted and understood in their original divinely intended
meaning.
•Chapter Two: The Nature of the Believer's Immanent Universe Page 37
•
The truth of a text may still fall pray to the Interference of satanic forces. In
Naqlj (p. 34). Ibn Taymiyya argues that in spite of the purity of the exegete's intent, he
may still misunderstand and/or improperly contextualize the Quranic expressions
(Majdid, 1984. p. 79). It results in misguidance as the truth becomes transformed into
a falsehood. From a theoretical perspective. the satanic dictation is no less then a
displacement of the originally intended correspondence between word or expression and
its attached meaning. and in ail cases, it forces a distortion of the object knowledge.
Nonetheless, the knowledge which can be derived from revelation is dependent on
elements of reason if the meaning of the scriptural text is to become transparent. Ibn
Taymiyya. Michel argues, envisions reason as a corollary to revelation. Michel
interprets the role Ibn Taymiyya assigns to human reason as being associative and
systematizing in nature (Michel. 1984. p. 3).
To avoid a possible confusion over the role played by reason as opposed to
revelation, a comparative statement is necessary. The implicit contrast which
permeates Ibn Taymiyya's thought. between the knowledge associated to the meanings of
concept-Iaden terms and the knowledge derived from the specifie contents of ethical
value. has to be pointed out. The former is accessible to mankind through a recourse to
the intellectual faculty, understanding arises from it and prior to revelation as it's
function (revelation) serves only to confirm the already known. The latter, from which
virtues. commands and obligations stem. is the exclusive domain 01 revelation and cannot•Chapter Two: The Nature 01 the Believer's Immanent Unive..s& Page 38
be known through another medium. The intellect is not entirely irrelevant to the
acquisition 01 knowledge. but its interpretative laculty is stringently regimented. Ibn
Taymiyya measures the merits 01 the activity against the potential benefits it can reap.
He arrives at the conclusion that knowledge is 01 value il it is strictly subordinated to
the lundamental obligations 01 the religion (Laoust. 1979, p. 74. n. 1).
According to Ibn Taymiyya, the truth expressed by the Qur'an. il conceived as an
object of knowledge,58 is singular. The nature of the knowledge expressed by the sacred
text is in no way repetitious, each sentence embodies a meaning which is not to be lound
anywhere else (Macfirij al-WU$ül. p. 71). Truth. then, being whole and unitary, is lully
accessible, except lor the intended ambiguity (mutashabih) 01 certain passages. These are
inelfable59 for reasons known to Allah only, however, the occasional opacity of the
Qur'iin does heighten the utter dissimilarity of the Divine (Macfirij al-WU$ül, p. 73).60
It is a whole encompassing entity which expresses the fundamental tenets 01 the laith
(u$ül). As such, it also expresses in no ambivalent terms, prools (bariihin), signs (ayat)
•
58
59
60
SÏJrah VII, AI-A criif. verse 52: "Verily We have brought them a Scripturc which Wcexpound with knowledge, a guidance and a mercy for a people who believe".
SÏJrah m, AI-'lmriin. verse 7: "He it is Who hath revealed unto thee (Mubammad)the Scripture wherein are clear revelations. They are the substance of the Book-andothers (which are) allegorical. But those in whose heans is doubt pursue. forsooth.that which is allegorical seeking (to cause) dissension by seeking to explain it.None knoweth its explanation save AI/iih".
The ambiguous nature of certain verses in th' Qur'iin is a fact which even the sacredtext acknowledges. The ambiguity of the Quranic language is universally accepledby Muslims. Sunni Muslims wouId, however. deny Ihe possibility for any humanbeing to know the truc meaning of these passages. with the possible, yet notableexception of Mubammad. Shi'i Isliim approaehes the topic from a differentperspective and entrusts its imiim with faeulties absent from the rest of humanity.Through their special girts, the Shi'i imiims may know the truc meaning oi themutashabiha verses.
and arguments (adiIla). elements which yield certain knowledge of the Divine ReaHty and
Divine will (Ma'5rij al- Wu~ül. p. 72).61 Ibn Taymiyya insists on the inner uniqueness•Chapter Two: The Nature of the Seliever's Immanent Universe Page 39
and incomparability of expressions in the sacred teXl. The unicity of meaning of each
Quranic expression is the rational foundation on which Ibn Taymiyya grounds his avowal
of the multiple descriptive tilles affixed to the Qur'fin. Whether called, Qur'fin. Furqfin.
Bayfin. Hudfi Ba~fi'ir. Shifli' Nür. Ra(lma. RÜ(l each altribute conveys its own
differentiated and unrepeated62 meaning (Ma"5rij al-WU$ül. p. 71). The sum tolal is the
verbal expression of absolute and universal knowledge available to the created realm.
although it is but a fraction of the knowledge of Allfih.
61 Laoust (1939. p. 68 n. 3) attempts to see in Ibn Taymiyya's belief. whieh claims thatthe logical universality of the Quranic affirmations represent proofs (burhiïniya) inthemselves. a parallel to the Isma'ili belief that the Qur'iïn is the exhaustive sourceof knowledge. His argumentation is based on Ivanow's translation of Tiïju'l al'Aqii'id (written by Sayyid-na 'Ali b. Mul)ammad b. al-Walid. ob. 61211215). Herefers specifically to aniele 53 which states:
The Coran conlains ail religious knowledge (al-'uliimu al-diniya), bOlh in letterand spirit (ammiï laf?an wa ammiï manü). Philosophy, /;Iikma, is whal is containedin the Coran (hiya ma'iïni miï üdi' fi al-Qur'iin). It contains ail Ihat mankind needs10 be guided in religion and in wisdom (shar'an wa 'aqlan) (Ivanow, 1936. pp.45-46).
•
62 To ilIustrate Ihe nuances in the knowledge each attribule convey. Nasr highlightstwo names, al-Furqiïn and al-Hudiï. He states that "the names of the Book, refer tothe fact that it contajns ail Islamic doctrine. and in fact, the root of ailknowledge...as al-Furqiïn. Iilerally th~ "discernment" is that which enables man todistinguish between truth and falsehood. good and evi!. The Book is also known asal-Hudiï. the Guide, since it contains the knowledge that the muslims possess inorder to remain upon the suaight path (al-$iriït al-Muscaqim)" (Nasr, 1991, p. 6).
•Chapter Two: The Nature of the Believer's Immanent Universe
1L III The Human ValQrizatiQn Qi The Divine Gujdance63
Page 40
The intuitive perceptiQn (fÏ!ra) man has Qf the Divine is due tQ a direct
relationship between Alliih and His creatiQn. A.lliih chooses tQ establish an intangible
awareness of His existence in the heart of men even though, this direct relatiQnship does
nQt bring abQut a cQgnitive knQwledge Qf the Divine. An intellectually derived knowledge
of the Divine can Qnly be altained through the creation Qf an indirect yet primQrdial
relationship between Alliih and humanity. For Ibn Taymiyya. this linkage between the
Divine and tempQral realms does not indicate an QperatiQnal or even functional unity as
the $ufis might argue, but rather suggests an intrinsic unity of purpQse and
signification. The unveiling of meaning and purpose represents knQwledge which the
Divine wants imparted to His creation and which necessitates the advent of a prophel.
The prQphet represents the gate to religio perennis. and withQut him. no path exists to
an understanding of the Divine and hence. salvation. Primarily then, the prQphet is one
who is fully receptive to Alliih 's presence and who perfectly surrenders to il. FrQm this
transcendental experience results the imparting of knowledge. but beYQnd the mere
cQgnizance of the unveiled dimension of the Divine. lies an even greater knowledge; the
knQwledge Qf Alliih's will or cibiida which must be translated into actiQn. Man is ordered
to comprehend and actively implement Alliih's will intQ his profane existence.64 The
63 H. Laoust and F. Rahman argue that the l;Ianbalite scholar's lrcatmcnl of thc issuc ofprophecy (nubuwwà) is convcntional and confines itself to a striCI rcliancc on thctraditions and the text of the Qur'iin (H. Laoust. 1939. pp. 179-180) and (F.Rahman. 1958. p. lOI). In addition. both H. Laoust and V. Makari point ouI thalIbn Taymiyya's discussion of prophethood is less conccrnce with an elucidation ofthe concept itself than it is with its theological-juristic function (H. Laoust. 1939. p.179) (V. Makari. 1983, p. 47).
• 64
Michel argues that Ibn Taymiyya wrote thr:e works on the topic of prophecy. Kieiiba/-Nubuwwiie in which he a::ldresses the doctrine of prophetic inspiration: itsuniqueness and characteristics. His argumentation is based on the Qur'iin and thetraditions. T3khjil Ahl a/-lnjil and AI-Jawiib a/-$a/;!J/;!. both are a treatment of thecbaracteristics of prophecy. Michel believes Takhjil Ahl a/-lnjil to have preccdedthe authorship of a/-Jawiib a/-$a/;!J/;! (Michel, 1984, p. 103).
According to Ibn Taymiyya, philosophers and mystical scholars like Abu l;Iamid al-
communication of the divine will results in the definition of both Allfill and His creation.•Chapter Two: The Nature of the Believer's Immanent Universe Page 41
A covenantal reJationship emerges in Iight of the Divine's desire to be known. It forces a
vertical relationship since to receive knowledge of the Divine forces the awareness of the
contingent nature of human existence. The prophetie cali is thus the exoteric and human
manifestation of this I-Thou encounter.
Il IV The Agent of prophecy
The prophet's elect status is totally removed from human operations and tha
human referents and Iimits which always accompany them. Alliih in His
•
unmanipulatability has the absolute freedom to choose and inform any prophet of His
designs (Nubuwwiit. p. 185). Furthermore, the choice of an unlettered (ummï)
individual as prophet not only confirms the absolute power of Alliih. but also stresses
the miraculous nature of the revelation and hence of ils originator (AI-Jawab al-$aQïQ.
p. 174). The illiteracy of MuJ:1ammad ensures the impossibility of a humanistically
coloured agency as revelation cannot be qualified by any form of human input. The
singui:arity o. MuJ:1ammad's mission is further evidenced by the terminology used to
define il. Mul:tammad is called "rasül", "the one who has been sent". The Arabie language
uses !WO terms to refer to the concept of prophecy, one is rasül while the other is nabï.
Rasül derived from the roots r-s-I, can be referred back to its fourth verbal form.
arsala. which means "to send". The noun "messenger" is, however. associated with a
Ghazali are misguided in their belief that the ultimate purpose of any aetion is theimparting of knowledge (a/-Nubuwwiit. pp. 77-79). To seek knowledge quaknowledge is to go beyond what eould be termed "a suffieient point of referenee".This point symbolizes the limit whieh sets apan neeessary and suffieient knowledgefrom intelleetual ventures which are sterile and fallacious ("anna). Ibn Taymiyyaargues that the thinker commilS the error of "anna and is deterred from the ultimategoal of thought which is to bring the individual to a consciousness which demandsaction. Sufficient and useful thought" enables man to transcend the plane of thoughtas such ar.d enables the believer 10 rise to the ultimate challenge which is to live outthe knowledge provided by the Divine.
specifie doctrine of prophecy (nubil,,·w;J). F. Rahman defines the term n;Jbi as "giver of
news"65 while A. Jeffrey interprets it to mean "one who summons or call"M> A subtle•Chapter Two: The Nature of the Believer's Immanent Universe Page 42
distinction separates the IWo terms. Ibn Taymiyya confirms their separateness through
his adherence to a categorization of the prophets. A prophet belongs to the category of the
legislating-prophet (rasill) or to the heralding-prophet (n;Jbi) or both.67 The
legislating-prophet brings with him a new revelation while the heralding-prophet does
nol. The nabi prophesizes within the context of an already existing revelation.68 ln
Fatiiwa Shaykh al-Islam. Ibn Taymiyya declares the legislating-prophets to be live in
number; Noah. Abraham. Moses. Jesus and MUQammad (Fatawii Shaykh al-Islam.
Volume XI. pp. 161 in conjunction with 369). The Qur'an refers to them as <ulu ;JI
<a?m, "the possessors of constancy·69 and states that MUQammad is the seal of the
prophets and the best among them (AI-Jawab al-$a/;IiJ). pp. 162 in conjunction with
•
357).
65
66
67
68
69
From a strictly methodological perspective. Ibn Taymiyya does not in fact
F. Rahman argues that as opposed to the Judeo-Christian tradition. the nabi does notforetell the future. He is solely entrusted with the mission to advoeate the good andto warn against evil (F. Rahman. 1980. p. 81).
