Identification of normative sources for systems thinking: an inquiry into religious ground-motives for systems thinking paradigms

SystemsResearchandBehavioralScienceSyst. Res.20, 475^487 (2003)DOI:10.1002/sres.579

& ResearchPaper

Identification of Normative Sources forSystems Thinking: An Inquiry intoReligious Ground-Motives for SystemsThinking Paradigms1

Darek M. Eriksson*

Industrial Management and Economics, Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden

In celebration of C. West Churchman’s work, this article investigates one of the mostcherished endeavours of his thinking: to provide a normative meaning for the conduct ofhuman affiars. Churchman has always emphasized ‘What-Ought-To-Be’, at the expense ofthe ‘What-Is’. To achieve this purpose, four Systems Thinking paradigms, namely HardSystems Thinking, Soft Systems Thinking, Critical Systems Thinking, and MultimodalSystems Thinking, are investigated with regard to their foundations for normativeguidance. This investigation is made by identifying their respective basic convictions inthe form of so-called ‘religious ground-motives’, which are based on the assumption thatall human thinking and acting starts with a credal conviction, be it Christian, Jew, Islamic,Buddhist, or other. As a result it is found that these systems thinking paradigms are eitherfounded on an inherent contradiction or provide a normative foundation that lacks asocial contract for their implementation, and therefore these paradigms do not provide astable and satisfactory normative guidance for system design.Note: The key claim of this author is that, to be normative, an ethical theory must be

grounded in a transcendental justification which is based on some religious faith. Theopinions presented in this paper are strictly the author’s, who does not claim that hisbeliefs have more merit or are more ethical than those of any competitive faiths.Copyright # 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Keywords systems thinking; paradigmatic analysis; normativity; religious ground-motives

FIRST DISCOVER: ‘Does God Exist?’ is themost important question of systems thinking.

C. W. Churchman (1987, p. 139)

INTRODUCTION

Professor C. West Churchman, the philosopherof systems thinking, one of the founders and themain critics of management science and opera-tional research, has puzzled the discipline withthis intriguing question and remarks for almost a

Copyright # 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

*Correspondence to: Darek M. Eriksson, TCG Cepro, Box 440, SE-10128 Stockholm, Sweden. E-mail: [email protected] text builds on parts of the work of Eriksson (1998).

century, as guided by a key question of his life-long inquiry was: ‘Is it possible to secure improve-ment in the human condition by means of the humanintellect?’ (Churchman, 1982, p. 19) this madeChurchman preoccupied with an endless andheroidic search for the boundaries of humanreason and for the sources of the ‘Ideal andUltimate Good’, or as he put it: ‘the problem ofsystems improvement is the problem of the ‘‘ethics ofthe whole systems’’’ (Churchman, 1968a, p. 4). As ameans for reaching this end he pursued holismand pluralism, as articulated in ‘Systems Appro-ach’ (Churchman, 1968b), where differentapproaches to planning and problem solvingcompete, such as the rationalist and humanist. InThe Systems Approach and its Enemies (Churchman,1979), rationality is confronted with politics,aesthetics, ethics and theology, while in TheDesign of Inquiring Systems (Churchman, 1971)alternative inquiring systems compete to securethe validity of propositions. In the last mentionedtext—but also suggested already in one of hisvery early texts The Theory of Experimental Infer-ence (Churchman, 1948)—Churchman showsthat there is no way to secure complete validityof rationality; all propositions are founded onsome assumptions that are subject to humanconviction and faith, which brings us to the topicof this essay. Based on the assumption here thatreligious convictions unconditionally govern allhuman activities, including intellectual andscientific, this study addresses the religiousfoundation of four systems thinking paradigms.2

A model of religious ground-motives is usedas a conceptual tool for investigation of theseparadigms. One of the results shows that (i) theanalysed paradigms are founded on differentreligious ground-motives, and that progress intheir development may be clearly distinguished.The results show further that (ii) these para-digms either: (a) rest on assumptions that haveinherent contradictions; (b) do not addressexplicitly the normative content and conse-quences of their propositions for the design ofhuman affairs; (c) have normative foundations

that lack social contract. the results show alsothat (iii) the model used here for paradigmaticanalysis has helped to uncover assumptions thatother analyses of systems thinking paradigmsdid not achieve. The main message of this studyis therefore to emphasize the need for explicitnormative considerations in the managementand design of human affiars.

The remaining part of this introduction pre-sents a motivation for this investigation. Whatfollows is a presentation of the tool of thisinvestigation: the model of religious ground-motives. The section thereafter presents foursystems thinking paradigms together with theirrespective religious ground-motive. A compar-ison of the model of religious ground-motivesemployed here with another well-recognizedmodel for analysis of systems thinking para-digms is given. The text ends with a discussionand some concluding remarks.

