QOS Based Performance Evaluation of Secure

On-Demand Routing Protocols for MANET's

Muhammad N aeemv, Zah ir Ahmed ", Rashid Mahmood'' and Muhammad Ajmal Azad"

"Dept. of Electronic Engineering Intemationallslamic UniversityJ3 Dept. of Computer Science International Islamic University

The Right Connection Pvt. LtdIslamabad , Pakistan

mna 199@gmail.com, zeemunj@gmail.com, rashidmahmood@live.com, majmalazad@hotmail.com

Abstract- With the ongoing progress of Telecommunicationhas increased the want of mobility, wireless or mobile networksand this desire has already swapped the wired networks. Theupcoming networks has totally different infrastructure and hasdifferent protocols and devices. These networks areinfrastructure less and no dedicated protocols or devices arerequired to deploy such networks. The theme of this paper is toevaluate the two secure routing protocols Ariadne and SAODV inthe performance aspects instead of security aspects underRandom Way Point and Manhattan Grid mobility models. Weused and implement the extension of AODV that is Secure Ad­hoc on-Demand Distance Vector routing protocol (SAODV) andthe extension of DSR that is Ariadne in the Network Simulator 2(NS-2). In this paper we compare these protocol on basis offollowing quality of service parameters like delay , jitter, routingoverhead, route acquisition time, throughput, hop count, packetdelivery ratio using manhattan grid and random waypointmobility models. Our main aim is to find out the payload a nodehas to pay to guarantee the good quality of service.

Keywords- MANET, Routing, Security

I. INTRODUCTION

The dictionary meaning of the word "Ad-Hoc" is"specific", "for one specific case", for particular application 'sspecial network. A mobile Ad-Hoc network (MANET) isconsists of mobile nodes and the communication betweenthese nodes took place through wireless links. It is a self­configuring network. Routers are allowed to organizethemselves arbitrarily and to move randomly; hence the rapidand unpredictable change s occur in network's wirelesstopology.

Normally whenever a network is established it requires aninfrastructure that can include switch, routers, base stations,access points etc. but when we talk about MANETs they donot demand any infrastructure. Another characteristic ofMANET's is mobility, all the nodes are allowed to move indifferent dimensions which results in dynamic topology, Sincenodes are moving so they can go out of the range of networkor come in the range of network at any time, a node which ispart of one network at time to can be part of an other networkat time tl.

978-1-4244-5137- 1/10/$26 .00 ©20 1O IEEE

Mostly MANETs are used in search and rescue operationswhere a quick time is required to establish a network. Oneother major application of MANETs is battlefields besides thatMANTE's are also used for meetings , sports stadiums and inPersonal Area Networks. In this paper our focus to comparethese two protocols on those QoS parameters that discussedseparately or ignored by previous authors [6,8-10,13-16]. Thiscomparative analysis of these protocols gave a clear idea whichprotocol performs better in aspects of QoS.

II. ROUTI NG IN AD- HOC N ETWORK

A. Temporally-Ordered Routing Algorithm (TORA)

TaRA can work in environment where mobility is highlydynamic. TaRA's algorithm concept is link reversal, whichhas the feature of loop-free and adaptive distributed routing. Itprovides multiple routes for any required source/destinationpair and that's why it falls in source-initiated category.Localization of control message is the key design of TORA,which adopts topological changes very quickly.

B. Authenticated Routingfor Ad-hoc Network (ARAN)

ARAN main feature is to find and protect from themisbehaving nodes from third party and peers environment. Todo so in an Ad-Hoc network ARAN introduces a minimalsecurity policy to integrate , authenticate and non-repudiation ofmessages. While using ARAN one has to pay less performancecost to achieve high security.

C. Secure Routing Protocol (SRP)

SRP is categorized as an on-demand protocol, whichenables SRP to be very dynamic , self-starting, multi hoprouting to be established when a source and destination want tocommunicate. In SRP all routing packets are of fixed size. Thekey feature of SRP is less consumption of energy at nodesbecause of fewer overheads.

D. Secure Efficient Ad-hoc Distance Vector (SEAD)

SEAD is an extended version of DSDV. In order tomaintain less CPU processing and to be suitable for Denial ofService from attackers some efficient one-way has beenimplemented in SEAD rather than asymmetric cryptographic

ICWCSC 2010X

operation in DSDV. SEAD is robust against attackers in allscenarios where it has been tested so for.

E. Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP)

It is not a separate protocol instead it's a hybrid solutionhaving the advantages of both reactive and proactive schemes.Proactive scheme is used for the discovery of localneighborhoods and for communication between neighborhoodsreactive scheme is used. In MANET the changes in topology,which took place far from neighbors, does not affect thevicinity of a node as most of the communication in MANETtook place within the neighbors.

B. Normalized Routing Overhead

It is defined as the total overhead added during a datapacket transmission. It is calculated as number of routingpackets transmitted during one single transmission of datapacket from source to destination.

C. Average Hop Count

It can be used for path measurement from source todestination during a packet transmission. It can also bedescribed as number of nodes transverse a data packet during atransmission.

III. IMPLEMENTATION

In this section we discussed the implementation detail ofSAODV and Ariadne.

D. End to End Delay

It includes queuing, propagation and processing delays.Delay is mostly considered and becomes important issue in realtime application.

rt

~DelayOfPacketJkfean Delay = .-;...i=---"l'--- _

H. Simulation Parameters

In table 1 we mention the list of simulation parameters.

F. Throughput

It can be expressed as the amount of data communicatesfrom source node to destination node during a specified amountof time.

SIMULATION PARAMETERSTABLE!.

Parameters Name Value

Radio-propagation model Two Ray Ground

Channel type Wireless ChannelMAC type 802.11Network interface type Wireless Physical LayerInterface queue type Drop Tail/Priority QueueRouting Protocols SAODV and AriadneAntenna model Omni-directionalTraffic Type Constant Bit RatePacket size 100 BytesMax Packets 10000X dimension of the Topography 1600Y dimension of the Topography 1600Transmission Range 100mQueue Length 50Simulation time 100 Sec

G. Packet Delivery Ratio

It is equal to the total number of data packets received ondestination node divided by total number of packet send onsource node during a specified time.

E. Jitter

It is a variation (somewhat random) of the latency frompacket to packet. Jitter is most often observed when packetstraverse multiple hops from source to destination. Jitter is alsoconsidering the deviation in the packet latency at the targetnode.

IV. EVULUATION CRITERIA AND SIMULATION PARMETER

We have evaluated the two protocols for following factors:

A. Route Acquisition Time

We can elaborate this concept as total time taken by RouteRequest and the time taken by the respective Route Response.It's describe total time taken by a particular route to establish.

A. Implementation ofSAODV

There is an implementation of SAODV using NetworkSimulator 2 (NS-2) and programming language C and is doneat Upsala University (UD) [5]. It has been used extensively inthe research projects of networks and its worth andperformance improving with the course of time. Theunderlying class hierarchy of the NS-2 has been built in C thatprovides the robustness in the execution of simulations and alsoprovides a reliable base for the simulations made in a relativelyunstable language like Tel or OTc!. The UU implementationcovers the all changes that made in the standard issued by theInternet Engineering Task Force (IETF) in latest draft [5]. Allthe amendments are targeted to achieve better performanceresults with the respect of security as the original version ofSAODV. This implementation covers Cryptography, MessageFormats, Hash and Signature Functions.

B. Implementation ofAriadne

To perform evaluation for our project, we have used theimplementation of Ariadne by Monarch Project people [19].The implementation makes use of TESLA as a broadcastauthentication protocol for the efficient key distribution andkey management. The implementation demands the use ofearlier version of NS-2 i.e. ns-allinone2.1b4a along with theCMU's extensions to the network simulator i.e. emu­extensions. The protocol has been implemented by modifyingthe original DSR implementation files and doesn't exist as anindependent protocol. Using this implementation forsimulations requires having three different files i.e. amovement model file, a communication model file and aprotocol specific file.

V. R ESULT AND DISCUSSIONS

We have performed number of simulations to show theeffectiveness, usefulness and performance of routing protocolsarchitecture. We have run number of simulations with variablenodes and communication flows in each simulation; a nodemay have send data to other node or act as an intermediatenode. Each simulation runs for 100 second. Route AcquisitionTime, Normalized Routing Overhead, Average Hop per Count,Throughput, Jitter and Packet Delivery Ratio, Mean End-to­End Delay is considered to evaluate the performance of theprotocols.