A. Jeffrey. argues that the Hebrew substantive of nabi is a eognate of the Arabienaba'a with the Akkadian nabu (Wansborough. 1977. pp. 54-55).
A legislating prophet combines the herolding and legislating funetions. The rasüJ isalso a nabi. however. the reeiproeal is untrue.
In AJ-Nubuwwâc. Ibn Taymiyya gives an aeeount of his conception of the twocategories. F. Rahman gives the following rendition of A J- N u b u w w ii C.
pp. li2-173: "a prophet (nabi) ris] a man whom God sends a message. Theordinary prophet is a reformer: he brings a message to a people who do not contestthe truth of the message but are simply morally not living up to what they recognizeas true. The prophet's function is to reform them morally. But when a peoplerefuses to accept the very truth. the task of the prophet is of a revolutionary chameter.His funetion is that of a socio-moral crusader (like Moses and Mul)ammad) and veryoften such a kind of prophet (ealled rasüJ) brings with him a new Shari'a - a sociomoral code to establish a new order of society" (F. Rahman. 1980. p. 104).
M. Pickthall renders Sürah XLVI. AJ-A1Jqiif. verse 3S as "then have patience (0Mul)ammad) even as the stout of hem among the messengers (of old) had patienceand seek not to hasten on the doom for them".
altempt to argue lhal the nalL:re of the revealed message is unique70 (even lhough he
ccnsiders il 10 have been perfecled with Mu~ammad's prophelhood (AJ-Jawab aJ-$a1;iJ;l.•Chapter Two: The Nature 01 the Believer's Immanent Universe Page 43
p. 355)), bul ralher that the uniqueness rests wilh the recipient. Ibn Taymiyya's beliel
in the universality 01 lhe message is evidenced in his usage 01 the substantive "Book". He
submils that every believer must surrender to the guidance engrained in the "Book". In
this conlext, the connotation is one of generality, the "Book" relers to ail scriptures
revealed by Allah and it includes the Torah, the Gospel and finally the Qur'an. The
commonality 01 ail scriptures lies in the cO:1tent they expre:;s; namely Al1ah 's will and
guidance (AJ-Jawab aJ-$a1)iJ;l. p. 148). If a theory of revelation is to hold on the grounds
of a universal me,ssage entrusted to a select le", then the simplest rationale is to argue in
favour of the extraordinary nature of the recipient. Hence, the simplest explanation to
the emergence of a single or a discrete series of individuals is to claim the prophet's
uniqueness among creation.
ln agreement with the fundamental concept which ascribes to the recipient a
unique nature, Mul).ammad as portrayed by Ibn Taymiyya is defined by the
superabundance of his skills (eloquence, arbitration, etc...).71 Yet, the level of
•
70
71
Revelation as an original VIsIon or intelligible is untenable to reason. since bydefiniùon the revealed message is nothing short of the unveiling of a fundamentaland primordial reality. The religion intimated by the prophet does not begin withhis calling but originates on the day of genesis. Sürah II. AI-Baqarah verse 117:"The Originator of the heavens and the earth! When He decreeth a thing, He saithunto it only: Be! and it is".
As the prophet of the Arabs. Mul)ammad displayed a mastery of the skills prevalentamong his people. One such skill Mul)ammad capitalized upon was the Arabs' loveof discourse. Mul)ammad is known to have had a loquacious disposition and hiseloquence eased Ihe acceptance of his message by his people. Sürah XVI. AI-Na/;l/,verse 125: "Cali unlO the way of thy Lord with wisdom and exhortation. andrcason with them in the better way," Ibn Taymiyya broaches the subject ofexhortation as an essential part of a prophet's mission in Ma'iirij al-W"$ül (Ma'iirij:1I- WU$ül. pp. 66-67).
ln AI-f3wiib al-SaQ/Q. Ibn Taymiyya resorts to the traditions to depict the perfectionto the messenger: "1 was given preference over the prophets in six things: 1 was
receptivity of Mu!:lammad to All5h is due not only to his natural talents but also to a
super-eminent nature (khuluq "i!?im) to which the Qur'5n testifies.n The ultimate goal
is the total infusion of A1l5h's message and its accurate recitation by His messenger. It
•Chapter Two: The Nature of the Believer's Immanent Universe Page 44
implies an absolute surrender to the Divine and that demands a profound tranquillity of
being. It intimates a temperament and disposition in perlect harmony and equilibrium.
devoid of human passions, the prophet's character s'Jblimates his humanness.
Mu!:lammad shares with ail mortals a temporal physical form, however, none of the
internai conflicts which prey upon them. affect him. The sublimity of the prophet's
personality is the minimum necessary for a transfer of knowledge from the sacred to the
profane. What can be termed "the mu!:lammedan substance"73 is the guarantor of the
divine promise as its worldly presence represents the access to the Divine from which
the rest of humanity is barred due to its inadequacies of mind and nature.
At the time of revelation. the Divine is observably involved in the realm of the
created through the commission of the prophet. He. as the recipient of kn Jwledge. must
convey the received information without any distortion of the divine intent. Hence. the
verbal expression of the message is something which could at times be agonizing and time
consumming for Mu!:lammad. The information cannot be sullied by human
contamination. Mu!:lammad is at the mercy of the inarticulate meaning until Allah in
His absolute freedom triggers the emergence of pure and pristine words in the prophet's
mind. The prophet's responsibility is to refrain from second-guessing the Divine. He
given comprehensiveness in utterance: 1 was dclivered from fcar: 1 was permittcdbooty: for me the earth was made a pure mosque; 1 was senl to mankind in ilSentirety: with me the prophets were concluded" (AJ-Jawàb aJ-$a!fi!f. p. 155).
72 Sürah LXVIII. AJ-QaJam. verse 4: "And lo! thou an of a lremendous nature."
• 73 Term coined by Frithjof Schuon.
must wait in a state of "wise-passiveness",74 for ti1e meaning to become embedded in
scriptural form.75 ln this theory of revelation, the prophet is removed from any direct•Chapter Two: The Nature of the Believer's Immanent Universe Page 45
involvement in the creation of scripture. As the first person to receive the message
from among the created, his role is Iimited to a degree of intimacy and proximity to il.
ln AJ-Nubuww5t, Ibn Taymiyya grounds his exposition of the existence of three
revelatory modes on the Qur'5n. He argues that the prophet acquires his knowledge
through the agency of direct speech, the intercession of the angels and the inspiration a
vision or a dream triggers in him (AJ-Nubuww5t, p. 168) (refer to Diagram 1). An
example of the first instance is the prophet's night journey (al-micr5j) during which
Aliiih impressed upon MUQammad the importance and obligatory nature of a specifie
religious duty: prayer ($aJah). The second and third modes of revelation are based on the
modified classical definition of man which stipulates that man is a "rational, mortal
animal". The fundamental role of the prophet is to convey otherwise inaccessible
knowledge to the rest of humanity. This function forces a modification of the definition of
man as the ~rophet must be an "insplred, rational, mortal animal". To the prophet
descends the holy spirit (aJ-ruQ al-qudüs) and for an instant the distinction which
separates the sublime from the mundane is abolished. Free of material contingencies,
the prophet is able to welcome the angelic form of the holy spirit (Jibnl) and receive the
divine message (Ibn Tümart, p. 174). In the case of oneiromancy or visions, the
rational faculties of the proilhet behold a glimpse of the divine reality as the veil which
usually obscures this dimension is lifted. Ali three modes of revelation result in a
•74
75
Tcrm coincd by W. Wordsworth.
Sür:lh LXXV. AJ-Qiyiimah. verses 16·19: "Sûr not thy tongue herewith to hasten it.Lo! Upon Us (resteth) the putting together thereof :lnd the reading thereof. Andwhen We re:ld it. fol1ow thou the reading; Then lo! UpOh Us (resteth) theexp1anation thereof.
transcending ot sheer humanity and the elevation ot the prophet to a superior station of•Chapter Two: The Nature ot the Believer's Immanent Universe Page 46
being. The admission to this plane is obviously highly restricted and the knowledge one
derives trom it is, by detinition, divinely sanctioned. The consequence ot the prophet's
exaltation is the reception ot inspired truths which, Ibn Taymiyya would argue, are not
removed trom common knowledge but rather constitute the ultimate consummation ot il.
Knowiedge runs para!lel to "the sequence 01 beings·, since it lollows a downward gradient
trom Alliih to man, and an upward gradient Irom man to prophel. The prophet beholds a
unique and exclusive epistemology since he symbolizes one man's entry into a realm
which transcends reason. The prophet ceases to require his senses or his reason to
internalize knowledge. Knowledge is Immediate to such an extreme that the distinction
between being and knowledge becomes blurred. Mul:tammad is living knowledge.
An integral aspect of the phenomenon of revelation is the occurrence of miracles.
As a constitutive part of the prophetie disposition, they represent intuitive and
spontaneous epistemological occurrences which corroborate an individual's claim to
prophethood. They can be equated with an internai prool of the agency of prophecy, and
not unlike revelation, they occur independently of the senses and reason (AI-Jawiib al
$abïb, pp. 173-174). The miracles produced by the prophet76 are due to an inner
prophetie disposition even though, it has to be supplemented by the power of the Divine,
otherwise they cannot occur. Contrary to aets of magic,77 miracles have beneficial
76 In AI-Jawab al·$a(lï(l, Ibn Taymiyya gives an extensive Iist of the miraclesperformed by MuJ:tammad. To illustrate the point, MuJ:tammad is said to havemultiplied food, to have caused water [0 spring from his fingers and to havedisclosed knowledge to which no human was privy (AI·Jawab al·$a(lï(l, pp. 173·181 ).
•77 Although occult acts, Iike miracles occur as a result of a spiritual entity unconnected
with the core upon which they take effec!. they are generally of :n evil nature andmalign in intent.
consequences and "cannot be duplicated by either man or jinn nor can they be proven
fa Ise" (AJ-Jawab aJ-$a1;Jf1;J, p. 179). Miracles faU within the specifie context of•Chapter Two: The Nature of the Believer's Immanent Universe Page 47
revelation and the laner's import on the human psyche is one of irreversibility. The
human spirit is totaUy and unerly transformed by AIIah's power as it is expressed in
its revelatory form. This innate power remains embedded in the scripture even alter
the demise of the prophet. The permanent efficacy of AIIifh's power in the created
dimension is tantamount to a testimony of the miraculous nature of the Qur'ifn.
The power of Allah is channeled into words and symbols and the intangibility of
His wisdom (1;Jikma;7S acquires the oulWard manifestation of a law (sharfCa). Once the
law subsists independently, outside of its stricUy spiritual dimension through the
acquisition of a scriptural structure, it becomes statutory. In addition, the law runs
paraUel to the agency of prophecy, and in the same fashion must represent the perfection
of a long process of law codification79. The shari'a brought down by Mul:tammad is above
ail others, just like Mul:tammad is a prophet above ail others. 80th are the sealsSO and
perfections of their respective functions (AI-Jawifb al-$a1;Jïl;!, p. 354). Yet, whereas the
person of the prophet is temporaUy bound through his mortal, physical form, the law is
not. Alter the demise of the prophet, the law assumes the role of surrogate-prophet in
as much as its function is ta guide mankind by commanding the good and forbidding the
•
7S
79
SO
Ibn Taymiyya draws on an carly connotation attached to the concept of çikma. Heascribcs to it a practical and voluntary value of which the tenn had long beenemptied. At the time of Ibn Taymiyya's writings. the tenn had come to mcan a fonnof wisdom derived from the study of Hellinistic philosophy.
The implication here is a reference to the Torah and the Gospel which were given tothe prophelS Moses and Jesus (AJ-Jawiib aJ-$açïç. p. 354).
Thc Qur'iin clearly states that the agency of prophccy has been perfectcd and scaIcdwith the advent of Mul;lammad. The Pentateuch and the Gospel indirectly testify tothe imperfection and un·ended succession of prophelS through their prediction thatan un-Iellercd prophet was yet to come (AI-8isba).
evi!. In effect. the internai excellence of the law and its efficacy bear witness to
Mul:tammad's claim to prophethood.•Chapter Two: The Nature of the Believer's Immanent Universe Page 48
Ibn Taymiyya's epistemological scheme results in creating Iwo distinct domains
of knowledge. The first, ir which knowledge is handed down to the created by the grace of
Al/lib: and the second, in which the passive reception of knowledge exists but it is
combined with an active seeking of knowledge on the part of mankind. It can be qualified
as a passive mode of transference for the former while the latter involves an active
participation by the seeker. Alliih stands outside of these Iwo spheres. even though He is
their originator as the sole fount of absolute and perlect knowledge. This first
conceptual domain is grounded in the spiritual dimension, as it encompasses the angels,
(Jibril. Mikal. Israfil...) and the exalted component of humankind. namely. the
prophets.81 Knowledge received by the subject is immediate and devoid of a codilied
structure. It is what might be termed "the spiritual82 Qur'iin". The "spiritual Qur'lin"
exists only belween Alliih's deliberate utterance and Mul:tammad's verbalization of il.
