II Field Force Vietnam Lessons Learned 10 Ferbuary 1970

8/3/2019 II Field Force Vietnam Lessons Learned 10 Ferbuary 1970

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LIMITATION CHANGESTO:Approved for public release, distributionunlimited

FROM:Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't.agencies and their contractors;Administrative/Operational Use; 17 NOV1969. Other requests shall be referred toAssistant Chief of Staff for ForceDevelopment [Army], Washington, DC 20310.

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CONFIDENTIALDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMYOUPI OF 11W ADJUTrANT W4REAL

WASHIN TON. D.C. 20310

Mi RLY TO

AGDA (M) (6 Feb 70) FOR OT UT 694259 10 February 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, II FieldForce Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

,T'4ATIOMSL71,f Of iriSEE DISTRIBUTION BEES Of

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordancewith paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions shouldbe reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 daysof receipt of covering letter.2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriatebenefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations andmay be adapted for use in developing training material.BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

~tI Incl NETH G. WICIKMas Major General, USA

The Adjutant GeneralDI STRIBUTIONComanding Generals '

US Continental Army Comand -US Army Combat Developments ComandUS Army Material Command nCommandantsUS Army War CollegeUS Army Command and General Staff CollegeUS Army Air Defense SchoolUS Army Armor SchoolUS Army Aviation SchoolUS Army Civil Affairs SchoolUS Army Combat Surveillance SchoolUS Army Electronic Warfare SchoolUS Amy Engineer School Regrae unclassife whm spraledUS Army Field Artillery SchoolUS Army Infantry School from dassifle Indosre.US Army Institute for Military Assistance

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CONFIDENTIALDISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)

US Army Intelligence SchoolUS Army Ordnance SchoolUS Army Signal SchoolUS Army Southeastern Signal SchoolUS Army Transportation School

Copies furnished:Office, Chief of Staff, US ArmyDeputy Chiefs of StaffChief of Research and DevelopmentAssistant Chiefs of StaffChief of EngineersThe Surgeon GeneralThe Provost Marshal GeneralOSD(SA) Assistant for Southeast Asia ForcesDirector, Defense Research & EngineeringOffice, Joint Chiefs of StaffCommanding GeneralsUS Army Electronics Command

US Army Weapons CommandIII CorpsII Field Force Vietnam

Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Force, Plans & OperationsCommandant of the Marine CorpsUSAF Air Ground Operations SchoolThe Air University LibraryDefense Documentation CenterUSAF Project RANDComanding OfficersUS Army Limited War LaboratoryUS Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency

US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center

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CONFIDENTIALOPRATIONAL REPRT - LESSONS LANED

HEADQUARTERS II FFORCIVPiRIOD OF 1 AUGUST 169 - 31 OCTOBER 1969

TABLE OF CONTENTS

P.&RAGfAPH PAGE1. (U) Section It Operations: Significant Activities*

a. Comnnde,... ....... *0eS.ooo. o.o......**** oooo0000..01b. Personnel# Health, Morale, Safety, and Disiplne............2a. Intelligence and Counterintelligenoe.....................00005d. Operations# Plans, and Training.............. ............. 26o. Logistics and Transportationoo............000 0.0.oo42f. Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs........ . .00.00.47g. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Sup,,ort.o...49h. Communcations .......... 55jo inspector General....ko Staff Judge Avocate.................. 0. . . o

2. (U) Section II, Lessons Learnede Commander's Observations,EvaluatLonsp and Recommendations.a. Personnel.,........ ............ .. ..........56b. Intelligence............. ........ . ... . .58a.eo Tprain....000000...... ..... o..0000 o.0.00..00000000.5do Organizations. ..................... 9 964

ho Tatri el.oo..... o.oo.O..... oooo.ooo...o*e .. 00000.69INCLOSURES

II FCRCEV Order of Eattle......................................olII FCRCEV Area of Operationso................................o.2C1 A0/Cir ............................. ..................... 0.Close Air Spot.o....o.....oe.....o..ooB-.52 Sre................. ......................... 0.0....0.5Disposition of Sneua Foroe................................oo. 6II FFORCI Troop stes..... .... .....ot................7Inemy Organisation in the III CTZ.............. ............ 8

INcL Rgradsd unclassifid whn sepratedCONFIDENTIAL from cIassifid In osur


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CONFIDENTIALDEPARTMET OF THE ARMYHEADqUARTERS, II FIELD FORCE IIETNAMAPO San Francisco 96266

AVFBC-RE-H 17 NO V 1969SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarter, II Fieid

Force Vietnam, Pericl Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(R2) (U)SE E DISTRIBUIION1. (C) Section I, perations: Significant Activities.

a. Command Group.(1) During the reporting period there were two major changes in hecommand group:(a) On 29 September, Major General Walter B. Richardson becameActing Commanding General of II ield Force Vietnam, while LieutenantGeneral Julian J. well wa s on leave in ONUS.(b) On 3 ctober, Colonel Berkeley S. Gillespie replaced BrigadierGeneral Burnside E. Huffman, Jr., as Chief of Staff.(2) During the reporting period., there were seven major changes inthe staff of II FFORCEV:(a) On 13 August, Lieutenant Colonel John E. Mann became Deputy AssistantChief of Staff, G5, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Daniel H. Wardrop.(b) On 25 Auguit, Colonel Charles W. Hayward became AssistantChief of Staff, G3, replacing Colonel Frederick C. Krause.(c) On 10 September, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas K. Lightcap became

Deputy Staff Chaplain, replacing Lieutenant Colonel John D. Logan.(d) On 20 September, Lieutenant Colonel Steven T. Clark becameProvost Marshal, replacing Colonel Saige Okazaki.(e) On 4 October, Colonel Joseph N. earin, Jr. became CommandingOfficer of the 23d Artillery Group, replacing Colonel Walter Beinke. On thesaw day, Colonel John E. Baker replaced Colonel Hearin as Deputy Commanderof Il ield Force Vietnam Artillery.(f) On 17 October, Lieutenant Colonel Richard T. ambert replacedLieutenant Colonel J.T. Raley A Secretary of the General Staff.(g) On 25 October, Lieutenant Colonel Joe E. McConnell became

CoinMding Officer of Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command, replacing ColsnelAlvin Ungerleider.(3) The overall assigned and attached strength of II FFORCEV increasedsubstantially during the quarter as a result of reorganization in II FFORCEV

4 / .5~- WNWOMA AT 311*M 1U3AJ4Inclosure CONFIDENTIAL tWum Am112 vimW w


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CONFIDENTIAL

AVFBC-RE-HSUBJECTs Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, II Field

Force Vietnam, Period Lnding 31 October 1969, RCS CsFOi-65(ii2) (U)Artillery. A comparison at the end of the last four reporting periousfollowstDATE OFICERS WARRAIT GFFICARS 1"bI~I..i,31 Jan 1969 37 6 36 310530 Apr 1969 412 37 292531 Jul 1969 418 36 301031 Oct 1969 572 57 4859

b. Personnel, Morale, Safety, and Discipline.(1) USARV General Order 3920, dated 21 October 1969, assigned th cfollowing units to II FFORCEV Artillery:2d Battalion, 32 d Field Artillery6th Battalion, 27th Field'Artillery7th Battalion, 8th Field ArtilleryBattery F9 16th Field Artillery6th Battalion, 15th Field Artillery*(*scheduled for deployment)

The personnel sections of the battalions are consolidated under the super-vision of the Sl, 11 FFORCEV Artiflery, and will accomplish personneladministration for all artillery units with the exception of the 5thBattalion (AW ) (SP), 2d Artillery which will retain its organic personnelsection until a later date. The personnel records and related functionsfor Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, II FFORC Artillery, Head-quarters and Headquarters Battery, 8th TAB, 25th Artillery, and 13 FAdetachments wre transferred from the II FFORCU AG Section to II FFORh6VArtillery on 31 October 1969.(2) The morale of the command remainnd at a satisfactory level.(3) The awards and decorations processed, approved an(' issuu nilisted below.

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AVFBC-RE-HSUBJECTs Operational bport-Lessons learned of Headquarters, II FieldForce Vietam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RC S CSFOR-65(R2) (U)

y69 - Jul.69 Aug 62 - Oct 69SILVER STAR 64 141DISTINGUISHLD FLYING CROSS 36 50SULDI S fWAL 17 34BR(NU STAR EIML 47 1 1282AIR MEDAL 500 1202ARMY CO*WDATIOJ MEDAL 667 1962PURPLE~HUIRT 28 4

TOTAL 1783 4717(4) Effective 17 October 1969, the following units were assigned toII Field Foroe Artillery and came under the decorations and awards

authority of CG, II Field Force:6th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery6th Battalion, 15th Field Artillery2d Battalion, 32d Field ArtilleryBattery F, 16th Field Artillery7th Pattalion, 8th Field Artillery234th FA Detachment (Radar)260th FA Detachment (Radar)258th FA Detaomnt (Radar)(5) Postal Activities, 44th .Army Postal Units(a) During the quarter, the 44th AP U sold $9030200.00 in mneyorders, processed 91 tons of inoomhW mail and 41 tons of outgoing mil.Wfective 15 September, all active duty military personnel in Vietnam were

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AVFBC-RS-H3UBJXT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, II FieldForce Vietnam, Period .Ending 1 October 1969, RCS CSFOE-65(R.authorized to purchase postal money orders without paying a fee. On 10October, the procedure for purchasing money orders was further modifiedso that personnel desiring to purchase money orders were reiuirea tnfurnish the postal clerk a pre-addressed envelope, with I',CV Form 5(Currency Control -late) and the ID Card. The postal clprk now Mtilst1* envelope.

(b) Th e period 1 October to 31 December was designatt,: by isCViperitd of increaad postal activity and has been termed "Ci.. k.TIA, .L, -b,;LL". In preparation for "ui&ATIUV iLGIWLLL", the 44t, Al-U has been Jmented with four personnel and 2' ton mail van.(6) The military personnel iijury rate for 1st ,.uarte:, PTY 0 1:

35.4,. below the FY 69 rate as shown on th e chart below. Tne --ru motorvehicle accident rate remained the sime.II 7ORCSV AiSIG.D, ATTACKED, AND OiCUN4 U1I' FY 69

GIL;GRY LU1st Jtr, 'Y I*ilitary personnel injury rate(Injuries pe r one million man-days) 46.1 29.8.%r1y motor vehicle acciaent rate(Accidents per one million miles) 6.5 6.

