DETECTING DECEPTION IN CONVERSATION:

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COMMUNICATION THEORIES

by

Chad C. Edwards

A SENIOR THESIS

in

GENERAL STUDIES

Submitted to the General Studies Council in the College of Arts and Sciences

at Texas Tech University in Partial fulfillment of

the Degree of

BACHELOR OF GENERAL STUDIES

Approved

MAY 1997

ni^'6'X(^i^D

i I ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In preparing this work, I have received help from

numerous sources. Many of these have been noted on the

reference page. I would like to thank Dr. Charlotte Dunham

of the Sociology Department and Dr. David Williams of the

Communication Studies Department for serving on my

committee. I would also like to thank Dr. Jim Sahlman from

Angelo State University for his help. Additionally, I would

like to thank my wife and daughter—Autumn and America

Edwards—for their support. Without the help of the people

above, this project would have never been completed.

11

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii

CHAPTER

I. EARLY DECEPTION THEORIES 1

Origin 2

Coding 3

Usage 3

II. INFORMATION MANIPULATION THEORY 5

Conversational Implicature 5

Information Manipulation Theory 9

III. INTERPERSONAL DECEPTION THEORY 15

Strategic Communication 15

Nonstratgic Communication 21

IV. THE FUTURE OF DECEPTION THEORIES 24

REFERENCES 2 6

111

CHAPTER I

EARLY DECEPTION THEORIES

Deceit and lying can be found in many aspects of our

society. Falsehoods can have important consequences for

both the deceiver and the one being deceived (Hocking,

Bauchner, Kaminski, & Miller, 1979). The study of deception

is probably as old as the study of communication itself. As

early as 900 B.C. in literature and historical accounts,

people were describing the "liar" (Hocking et al., 1979).

In the late 1800's, researchers were trying to identify

physiological differences (e.g. eye movements, etc.) between

lying and truth-telling individuals (Hocking et al., 1979).

Although, this type of research had obvious limitations (in

not considering the verbal dimension) it did lead to more

scientific types of research. This paper will examine one

of the earlier modern scientific deception theories and then

proceed to examine the two main present theories.

Ekman and Friesen (1969) were two notable pioneers in

the emergence of modern deception theories. They maintained

that people will "leak" emotional (nonverbal) behaviors when

being deceitful. They proposed that micromonentary

behaviors (e.g., knitted brow) are behaviors that are leaked

when deception occurs. They suggested that the leakage cues

occur in a "leakage hierarchy"; however, there was dispute

as to the order of the leaks: that is, whether shifty eyes,

say, preceded twitching fingers. Ekman and Friesen (1969)

also suggested that it is difficult for the deception to

occur when the deceiver thinks that negative consequences

will occur.

However, their main concept, "leakage," refers to the

nonverbal behaviors which are shown by the deceiver that

express his or her true emotion (Ekman & Friesen, 1969).

Ekman & Friesen (1969) established the difference between

"leakage accuracy" (being able to identify the true affect)

and "deception accuracy" (recognizing whether deception is

occurring)--a distinction which would help future

researchers (Hurd & Noller, 1988). Furthermore, Ekman and

Friesen (1969) argued that there are three types of

nonverbal activities that can help one detect deception:

origin, coding, and usage (Littlejohn, 1996).

Origin

Origin refers to the source of an act (Littlejohn,

1996). For example, the deceiver is the origin. A nonverbal

behavior can be innate (built into the nervous system),

species-constant (universal behavior required for survival),

or variant across groups and sub-groups (Littlejohn, 1996).

By examining the type of origin framework, one can have a

better understanding of whether deception is happening.

Coding

Coding is indicative of the relationship of the act to

its meaning (Littlejohn, 1996). There are three types of

coding: arbitrary, iconic, and intrinsic (Littlejohn, 1996).

Arbitrary indicates that no meaning is inherent in the sign

or behavior itself. For example, in our society, we agree

that a head nod sideways is the "no" symbol. Iconic signs

resemble things being signified. For example, obscene

gestures (e.g., giving the bird) are iconic signs

(Littlejohn, 1996). Intrinsic coded cues are part of the

signified and hold their meaning (Littlejohn, 1996). Crying

is an example of intrinsic coding. It is a sign of emotion,

but it is also a part of the emotion as well.

