23
Agriculture and economic development in Europe 1870-1939 French studies, Nadine Vivier French overall economic development was lying behind England’s, with its earlier and faster industrialisation. In particular, French agricultural model was considered to be less advanced than the British one. Actually, this impression of economists of the time is confirmed by the comparative calculations. 1 Its GDP was rising more slowly and its rural population remained greater. Many economists considered the weight of the agricultural sector to have impeded the evolution of economical structures. The ratio of agricultural and non agricultural (industry + tertiary) growth rate was 0,67 for the period 1800-1860, 0,1 for 1865-1890, 0,5 for 1890-1938 (time of WWI non included) and 0,67 for 1950-1990. 2 Historians have blamed this situation on the peasants’ routine, conservatism and archaism for this. They were actually only echoing general preconceived ideas, relayed at length since 1750 by urban elites and administrators. The written reports of prefects and of Parisian administrators demonstrate how their judgement was always influenced by the idea that progress could come from the top only, i.e. the large cities, and definitely not from the farmers themselves. This theory was even reinforced at the end of the XIX th century when conservative big landowners tried to obtain political mandates: they then emphasised their role by putting forward all they were bringing to the poor backward peasants. All this literature continues to influence historians, all the more that it corresponds to general public “idées recues”. Peasants’ alleged responsibility is all the more heavy that the French have long been aware of the important role they played in the French nation. In 1872, their role was indeed very important. The rural population (i.e. living in towns with a total population with fewer than 2,000 inhabitants) represented 69% of the total population and was to become inferior to the urban population only in 1930. The number of farmers in the active population decreased progressively, from 51% in 1872 down to 45% in 1896, 32% in 1936 and 10% in 1975. Also, from 1880, the share of the revenues from agriculture in the gross domestic product (GDP) started its relative decline: from 35%-38% in the 1860s, down to 32% in 1880, 21% in 1930 and less than 10% in 1960. These figures notwithstanding, society still has an over-inflated view of the importance of agriculture in the country. Despite the reality of the figures on paper, the rural world is still important in our industrialised society. Customarily, the French have always considered their country to be more rural than it really is. Historical research has suffered from this vision of the status of agriculture, disconnected from reality. This vision had also a long lasting impact on politicians, who made a point in addressing these issues. As a consequence of this constant scrutiny on agriculture development since 1750, literacy has been very abundant. 3 The national inquiries of 1852, 1862, 1882, 1892 and 1929, and the annual agricultural statistics published since 1852 have been used as the basis for production and productivity calculation. Partial estimates have been made by statisticians in the XIX th century (Levasseur, Lavergne,…) and then by economists during the XX th century (Francois Simiand then Mayer, Sauvy, Brousse and Pellier). After 1945, the Institut of Science économique appliquée (ISEA) undertook an important team work around Marczewski, Markovitch et Toutain to put together 1 O’Brien & Prados, 1992:518. 2 Toutain, 1993:18 3 cf. Barral Pierre, in Braudel et Labrousse, 1982, t.IV, p. 31 IEHC 2006 Helsinki Session 60

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Page 1: IEHC 2006 Helsinki Session 601865-1890, 0,5 for 1890-1938 (time of WWI non included) and 0,67 for 1950-1990.2 Historians have blamed this situation on the peasants’ routine, conservatism

Agriculture and economic development in Europe 1870-1939

French studies, Nadine Vivier French overall economic development was lying behind England’s, with its earlier and

faster industrialisation. In particular, French agricultural model was considered to be less advanced than the British one. Actually, this impression of economists of the time is confirmed by the comparative calculations.1 Its GDP was rising more slowly and its rural population remained greater. Many economists considered the weight of the agricultural sector to have impeded the evolution of economical structures. The ratio of agricultural and non agricultural (industry + tertiary) growth rate was 0,67 for the period 1800-1860, 0,1 for 1865-1890, 0,5 for 1890-1938 (time of WWI non included) and 0,67 for 1950-1990.2

Historians have blamed this situation on the peasants’ routine, conservatism and

archaism for this. They were actually only echoing general preconceived ideas, relayed at length since 1750 by urban elites and administrators. The written reports of prefects and of Parisian administrators demonstrate how their judgement was always influenced by the idea that progress could come from the top only, i.e. the large cities, and definitely not from the farmers themselves. This theory was even reinforced at the end of the XIXth century when conservative big landowners tried to obtain political mandates: they then emphasised their role by putting forward all they were bringing to the poor backward peasants. All this literature continues to influence historians, all the more that it corresponds to general public “idées recues”.

Peasants’ alleged responsibility is all the more heavy that the French have long been aware of the important role they played in the French nation. In 1872, their role was indeed very important. The rural population (i.e. living in towns with a total population with fewer than 2,000 inhabitants) represented 69% of the total population and was to become inferior to the urban population only in 1930. The number of farmers in the active population decreased progressively, from 51% in 1872 down to 45% in 1896, 32% in 1936 and 10% in 1975. Also, from 1880, the share of the revenues from agriculture in the gross domestic product (GDP) started its relative decline: from 35%-38% in the 1860s, down to 32% in 1880, 21% in 1930 and less than 10% in 1960. These figures notwithstanding, society still has an over-inflated view of the importance of agriculture in the country. Despite the reality of the figures on paper, the rural world is still important in our industrialised society. Customarily, the French have always considered their country to be more rural than it really is. Historical research has suffered from this vision of the status of agriculture, disconnected from reality. This vision had also a long lasting impact on politicians, who made a point in addressing these issues. As a consequence of this constant scrutiny on agriculture development since 1750, literacy has been very abundant. 3

The national inquiries of 1852, 1862, 1882, 1892 and 1929, and the annual agricultural statistics published since 1852 have been used as the basis for production and productivity calculation. Partial estimates have been made by statisticians in the XIXth century (Levasseur, Lavergne,…) and then by economists during the XXth century (Francois Simiand then Mayer, Sauvy, Brousse and Pellier). After 1945, the Institut of Science économique appliquée (ISEA) undertook an important team work around Marczewski, Markovitch et Toutain to put together 1 O’Brien & Prados, 1992:518. 2 Toutain, 1993:18 3 cf. Barral Pierre, in Braudel et Labrousse, 1982, t.IV, p. 31

IEHC 2006 Helsinki Session 60

Page 2: IEHC 2006 Helsinki Session 601865-1890, 0,5 for 1890-1938 (time of WWI non included) and 0,67 for 1950-1990.2 Historians have blamed this situation on the peasants’ routine, conservatism

coherent series of each sector’s GDP (agriculture, industry and services). The historian Lévy-Leboyer and the economist Bourguignon elaborated also their own set of numbers. These results led to a controversy and Toutain managed year after year to revise his figures. We can’t go into the details of the index construction, rarely disclosed by their authors. Recent economists works either refer to Toutain4, or to the two series of index without chosing between them (ex: Marchand and Thélot, 1991:154). They are both based on the same chronology and the only real difference between the two series concerns the period of 1870s .