(7) Weapons accidents involving s:, ll irms anl/or 'rnridpf r' 1~cq1 injuries and 12 fatalities, accountinC for 41.5, of t)-e tot) ', w. motor vehicle accidents accounted for 29 military ;,erc'nne 1a&id sevn fatalities. Additionally, there were 26 Viet.,>e rI" killed in ccidents involving Army motor vehicles. r iv. k t,,for conditions was the primary cause of Army motor vehicle accidents, in"failure to clear weapons upon entering a secure area was the major factorin weapons accidents.(8) The status of discipline, law Hn order within thp CoQM,.A ,k-mained reiativelV stable. Nuarterly sttistics for the lit art,',70 indicate that offense rates for II ?kXtkW, V assigned, ,ttacnea ;,_nits remain relatively stable when compared witn tne previos tartquarters. Miscellaneous and military offenses ',ontinued to declin,"w inerease wa s experienced in rimes against persons and pro erty.downturn in previously increasing traffic offenses reflected increaz-dconand interest and selective enforcement. Unit standdown and larger

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CONFIDENTIAL

AVMBC-IM-HStUJ&Vol Operational Report-Lessons learned of iheadquarters, II FieldFbroe Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65() (U)

troop densities In base camps associated -ith the tactical lull can beviewed as primary causes cf increased incidents. Th e last three quartersof IT 69 an d the first quarter of FY 70 compative rates Zcmputt on thebasis of 1000 troops are listed below.

0 SE A ORY 2d 3r6 tr 69 4th Qtz9 lot tr 70Crime Againet Personsand Property 3.17 1.91 1.,2 2.13Miscellaneous Offenses 50.08 4.44 6.29 6.00Military Offenses 22.18 20.09 19.16 17.53Traffic Offenses 13.31 16.89 21.*5 17.53

O Intelligence an d Counterintelligence.(1) Intelligence aspects .of tactical operations conducted in he IIField Poroe Vietnam (II MIRCE!) Tactical Area of Interest (TA0) arediscussed in he Operational bport-Lessons Learned submitted by unitsunder the operational control of this headquarters.(2) Intelligence Collection.(a) The daily briefing of selected agent reports was continued byColleotion Division. Th e purpose of this briefing was to inform th l 02of enear momemnt, supplyg, subordination, strangth, and intentions sveil as to better evaluate intelligence produced by agents and to deter-nine the reliability of the sources. This, in turn, enables the agencywhich smpleys the sources to decide which saents warrant retention andwhich should be released.(b) Colleotion Division was also responsible for insuring that ellmuessawy pecific Intelligene bquiremtu (SICR) were published adlevied on the appgrwiate olleotion ageniese In addition, olletievision ecordinated the collection of intelligence on specific subjectsWi infaored subordinate uits as to which SICR'S were ourrent by publishinga qutery I11 0MO0 specific Intelligence Collection Requiremntsbgsta/. The hlgitt Indeed all SICR's by amber and by collection

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SWJs Operational Haport-lessone learned of Hbadquarters, II FieldForce Vietnamt Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS C.3FR-65(R2) (U)

asncy. During the past quartert 7 MACV 5ICR's an d 2 II FFORCEV SICR'aWere canoelledt while 18 new MACV an d no new II FFORCLV SICR's were levied.Two MACV colleotion plans, Black Beard and Rapid Shave, were revised andon e MACV collection plan, Empty Flask, was cancelled, it s requirementsbeing incorporated into Black Beard. One new collection plan wa s imple-mented, the I FFORCET Intelligence Collection Plan III CTZ against localforce units in III CTZ.

(c) During the period 1 August to 31 October 1969, Collection Divisioncontinued to analyse agent reports for more complete exploitation of allreported information* Specific area of interest examined were: enerwsanctuaries and base areas; movement - particularly of regimental anddivisional force.; caches; intelligence which would contribute to thaidentification and selection of targets by the G2 Target Division; andinformtion regarding enen activities on interior waterways patrolledby the W3 Navy, which is passed to the Navy 150, II FlORCEV.

(3) Counterinte llisence/PHOENIX,(a) Operations of the Province and District Intelligence and OperationsOoordinating enters (DlOCC) improved considerably as compared to the pre-

vious quarter. This improvement was borne out by the increased rate ofVCI neutralisations, (aonthly average of 221 VCI neutralizations for firstsix months of 1969, as compared to 380 fo r this reporting period). Thisincrease was attributable to (1) increased emphasis by the GVN on theI'hung HOW Program; (2) upgrading the US advisory effort to tho PhungHong Program; (3) increased use of speoifio targeting; (4) increasedrate of Doi Chah; and (5) extension of GVN control over additional hamlets.The GVN Phung Wang Program was extended down to the village level in thrnprovinces In III CTZ. These village organizations were designed to serveas intelligence collection agencies and, hopefully would involve villageoffioials to a greater extent in the attack on the infrastructure. TheBig ack Intelligenoe Collection Program continued to improve. Duringth quartet 40 per"oaul from II FIORCOT OPCO units attended thePRODIX School Mesented by MACOORDS/PBONIX.

(b) Emphasis contimued on the Volunteer Informant Program (VIP) butthe results continued to fall short of expectations. The limited responseto the program a attributed to the overall decline in military activity.Additionaly, Vietnamese civillans were still restricted from entering theforested areas of III MZ. The VIP was not seriously affected by theaustere funding conditions existing throughout South Vietnam.

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CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECTs Operational BRport-Leusons Learned of badquarters, II FieldForce Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, SCS cSFOR-65() (U)

(o) The analysis of serrorist incident locations, which began lostMay, continued through the past quarter. In general, the analysis indi-cated that terrorism ocourred along lines of o.mmunication in contestedareas. This result was Mediated at the tim the analysis was initiated.Over the past six months, it was shown that terrorism followed no definitepattern. One thing which we learned from the anlysis, however, was thata need existed fo r a more precise definition of terrorism. The definitionused by MACV iss Terrorism includes those acts by th e ene directedprimarily against the civilian population. The ke y word in this definitionis "direoted". This required a decision as to the intent of the personsresponsible for the incident. For example, a mine is planted on a road.If a military vehicle detonates the mine, it wae not listed as a terroristincident. However, if a tri-lambretta hit the mine, it was terrorism.Another common example was a rocket landing in a hamlet near a militaryinstallations. WIea the rocket aimed at the hamlet, or was it unsuccessfullyaimed at the installation and missed? Monitoring terrorism did Mrovidean indication of the progress of pacification efforts, During the pastquarter, terrorism steadily declined, from 211 incidents in July, to 180in August, to 123 in September. At the tim of preparation of this report,it was too early v.o forecast an y trend for tim month of October.

(4) Ground Reconnaissance. Company D (Ranger), 151st infantry GOn-tinued its operations In U1 Province, Eastern SR-5. and southern War ZoneD. Initially, the unit screened the northern approaches to the long Dinh -Binh oa complex, while in September and October, Company D was targetedagainst elements of the 74th Artillery Pegiment. As the quarter progressed,more frequent use of the ready reaction force was noted along with afreaggressive employment of the team. Utilising saturation patrolling tech-niques, there were 241 teams inserted which resulted in 30 contacts, 53sightings, 17 eneW killed and I prisoner. In mid-October, Company Dentered into an extensive training program as the National Guard personnelwere replaced by active Army personnel.

(5) Q,2 Air.(a) While Air Pore photography continued to be the photographicmainstay because of its ability to cover relatively larger areas than theOV-1 Mohawk, increasing use was made of Mohawk photography using theKA-30 oamra. The most suitable lens was found to be the six-inch lens,which produced greater clarity at large scales (1:1f500 - 13000). This was

excellent photography for exploiting small areas of interest originallydetected on smaller soale Air Force photography. Experience shoved that7

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CONFIDENTIALAVFBC419-

SUBEiCTt Opational 11port-Lessono Learned of Headquarter, 11 FieldForce Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(2) (U)the two systoe, Air Foe and ArW, complement each other muost ef(~otivelyIn the O0ltr.in8Ur98ncW environment in the III Corps Tactical Zone.The Mohawik photogwapl' at a 2X enlargemnt has made a substantial contri-bution in the area,of targeting and monitoring ensM aetivitir.

(b) Side Looking Airborne Rladar (SLUR) aircraft covered the entireIII CTZ five times a night pine once during th e day in an attempt todetect ay movement within and on the periphery of the corps area.Surveillance patterns placed a heavy emphasis along the Cambodian border,Angel's Wnes& oy Viah Province, the Fishhook, and the northern andsouthern TAWI'se Movement remained fairly constant on all approachesinto the Saigon area. with the ezoeption of the Adamsa Road Corridor whereabove, normal movement was detected throughout the majority of tho report irgperiod*

(c) Infrared (Red Raz) surveillance was flown~ to detect enemy activity,base camps, staging areas, and asseubly areas within ni ci1z. During thisperiod, emphasis was placed on the surveillance of the areas adjacent tothe Cambodian border, Tay JWinhv Binh Long, and Phuoc Long Provinces, andWiar Zones C and D) . Coverage was also provided, almost nightly, over theSong B. Corridor, Michelin Plantation, go Bo and Dci Loi Woods, Filholflantation, the Phno Vlnh Funnel Area, the Catcher's Mittv and the are asouth of Trang Scm. Also, possible rocket launch sites around Long Binh/Bien floa area an d around Saigon were given high pricrities, The monsoonseason drastically reduced the quantity of recorded Rled Haae emissionsbecause of weather aborts, at:mospheric attenuation, and the high contentof moisture in the jungle aoov and soil.(d) On 16 September 1969, the recommendations of the 07-1 FohawkDirect Support Concept Evaluation were realized with the publication ofGeneral Orders attaching the Aerial Surveillance and Target Acquisition(ASTA) Platoons of the lot UM Infantry Division and let US CavalryDivision (AX) for all purposes to the 73d Aviation CompszV (SurveillanceAirplane).(e) Th e height of the southwest monsoon during the montbs of Auguatand September reduced the Air Force target attempts, and completions fellfrom the usual 50 per cent of all RIB to approximately 35 Per Cente Thesouthwest monsoon subsided early in October, resulting in the coverageI of many backlogged targets (exact figures not ye t available). Daring this

period the organization of preplanned targets in in! orps increased by90 per cent to constitute 71 per cent of all preplanned targets in RYN.8

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SUBJCTS Operational Report-Lessons Leazned of Headquarters, Il FieldForce Vietnaua Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFO-65(2) (U)

(f) Closer coordi ation was established with Detacibment 1, 460thTactical Reconnaissance Wing (TRW) which utilized the ES-10-A real timeRed Haze sensor to increase flexibility and resionsiveness. Availabilityof this sensor increased by 100 per cent in Octcber: however, fulleffectivness will not be realized until December because of the influxof itrexperienced crew mebe-s.