The secon'"! domain comprises the entirety 01 the corporeal world to which man
belongs. Man is the best Irom amongst those in his realm. although his passions Iimit
his aceess to the exalted sphere described above. As the seeker of knowledge. he has to
rely on Iwo natural dispositions. his mind (CaqI) and his intuitive knowledge (fi{ra). In
8 1 Both the Qur'iin and the /;ladïth repons claim that the number of prophets sent 10humanity is so large that man cannot argue 10 have not been adequately granted thenecessary knowledge to obtain salvation. Sùrah X. YÙnus. verse 47: "And forevery nation there is a messenger." This verse is further corroborated by the /;ladïthwhich state that there have been one hundred and twenty four thousand prophetssent to mankind.
•82 The intention behind the use of the terrn spiritual is not to argue that once codified
the revelation loses any spiritual <Iepth. Rather. it is employed to mean the nonverbal expression of the di vine message.
addition, he has received the scriptural form of revelation from the prophel. His
natural dispositions must, hence, be harnessed to comply with the divine guidance. If he
is able to meet human perfection in his horizontal (man to man) and vertical (man to
Gad) responsibilities, he becomes the perfect believer (refer to Diagram 1).
•
•
Chapter Two: The Nature of the Believer's Immanent Universe Page 49
Chapter Two: The Nature of the Seliever's Immanent Universe Page 50
OIAGR....M 1: Gradient of Knowledge
Modes of Knowledge TransmissionA =Angels as intermediariesB =Direct mode ofknowledgeC =Dreams or visions
Mankind
Animal Realm
Plantrealm
Physical existants
•
Chapter Three: Fitra, the Anti-Intellectual Element of Knowledge
Independently from the evidence provided by the revelation of the existence of
Alliih and thus knowledge of Him, Ibn Taymiyya posits Iwo alternative but subordinated
avenues to the acquisition of knowledge; namely what can be termed a form of intuitive
perception, fi[r:J, on the one hand, and a recourse to man's reflective capacity, c:JqI, on
the other.83
Ibn Taymiyya sees no redeeming quality to the acquisition of knowledge for its
own sake. Knowledge qua knowledge is not only pointless, it has no quiddity as such.84
Knowledge is to be conceived as an activity Md hence, is not embued with a privileged
ontological status as of itself. The relevance of knowledge is in the content of the activity
83 ln his article, Hallaq mentions that Ibn Taymiyya did conceive of numerous ways ofknowledge acquisition (Hallaq. 1991. p. 54). However, the non-intuitiveacquisition of knowledge is necessarily bound to a form of intellectual knowledge.As such. il falls under the category of knowledge channe1ed and/or inferred by themind. which from a larger perspective cao be subsumed under the broad category ;,f'aqI.
• 84 ln al-Nubuwwiil. pp. 77-79. Ibn Taymiyya clearly condemns the philosophers intheir efforts to make knowledge qua knowledge the fount of happiness.
Page 51
as it runs parallel to. and against the ontological reality of the Divine. Knowledge does
not exist as an empty receptacle. and it can never be removed from or disassociated with•Chapter Three: The Anti-Intellectual Element of Knowledge Page 52
the medium of signification on which it relies.
Such a position assumes a two pronged hypothesis, namely, that meaning or
signification is the ultimale evidence of knowledge as weil as the mechanism necessary to
its acquisition. Signification is multifarious not only in function, but it is also multi·
faceted as an agency conducive to the understanding of the Truth, the Real. Signification
in its most manifest form is the unambiguous correspondence between an object and the
word or thought which encompasses il. As such, it faUs under the sphere of influence of
the reflective human capacity (Caql). The knowledge derived thereupon is non·immediate
or inferred and relies on instruments Iike language and logic to convey a measure of the
Truth.
Ibn Taymiyya does not hesitate to belabor the point that the rational and/or
verbal correspondence to reality is at best an approximation,8S far removed from
perfection. Ils imperfection is created by a flawed quantitative nature since the
criterion of fullness of correspondence between the observed subject and its definition is
unaltai!'lable. To insist that signification is based on unequivocal meaning and
unambiguity is at the root of the concept of signification's defective nature and to elevate
this definilion to a normative stanàard of knowledge is absurdo The collation of such a
rigid definition to knowledge empties the lalter of its benefits. Ibn Taymiyya accepts
that knowledge can, nonetheless, be derived through this approach although it is
•8S Ibn Taymiyya refutes the believed benefits inherent in the discipline of logie. He
adamant1y believes in a fundamental disjunetion between reality and logie. Thetwo ean never be in full eorrespondenee. Logie is thus always defeetive in itsexpression of the true reality. See Hallaq, 1993, "Ibn Taymiyya Against ti.e GreekLogieians", where he translates Jahd aJ-Qari/;Ja fi Tajrid aJ-N~i/;Ja.
impertect and Iimited in ils essence. The realization of human knowledge through the•Chapter Three: The Anti-Intellectual Element of Knowledge Page 53
active mean of reason places man in the position of agent.
Moreover, man's aptitude in his search for knowledge is not monovalent, his
being is doubled with a passive or receptive nature which allows for the existence and
the Inherence of volitions essentially ditterent from the reasoned ones. He is the
receptacle of a substrate wherein inhere an innate. intuitive knowledge ([itra). This
aggregate of necessary knowledge derives its signification from the immediacy of its
nature combined with the completeness of the signification which can be derived from it.
As a potential embedded in human nature, distinct and unchanneled by reason, this
substrate is potentially a form of knowledge which can be in full. though non-verbal.
correspondence with the perception the Divine has intended for it. The actualization of
this type of knowledge is based on the faculty of inwardness (qaJb) and inner sensitivity
or more specifically sapience (dhawq). Such perception is by definition inexpressible
and always diminished by allempls to express ils nature through the medium of language.
III 1 Fitra;86 !nnate Knowledge
At the risk of stating the now obvious. Ibn Taymiyya's epistemology is shaped and
erected on the basis of his religious convictions. As an integral and tundamenlal element
of his religiously motivated epistemological framework. Ibn Taymiyya's discussion of
the notion of fi[ra. is grounded on the Quranic87 reference and allusion to the concept as
weil as to a traditional recourse to the 1)adith reports.88
86 Ibn Taymiyya discusses or alludes to the concept of firra in a number of his works.Naq{i a/-Manriq. Kiriib a/-Radd 'a/à a/-Manriqiyyin. Tawhid a/-Rubübiyya., to Citebut a few. These works are used when signilicant to the argumentation of 'hechapter. However. the primary text on which the chapter relies upon is RisiiJa fi a/Ka/lim 'a/Ii a/-firra. itself a pan in the larger volume Majmü'at a/-Rasà'iI al-Kubra.• 87 ln a/-Firra. Ibn Taymiyya grounds his expose on the following Quranic verse:
ln an attemp: !~ express the signification he attaches to the cC'ncept of tïira, Ibn•Chapter Three: The Anti-Intellectual Element of Knowledge Page 54
Taymiyya initially anchors his argumentation in a semantic examination, His outlook
upon the concept questions the position taken by dogmatic theology, which had adopted a
definition of firra which equated it to an aggregate of necessary knowledge Iimited to
mankind and the realm of the jinns, Ibn Taymiyya's assessment of tïrra does not
essentially differ on the definition of the term but rather questions the Iimits imposed on
it. Firra is derived from the verb {arara which Lane translates as meaning to come forth
or to originate,89 The word {irra in itself is embued with a sense of intuition. It can be
most adequately rendered as a natural perception or an innate sensual knowledge. It is
devoid of any intellectual referent, the knowledge derived from it is not of an inferential
nature and as such it eludes acquired methods of reflection. Conceptua1ized in this
. manner, it was maintained by theologians and thinkers that fitri knowledge was the
exclusive preserve of man and jinn. Ibn Taymiyya challenges that premise and insists
on broadening the scope of the concept. He universalizes the concept by declaring it
Inherent in ail created agents.90 The altempt results in the existence of a created
.1l Jl>.l ...k"': '1 ~ ..,..WI .,.... .rJ1 .1l ..:..,.... Li.,..:.. v<.l.!J 4 J r'uPickthall's renders the verse as: So set thy purpose (0 Mul)ammad) for religion as aman by nature upright-the nature (framed) of Allfih. in which He hath created man(Sürah XXX. a/-Rüm. verse 30).
88 Ibn Taymiyya resorts to the "ku// maw/üd /Jadith". a tradition first transmitted byAbu Hurayra. G. Gobillot trG..slates it as follows; "Tout être humain nait selon lafirra et ce sont ses parents qui en font un Juif. un Chrétien ou un Mage: de mêmeque l'animal donne naissance à un animal complet. en trouvez-vous qui soientmutilés (à la naissance)?" (G. Gobillot. 1984. p. 33).
89 Edward. W. Lane, 1980, pp. 2415-2416. Hallaq gives a similar lexicographiedefinition of the term in his article "Ibn Taymiyya on the Existence of God" (Hallaq,1991. p. 55).
•90 Agent is used in this context to convey an active participation of the created world as
it is differentiated in multiple strata of existence in its praise of the Divine. IbnTaymiyya ascribes to inanimate objeclo and animate creatures a firra. Concretely, itmeans that minerais (rocks. mountains). plants. animaIs have a fi;ra. It inheres inthem with the purpose to induce them to praise Allfih (a/-Firr•• p. 41).
universal91 and places the theory of knowledge on a new and original plane as this
development is conditioned by the expansion of a .emantic definition of the term fi{ra.•Chapter Three: The Anti·lntellectual Element of Knowledge Page 55
II!" Fitra of the World.
Ibn Taymiyya encapsulates the notion of fi!ra in a stratified structure. Ali of
creation possesses a fi!ri disposition. still, the quiddity of that capacity is not a
monolithic entity as its "quality" is nuanced by the existents in which it dwells. The
notion of fi!ra varies from a pure active existent embedded in the inanimate or in the
creatures to a natural ability capable of seeking and acquiring knowledge when it is
engrained in mankind. Hence. Ibn Taymiyya ascribes the epithet of fi{r:J to a principle
inherent in ail levels of existence; though. the nature of the principle differs with the
object of inherence's position on what might be termed "the sequence of beings".92
Ali the constituents of the created plane are innately aware of the Divine's
invisible immanence through their engrained fÏ{ra faculty. The certitude in Allàh 's
existence is thus immediate, unreasoned and represents a form of imposed knowledge
91 The use of "ereated universal" seems to contradict Ibn Taymiyya's belief iil the nonexistence of universals outside of the mind; in reality it does not. The point beingput forward is the commonalty of fifra to ail of creaùon. which by definiùon can betermed a universal. but the term as it is understood by Ibn Taymiyya has anotherdimension. Ibn Taymiyya does not abdicate his criticism of Platonic idealism byaccepting the universality of lilra. His form of universal a1l0ws for individualvanaùons which leads him to re·affirm his rejection of the philosophers notion ofuniversal wh.i~h postulates a fixed and unchanging concept. It is true that lilrainheres in of a1l of creation but Ibn Taymiyya negates the idea which would renderthe nature of filra idenùcal in a1l objects of Inherence. The individuality of therecipient rauses the individualization of its fifra.
•92 The sequence of beings symbolizes a linear gradient of knowledge and complexity.
It can al50 be typified as a pyramidal structure where the base consists of thephysical existents (earth. water. fire. air). on top of which are superimposed theplant realm f01l0wed by the animal realm and ultimately ma~kind (refer to Diagram1). Ail of the consùtuents are be!ieved by Ibn Taymiyya to ,ossess filra. It wouldbe interesting to study Ibn Taymiyya's theory of creation to understand his conceptof chaos. Does chaos exist in his theory and if it docs. is it endowed with a fifr3?
inasmuch as it self-proclaims the Divine Reality. Ideally. ail of creation participate in
this reductionist form of knowledge of Al/ah and it can easily be equated with an•Chapter Three: The Anli-Intellectual Element of Knowledge Page 56
"original state" of existence. To postulate the reality of a pristine original state in
which ail of creation partakes. through its fi rra faculty. is the equivalent to the premise
which stipulates that ail of creation is existentiaied under the aegis of [sIam.