Justification

Since the time around World War II, a particularscientific area has emerged, focusing on practicalproblem solving in human affairs, by employingthe scientific method. Today, its different dialectsare associated with various labels, such asoperations research, management science, sys-tems analysis, systems engineering or systemsthinking. Over the years various specialized sub-areas have emerged, such as logistics, computerscience and information systems science. In thepresent study, the focus is set on currentparadigms of ‘systems thinking’.

Each paradigm comprises various theories,models, methodologies, methods, and techni-ques, all designed to support the solving ofproblems, whether of particular or general type.These theories and methodologies are taught atuniversities around the world and are used byproblem solvers, whether managers, engineers,policy makers, or others—therefore they may beconsidered as intellectual tools for problemsolving. This means that Western societies haveformed intellectual tools that they use to solvetheir problems, to design or shape our society andlives, hence they have normative implications,

2The conception of a Paradigm is associated with Kuhn’s (1970) work.The formation of ‘system thinking paradigms’, such as hard systemsthinking, soft systems thinking, and critical systems thinking, were allaffected by the thoughts of C.West Churchman.

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476 Darek M. Eriksson

as all design implies a solution of how thingsought to be instead of their present state. A keyquestion may then be posed: What kind of ethicaland overall normative, guidance do these toolsprovide, and why? In answering these questions,an understanding of their theoretical foundationis necessary; that is, their respective fundamentalassumptions about reality, knowledge, man, andthe source of norms. This understanding can beobtained through the identification of the reli-gious ground-motives that govern the variousparadigms.

In his original philosophical work, the Dutchphilosopher Herman Dooyeweerd (1894–1977)focused his attention on the conditions oftheoretic thought (Dooyeweerd, 1955). He hasshown that all human thought is unconditionallygrounded in religious convictions. This meansthat a ‘religious ground-motive’ prompts allphilosophical activity, as well as all human life.‘Religious’ is here a technical term, whichDooyeweerd defines as: ‘the innate impulse ofhuman selfhood to direct itself toward the true ortoward a pretended Origin of all temporaldiversity of meaning, which it finds focusedconcentrically in itself’ (Dooyeweerd, 1955, vol. I,p. 57). A religious ground is thus a transcendentmotive that takes hold of a person’s heart, fills,motivates and dominates his every action—whether consciously or not. A religious ground-motive can be considered as a ‘moving power orspirit at the very roots of man, who so capturedworks it out with fear and trembling, andcuriosity’ (Dooyeweer, 1955, vol. I, p. 58).

Given this background, the present investiga-tion asks: which religious ground-motives pro-vide foundations of the paradigms of systemsthinking? And: what are the respective implica-tions? The next section exposes a model ofreligious ground-motives that is used to obtainanswers to these questions.

Other frameworks for the analysis of norma-tive and/or religious foundations exist and maybe utilized for a similar analysis. This investiga-tion has chosen Doyeweerd’s model partlybecause it is the most elaborated theory ofreligious ground-motives that is known to us,and because one of the investigated systemsthinking paradigms has employed it as its own

foundation. However, similar investigations ofsystems thinking paradigms, employing othernormative analysis frameworks, may be desir-able, leading to a foundation for fruitful debate,when the results of the various analyses arejuxtaposed.

THE MODEL OF RELIGIOUSGROUND-MOTIVES

In his histographical studies Western philoso-phy, Dooyeweerd has laid bare the basic reli-gious commitments of theoretical thought. Hehas identified four religious ground-motives, allof which identify the religious nature of philo-phical activity in the Western world. Three of thefour ground-motives are ‘apostate’—i.e. theyhave abandoned religious faith—and are saidto contain an inner tension (Dooyeweerd, 1955,vol. I).

The Matter–Form Ground-Motive

The first of the four religious ground-motives iscalled matter–form. It is said that the dialectic ofthis ground-motive characterizes all pagan Greekphilosophy, and thus should not be associatedexclusively with Aristotelian philosophy.

During the early period of Greek historyworship centred essentially on natural powers;thus the Greek religion was a nature religion. Itimplied a worship of a formless stream of life outof which generations of beings periodicallyemerged. These beings were all subjected todeath, fate and decay. This includes a continuousprocess of coming into being and passing away.The stream of life can only continue if individualsat the end of their allotted life are absorbed again.Individual man and beings are doomed to dieand decay so that the cycle may continue. At alater stage a new type of religion arose. This was aculture religion, as represented in the Homericgods dwelling on Mount Olympus. These godshad left mother earth with her eternal cycle of lifeand death, and acquired a personal and immortalform of splendid beauty. They became gods ofabiding form, measured harmony.