(g) The efficiency of film processing ed inte:iretation of the460tb TRW at ?an Son Bhut va.; increased by the 45th 2actical ReconnaissanceSquadron-(TS) nquiring its own Portabka Photographic InterpretationFacility (PPIF). In the near future, the 12th Reconnaissance TechnicalSquadron (S) will also acquire a FPF3 to further increase the Air Forcesupport.

(6) M Targets Division.(a) The G2 Targets Divieion's rima7r function continued to be the

development and evaluation oi targets for B-52 strikes. Tn conjunctionwith this function, an extensive data base of hard ir'stallations 'rawnon acetate maps, to encompass niI Corps Tactical Zone, continued to evolve.The data base portayed eney hunkers, base camps, fightin6 positions,tunnels, an d other hard installation data. Since friendly units wereoften not in an AO for a sufficient period of time to have a complete"feel" for the previously constructed hard installations, C2 Targetsalleviated this problem in the areas of Long Thanh, Catcher' s Mitt.Gang Toi and traditional areas of the 274th Regin t by providingfriendly units involved in the above stated areas with a comprehensiveand current acetate overlay of enemy hard installation data in theirrespective AC'so

(b) siring this quarter, 504 B-52 strikes were targeted apinstlucrative base and staging areas within III Corps Tactical Zone. Fifty-sve per cent of the B-52 air assets available within Southeast Asiawre allocated for strike to this headquarters by YACV. The most inten-sive targeting of the quarter was in August against the lot EV A Division#7th NVA Division, ad 9th VV A Division located in northeastern Tay 3bbProvince and western Binh Long Pzovine. Tb 5th VC Division was alsoheavily bomba ded in its base areas southeast of Bu Gia Naps In Septeabero3-52 strikes weo evenly dispersed in II CTZ with the exception ofconsentrations in nortbwesteorn Due Phong targeted against the 5th VCDivision and northeast of Bearcat against the 274th Regimt. In October,targeting emphasis continued against the 274th Regiment with emphasisalso on infiltrating WVA/VC troop concerretions based along logistical

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I COWFITIENTIAL

IVFBC-PRE.-]SJCTs Operational Report-lessons learned of Headquartersq II FieldForce Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(02) (U)

resupply points along the Serges Junle Highway. One strike wa s targetedagainst the D445 Battalion in the Long Hai area located in southern PhuocTu y Province and resulted in 46 secondary explosions, suggesting tbat thearea was probably being used for the storage of vast quantities of munitions.(c) Th e 29th Chemical Detachment, under the operational control ofG2 Targets Division, remained one of the princiral sE4eiilance meansavailable to tlx division. This quarter, 212 hours -ere flown on air-borne personnel detector (Sniffer) missionst compared to 184 hours fortie previous quarter. Units supported on "Sniffer" missions during thequarter were as follows: 199th LiFbt Infantry Brigade, RTAVF, 1d Brigadeof 82d t rborne, and BMTAC. Due to tle rainy season, there were nodefoliation missions conducted or reqc 'd of this unit.(7) Description and Recepitution of Enemy Qrde;. cf Battle.(a) Descriptions The Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVK)

rericined th e supreme political military headquarters controllin allViet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (YVA) activities in the southervhalf of the Republic of Vietnam. Military units in II I CTZ are subordin-ated either directly to COSVN.or to one of eight secondary level headquartersin III CTZ. (See Inclosure 8). There were no significant changes in theenemy's military-political bcundaries during the quarter and the avea ofII CTZ continued to be divided into 13 major sub-divisions. Thereappeared to be a shift in eneo tactics toward decentralization and smallscale actions aimed at sustaining a steady attrition of US and alliedforces and protecting the VC political infrastructure, while keeping mainforce strength intact for the long run. Yost large VC and ?VVA maneuverunits were back in base areas preparing fror the Winter-Spring Campaign,but reCional and sub regional commands appeared to have been given thego ahead to plan and execute highpointr indepenilently.

(b) Significant Order of Battle Developments..t Few significant changes in the number an d effectiveness of eneiunits were noted in the E FFORCEV TAOI. The table below portrays thecombat effectiveness of regiumnts and separate battalions at thebeginning and end of the quarter. Units which were believed to bepresent, but not confired, are shown in parentheses:

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CONFIDENTIALAT1BC-R-ESUMJECT, Opational flpOrt-L5 so0 Tarned Of Headuarts, II Field

Forae Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, Rso CSVOR-65(R2) (U)Tables Combat Effectieness. of m UniS31 Jul 69 31 Oct 69

CX CE PM NCE TOTAL ICE CE MCE WCE TcMALInfRegt 5 6 5(2) 16(2) a a 3 19Arty Rgt 3 3 3 3InfB 6 11 4 21 11 a 4 23ArtyD 14 2 16 16 16Sapper Bn 8 8 10 6 16Recon 1 1 1 1ICE - Ftlly Combat Effoctive ME - Mrginally Combat EffectiveCS - Combat Effecti" XCE - Not Combat Effective

2 Tb. 12 Sappe/Bsoonnaiesnoe Battalion of SR-2 and the 3d ArtilleryBatt2Lion of SR-3 W" adopted by II 10RC1 Order of Battle as confirmd4e92 combat support battalions during the reported period. Based on thecriteria outlined in MACV Direotive 381-12p the designation of the unitswere knows suberdination had been established, and the locations ha d beendetermined by a minima of two reports from VC/NVA prisonerst, Hoi CheoA,or captured doeumnts,.

O The Special Actions Elements of Saigon were adopted by 11 FORCETOrder of Battle as confirmed combat support battalions in nI CTZ. Tb afive mapper battalions NIO 113, N14, 115, and N16 were originated in1967 but had been redesignated and reorganized countless time and boreno resemblance to their original state. he NI18 Artillery Battalion wasnewly formed in Februamy 1969 to provide artillery support fo r the sapperbattalions in the capitals The special action elemnts were locatedbetween B Thug their base areap and Saigon, their objective.

Th e 18B Regiment remained out of contact following a Roi Chanhidentification an 26 Ju south of Bo Tuc, an d vantt agin identifieduntil 21 AuMt in a contact in IV CTZ, Chau Due Province, which resultedin three enem killed. Documents captured in this contact identified a

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MUMIC, Operatloam bptSWson Of n ielDomeQ VietMAm hUd ine 31 October- 1969 203 csio-65(12) (U)'batalon Wo~din officer of the regiment. Since this Identification,the iegiaint Was identified mnumber of ties s operatijng in the I'1 CZaa tbo. SXPla&Uim the isok Of ontact With the regimnt since 26 Jun.aa confirmiag the aqiment's8 relooation to IV CTZ.

fth 16 Armor Office P CoBYN was confirmed at an eq'i amnuvrIfit In III *,2 en 27 September as a result of a study compiled throughthe was Of P1isoMe inteuroations, document readouts, end contacts whichIdentified elemenat of this unit. The regimental mss unit ba 4 an6111@Sm04 strenth of 1,600 men and had six battalions enumerated 3thr~u*bSo fthattalion operate throughout northern MX Cz and con-dust*& sapper/ne00naissnee Operations assigned by the Armor Office.8i30 ot the battalions varled from 100 to 300 men. The Armor Office alsohad tveo piberdiite coppanie of fifty -n each. Supporting the Armor099" " #reduresombat operationo, signal, security, an dtainling elementa. Sh e X Battalion was last Identified by doovimentsfound an a body followimg an, a August 1969 contact southeast of PhwoVIMh. TW O Waonze captored on 12 Anpgst during an attack an LZ Andyidentified elemnts Of the Oth Battalion, 16th Armor Office. The 5th20811601c was Identified In the Watum area in September 69 and at Dau.Tien# OR 23 DebtUar 1969. It had sAmc been identif ed In the area, ofMOcG TIMh W a prioner eaptud On 14 September 1969. On 12 Augustand 5 September 1969 prison=a Identified a 6th Sapper Battalion sub-Ordinate to the 16t Armor Office; hover, documents found prior totheir capture indsoited toat the 6th Battalion ay be subordinate toM.7* The 7th Battalion vas last identified by prisonere capturedfollowing a0 &At On Ohon Thai. ftey als stated that the 6thSapper Battalion was subodinte to the 16th Armor office* The 16thAVmOW Offic vas believed to be operating out of base areas 35 2 and

ftT eglevot proiness, an d special sones in III CI'Z con-trlfed 44 100al force companies uad 19 local force platoons (Note alocal ois and Platoon. with A, trength Of 40 Or' ess are considered

jThe battalions an d regimental. aimed units located within III CTZwere " followsaI

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$BC!s Operational 1wport-Lmsone Iasoned of Headquartere q II FieldForce Vietnam, Period Endi 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(2) (U)M1 SUBRDINATICR

74th IVA Artillery NetiLmnt 69th VC Artillery Comand96th NVA Artillery Regiment 69th VC Artillery Co=mnd58th VC Artillery Battalion 208th Artillery Begiient66th VC W Base Seourity Regimnt COMV146th VC W Reconnmissanoe Battalion 006V12d VC 1 Gord Battalion COVN16th Armr Office 00SVN95C IVA Regiment 1st WVA Division101D NVA ogiment lot NVA Division95th NW A Regiusnt 5th VC Division174th IVA lsgimnt 5th VC Division275th VO Regiaent 5th VC Division22 d VC Artillery Battalion 5th VC Division24th NVA Anti-Aizraft Battalion 5th VC Division141st IVA belrmmt 7th NVA Division165th IVA egiment 7th IVA Division209th IVA Rhgifmht 7th NVA Division271st VC Rgiment 9th VO Division272d TO Regiment 9th VC Division66th IA RegIment 9th VC Division22d TC Artiller Battalion 9th VC Diviso0