B. Normalized Routing Overhead

The figure 3 and 4 elaborate the normalized routingoverhead of SAODV and Ariadne in manhattans grid andrandom waypoint mobility model respectively. We run thesimulations for 100 seconds with constant traffic. We haveshown the routing packets overhead with respect to number ofnodes. Both graphs illustrate that SAODV routing overheadincreases for both mobility models as the number of nodesincreases and Ariadne routing overhead slightly change asnumber of nodes increases throughout simulation time.SAODV routing overhead mainly due to the lot of routingmessage generated by frequently after route failure.

20

0 -'---- - - - - - - - - - - -

Figure 3. Normalized Routing Overhead in Random way Mobility Model

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Number of Nodes

10

~ 15to....~ 10U..~ 5

A. Route Acquisition Time

The figure I and 2 show average route acquisition time ofSAODV and Ariadne in manhattans grid and random waypointmobility model respectively. We run the simulations for 100seconds with constant traffic. The average route acquisitiontime is measured with respect to number of variable nodes. Thegiven graphs show route acquisition time of Ariadne is lesserthan SAODV with nodes increases in both mobility models . Asshown in given graph SAODV consumes larger time whenevernodes are equal to 10 and it is gradually decreasing as thenumber of nodes increasing from 20-50. The Ariadneperformance is due to a reliable authentication protocol likeTESLA with Ariadne. We have analyzed that an overheadcoupled with SAODV which are hashes or verify existedsignature, processing new signatures and extra time is occurredin link establishment.

10 20 30 40 50

- S AODV

- Aria dne

20

ell 15Q.Oto....e 10ellu

Cii 50-

0

0 10 20 30 40 50

Number of Nodes

- S AODV

- Aria dne

•••••

0 .12

0.1

0 .08

0 .06

0 .04

0 .02

o~~='---__--_I-

l::oEli)·5 .§.e" ellU E<t ._ell I-....:Ioc:::

Number of Nodes

Figure I. Route Acquisition Time in Random way Mobility ModelFigure 4. Normalized Routing Overhead in Manhattan Grid Mobility Model

l::o·z

:ia E:I_e" ell

;;, Eell i=....:Io

c:::

0 .12L -Ariadne0 .1

0 .08 ~-SAODV0 .060 .040 .02

o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

o 10 20 30 40 50

Number of Nodes

C. Hop per Count

The figure 5 and 6 show the hop per count of SAODV andAriadne in manhattans grid and random waypoint mobilitymodel respectively. The both graphs show average hop percount with respect to number of nodes. Both graphs illustratethat SAODV and Ariadne hop count vary from 1.2 to 1.6. Theaverage hop count value of Ariadne is greater than SAODVbecause, SAODV establish route from scratch after the linkbreaks and Ariadne uses already updated path information forroute establishment.

Figure 2. Route Acquisition Time in Manhattan Grid Mobility Model

- Ariadne

- S AO DV

1.8

1: 1.5s 1.2c;. 0 .9

~ 0.60.3

o -'---------------

120

100\il 80.§. 60>~ 40

C 20 ~:o

- Ariadne

- S AO DV

Number of Nodes

10 20 30 40 50 10 20 30 40 50

Number of Nodes

Figure 5. Hop per Count in Random way Mobility ModelFigure 8. End to End Delay in Manhattan Grid Mobility Model

E. Jitter

The figure 9 and 10 elaborate the jitter of SAODV andAriadne in manhattans grid and random waypoint mobilitymodel respectively. After many simulations we find out thejitter for both the secure protocols with variable nodes. Theaverage jitter value of Ariadne is lesser than SAODV and thisvalue slightly decreases with respect to number of nodes. Thistrend show that there is continuously packet transfer from oneto other node despite the intermediate nodes and in the case ofSAODV there is larger variation because of route failure androute establishment.

