Ibn Sina: Qiyas iv.2¯ - Wilfrid Hodges · Ibn Sina: Qiyas iv.2¯ Trans. Wilfrid Hodges, based on the Cairo text ed. Ibrahim Madkour et al. (DRAFT ONLY) 4 November 2012 190 » B@

Ibn Sina: Qiyās iv.2

Trans. Wilfrid Hodges,based on the Cairo text ed. Ibrahim Madkour et al.

(DRAFT ONLY)

4 November 2012

190

» ✏ �B @ …æ ⌘ÇÀ @ ⌦̇ Ø ⇣Ü C£ B� @ ‡ Aæ” B� @ ·”

⇣È¢ ⇣J j÷œ @ ⇣H AÉ AJ⌦ ⇣ÆÀ @ ⌦̇ Ø

iv.2 On syllogisms that are mixtures of possible and absolute in thefirst figure

: » ✏ �B @ H. QÂ îÀ A Ø . » ✏�B @ …æ ⌘ÇÀ @ ⌦̇

Ø ⇣á ¢÷œ @ ·∫“÷œ @ † C⇣J k @� » Ag …✏” �A⇣JJ⌦ Ø

[4.2.1] Let us examine the facts about the mixtures of possible and abso- 190.4lute in the first figure. The first mood is:{Prior Anal i.15, 33b25. }

. ‡ Aæ” B� AK. @ h.✏…ø ✏ ‡�@ QÎ A ¢ Ø , ‡ Aæ” B� AK. @ H.

✏…ø , H. h.✏…ø

(1)Every C is a B;and every B is an A with possibility;so it is evident that every C is an A with possibility.

·∫÷fl⌦ È✏ K�@ QÎ A ¢ Ø , @ H. ·” Z ⌦̇Ê⌘Ö ‡ Ò∫K⌦ B ‡

�@ ·∫÷fl⌦ , H. h.✏…ø : ⌦̇

G A⌘JÀ @And the second is: 190.6

(2)Every C is a B;and it’s possible that no B is an A.So it’s evident that it’s possible that no C is an A.

1

QIYAS .2 Prior Anal i.15, 33b25

⇣È J∫‹ÿ ¯ Q ™íÀ @ ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢” ¯ Q�. ∫À @ ⇣I K Aø @ X @� A✏”�@ , @ h. ·” Z ⌦̇Ê

⌘Ö ‡ Ò∫K⌦ B ‡�@

[4.2.2] When the major premise is absolute and the minor premise is a 190.7possibility proposition,

⇣I K Aø @ X @� ¯ Q ™íÀ @✏ ‡ �B ΩÀ X . ⇣ÈÍk. ⇣È✏K⌦

�@ ˙Œ´ i. ⇣J ⌧K⌦ Ä AJ⌦ ⇣ÆÀ @✏ ‡�@ A J✏⌧⌦K. ‡ Ò∫K⌦ Å⌧⌦ Ø

it is not clear that the syllogism entails a conclusion with any modality.That is because when the minor premise

⇣á ¢” È✏ K�@ ⇣ÈÀ Ag ·” ºP YK⌦ ⇣È ÎÒÀ @ » ✏�@ ·∫K⌦ ’À XÒk. Ò” ’∫k ⇣Im⇢

⇣' ⇣Ë ✏Ò ⇣ÆÀ AK. ⇣È g @ Xis potentially included in things that satisfy a factual condition, one is notimmediately conscious of whether the resulting mode [of the conclusion]is absolute

ÈÇ Æ JK. A J✏⌧⌦K. ’∫mÃ '@ ⇣Im⇢⇣' ⇣Ë ✏Ò ⇣ÆÀ AK. » Ò k YÀ @ ‡ Aø ‡ @� , ©

⇣Ø @ÒÀ @ † C⇣J k C� À ·∫‹ÿ �@

or possibility, even if in this syllogism the potential inclusion in those things 190.10is self-evident.