Firra and Islam become interchangeable and are representative of a natural state
of existence, unburdened and uncompromised by the individual endowments and
capacities of the recipient (al-Firra, pp. 34 in conjunction with 35. p. 41). It is only in
this purely abstract domain that a universal93 does exis!. The perfection of the natural
state occurs in the instant of existentiation for the creatures while mankind's in potentia
knowledge of Allah is engrained at the time of a Divine-man encounter which can be
called the pre-etemal covenant94 (GC/billot. 1984, p. 41 n. 1). Ibn Taymiyya thus
clearly stipulates a reciprocity of meaning between the two terms firra and Islam.
This equation firra =Isliim is acceptable if examined from Ibn Taymiyya's
approach ta semantics. The emphasis here is on the usage of firra and Islam. Ibn
Taymiyya argues in favour of a distinction between the absolute mode of application and
93 The perfection of the original state is a vision of the mind which attempts to localethe actualization of firra in both the creatures and mankind. In this ideal state. noneof the created distinguishes itself. henee. particularity of behavior is none existent.
•
94 This pre-eternal eovenant or mirhaq to which Ibn Taymiyya refers and uses as thetime referential to the indwelling of filra in man is depicled in Quranic passages.One such reference is Sürah. VII. a/-A'riif. verscs 172; "And (remember) whcn thyLord brought forth from the Children of Adam. from their reins. their seed. andmade them lestify of themselves. (saying): Am 1 not your Lord? They said: Yea.verily. We testify. (That was) lest ye should sayat the Day of Resurrection: Lo! ofthis we were unaware." G. Gobillot points out that Ibn Taymiyya accepts theassimilation of the filra to the mithaq. as long as it foreshaàows what can be termedIslam firri. Ibn Taymiyya insists that the stale be characterized by an absence ofindividuality which would set man apart from one another (Gobillot. 1984. p. 4142. n. 1).
the delineated and conditioned mode of usage of a panicular term. When. for example,•Chapter Three: The Anti-Intellectual Element of KOlowledge Page 57
the Qur'ân refers to the word fi.cra in the former way, i.e. in its absolute dimension,
then it must be understood in its natural, broadest sense. The absence of any
delimitation 'lilows for its synonymity with the term lslâm. which is also embued with
the absolute unconditioned meaning of one very specifie aspect of the creed, namely, what
can be loosely stated as "there is no Rabb other than al-Rabb,"95 Fitra and lsiâm are
one if the meaning is one that recognizes !l1at ail of creation is dependent on the Lord (al-
Rabb) (al-Fi{ra, p. 40). To believe in this manner, is not only to believe intuitively but
also to acknowledge the Divine-creation relationship thrcugh the actualization of a
contingent act which the belief intimates, namely, a proclamation of the divine existence
through the medium of laudation {al-Fitra. p. 42).96
95 Thc notion implicd by thc usagc of the attribute al-Rabb is one of non-specificity,An awareness of divinc lordship is common to ail the monotheistic religions and itis not usually assumed to mean that it is neccssarily Islamic in ovenones. Allah isnot yet assimilated with the Divinity of one scriptural religion. Nevenheless, theimplication is that firra is not synonymous with a vacuity of knowledge. Theintuitive awareness of the Divine is present but it is not constrained to the confinesof a single religion defined in its particulars. It is in astate which Hallaq depicts asneutral (Hallaq. 1991, p. 58. footnote 46). Yet. Ibn Taymiyya nuances his conceptof neutrality in al-Firra, He realized the theological danger of equating firra withan unqualified sound disposition. In the absence of an original dimension of Islamattached to the notion of firra. the danger is that Islam becomes one among otherreligions deprived of a divinely ordained privileged Status. His preemptive answer10 the challenge is to typify firra through the adjunction of the qualifier of Islamprior to it. Il becomes Isliim fi(ri which he intends to mean the inclination to glorifyAllah. His adoration ""d man's prostration in front of Him. namely. the recognitionof His lordship. His position is based on the prophet's attribution of blame unto theparents for making unbelievers of their children and his enumeration of thereligions gone astray (al-Firra. p. 38). Ibn Taymiyya interprets the absence of Islamfrom the list as a proof of its grounding on a rightful cause devoid of any similaritywith unbelief. The obvious conclusion is that each individual is bom pure andMuslim. fre~ of unbelief. This in cffect, is the definition of 1)anif. If one is tofollow Ibn Taymiyya's 10,l:ic, Abraham symbolizes man's natural dispositiontowards Islam due to his tl(ri capacity. Sy paying attention to his inner nature.Abraham expresses his muslimness even :!lovgi: he is unaware of the scripturalinjunctions of a religion still unreveiiied. SL'rah m. Ali <[mran. verse 67;"Abraham was not a Jew, nor yet a Christian; but he was an upright man (1)anif)who had surrendercd (to Allah) and he was not of the i~:>laters:'
• 96 Ibn Taymiyya's grounds his argumentation on the Quranic passage taken from. SürahXXXVIII. Sad. Verse 18 states; "Lo! We subdued the hills to hymn the praises (of
•Chapter Three: The Anti·lntellectual Element of Knowledge Page 58
This act precedes in time creation's consciousness of Allah as the sole Divinity.
Hence, the creed which is traditionally expressed as La ilah:J illa Allah ",a·Mu~l:Jmm:Jdu
f:Jsül Allah 97 is not initially an integral part of creation's awareness of the Divine
Reality. It is an aposteriori knowledge which is transmitted to the created through the
intermediary of the messengers (rusül). The messengers unveil the continge:lt nature of
creation on the Divine and the prescriptions such a relationship entails (:JI-Firf:J, p. 40).
Physical reality acquires its meaning through the disclosure of a formai relationship
between the Creator and the created. The knowledge which the messengers. and more
specifically MlIi).ammad. unveil to creation is of course Isliim. However, the term is no
longer embued with the meaning mentioned above.
The substantive Islam is henceforth imbued with a new meaning. In other words,
the signification domain of the term becomes delimited and constrained in time98 and
space. The spatial referential of the term Islâm is diametrically altered as its meaning
changes. Wher. Islâm conveys the meaning of titra. il discioses an inward dimension of
belief. The laudation of Allah is the inward act of the heart (qalb) and thus the spatial
referential is one of interiority. This is no longer the case when Islam ceases to signily
titra. Islâm becomes attached to a spatial referential which is outside the matter it used
tlleir Lord) with him (David)" at nightfall and sunrise." "Indicates author'sinsertion.
97 This nominal sentence is usually translated as "There is no deity except Alliih andMu!)ammad is His messenger". The syntaetie whole "M'I!)ammad is the messenger ofAlliih" is preceded by (wa) to highlight ilS subordination to the first syntactic who!eeven though the two are contingent.
•98 The notion of time is not reiterated here. as it has been discussed above in
conjunction with the notion of creed. It suffices to say that the first mentionedconnotation of the term Islâm precedes the second in time.
to indwell. The externalization of the concept ties it to the prescriptions brought down
by Mul:tammad. lsliim becomes synonymous with external works which Ibn Taymiyya
details as the witnessing to the Oneness of Alliih, the messengership of Mul:tammad, the
•Chapter Three: The Anti-Intellectual Element of Knowledge Page 59
standard obligations of worship, zakiie, fasting, pilgrimage as weil as the divinely
imposed prohibitions as they are itemized by the shar'.
111 III Human PaOjcylarjty of Fiera
To discuss the human dimension of the concept of {ifra results in the re·
assessment of ilS quiddity. What is a natural disposition to praise the Divine among the
inanimate and the creatures becomes a moral proclivity in mankind as a result of its
indwelling. Alliih does not endow his creation with a virgin disposition inclined neither
towards the truthful nor the harmful. He specifically permeates the state with a
propensity towards the truthful and the useful. As pure and untainted, {ifra is an
instrument of discernment; it innately and immediately perceives and distinguishes the
fa!se from the true, the Divine from the satanic. D:Je to its own positive nature, flrra is
drawn to the "knowledge of truth anù its attestation of it" while simultaneously
apprehending falsehood and rejecting ;t (Naqçl, p. 29).
This natural disposition forces man into a unique status in the order of creation.
His position is characterized by a level of responsibility which had initially been offered
to the inanimate realm. Frightened by the implications of entering into a covenant with
Alliih, they declined99the offer, only for man to accept the burden of obligations and
answerability (al-Fifra, p. 47). In effect, this refusai forces a telescoping of the
•99 Sürah xxxm, a/-A/lziib, verse 72: "Lo! We offered the trust unto the heavens and
the eanh and the hills. but they shrank from bearin;.l it and w~re afraid of it. Andman assumed it. Lo! he hath proved a tyrant and a fwl".
meaning a'lributed to the notion of rÏrra atthe level of mankind. Firra assumes in the•Chapter Three: The Anti-Intellectual Element of Knowiedge Page 60
•
inanimate and the creatures a natural disposition of laudation of the Divine whose
purpose is to confirm and acknowleège the Divine's existence. In man, it is imbued with
the added dimension of a moral act since the potential guidance is kneaded into man's
primordial nature insofar as the distinction between good and evil is engrail1ed in his
heart (qaIb).IOO Firra is thus never a neutral entity; it is tixed by AlIfih (arkazahfi
AIIfih) (aI-Firra, p. 44) within the individual to represent HirT! and to instill the
sentiment of His lordship over creation albeit as a global discerr.ment without particular
except for the broad distinction between the truthful and the harmtui.
The immediacy of the knowledge which firra conveys to the beholder can only be
apprehended through the senses, it is necessary knowledge (çlarüri) which the recipient
cannot escape due to its sel!-imposing nature. Yet, in spite of placing the benefits of fitra
on an experiential plane, Ibn Taymiyya attempts to convey this intangible dimension
through a recourse to semantics. Hallaq observes that Ibn Taymiyya frequently resorts
to a juxtaposition of the terms firra and çlarüri as in 'ilm fitri çlarüri to express the notion
of indwetling on the human sense of perception. Hallaq goes on to contrast it to the
possible antonym of muktasab, which in traditional medieval IsUim was used to convey
the notion of reasoned or inferred knowledge (Hatlaq, 1991, pp. 55-56). The
100 ln ~:-firra, p. 48. Ibn Taymiyya resorts to a saying attributed 10 Al)mad Ibn !;Ianbal10 argue that the seat of the knowledge of the Divine is in the hean (qalb). Ibn!;Ianbal's statement also depiets the hean as a source of knowledge acquisition whichcan expand and re-enforce an already "known" notion. One of Ibn Taymiyya'sintention is to confirm the absence of inference in the process. an approach whichwhen pushed dissolves into sensualism.
Chapter Three: The Anti-Intellectual Element of Knowledge Page 61
substantive block of 'ilm fiVî ç/arüri is thus, an allemptto verbalize 101 the mechanism
of Immediate apperception of Al/Iih's existence obtained through fi{ra. This implies the
following postuiate: direct knowledge as in fi{ri knowledge is sensuous and intuitive.
while indirect knowledge of the self and the Divine, although possible, falls under the
dominance of a conceptual order.
An untainted fi{ra can thus be equated with an ev;dence of truth. It embodies a
primary knowledge of the existence of the Divinity and as such represents an
unparticularized truth. It is the fou:1t of ail human knowledge of Al/ah which can be
built upon by the individual through his observations of the particulars in existence in
the world around him (TawQid al-Rubübiyya. pp. 9·10 in conjunction with 74). Hence.
to find Allah through a recourse to one's fi{I'a is not a personal discovery of an unknown
entity. but rather it is the remembrance 102 of an undifferentiated knowledge. The
mechanism of initial remembrance is in ail cases recursive. as [i{ra is the divine
element in man 100king inwards. The recursivEt nature of the process ceases whence man
advances from this initial remembrance to an active seeking of the Divine's existence
through observation. It forces the process into an outward active mode where upon the
individual can expand and specity the pre-existing. undifferentiated knowledge of Allah
which he arbours. It is no more than the realization of the spiritual l03 and intuitive
10 1 The verbalization attempts to depict a mechanism or process of knowledgeacquisition and does not pertain to the result of Immediate and unmediatedapperception. which is by definition beyond verbal expression. This is based ",.the rationale that since the result cannot be fully assimilated by its concept, languageis systematically defective in expression.