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AWBC-RZ-1SUJW, 0peMaIonal, Bhport-Xassons Imeemed of lbadquezters, nI FieldAbres, Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CS?(.65(h2) (U)

20th VC Anti-Aircraft Battalion 9th VC Division101t EVA Regiment Sub Region 1268th VC IVFoRgiment Sub Region I*"t Tong I VC wI Battalion Sub Region IQq~t Tang n V C iv Battalion Sub Regiori 16th VC Artiller.' Battalion Sub Region I9th TO Artillemy Battalion Sub Region I6th TO WV Battalion Sub Region 2M16 EVA Battalion Sub Region 2267th TO IV' Battalion Sub Region 2269th VC N? Battalion Sub Region 2WOth VC W9 Battalion Sub Region 2

2642 EFVA Battalion Sub Region 2128th Arilr Battalion Sub Region 2lot IV A Regiment Sub Region 3211th EVA Sapper Battalion Sub Region 3265th TO WI Battalion Sub Region 3506th TO WF Bttalion Su b Rlegion 3500th TO HF Battalion Sub Region 3

I520th TC W Battalion Sub Region 3Doing I VA Battalion Sub Region 314CONFIDENTIAL


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8U.ELs Opratlom bprt-lassi Isafea of npu'(iS,ImWAWcoe "Stu%, NWl 3M M 31 October I99,K CU'(R65(Jt2) (U)IBrng kai TO Dlbset subRegion 5Special Actiom Zlemmt su laglon 6

1.10 sapper lattaliom1-13 Sapper Battali.o1-14 Sapper Battulion1-15 Sapper lattallon1-16 Sapper Bttalon11-18 A'til14s Bataion

D14 VC L7 Battaliso TV Nuh ft"v "33d NVA Fasivent Probably 0M ooperatingwith Military Region. 7274th VO W Bsimnt Military b,6On 72d VC WaUttalion Sub Region 44th VC R Battalion Sb Region 46th sear loapeos Battalion Sub Rlegon 48th Water Sapper Battulion Su b Recon 4

oen 10 TC NY Sapper Battaliom * Region 4DM VO W Uppr Battalioa U-1 Provinoea VO It Sapper Battalim U-1 ProvinceS6 VC WII apper Battalion U-I ProvinceM440 VO LIP Battalion B&Dies ProyuMe

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CONFIDENTIALAVDC3-,1lsUUOwu Opmaticoal ps--tzesom ierned of sbadquarters n !da.as Vietn, hod Rndg 31 October 1969, ics cSR-65(R2) (U)

145 VC 21 Battulifs Ba Dion ProvinceBanSog B INA Battalion Mlitary Region 1013th IVA Artillery Battalion lot IVA Division14th NVA AA Battalion lot IV A Division21.4 Sapper Battalion 5th VC Divilon224 IV A Artillery Battalion 7th NVA Division24th EVA Anti-Airoraft Battsl.on 7th IVA DivisionQ# Dinh 4 TO Sapper Battalion Su b Region 115 Water Sapper Battalion Sub legion 19th VC ArtileR Battalion Sub Region 112th VC HP Sapper eeoonnalseanoe Battalion Sub Region 23d Artillery Battalion Sub Region 3DI VC L? Battalion Tay Ninh Province67th NVA blglmer Battalion Military Region 7D168 VC I Battalion Phuoo Long ProvinceDA V01W Battalion Binh Lone Province

(d) Summary of Recent Activity.I hneq level of activity during the quarter was somewhat loverthan tin previous qusarteo. fe quarter witnes-ied the start of the all0appalpi on 11-12 Augut, with a highpoint of eis action that appearedto be a le intenep bu t sore sunstained effort than the highpoints of

the Smuer Cmpaipa. The September effort was quite similar to that ofAuust, featuring gound probes and standoff attacks. The attacks byfire during these actions were generally of light Intensity and wre16

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CONFIDENTIALSOVoBC-IE-H~ S u B J E C T ' : Operational Report-Iessons Learned of Headquarters, II Field

Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFC-65(R2) (U)scattered throughout the corps zone. Enemy efforts were continued inoutlying areasp as during the Summer Campaign, but several indicatorsrevealed emphasis on strengthening hi s infrastructure and the continuedus e of military actions to further his political goals. Th e close of thequarter saw the ene continuing hi s prolonged period of relative in-activity. The bulk of his divisional forces remained in ase areasengaged in resupply and training activities. Intelligence indicatedthat th e provisions of C(OVN Resolution Nine were being studied andwoull serve as a basis for the Winter-Spring Campaign. Th e -esolationindicated that the Winter-Spring Campaign was intended to be a decisiveeffort to force a US withdrawal, thwart th e Vietnamization of thL war,an d disrupt the pacification program.

lst NVA Division. At the beginning of the quarter, the divisionalheadquarters had a probable location in Base Area 353 west of the Fish-hook while th e 18B an d 95C Regiments were believed located northeast ofNu i Ba Den in central War Zone C. The 101D Regiment wa s located byprisoners an d documents north of Iinh Thanh. The estimated strength ofthe division at that time was 4,425. Toward the end of July, followingresupply operations in rear base areas, th e division moved into forwardpositions to begin offensive qperations. Th e 101D Regiment was firstidentified in several light contacts southwest of An Loc during the firstmonth of the quarter. Although th t 18B and 95C Regiments were notidentified during the first month of th e quarter, numerous attacks byfire on aircraft in central War Zone C indicated their presence intraditional AO'se. Agent reports an i a 'Coi Chanh report that the missionof the 101D Regiment was the interdiction of convoys along Uighway 13south of An La. This mission was confirmed on 12 August when the 1ODRegiment initiated an attak on a convoy 11 kilometers south of An Loc.Th e contact resulted in 4 enemy dead and 2 prisoners. A prisoner cap-tured while penetrating a night defensive position in central War ZoneC identified the 95C Regiment. This, along with increased activity inWar Zone C suggested that the 95 C Regiment had completed refitting inpreparation for renewed operations. The 183 Regiment was not identifiedand agents indicated that th e regiment had relocated. Toward 'he endof August, the regiment was identified in Chau Due Provinoe in IV CT Zfollowing a light contact, thus explaining the lack of contact with the19 B Regiment since 26 Juns. This wa s the first indication of a NVAelement in IV 0!Z and reduced the strength of the lot NVA Division to3,200. At the sam time, agents indicated that the 1OD Regiment wasstarting to conduct a move into War Zone C. On 25 August a forwardelement of th e 1OID Regiment was identified by documents captured in abunker complex nine kilometers southeast of Bo Tuc. In what was probably

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AV90-131-NSBMUOs Operational Report-Iossons learned of Hadquarters, 17 FieldForce Vietnam, Period E~ndg 31 October 1969, ROS csFoR-65(12) (U)

the regIment's last operation prior to moving to War Zone C, the 101Dwas identified In an ambush an a convoy four kilometers north of ChonThanh on 6 September. Security elements of the convoy returned fireresulting in 51 ensiW killed and 4 prisoners. Through the months ofSeptember and into October the divis.ion conducted no significant op.-erations and only minor contacts were established with the unit. DurirngOctober, the 95C Regiment was agin located in Cambodian border baseareas conducting reorientation and refitting and remained there untillate in the month. At that time agents reported that elements or theregiment had moved into the traditional 95C base area north of theCrescent* The IOID Regiment also remained ou t of contact; however,Roi Chenh and agent reports indicated that the unit had moved intoBade Area 354, north of the Angelis Wing. Indications were that thergimnt might follow the 183 Regiment to IV CTZ to establish thethree regiment division.as reported by prisoners; but by the end ofOctober the regiment uas probably still located west of Nui Ba De nalong tkoe ashodir. border. The headquarters and support element wasuniccated and might have moved from the base area north of Katum whichit had occupied during the first of this quarter. By the end of Octoberthe divisional strength was estimated at 3,200..~5th VC Division. At the start of the quarter the 5th VC Divisionwa dispersed in orth W ar Zone D and south H.R-10 with an estimatedstrength Of 4,300 men. The division wa s believed to have moved here toconduct training, resupply aotivitieu, and operations in huoc LongProvinces The first identification of the quarter occurred on 8 August

at YU185031 when elements of the 5th Special Forces Group Airbornereceived a Hoi Chauh wh o wa Identified as a member of the Jbeavy WeaponsCompMn 3-275 Regiment. The Roi Chanh stated that the regiment sufferedapproximar~sy 50 killed, 25 wounded, and 20 missing due to a 5 August3.52 strike. The source stated the mission of the 275th Regiment was toattak Song Be#) while other elements of the 5th VC Division attackedBaad and Duc Phone* On 12 August the 275th Regiment was againIdentified in a contact which resulted in 31 *esW killed. The 275thRegiment was Identified tWce more during the month by a document and ahbi Chanh. On 5 September, at YU394088 the 174th Regiment was identifiedin a ontact which resulted in 21 enesy killed. On 11 September at YU259-035 the 3.275 'legiment was identified by a prisoner who stated the 2-275flegiment rnfred 30 killed and many wounded in 28 August B-52 strikes.On I October the documents found on an sassi identified the 2-174Asleiment. On 17 October the 21st Reconnaissance CompanY, 95th Regimentwe Identified by a Roi Chanho The 5th VC Division wasn believed to have

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SUBJW , Operational Reprt-lesooo Larnd of Hsadquartea.n9;FlldForce Vietna, Period 3ndingr 31 October 1969t 10B C: OR-65(B2) (9)

relocated to northern MR-10 to retrain an d resupply. The 174th Regimentwas loft in contact while the 95th and 275th Regiments conducted refittingoperations.A 7th INVA Division. At the beginning of the quarter the 165th an d209th Regiment# were believed to be located northwest of An leo and Westof An Loo respectively, with the 141st Regiment positiond east of AnLoo. Prisoners and documents captured during the first part of thequarter indicated that the division was planning future offensive operationsin the northern Binh Long Province area. These indications were partiallysubstantiated by a contact on 13 August four kilometers southwest of LoNinh in which the 209th Regiment suffered 79 killed in a contact with the11th Armored Camalry Regiment. Three 14 August contacts northeast of LoaNinh, which accounted for 40 enev killed, ight possibly he" beenattributed to the 141st Regimnt. Documents taken from an *nea killedfollowing a contact an 13 August east of Bu Dop, identified a platoonleader of a reconnaissance element and included orders from a divisionallevel element to conduct reconnaissance of the Bu Dop Special Force campfor a forthoming attack. Although the unit was uidentified it wasfeasible that it was an element of the 165th' Regiment. The 141st and209th Regiments continued to be identified in interdiction@ of lime ofcomunioations during the remainder of August. Two contacts on 5 and 6September with elements of the 209th Regiment cost the #nea 75 killedand 6 prisoners. Both of these contacts took place northwest of An Loa.