Annual growth rate – Figures derived from index of A Toutain (1987), B Lévy-Leboyer et Bourguignon (1985) and C Carré-Dubois-Malinvaud (1972)

Agriculture

Average annual growth rates

Whole economy Average annual growth rates

A B A B 1851-1866 0,7 1,5 2,0 2,0 1866-1881 -0,6 0,5 1,0 1,2 1881-1896 1,1 0,7 1,5 0,4 1896-1911 0,6 0,6 1,5 1,7 C C 1921-1931 1,2 3,6 1931-1949 0,8 0,9 1949-1961 3,6 4,9 1961-1973 2,0 5,4 1973-1979 0,6 2,8 1979-1984 2,5 1,5 1984-1989 1,1 2,4

While figures vary, their interpretation is also a heavily debated subject. The 1870-

1939 crisis period has been key, and understanding it is a prerequisite to interpreting the agriculture evolution over the 1870-19740 period. In fact, after a high-growth and modernisation period from the beginning of the XIXth century until about 1870, Great Depression hit agriculture: international competition put it in a difficult situation and protectionist measures were put in place. From then on, agriculture developed much slower than the other sectors (industry and service). For some (Asselain, Lévy-Leboyer, Beltran and Griset5) the agricultural sector, sheltered behind its trade barriers, is responsible for the global economical backwardness. Retarded sector, the agriculture cumulated both too much labour and too small farms. The French did not invest enough in agriculture for several reasons: they rather invested their money either in the industry, or abroad; or they locked their money up simply out of conservatism, or in the acquisition of new land. Conservative mentality of farmers is always put forward: their individualist and anti-modernism attitude led to a general opposition to change.

For others (Caron, Toutain, Barral, Postel-Vinay), the end of the century’s stagnation is neither opposition to progress, nor drowsiness. The routine was never predominant. The slow restructuring of agriculture carried on, in an increasingly difficult environment... “From

4 Ex. : O’Brien & Prados 5 In students textbooks, collection Cursus, A. Colin, Beltran et Griset, L'économie française, 2 volumes, 1994

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driver of the growth in the first two thirds of the XIXth century, agriculture went then through a period of slow adaptation to new conditions and new markets”.6

This article aims at understanding through a careful analysis of statistical data why

French agriculture experienced difficulties from 1870 to 1939, while the 1830-70 et 1945-75 periods have seen a strong increase in both production, productivity, as well as investments. On the contrary, production stagnated at the end of the XIXe century and increased only very slowly in the first half of the XXe century due to a lack of investments. Meanwhile however, productivity steadily improved during the first half of XXe century thanks to the reduction in manpower

I. 1870-1896: the great depression

a) The situation of agriculture in 1870 seems prosperous. From the 1840’s, agricultural production has experienced a strong growth period. Only interrupted by small crises due either to bad weather (1845-46, 1853-55) or inability to sell despite a good harvest (1848-52), this growth has been most of the time greater than 1% per year. The development of urbanisation and communication means, as well as the increase in living standard supported demand, leading to agricultural production growth and high prices: increase in the price of cereals (by the middle of the century), of wine (in the 1850s) and of animal products thereafter.

The increase in production was enabled by the extension of cultivated land and the increase in livestock. The fallow decreased in importance, replaced by the crops rotation differing between the regions: artificial fodder and sugar beet in Northern france, potatoes in Brittany, forage in Southern France. Improving soil with marl or lime spread and allowed an increased productivity (for example in Champagne). Stock raising changed from being a secondary activity intended to provide manure, to a production in its own right. Grass surface increased (meadows and fodder). Polyculture including an important part of cereals remained the most frequent one. However, this favourable economic environment encouraged specialisation : rotation of wheat, sugarbeet and sheep raising in the Northern part of the Paris Basin; vineyards in Languedoc and Burgundy; fruits in Rhone valley and Normandy; livestock farming in regions less adapted to cereals growing (Normandy and Limousin). Growth contributed to reduce regional discrepancies : the rich agriculture regions of the North and North-East grew at a slower pace than Brittany, Massif Central, and Southern regions specialised in fruits and vineyards, that benefited from a rapid development. However, the gap remained important between regions of large scale farming (North of Loire), specialised regions and those which tried to specialise but were encountering difficulties, particularly in mountainous regions.

These agricultural progresses required investments. Funds have come both from the farmers’ own savings, constituted thanks to good agricultural prices during the 1850-60 period, and from loans granted by notaries and small local banks (Postel-Vinay, 1997). However, these funds were mainly invested into high potential farms. At the time, economists estimated that the necessary working capital amount was between 150 and 300francs/ha. Farms that had been rewarded in best performance competitions (Primes d’honneur) were run with an average working capital of 800 F/ha.

Productivity of land increased more than work productivity, All testimonies of the agricultural inquiries show the increasing need for workforce in order to face a more intensive

6 Caron, 1981 : 29

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agriculture. The first machines appeared at this period, but consisted mainly of seed dills and threshers. Calculation show a parallel increase in labour and productivity until 1879.

François Bourguignon stated that, during the 1825-59 period, it can be estimated that agriculture contributed by 75% to the general growth of the economy, a figure much higher than its share in the overall domestic product. During the 1887-1913 period on the other hand, the contribution of agriculture to the growth of global development clearly diminished: it can be estimated at about 11%, a figure this time inferior to its weight in the domestic product (i.e. 20%).7

b) La Grande Dépression : a structural crisis According to the traditional thesis, this crisis was triggered by the massive import of American wheat into Europe after the 1879 bad crop. It abruptly put an end to the former growth. Trade tariffs voted in 1885 and 1892 were presented as having enabled agriculture to continue growing; however, a careful analysis of production and productivity figures gives a different view.