Usage

Usage refers to the degree to which a nonverbal

behavior conveys information to the receiver (Littlejohn,

1996). There are two types of usage: communicative and

interactive. A communicative act is used to deliberately

convey a message to the receiver (telling someone a

statement); while a interactive act indirectly influences

the receiver (demonstrating a behavior) (Littlejohn, 1996).

Some behaviors are not intended to be informative; rather

these acts are perceived by the receiver and provide

information in spite of the intent of the communication

(Littlejohn, 1996). For example, a friend sees you in the

hall, but you duck into a room to avoid being detected.

However, the friend sees this action and attributes meaning

to it no matter what the communicative intent of his/her

friend.

Although Ekman and Freisen attracted attention to

deceitful behavior as a communication phenomena, their

research was limited in that it was only interested in the

micro level behaviors that are exhibited during deception

(Ekman & Freisen, 1969). This type of research ignored all

other types of possible deceptive cues. Nevertheless, Ekman

and Friesen (1969) provided the necessary framework for

various deception theories that were to follow. Among their

contributions, Ekman and Friesen (1969) demonstrated that

deception could occur on two levels: strategic and

nonstrategic. Strategic is purposeful manipulation of

deceptive cues, and the nonstrategic level involves cues

that are "leaked". Their concept of the usage dimension

allows for both strategic and nonstrategic deception. Their

usage element would later influence the work of Buller and

Burgoon (1994;1996). Furthermore, Ekman and Friesen's three

elements (origin, coding, and usage) were built on by the

later work on deception by Grice (1989) and McCornack

(1992), which will be explored in the next chapter.

CHAPTER II

INFORMATION MANIPULATION THEORY

After the work of Ekman and Friesen, other researchers

studies deception and developed alternative theories. For

instance. Information Manipulation Theory was first

developed by Steven McCornack. His theory is an extension of

the work of Paul Grice (who had built on the foundation of

Ekman and Friesen). Grice (1989) proposes four

conversational maxims that form the cooperative principle.

Collectively, these maxims are labeled the Conversational

Implicature. This chapter will first examine the

Conversational Implicature as developed by Grice and then

examine how Grice's work influenced Information Manipulation

Theory.

Conversational Implicature

Paul Grice devised a theory of language use that now

has become known as the conversational implicature

(McCornack, 1992). Grice (1989) maintained that people

involved in any interaction follow a general principle of

cooperation. The cooperative principle defines when and how

a person is required to contribute to a conversation.

In order for a mutually satisfying conversation to take

place, the contributors must follow and adhere to the

cooperative principle. The cooperative principle allows for

each person to reach an agreement for the conversation.

Each individual has the expectation that the conversation

will be relevant, rational, and have a common purpose. For

example, when a person answers the telephone, s/he expects

there to be a certain order for the greeting to take place.

Without this agreement, the conversation would not take

place nor be mutually satisfying.

Grice (1989) notes that people's conversations do not

develop from irrational statements. Conversations must

develop from rational thought patterns, or the discourse

will be irrational. Moreover, conversations are cooperative

efforts of discourse that have a common purpose. For

example, a person would not want a conversation to take

place in which each person had contradictory goals. This

action would not be mutually satisfying. People expect the

conversation to be relevant or have this common purpose.

The cooperative principle includes four maxims (quantity,

quality, manner, and relation) that cannot be violated in

order to have a mutually beneficial conversation. They are

necessary for the a successful, efficient conversation.

McCornack (1992) realized the need for a new deception

model. Through his readings of Grice (1989), he recognized

that the conversation implicature could be applied to

deception research. The four maxims would serve as the

areas in which a person would covertly violate in order to

be deceptive. The following example will discuss each maxim

and the cooperative principle.

Sahlman and Canary (1996) gave an example based on the

Information Manipulation Theory (IMT) to demonstrate the

cooperative principle and the four maxims. One day a son

attends a basketball game instead of doing his homework. The

son comes home late, which has become a repeated event. The

father will probably ground the son for many weeks. IMT

argues that the son's response will vary among the five

response modes to the father's question: "Where have you

been? You're late again and you had better have a good

excuse!" The first option for the son is tell the truth and

live up to the expectations of the cooperative principle.