No other significant contacts were mads with the division's elementsfor the remainder of the month. The 209th Bogiment suffered 14 killedand 3 prisoners following a contact southwest of Lo linh on 5 October,while the 141st Regiment was identified by a 14 October rallier as beilocated north of Ioo Ninh. No other significat contacts were made withelements of the division throughout the reminder of the quarter* Atthe end of October the division had an estimated strength of 49750. The165th Regiment was believed to be located southwest of Au Dop, almog theBinh Long - Cambodian border area, the 209th Regiment in base areas inthe Flat Iron, and the 141st Regiment in Bas Area 350,. north of Leo lih.

I 9th VC Division. The 9th VC Division was most active duringAucst, On 9 August the 271at Regiment was identified In a contact inBinh Long Povince, west of An Loo where they suffered 41 killed and 6prisoners. During the 12 August highpoint, the 2718t and 272d Rlegimentswee identified. The 271st Regiment suffered 78 killed and 2 prisonerssouthwest of An Ie while the 272d lost 50 killed, 7 prisoners, and 10Rol Chanh near Qun Lo. On 14 August the 3-68 Regiment was identifiedsouthwest of Tay linh am they suffered 63 killed and 2 prisoners in a19O IT

CONFIDENTIAL


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CONFIDENTIALAVWBC-RZ-HSU.JBJCTu Operational Dport-Leso- r ,,. d of HeadquartrsII FieldForce Vietn, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS csFOR-65(2) (u)contact vith the lot AM Airborne Battalion. On 21 August, an elementof the 88th Regiment vas engaged in the vicinity of lti a Den. The con-tact resulted in 32 killed an d 2 ensaW captured. Since late August, the88th Regiment has avoided contact and remained in base areas along theTay uinh Provine-Cambodian border. Th e 271st and 272d Regiments, oper-ating in Binh Long Province withdrew to prepare for the fall offensive.The 271st Regiment is currently believed to be in base areas in the Fish-hook area. The 272d Begiment, which began to move through war Zone C inlate September, wan identified in only a few small contacts. Th e 9th VCDivision activity over the past three =nthe was characterized by inoreasedoffensive activity in August and the avoidance of contact in September andOctober.

j, lot NT A Regiment. The lo t NVA Regiment continued to avoid contactas amh as possible during the roporting period. On 18 August, the 14Battalion, lt NV A Regiment wa s contacted in westem Ranah [ten District.The eamming contact resultel, In 23 killed, 1 prisoner, and I Ho i Chanh.The lot IVA Regiment wa s not involved in another contact until 16September when the 16 Battalion wa s contacted in Binh Phuoc Districtan d suffered 15 killed an d 5 prisoners. On the following day, the [4Battalion was engaged by elemnts of the 9th US Infantry Division inwest Bach lten District. The contact resulzed in 12 ene killed and4 captured. The mission of the regiment continues to include controlof land areas and opposition of the GVN Pacification Prograa.

2 33d NVA Infantry Reygient. In early August 1969, the 33dRegiment was moving to a ne w base area along the La Nga River with anapproximate strength of 1,075 men. During the beginning of August, theregiment remained out of significant contact although there were smallidentifiable contacts in VC Ba Bien Province. The regiment moved to theLe ga Boe Area along with MR-7 headquarters and bad the probable mieionof reorganizing and refittirg. On 25 August at YZ544490 11 kilometersnorth of Dinh Quan, 30 ene, of the 33 d Regiment were engaged resultingin 7 enen killed and 2 prisoners. Also in this approximate area (YT5449),there were sigificant engaements resulting in a total of approximately55 enes killed plus large caches. In the begiming of September, i.t wsbelieved that the 33d Regiment was north of Dinh quan with some elementspossibly remaining in the La Ngsa Base Area. Captured documents revealedthat the 3-33d Regiment had the mission of transporting wounded and movingsupplies consisting of food and ammunition from north of Dong Nai River,south across Route 20, to the I& Nga River Base. The 3d Battalion alsowas to conduct ambushes on Route 20 between I& Nga River bridge, TT482340,end Dinh Quan. During the months of September and October the 33d Regimenrt

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AMC-P.E-H-1SUBJi.Cs Operational Pport-Ieszons learned of Headquarters, II FieldForce Vietnam, Feriod Iding 31 October 1969, RCS CSPOR-65(F) (U)

remained out of significant identifiable contact and moved into .a r ZoneD north of Dinh Quan. Captured documents indicated that the reciment w,:sprobably directly subordinate to COSYII and operating in a coordiratirgrole with MR-7.8 101st Regiment. Th e second quarter showed si~nificant changes inthe 101st Regiiment's area of oreration, missions, and frequency of ccn-tact. By the end of August it was pretty well established that CWOVheadquarters had extended the western boundary of SR-1 to iizclude tie BoiLoi Woods. Documents captxwed during the previous quarter (19 1Ay 69)indicated the presence of 101st Regiment in the area just south of tieBoi Loi Wcod.ot Since the first quarter the main body of lC1st Eegiz.entlas been engred in resupply missions to other mR-iain force units.One Battalion appeared to be continuing the regiment's combat missicnof 1wovi(ing security for SR-1 headquarters. Increased enemy activityat the Ben Chua River crossng (vicinity XT5535) during the latter partof September resulted in increased contacts with the 101st Regiment.T'e most significant contacts occurred on 22 and 23 September when USNavy river patrol boats engaged an undetermined number of persoiMelattempting to cross the Saigon River. A total of 30 eneP- were killedin the two contacts. These personnel were later i-entified by captureddocuments as members of the 101st Regivent. During the first tw o werksof October small contacts continued to be made with elements of the101st Regiment in the Boi Loi Woods, northern Trapezoid area, andnorthern Nichelin-Razor Back areas Contacts during the past duringthe past quarter involving the regiment have resulted in 119 killed.The 101st Regiment's strength was carzied at 1,075 men. The most

significant change in the unit's tactics was it s opersting in squadand platoon site elements due to the extensive allied operations iz, tsAO and lack of adequate cover since the beginning of rome plow operations.268th Regiment. During the present quarter the 266th Regimentsustained the heaviest losses among SR-1 main force units, lesing 15 6killed. Since the beginning of the secord quarter the 268th Regimenthas been undergoing sapper training in conjunction with SR-I changesin tactics. The decision to revert to small unit sapler-type operationswas perhaps due to the critical resupply problem and decreased combatcapability of SR-1 main force units. The 268th Regiment reportedly hastwo sapper battalions ad one infantry battalion, with elements operatingin the Boi Loi Woods, Po 30 Woods and Citadel area. During the month ofAugust, two significant contacts were reported involving the 268thegiment in the 1b Do Woods and Citadel area. The first ocourred on 5

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CONFIDENTIALAVFtBC-Ri3-.SUBJECT, Operational Report-lessons Leearned of Headquarters, II Field

Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RC S C5FOR-65(R2) (U)August resulting in 14 enWq killed and the second on 7 August in which17 eneq were killed. Poth contacts were with the K3 Battalion. On 17September the 13 Battalion lost 32 killed in a contact with elements of25th US Infantry Division in eastern Filhol Woods. On 2 ctober the K3Battalion was again identified south of the Boi Loi Woods in the onlyGiOnificsnt contact with 268th Regiment for the month of October. The13 Battalion lost 10 men killed in that engagement. 'he 268th hegiertoctirune to suffer acute morale problems as a result of supply shortagcs,intensive allied activities, and numerous casualties. The strength ofthe 268th Regiment was held at 910 men.

10 274th VC hf Infantry Regiment. In early August 1969, elementsof the 274th Regiment were believed to be in the Hat Dich area with anapproximate strength of 700 men. Throughout the month of August, theregiment remained out of significant contact. Although identifiablecontacts were mde, they were no larger than platoon size. Durine themonth of August it was believed that the regiment's main concern wFsresupply. In the first part of September, the regiment still remainedout of significant indentifiable contact. It was believed that theregiment was having a difficult tim obtaining Dxovisions. Becauseof friendly artillery fire and air strikes, it s base camps were movedconstantly. On 25 September at YS2182, 12 kilometers southeast of LongThach, an 18th ARMN coavoy with the l-2-48th ARVN as escort, rece iedfire from an unknown number of enemy resulting in 62 ener. illed anda prisoner who was identified as a member of the 3-274th Regiment. Intie begirning of October, the regiment was identified in various contact-,with a significant contact on 4 October at YT279354, 23 kilometersnortheast of Trang Born, where a company was engaged resulting in 15emoa killed identifying the 2-274th Regiment. This contact was inWar Zone D where the 274th Regiment acquired munitions end weapons.Doe to concentrated allied operations the regiment was continually onthe move, attempting to avoid decisive contact. Also, allied operationsnorth of Highway I are believed to have caused continuing resupply

fo r the regiment.1. Dong Nai Regiment. At the beginning of the quarter the L;ongNai Regiment was dispersed throughout SR-5 with an estimated strengthof 19150 men. The regiment's mission was to conduct harassing attacks

and attacks by fire with some of the battalions' companies supportinglesal fore =its. Lements of the 12 and 14 Battalions along with the13 Battalion or. situated in the An Son area. The remaining elementsof the 12 and K4 Battalions were southwest of Phuos Vinh. The K1

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CONFIDENTIALAVFBC-RZ-HSUBgOT s Operational Report Lessons-Learned of Heafquarterst I FieldForom Voetanam Priod Ending 31 otober 196, IC S CSPO"5(3) (1i)Battalion continued to operate north of Tax Ven. On 14 October at XT-765623 Tran Thah Danh rallied to Con Thanh headquarters. Dw h statedthat the regiment vas experienoing difficulty in obtaining rise an dother food supplies. B stated the only reliable source of supply forthe regiment was Cwabodia. The 1i Chanh stated the Dong lal Regimentis 95% NVA and there is dieention betveen the VC and eV. anh statedthe Don Nag. egient headquarters moved north of the Song Be River.Souroe also stated that the K1 Battalion is located in the vioinity of1%66, the 12 Battalion in the vicinity of T8746 and the 13 Battalionis located in the An Son area. The location of the 14 Battalion wasunknown to the Hi Chaenh. The estimated strength of the Dong lai Regimentis 870 men. Although the Doug Nai Regiment wu not involved In any majoroontacts, the losses suffered in numerous small oontaots and desertionsare believed to have hampered the regiment's operational cpability.

