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Identities, Identities, cleavages and cleavages and European party European party systems systems Alistair Cole Alistair Cole

Identities, cleavages and European party systems Alistair Cole

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Page 1: Identities, cleavages and European party systems Alistair Cole

Identities, cleavages Identities, cleavages and European party and European party

systems systems Alistair Cole Alistair Cole

Page 2: Identities, cleavages and European party systems Alistair Cole

Is there a European party Is there a European party system and does it matter?system and does it matter?

How important are partisan, national How important are partisan, national institutional, ideological factors therein?institutional, ideological factors therein?

Do different types of party perform different Do different types of party perform different functions within the political system? Do functions within the political system? Do national populist and extreme-left parties national populist and extreme-left parties have more in common than with social-have more in common than with social-democratic parties? Should we adopt democratic parties? Should we adopt different critiera to compare types of party? different critiera to compare types of party?

How best can we illustrate these arguments: How best can we illustrate these arguments: do we need to compare all parties claiming do we need to compare all parties claiming to belong to a certain family? Or ought we to to belong to a certain family? Or ought we to focus on one or two case studies? focus on one or two case studies?

Page 3: Identities, cleavages and European party systems Alistair Cole

Lipset and Rokkan Lipset and Rokkan Cleavages are social or value-based conflicts. The term cleavage Cleavages are social or value-based conflicts. The term cleavage

structure refers to the main lines of political division within a structure refers to the main lines of political division within a society. society.

In their classic work, Lipset and Rokkan identify three main In their classic work, Lipset and Rokkan identify three main sources of division within European societies society: sources of division within European societies society:

Anticlericalism [Republic]/Church , from the French revolution Anticlericalism [Republic]/Church , from the French revolution and subsequent wave of anti-clericalism across Europe and subsequent wave of anti-clericalism across Europe (eighteenth);(eighteenth);

Centre-Periphery, from the imperfect process of state formation Centre-Periphery, from the imperfect process of state formation across Europe in the nineteenth century (19th century); across Europe in the nineteenth century (19th century);

Social class, inherited from the industrial revolution and the Social class, inherited from the industrial revolution and the conflict between capital and labour, which largely structured conflict between capital and labour, which largely structured 20th century politics. 20th century politics.

For Lipset and Rokkan most of the key cleavages in place in the For Lipset and Rokkan most of the key cleavages in place in the 1960s were in place by the late nineteenth century; their thesis 1960s were in place by the late nineteenth century; their thesis on the frozen character of cleavages remains very influential. on the frozen character of cleavages remains very influential. Different countries can be characterised by the importance of Different countries can be characterised by the importance of one, or more than one cleavage – and this cleavage structure one, or more than one cleavage – and this cleavage structure has had a very important effect in structuring the party system. has had a very important effect in structuring the party system.

Page 4: Identities, cleavages and European party systems Alistair Cole

Cross-cutting cleavagesCross-cutting cleavages These cleavages could stand alone: where there is only one These cleavages could stand alone: where there is only one

line of cleavage – the normal or residual social class one – line of cleavage – the normal or residual social class one – then this acts as the fundamentally structuring element. then this acts as the fundamentally structuring element.

But other cleavages might cut across the class one, and be But other cleavages might cut across the class one, and be more pertinent politically; this can be the case of religion, for more pertinent politically; this can be the case of religion, for example, where religious behaviour is very closely associated example, where religious behaviour is very closely associated with a conservative orientation in most countries, whatever with a conservative orientation in most countries, whatever social class one belongs to. social class one belongs to.

On the other hand, lower-level cleavages might be nested in On the other hand, lower-level cleavages might be nested in higher order cleavages: thus, the centre-periphery cleavage – higher order cleavages: thus, the centre-periphery cleavage – where minority nations resist the construction of a state – where minority nations resist the construction of a state – might strengthen divisions based on social class; especially if might strengthen divisions based on social class; especially if members of a minority community are also in an members of a minority community are also in an unfavourable socio-economic position.unfavourable socio-economic position.

Thus cleavages can be structuring; reinforcing or cross-Thus cleavages can be structuring; reinforcing or cross-cutting.cutting.