The other four modes of responses will vary or violate

according to the four maxims (which will be applied to the

example in the next section).

Cooperative Principle

The cooperative principle is the idea that a person is

to answer or disclose all relevant information to another

person's inquiry (Sahlman & Canary, 1996) The son would

tell the father all relevant information in order to be

truthful. Deviant statements that covertly violate these

expectations are not part of the cooperative principle.

Quantity. Quantity refers to the amount of information

given in any conversation. It is assumed that the

information given will be as informative as required by the

other's discourse (McCornack, 1992). However, if he chose

to be deceptive, the son could be uncooperative and leave

7

out critical information. "Hey, Dad, I'm sorry. I was at

the school with the guys" (Sahlman & Canary, 1996). The

son's response is truthful at some level; however, the son

left out the critical information of being at the basketball

game. The omission of information demonstrates a deceptive

intent (McCornack, 1992).

Ouality. Quality refers to the integrity of the

information presented in any given conversation (Grice,

1989). Individuals are expected, according to the

cooperative principle, not to make claims that are false or

claims which lack evidence (McCornack, 1992). This maxim

refers to the essence of what most people believe is

deceptive communication (Sahlman & Canary, 1996). The son

might respond "Hey, Dad, sorry I'm late. I was at the

library working on school work" (Sahlman & Canary, 1996).

This response reflects a complete fabrication that obviously

violates the cooperative principle (McCornack, 1992). An

absolute fabrication (e.g., boldface lie) would be the

extreme end of the quality maxim.

Manner. Manner refers to clarity and directness of

the information (McCornack, 1992). The maxim manner

includes the expectation that individuals will avoid vague

and obscure statements and deliver the information in a

direct and clear way (McCornack, 1992). The son could be

noncooperative by responding, "I know I'm late. Dad.

Things are very busy right now. I was doing a whole bunch

of stuff and lost track of time. All of a sudden I was

8

late" (Sahlman & Canary, 1996). In this mode, the son gives

the information, but he gives it in a vague and unclear way.

Relation. Relation indicates that an individual acting

in a cooperative way will make statements as relevant as

possible to the conversation (McCornack, 1992). If the son

responded "Sorry, I'm late. I bet you are upset with me.

Danny got in trouble with his Dad, too. Danny took his

dad's car key without asking. If I did that you would get

real mad" (Sahlman & Canary, 1996). A person who is

behaving noncooperativly will try to switch the conversation

to a different topic.

People unconsciously assume or take for granted the

cooperative principle, which allows them to make sense of

their conversations. Grice (1989) believed that the four

maxims provide the framework for conversations to take

place. The deceptive statements leave an impression of

coming clean. They manipulate the relation, manner, and

quantity in various ways to give the impression of being

truthful to the receiver. Each one gives some of the

information, but does so in a limited or distorted way to

give the impression of truthfulness while being deliberately

deceptive.

Information Manipulation Theory

Most research on deceptive communication has generally

concentrated on nonverbal behaviors rather than on verbal

statements (Sahlman & Canary, 1996). Yet, some research has

been done on verbal deception (deTurk & Miller, 1985;

Sahlman & Canary, 1996; Burgoon, Buller, Guerrero, Afif &

Feldman, 1996). We do know that the verbal content of a

deception is considered less consistent (Kraut, 1978).

Furthermore, denials and falsification are used by deceivers

(Metts, 1989). Verbal messages make up what is thought of

as deceptive (Sahlman & Canary, 1996) . Verbal statement are

more reliable cues of deception than nonverbal behaviors

(Miller & Stiff, 1993). Deceived people are deceived

because of the verbal statements rather than the nonverbal

behaviors.

Until McCornack (1992), deception research had been

deficient. Research relied on the recall method to examine

deception. Through its use of narratives, IMT clearly shows

it is possible to test deceptive messages without using the

recall method, and without violating ethics in the process

(McCornack Levine, Solowczuk, Torres, & Campbell, 1992 ).