103 Spiritual is used here to convey an immaterial faculty whose only function is toremember and expand its understanding of AII:!h. Fîtr. is of a spiritual natureinsofar as it is reminiscent of AlIah's imparting of His breath to the clay from•
102 ln this case. remembrance does not indicateSinii's Platonic understanding of the term.one's divinely implanted clement.
the dhîkr of the $ufi; it is closer to IbnIt refers to a loolcing inward to recall
component of humanity. Ibn Taymiyya does not contemplate the possibility of a de.
corporealisation of man's firra. l04 Firra, the element of residual divinity is always tied
to the physical dimension as the corporeal l05 and the spiritual are grounded in
mutuality. Due to the spiritual's concomitance with the physical, its essence is shaped
and altered by the corporeal's inclinations.
•Chapter Three: The Anti-lntellectual Element of Knowledge Page 62
ln the course of his life, the individual's natural drive for virtue and the
attestation of truth is challenged by the demands of his corpcreal nature. The mind and
the body are easily influenced by temptation and attracted to the inauthentic. The
weakness of the physical dimension in man leads him to succumb to the appeal of flawed
religions e.g. Judaism, Christianity. The adoptio,l of any one of the religions other than
Islam tamishes and taints the individual's fitra leading the individual away from a true
understanding of AIliih. Ibn Taymiyya attributes to malevolent forces the doubts to
which the human being might succumb (al-Fitra. p. 50). The whisperings of Shaytiin
gives the appearance of truth to falsehood, thus blinding man to the true nature of his
aet. The deiusions lead to a rejeetion of the truth and consequently man strays from his
intended faith; Isliim. Once doubt filled, man can no longer appeal to his fipj disposition
to arbitrate and sway him towards the straight path. Having contaminated his source of
necessary and intuitive knowledge, he has no other choice but to turn to an alternative
whence Adam originated. It is not to imply that filra is man's soul, the allempt hereis to highlight a similarity in essence and process.
104 Ibn Taymiyya does not intend to ponray the concept of filra as a divine elementlonging to be re-joined with the spiritual realm. e.g.. the soul in the Aristotelianand Platonic systems. It is a spiritual element whose object is man. Il is thusnecessarily tied to the corporeal since ilS function is to crcate an awareness of theDivine's existence in man.
• \05 Under the notion of corporeal are subsumed the physical body as wel1 as ;he mindand the intel1ectual processes it engenders.
method of knowledge acquisition, i.e., one which relies on the inferential capacity of the•Chapter Three: The Anti·lntellectual Element of Knowledge Page 63
mind (raql) (a/·Fi[ra, p. 49). Doubts serve to neutralize lt1~ guiding principle of the
/ï[ra, once inhibited in its imparting of knowledge, it can no longer serve the individual
as an objective reference of the Divine's existence or as a moral imperative. Ibn
Taymiyya not only attributes the dysfunction of an individual's fi [ra to forces
external l06 to the subject but also accepts that an individual's own ego 107 or lower self.
i.e.• an internai factor, may be the agent of corruption. In ail cases. once the fi{ra is
corrupted it is no longer a reliable mechanism through which a certain knowledge of
A/Hih may be attained. As the repository of necessary knowledge. it is tainted and as the
individual is shaken in his faith, speculation becomes necessary (aJ-Fi{I'a, p. 44).
"UV Modes of Acquisition of Knowledge
Ibn Taymiyya ascrib6S to mankind a nobility and superiority in which the other
creatures do not share. The exaltation of man's status vis-à-vis the created realm
ensues from the specifie conceptior, (yuf{ar) A//ah has intended for him (aJ-Fi{I'a, p. 44).
Man is created from a mold which allows him a knowledge of Al/ah which he derives from
elementary and superior mechanisms of knowledge acquisition. Ibn Taymiyya's
106 The extemal forces at playon the individu..! vary from demonic to human b nature.e.g. one's non Mus/im parents. Both serve :0 confuse the believer since bothtransform truth into falsehood. Their intervention results in a deviation in theintended signification of the knowledge the believer is entitled to receive. If themeaning is not entirely falsified by their· efforts and the individual is led astray. themean result is nonetheless a measure of doubt to which the individual's onlyresponse is an appcal to a less certain form of knowledge; inferential knowlcdge.
•
107 Such an individual is no longer God·fearing. The motivating factor to his existenceis the belief in the superiority of his own capacity over the rest of his kind. Conceitleads this subject to a suspicion of anyone else's claim to a comprehension of theDivine and a reliance on his own intelligence and reasoning capacity (al-Filra. p.49). This typifies the inability to recognize the Divine's lordship over creation andis [he evidence of a corrupt filra. Such an individual is abandoned by AIIEh. (SürahXVIII. Al·Kahf. verse 17; "He whom AIIEh guideth. he indeed is led aright. and hewhom He sendeth astray. for him thou wilt not find a guiding friend.") and his onlysolace is to turn to speculation in an atlempt to know Him (al-Filra. p. 50).
construct is in effect based on an engrained dichotomy within the nature of the human•Chapter Three: The Anti-Intellectual Element of Knowledge Page 64
being.
On the one hand, man is empowered with the unique faculty of the mind ("aqlJ:
on the other, he is endowed with the faculty of volition (a/-irJçfai. This first disposition
rules over a finite number of capacities through which knowledge-engendering data is
channeled. The Divine has in effect endowed the human being with the attributes of
reason «aq/), lOS discernment (Camyiz) and sagacity (firna)109 (a/-Firra, p. 44).
Sroadly speaking, ail human sources of cognition can be summed up into Iwo categories:
sense perception (/;liss) and reason (a/-na+ar), although the Iwo mediums of knowledge
acquisition can be combined by the individual to form a third hybrid category
(khabar).IIO Within this structure, Ibn Taymiyya's theory allows for further sub·
divisions of the category of sense perception. 111 The faculty of sense perception is dual
in nature, and can be divided into an experiential category (cajribi) and an intuitive
•
lOS
109
110
1 1 1
'Aql in this context is synonymous with the capacity one has to <ef1ect and tospeculate. It translate the notion of theoretical thought removed from experientialknowledge. It can be kindred to the notion implied by the Arabic a1-na?ar.Derived from the root " q • l, Lane defines it as intelligence. reason. intellect ormind (Lane, 19S0, pp. 2114-2115). une renders the meaning of the root n. ~. r asspeculation. investigation by thought (Lane. 19S0. p. 2S12). When translated bythe English mind. it is taken to mean the physical organ. not the function itperforms.
The overtone conveys by the term is one of sense perception. Sagacity is taken in thecontext of a keen discemment based on the senses.
Ibn Taymiyya ascribes to man a third source of cognition which he terms khabar(report). It represents a cembination of sense perception and mind (Hallaq. 1991. p.62) and constitutes an intermediary between the two poles mentioned above in thequality of the knowledge one derives From it.
The discussion that ensues on the divisions within the category of sen.e perceptionis also analyzed by Hallaq (Hallaq, 1991. pp. 63-64).
faculty (/:Iadsi).112 ln the allempt to prove the existence of the Divine, the experiential•Chapter Three: The Anti-Intellectual Element of Knowledge Page 65
dimension's function is to extract the necessary knowledge from the existing external
realilies while the intuitive faculty's design is to look inward. The practical experience
derived from the experiential category is !WO fold as the observation of sense data i!. of
an external nature (?fihir) as weil as of an intemal one (bfi{in). In Naqçf, Ibn Taymiyya
defines the nature of each; the ?fihir derives its data through a recourse to the senses
themselves e.g. touch, smell, and taste while the bfi{in is emotion based, e.g., hate, jove,
and fear (Hallaq, 1991, p. 63). Both can be combined to provide the individual with the
highest level of extemally observed certainty of the existence of Allfih (refer to Diagram
Il). Short of a recourse to his intuitive faculty, the identification of Signs in the
external physical world is the sole avenue through which the human being can
experience with Any degree of certainty the Divine's eXistence.! 13 Although processed
by the mind, the information derived from sense perception does not require a form of
speculation to acquire a meaning. The data collected by the sense perception is directly
translated into cognition as the information it channels is so persuasive that the imbued
meaning becomes self-eviden!. As the highest degree of certainty of the Divine's
existence that the human being can experience without remembering r,is primordial
knowledge, sense perception is the apex of a gradient of knowledge certainty. The other
•
1 12
113
Although Ibn Taymiyya ranks intuition among the assets of the sensory faculty(Na q (1, p. 194), it does not fall under the broader of category of reasonedapprehension. 1 believe that there is a difference in the process of apprehensionhence eliminating intuition as a component of 'aql. Ali the constitutive elementsenumerated under the label of mind. are channeled and reflected upon by theintellectual faculty before the object becomes assimilated by its concept and viceversa. In the case of intuition, one seizes the immediacy of the object of knowledgedirectly. Although it passes through the mind for the awareness it creates to beknown. it is not inferred by the mind. The knowledge embedded in firra isremembered through the recourse 10 the intuitive faculty.
Author's tr:Inslation: "in all things resides a sign which proclaims His oneness" and"the exislenee of this world is the certain sign that there is an Architee!. a Creator andan Organizer (mudllbbir)" (al-Firra, p. 44).
nadir which symbolizes the highes: degree of uncertainty is occupied by the faculty of•Chapter Three: The Anti-In:ellectual Element of Knowledge Page 66
•
reason (refer to Diagram Il).
To simply focus on a narrow argumentation of the concept of firra obscures the
reason why Ibn Taymiyya engages in discussing it in the first place. Firra is a corollary
to a wider area of interest for Ibn Taymiyya: namely a rellection on the workings of the
human mind ('aql). As discussed previously. Ibn Taymiyya attributes to the mind a
natural inclination to veer to the general. hence. the mind's capability to formulate
generalizations or universals. This tendency forces the question of how does an entity
which is conceptualized as an instrumental mold perceive and understand the particulars
constitutive of tne created dimension. From this initial question arises the subordinate
problem of how sense apprehension, which acquires its ft:nction through the perception
of particulars participate to the cperations of the mind. il.;:l Taymiyya's answer is that
reason alone cannot discern and integrate meaningfully the divine sign which a
particular, temporal object represents. Sensory perception and intuition are the !wo
faculties capable of discemment. the mind is simply left to channel and process the input
of information. This creates in the human being what might be termed "intelligent
knowledge" as opposed to ?anna or purely speculative reflection. Il is the latent reason
behind Ibn Taymiyya's vehement condemnation of the schools of thought 114 which
attributes to reason alone the capability to uncover the truth of religion and knowledge of
Alliih. Speculation is not required of man to attain knowledge of Alliih. essential
114 Ibn Taymiyya accuses the mu'tazilite of having championed reason as the ultimatefacu1ty of knowledge acquisition. He extends his critical attitude to a number ofindividuals whom he feels were influenced by mu'tazilite thought. This anacktargets al-Ash'ari. and legal scholars who belonged to the four major schools(madhhabs); QaQi Abü Ya'ia and his disciples. Abü al-Khaniib. Ibn 'Aqil and others(al-Fi/ra. pp. 50-SI).
knowledge is only to be found in faith not in gnosis (ma'·rifah).!15 imân is self-•Chapter Three: The Anti-Intellectual Element of Knowledge Page 67
sufficient and does not need to be supplemented by reason. Ibn Taymiyya titters on the
edge of a "puritanical" 116 definition of sufism in his advocacy of necessary knowledge
acquisition through a recourse to private inspiration (i/hâm) and purification techniques
of the soul (tJ.~/iyyat a/-nafs) (aJ-Fi{r.l. p. 51).
The intellect is thus dichotomized in its essence; it can provide a source of
comfort and aid to the individual in his time of doubt (al-Firra, p. 47) but it can also
distract the human L·;:ing away from the true religion. As the weakness in man. it is
particularly sensitive to delusions. and thus can veer away from the straight path.
Alone. it is a sterile disposition, unable to grasp the external reality in its objective
quality. Because of its natural disposition towards the abstract and the general. it
always has an impoverished cognizance of the other. Deprived of a divinely intended
function if relied upon independently from the superior means of cognition entrusted to
115 Ma'rifah. literally knowledge acquired a super-added dimension in religiouswriting and came to mean an esoteric knowledge of Allah. At the hean of whichlies a concern for the unveiling of the hidden jimension that would free the seekerfrcm the fragmer.ted and illusionary corporeal existence and open him to the originof the spiritual 10 which he naturally belongs. Ibn Taymiyya attaches a speculativedimension to the gnostic concern and deplores the am~iguity of its nature. Even if atrue form of knowledge acquisition. the methoc of knowledge derivation is tooambiguous to be relied upon. The resulting cognition could be interpreted in waysinimical to Islam due to the ambiguous nature of the process. Certain knowledge ofAllah comes from a faith informed intuition (aI-dhawq aI-imani).