As early as at the end of the 1860s, one can actually detect successive phenomenons leading to a structural crisis that started before this inflow of American and Russian wheat. Three types of causes can be distinguished : plants diseases, opening to competition and structural transformation of the industry.8

Accidental diseases affected silkworms in the 1850’s, and French silk thus lost market share. When sericulture finally recovered, they had to compete with cheaper far-eastern silks. The most serious disease has been phylloxera. First appeared around 1863 in Languedoc, phylloxera progressively destroyed vineyards while slowly moving up north, reaching Champagne in the 1890’s. Chemical treatments and drowning were tried against it, but the only efficient solution was digging out and planting new American stocks, resistant to this insect. Considering that wine represented in 1860 the second production in value, one can appreciate the importance of the losses incurred. New plantation costs were high; in Languedoc, it led to concentration : alongside surviving small family farms, large companies established themselves. When the vineyard was reconstituted, production became much too important as the planted species were high-yielding ones. Too abundant crops made price drop, leading to Southern wine-growers’ unrest .

After 1860, the agricultural market was opened more widely and rapidly confronted international competition : the first and very sensitive impact was the inflow of Argentinian wool and US wheat after the transcontinental railway’s construction, it subsequently also affected sugarbeet. Competition particularly affected the large farms of the Parisian basin which had modernised in order to specialise into these sectors (wheat, sugarbeet and sheep farming): sheep farming in Champagne, investments to create sugar refineries in Picardie.

Other productions faced competition from imported products specifically designed to answer the transformation of industrial needs : increasing purchase of cotton, rapidly developping as spinning and weaving get mechanised easily; flax and hemp collapsed whereas their culture was important in the west and north-west regions; increasing weigth of imported oleaginous plants competing against rape seed: groundnut, and palm oil used in the industry and oil for lighting. This particularly impacted the Beauce region, which had chosen a wheat/rape crops rotation model. Chemical dyes slowly replaced dye-producing plants, hence the disappearance of Vaucluse’s garance from 1868 and Toulouse’s pastel from 1883. 7 Lévy-Leboyer et Bourguignon 1985 :219. 8 The first historians who emphasised this issue are Gilles Postel-Vinay, 1991, and Patrick Verley, 1989

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This accumulation of structural crises started in the 1860’s, bothering the population in the 1870’s, and finally exploded with the 1879 cereals bad harvest. It is during the 1875-1895 period that the vegetal production slightly decreased by 0.79% in volume, a drop mainly due to vineyards problems (see table below).

A few productions :

Potatoes (millions of

quintal)

Wheat (millions of

quintal)

Vine (millions of hectolitres)

Sugar beet (millions of

quintal) 1861-65 87,7 76,3 49,8 44,3 1874-78 93,6 78,7 58,7 77,4 (1873) 1889-93 116,5 78,3 32,0 64,8 1909-1913 133,1 88,4 46,4 70,7

Price deflation was general and important. A wheat quintal that often cost more than 30 francs under the Second Empire cost less than 25 francs in 1882 and dropped down to 18.2 francs in 1895. On the other hand, markets for meat and dairy products were good and prices decreased only by 7%. This was due to the fact that demand in vegetal products, and in particular in cereals, stopped growing (bread consumption per person per year : 285 kg in 1865, 296kg in 1885 and 266kg in 1905) while the diversification of diet called for the intoduction of more animal products.

The above description shows that the agricultural crisis was not attributable to international competition only. It was also, and maybe above all, a structural crisis. The 1875-1900 years was a time of major breaking off that totally changed agriculture’s place in French economy and solidarity between agriculture and the rest of the economy ended. It was the time of the completion of setting up an integrated national market, which led to the decline of the craft industry and of the diffuse industry in the countryside as well as of farmers’ seasonal migrations. From then on, plants required full-time workers, as opposed to rural workskhops that closed in the summer.

According to the 1862 agricultural inquiry, 57% of agricultural day labourers also had a job in the industry that could represent on average 155 days a year. On the other hand, the 1860-65 inquiry on the industry showed that 15.4% of the working population in the industry were absent during the 2 to 3 summer months. Thirty years later, the 1892 Office du Travail’s inquiry highlighted only minor variations of plants’ labour.9 This resulted in an important drop in the number of agricultural employees between 1876 and 1896. Farmers multiactivity markedly diminished, surviving only in a few regions (lace from Le Puy, knives from Thiers,…) and one could speak of a ruralisation of the country : after the departure of craftsmen, rural communes became mainly inhabited by farmers, who had now a single job : agriculture.

After 1896, and particularly during the 1903-1909 period (with an annual growth rate

of 1.7%) agriculture recovered thanks to the general economic growth. Urban demand stimulated regions able to answer this demand. Production and productivity increased and prices trend was favourable apart for wine suffering from over-prouction

c) Interpretations and debates

As mentioned above, the interpretation of these figures is controversial. Let us study the influence on the evolution of productivity of trade barriers, investments level and rural depopulation .

9 Marchand et Thélot, 1991 : 136-139

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Protectionnist policy had consequences that remain very controversial. Measures taken by Meline were twofold: on the one hand the customs tariffs meant to soften competition and isolate agriculture from international markets, and on the other hand, measures designed to help in this structural crisis context. They aimed at relaunching credit through the allocation of state subsidies to Credit Agricole in 1879 and the creation in 1894 of local credit funds with limited responsibility. Méline also tried to develop professionnal education for farmers, but attendees never represented more than 1% of each age class.

The tariffs voted in 1885 by the Parliament on Meline’s initiative (a 3francs fee per hl of wheat, progressively increased up to 7f) and in 1892 (extended to other agricultural products) were obtained through lobbyist groups.10 Republicans, first hostile to protectionnism, came to it under pressure from the textile industrialists first and then from large cereals-growing landowners and the majority of landowners who answered the inquiry of 1879. The question remaining open is whether small farmers really wished to have protectionnist tariffs set up? We hardly have any appropriate measurement tool other than the results of the votes to legislative elections, however these never address this issue only and it must be kept in mind that Meline’s measures involved elements of structural help.

Custom tariffs led to the temporary decrease in cereals’ imports. Net cereals import rate reached 20% of agricultural product during the 1875-85 period, and dropped down to 15% around 1900, hence a real positive impact on large cereals’ growers.

For some (Levy-Leboyer), these tariffs have negatively impacted agricultural productivity; for others, they helped overcoming the crisis, as they enabled to keep prices superior to world market prices, so that farmers had no interest to either export or produce more than the national demand. Yet, this food national market depended of 3 factors : total population, which was stagnating; food consumption, almost not increasing anymore; and income per non-agricultural people, which in turn depends on the sale of industrial products and public expenses. In these conditions, food market was not expanding and was subject to the global economical environment.