Remains seminal for considering contours of European party Remains seminal for considering contours of European party systemsystem

Page 5: Identities, cleavages and European party systems Alistair Cole

Tim BaleTim Bale Bale identifies nine key cleavages that structure politics in Bale identifies nine key cleavages that structure politics in

Europe today: in order of their appearance, these are:Europe today: in order of their appearance, these are: Land-industry (18th century), representing the conflicting Land-industry (18th century), representing the conflicting

interests of the aristocracy and the emerging bourgeoisie… interests of the aristocracy and the emerging bourgeoisie… gradually victory of the bourgeoisie and creation of bourgeois gradually victory of the bourgeoisie and creation of bourgeois partiesparties

owner-worker, giving rise to the classic labour-capital division owner-worker, giving rise to the classic labour-capital division and to the birth of SD partiesand to the birth of SD parties

urban-rural cleavages, especially in countries such as Norway urban-rural cleavages, especially in countries such as Norway where the urban middle classes were of foreign extraction where the urban middle classes were of foreign extraction and the rural areas were peopled by poor indigenous and the rural areas were peopled by poor indigenous peasants (agrarian parties, today largely disappeared)peasants (agrarian parties, today largely disappeared)

centre-periphery (regionalist/ minority nationalist parties)centre-periphery (regionalist/ minority nationalist parties) church-state (clericalism/Christian democracay against anti-church-state (clericalism/Christian democracay against anti-

clerical parties)clerical parties) Revolution-gradualism ( Social Democracy and Communist Revolution-gradualism ( Social Democracy and Communist

parties in 1917)parties in 1917) Democracy-totalitarianism (rise of fascists in 1930s)Democracy-totalitarianism (rise of fascists in 1930s) modernism/post-materialism(environmental and quality of life modernism/post-materialism(environmental and quality of life

issues, from 1960s onwards (Greens) issues, from 1960s onwards (Greens) multiculturalism/homogeneity (far-right and populism)multiculturalism/homogeneity (far-right and populism)

Page 6: Identities, cleavages and European party systems Alistair Cole

Case study of Social Democracy: Case study of Social Democracy: 11 core and contested features11 core and contested features

Strong working class anchoring, but not strictly speaking Strong working class anchoring, but not strictly speaking class parties (i.e. always appealing beyond just the class parties (i.e. always appealing beyond just the industrial working class)industrial working class)

mass parties mass parties close relationships with the trade unionsclose relationships with the trade unions an interclassist electoral profilean interclassist electoral profile dominant force of the leftdominant force of the left accept rules of democratic game accept rules of democratic game party of governmentparty of government national, rather than internationalist partiesnational, rather than internationalist parties corporatism corporatism mixed economy mixed economy northern-southern divide… northern-southern divide…

Page 7: Identities, cleavages and European party systems Alistair Cole

Crosland’s core values of social-Crosland’s core values of social-democracydemocracy

This was well described by British revisionist This was well described by British revisionist thinker thinker Tony CroslandTony Crosland, who defined five , who defined five features which constituted the core values of features which constituted the core values of social-democracy:social-democracy:

political liberalismpolitical liberalism the mixed economythe mixed economy the Welfare statethe Welfare state Keynesian economicsKeynesian economics a belief in equality. a belief in equality. Social-democratic governmental action was Social-democratic governmental action was

characterised by moderate incrementalism, characterised by moderate incrementalism, rather than systemic transformation.rather than systemic transformation.

Page 8: Identities, cleavages and European party systems Alistair Cole

‘‘Social democracy is a policy Social democracy is a policy paradigm, rather than an paradigm, rather than an

organised political movement’ organised political movement’ Peter Hall. Peter Hall. A social-democratic ethos underpinning the postwar A social-democratic ethos underpinning the postwar

consensus? Evidence usually involves the followingconsensus? Evidence usually involves the following a new form of settlement between politics and markets. a new form of settlement between politics and markets.

Acceptance of a higher degree of state interventionism in Acceptance of a higher degree of state interventionism in economic management (especially through the budget)economic management (especially through the budget)

Public ownership or regulation of certain key industries, Public ownership or regulation of certain key industries, especially natural monopolies like gas, electricity and especially natural monopolies like gas, electricity and transport.transport.

Governments also invented interventionist industrial Governments also invented interventionist industrial policies where the State played an important role: including policies where the State played an important role: including in countries such as the UK. in countries such as the UK.