(8) VC/IVA Battle losses.(a) Overall per oml andmateriel losses&

Auust 5034 427 787 369 1267 243 54.9September4464 381 967 37 1325 199 46.6October3754 310 1208 *85 1479 220 89.2*VCI figures for October are from military unite only. Final updatefigure from CORDS not available until 10 November.

(b) losses in Caches. One of the major factors which continue toblunt ene offensive@ is the continued discovery of eim caches byallied forces.

HLMUEL CAMMRE FROMt IaU~'ff CA HOAugust - October 1969AUGUS? SEPTEMER OCTOBER TOTAL

122m rokets 4 1 0 523

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IM 33-ioJajsace po z uJ.oaauod of Basdquarters, II FPildYom Vietung bood Ra g 310ober 1969 AC CSoR.-65(2) (U)

AUG13! SIMEt'SIR 0010313 TOTAL107M rockets 69 105 77 2513 rounds 2715 1683 1232 5S301hrtar rounds 2885 826 2279 5990ResoiUess Rifle rds 163 219 480 86 2SA as 154,200 86,300 226600 467,100(osdends 3767 3774 2626 10,167N*oeu/ooby traps 679 822 919 2420Inividal veapons 1267 1325 1479 4071Wwve 4veapons 243 199 220 662itie (tons) .54.9 46.6 89.,2 190.7

(9) & V oapabilites, vaUlnerbilities and relative probability of&doption,at the end of the quarter*

.. The mw Is capable of launching s&pper and mlti-battalion sizendattak3 th~oughout the Ao8ons, ttacks may be supported byrocket end Mortar fir.2 Th onew is apablo of attaks against province and districtoapital. and fire support bases.I The ~enx is capable of increasing the intensity and frequency ofby rokets, mortar, and direct fire by heavy wapons againstselected t*pets througout IM I CTZ and military targts In the CM

Thee soqx,s capable of conducting pround attacks against theperipery of the CND, utilising SR battalions and sapper.LTeL oAe i capable of harssing installations and intensifyingLOC interdiction throughout II CTzp for limited periods of tis.

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AVID C-RE-HSJECTs Operational bmport Leesou-Learned of Headquarters, II FieldForce Vieta, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65( 2) (U)

6 The sneer is capable of Increasing terrorist, sabotage, andassssination activities in the CMI) an d throughout the CTZ.

2 The ezaW is capable of conducting propaganda, subversion, sabotage,espionae, and political efforts throughout III CTZ.8 Th e eneaW is capable of avoiding contact for limited periods of

time, contingent on the extent of allied efforts and operations.The eneaV is capable of withdrawing to out-of-country sanctuaries

fo r the purpose of avoiding allied operations.10 The eneW is capable of positioning forces in forward base areasthroughout III CTZ in order to support his efforts to subvert the populationof such areas.(b) Vulnerabilities.I Concentrations of enew forces are vulnerable to detection byvari7ous modes of reconnaissance activity and to destruction by air, artillery,or ground actions.2 Enemy movemnt in vulnerable to interdiction by allied ground,artillery, and air attacks.t Th e snow's supply system, particularly his caches, is vulnerableto discovery by allied operations.j Th e infrastructure is vulnerable to aggressive allied action.(c) Relative probability of adoption at the end of the quarter.. Little chane is expected in the pattern of enew activity duringthe next three mnths. H will continue to attempt to achieve the goalsof withdrawal of M forces, recognition of the NLF/PRG, and the acceptanceof a coalition government. The enen's "Winter Campaign" will probablyconsist of a series of planned highpoints separated by periods of lowactivity. Ephasis will continue on attacks by fire, sapper, and smll

scale round actions as he attempts to produce maximum casualties whileholding his losses to a minimu.2 The enea's divisional forces are likely to operate from relativelysecure base ais from which they an maintain a threat to outlying areas

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CONFIDENTIALAWEIVO-o-H5U3Jk]OT: Operational Iport Lessons-Learned of headquarters, II Field

Force Vietna, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(R2) (U)ind conduct limited attacks during cyclic highpoints. These forces willcontinue to in4tain pressure on III CTZ northern tier of provinces.

J In the populated areas, sub regional forces will continue to con-dot attacks by fire and sapper actions, with further emphasis on guerillatactics. The pattern will continue to be one of periodic highpointsfollowed by lulls in activity. Particular emphasis will be placed onattacking the Allied Pacification Program which is a major threat tohis attempts to control the population.

do Operations, Plans, and Training.(1) General.(a) During the reporting period II FFORCEV completed Phase III ofCepaW Toan Thang. Operations throughout the III 7 to locate and

destroy enese forces ard to interdict infiltration routes continued andthe enemV failed to achieve any significant tactical success. Generallypoperations during the quarter continued at a lower level than the precedin6quarter; however, emphasis was maintained on the pacification program andon oobined operations* The period was characterized by the enewy con-tinuing to avoid major contact with some exceptions. The eneaw's "FallOffensive" was conducted during August and September, with three highpoints. Theme high points were limited primarily to attacks by fire andwere conducted by sub region forces fo r the most part. During October,a definite lull in enerr activity occurred. The second withdrawal move-ment resulted in the reduction of approximately 5,700 troops in II FFORC. Vwith the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne the only major unit in this reduction.As of the close of the reporting period, about one third of the designatedtroops had been withdrawn, with a completion date of 15 December scheduled.fte 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division remained OPCON to the 25th InfantryDivision. The 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry was released from its securitymission at Dn Tan in late August and joined the 3d Brigadep 9th InfantryDivision bringing its strength to three infantry an d ons mechanizedinfantry battalions. It oontiniecI to operate in Long An Province, conductingpIriparily a war of attrition against main and local force eneqr elementsIn the area. Two regiments of the 25th ARVN Division contirued underOPIO of the ong An Province Chief, conducting extensive pacificationOperations an d combined operations with the 3d Brigade, 9th InfritryDivision. The 25th Infantry Division area of responsibility was RauVghia and Tay Ninh Provinces. Operations aginnt the 9th VC Divisionwere conducted in Tay Ninh Province and neutralization of SR-i forcesand base areas along the Saigon River Corridor contitued. TI-e 1st

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AVDC-RE-R xSDJECT8 opamtlonal, Rport Lessons-Learned of sdu omtn idForce Vielmam, Period Rmding 31 October 1969, R(ZCSS-65(R2) (U)Cavalry Divisions with the 11th Armered C&aary eimnOPCO11 mtad thenorthern tier, with operations conducted in W ar ZOns C, Binh 0og0 dPhwc long provinces. The 2d AMV Airborne Brigade deployed from the TayNlnh City area into liar Zon1e C, ald conducted combined operations withthe lst Cavalry Division. The lot Infantry Division, with elements ofthe 5th AMI Division continued to grind down SR-I and SR-5 eleimnts. Theremainder of the let Infantry Division concentrated on pacification op..erations. The 199th Light Infantry Brigade'& areas of operation was longKhanh Provinces where it continued its efforts to upgrade the 18th AMVDivision. In early September, a coordinated operation with the lot AT?,RTAVF, 18th ARVN Division and 199th Light Infantry Brigade warn initiatedin the Hat Dich. This mlti-battalion effort, directed against 811-4 andthe 274th VC Regiments ws scheduled to continue until early Janumz7.The UTAhF also concentrated on Doan 10 forces in the lower Mhon fract-Rung Sat. Tw o operations, in coordination with Rung Sat Secret ZonesCapital Military District and li t AT? forces were conducted. The 1stAT?, in addition to Pimoc Tu r Province, extended its ovea of responsibilityinto southeastern Bien Ha Province. The 3d Mobile Strike Force Campoperated in W ar Zone D a& W in Phuoc Long Province. In October the 5thMobile Strike Force Camp, with two battaliona, deployed from IICTZ andinitiated operations In War Zone C. Operations "Giant Slingshot",9 aneffort by US and VI Navy elemennts to interdict enecW movement on inlandwaterways continued on the Tom Co Dong, Van Co Toys and Saigon Rivers."Ibag Tien", a concept designed to "marry up", IIFFORCWf and RYNA unitson an extended basis to conduct combined operations, proved highlysuccessful and continued* At the close of the reporting period, IIMIRCBT combat operations and quick reaction to intelligence continuedto hurt the ability of the enedy to wage large scale offensive actions.(b) Results of operations in III CTZ.

.1 Significant results of thiited States and Free World MilitaryAssistance Forces (t3/NK4) participation in Campaign Toan Thanhp Phasenip during Augut, September, and October were 494 US/NMAP killed (451US, 9 Autralians, and 34-Thai.); 4,334 wounded or missing (4,095 UB, 77Australians, and 162 Thais); 13,240 eneW killed; and 1,107 Prisoners.In addition, em W losses Included 2,911 small arm; 407 crew servwdweaPOns; 383P541 rounds of small arm ammunition; 10,074 high explosiverounds; 214 rockets; 887 mines; 5,880 grenades; end 199.42 tons of riceeither captured or destroyed.2 Cumulative results of Campaign Toan Thongs Phase U11, which wa sterminated effective 2400 hour on 31 October 1969, were 2,037 N/F'MF

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CONFIDENTIALAwCcMW-SUJWo Operational bport Lessons-Learned of Headquartor, 11 FieldForce Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(R2) (U)killed (1,926 US, 35 Australians and Now Zealandere, and 76 Thali);14,880 wounded or missing (13,874 US, 291 Australians and New Zealanders,ml 715 Tham); 34,630 onew killed; and 1,955 prisoners. Enmv lossesIacluded 7,935 small arm; 1717 crew served weapons; 1,281,663 roundsof small arm ammunition; 36,528 high explosive rounds; 254 rockets;3,218 mines; 18,754 grenades; and 977 tons of rice either captured ordestroyed.