Was the Great Depression simply a period of stagnation of the production and of

cautious withdrawal of agriculture or rather a restructuring period ? Overall, the low agricultural over non-agricultural growth ratio shows that the Great Depression is predominantly a depression of agriculture, while industry kept on growing. However, more than a stagnation period, the following table shows that it was a period of restructuring. (see also table 4)

Differential growth rate per product per year11

Food products Milk and meat Raw materials 1817-21 / 1862-66 + 1, 08 + 1,3 + 1,05 1862-66 / 1892-96 + 0,16 + 1,2 - 1,7 1892-96 /1907-13 + 0,5 + 1,13 - 1,2

Yields progressed slowly. For example, wheat yield increased from about 14 to 15

hl/ha in 1850 to 17.2 lh/ha in 1913. These improved national averages have mainly benefited from the concentration of production in best-yielding regions and the giving up of the exploitation of difficult lands (i.e. no more wheat production in the mountains). Total 10 Cf Pierre Barral, 1968, and the papers in Histoire et Sociétés rurales of Soo-Yun Chun (n°20, 2003, 147-172) and Rita Aldenhoff ( n°21, 2004) 11 Caron, 1981 : 28

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production increased only slowly, as it seamed unneccesary to produce more, given the fact that imports were completing the fullfilment of needs (imports represented 20% of our needs in cereals). France who was in 1860 the second wordwide cereals producer along Russia and behind the US, had far superior production costs and didn’t introduce mechanisation quickly enough.

Reconversion towards fruits and vegetables, meat and dairy products was noticeable, but it happpened progressively. The surface dedicated to cattle went from 8 million ha in 1860 up to 14 million ha in 1910. Specialisation occurred on the basis of the soil and climate’s characteristics, following the same trend initiated in the 1840-70 period. While around 1850 the production of wheat, wine, porks and sheeps was spread over the country, a regional geography appeared by the end of the century. Cereals were concentrated in the Paris basin (Beauce, Picardie and Champagne), vineyards, fruits and vegetables in the South (Languedoc, Provence and Aquitaine) and the livestock farming first developed by the end of the XIXth century in regions were it was already important ( Basse-Normandie, Bretagne and Limousin) and then spread to Franche Comté, Lorraine and Auvergne at the beginning of the XXth century, before reaching Pays de Loire after 1930. The amplitude of variations between the regions, that had reduced during the prosperity period of the 1860s, started to widen again. Modernised regions with large scale farming suffered from the economic stagnation and the lack of capital (Ile de France, Picardie). However, protectionnist measures helped them. On the other hand, backward regions, that tried in the 1860s to progress, didn’t benefit from the same level of help, the Third Republic policy having chosen to favour the large cereals producers.

According to the traditionnal view, farmers have had a tendency to thesaurise or invest

in the acquisition of land instead of modernising their farm. And actually, several studies describe a fund-lacking agriculture, cut from credit facility.12 From 1879, Credit Foncier, a semi-public organisation, got increased ressources and it was able to grant more credit. However, funds were first allocated to face up the losses and the reimbursment of debt incurred during the 1840-65 modernisation period. Indebted farms couldn’t satisfy the service of the debt and numerous lands were sold. On the other hand, credits available in France remained limited. After the 1870-71 war, France had to pay a heavy tribute to Germany, and the national balance of payments encountered problems due to agricultural imports, while the 1882 crisis led to the bankruptcy of banking institutions. French investments into foreign countries during this period also decreased.

Following the Great Depression, investments slowly picked up, while still remaining limited.

Production means (in Billion French Francs) Source : Lévy-Leboyer, 1985, p. 289 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1913

Rural houses

5,5 6,0 6,2 6,8 7,6 7,7

Buildings, equipment

9,7 10,0 7,8 7,6 9,4 10,0

Livestock 4,5 5,6 5,2 5,3 6,0 7,0 Total 19,7 21,6 19,2 19,7 23,0 24,7

12 See Gueslin, 1978, Gilles Postel-Vinay, 1991

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Farmers savings also decreased in the last third of the XIXth century as they utilised

their resources.13 The agrarian structure dominated by small owner-tenants was held responsible for agricultural backwardness as it was always compared to England’s one, whereas it would be more comparable to the German structure. See table 5: distribution of farms

1892 Owner-tenants Tenant farmers Share cropping

% of farms 75 19 6 % of superficie 53 36 11 Put in perspective with the data on available funds, this structure shows that half of the

land was owned by small farmers with limited financial means, all the more that they did not benefit anymore from the injection of supplementary income from rural industries. The other half was owned by important landowners who considered the land to offer limited returns on investment in comparison to other sectors. Between 1896 and 1901, the number of farmers grew while the number of employees decreased: one could think that part of the employees became independent farmers, they had however very limited capital, hence the number of small farms practising polyculture, based on intensive family labour and limited production tools. Surely, this structure wasn’t propitious to economies of scale. Studies have however demonstrated that small farms managed to implement a specialised and high-yielding intensive agriculture.14

This limited availability of funds explains why investments remained weak, with the exception of the planting of the vineyards. Landowners saw their income drop dramatically, and did not invest in agriculture, finding the industry more attractive; farmers could therefore only count on their own resources.

Backwardness of the French agriculture in labour productivity has often been

attributed to a too weak and slow rural depopulation. Too numerous labour in the countryside, and hence a too weak work productivity while migration was not important enough to avoid the increase in industrial wages. (see table 6)

Figures of rural depopulation demonstrate its importance, rural zones having reached the highest pitch of population in 1846. Then, the ratio of rural to urban population decreased constantly despite a higher birth rate for rural population. In the 1850-1875 years, craftsmen were the first to leave for the towns, followed by day workers and day-workers-owners having lost their job in the rural industry. The pace of departures slowed down in 1870-75 because of the war, and then in 1881-86 when the difficulties in the industry and the construction sectors delayed departures. Hence the departure of not-yet active young people, mainly young girls, to look for a job in the town. Regions depopulated at a different pace : Poor agricultural regions, mountains, started to lose population as early as 1846, while rich lands continued to attract labour. By the end of the century, all were sending people to the towns, some seeing their overall population decrease as birth rate wasn’t sufficient to compensate for departure (Normandy) while others benefited from the high birth rate to slightly see their overall population grow (Brittany).15

13 Hubscher, 1979 : 878-79 14 Michel Hau, "La résistance des régions d'agriculture intensive aux crises de la fin du XIXe siècle, le cas de l'Alsace, du Vaucluse et du Bas-Languedoc", Economie rurale, 1988, et Ronald Hubscher, "La petite exploitation en France aux XIXe-XXe siècles" Annales ESC, janvier 1985. 15 Cf. Alain Faure et Jean Claude Farcy, La mobilité d’une génération de Français, INED, 2003

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As a consequence, the part of agricultural workers in the whole active population went from 47% in 1880 to 41% in 1910, a proportion still much more important than in England (8.8% in 1910) but comparable to Germany, Denmark and below Italy and Spain.