•
116 The intent is to convey a strictness and auslerity in the treatment and approach toreligious mallers. what F. Rahman defines as neo-sufism (Rahman. 1979. p. 112).Ibn Taymiyya's view of sufism is one expurgated of the excesses which heconsidered to be in direct conflict with the ideals of his concept of pure Islam. Thepractices of fana'. dhikr. sukr ail have to be harnessed within the strictly delimitedcontext of the Qur'an and the Sunnah. To ilIustrate the point. Ibn Taymiyyabelieves the best dhikr is the voicing of the tirst shahadah. and the best fana'. is thefana' of Allah. namely fana' iradi (aI-I1)rijaj bi aI-Qadar. p. 25 cited by Michel.1984. p. 33). In both cases. the believer can feel secure that in spite of his loss ofcontrol and hence his inability to trust his sedsibilities. he will not be susceptible todemonic delusions.
man. it is misguided and unable to grasp the meaning of human existence: the service and
worship of Al/fih (al-Firra. pp. 52-53). The destructive dimension of the intellect can
be neutralized if the mind recognizes and accepts its limitations. As an e"tity made
subservient to the divine residual in man (firra). it unvails a constructive nature. The
speculative cognition derived by the mind brings forth true knowledge upon its
transmutation by the sound tïrra. This essential change transforms intellectual
knowledge. sterile by nature. into a divinely sanctioned cognition about His existence and
the extemal world: it can be typified as a knowledge of the heart.
•Chapter Three: The Anti-Intellectual Element of Knowledge Page 68
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Broadly speaking. the intellect is limited by its essence as it is deprived of a
faculty of volition (al·irfiçla). The natural inclination toward the knowledgeables (al
maCrüfat) combined with an intuitive propensity to circumvent what is beyond the
knowledgeables (al-munkariit) is absent from the faculty of reason. This disposition is
beyond the competence of the mind. as it falls under the intuitive. innate faculty of
discemment of which firra is an expression.
The primary knowledge Inherent in firra is the guiding principle which must
permeate and orient ail acquired human cognition. As the repository of the basic concept
of Allah 's existence. it is the expression of the highest truth and must be recalted to
serve as the fountainhead of ait human reflection. Ibn Taymiyya emphasizes the
mechanism of recalt (dhikr) to highlight once more the utter dissimilarity of the Divine
with his creatures. Man does not reflect on his firra since reflection is grounded on the
mechanism of comparisons, extrapolations, metaphors and Inferences derived from the
observation of created elements with whom the subject is familiar. Reflection
rcafakkur;117 is a human process, available to man to ponder human issues. The object•Chapter Three: The Anti-Intellectual Element of Knowledge Page 69
of reflection is mankind, since reason cannot behold the divine dimension. Dhikr is not a
proce::s whose o!'ip':t is mankind, it is a facully wnose nature is to recall a realm which
is beyond the grasp of cafOlkkur, namely, God. To recall does not intimate a human
contamination, it is the remembrance of the imposition of an external realily inside a
substrate of a different nature and hence can be unveiled in its pristine form. Dhikr is
therefore the preserve of Alliih, while mf<lkkur can never do justice to an entily beyond
itself. 118
Ultimately, absolute human knowledge about Alliih is a knowledge of H:s
altributes of perfection and power, the knowledge of His names, of what He has ordered
and forbidden, of what He has offered in guidance, of the law which He has entrusted to
His messengers and finally an awareness of what He has denounced and disliked from
among His servants and what He has done once and will never reiterate (al-Firra. p.
48).119 The process of knowledge acquisition mirrors the Divine at the human level in
a particular way. Just like Alliih does not suffer any internai contradiction, the way to
Truth is integrative and the various components 01 the system cannot be in conllict with
one another. At the apex 01 human cognition, ail elements are grounded on the firra and
participale in their positive dimension to the unveiling of the Real.! 20 To the total
•
1 17
1 18
119
120
Derived from the root f. k. r. tafakkur can be trans!ated as cogitation. speculation.reflection. Lane renders fikrun as the arranging of known things in the mind inorder to attain to the knowledge of an unknown thing (Lane. 1980. p. 2431).
Ibn Taymiyya's position finds credence in the Qur'an. Sürah xxn. OlJ-HOljj, verse 22:"They measure not Al/ah His rightful mcasure. Lo! Al/iih is strong, Almighty".
The above passage summarizes the mcaning Ibn Taymiyya attaches to the substantiveof mOl'rifOlh. It departs from the $ufi interpretation of the same term as was describedin footnote 33.
Firra has ultimately two dimensions. it has a core dimension which is the inbornknowledgc of Al/iih. from which ensues a corollary, namely the ability to discern
integration of the self are added the extemal elements of guidance of the Qur'an and the•Chapter Three: The Anti-Intellectual ElemGnt of Knowledge Page 70
•
exemplar of the prophet. ThEl reunion of the micro-Ievel (man) and the macro-Ievel
(Qur'an and Sunnah) complete the epistemological structure.
the Divine signs in external particulars through sense apperception. Senseperception then becomes the instrument of a disciplined reason. Ali of theseclements combined with the divinely sent guidance constitute the entire scope ofknowledge available to man in his quest for Allah. It is in the instant of totalintegration that man knows Allah and obtains a glimpse of his accomplishedhumanncss. The circular clement in Ibn Taymiyya's concept of filra. which Hallaqbring5 ror,b in his article on the existence of God. does not seriously Oaw IbnTaymiyya's theory of knowledge (Hallaq. 1991). The statement that Allah createdfilra. and through filra. the human being knows that Allah exists is clearly circular,still in this case. the who!e is very obviously <lreater than the sum of its parts. IbnTaymiyya's ultimate purpose is to create the model of a moral individual through themedium of knowledge acquisition.
Chapter Three: The Anti·lntellectwal Element of Knowledge
DIAGRAM II: Quadrapartitc Division of the individuaJ
1. Al-Fitra
Intuitive - AbstraCt~Cnowledge
.. -:':±.':
:':·:±r=-:~.=-: ...... :~
...... : .. :.:.:,,-:..: ••--:-=.:..:...:.:.:
••••••• :+:-:.:.:.,;.:-:
Page 71
)JI ..~ ..
Il~: .
Il.~:::::;~.:.;*~
:' •qo:qo:.• '.,.' . qo:~:.............:..: ............. .~
.~ot:~'=~•.' •• t ••••••••••• :-1::-1::±;-:-:
..... ' : ~
......... " ~~
............................ .. .. : -r" ...~.~.~.,.:.: .. :.: : .,~=-:·.··.· ..:T·.:.:.:.:· .
•:." .:...::.:.:-=.0:.:..: •••••••••.:-:· .. ·.·.·:.·:-=·:·:T=-:.·:·:·.'.,.•••••••.• , ••• :-1:•••
'7'-..·.·.· ..:.:·.~~ : .,.:.,
·.,·.·"z.-:.±.·.'.' :±:±o±~.,:.,...... :.,......
.. ......:..::.::-:+:
~;'.
JIô-''IÏ
2b. Extemal SenseAppIehensionPhysical cognizance
----.....;;;::;--......:::::;..---__....., 2a. + 2b. =Senseperception
The information necessary fc.lr this summary was in part derived from Hallaq, 1991,~Ibn Taymiyya on the Existence of God~.
1 - AI-FifrB - represents the non-inferential. abstractive form of cognizance.2 - Sensory Perception - Experiential in nature -!Wo kinds :
Internai (biitin)Based on an emotlonal mode of cognizance e. g.hate. love. fear.ExternaI (?iihir)The senses are the agents of primary receptione. g. touch. smelJ. taste.
3 - AI-Na+Br - Faculty of Reason - Th~oretical in nature.
•Chapter Three: The Anti-lntelJectual Element of Knowledge Page 72
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Degrees of Certajnty in Knowledge aboyt the Divine Existence and His Anrjbytes
1 - Highest Degree = (1) + [(2a) + (2b)]The abstract notion that Allah exists (1) is further confirmed and particularizedthrough a recourse to the sensory perception. The external apprehends the signs and theinternai channels the input at an emotional levaI. Both categories of sense perceptionare processed by the rnind (CaqI).
2 - Intermediate Degree = (2a) + (2b)The elernent of titra is removed. The individual relies exclusively on the observation ofthe external world and the emotions it generates to come to an understanding of theDivine. Both forms of sensory modes provide sense data which the mind channels.Empirical observation bn."gs about a degree of certainty greater than reason. Sensualistapproach.
3 - Lower Intermediate Degree = (2b) + (3)Combination of external sense perception and reasoned cognizance. The intangibl6insight provided by (2a) is removed and replaced by an evident form of rational thoughl.Conclusions are based on Inferences which are derived from the experiential data.
4 - Lowest Degree = (3)Pure intellection. Intellectual exercise in a vacuum which yields conclusion basedentirely on a human based methodology.
ln degrees (3) and (4). the absence the element of ti{I71 may be due to its contamir.ationby forces internai or external to the individual. Once tainted. it cannot function as areliable source of knowledge.
Ibn Taymiyya speaks of an intuitive (1)adsi) form of sense perception in addition to theexperiential sensory perception described above. He assigns a theoretical (Ci/mi) natureto il. Its function is ambiguous and its relationship to the concept of ti{I71 is unclear.
•Chapter ïhree: The Anti-Intellectual Element of Knowledge
AxjQmatjc CQnyeyance of the Certainty Qf Alliib's Exjstence
Page 73
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Fi!ra - A!::stract notion A/Wh exists + {[(Vision of Allah in External Signs) -->(feelings of love, fear and acceptance - internai )) --> acceptance in the heart} =AbsQlute Certainty Qf Alliih's Existence.
--> to generate
The certainty of Allah 's existence is henceforth established, yet the Divinity remainsundefined to a large extent. The particularities of the Divine as weil as the obligationsand prohibitions vested on man can only be known through revelation (see Diagram III).
•
•
Conclusion: The Perfect Balance
This thesis has revolved around lour questions w;th the purpose 01 delining the
parameters of the cognitive space open to creation and more specilically to man, th~
attempt being the investigation of an epistemological method through which the human
baing is able to grasp his funetion at the microcosmic and macrocosmic levels -- what
should be known by whom, how and why. The analysis has tned to remain aware 01 the
constant underlying m. ,thodological parameters against which Ibn Taymiyya weighs and
r.ontrasts ail theories and arg:Jmentations. An investigation under that name is possible
if the initial assumption is one which credits the mind behind the theory to be an
intelligent teacher concerned by the human predicament and condition. Throug~, a
reliance cn the traditions which permeated his environment, Ibn Taymiyya constructed a
conceptual framework of knowledge acquisition. The analytical con::truet which he
fashioned. can then be used as a tool through which the possibilities and limitations of
human cognition can be tested and explored.
Page 74
01 course, the purely cognitive goal 01 human Iile is not Ibn Taymiyya's primary
concern. He tailored his theory 01 knowledge with a more ambitious design in mind;
namely, to undermine the intellectualism 01 the philosophers and to re-emphasize the
absolute character 01 the moral imperative. His investigation 01 knowledge is not
intended to lormulate an ethereal analytical myth devoid 01 practical implications.
Rather, it seeks to endow knowledge with a dimension 01 purposiveness which dissolves
into activism at the societal level. Knowledge has no Inherent worth, but as an
instrument, it can participate to the construct 01 the soclo-moral and ethical loundation
01 human existence and be endowed with positivity. The intent 01 knowledge acquisition
is not the passive contemplation or awareness 01 Allah, which is just the one sided ascent
towards the realization 01 man's contingent nature. To come to absolute lruition, the
process must retum, through a descent to the human level, whereupon the individual
becomes conscious of his horizontal and vertical obligations and i: willing to fo!low
Alltih's cibfida.
•Conclusion: The Perlect Balance Page 75
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The full Integration of the divinely ordained horizontal and vertical demands by
the individual, create a true and golden mean, namely, virtue. It is after ail the perlee!
balance on the human continuum between two extremities which are exaggerations.