(2) Summary of Combat Operations.(a) lot Infantry Division. lot Infantry Division operations duringthe quarter were cbaraoteriaed by the use of sell unit ambush, groundreOaOWisae, and airiobilo techniques supported by the integration ofall available target acquisition, mobile, artillery, and air assets.

Riverine, land olearing, and air cavalry operations supported by groundmaneuver forces succeeded in further attriting enesa main and local forceelements. The division continued to participate in Campaign TOn Thangduring the reporting period. Operation Strangle, which began on 21July, continued into the period and terminated 21 September. This op-eration was conducted In western Binh Duong Province with the objectiveof neutralizing Sub Region 1 forces in the Iron Triangle and the Trap-esoid by interdioting supply routes, cutting the flow of replacements,'and destroying base camps. The operation was conducted using the 2-16thInfntryp the 1-28th Infantry the 2-28th Infantry, the 1-4th Cavalry,the 2-2d Infantry (Iechanied , B/2-34th Armor, elements of the 8th ARVVRegiment, and US and Vietnamese naval forces. The operation resulted in414 ensi eliminated, consistig of 365 killed, 35 prisoners, and 14rallierse Operation Thunder Run, a 3d Brigade operation, was initiatedon 12 August to counter an inereased enecW threat in northern Binh LongProvince. This threat necessitated the division assuming an additional17 kilometer section of the QL 13 road security as 1st Cavalry Division(AM) forces countered the enea threat in the north. On 21 SeptemberOperation Door Forward (Phase I) commenced. It involved all li tDivision elements and the OPCON units of the 1-505th Airborne Infantryand of the 2-11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The objectives of thisoperation were to destroy NVA/VC forces within the area of interest,to assist in upgrading of ARVI/YN forces, and to establish an overwatchresponsibility for the pacification program throughout the area ofinterests The operation included the lot and 3d Brigades in Dong Tien(Progress Together) operations with the 8th ARVN Regiment in northernBinh Duong Province against SR-1 and to the east of QL 13 against theone Kai Regiment. The 2d Brigade, in Dong Tien operations with the7th Regiment in southern and eastern Binh Duong Province, was targeted

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AVFBC-Rik -HSMRB,, g Operational Report essons-fearned of Headquarters, II FieldFore Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCs CSFOR-65(R2) (U)aainst the K-I Battalion, t,,e Dong Nai Regiment, the 2d Quyet ThagBattalion. Iand clearing operations continued during the quarter asdid riverine operations along the Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers. InSeptember the division established a Target Iestruction Section (TDS)within it s operations center in order to analyze all available in-telligence In an effort to eliminate lucrative enevr targets. Th e sectionwas organized to analyze contact, agent, radar, and reconnaissancereports and to analyze patterns of sensor activities which developed.Collocated with the 02 and G3 Air, the fire support element, an d 4.heArmy aviation element, the TIS recommended employment an d coordinatedthe use of assets to include artillery, tactical air, and ground andnaval forces. Some of the significant contacts during the quarterfollow. On 12 August at 1530 hours approximately 5 kilometers southof Ap Due (XT768761), a contact by the 2-2d Infantry (Y) esulted in54 enemy killed and 2 prisoners. Friendly losses were 2 US kil led and2 wounded. On 24 August at 1556 hours approximately 3 kilometers south-east of Ap So Ba u No (72575365), the 2-28th Infantry cortacted an enemyforce resulting in 28 enea killed with 6 S wounded. At 1100 hours on6 September approximately 5 kilometers north of Chom Thanh (XT763680)pelements of the 3d Brigade made contact with an enemy force of unknownsize. Results were 55 enesw killed and 4 prisoners, 3 crew servedweapons, 1,00C rounds of small are. aunmnition, 49 grenades, 11 HErounds, and 8 small arms captured. Friendly casualties were 1 US killedand 7 wounded. The seal of Phu Hos Dong from 15 to 26 September was oneof the oost significant operations conducted during the period. Thiscombined seal by elements of the 2d Brigade, the 7th ARVW Regiment, andGVN foroes of Phu Eoa District included elements of four infantrybattalions. Payops throughout the seal was used extensively. The sealresulted in 23 enemy killed, 16 oioChanh an d 17 prisoners, 32 individualweapons, 6 crew served weapons, and significant quantities of war materielcaptured* At 0015 hours on 22 September in the vicinity of X. Bung Binh( 559350), a contact by the 2-28th Infantry resulted in 25 enemy killedwith no friendly casualties.

(b) lo t Cavalry Division (AM)* Operations during the qutrer wereinterdictory in nature, characterized by the exploitation of B-52 strikesand the ihcreaaed employment of small unit day and night ambushes. Com.bat assaults followed by extensive ground reconnaissance operations provedeffective In disrupting emW infiltration routes, discovering and elin-nating eneW cashes, and innlioting casualties on the enes . The divisionwas orgunisd with the lt and 2d Brigades in War Zone C, the 11th ACR(minus one squa r ) in Binh lon Provinee, and the 3d Brigade in PluocLong Province. The lot Brigade operations were targeted against units

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ATFBC-RE-HSUBEt Operational Report Lessons-learned of feadquarters, II Field

Force Vietnm, Period Wnding 31 October 1969, RC S CSFOR-65(B2) (U)of the lot NVA Division and the 82d and 50th Rear Service Groups withpriority of effort directed toward the reduction of base areas, cachesites, and the interdiction of eneMy lines of comunication, The 11thACR continued combined operations with the 9th ARV Regiment and the 5thARVN Division. Priority of effort was directed against cache sites,against enesW local forces in the An Loc, Leo Nih, and Quan Lo i area,and toward the interdiction of enemy units moving from base areas 350 and352 in northern and western Bnh Long Province. The 2d Brigade operatedagainst elements of the 5th VC Division in the eastern portion of FhuocLong Province with priority of effort directed toward the interdictionof the Ada&m Road complex and toward the elimination of the D/168th VClocal fore and the Song Be battalions. Ephasis was placed on combinedoperations with RY/P units stressing increased night ambush positionsin the vicinity of villages and hamlets to enhance security of theseareola The 3d Brigade was targeted against elemnts of the 7th NV ADivision, local and main foroe VC units and rear service elements op-orating in Binh Long Province and along Serges J=u4ge Highway.Psychological operations supported three major campaigns during thereporting period. These were Family Tree, Exploiter, and AcceleratedChieu Beb. These campaigns resulted in 128 returnees to GVN and 11returnees rallying to US forces in the division area of operations. On4 August at 0842 hours arproximately 7 kilometers north of Katum(X?332978), a contact by the 1-9th Cavalry resulted in 23 enezr killedad 5 smafl arm destroyed. There were no friendly casualties. On 9August at 1145 hours in the vicinity of teo Thanh (XU595065), a contactby the 1-9th Cavalry resulted in 21 enemy killed with no friendlycasualties. On 10 August at 1310 hours in the vicinity of Ap Ta ThieKro. (XT622972), a contact by elements of the 11th Armored CavalryRegiment resulted in 23 aenmy killed and 8 prisoners. There were 5tM wounded. Cn 11 kugust at 0300 home in the vicinity of LZ Becky,a 2-8th Cavalry contact resulted in 17 enemy killed and 5 crew servedwepoe 26 HE roumd5, 10 rounds of small arm amunition, and 19 0grenades captured. Friendly losses were 4 US killed and 14 wounded.Between 0100 and C200 hours on 12 August the enerl initiated attacksagainst M5's Becky, Sidewinderp Aspen, and Quan Loi base camp.Sporadic contact coatined at F18 Becky until 0450 hours. Th e enemywa s engaged with organic weapons, artillery, Shadow, and Night Hawk,resulting In 54 enem killed and I prisoner* Friendly losses were 8M killed and 39 wounded. During the attack on F3 B Sidewinder friendlyforoes wee supported by artillery and light fire team. C/1-11thCavalry moved from F8 Aspen during the attack to support the 2-11thCavalry at M83 Sidevinder. The enemy withdrew at 0400 hours leaving78 killed, 3 prisoners, and 4 EoL Chanh. There was one US wounded.

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CONFIDENTIALAVFBC-IH-ES1MhJMl? Operational Report Ifilsona-Lsawmd of ibadquarters, nI fieldForce Vietnam, Period Enidizi 31 October 19699 RCS cSFOR-65(R2) (UT)Th e attack at Quan [ci base camp began at 0107 hours with 920W mortarand rocket propelled grenade fir., followed at 0140 how$s by a groundprobe on the southeast Olde Of tim perimeter, and at 0358 houme by 1070rocket fire. ?im eneW broke contact and witdrew to the mouth at 0430hours. Results of the contact were 50 enemy killed and 9 prisoners.Friendly losses vere 7 US killed and 45 wounded. On 12 August at 1300hours, 3/2-11th Cavalry and 1/2-11th Cavalry made contact with the re-treating enexy in the vicinity of Ap Due, Thinh (XT720824). The *enWwas engaged with organic weapons supported by a light fire team andtactical air. Results of the contact were 85 enemy killed with friendlylosse of 5 US killed and 42 wounded. On 12 August at 0215 hours in thevicinity of Ap Soc Xiem (X!845894)9 a contact by elements of the 3dBrigade resulted in 23 emnw killed and 3 small arm and 2 crew servedweapons oaptured. Friendly losses were I US killed and 14 wounded., On12 Auguat at 0140 how*e in the vicinity of M5 Aspen, a contact by the2-11th Cavlry resulted in 32 enm killed and I prisoner, 5 salal amweapons, 4 crew served weapons, 73 HE rounda, and 1 rocket captured*Fiendly losses were I US killed and 19 wounded. On 12 August at 0910hours approximately 12 kilometers southeast of Prek Kiok (XT412732)# the1-12th Cavalry located 15 enovq killed and I crew served and 2 smallarm weapons. On 12 Aug a,.t,he lot Cavalry Division accouted for 452enezW killed. On 13 Avgust at 1206 hours in thin vicinity of loo Thien(XU695087), a contact by the 1-11th Cavalry resulted in 77 oeqr killedand 26 EW ruando, 20~ small am weapons and 7 or%'i served weaponscaptured. Friendly losses were 2 US killed and 6 wounded* On 13 Augustthe 1st Cavalry Division accounted for 148 enemy killed. During theperiod of 12-14 Auguist the enemy suffered 76 1 killed while friendlylosses were 36 US killed. EnemW activity decreased after 14 August %aconsisted generally of indirect fire attacks. On 16 August at 0645hours ap:xoxiiuately 10 kilometers southeast of Prek n.ok (XT328779),2-8th Cavalry contact resulted in 25 oneqw killed with 1 US killed and3 wounded. On 23 August in the vicinity of Phum Tate* (X0678082)9 the1-11th Cavalry 2 dcated 40 enemy killed. On 5 September the 2-8thCavalry at 7' Ike received an Indirect fire attack followed by a groundprobe from a, estimated reinforced enemy company. The enemy was engagedwith organic veapon., artillery, and tactical air. Results of thne con-tact were 46 eneW killed with 1 prisoner# 24 AK-47'sp and assortedammunition capturoe Friendly losses were 1 US killed and 33 wounded.At 1615 hours an 5 September in the vicinity of An Ina (Xr732899)9 acontact by the 1.16th Infantry (M) resulted in 40 eniWr killed. Friendlycasualties were 2 US killed and 25 wounded. At 090 hours on 6 Septemberin the vicinity of lao Thien (XU699081), a contact by 1-11th Cavalry re-sulted In 55 oemW killed and 5 prisoners aW 2 small ara-i captured.