The main issue to evaluate accurately the labor productivity is the exact measure of active population. The census of population are reliable, except for the evaluation of active population in agriculture; statisticians of the time thought that it was underestimated. Sometimes, the census took into account the number of persons living from an activity, which meant the whole family of an active man (1856 and 1891) and sometimes the number of persons practising an activity (1851 and 1866 to 1886). In 1881, only the man, chief of the household, was considered as working. Marchand and Thelot attempted to reconstitute the active population profile before 1896. They made two assumptions : i) the number of women/men ratio in the active population remained constant between 1806 and 1956, estimated at 54.7%; and ii) the ratio of active population in the agriculture / rural population remained constant between 1806 and 1911, around 34.9%. No particularly convincing argument was able to either justify or destroy these assumptions. Their figures, presented in the tables, show that the maximum of the agriculture active population was reached by the middle of the XIXth century and decreased progressively thereafter, a result widely accepted today.

Labor productivity grew only by 0.5% per annum between 1860 and 1890, against

1.2% before 1860. It was higher in the North and North-east part of the country (North of the St Malo-Geneva line) while the South and South-west suffered from a recurrent underemployment.16 Land productivity experienced an inflexion as well : 0.2% against 0.8% before. Capital productivity was at this time linked to labor productivity by a 0.7% correlation.

II.

The 1914-1939 period : unsettled economic environment and lack of structural changes The analysis of this period is much less controversial : all agree on the weak growth of

agriculture, isolated from both world markets and development. New hurdles will abruptly put an end to a short recovery period in the 1920’ies.

a) an overview: three periods are clearly identified. 1914-1920. WWI requisitionned animals and mobilised working men. Agriculture

momentarily lost 2 millions workers (and up to 3 millions in 1918), which represented between 38% and 58% of total working men. Women had thus to handle production when animals, transportation means, fertilizers, machines, and spare parts were missing. And during this time, production means deteriorated. Moreover, battles took place on productive fields of the Northern and North-Eastern regions. The toll of the war was thus very heavy for French agriculture. During the following years of rebuilding, 1919-21, prices increased and brought cash to farmers. This was a good period which led population to believe that peasants became richer through the war. They had however paid the heaviest toll to the war with about 50% of

16 Calculus by Toutain, 1993: 280-84

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the total 1,35 million dead and 3,5 million injured, i.e. about 670,000 and 1,75 million respectively.17

The 1920s, and in particular the 1921-26 period, were years of rebuilding and of agricultural production growth: the 1910-13 production level was reached again in 1925-29. As labour diminished, productivity increased. However exchange terms deteriorated with the simultaneous increase in industrial prices and the reduction in agricultural prices worldwide.

The 1930s was a period of crisis. Production kept growing (by 1.2% per year) but prices dropped dramatically: by 53% for vegetal products and 40% for animal products. A wheat quintal went from 179F in 1931 down to 78F in 1935 (Paris stock exchange prices) and wine hectolitre from 183F in 1930 down to 64F in 1935. Overall agricultural prices dropped by 22% during 1933, 16% in 1934 and 42% in 1936. Protecting tariffs increased. According to Alfred Sauvy, this led to a 31% decrease of farmers’ purchasing power, but figures show that this happened progressively : from an index of 100 in 1929, purchasing power went down to 86 in 1930-34 and 67 in 1935.18 And Gilles Postel-Vinay states that the consequences of this drop were partly balanced by the increase of the production. Thus this crisis was not as severe as the great depression of 1880-95.19

b) Productivity of land Farms structure has evolved slowly since the end of the XIXth century and over time,

family-run farms (i.e. farms of 5-40 ha) became dominant : in 1929, they represented 67,1% of the cultivated acreage. The number of both very small farms of less than 5 ha and farms of more than 100 ha diminished. It has to be noted that most of those farms under 5 ha were only gardens belonging to part time workers or to non agricultural workers. Peasants managed to buy these land, first at the end of the XIXth century when funds were injected in the industry rather than the agriculture; and then, more widely after WW1, at a time where land became available following the death of numerous peasants, while the surviving ones benefited from the favorable context of inflation and increase in agricultural prices. This ideal of acceding to the ownership of a family farm was the mainstream ideology under the Third Republic, accepted by all political parties, from the conservatives to the socialists. (see table 5)

In order to compensate for this division of the farms, associations were created in the crisis periods (the 1880s and later in the 1930s) but developped only slowly. Dairy cooperatives were the first created : the association centrale des laiteries coopératives de Charente consisted of 80,000 members in 1913 and managed over 3,5 million hl of milk ; wine cooperatives were created as an answer to overproduction and sales decline : their number went from 92 in 1920 up to 834 in 1939. Finally, cooperatives created to centralise the sale of the cereals developped rapidly, from 650 in 1935 to 1100 in 1939, by which time they were collecting 85% of the traded wheat.

Production grew slowly, at a rate slightly higher than 1% during the 1920s. Cultivated

surface did not extend, but these progresses were enabled by the increased productivity achieved thanks to the selection of high-yielding species and the use of fertilisers (average use was 14 quintal per ha in 1925, i.e about 2% of the production value). For example, the wheat average yield went from 17.2 quintal/hectare in 1909-13 to 19 quintal/hectare in 1932-36 ; over the same period, potatoes went from 85.7 quintal to 110 quintal.

Livestock kept growing and its productivity increased between 1890 and 1930. The weight of animals increased and prices were more favorable. The ratio of the value of animal

17 Becker Jean-Jacques, La France en guerre, 1914-1918, Complexe, 1996. 18 Barral, 1968:220 19 Gilles Postel-Vinay ,1991:80.

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product over the value of the livestock jumped to 0,9 whereas it stayed at 0,7 before 1913.20 Stock raising still was concentrated in a few regions.