. A“ÓD⌦ ø �@ A J∫‹ÿ �@ A ⇣Æ ¢” È KÒª » Ag , …æ ⌘Ç�⌦ ⌦̄

Y✏À @ A÷ ✏ fl @� . Ä AJ⌦⇣ÆÀ @ @ YÎ ·”

What is unclear is just whether [the conclusion is] absolute, or possible, oreither of these two.

‡ AJ⌦J. À @ ⌦̇ Ø ⇣á ¢÷œ @ – QÀ �@ È J´ ·∫“÷œ @ – QÀ ⌦̇

Ø ≠J⌦À�A⇣JÀ @ @ YÎ » Ag ‡ Ò∫K⌦ B ‡ X A�

ØThat shows that this premise-pair doesn’t behave like a pair of possibilitypremises as regards entailing a possibility proposition or an absolute onein a proof.

⌘Ä ✏Ò ⌘Ç�⌦ B ⇣Ë ✏Ò ⇣ÆÀ AK. ·∫“÷œ @ ’∫mÃ '@ ⇣Im⇢⇣' º A JÎ » Ò k YÀ @ ✏ ‡ A�

Ø . ·�⌦⇣J J∫‹ÿ ·” ⌦̄ Y✏À @ » Amª

In the case of the two possibility premises, the potential inclusion in therelevant class doesn’t confuse

‡ Aø A✏‹œ . ‡ Aæ” @� ‡ Aæ” B� @ ‡ Aæ” @�✏ ‡�@ : ⇣È j. ™K. ÈJ⌦ Ø ·Î YÀ @ ⌦̇Ê

î ⇣ÆK⌦ …K. , ·Î YÀ @the mind; in fact the mind judges the question quickly from the fact thatthe possibly possible is possible. When

, ê @Q⇣� Ø B� AK. �@ Å∫™À AK. È⇣J K AK. @� ·∫÷fl⌦ ’À » ✏

�B @ …æ ⌘ÇÀ @ ⌦̇ Ø A✏J⌦

✏ ø ¯ Ò´ YÀ @ Ë YÎthis claimed conclusion is universally quantified, and in the first figure, one 190.15can’t show [the correctness of the syllogism] by conversion or by ecthesis,

Transcription checked 7 Sep 12. Readings checked 9 Sep 12.

2


191

. ≠ mÃ '@ : È⇣J K AK. @�⇣áK⌦ Q£ ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ‡

�@ I. j. J⌦ Øso it has to be shown by absurdity.

…J⌦À X …” Aø Q�⌦ ́ Ä AJ⌦ ⇣ÆÀ @ @ YÎ ‡ Ò∫ Ø[4.2.3] The fact that this syllogism is not perfect is an indication 191.1

{This paragraph looks like an interpolation, possibly rough notes by IbnSı̄nā himself that were prematurely included by a copyist. The precedingand succeeding sentences join up.}

h. ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ‡�@ ·∫÷fl⌦ A” ✏…ø ✏ ‡�@ Ë A J™” , H. h.

✏…ø : A JÀÒ⇣Ø ✏ ‡�@ ✏ · £ ·” ° ́ ˙Œ´of the error of the person who thought that when we say

(3) Every C is a B.

it means

(4) Everything that could be a C, and [everything] that truly is a C,is a B.

{Cognitive point: if person X doesn’t see the syllogism immediately, this isevidence that person X is not ampliating. Cf. the distinct point at 183.5. }

h. ‡ Aø A✏‹œ ÈÀ A⇣Ø A” ˙Œ´ Q”�B @ ‡ Aø ÒÀ . H. ÒÍ Ø , h. ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ‡

�@ ✏ií�⌦ If the thing was as he said, when C{NB Nice example of explanation by expansion. }

…J⌦⇣Ø A” ⇣È ‘g. ·” ÒÎ ‡ AæÀ , …™ ÆÀ AK. ÈJ⌦ Ø C g @ X ‡ Aø …K. ; ⇣Ë ✏Ò ⇣ÆÀ AK. H. ⌦̇

Ø C g @ Xis included in B in potential — or rather it is included in it in act [on hisaccountr] — then it would have been one of all the things that are asserted

» Ò ⇣Æ÷œ @ ⌦̇ Ø …™ ÆÀ AK. ¯ Q ™íÀ @ … g X X @� . ÈÇ

Æ JK. A J✏⌧⌦K. AÉ AJ⌦⇣Ø ‡ Aø , @ È✏ K @� ÈJ⌦ ´

to be As, and the syllogism would have been a self-evident one, since the 191.5minor term is included in act in what is asserted

. ✏…æÀ @ ˙Œ´of ‘all [Bs]’.