Virtue elevates the individual closer to his Creator, as virtue's sphere of action is
unbeholden to matter. Once it inhabits the self, it takes full control of the lower soul and
its appetitive capacities, and curtails the prel9nsions of the laculty of reason. In short,
it brings about a Iiberation process from which emerges the virtuous man. Due to the
balance of proper knowledge combined with rightful behavior and the capacity of
discernment between the truthful and the harmful, man releases himsell from his
appetites and becomes moral and jus!. Once released from the demands of his self, the
believer accepts to absolutely submit to the Divine and to fulfill the divine. will. The
actualization of these !Wo actions ereate in man the highest level of reeeptivity to A JJ::ih.
It represents the perleet integration of the I-Thou eneounter within eaeh individual.•
Conclusion: The Perlect Balance Page 76
•
Obviously, the absolute Integration of the self, the perleet balance is neeessarily
and indissolubly dependent on the Divine. The ~erfeet beli.;ver. or virtuous individual
must surrender to the influence of AIIiih's transcendent potency. Although allied to the
transcendent purpose, man is limited in its knowledge white the Divine is not. Man's
knowledge ean be absolute and certain in his own realm t'ut cannet partake of the realm
of Divine cognition. Ultimately, it means that the relative subject (man) does not need
to know absolutely. 8eyond his own cognitive realm, man's quest for knowledge is
inadequate and dangerous. Total knowledge certainly exists, but it is the exclusive
preserve of Alliih. The meaning of which lies beyond the compiementarity be!Ween the
notions of object and subject, in an ineffable dimension created by the ontological essence
of the !wo substantives. Simply stated, total human cognition is the awareness that
absolute knowledge belongs to the absolute knower, Alliih, as He alone knows and
understand Himself fully, eombined l'.'ith the consciousnass that there is within each one
an imprint that opens onto His knowledge within one's self, yet also beyond one's self.
ln such a epistemological scheme, the modality of cognizance is relative to the
apprehension, not to the object under scrutiny. It justifies an integrative approach to
knowledge, as the recognition is made that a number of methods lend themselves to
knowledge acquisition. The importance lies in the necessity to recognize the
speci!'.Iization ",nd autonomy of each method, Hence, reason, revelation, fitra, sense
p~rception... each have their domain of preponderance. Revelation simply happens to be
the one mode to which the other dimensions have no access. It is particularly closed to
reason as its viability in its own realm does not sanction it viability elsewhere.
Ultimately, if properly used, there is ne contradiction in the knewledge derived from
each method of cognition. Ali are componen~s of an integrative whole whose funeticn is to
model the perlect believer.
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Conclusion: The Perlect Balance Page 77
Conclusion: The Perfect Balance
DIAGRAM Ill: The Total Dimension of Knowledge
God: Absolute Ineffable Knowledge
Page 78
Capacities in existentia through the Divinecreative command
(1)FilIa-Knowledge in potentiaIntuitive knowledge
Theoretical ln nature
/\(2a)Sensory (2b)AI-Na~ar
A 1
.......,' .......
..............,......
Nomothetie Discoursa of Prophetie Origin
TIlEQUR'ÀN
(3)Ambiguous Knowledge
(4)Unambiguous Knowledge
{4a)Man-Man ObligationsHorizontal Axis
(4b)I-Thou ObligationsVertical Axis
InternaI External
(1) + (2) =No consciousness of Man's contingentnature on the Divine
(! )·if sound. provides innate knowledge of the Divine.
=:; Signifies processed by the mind
(3)-Proofof the Divine's inaccessible knowledgeBeyond interpretation
(2) + (3) =Realization of the Divine's Absoluteknowledge and therefore power.
(3) + (4) =Totality of knowledge available (0 man.(2) + [(3) + (4)]=Realization of man's contingent
nature.(3) + (4) > (2b)-Revelation is always superior lO
reason. Revelation encompassesreason yet reason confirms il.
(1) + (2) + [(4a) + (4b)]= Perle':t Knowledge=Perfeet Bellever
Micro-Level Summary Macro-Level Summary
•
SELECT GLQSSARY Qf TERMS
Terms of a general nature, such as, Qur'ân. Islam. Sunnah. l:Iadïth, etc..•, have not beenincluded in this glossary. ïhe reader is assumed to have an a priori knowledge of themeaning conveyed by such terms. The glossary does not purport to be inclusive of ail themeanings a term might convey. The aim is to provide the reader with the InterpretationIbn Taymiyya applies to each term.
A
•
'Abd
AdillaAmr
'Aql
Asma'Ayat'Ayn
Derived from the verb 'abada; to serve. Literally meaningslave. Refers to a state of complete dependence andreceptivity to Allah. One of the epithets of Mutlammad.Arguments.Literally commando Refers to Allah's creative principle.Passage from the unmanifested to the manifest.Intellect • reason.(1) CAqI aI-faccaI • element of the Neoplatonicemanationist system. The active intellect's role is to bridgethe supra and the infra lunar woods.Epithets of Allah.Signs manifested by Allah.Particular materialization.
Page 79
•
•
Apperodix 1
B
Banat AllahBarahînBa~a'ir
Baçin
Bayan
Bid'a
Bila Kayfa
oparunDhatDhawq
F
Falsafa
Faliisifa
Fana'
Fiqh
Fitra
Furqan
G
Ghuluww
H
I:Iadsi
Page 80
Literally "Daughters of Allah". False objects of divinity.Plural of burhan. Literally prools or demonstralions.Plural of ba~îra. Epithet of the Qur'an meaningdiscernmenl.Internai, or inner disposition. Connotes an esoteric form ofknowledge in ~ufi IslamEpithet of thG Qur'an. Implies the clarity of thescriptures.Innovation, not sanctioned by the Qur'an, the prophet and orthe Salaf. Ibn Taymiyya considers any innovation to beheretical.Classical thec'ogical position uf "ask not how".
NecessaryArabic philosophical equivalent of the latin essentia.Intuitive perception. A distinct form of knowledge whichstands in contrast to the knowledge acquired throughreason.
Hellenistic philosophy(1) aI-faisafa bi aI-!}.aqïqah" the true philosophy.Plural of failasüf. Philosophers. Adept of the Aristotelianand Neoplatonic tradition. See also mutafalsifaMystical principle which is defined as the annihilation ofone's ego.Jurisprudence. See 'ilmDerived from fatara; to create something. Form oi !'l prioriknowledge common to ail of creation. Innate dispo&:tiontowards truth.Epithet of the Qur'an. Symbolizes the scripture as thecriterion of determination between truth and lalsehood.
Literally exaggeration. Exceeding the proper limits 01beliels and praclices.
Intuitive sense perception.
•
•
Appendix 1
l:Iaqlqil:Iikma
l:IissHudti
'Ibada
Ijma"
IkhbarlIham
'llm
Iman
Inniya
Insha'aI-Ïriida
J
Jins
K
IGi:firKaIamKhabar
Khuluq "lI:?im
Page 81
Plural; al)wal. In a mystical context refers to spiritualstates along the Su fi path. In this case it is devoid of itsmystical connotation and simply represents a state orcondition.The real. reality.Wisdom. Given a practical and voluntary value. Stands incontrast to the Hellenistic understanding of the word.Sense perception.Epithet of the Qur'an, meaning guidance.
Derived from the verb 'abada; to worship. Literallytranslated as devotional service to Allah. In IbnTaymiyya's framework, the implication is one ofsurrender to the will of AllahConsensus of the Community. Accepted by Sunnis as a tool oflegislation.Parables about ,he creator and/or the creatures.Private inspiration. In theory, accessible to ail, as opposedto revelation which is the special domain of the prophet.Literally translated as knowledge. Acquired the meaning ofrationaVdiscursive knowledge. To be opposed to intuitiveknowledge, ma'rifah.(1) "!lm al-fiqh - science of jurisprudence.(2) "Um al-kalam - science of dialectical theology.Literally faith. Encompasses faith in Allah, His angels, Hisrevelation, His prophets and the day of judgment.Not to be confused with Ibn Sina's understanding of theterm. To be taken as Allah as He is in Himself.Commands regarding the permissibility of actions.Faculty of volition.
Plural; ajnas. Literally meaning species.
Unbeliever.Dialeetical theology. See 'lim aI-kaiam.Information derived from both the mind and the senseperception.Super-eminent nature.
•
•
Appendix
M
Ma'dumMakhlUqMi~na
Mi'raj
Mu'min
Mutafalsifa
Mutashâbih
N
Nahi
a1-N~
Nubüwwa
Q
QadimQalb
R
Rasül
Rü~ al-Quddüs
sSalaf
SalbiyaAl-$amad
Shar<Shifâ'Shirk fi rubübiyatihi - -
Page 82
Non-existent, nothingness as opposed to existent mawjud.Literally created being.Aiso relerred to as tlle Inquisition. Political and theologicalcrisis which engulled the community over AI-Ma'muu'sendorsement 01 the createdness 01 the Qur'an.Prophet's night journey. Direct discourse between God andthe prophet.Active participle 01 the verb amana; to believe. One who~ractices the true laith. In the case 01 the "perfectObeliever. the implication is one 01 perfection along thehorizontal and vertical axes 01 obligations.Would be Philosophers. Scholarship is divided over whetheror not Ibn Taymiyya makes a semantic distinction betweenfàliisifa and mucafalsifaIntentionally ambiguous.
Heralding prophet. Does not bring lorth a new revelation.Faculty 01 reason. reflection.Prophecy. prophethocd
Notion of eternity.Heart - inward faculty.
Prophet 01 Allah. Indicates a messenger endowed by Allahwith revelatory scripture.The Holy Spirit. Equated with the angelic entity of JibrïI(Gabriel).
Forefathers. Represents the tirst three generation of Islam.Their practice and beliefs are taken to be correct.Negative attributes.Curanic epithet of Allah. Indicates his absolute independencefrom creation and the dependence of the created uponhim.Revealed law.Epithet of the Qur'an.To assign to others than Allah a share of His divinelordship.
Appendix 1
• Shirk fi uluhiyatihi
SiratSirat al·Mustaqim
Sukr
T
TaJ:uifTajnoiTakyif
Tamthil *
TamyIz
Tanzih *
Tariqa
T::shbih
Ta'ÇiITawl;üd
u
Page 83
To worship others than Allah and thus stripping Allah of Hisabsolute divinity.Attributes.Via media as it re;>resents tanzih without ta'li! and tamthilwithout tashbih.Intoxication.
Literally distortion or deviation.Experiential sense perceptionThe error one commits by affirming that what can be knownof Allah can also be rationally explained.The proper expression of divine imminence which avoidsboth essentiai identification of God with creation and Hisdependence upon il.Discemment.The proper expression of divine transcendence whichpreserves God's constant, active relation to creation.Mystical progression or path. Can also refer to a $ufi order.Understood by Ibn Taymiyya in its strict theologicalmeaning devoid of mystical overtones.To equate or Iiken Allah to His creation. Anthropomorphicconnotation.To empty of meaning or to void the Divine attributes.Verbal noun of wal).l).ada; to make into one. Doctrinecentral to Islam which professes the unity of Allah. Fromthe concept stems a sense of exclusivity and inclusivity.(1) Tawl;1ïd al-ulühi~'ya - ulühiyya is generallytranslated as divinity. When compounded with tawl).ïd, it istranslated into the recognition that Allah is the only one towhom adoration is owed.(2) Tawl;1ïd al-rubübiyya - rubübiyya is generallytranslated as lordship. When associated with tawl).ïd, itimplies a recognition of the unity of the Ali Mighty.(3) Tawl;1ïd al-asma' wa al-~ifiit - is to claim Allah'sunicity through a recourse to a positive theodicy.
• NOle: The definitions for the lerms lamlhil and lanzih are lhe ones used by Michel in hisbook A Muslim Theologian's Response CO Chrislianity.•
'Ubüdiyya
Ulü al-'azm
Derived from the verb 'abada; to worship. Dependencyrelationship between men and Allah. Implies completesurrender and obedience to the Divine reality.Possessor of Constancy. Refers to the legislating-prophets:Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and Mul).ammad.
Appendix 1
wWaI:ldat al-wujüd
Wa.)fWiHiyatWujüd aHlaqq
z
Page &4
Literally translates as "oneness of being". Can be succinctlydefined as existential monism. A ~uti doctrine.Depiction of properties and anributes.Social interaction.
Reference to Allàh. as He exists unerly and absoJutely.
Uterally meaning manifest. Represents the evident exotericmeaning as opposed to the esoteric meaning. b5.~in.
Sterile and fal1acious intellectual exercise.