The SD model associated with Keynesian demand The SD model associated with Keynesian demand management in macro-economic policies: the role of management in macro-economic policies: the role of governments was to pump prime – to create demand in governments was to pump prime – to create demand in periods of recessionperiods of recession

Page 9: Identities, cleavages and European party systems Alistair Cole

The social democratic paradigm The social democratic paradigm 2.2.

Social democracy = sophisticated Welfare statesSocial democracy = sophisticated Welfare states But is a difference between the Universal Beveridge But is a difference between the Universal Beveridge

principle in the UK and Scanidinavia; and the Corporatist principle in the UK and Scanidinavia; and the Corporatist contributions based models in France, Germany , Austriacontributions based models in France, Germany , Austria

As a counterpart, the purest Social-Democrat regimes – As a counterpart, the purest Social-Democrat regimes – such as those in Sweden – relied on high redistributive such as those in Sweden – relied on high redistributive taxation to provide finance and secure equality as the main taxation to provide finance and secure equality as the main goal of public policy.goal of public policy.

In its purest form (Austria, Germany, Scandinavia) a In its purest form (Austria, Germany, Scandinavia) a corporatist style of state-group relations complemented corporatist style of state-group relations complemented these macro-tendencies. these macro-tendencies.

The role of social partners vital in some versions of Social The role of social partners vital in some versions of Social Democracy, less so in others. Generally a belief that Democracy, less so in others. Generally a belief that industrial policy should be coordinated by the Iron Triangle industrial policy should be coordinated by the Iron Triangle of State, Business and Labour. of State, Business and Labour.

Page 10: Identities, cleavages and European party systems Alistair Cole

A word of cautionA word of caution

The welfare state was not invented by social-The welfare state was not invented by social-democrats, but predated social-democracy. democrats, but predated social-democracy.

In the UK, Germany, France, the basic In the UK, Germany, France, the basic architecture predated 1945. architecture predated 1945.

Social-democrats were not the only players in Social-democrats were not the only players in developing the postwar consensus. developing the postwar consensus.

In Italy the right dictated the terms of the postwar In Italy the right dictated the terms of the postwar constitutional settlement.constitutional settlement.

In Austria, nationalisations, welfare reforms and In Austria, nationalisations, welfare reforms and state economic interventionism were consensual state economic interventionism were consensual measures emanating as much from traditions of measures emanating as much from traditions of social christianity, as from social democracy. social christianity, as from social democracy.

Page 11: Identities, cleavages and European party systems Alistair Cole

What Went Wrong? What Went Wrong? The basic assumption of social-democracy had been that an The basic assumption of social-democracy had been that an

interventionist state could control the economic cycle interventionist state could control the economic cycle through the use of Keynesian demand-management through the use of Keynesian demand-management techniques. techniques.

Damaged by the move to global recession after 1973-4.Damaged by the move to global recession after 1973-4. Keynesian policies, where applied, increased public Keynesian policies, where applied, increased public

expenditure and aggravated inflation. expenditure and aggravated inflation. Inflation, unemployment, balance of trade crises and state Inflation, unemployment, balance of trade crises and state

debt put paid to Keynesianism.debt put paid to Keynesianism. While certain features of social-democratic management While certain features of social-democratic management

initially appeared strengthened by the 1970s crisis (notably initially appeared strengthened by the 1970s crisis (notably attempts at corporatist-style management), others were attempts at corporatist-style management), others were irremediably weakened. irremediably weakened.

Even successful social-democratic governments - such as Even successful social-democratic governments - such as those in Scandanavia - began to cut back upon the huge those in Scandanavia - began to cut back upon the huge bureaucracies they had created, and to adopt anti-inflation bureaucracies they had created, and to adopt anti-inflation programmes.programmes.

Page 12: Identities, cleavages and European party systems Alistair Cole

Comparing Social Democratic Comparing Social Democratic PartiesParties today today

Social-democratic parties have always Social-democratic parties have always followed the nature of capitalism (Bull, 1998). followed the nature of capitalism (Bull, 1998). They have provided responses to the They have provided responses to the evolution of capitalism at any given point in evolution of capitalism at any given point in history. history.

there is an argument that social-democratic there is an argument that social-democratic parties in the late 2000s can at best adapt to parties in the late 2000s can at best adapt to common externally driven convergence common externally driven convergence pressures. pressures.