The trend of regional specialisation and concentration of production in regions

offering the best yields continued. The dispersion rate of regional growth increased between the two wars. The North and North-east rich regions suffered from the damages of the war and growth remained weak. Meanwhile, poor regions (particularly mountains) become depopulated and the family farms with very limited means favoured the poultry, hives and gardens. Only a few regions, specialised in fruits or livestock farming, continued to grow (Brittany, Aquitaine, Languedoc).

While production grew, demand remained stable. Exports did not recover post 1920 in

a context of low prices on world markets. National market was narrow and lacked dynamism : population stagnated, its consumption reached a pick in 1934 but growth could only be limited. As soon as crop was plentiful, prices dropped and farmers called in the government. Custom duties were raised and imports subjected to quotas. A new policy was defined in order to organise the market, which included measures to reduce production and support of prices for cereals, sugar (1931) and wine (1931). The ONIB (Office National Interprofessionnel du Blé 1936) was responsible for the marketing of the cereals, a decision taken with mixed feelings by the producers: increased security but fear of losing autonomy.

From 1914 onwards, inflation mechanically reduced indebtedness. But the

deterioration of exchange rate between industrial and agricultural prices left the farmers with limited resources. Then in the 1930-38 period, indebtedness grew, reaching 10 billion French francs against 5 billion in 1900 ; however, these funds were used to face the crisis rather than to modernise. The use of credit remained limited: farmers relied principally on Credit Agricole who rapidly became the main financing provider; unofficial and notarial credits decreased dramatically and other banks disregarded agriculture. This lack of capital explains the low investment, hence the slow development. Farmers were therefore not able to constitute savings that could have been invested in the industry. Their investments in farm buildings were almost non-existent, while those dedicated to machineries only represented 2% of the annual production value. In the 1930s, the State provided subsidies for the electrification and by 1937, 96% of the communes were actually wired.

. c) Work Productivity

By and large, work productivity increased by 1.4% per year and 1929, and by 2.5% per year over the 1929-1938 period, the introduction of machines making off for the lack of labour. Active male population reduced (1% per year in the 1920s, only 0,9% in the 1930s) and changed. On one hand, the average age of farmers grew as a consequence of the inexistence of pensions, and of the increasing share of tenant owners. In 1931-36, 21% of men were over 60, with a higher representation in small farms, while the weigth of the over-60 years old in the total active population in France was only of 8% . On the other hand, the number of domestics decreased quickly, all the more that now only few young started under the age of 16 (among domestics only 7% are under 16).

Moreover, wages of day-workers and domestics were low, inferior by one third to industrial ones on average. Louis Goreux states: "Because of higher mobility, regional differences in wages and average output per worker diminished. However, the dispersion of

20 Toutain, 1993: 24.

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average output per worker did not decrease as much as the dispersion of wages; the effect of a better distribution of workers per unit of land was partially offset by an increase in the dispersion of yield per unit of land. It seems that technical improvements in agriculture since 1882 affected mainly high productivity areas, while low productivity areas suffered from capital rationing".21 According to this theory, wages were higher near industrial towns. This explanation seems however to lack accuracy as it does not reflect the diversity of the departments respective evolutions. The countryside near Rouen had a level of agricultural wages inferior to the national average despite the demand in labour from textile manufactures ; on the other hand, the Hautes-Alpes, isolated from large urban centers had to pay high salaries to attract the necessary number of agricultural workers. Postel-Vinay quantified the correlation factor between the variation in the wage bill in France and the variation of agricultural production between 1862 and 1892 around 0,05.22 Depsite the lack of manpower after 1919, mechanisation (mainly animal-tracted) only progressed very slowly, all the more that it was ill-adapted to the small farms. The State itself did not foster mechanisation; on the contrary, men and women were recruited abroad by the government. Agriculture employed 62 117 immigrants by 1919, mainly Spanish. This number increased to 70 911 in 1920, 92 800 in 1930, immigrants coming then mainly from Belgium, Italy, Poland and Czechoslovakia, on the basis of annual contracts. 23 Also, the State didn’t invest in the farmers training.

The importance of wages in the total cost of production diminished because of the decreasing proportion of workers employed. The regional dispersion of output per worker decreased constantly over time.

Conclusion

Agriculture kept playing an important role in the global economic trend until 1940. Although the link was less close than in 1850, harvest remained a major factor in the economic environment, despite progresses of the industry. Marczewski demonstrated that 81% of growth years had been characterized by a growing agricultural product, and 80.5% of recession years were also years of reduced harvests24.

All statistics give evidence that between 1870 and 1940, agriculture underwent heavy difficulties it could not overcome. The Great Depression interrupted a high growth phase : it was as much a structural crisis as one triggered by the import of foreign wheat. From then on, farmers, deprived from access to industrial activities, had to adapt; on the one hand by giving up the production of raw materials (textiles and oil-yielding plants) and reducing the weight of cereals, and on the other hand, favouring stock raising and fruit production, and in parallel replanting vineyards after the phylloxera crisis. The State, under the pressure from conservative big landowners, introduced tariff barriers in order to isolate the French market from foreign markets where prices were much lower. Facing a stagnating domestic market, lacking capital inflow, agriculture only recovered from 1900 to 1913.

WW1 destroyed part of the soils and manpower, and made obsolete the production means. Despite a few good years from 1921 to 1928, dynamism did not come back as agricultural prices decreased while industrial prices increased (scissors effect). The 1930s crisis, although

21 Goreux, 1977 : 60. The conclusions of Toutain are similar, 1993, p. 288 22 Postel-Vinay, 1991, p. 65 ; Vivier, Le Briançonnais rural, Paris, 1992 23 Hubscher, 2005:36 and for female workforce ; Hubscher " Les femmes de l’ombre : migrantes italiennes et polonaises dans l’entre-deux-guerres » in Vivier (dir), Ruralité française et britannique, Rennes, 2005 24 in Toutain, PIB, 1987, p. 37

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less severe than the Great Depression, finished off the decline of agriculture, a now secluded world protected by State subsidies, isolated from general movements of both foreign markets and domestic labour market because of low wages.

What are the reasons behind this lack of dynamism and the slow growth of production and productivity? Reasons most often put forward are: the small family farms, insufficient investment, and slow depopulation. However, one should distinguish the answers between the different periods.