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Combined, these two religions—the naturereligion and the culture religion—gave rise tothe inner dialectic of the Greek matter–formmotive. The nature religion contributed with theprinciple of matter, that is, mortality and change,the elements of unpredictable mystery and theformless dark. The culture religion, on the otherhand, contributed with the principle of form, i.e.abiding being, light and heavenly splendour, aswell as reason. According to Dooyeweerd (1955,vol. I), these two principles controlled all Greekthought.

The Creation–Fall–RedemptionGround-Motive

The second religious ground-motive, probablythe most familiar, is the biblical. Mor precisely it isthe creation–fall–redemption ground-motive,which dominates the Scripture and constitutesthe Archimedean point that determines allChristian activity. The creation–fall–redemptionrelation is set by God as Creator, who gives Hislaw to which creation is subordinated. In the Fall,humans separate themselves from their relationto God. Redemption is thus required to allow afull restoration and reintegration. Thus, thisground-motive is the religious presuppositionof any theoretical thought that may claim abiblical foundation. The Christian ground-motive is beyond the reach of a theoreticalinvestigation, says Dooyeweerd (1955, vol. I).

The Nature–Grace Ground-Motive

The medieval synthesis that combined biblicalthemes, with pagan thought is characterized bythe third ground-motive, the nature–graceground-motive. This ground motive is a productof a synthesis mentality that adopted the tension-ridden matter–form ground-motive of the ancientGreeks and incorporated it into its nature motive.This implies that the notion of philosophy—including natural theology—belongs to thelower level of nature, while revealed theologybelongs to the higher level of super-nature, of thegrace ground-motive. This articulation of dual-

ism contains on the one hand a view of God as atranscendent pure form, and on the other hand anon-transcendent material world.

In the synthesis philosophy, Christianitydeveloped a synthesis that culminated in thegreat scholasticism of the Middle Ages. Thenature–grace ground-motive came to its mostarticulate expression in the philosophy of Tho-mas Aquinas. It stated that human nature isweakened by the Fall and directed by a commonnatural law and the natural light of reason.Christianity, the Bible, faith, all these are spe-cially added items. The natural man is not theradically fallen but a man endowed with reasonthat is one and the same in all men, and thereforethe basis of all common neutral and autonomousareas of life. In the nature–grace ground-motivethere was an implicit possibility of secularism.This so, because if it is true that there is a wholerealm of nature and if that nature possesses acertain amount of autonomy, then there isnothing to prevent the area of nature from goingalone—there is no reason why whole areas of lifemay not be secular. Aquinas’ position thoughwas that the realm of nature was the primer andnecessary step toward the realm of grace. Hence,there was a necessary link and order between thetwo realms. William of Ockham was, however,determined to show that this link was notnecessary. Ockham drove a wedge betweenthese two areas in order to drive them as farapart as possible, which implied that the area ofgrace—i.e. of Bible and faith—was considered tohave nothing whatsoever to do with the area ofnature, i.e. the state, society, science.

The Nature–Freedom Ground-Motive

While the philosophy of the Middle Ages wasbased on, and determined by, the nature–graceground-motive, it can be said that the modernperiod has adopted the nature–freedom ground-motive (Dooyeweerd, 1955, vol. I). As soon as therealm of grace was eliminated the realm ofnature was accompanied by the realm of free-dom, of autonomous man. However, this repla-cement of the realm of grace by the realm offreedom gave rise to a conflict between nature




and freedom. This is so because nature isconceived as a set of scientifically discernedmechanical laws and processes which gives noroom for autonomous freedom. Hence one of theproblems of modern philosophy was to reconcilethe two, that is, to answer the question: how canman maintain his autonomous freedom in a mechani-cally determined world?3

Immanuel Kant may be considered to be thefather of the nature–freedom ground-motive. HisCritique works attempted an idealistic solutionto the nature–freedom tension. Kant’s (1998)Critique of Pure Reason investigates the conditionsdetermining the possibility of human knowl-edge. One of the central postulates is that theimpressions humans receive from externalobjects are shaped and determined by an a prioristructure of our mind. Kant thus rejected thelong-standing assumption that human knowl-edge depends on external objects and replaced itwith the claim that objects depend on ourknowledge. However, the ultimate conditionsor principles of knowing—which Kant called‘ideas’—are said to exceed the possibility ofhuman experience. People could search for souland world, but would never find them. God, thesoul, immortality, freedom, as such cannot beknown. Therefore, the best man may do is to actas if he had already reached those ultimateprinciples, and allow these regulative ideas toguide his further investigations. In his secondmajor work—the Critique of Practical Reason(Kant, 1997)—Kant explored the conditions ofmoral actions. He stated that man’s morality isessentially a matter of obligation and freedom.Kant’s categorical imperative implies that indi-viduals are capable of formulating laws ofconduct for themselves and that the fundamentallaw is that one should perform an act only if onewished that anyone in similar circumstanceswould do the same thing. Moral law is a directresult of human reason, and moral goodness isdetermined by nothing other than reason. Rightand wrong rest in man’s autonomy; man is arational being who knows a priori what is good

without any help from outside. In order toreconcile the tension between the realm of natureand the realm of freedom, Kant wrote a thirdcritique, the Critique of Judgement (Kant, 1987).There he attempts to construct a bridge betweenthe two realms with the help of imagination.