•
SHORI T!ILES EOR IBN TAYMIYYA'S WORKS
Below is a Iist of short titles for Ibn laymiyya's selected works. as used by the author ofthis thesis or by authors of other works.
•
Fattiwa Shaykh al-I~liim MFIT
Al-Fifül
Futüh al-Ghayb
Al-J:fisba
Ibn Tümart
Al-Ikhlfi$Al-Iqtù;Ja'"
Jahd al-QariI)a
Jiimi' al-Rasa'il - IR
Al-Jawiib al-$a1}il)
Majmü' Fatfiwti Shaykh al-Isliim A1)mad Ibn TaymiyyaVolumes I. II. III. X. XI. XVII. XXVIII.
Risfila fi-I-Kaliim 'Alti al-Fi[ra
Sharl) Kalimtit ü-'Abd al-Qtieiir fi Kitfib "Futühal-Ghayb".
Al-I;lisba fi al-Isliim.
Une Fetwa d'Ibn Tairruya sur Ibn Tümart.
Tafsir SÜl7lt al-Ikhlfi$.Kital> Iqtic;lfi' al-$irat al-Mustaqim MukhiiJafat A~l)tib
al-Ja1)ïm.
Jahd al-QaIil)a fi Tajrid al-NilIjilJa.
Jiimi' al-Rasa"'iJ.
Al-Jawiib al-$a1)ïl) Ii-man Baddal Din al-Masil).
Page 85
Appendix Il
Naqçi
Al-Nubuwwâc
Al-Nu~ayriyya
Al-Radd
Al-Rasii'il aJ-KubrJ - MRK
AI-Rasii'iJ - MRM
AI-SamâC
Al-$üfiyah
Tanbih
Al-WiL5#iyya
Page 86
lvla'"arij aJ- Wu~ül i15 Ma'"rifac anna U~ül
al-Din wa Furu'abu Qad Bayyanahà al-Rasül ische tirsr treatise found in Conriburion il une Étu1ede la Méthodologie Canonique de Taki d-DinA1)mad Taymiya. The second treatise found in thiswork is AI-Qiytis Fi al-Sharc al-Jslfimi (not referredto in this thesis).
Naqçi aJ-Manpq.
Kiciib al-Nubuwwtir.
Al-Faewii fi aJ-Nu$:J.yriyya.
Kitiib al-Radd cala al-Manpqiyin.
MajmüCac al-Ras:I'l1 al-Kubra.
MajmüCae al-Rasii'il wa al -Masa-'il.Volumes J. II. m.
Kicao al-Samac wa al-Raq$.
Al-$üfiyah wa al-FuqanP.
The Tanbih of Ibn Ta.imïya on Dialectic: ThePseudo-CAqï1ian Kiœb al-Farq.
Al-CAqida al-Wiisipyya.
•
.'
~ELECT BIBLlOGRAPHY
Although there are available a number of english translaùons of the Qur'an. this thesisrelies on a single version: M. Pickthall. The GIonous Qur'an. Chicago: Iqra' InternationalEducaùonal Foundaùon. The concem to adequately render the meaning of arabic tenns intoenglish has been addressed by relying on H. Wehr. (1976). The Hans Wehr Dietionary ofModem Wnrren Arabie. ed.• J. M. Cowan. New York: Spoken Languages Services Inc.asweil as on E. Lane. (1980) An Arabie-EngIish Lexieon. volumes 8. Beirut: Librairie duLiban.
Ansari. M. (1986). Sufism and Shari'ah. Leicester: The Islamic Foundaùon.
Aristotle.(1941). The Basic Works. ed.• R. Mckeon. New York: Random House.
Aristote. (1991). La Méraphysique. tr.• 1. Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire. armotated. P. Mathias.introducùon. J. L. Poirier. England: Agora. Les Classiques.
Armstrong, K. (1992). Muhammad: A Western Arrempr ro Understand Islam. London:Victor Gollancz Ltd.
Barral, J.M. (1985). "The Origin of the Controversy Concerning the Creation of theKoran", in W. Madelung (ed.), ReIigious SehooIs and Seets in Medieval Islam.London: Variorum Reprints, pp. 504-525.
Brohi, A. K. (1991). ''The Spiritual Significance of the Quran", in S. H. Nasr (ed.),IsIamie Spirirua/iry: Foundations. New York: Crossroad Publishing Compagny,pp. 11-24.
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Fakhry. M. (1971 J. "Three Varieries of Mysticism in Islam". Incernacional Journal for chePhilosophy of Religion (The Hague). 2. pp. 193-207.•
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•
--------------. (1983 J. A Hiscory of Islamic Philosophy. New York: Columbia UniversityPress.
--------------. (1991). Ethical Theories in Islam. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
Frank. R. (1978). Seings and Their Attributes: The Teaching ofthe Basrian School of theMu 'tazila in the Classical Period. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Gauthier, L. (1909). Ibn Thofail: Sa Vie. Ses Oeuvres. Paris: êmest Leroux.
Glassé. C. (1991). The Concise Encyclopedia of Islam. New York: HarperColIinsPublishers.
Gobillot. G. (1984). "L'Épitre du Discours SUT la Fiçra", tr.• with a commentary by G.Gobillot. Annales Islamologiques. 20. Le Caïre: Institut Français d'Archéologie duCaire. pp. 29-53.
Goldziher. I. (1981). Introduction ta Islarnic Theology and Law. tr.. by Andras and RuthHamori.Princeton: Princeton University.
H:.iIaq. W. (1991). "Ibn Taymiyya on the Existence of God". Acta Orientalia(Copenhagen). 52. pp. 49-69.
--------------. (1993). Ibn Taymiyya Against the Greek Logicians. Oxford:ClarendonPress.
Haque. S. (1966). "Ibn Tayrniyya". in M. M. Sharif (ed.). A History of MuslimPhilosophy. Karachi: Royal Book Co. pp. 796-819.
Heer. N. (1988). "Ibn Tayrniyya's Empiricism". in F. Kazerni and R. D. McChesney(eds.). A Way Prepared: Essays on Islarnic Culture in Honor of Richard BaylyWinder. New York: New York University Press. pp. 109-115.
Holt. P. M. (1975). "The Position and Power of the Mamluk Sultan". Bulletin of theSchool ofOrientaI and African Studies. 38. no. 2. pp. 237-249.
Homerin. Th. E. (1984). 1985). "Ibn Tai~ya's Al-Süfiyah wa-al-Fuqarii'''. tr. and notes.Th. E. Homerin. Arabica: Revue d'Etudes Arabes. 32. no. 2. pp. 219-44.
Ibn Qudàma. Muwaffaq al-Din 'Abd Allah b. Ahmad. (1962). Censure ofSpeculativeTheology. tr.• ed.• G. Makdisi. London: Luzac and Co. [English translation ofTaQrim an-N:l?3r fi Kutub Ahl al-Ka/iim.]
Ibn Taymiyya. Taqi al-Qin. \ 13..911930). .\laj[l""ar al-Ra,a"il \l·al-Ma,a·il. Vols. I. 3....Curo: Matba'at al-Mana!'.•
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•
--------------. (1871). "Le Felwa d'lbn Tavmivvah sur Les Nosairis". tr.. St. Guvard.Published for the first time with a ne\~ fr~ri'ch tr.lI1slation in !c'lmalAsiariqut':,elie6. t. 18. pp. 158-198. [french translation ofal-Fatwà fi al-Nu~ayriyyaJ.
--------------. (1939). Contriburion Il une Érude de la Méchodologie Canor;i4ue ,k' Taki dDin A/:lmad Taymiya, cd.. and tr.. with an introduction and commentary by H.Laoust. Le Caire: Imprimerie de l'Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale. Thistext comprises the french translation of the following two treatise!,:(1) Ma''iirij al-Wusül iUi Ma'rifac anna U~ül al-Din 1\'.:1 Furu'ahu Qad B.:Iyyanah:ial-RJSül.(2) Al-Qiyfis Fi al-Shar< al-IslJau~
-------------. (1960). "Vne Fetwa d'Ibn Taimïya sur Ibn Tù;;"art", tr., and commentary byH. Laoust, Bulletin de l'ILstiwt Français d'Archéolcgie Oriencale, 57-59. Le Caire:Imprimerie de l'Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale, po. 157-184. (Frenchtranslation] This fatwa can be found in a collection called Kitâb al-Kawâkib alDariiri. It was compiled by a Hanbalite scholar by the name of Abü l;Iasan 'Ali b.l;Iusain b. 'Vrwa al-Dimashqi (d. 837/1434) more commonly known as IbnZuknün.
----------. (1961). Majmü' Facawii Shaykh al-Isliim A.1)mad Ibn Taymiyya. eds., 'AbdAllâh b. Mul:lammad b. Qasim and Mul)ammad b. 'Abd Allah b. Qasim, 37 vols,Rabat: Maktabat al-Ma'W.(1) Volume 1: Tawl:üd al-VIühiyya(2) Volume II: Tawl:üd al-Rubübiyya(3) Volume ID: Al-'Aqïda al-Wasitiyya(3) Volume X: Sharl) Kalimat Ii-'Abd al-Qadir fi Kitàb "Futül) al-Ghayb·(4) Volume XI: Al-$üfiyah wa-l-Fuqara'(5) Volume XVII: Tafsï! Sürat al-Ikh1~(6) Volume XXVill: Al-I;iisba fi al-Islam
----. (1905). Majmü'at al-Rasa-'il al-KubrJ, ed., Rashid RiQii. 2 vols, Cairn.(I) Volume 1: Ma'arij al-Wu~ül ila Ma'rifat anna u~ül al-Dïn wa fufÜ'ahu qadbayyanahà al-Rasül. H. Laoust gives a french translation of this work in hisContribution à une Ewde Méchoclologique.(2) Volume 1: Al-I;iisba fi al-Islam(3) Volume 1: Al-'Aqida al-Wasitiyya(4) Volume II: RisàIa fi l;Iukm al-sama' wa al-raq~. J. R. Michot has written afrench translation and commentary.(5) Volume II: Risàla fi al-Kalam cala al-Fiçra. A french translation of this risàIa isavailable due to G. GobilIot's work on Ibn Taymiyya
-------. (1972). "The Tanb,h of Ibn Taimïya on Dialectic: The Pseudo-'AqiIianKitàb al-Farq", comments and notes G. Makdisi, in S. Hanna (ed.), Medieval andMiddle Eastern Studies in Honor of Aziz Suryal Atiya. Leiden: E. J. BriIl, pp.
285-95. [Makdisi attempts to prove lhal Kitiib a1-Farq is Ibn Taymiyya's Tanbiha1·Rajul a1-Ghafil 'a1ii Tamwih a1-Jadal al-Bii~il.l•
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Ibn Taymiyya. Taqi al-Din.. (1977). Ibn Taymiya's Srruggle againsr Popular Religion.eds.. L. Laeyendecker and J. Waarden~urg. tr.. with an introdu.:ticJn andcommentarv bv M. U. Memon. Paris: Moulon Publishers. An annotatedtranslation ~f Ibn Taymiyya (1369). Kiriib Iqric;fiï' al-$irJr al-Muscaqim MukhfilafarA;.iJiib al-Jal;ïm.
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--------------. (1984). "L'Épitre du Discours sur la Fi!fa". tr.• with a commentary by G.Gobillot. Annales Islamologiques. 20. Le Caire: Institut Français d'Archéologie duCaïre. pp. 29-53. A French translation of Ibn Taymiyya, (1385/1966). Risfila fi-lKaliim 'Alii-I-Fi?fa, pp. 333-349.
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--------------. (1986). La Proféssion de Foi d'Ibn Taymiyya, ed., and tr., with anintroduction and commentary by H. Laoust. Paris: Librairie Orientaliste PaulGeuthner. French translation of Ibn Taymiyya, Al-'Aqida aI-Wiisi[iyya.
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--------------. (1993). Ibn Taymiyya Against the Greek Logicians, trans., with acommentary by W. B. Hallaq. Oxford: Clarendon Press. [Translation of Suyüp'sabridgement of Ibn Taymiyya, Jahd aI-QariJ;la fi Tajrïd aI-N3$i1)a.].
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Ivanow, W. (1936). A Creed ofthe Fatimids. Bombay: Qayyimah Press. Translation of'AJi b. Mul)amrnad b. al-Walid, Taju'l-'Aqa'id.
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LamblOn, A. (1981). Scace and Governrnenr in ,\;ledie,'al l,larn. Oxford. England:Oxford University Press. -
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Lapidus. 1. M. (1991). A History of Islamic Societies. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.
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