At the end of the XIXth century, the rural society managed to react. Rural depopulation was in fact quite significant and regular, only weakened in years of industrial stagnation. Small intensive holdings could prove very profitable (in soil productivity) when they opt for specialised productions, especially at a time when capital needs are still modest. Farmers didn’t misuse their savings in buying land; they had surely bought land but it seems that farmers were already heavily indebted and lacked capital to finance the modernisation of their production means. Investors favoured industry and demand from foreign countries rather than agriculture for their investments. Agricultural professional training also suffered from insufficient funds; it concerned only a small proportion of farmers.

The situation between the two world wars appears very different. Rural depopulation slowed down, small family farms were largely dominant and investments were almost non-existent. How can one explain these trends? Beyond the economic reasons of market conditions, the trade barriers acting as morphine (Barral, 1968), the main factor is, in our view, the state of the French society. Two main reasons can explain the situation in the 1930s. First, the farmers, bled white by WW1, aged and traumatised, preferred to adopt a subsistence production mode. Second, the dominant ideology, advocated by both the Third Republic and the large landowners, relied on the small farm ideal, as he basis of social stability ; this ideology condemned both indebtedness and rural depopulation. One must not forget that, since the middle of the 19th century, departure to the city has been considered as a plague and people were encouraged to stay in the countryside. Republican politicians saw in the agricultural world a conservative world, very useful as an agent of preservation of social values and they managed to conquer its votes thanks to the introduction of protectionist measures against foreign competition. This agrarian ideology prevailed until 1940 and the idea of the "return to the land" advocated by Marshal Petain in 1940 followed the same tradition. One can wonder about the respective responsibility of the farmers themselves and the decision-makers (big landowners and politicians) in the lack of vitality of agriculture. Nevertheless, French agriculture during the first half of XXth century had also a second aspect which has to be enlightened. It had, since the end of XIXth c., passed a turning point towards modernisation. It was efficient again, on new basis: the workforce was now entirely devoted to agricultural tasks. It lacked only incentive energy. In the 1930s, young farmers created the Jeunesse Agricole Catholique (Catholic Agricultural Youth) movement and led the agricultural revolution after 1945, backed up by a renewed political class.

Bibliography :

Asselain Jean-Claude, Histoire économique de la France du XVIIIe siècle à nos jours, Paris, 1984

Bairoch Paul , L'agriculture des pays développés: 1800 à nos jours : production, productivité, rendements, Paris : Economica, 1999

Barral Pierre, Les agrariens français de Méline à Pisani, Colin, 1968 Boussard Jean-Marc, « Productivité et inflation : le cas de l’agriculture

française, 1960-1982 », Revue d’économie politique, n°1, 1986, p. 13-24

Page 14: IEHC 2006 Helsinki Session 601865-1890, 0,5 for 1890-1938 (time of WWI non included) and 0,67 for 1950-1990.2 Historians have blamed this situation on the peasants’ routine, conservatism

Braudel F. et Labrousse E., (dir), Histoire économique et sociale de la France", tome IV, 1880 à nos jours, PUF, 1982

Brousse et Pellier, Production agricole et consommation alimentaire de la France de 1892 à 1939, Service national des statistiques, institut de conjoncture, étude spéciale n°2, Paris, 1944

Caron François, Histoire économique de la France, XIXe- XXe siècles, Colin, 1981

Carré Jean-Jacques, Dubois Paul, Malinvaud Edmond, La croissance française. Un essai d'analyse économique causale de l'après-guerre, Paris, Seuil, 1972

Duby G. et Wallon A., Histoire de la France rurale, tomes 3 et 4, Seuil, 1976. Tome 3 chapitres de Pierre Barral, tome 4 chapitres de Michel Gervais, Marcel Jollivet et Yves Tavernier

Goreux Louis-Marie, Agricultural productivity and economic development in France, 1852-1950, Arno Press, New York, 1977

Gueslin André, Les origines du Crédit agricole (1840-1914), Nancy, 1978 Hubscher Ronald, "La petite exploitation en France", Annales ESC, janvier

1985 Hubscher Ronald, L'agriculture et la société rurale dans le Pas-de-Calais, du

milieu du XIXe siècle à 1914, Arras, 1979 Hubscher Ronald, L’immigration dans les campagnes françaises aux XIXe et

XXe siècles, Odile Jacob, 2005 Lévy-Leboyer Maurice et Bourguignon François, L'économie française au

XIXe siècle, analyse macro-économique, Economica, 1985 Marchand Olivier et Thélot Claude, Deux siècles de travail en France,

INSEE, 1991 Mélinisme ou protectionnisme, Economie rurale, mars-août 1988 O’Brien Patrick & Prados Leandro, « Agricultural Productivity and European

industrialization, 1890-1980 », Economic History Review, XLV, 3(1992), p. 514-536.

Pinchemel Philippe, Structures sociales de dépopulation rurale dans les campagnes de Picardie de 1836 à 1936, Colin, 1957

Postel-Vinay Gilles, "L'agriculture dans l'économie française. Crises et réinsertion", in Lévy-Leboyer M. et Casanova J-C (dir), Entre l'Etat et le marché, l'économie française des années 1880 à nos jours, Gallimard, 1991

Postel-Vinay Gilles, La terre et l'argent : l'agriculture et le crédit en France du XVIIIe au début du XXe siècle, Paris : A. Michel, 1997

Toutain Jean-Claude, La Production agricole de la France de 1810 à 1990 : croissance, productivité, structures, Cahiers de l’ISMEA, Grenoble, 1993

Toutain Jean-Claude, "Le produit intérieur brut de la France de 1789 à 1982", Economie et sociétés, Cahiers de l'ISEA, XXI, n°5, Grenoble, 1987.