FOUR PARADIGMS OF SYSTEMS THINKINGAND THEIR RELIGIOUS GROUND-MOTIVES

This section presents four paradigms of systemsthinking4 together with their respective religiousground-motive, and thereby their source fornormativity.

Hard Systems Thinking: Presentationand Analysis

There are usually four distinct systemsapproaches associated with hard systems think-ing (HST) (e.g. Flood and Jackson, 1991a):operations research (e.g. Churchman et al., 1957,systems analysis (e.g. Atthill, 1975), systemsengineering (Jenkins, 1969) and systemsdynamics (e.g. Forrester, 1961). Even thoughdiversity is present in particular theories, meth-odologies and methods related to the fourmentioned approaches, they all have certaincommon properties that make it meaningful toorganize them into one scientific paradigm.Onto-epistemologically they are all founded onsome version of the realist–positivist position.They provide support for solving problemsmostly by means of mathematical–statisticaltools. They hold an assumption that an optimalsolution exists andmay be uncovered. Hence, themodels are deterministic and/or stochastic asinherited from classical mechanics and thermo-dynamics. These systems approaches, stemmingfrom the natural sciences, aspire to describe,

3Dooyeweerd saw the history of philosophy as swinging back andforth between two anthithetical poles within the various apostateground-motives.

4Management science constitutes a broad amount of models andframewords (Gass and Harris, 1996; Jackson, 1991), which are not welldefined or coherent with each other. However, it is the presentassumption that the normative foundations of the four systemsthinking paradigms selected here represent the majority of manage-ment science normative foundations, even for theories and frame-works that do not present themselves as part of systems thinking.




explain and predict a studied phenomenon bymeans of the analytic–mathematical method.HST does not provide any explicit ethical–normative support for problem managementalthough it seems that it is often employedtogether with the utilitarian approach—bothaspire to optimize. HST manifests usefulness insituations where problems are already defined,and where their properties may be representedeasily and meaningfully in numerical form.

This notion corresponds clearly to the naturerealm of the nature–freedom religious ground-motive, andHST does not provide any account ofhuman freedom or autonomy, human intentionsor non-rationalistic behaviour—such as emo-tional and spiritual—when referring to theaxiomatic analytic–rational epistemologies. Thisimplies that the realm of freedom, within thenature–freedom religious ground-motive, is notonly ignored and omitted, but also conditionedby the principles of the nature realm. Further, themethodologies of HST do not only consider thatit is possible to manage and control humanaffairs bymeans of the method of the realm of thenature but also that this is a preferable approachfor such a purpose.

Soft Systems Thinking: Presentationand Analysis

Soft systems thinking (SST), (e.g., Jackson, 1982,1991) is often associated with methodologiessuch as interactive planning (Ackoff, 1981),strategic assumptions surfacing and testing(Mason and Mitroff, 1981), interactive manage-ment (Warfield, 1990), and soft systems metho-dology (Checkland, 1978, 1981; Checkland andScholes, 1990).

One of the main distinctions between HST andSST is the difference in their respective onto-epistemological positions. SST tends to have anon-realist and non-positivist position, whichvaries between nominalism, interpretativism,constructivism and pragmatism. This difference,which it seems to have inherited from the socialand mind sciences, has important theoretical andmethodological consequences. SST does notassume that problems exist and are well defined

and independent of observers, and that theyalways have an optimal solution. Instead, prob-lems are interpretations and/or constructions byits perceivers and/or conceivers where culturalbackgrounds of each observer are considered todetermine the understanding of a problematicsituation. These situations are seen as ‘messes’ ornetworks of problems, which may be managedsatisfactorily, yet very seldom optimized. Thediverse perceptions of situations should beaccommodated with each other by means ofcommunication and learning. Several of SST’sapproaches provide representational conceptspeculiar to social systems, for example, as owner,customer and Weltanschauung. Hence, whileHST’s central issue is to explain and solveproblems—as inherited from natural science—SST’s central issue is to interpret and managesituations—as inherited from social science. LikeHST, SST does not provide any explicit norma-tive ethical framework as a guide for problemmanagement. SST arose from critique of HSTapproaches as delivered, for example, byChurchman (1970), Ackoff (1979) and Checkland(1985), and took its present shape in the 1970sand 1980s.