McCornack (1992) provides justification for applying the

cooperative principle to deception communication:

Deceptive messages are unique from other forms of discourse in that they involve deviations from what can be considered rational and cooperative conversational behavior. When presented within ongoing conversations, deceptive messages mislead listeners through covertly violating the principles that underlie and guide conversational understanding, (p. 2, emphasis added)

10

Typings of Deception

Current researchers have been using "typing" to

evaluate deception (McCornack, 1992). However, typing

limits the generalizations and validity of the taxonomies

often because the researcher may be tempted to create the

types to fit the research (McCornack, 1992). Therefore, a

fundamental idea of IMT is that the coding of deceptive

messages as a type (e.g. fabrications, half-truths, etc.) is

limiting to research. Types present a finite number of the

kinds of deceptions that can occur. If a new type is

discovered a new category must be made. Eventually there

could be thousands of types. IMT does not allow for types

and maintains that the maxims can blend to allow for new

discoveries. The four maxims allow one to mix and cross

maxims much as one blends the primary colors to create

secondary colors. Types force an idea into one category,

regardless of the validity of the placement. For example,

various researchers might type messages fundamentally

different as identical. For example, a boldface lie and a

half-truth could be put in the same category (McCornack,

1992).

Attributions

Additionally, IMT provides for both the sender and the

receiver perspectives. IMT exists as a receiver-based model

of deception, ignoring whether or not deception was

successful(Sahlman & Canary, 1996). For example, suppose a

11

politician were asked the question: Did you smoke pot? The

politician answers that s/he did but did not inhale. It

would be up to the receiver to perceive any violation of the

quantity maxim. McCornack (1992) says that deception

involves the perception of the receiver as to whether the

information is being manipulated or not. Yet at the same

time, it is a quasi-source oriented model because of the

covert violation. The sender has to covertly violate one of

the maxims to be deceptive. The sender strategically makes

the choice of which one.

Violations

McCornack's work takes Grice's theory to a new level

and extends it to deceptive communication. IMT argues that

"in ordinary conversations, individuals monitor the

information that they disclose along four different primary

dimensions: amount, veracity, relevance, and clarity"

(McCornack et al.,1992, pp. 17-18). Only one maxim needs to

be violated in order to be considered deceptive (Sahlman &

Canary, 1996). However, the dimensions can overlap each

other (McCornack, 1992). The son could violate two of the

maxims at once. For example, the son could respond, "Dad,

sorry I'm late. I was hanging out with the guys. Did you

hang with the guys when you were young?" The son, in a

noncooperative way, violated relation and quantity. Any

combination of the maxims can be used to deceive (Sahlman &

Canary, 1996).

12

However, Jacobs, Dawson & Brashers (1996) argue that

deception does not necessarily occur only with the maxims,

but instead deception may also be generated through false

implicatures. For Jacobs et al. (1996), quality exists as

the main maxim and all other maxims fall into the subsets

(i.e. quantity, relation, and manner) of quality. For

example, the son's violation of relation is really a quality

violation with the subset of relation. According to Jacobs

et al. (1996), implicatures can be created even when no

maxim is violated. Rule conforming implicatures are

generated on the assumption that what was said directly and

literally conforms to the maxims (Jacobs et al., 1996).

McCornack, Levine, Morrison, and Lapinski (1996)

respond to this criticism of the theory by arguing that

quantity, relation, or manner must generate erroneous

quality violations. Quantity, relation, and manner give the

impression of "coming clean" while actually being deceptive,

hence the generation of erroneous quality maxims.

Covert versus Overt

Sahlman & Canary (1996) made a positive contribution by

pointing out that Information Manipulation Theory requires

that the-violation be covert to the deceiver. McCornack

(1992) states: "Deceptive messages are "deceptive' in that,

while they constitute deviations from the principles

underlying conversational understanding, they remain covert

deviations" (p. 6, emphasis in original). The person who is

13

being deceived cannot know that the information is being

manipulated. "From the perceiver's perspective, covert

violations of these maxims are probably attributed when

perceivers become suspicious" (Sahlman & Canary, 1996, p.

5). Overt violations do not make up deceptive communication

(e.g., sarcasm) (McCornack, 1992). For example, in an

interchange between two friends that are making sarcastic

statements to one another during playful conversations, one

might say, "Oh THAT was real smart!" This example would not

be considered deceptive because the violation of the quality

maxim was overtly made.