·∫“÷œ @ Q” �B @ ✏ ‡�@ ˙Œ´ ⌦̇ ÊJ. ” ÒÍ Ø ≠ mÃ '@ @ YÎ Èk. A ✏”

�A Ø[4.2.4] As for this absurdity: it is built on the fact about propositions 191.6

3


that in themselves are possibly true,

, È” Q K⌦ È” Q K⌦ A” …K. ; » Am◊ È™ ì ·” êQ™K⌦ B ✏—´�B @ ˙ Ê™÷œ AK. ÒÀ ÈÇ Æ K ⌦̇

Øthat if they are broad-possible then no impossibility results from assumingthem; so what follows from them must rather follow from them

. ✏– A´ ·∫‹ÿ ÒÎas a broad-possible proposition.

‡�B @ » Ò¢ � ‡�@ A JK. ·Çm⇢'⌦ C Ø , ≠ É A“J⌦ Ø ΩÀ X ⇣È ⇣ÆJ⌦ ⇣Æk ˙Õ @� A K�A”�@ Y⇣Ø

We have talked about the truth of this fact already, and there seems no good 191.9reason to draw out

» Òím◊ ✏ ‡ A� Ø . H. AÓDÖ @�

̈ Qk © ì ·” ÈK. ⇣Ë X A™À @ ⇣H ✏Qk. A÷fl. ΩÀ X ‡ AJ⌦K. ⌦̇ Ø

an explanation that spells it out at length in the usual way. The customary 191.10way of making sense of it{Read ’ishābin with several mss, for the Cairo ’asbābin. }

B A” © ì ·” – Q K⌦ B ⇣È “m.Ã 'AK. . ≠ É A“J⌦ Ø ÈJ⌦ ´ A J À X A” , ⇣Ë X A™À @ ÈK. ⇣H ✏Qk. A”, © J⇣J÷fl⌦

is what we indicated earlier. In brief, no impossibility follows from theassumption of something that is not impossible.

. ⌦̆⇣ÆJ⌦ ⇣Æk ·∫‹ÿ B

✏ @� ⌦̆⇣ÆJ⌦ ⇣ÆmÃ '@ ·∫“÷œ @ © ì ·” – Q K⌦ B È

✏ K @� : » Ò⇣Æ K A JÇÀ . © J⇣J‹ÿ Q”�@

This is not to say that only what is strictly possible follows from the as-sumption of something that is striclty possible.

˙ Ê™÷œ @ ˙Œ´ …“⇣J ⌘Ç÷œ @ ✏– A™À @ ˙ Ê™÷œ AK. ·∫“÷œ @ © ì ·” – Q K⌦ B È✏ K�@ @ YÓE. ⌦̇

Ê™ K …K.What we mean is rather that only what is broad-possible follows from theassumption of something broad-possible, where broad-possible is used tocover both

, ⇣È✏⇣JJ. À @ È” Q K⌦ B © J⇣J“÷œ @✏ ‡ A�

Ø . ⌦̇✏◊ A™À @ ˙ Ê™÷œ AK. ·∫‹ÿ B

✏ @� ⌦̄ P QÂ îÀ @ ⇣á ¢÷œ @ ✏ê A mÃ '@

what is narrow-possible and what is absolute and what is necessary. Innone of these cases does anything impossible doesn’t follow from it,