SST recognizes the autonomy or freedom ofhuman beings that is often conceived in ateleological manner. Therefore it seems correctto consider SST to be founded on the realm offreedom, within the nature–freedom ground-motive. However, SST does not provide anyexplicit and articulated normative guidance formanagement of human affairs but rather relieson the value systems of the designers andstakeholders involved. All the various involvedviews in a situation are considered to be equallycorrect and attempts are made to accommodatethese with each other by means of communica-tion and learning. As a consequence of, orperhaps a reason for, this lack of a normativeframework, SST does not provide any solution tothe gap and tension between the realm of natureand the realm of freedom, other than consideringSST—i.e. the realm of freedom—to be superiorto and controlling HST—i.e. the realm of nature.Hard system thinking is thus considered to be aspecial case of SST where the latter will decidewhere HST should be employed.




Critical Systems Thinking

Presentation of Critical Systems ThinkingLike SST, critical systems thinking5 (CST)emerged from the critique of its forerunners,which is from HST and SST. While the critique ofHST is similar to the critique formulated by SST,CST states that SST assigns itself primacy overHST approaches, and is therefore isolationist.Further, it is said that SST is unable to handlepower structures in social situations, and that itis theoretically dogmatic and therefore not self-reflective (Flood and Jackson, 1991a). As asolution to these problems, CST has adoptedHabermas’ (1984, 1987) version of critical socialtheory. CST’s programme has three main com-mitments, which reflect well the critique that isdelivered on SST. These commitments are (i)theoretical and practical complementarism, (ii)promotion of emancipation and (iii) critical self-reflection.

Theoretically considered, CST accounts forthree kinds of rationality or inquiry. First is theempirical–analytical science that focuses oninstrumental reason, provides nomological cau-sal knowledge, and aims at explanation, predic-tion and control of nature, which is the solefoundation of HST. Second is the historic–hermeneutic science that provides a practicalunderstanding of other human beings, on whichSST is founded. Third are the critically orientedsciences such as psychoanalysis and critical socialtheory that aim to provide emancipatory interestin freedom and overcoming unconscious com-pulsion. So far, CST offers the practitioner twomethodologies: critical systems heuristics (Ulrich,1981, 1983, 1987), and total systems intervention(Flood and Jackson, 1991b). The first mentionedaims to manage normative distribution in adesign situation and therefore also manage socialpower structures in the design process. This isachieved by interrogating the conceptual bound-aries or assumptions of a system design, throughcontrasting its is situation with its ought to

situation, where all stakeholders are supposedto be represented in the design situation. It isUlrich’s work—inspired by Churchman—whichhas made an unparalleled breakthrough insystems thinking, by explicitly and operationallyaddressing the normative content of systemdesign. Hence, unlike HST and SST, CST doessupport the systems designer with mechanismsfor normative guidance, arising from Kantianphilosophy. Even though CST started to emergein the 1970s, it did not become widely recognizeduntil the late 1980s and the early 1990s.

Ana1ysis of Critical Systems ThinkingCST is founded mainly on Kantian philosophyand Habermas’ notion of critical social theory.Compared with HST and SST, CST makes aserious attempt at representing the completenature–freedom ground-motive. It does not onlyarticulate explicitly the, two realms but alsoattempts to provide a link between the two.Thus, the empirical–analytic sciences representthe realm of nature, the historic–hermeneuticsciences represent the realm of freedom, and thecritically oriented science represents the linkbetween the two realms, aiming to secure asuitable coexistence. However, as CST stands inthe Kantian shadow, it has not succeeded insolving the very fundamental tension betweenthe realm of nature and the realm of freedom,which is: how can man maintain his autonomousfreedom in a mechanically determined world?To make the argument more intelligible, the nextfew lines summarize Dooyeweerd’s critique ofKant’s position.

A starting point is that Dooyeweerd has shownthat ‘All meaning is from, through, and to anorigin, which cannot itself be related to a higherorigin’ (Dooyeweerd, 1955, vol. I, p. 9). Further,he has shown that truly critical thinking mustaccept the three transcendental ideas, which intheir trinity must be considered as the transcen-dental ground-idea (1955, p. 89). These three arethe idea of the universe (which Kant reduced tothe sphere of nature), the idea of the ultimateunity of human selfhood, and the idea of theabsolute origin. Hence, ‘Truly reflexive thought,therefore, is characterized by the critical

5The present author is aware that there exists a tension (Ulrich, 2003)within critical systems thinking, between its two strands: criticalsystems heuristics, on the one hand, and total systems intervention, onthe other hand. The present analysis. however, investigates the veryfoundations of CST, which is valid for both the strands within CST.