Information Manipulation Theory made advances in

the deception field of research. It stresses the verbal

dimension of deception, which no other previous research had

looked at. IMT is a major improvement over other attempts

to help explain deception.

14

CHAPTER III

INTERPERSONAL DECEPTION THEORY

Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT) is an alternative

to IMT, developed by David Buller and Judee Burgoon

(1994;1996). Their theory emphasizes strategic moves and

counter moves by the deceived and the deceivers (Burgoon et

al., 1996; Buller, Burgoon, White & Ebesu, 1994). The most

fundamental aspect of Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT)

is that of strategy and choice. When a person is deceiving,

s/he strategically controls the information in the

discourse. This information co-occurs with unintentional

nonverbal behavior that detract from the person's

credibility. Furthermore, the deceiver has inadvertent

behavior that signals deceptive motives (Buller et al.,

1994). In order to better understand IDT, it is important

to divide IDT into two categories: strategic and

nonstrategic communication.

Strategic Communication

Strategic communication includes uncertainty/vagueness

cues, nonimmediacy/disassociation cues, and image

protection cues(Ebesu & Miller, 1994; Koper & Sahlman,

1996). Any effort on the part of the deceiver to reduce the

possibility of being detected is thought of as strategic

(Koper & Sahlman, 1996). Strategic communication is

intentional by the deceiver.

15

Uncertainty and Vagueness

Uncertainty and vagueness cues refer to the clarity of

the statements. For example, an ambiguous statement would

leave the feeling of uncertainty and vagueness. It is not

entirely clear why one would strategically be uncertain in

order to be deceptive (Koper & Sahlman, 1996). However,

uncertainty could provide the deceiver with a potential

explanation (e.g., misunderstanding) when probed about the

lie (Koper & Sahlman, 1996). On the other hand, vagueness

has been well documented in the research (Koper & Sahlman,

1996; Burgoon et al., 1996; Buller & Burgoon, 1994).

Information management (or manipulation) is an easy way to

create uncertainty or vagueness for the receiver.

Information management is the manipulation of deceptive

messages to disassociate the deceiver from the message,

portray uncertainty or vagueness, or withhold information

from the receiver (Buller et al., 1994). For example, one

would see a sender who is vague in the discourse, or one who

withholds critical information from the receiver.

Furthermore, one could distance her/himself from the message

entirely, hence completely disassociating from the message

(e.g., using the statement "people say"). IDT proposes five

dimensions along which deceivers manipulate information:

veridicality, completeness, directness, clarity, and

personalization.

Veridicality. Veridicality refers to the

"truthfulness, honesty, veracity, or message fidelity"

16

(Burgoon et al., 1996, p. 53). This dimension involves the

very essence of what most people think of as deceptive

communication. Grice's (1989) maxim of quality is the basis

for this dimension veridicality. A deceiver who is

successful in the deception must give the appearance of

truth (Burgoon, et al., 1996). However, it is important to

clarify the difference between actual veridicality and

apparent veridicality. Actual veridicality examines the

objective truth value of the message, while apparent

veridicality refers to the believability of the verbal

discourse in relation to the social context (Burgoon et al.,

1996). Information Manipulation Theory does not recognize

the difference between apparent truth and actual truth

(Burgoon et al., 1996). For example, using the scenario

from IMT, one would find the son's response the same;

however, with the IDT theory ,one would examine the response

on two levels: apparent truth and actual truth.

Completeness. Completeness refers to the idea that

a speaker provide as much information as required by the

conversation (Burgoon et al., 1996). Completeness is

basically the same as the quantity maxim of Grice (1989).

Yet, Burgoon et al. (1996) argue that there are two types of

completeness: informational completeness and conversational

completeness.

Informational completeness refers to the delivery of

all important and relevant information. Informational

completeness can only be determined by the reality of the

17

sender (Burgoon et al., 1996). Conversational completeness

refers to the "apparent sufficiency of an utterance in

satisfying current conversation demands" (Burgoon et al.,

1996, p. 53). Conversational completeness is what is judged

true by the receiver (Burgoon et al., 1996). For example,

suppose the son said something (based in his reality) that

was cooperative. The son could say, "I was at the game with

my friends." This would be an example of informational

completeness. However, the dad's judgment of this statement

would determine its conversational completeness.