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SUBJCTt Operational blport Isason-Iarned of Headquarterg II FieldForce Vietnan, Period Ending 31 October 1969, JtCS CSFOR-65(B2) (U)Friendly losses vane 1 US killed and 14 wounded. At 1515 hours on 7September in the vicinity of Xa . Minh Duec (XY708820)p a contact by the3-11th Cavalry resulted in 32 enemy killed and 2 crew served weapons and1 gs ar 10 weapon captured. Friendly casualties were 1 US killed and5 wounded. On 10 September in the vicinity of Lang Nam (XT713836)o the3-11th Cavalry located 28 eneqW killed and captured 1 prisoner, 16 WEVound.., I small armn weapon, and i crew served weapon. At 0005 hoursOn 14 September in the vicinity of LZ Ike, a 2-8th Cavalry contact re-sulted in 34 ensaW killed and 1 prisoner, 7 small ars, 3 crew servdweapons, 5 rockets, 40 M1 oundu, and 450 rounds of small armsaumitidi captured. Friendly casualties were 14 US wounded* On 28October at 0955 hours approximate3.y 16 kilometers east of Katum (AT-485e8), a contact by 1-9th Air Cavalry resulted in 17 enemy killed.There were no friendly casualties.

(o) 25th Infantry Division. The division continued operations inTO A Thftn Phase III during the reporting period. At the beginning oftbhi relrting period the deployment of forces remained the sawe an atthe end of the previous period. On 8 August the lot Infantry Divisionassumed responsibility for the majority of the Phu Nia,District and thePhu Ciacag and Ba Bsp bridges. Within the division a minor boundarychenge affecting the 2d Brigi~de took places The 1ot Brigade continuedombined operations with ARVI airborne, PF/PP9 and CIDG units with theVietnamese undertaking more diversified operations throughout the area,of operations. During the quarter the 2d Brigade intensified its effortseAsinst the Cu, Cki and frang Bang District local force and the Viet Conginfrastruoture and greatly limited the enea~ls use of his base camps,staging areas, and resupply areas in the lower Boi loi Woods, theCitadel, end the Filhol. The 3d Brigade emphasized the pacificationrole during the quarter. Mixod stationing of one US platoon with oneor more R? platoons wes attempted during the quarter. The relativelyheavy concentration of government forces coupled with the relativelysecure hamlet evaluation status for all hamlets and villages permittedthe brigade to operate in smaller size units. Mobile patrol bases con-sisting of a rifle company were positioned in rural development targetareas and operated well with minimm guidance. Operations during thequarter were directed to finding and engaging small eneaW groups.During the reporting period operations were conducted to deny the eneqwthe use of Nui Ba De n as a sanctuary* Elements Of the 4-2 3d Infantry(muchanized), the 2-34th Armor, and an ARVN airborne battalion appliedconstant pressure on ensm' forces on the mountain. The ground forceswere supported by heavy artillary, air boiibardments, and the use of CSpa. Psychological operations were conducted in support of tactical32

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CONFIDENTIALAVFC-BE-HSJECT, Opamtiomal bport Lessono-Leamed of Bhadquartero, II FielForce Vietnam, Period Nodin 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(B2) (U)operation@ and the psofiation program Special emphasis was placed onrapid response to intelligence targets and coordination of pyohologicalwarfare activities with tactical operations Government operations weresupported by dissemination of Information developed by psyops operationsin conjunction with Ibdical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP). DCAP wasthe most effective oivic action activit. It raised health standards andalso provided a mans through which intelligence gathering and peyopecould be conducted. On 12 August at 0710 hours in the vicinity of ApGiong Gong (zT363147), a contact by the 2-27th Infantry resulted in 57em*r killed and 13 crew served weapons, 14 sall arm, 105 1W rounds,and 2,000 rounds of small arm ananition captured. Friendly losseswere 7 US killed and 18wounded. On 13 August at 2315 hous in thevicinity of Den Co oi (XT141434), elements of the lot Brigade cam tothe assistance of the let ARVI Airborne Battalion, which was underattack, by providing air assets an d artillery support. At first light,A/3-22d Infantry was lifted into a blocking position. The eneW attackedagain on the night of 14 August. On the morning of 15 August, US and ARVNtroops assaulted to the southwest of the airborne coumand post. The re-sults of the eeagement were 48 ensaW killed with friendly casualties of2 US killed and 3 wounded. On 16 August at 1325 hours in the vicinityof Pbum Xosi (XT095433), a contact by the 3-22d Infantry resulted in 19enem killed an d 500 rounds 6f smell arm amunition destroyed. Therewere no friendly casualties. On 17 August at 0325 hours in the vicinityof FSB St Barbara (V!272662), a contact by 3-22d Infantry resulted in 21ensy killed and 3 US killed and 8 wounded. On 19 August at 0945 hoursin the vicinity of Ap Doi lo i (X52o337), a contact by the 2-22d Infantry(14) resulted in 25 enm killed and 1 prisoners Friendly losses were 5US killed and 6 wounded. On 20 August at 1112 hours in the vicinity ofAp Phuoo Ruh (766M06), & contact by elemnts of the 3d Brigado, 9t bInfantry Division resulted in 35 en killed with I US killed and 2wounded. On 21 August at 0150 hours In the vicinity of Ao Do Len (Xl-296551), a contact by the 4-23d Infantry resulted in 41 eneor killedand 3 Prisoners, 4 small arm weapons, 3 crew served weaSpon, 4 RErounds, And 4 grenades captured Friendly losses were 6 US woundedand 2 oam d personnel oarriers danaged. On 24 August at 1204 hows inthe vicinity of Ap Trta (X640247), elemnts of the 2d Brigade contactedan enoi farme of unknow sse. Results of the contact were 48 enoWkilled with I prisoner, 23 sull am, 4 grenades, ad I crew servedweapon captured. Friendly casualties were 2 US killed and 4 woundedwith 2 helicopters dgaed, At 0745 hours on 5 September approzimatel3 kilomtoe otheast of 3.1 Ba Den (XT292563), a 4-23d Infantry (M)ecutet resulted in 30 eom" killed with 1 US killed. At 1415 hours on6 Septeer in the vicinity of Val Be De n (XY300575), in 4-23d Infantry

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AVBC-RE-HSUBJ'ICT: Operational Report Lessons-Learned of Headquarters, II FieldForce Vietnam, ieriod Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(2) (U)(M) contact, 27 eneiv were killed. At 0950 hours on 11 September inthe vicinity of Nui Ba Dan (XT299569), a contact by the 4-23d Infantry(M) resulted in 49 ene, killed with friendly casualties of 2 US killedand 5 wounded. On 12 September in h. - vicinity of Ap An Thoi (XT515205),a contact by D/2-12th Infantry resulted in 33 enemy killed with friendlycasualties of 1 US wounded. At 1530 hours on 15 September in the vicinityof X. Go Noi (XT597227), a contact by the 2-14th Infantry resulted in 36enemy killed and 2 H,-,ounds and 15 small same destroyed. There were nofriendly casualties. On 26 September, A/B/2-12th Infantry conducted acombat assault in the vicinity of the Boi Loi Woods and encountered anestimated en V comparq. Results were 30 enemy killed and 10 small armsweapons destroyed. Friendly casualties were 1 US killed and 4 wounded.On 15 October in the vicinity of X. Bung Binh (XT543347), a contact byelements of the 2d Brigade located 25 enemy killed. On 24 October at1240 hours in the vicinity of Xe Ben Dong (x1576304), a contact byelements of the 2d Brigade resulted in 3 enem~y killed and 15 small armscaptured. Friendly casualties were 9 US killed and 12 wounded.

(d) 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. The brigade continuedOPCON to the 25th Infantry Division during th e reporting ,*riod. Thebrigade continued operations, in Long An Province, with responsibilityfo r the security of highways 4, 18, and 23 and for the local pacificationprogram. Emphasis during the quarter was placed on psyops, particularlyquick reaction operations. The Family Tree Psyop Campaign was conductedwhenever the parent enemy unit could be identified. In this campaign,accurate onerq casualty figures were publicized to the SR-3 command bymeans of loudspeakers or leaflet drops. As enemy units in most instancesdo not report heavy casualties, this operation was designed to produceconflict within the oneumr command. Psyrops operations were also inte-,7ated with civic action operations during the conduct of MDCAPS,ICAPS, and NITECAPS. During the month of August the brigade killed 453eneaW and eaptured 29 prisoners# 8 crew served weapons, 10 1 small arm,and 13 rockets. The most significant contact took place on 3 August.At 1155 hours, the 190th Assault H