Comparison provides more precise responsesComparison provides more precise responses

Page 13: Identities, cleavages and European party systems Alistair Cole

Hypothesis One Hypothesis One externally externally driven convergencedriven convergence

Social-democratic parties are converging towards a Social-democratic parties are converging towards a common pattern of political management, under common pattern of political management, under the influence of the separate but related exogenous the influence of the separate but related exogenous pressures of globalisation and Europeanisation. pressures of globalisation and Europeanisation.

The essence of the ‘external convergence’ The essence of the ‘external convergence’ argument is that economic globalisation and argument is that economic globalisation and European integration have combined to European integration have combined to disempower social-democratic parties in office. disempower social-democratic parties in office.

These pressures include the impact of These pressures include the impact of globalisation, the ascendancy of a particular type globalisation, the ascendancy of a particular type of European integration project (EMU), the of European integration project (EMU), the contingent necessity for domestic budget and contingent necessity for domestic budget and welfare state retrenchment and changing policy welfare state retrenchment and changing policy fashions, rendering more difficult traditional fashions, rendering more difficult traditional interventionist industrial policies.interventionist industrial policies.

Page 14: Identities, cleavages and European party systems Alistair Cole

Hypothesis Two Hypothesis Two Internally driven Internally driven convergenceconvergence

Parties also respond to pressures forParties also respond to pressures for internally internally driven convergencedriven convergence: EU societies are becoming : EU societies are becoming more and more similar. They have had to affront more and more similar. They have had to affront comparable cultural and political effects of social comparable cultural and political effects of social change. change.

There has been a lessened significance of There has been a lessened significance of cleavages based on social class. cleavages based on social class.

In their internal programmes, parties have In their internal programmes, parties have abandoned Marxism and responded to the abandoned Marxism and responded to the emergence of new political agendas and ideas emergence of new political agendas and ideas based on post-materialism and individualism. based on post-materialism and individualism.

Parties have reacted in similar manners to Parties have reacted in similar manners to comparable domestic demographic and economic comparable domestic demographic and economic changes. changes.

Page 15: Identities, cleavages and European party systems Alistair Cole

Hypothesis 3: Hypothesis 3: institutional and institutional and cultural differentiationcultural differentiation..

Institutional and cultural forces differentiate Institutional and cultural forces differentiate between parties, and are more important than any between parties, and are more important than any pressures for convergence. pressures for convergence.

According to this hypothesis, party performance is According to this hypothesis, party performance is above all shaped by the very different national above all shaped by the very different national institutional arrangements and incentives. This can institutional arrangements and incentives. This can include institutions include institutions stricto sensustricto sensu ( the structure of ( the structure of executive leadership; executive-legislative executive leadership; executive-legislative relations; electoral laws, and central-local relations; electoral laws, and central-local relations), but also the myths and symbols attached relations), but also the myths and symbols attached to institutionalist perspective. to institutionalist perspective.

It also comprises different discursive traditions and It also comprises different discursive traditions and rhetorical devices which are themselves rooted in rhetorical devices which are themselves rooted in nationally specific cultural traditions. nationally specific cultural traditions.

Page 16: Identities, cleavages and European party systems Alistair Cole

Hypothesis 4. Hypothesis 4. parties matterparties matter..

The structure and functioning of the domestic party The structure and functioning of the domestic party system determines party performance in office.system determines party performance in office.

Governmental performance will depend on the Governmental performance will depend on the structure of political competition in national party structure of political competition in national party systems (bipolar and centripetal? fragmented and systems (bipolar and centripetal? fragmented and centrifugal?); upon the stability of political supply centrifugal?); upon the stability of political supply and demand; single-party majority or coalition; the and demand; single-party majority or coalition; the importance of parties as organisational entities vis-importance of parties as organisational entities vis-à-vis of parties in office; the emergence of new à-vis of parties in office; the emergence of new players articulating new political agendas (the players articulating new political agendas (the greens and post-materialism). greens and post-materialism).

Are there inherent social-democratic party features Are there inherent social-democratic party features that determine outcomes ? that determine outcomes ?