Directness/re1evance. Directness/relevance refers to

the degree in which a statement is directly related to other

statements (Burgoon et al., 1996). Directness/relevance is

equal to Grice's (1989) maxim of relevance. There are two

types of directness/relevance: pragmatically or

syntactically direct and semantically direct (Burgoon et

al., 1996).

Pragmatically or syntactically direct statements appear

to be grammatically coherent in relation to the previous

statements. To be semantically direct implies that the

statements are related to the previous statements or the

topic of discourse (Burgoon et al., 1996). For example, a

hedge might satisfy syntactic directness, but it would not

satisfy semantic relevance (Burgoon et al., 1996).

Clarity. Clarity refers to the idea that the sender

should be direct and avoid ambiguous and vague statements

(Burgoon et al., 1996). This dimension correlates to

18

Grice's (1989) maxim of manner. For example, the son would

avoid unclear and vague statements to be cooperative.

Doublespeak is a violation of the dimension of clarity

(Burgoon et al., 1996).

Personalization. The last dimension for Burgoon et al.

(1996) is personalization. Personalization refers to the

disassociation or verbal nonimmediacy of a deceiver. Grice

(1989) does not provide a maxim for personalization, but

Grice (1989) does say that a person has a sense of ownership

over statements. "Personalization captures the extent to

which the information presented conveys the speaker's own

thoughts, opinions, and feelings" (Burgoon et al., 1996, p.

55). Nonimmediacy refers to the relationship between the

sender and receiver (Koper & Sahlman, 1996). Nonimmediate

language severs the relationship by adding descriptions of

events from the present to more distant places (Burgoon et

al., 1996). Descriptions can be modified by adding

modifiers, substitution generalizations for concrete

details, or by obscuring the agent of the action (e.g.,

"experts say"). For example, suppose a mother (Debbie) told

her two sons to be careful on the trampoline because experts

say it is the leading cause of death among teenage boys.

However, Debbie is being deceitful to protect her boys. The

use of "experts say" demonstrates her disassociation from

the actual discourse or text.

19

Nonimmediacy/disassociation

As a result of the negative affect that deceptive

messages create, deceivers distance themselves from the

receiver (Koper & Sahlman, 1996). Affect displays refer to

emotional displays that are intentional or unintentional

(Burgoon, Buller, & Woodall, 1994). This distancing occurs

with words and nonverbal behaviors (Buller & Burgoon, 1994;

Buller et al., 1996; Koper & Sahlman, 1996). Verbal

nonimmdiacy reduces insecurity by distancing oneself from

the text of the deceptive message (Buller & Burgoon, 1994).

Behavior management is one such way to distance one's self

from the receiver (e.g., avoid nonverbal leakage).

Behavior management. Behavior management attempts to

use nonimmediacy and withdrawal as ways to avoid leakage

cues (Buller et al., 1994). Leakage refers to behaviors

which are shown by the deceiver that express true emotions

(Burgoon et al., 1994). For example, a person trying to

deceive would suppress nonverbal cues and activity. Suppose

a child is lying to you. The child would try to act very

calm, but would not have any normal expressions (be

"stonefaced") that one would expect from a child.

Image Protection

Image management tries to project a credible image and

deny any responsibility for the deceptive message (Buller et

al., 1994). For example, a person will pretend to be

knowledgeable in the area of discourse to portray a credible

20

image. However, it is not clear what deceivers do to

protect their image (Buller & Burgoon, 1994). Image

protection can be evidenced by cues related to credibility,

security, and honesty (Koper & Sahlman, 1996). For example,

a deceiver may want to lower eye contact during the

deception; however, the deceiver may try to increase eye

contact in order to seem more credible (Koper & Sahlman,

1996).

Nonstrategic Communication

Nonstrategic communication involves signals of arousal

and nervousness, incompetent communication, and damped

affect (Buller et al., 1994).