self-reflection as to the transcendental ground-idea of philosophy, in which philosophic thoughtpoints beyond and above itself towards its own apriori conditions with and beyond cosmic time’,i.e. towards its origin (1955, p. 87). Further,Dooyeweerd has shown that ‘A sharp distinctionbetween theoretical judgements and the supra-theoretical pre-judgements, which alone makethe former possible, is a primary requisite ofcritical thought’ (1955, p. 70). Consequently,‘Every philosophical thinker must be willing toaccount critically for the meaning of his formula-tion of questions. He who really does so,necessarily encounters the transcendentalground-idea of meaning and of its origin’ (1955,p. 70). The Kantian system of thought—andtherefore the Habermasian notion of criticalsocial theory and thus critical systems think-ing—never fulfilled the latter requirement.Instead, their thinking is founded upon the yetunresolved dogma of the nature–freedom ten-sion. More specifically, the dogma of Kantianepistemology is that it issues from the assump-tion of the autonomy of theoretical thought (1955,p. 35). Kant did not accept the three transcen-dental ground-ideas as the real hypothesis ofcritical philosophy. Therefore, he could not seethat ‘in their very theoretical use, they must havea real content which necessarily depends uponsupra-theoretic presuppositions differing inaccordance with the religious ground-motivesof theoretic thought’ (1955, p. 89). Instead, ‘He[Kant] restricted their significance theoreticallyto a purely formal–logical one; they have,according to him, only a regulative, systematicfunction in respect to the use of the logicalconcepts (categories) which are related a priori tosensory experience’ (1955, p. 89). When askingwhy Kant, at this critical point, abandoned thereal transcendental motive, Dooyeweerd statesthat Kant ‘had become aware of the unbridgeableantithesis in the ground-motive of nature andfreedom, and now rejected every attempt atdialectical synthesis’ (1955, p. 89). More pre-cisely, the problem is that Kant did not see ‘thathis theoretical epistemology itself remainedbound to a transcendental ground-idea, whosecontents were determined by this very basicmotive’ (1955, p. 89).

In the line of this argument, Strijbos’ (1995)investigation of various systems approachesconcluded that CST does broaden the notion ofrationality when compared with the earlierapproaches, which implies that the normativeand ethical question is assigned a central positionwithin CST. However, Strijbos (1995, p. 373)emphasizes that rationality as such retains itsplace as the necessary, all-embracing frameworkfor approaching reality’. The problem is, thus, that‘Science as an instrument of control is subjected tocriticism by ‘‘critical systems thinking’’ but thiscritical thinking remains subject itself to anautonomous rationality’ (1995, pp. 373–374).

Multimodal Systems Thinking: Presentationand Analysis

Multimodal systems thinking (MST) (e.g. deRaadt 1991, 1997) is the most recent contributionto the family of systems thinking paradigms herepresented, and probably not yet generallyaccepted. MST has its foundation in the Cosmo-nomic philosophy of H. Dooyeweerd (1955),which is founded in the Christian Reforma-tion—the latter provides it with the source ofits normative content and guidance. A secondcentral theoretical component of MST is themultimodal theory, which has been inheritedfrom Dooyeweerd’s general theory of modalspheres. In this respect, Dooyeweerd maintainedthat human thought is based upon and bound toits experience, and that this experience exhibits15 modalities, aspects or levels of laws. MSTcombines Dooyeweerd’s Christian thought andmultimodal theory with, among others, thegeneral systems theory and with managementcybernetics. Methodologically considered, thisapproach offers the living social system model(de Raadt, 1991) and multimodal methodology,(1995), both aiming to support systems design ina broad manner. In de Raadt’s (1996) notion,MST ‘is based upon the presupposition that theuniverse is ordered and that this order encom-passes the totality of natural phenomena andhuman life. This implies that there exists a truththat is absolute and autonomous from man andnature.’




The criticism levelled by MST is similar to thecritique delivered by SST. When it comes to SSTand CST, both are considered to be normativelyunsatisfactory. SST is said to promote nihilism,while CST is said to be founded on a dogma thatassumes human reason to be autonomous.According to MST such a standpoint is unableto provide an appropriate normative guidancefor human affairs. This is the main argumentagainst CST, where MST distinguishes itself byproviding an external source of norms: theChristian faith, which is assumed to transcendhuman autonomy.

MST rejects the intellectual supremacy ofrationality, where the latter is conceived to beembedded within a transcendental normativeorder aiming to determine the status of reasonand science. Therefore, reason is considered to bedependent upon and determined by faith. Godhas provided the universe with laws that governit. Their relation to each other is expressed in themultimodal theory, which is meant to be atheoretical abstraction of the human universethat is governed by both determinative andnormative laws. MST is thus founded on thereligious ground-motive of creation–fall–redemption. An issue of the biblical foundationis to judge whose interpretation of God and theBible is to be considered valid. The Christiancommunity itself has not succeeded in finding acommon unity. Thus, in the present Westerncultures, an unconditional faith in God and JesusChrist is not widely accepted Table 1 shows anoverview of the investigation carried out in thissection.