Page 17: Identities, cleavages and European party systems Alistair Cole

Hypothesis 5 Hypothesis 5 political political autonomy.autonomy.

Politics and party programmes Politics and party programmes matter. Parties in office are able to matter. Parties in office are able to devise original solutions to identified devise original solutions to identified policy problems; they dispose of far policy problems; they dispose of far more autonomy than deterministic more autonomy than deterministic theories allow. theories allow.

There are limits to the ‘convergence’ There are limits to the ‘convergence’ theses, in spite of the narrowing of theses, in spite of the narrowing of possibilities for autonomous political possibilities for autonomous political action. action.

Page 18: Identities, cleavages and European party systems Alistair Cole

Comparative indicators: Comparative indicators: Adaptation?Adaptation?

European integration has called into question many European integration has called into question many features traditionally associated with the politics and features traditionally associated with the politics and policies characteristic of social-democratic governmental policies characteristic of social-democratic governmental experience.experience.

European integration agenda threatens the social-European integration agenda threatens the social-democratic model of public service and of political democratic model of public service and of political economy. economy.

how have social-democratic parties coped with common how have social-democratic parties coped with common externally driven convergence pressures? externally driven convergence pressures?

Adjustment, adaptation, rejection, reframing? Responses Adjustment, adaptation, rejection, reframing? Responses reveal clear differences between European social-reveal clear differences between European social-democratic parties: from the pan-European activism of the democratic parties: from the pan-European activism of the French Socialist party - calling for a Keynesian relaunch at French Socialist party - calling for a Keynesian relaunch at the European level and a concerted European effort against the European level and a concerted European effort against unemployment - to the proselytising neo-liberal flexibility unemployment - to the proselytising neo-liberal flexibility of the Blair administration.of the Blair administration.

Page 19: Identities, cleavages and European party systems Alistair Cole

Comparative indicators: Re-Comparative indicators: Re-regulation?regulation?

While globalisation introduces a new form of macro-While globalisation introduces a new form of macro-economic regulation, European integration provides a economic regulation, European integration provides a political arena whereby European polities (Social-political arena whereby European polities (Social-democratic parties in particular) can combine their democratic parties in particular) can combine their governance capacity to create (or strengthen) a European governance capacity to create (or strengthen) a European political, social and economic model. political, social and economic model.

Given the weakness of the nation-state, the European Given the weakness of the nation-state, the European arena is the only arena where politics can reinvent new arena is the only arena where politics can reinvent new forms of political regulation faced with economic forms of political regulation faced with economic globalisation.globalisation.

This underlies mainstream French perceptions of the single This underlies mainstream French perceptions of the single currency. It underpinned the efforts of the Jospin currency. It underpinned the efforts of the Jospin government to strengthen social and employment policies government to strengthen social and employment policies at the European level. at the European level.

The credibility of such a perspective has increased with the The credibility of such a perspective has increased with the dysfunctionning of the global economy and international dysfunctionning of the global economy and international financial markets in particular. financial markets in particular.

Page 20: Identities, cleavages and European party systems Alistair Cole

Comparative indicators (3) programme Comparative indicators (3) programme adaptation.adaptation.

Attempts to define a new equilibrium for the European Attempts to define a new equilibrium for the European centre-left sparked fraternal rivalries between Blair and centre-left sparked fraternal rivalries between Blair and Jospin in particular. Jospin in particular.

In response to Blair’s ‘third way’ between the old left and In response to Blair’s ‘third way’ between the old left and the new right, Jospin has pointedly refused to define a new the new right, Jospin has pointedly refused to define a new orientation between social-democracy and liberalism. orientation between social-democracy and liberalism.

While the new Labour enterprise was intended to demarcate While the new Labour enterprise was intended to demarcate the party from ‘the perceived defeats and bankruptcy of the party from ‘the perceived defeats and bankruptcy of traditional social-democracy’ (Randell, 1998), the French traditional social-democracy’ (Randell, 1998), the French Socialist administration rediscovered a familiar social-Socialist administration rediscovered a familiar social-democratic political style.democratic political style.

