Idaho Cleanup Project _____________________ ICP Spent Nuclear Fuel Examination Barbara Beller for Kathleen Hain, PBS-12 FPD April 15, NSNFP Strategy Meeting

Idaho Cleanup Project_____________________

ICP Spent Nuclear Fuel Examination

Barbara Beller forKathleen Hain, PBS-12 FPD

April 15, NSNFP Strategy Meeting

Idaho Cleanup Project

U.S. Department of EnergyIdaho Operations Office 2

History of SNF Examination• 1998 EM-60 memo to INL and SRS directed use of technically based criteria

for receipt of FRR SNF.– EM had little experience receiving FRR SNF.

– Criteria were based on National Spent Nuclear Fuel Program, Foreign Research Reactor Fuel Acceptance Criteria – Failed Fuel Report.

• Material control and accountability compliance requires verification of unique identifier for each SNF element.

• ICP cannot readily handle individual fuel elements to examine SNF at receiving/storage facility (CPP-603).

• ICP completes physical fuel examination at pre-loading and “accountability” at loading for both FRR and DRR SNF (2 trips). Tamper indicating device fixed, removed at receipt, buckets unloaded from cask.

• SNF identified as posing a potential risk to the receipt facility (at unloading or in the future i.e. 2035) is canned prior to loading.



Receipt Facility Considerations Leading to Examination

• Review of receipt of specific fuel against documented safety basis for fuel handling and storage at receipt facility.

• Evaluation of impact of (degraded) spent fuel condition on handling and interim storage at receipt facility.

• Planning and scheduling for fuel cask unloading, and handling for storage placement at receipt facility.

• Evaluation of monitoring of fuel under fuel management program for interim storage at receipt facility.

• Additional planning, as appropriate, for preparing fuel for ultimate disposition post-interim storage.

– Source Document:

Foreign Research Reactor Spent Fuel Return Program

U.S. DOE Experience in Planning, Receipt and Transportation

A Review and Lessons Learned

October, 2008



Elements of SNF Examination for Dry Storage by ICP Contractor• ICP contractor is responsible for operation of CPP-603 within the

approved nuclear safety authorization basis.

• Required Shippers Data review and approval required.

• Each SNF element is videotaped and written record of the visual inspection is completed (length, instrumentation, unusual attachments, as well as any damage).

• The unique fuel identifier is verified in addition to verification completed by the reactor site fuel handlers; tied to the fuel fabrication data.

• Any questions necessary for authorization basis compliance calculations are asked. (Any unexpected condition e.g. hose clamp.)

• Decision is made on which elements will require canning based on storage requirements at receipt facility.

• Coordinate with shipper concerning fuel position in basket.



Damaged or Compromised Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF)• Normal reactor operations and fuel handling can result in damage to

SNF that may cause a release of radioactive contamination or fuel handling issues at receipt facility in the future.

• ICP has documented damage to the aluminum and stainless steel clad TRIGA and SNF received from Foreign Research Reactors (FRR) since 1997 and Domestic Research Reactors (DRR) since 2003:

– Corrosion, cuts, bulges, dents, scratches

• In addition, ICP requires canning of damaged SNF to prevent contamination of storage facilities, exposure to current and future workers and control during future characterization and packaging processes.

• On-site visual examination with the use of cameras is the method used to identify SNF that should be canned (360°, full length).



Gouge/Cut



Damage/ Gouge



Crack near Bottom of SST Element



“Bulge” Dropped? (Al)



Corrosion Suspect Dissimilar Metals of Weld Procedure (SST)



Cut /Corrosion (Al)



Dent/Corrosion/Pit (SST)



Early At Reactor Examination Pros

• Condition of SNF is known early enough to address any concerns.

• Loading issues can be resolved.– SNF is received in CPP-603 in a shipping basket and stored in the basket.

– SNF is not handled again until the basket is transferred to the future Idaho Spent Fuel Facility (TBD).

• Special equipment can be identified.

• Authorization basis issues can be resolved; SAR changes made and approved.

• Receipt procedures can be written to account for and issues unique to this shipment.

• Sufficient cans can be provided.

• Coordination with shipper.



Early At Reactor Examination Cons

• Expense– EM cost of travel to reactor and time at reactor.

– Reactor cost to handle SNF for examination; may be paid by NE/NNSA.

– Much of the work appears to be redundant.

• Contract interference– NE/NNSA contracts with reactor and shipper, remember Roles and Responsibility

– EM contract with receiver

• Political– Examination can be perceived as questioning nuclear regulation compliance



New SNF Receipt Issue

• Regulatory Requirements and framework for fuel manufacturing, reactor operation and fuel storage.

• Documentation requirements are established – can data available fulfill our data needs?

• Is the paperwork available a “record” prepared under an acceptable QA program?

• Are the data needs different for and dependent on fuel disposition path (recycling or disposal)?

• References: 1) NRC Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation, Interim Staff

Guidance - 1, Revision 2 Classifying the Condition of Spent Nuclear Fuel for Interim Storage and Transportation Based on Function

2) IAEA-TECDOC-1593

3) FRR Spent Fuel Return Program Lessons Learned October 2008

Documents

Idaho Cleanup Project _____________________ ICP Spent Nuclear Fuel Examination Barbara Beller for Kathleen Hain, PBS-12 FPD April 15, NSNFP Strategy Meeting