A COMPARISON OF THE MODEL OFRELIGIOUS GROUND-MOTIVES WITHJACKSON’S EMPLOYMENT OF THEBURRELL–MORGAN MODEL OFSOCIOLOGICAL PARADIGM ANALYSIS

Given the results of this analysis, a reasonablequestion is: what is the value of the above par-adigmatic analysis? In order to provide one pointof reference for the assessment of the value of theparadigmatic investigation, a comparison withanother paradigmatic analysis is made.

Several models have been advanced with thepurpose of investigating the variety ofapproaches of systems thinking (e.g. Ulrich,1983; Miser and Quade, 1985; Bowen, 1986; Edenand Radford, 1990; Jackson, 1991; Strijbos, 1995;Flood and Romm, 1996). One popular approachis Jackson’s (1982, 1991) use of the Burrell andMorgan (1979) model of sociological paradigmsto interpret the various contributions to systemsthinking. This section presents a comparisonbetween Jackson’s investigation and the presentinvestigation. This comparison is aimed toidentify differences between the two models, inorder to illuminate the respective strengths andweaknesses of the model of religious ground-motives, and thereby suggest the value of theparadigmatic analysis presented in this essay. Asummary of Jackson’s analysis is presented priorto the comparison.

Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) model of socio-logical paradigms attempts to illuminate theassumptions on which the various theoreticalmodels within social science are founded. The

Table 1. The religious ground-motives of the four investigated systems thinking paradigms. Hard systems thinking wasfound to articulate the realm of nature of the nature–freedom ground-motive. Soft systems thinking was found to articulatethe realm of freedom of the nature–freedom ground-motive. Critical systems thinking was found to articulate the wholenature–freedom ground-motive, while multimodal systems thinking was found to articulate the biblical motive of creation–

fall–redemption

Paradigms of systems thinking

Hard systems Soft systems Critical systems Multimodal systemsthinking thinking thinking thinking

Dominating religious Nature Freedom Nature–freedom Creation–fall–ground-motive redemption




model is a matrix along two variables. One isabout the nature of social science, and the other isabout the nature of social systems. The first vari-able may take an objectivist or a subjectivist pos-ition. An objectivist position implies realistontology, positivist epistemology, deterministanthropology and nomothetic methodology. Asubjectivist position implies, on the other hand, anominalist ontology, anti-positivist epistemology;voluntarist anthropology, and ideographic meth-odology. The second variable implies assump-tions about the nature of society. One position isthe sociology of regulation of status quo socialsystems, while the other is the sociology of radicalchange, which considers social systems to beconflicting and dynamic. Burrell and Morgancombined these positions and thus obtained fourpossible sociological paradigms. These are thefunctionalist paradigm (objectivist–status quo),the interpretative paradigm (subjectivist–statusquo), the radical humanism paradigm (subjecti-vist–dynamic) and the radical structuralism para-digm (objectivist–dynamic).

The functionalist paradigm implies that thestudied systems are easy to identify and describe,and possess an existence independent of itsobservers. Their study searches for regularitiesand relationships between the various compo-nents. Human behaviour is determined by itsenvironment, and the studied system as such ischaracterized by status quo. Quantitative modelsare built as representations meant to facilitateprediction and control of the studied systems.

Second, the interpretative paradigm implies thatthere are individual interpretations of the obser-

vers, which may well vary according to theobserver. The voluntarism of humans makes itin practice very hard to construct a feasiblequantitative model; the constructed models arequalitative where knowledge is obtained byinvolved studies. Still, the idea of the study assuch is to identify some status quo, so thatunderstanding and eventual prediction and con-trol may be obtained.

Thirdly, the radical structuralist paradigm pos-tulates an independent existence of the studiedsocial reality. It searches for regularities ofdeterministic system behaviour. This implies arepresentation of radical changes and conflicts.

Finally, the radical humanist paradigm considersthe social reality to be a construction of itsobserver, which implies that personal involve-ment is necessary to question these systems, andqualitative representation will be its result.Again there is a notion of transformation andchange of the social systems.

Jackson (1982, 1991) allocated the varioussystems thinking approaches into this model ofsociological paradigms, as follows. Theapproaches labelled hard systems thinking, inother words operations research, systems analy-sis, systems engineering and systems dynamic,were found to belong to the functionalist para-digm. Secondly, approaches belonging to softsystems thinking, that is, soft systems methodol-ogy, interactive planning, and social systemsdesign, were allocated to the interpretativeparadigm. Thirdly, critical systems heuristics ofcritical systems thinking were found to be radicalhumanist in orientation; see Table 2 for an

Table 2. Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) model of sociological paradigms together with some systems thinking approaches asallocated by Jackson’s (1982, 1991) investigation.