While Blair looks to the international centre-left (to Clinton While Blair looks to the international centre-left (to Clinton and the new Democrats in particular), Jospin’s activity and the new Democrats in particular), Jospin’s activity focussed more firmly on reorientating the European centre-focussed more firmly on reorientating the European centre-left towards a new equilibrium less favourable to globalised left towards a new equilibrium less favourable to globalised international exchanges and more resolutely favourable to international exchanges and more resolutely favourable to EU-level and state public policy interventionEU-level and state public policy intervention

Schroder somewhere in betweenSchroder somewhere in between

Page 21: Identities, cleavages and European party systems Alistair Cole

New Labour against social New Labour against social democracy?democracy?

While the landmark reforms of the Jospin While the landmark reforms of the Jospin premiership were implemented in the face premiership were implemented in the face of fierce business opposition (35 hour of fierce business opposition (35 hour week), Blair appeared more wary of week), Blair appeared more wary of espousing anti-business policies for fear of espousing anti-business policies for fear of damaging a sustained effort at repositioning damaging a sustained effort at repositioning and repackaging an old party.and repackaging an old party.

Acting on the environment, embracing Acting on the environment, embracing globalisation and increasing labour flexibility globalisation and increasing labour flexibility and employability were the key cognitive and employability were the key cognitive codes of the Blair universe. They break with codes of the Blair universe. They break with social-democracy in a more distinctive social-democracy in a more distinctive manner than in France or Germany.manner than in France or Germany.

Page 22: Identities, cleavages and European party systems Alistair Cole

National versus partisan National versus partisan responsesresponses

the importance of national and partisan the importance of national and partisan contexts as filters of change and tellers of contexts as filters of change and tellers of truth. truth.

While all parties in government have had to While all parties in government have had to cope with similar pressures, national cope with similar pressures, national responses have varied. responses have varied.

In a narrower time frame, parties have also to In a narrower time frame, parties have also to react to the institutional and policy legacies of react to the institutional and policy legacies of previous governments. Thus, Blair’s new previous governments. Thus, Blair’s new Labour has incorporated a more radical Labour has incorporated a more radical paradigm shift than is the case for the French paradigm shift than is the case for the French SocialistsSocialists

National contexts might matter much more National contexts might matter much more than the partisan ones. than the partisan ones.

Page 23: Identities, cleavages and European party systems Alistair Cole

Intellectual traditions allow Intellectual traditions allow politics a more or a less politics a more or a less

important role.important role. The perception of the available margins of The perception of the available margins of

manoeuvre provides the clearest manner of manoeuvre provides the clearest manner of drawing a distinction between the parties in drawing a distinction between the parties in government. In France, the underlying philosophy government. In France, the underlying philosophy of the Jospin government was that ‘margins exist. of the Jospin government was that ‘margins exist. We must use them to the full’. The Jospin We must use them to the full’. The Jospin government attempted to restore faith in politics, government attempted to restore faith in politics, and to make full use of the limited policy autonomy and to make full use of the limited policy autonomy that exists. that exists.

The discursive basis of Jospin’s method is that The discursive basis of Jospin’s method is that politics does matter; in the permanent compromise politics does matter; in the permanent compromise between politics and markets, economic between politics and markets, economic imperatives must be counterbalanced with a imperatives must be counterbalanced with a respect for social equilibrium. This discourse retains respect for social equilibrium. This discourse retains a strong faith in voluntaristic action to combat a strong faith in voluntaristic action to combat unemployment.unemployment.

Page 24: Identities, cleavages and European party systems Alistair Cole

Social democracy and party systemsSocial democracy and party systems

How do the contours of domestic party How do the contours of domestic party systems impact upon the operation of social systems impact upon the operation of social democracy in power? democracy in power?

Is there a uniform model of centripetal party Is there a uniform model of centripetal party competition (with successful social-competition (with successful social-democratic parties occupying a shifting democratic parties occupying a shifting centre of gravity), or do national political centre of gravity), or do national political circumstances condition the social-circumstances condition the social-democratic strategy and discourse? democratic strategy and discourse?

How do these parties manage relations with How do these parties manage relations with their neighbouring competitor parties, such their neighbouring competitor parties, such as the greens in Germany, the communists in as the greens in Germany, the communists in France and Italy, the liberal democrats in UKFrance and Italy, the liberal democrats in UK