Arousal and nervousness cues. Arousal and nervousness

cues usually occur because of the person's guilt, the

consequences of getting detected, the preparation, and the

anxiety about the deception (Buller et al., 1994). For

example, a person who is deceiving might act out an

unintentional nonverbal behavior like tapping a foot (Buller

& Burgoon, 1994). Arousal can vary dramatically depending

on four factors: how serious the lie is, how motivated the

deceiver is to avoid detection, how serious the consequences

are of being found out, and whether the actor has had time

to rehearse the lie beforehand (Buller & Burgoon, 1994),

When someone lies under low arousal rates, the leakage will

be less apparent, and the deception will draw less suspicion

(Buller & Burgoon, 1994).

21

Much research has been done to determine the

differences between the arousal rates of deceivers and

nondeceivers. deTurk and Miller (1985) found six cues that

distinguish deceivers from receivers: increased adaptor

behaviors (e.g., positioning of the body), increased hand

gesturing, increased speech errors, longer within-turn

pauses, longer response latencies, and shorter message

duration. Kraut (1980) found that deceivers blink with

greater frequency than nondeceivers.

Incompetent Communication

Incompetent communication refers to the increase in

speech errors, hesitation, word repetitions, postural

rigidity, random movement, inconsistency with verbal and

nonverbal behaviors, and kinesic behaviors that are out of

sync (Buller & Burgoon, 1994). For example, when a person

creates a fiction, it creates a greater number of

constraints on the deceiver, and the communication will be

less fluent and competent (Koper & Sahlman, 1996).

Deceivers' communication will become inconsistent and

awkward (deTurck & Miller, 1985). For example, a deceiver's

discourse would become inconsistent with the information

that s/he is giving.

Damped Affect

Deception creates an unpleasant experience for most

people (Buller & Burgoon, 1994; Koper & Sahlman, 1996). One

of the main cues of deception is the negative affect leaked

22

in an otherwise pleasant conversation even when the deceiver

is trying to hide his or her true feelings (i.e., to dampen

the affect). Ekman and Friesen (1969) proposed that

micromomentary expressions leak out during times of

unpleasantness. For example, a person for a brief moment

would leak out a negative emotion by showing an unpleasant

demeanor. Hocking and Leathers (1980) contributed to IDT by

developing three categories for nonverbal behaviors. Class

I consists of typically controllable behaviors. Class II

are behaviors which are more difficult to control but not

impossible (e.g., facial expressions). Class III are

behaviors that are typically impossible to control (e.g.,

sweating). Few studies have directly studied negative or

damped affect (Buller & Burgoon, 1994).

Interpersonal Deception Theory is a very good

comprehensive theory to cover allot of ground in the

deception field. It is very well organized and explains

numerous behaviors. IDT is probably a better overall theory

than IMT. However, IDT has not been fully tested in all

areas.

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CHAPTER IV

THE FUTURE OF DECEPTION THEORIES

Deception research has gained complexity throughout the

years. Ekman & Freisen (1969) provided the basis for both

IMT and IDT. These two theories currently seem to be very

good theoretical frameworks to study deception. However,

where do deception researchers go from here?

IMT can possibly be explored using a nonverbal

approach. One would apply the four maxims to nonverbal

behaviors. There is no reason why IMT cannot be made to be

a more comprehensive theory. The empirical findings suggest

that IMT is a very good theory for research into the verbal

usages of deception; however, IDT is a more comprehensive

theory.

IDT allows for both the receiver and the sender, and

IDT uses nonverbal and verbal to determine deception. IDT

is still very young, and not much empirical research has

been done. IDT needs to be further explored by other

researchers. The dance between receiver and sender in IDT

is a possible research question. Why does this dance occur?

Attribution probably plays an important part. The receiver

determines which direction the sender takes in the

deception.

Deception research has come a long way since the early

days. Furthermore, the complexity of deception research

grows everyday. These new theories need more research, but

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the new theories can help lead to new ideas. IMT and IDT

provide a good jumping off point for future theories and

research to emerge.

However, IMT and IDT only use United States studies to

determine an effect. Deception detection could possibly be

different in other cultures (Olaniran & Williams, 1995).

Cultural deception research could enhance the field of

deception literature.

IMT and IDT clearly demonstrate that research on

deception is not dead. Possibly in the near future, a

central theory may synthesize many of the various

contributions in a single, more comprehensive framework to

accommodate the findings of further research into the

process of deception.

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