Verley Patrick, Nouvelle histoire de la France contemporaine, 2. L'industrialisation, La Découverte, 1989

Viallon Jean Claude, La croissance agricole en France et en Bourgogne, 1850-1970, Arno Press, New York, 1977

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Table 2 : agricultural outputFinal agricultural outputindice 100= 1905-1913

prices of agricultural

products

gross agricultural output

Growth rate

indice 100= 1905-1913period volume value volume final

agricultural gross

agricultural prices

1815-1824 48.8 32.5 66.8 53.7 0.77 0.75 0.081825-1834 54.3 37.0 68.0 59.9 1.08 1.10 0.181835-1844 62.0 39.4 63.6 67.6 1.33 1.22 -0.671845-1854 69.4 46.3 67.0 74.9 1.14 1.03 0.521855-1864 78.1 68.6 88.0 81.7 1.19 0.87 2.771865-1874 82.3 81.5 99.1 83.2 0.53 0.19 1.191875-1884 81.6 78.4 96.3 79.7 -0.09 -0.43 -0.221885-1894 84.5 71.3 84.4 81.6 0.35 0.23 -1.311895-1904 93.7 76.9 82.1 92.1 1.04 1.29 -0.271905-1913 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.69 0.92 2.091920-1924 101.4 361.9 357.0 99.7 0.10 -0.02 10.281925-1934 113.3 606.3 538.9 109.4 1.48 1.25 5.651935-1938 116.8 613.8 524.0 108.8 0.43 -0.08 -0.40

1950-1954 137.81955-1959 148.81960-1964 180.01965-1969 197.31970-1974 213.71975-1979 208.51980-1984 244.81985-1989 268.0Gross agricultural product is the summ of all the animal and vegetable output, production of food for animals is includedFinal output is the gross output less the consumption for agriculture (seeds, food for animals :fodder, cereals, potatoes)Source : Jean-Claude Toutain, La Production agricole de la France de 1810 à 1990 : croissance, productivité, structures, Cahiers de l’ISMEA, Grenoble, 1993

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France gross agricultural output

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

1835-1844

1865-1874

1895-1904

1925-1934

1950-1954

1965-1969

1980-1984

inde

x 10

0 =

1905

-191

3

volume

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France- Growth rate

-1

-0.5

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

1825-1834

1845-1854

1865-1874

1885-1894

1905-1913

1925-1934

final agricultural outputgross agricultural output

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Table 3 Distribution of land use (cultivated acreage , thousands of ha)1862 1892 1913 1929 1986

Cerealsg 15621 14827 13519 11096 9499land (gardens 21421 23339 18465 19883 18009

fallows 5148 3368 2593 1352 218

woods 9317 9522 9887 10670 14635

meadows 5021 6213 10048 10712 12093cultivated grassland 3159 4101 4118 4566 5086

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Table 4 composition of agrarian output

1850 1900 1930 1990cereals 39 24 15 17fruits and vegetables 6 13 21 12vine 10 10 9 12cultures industrincluding thimber 10 7 7 6total vegetal products 65 55 52 51meat 14 24 25 27dairy products 13 13 15 15industrial products including leather 8 8 7 7total animal products 35 45 47 49

Annual growth rate of vegetal product and animal output

vegetal output animal output

agricultural output

1815-1824 0.80 0.76 0.771825-1834 1.08 1.07 1.081835-1844 1.00 1.94 1.331845-1854 1.04 1.29 1.141855-1864 1.09 1.38 1.191865-1874 0.58 0.43 0.531875-1884 -0.79 0.92 -0.091885-1894 -0.57 1.44 0.351895-1904 0.88 1.21 1.041905-1913 0.22 1.15 0.691920-1924 -0.18 0.32 0.101925-1934 1.19 1.74 1.481935-1938 0.11 0.77 0.43

d'après Toutain, Le produit agricole, 1993, p. 17

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Tab 5 distribution of the number of farms (in %)size (ha) 1 to 5 ha 5 to 10 ha 10 to 40 > 40 ha total number

(thousands)

1862 56.3 19.2 11.3 4.8 32261892 52.7 22.7 12.4 4.0 3471

> 50 ha1929 38.8 24.3 20.1 3.9 29521986 24.0 10.9 17.8 16.8 1020

distribution of the cultivated acreage according to the size of farms (%)size (ha) 1 to 5 ha 5 to 10 ha 10 to 40 > 40 ha total of ha

(thousands)1892 13.8 14.2 33.7 38.3 347201929 9.5 14.0 53.1 23.4 330801986 1.7 2.8 43.4 52.1 28270

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Table 6 A Active population by sector

source : Marchand et Thélot, 1991, p.175Labour force

agricultureindustry and

building services total1866 50.5 28.6 20.9 100.01876 48.7 29.2 22.1 100.01881 46.3 29.7 24.0 100.01886 45.2 29.4 25.4 100.01891 44.1 29.7 26.2 100.01896 42.5 31.4 26.1 100.01901 41.0 31.8 27.2 100.01906 39.9 32.3 27.8 100.01911 38.5 33.1 28.4 100.01921 36.2 33.6 30.2 100.01926 34.1 36.2 29.7 100.01931 31.5 36.6 31.9 100.01936 31.6 33.6 34.8 100.0

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Table 6 B Social structure of workforce: farming populationsource :Olivier Marchand et Claude Thélot, Deux siècles de travail en France, Paris,

INSEE, 1991, p. 182-186

farmers farm workers total men+women men women men women farmers workers total

1866 3425 2430 2550 840 5855 3390 92451876 3310 2346 2318 732 5656 3050 87061881 3340 2369 2203 664 5709 2867 85761886 3425 2431 2094 590 5856 2684 85401891 3393 2407 2030 560 5800 2590 83901896 3444 2443 1869 463 5887 2332 82191901 3475 2464 1708 376 5939 2084 80231906 3428 2431 1688 367 5859 2055 79141911 3367 2390 1634 347 5757 1981 77381921 3127 2218 1527 365 5345 1892 72371926 2973 2109 1451 340 5082 1791 68731931 2784 1976 1361 302 4760 1663 64231936 2640 1874 1292 267 4514 1559 60731954 2322 1636 988 173 3958 1161 51191962 1834 1181 728 98 3015 826 38411968 1515 932 523 61 2447 584 30311975 1085 565 328 43 1650 371 20211982 904 545 255 48 1449 303 1752

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Table 7 Growth of work productivitysource: Marchand et Thélot (1991 : 143).

Calculus made from the indices of GDP given by a=Toutain (1987), b=Lévy-Leboyer et Bourguignon (1985), c= Carré, Dubois et Malinvaud (1972)

périod all the economy agriculture

added value by man

added value by hour worked

added value by man

added value by hour worked

a b a b a b a b1851-1866 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.8 2.5 1.8 2.51866-1881 0.7 0.9 0.8 1.0 -0.1 0.7 -0.1 0.71881-1896 1.1 0.2 1.3 0.4 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.0

c c c c1896-1911 1.2 1.7 1.2 1.41921-1931 3.4 4.0 2.4 2.91931-1949 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.91949-1961 4.7 4.9 6.5 6.81961-1973 4.7 5.4 6.4 6.41973-1979 2.5 3.4 4.0 3.51979-1984 1.8 3.0 5.6 6.11984-1989 2.6 2.8 4.3 5.6