Radical change sociology

Radical humanism: Radical structuralism:Subjective CSH empty Objective social

sciencesocial science Interpretative: Functionalist:

SSM, IP, SSD OR, SA, SE, SD

Regulation sociology

OR, operations research; SA, systems analysis; SE, systems engineering; SD, systems dynamics; SSM, soft systems methodology;IP, interactive planning; SSD, social systems design; CSH, critical systems heuristics.




overview. Jackson’s investigation implies thathard systems thinking was found to be function-alist, soft systems thinking was found to beinterpretative, critical systems thinking wasfound to be radical humanist, while radicalstructuralism was found to have no relatingsystems thinking paradigm.

What is the value of the model of religiousground-motives for paradigmatic analysis ofsystems thinking paradigms? is the question.Whatever the result of Jackson’s investigation ofsystems thinking paradigms, the religiousground-motive model shows its limitation, byshowing the limitation of the Burrell–Morganmodel itself and therefore of any positioning ofsystems thinking paradigms within the Burrell–Morgan model. The Burrell–Morgan model itselfis grounded on the nature–freedom ground-motive. This both articulates and forces the inve-stigated systems thinking paradigms into theunbridgeable tension of dualism, founded onthe assumption of autonomous reason. Hence,the nature–freedomground-motive ismanifestedin the assumptions of dualism in the nature ofsocial science, of the Burrell and Morgan model.Realist ontology, positivist epistemology, deter-minist anthropology and nomothetic methodol-ogy express perfectly the nature realm, whilenominalist ontology, anti-positivist epistemol-ogy, voluntarism anthropology and ideographicmethodology express the realm of freedom. Aproblem with the use of the Burrell–Morganmodel for paradigmatic analysis is thus that itdoes not allow the detection of problems in thenature–freedom ground-motive governing thevarious systems thinking paradigms; this is sincethe Burrell–Morgan model founds itself on thevery same religious ground-motive. A secondproblem is that this model misconceptualizessystems thinking paradigms that are not basedon the nature–freedom ground-motive, such asmultimodal systems thinking. Finally, Jackson’sanalysis does not inquire explicitly into thesources of norms of these paradigms.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This investigation starts with the conviction thatit is important to understand the intellectual and

pre-intellectual (i.e. religious) foundations ofsystems thinking paradigms. The reason for thisis that each paradigm consists of theories, modelsand methods employed for problem solving inhuman affairs. This implies that the use of thesetheoretical constructions in problem solvinginfluences the content of the generated problemsolutions and hence the design of how humanaffairs ought to be. The latter implies necessarilythat a normative decision is made, when makinga choice how something ought to be. Given thatall norms are ultimately based upon religion—whether on Christianity, Judaism, Islam,Buddhism, or any other—the question of thisinvestigation was: which religious ground-motives govern systems thinking paradigms?The results show that:

* the hard systems thinking paradigm is basedon the nature realm of the nature–freedomreligious ground-motive;

* the soft systems thinking paradigm is based onthe freedom realm of the nature–freedomground-motive;

* the critical systems thinking paradigm isbased on the whole nature–freedom religiousground-motive;

* the multimodal systems thinking paradigm isbased on the creation–fall–redemption reli-gious ground-motive;

* a progress or evolution in time of systemsthinking paradigms may be identified; start-ing with HST, hence the nature realm, throughSST, hence the freedom realm, and currentlyending with CST, hence the nature-freedomrealms, and MST the creation–fall–redemp-tion motive.

This means that HST, SST and CST arefounded on religious convictions containing aninherent contradiction, implying that these para-digms do not offer a coherent and stablefoundation for normative guidance. MST, onthe other hand, is founded on a coherent andstable religious conviction, which does offernormative guidance. However, this guidanceseems to lack the social contract necessary for itsemployment in practice. Consequently, thismeans that none of the systems thinkingparadigms, here investigated, provide viable




normative guidance. This can open variousquestions, such as: What should characterizesuch an approach? Is it possible to formulatesuch an approach? Or even: is it desirable todo so?

Finally, in order to assess some aspects of thisinvestigation’s value, the employed model ofreligious ground-motive was compared toanother model of paradigmatic analysis. This isJackson’s use of the Burrell andMorgan model ofsociological paradigms. The result of this com-parison shows that: (a) the very model of Burrelland Morgan as such is founded on the nature–freedom religious ground-motive, hence on atheoretical antinomy; (b) and, as a consequenceof this, its analysis of systems thinking para-digms misconceptualizes the foundations ofthese paradigms with regard to their normativefoundations, when compared with the model ofreligious ground-motives. The value of thepresent investigation resides in the fact thatnew knowledge about systems thinking para-digms has been obtained; knowledge that is, inour opinion, of importance because it searchesfor the ability to set the direction for ourmanagerial decisions and actions.

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Identification of normative sources for systems thinking: an inquiry into religious ground-motives for systems thinking paradigms