- S AO DV

5040

- :.~ - Ariadne

3020

Number of Nodes

10

1.8

1: 1.5g 1.2

c;. 0 .9

~ 0.60.3

o -'---------------

Figure 9. Jitter in Random way Mobility Model

- Ariadne

- S AO DV

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Number of Nodes

10

12

10\il.§. 8~ 6~ 4

2

0 -'---- - - - - - - - - - - -

Figure 6. Hop per Count in Manhattan Grid Mobility Model

D. Average End to End Delay

The figure 7 and 8 elaborate the end-to-end delay ofSAODV and Ariadne in manhattans grid and random waypointmobility model respectively. After a number of simulations forboth protocols we extract the average end-to-end delay withvariable nodes. The average end-to-end delay inverselyproportional to the number of nodes throughout simulationtime. SAODV has much lower delay as compared to Ariadne.This delay occurs due to the packets are remain in the buffer ofintermediate nodes for variable time duration. In the case ofSAODV intermediate nodes involvement is less during packetstransmission. The value of hop count is evidence for thisaverage delay trend.

5040

•

3020

Number of Nodes

- Ariadne

-----_1--- ....'--• --- - S AO DV

10

1210

E 86

4

2

0 -'---- - - - - - - - - - - -

...ClI...~

--- Ariadne

5040

---....__ -+- S AO DV

302010

120100

ViE 80-;: 60III 40Q)

o 200 -'---- - - - - - - - - - -

Number of Nodes

Figure 10. Jitter in Manhattan Grid Mobility Model

Figure 7. End to End Delay in Random way Mobility Model

- SAODV

- Ariadne

•.••

100I~ 80 ••------....--.l'tI~ 60

~ 40

~ 20o ------------

F. Throughput

The figure 11 and 12 show the throughput of SAODV andAriadne in manhattans grid and random waypoint mobilitymodel respectively. After several numbers of simulations wefind out the average throughput for both the protocols whilerandomly changing the values of node density. The averagethroughput value varying from 130 to 170 Kbps and there isslight variation as the number of nodes increases.

10 20 30 40 50

Figure 13. Packet Delivery Ratio in Random way Mobility Model

Number of Node200Via. 160.0 , =="- -41~ • •- 120....:J - Ariadnea. 80.ct10 40:J - SAODV0...

0.cl-

10 20 30 40 50

Number of Nodes

Figure II. Throughput in Random way Mobility Model

100 . :;::::::::>.~ 80l'tI~ 60

~ 40

~ 20

o

• • •

- Ariadne

- SAODV

10 20 30 40 50

Number of Nodes

Figure 12. Throughput in Manhattan Grid Mobility Model

200

Vi 160 ~:.......... ..-....,.

Co..c

=- 120....:l

- AriadneCo 80..c:b.D:l 40 - SAODV0...

..c: 0I-

G. Packet Delivery Ratio

The figure 13 and 14 show the packet delivery ratio ofSAODV and Ariadne in manhattans grid and random waypointmobility model respectively. Both figures show there is slightvariation in ratio throughout simulation time. At some point itapproximately reaches the value of 99 that show theperformance and effectiveness of these secure routingprotocols.

Number of Nodes

VI. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we evaluated two secure routing protocols forthe mobile Ad-Hoc networks (MANETs) under the RandomWay and Manhattan Mobility Model with the performancemetrics despite the security metrics. Ariadne performs better interm of route acquisition time and routing overhead over theSAODV. The routing protocol SAODV takes advantage interm of end-to-end delay and packet delivery fraction over theAriadne . As we have seen in the graphs the performance hasincreasing as the number of nodes is increased. The protocoloverhead of SAODV is greater as compared to Ariadne.TESLA provides the edge to Ariadne, as TESLA is verylightweight algorithm and SAODV using hash chains anddigital signatures demands for extensive computing. Ariadnewith the use of TESLA is more protected, reliable and efficientthan SAODV as the number of nodes increasing. In conclusion,to route the data packets securely Ad-Hoc routing protocols areessential. In the implementation of such routing protocols, theneed is to eliminate the shortcoming of these protocols byevaluating performance of them on a simulation platform. Tominimize the associated overhead like delay, routing overheaddemands an intensive optimization in both the protocols. Andmore specifically SAODV is required to decrease theprocessing requirements to tackle hash chains and digitalsignatures to implement the security.

Figure 14. Packet Delivery Ratio in Manhattan Grid Mobility Model

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