·∫“÷œ @ – Q K⌦ A”✏ ‡ A�

Ø . A✏K⌦ P QÂ ï �@ A ⇣Æ ¢” �@ A✏J⌦ ⇣ÆJ⌦ ⇣Æk A J∫‹ÿ – Q À © ì A” ‡ Aø Z @ÒÉ

whether what was assumed for purposes of the entailment was strict pos- 191.15sible or absolute or necessary. So what follows the broad possible

4


H. Yª È” Q K⌦ B » Aj÷œ @ Q�⌦ ́ H.

Y∫À @ ✏ ‡ A� Ø ΩÀ YÀ . ‡ Aø A” A J�K Aø © J⇣J‹ÿ Q�⌦ ́ ÒÍ Ø ⌦̇

✏◊ A™À @is not impossible, in all cases. And for that reason, a falsehood which is notimpossible doesn’t entail a falsehood

Transcription checked 7 Sep 12. Readings checked 12 Oct 12.

5

QIYAS .2 Prior Analytics i.15, 34a34

192

‡ @� …K. , †QÂ⌘Ö CK. ÈÇ Æ JK. A÷ �fl @ X È íJ⌦ ⇣Æ K ⇣Ü Yì

✏⇣áj⇣JÇ�⌦ ⌦̄ Y✏À @ ÒÎ , » Am◊

which is impossible, i.e. a proposition whose contradictory negation is per-manently, intrinsically and unconditionally false. If

. » Am◊ Q�⌦ ́ H. Yª È” QÀ H.

Y∫À @ È” QÀa false proposition does follow, then it is a falsehood which is not impossi-ble.

✏…ø , ‡ Aæ” B� AK. H. h.✏…ø ‡ Aø @ X A�

Ø[4.2.5] So:

(5)When every C is a B with possibility;and every B is an A with truth;then we say: Every C is an A with possibility.

{One would think that if Ibn Sı̄nā accepted Barbara MMM, then he wouldhave deduced this one from it by simply deducing possible from actual.Does he deduce possible from actual? We saw there is no direct evidenceof his accepting Barbara MMM as opposed to Barbara QQQ. }

ΩÀ Yª È✏ K�@ P ÒÓD⌘Ñ÷œ @ . ‡ Aæ” B� AK. @ h.✏…ø ✏ ‡ @� : » Ò

⇣Æ J Ø , XÒk. ÒÀ AK. @ H.The standard view is that [the conclusion] is likewise{This is Prior Analytics i.15, 34a34–34b6. The ‘likewise’ suggests, surpris-ingly, that here he takes the possibility in the premise to be broad too. }

’À ‡ @� È✏ K�@ ˙Œ´ ⌦̇

ÊJ. ” ≠ mÃ '@ ΩÀ X . ≠ mÃ 'AK. ·✏�⌦J. ⇣⌧K⌦ ‡�@ ΩÀ X . ✏– A™À @ ‡ Aæ” B� AK.

a broad-possibility proposition, and that this is proved by absurdity. Thecontradiction is created on the basis that if

. ‡ Ò∫K⌦ Å⌧⌦À ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. ⌦̄ Y✏À @ ÒÎ , ·∫‹ÿ Q�⌦ ́ . ·∫‹ÿ Q�⌦ ́ ·∫J⌦ Ø , A J∫‹ÿ @ YÎ ·∫K⌦

[the conclusion] is not a possibility statement, then we can suppose that 192.5[the content of] the conclusion is impossible. To be impossible is to be nec-essarily not the case.

, ‡ Ò∫K⌦ Å⌧⌦À , ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ @ ⌦̄ Y À …K. A ⇣Æ÷œ @ ⌦̇

✏◊ A™À @ ÒÎ ‡ X @� ·∫“÷œ @ @ YÎ ✏ ‡�@ ✏Ω ⌘É C Ø

(This leaves no doubt that the ‘possible’ here is the broad possible which isopposite to necessary — it is [a proposition that is] broad possible and willnot be the case.){NB This is scholarly interpretation of the text in front of him. Aristotle? }

6


êQ Æ JÀ , @ h.✏…ø Å⌧⌦À ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. ÒÎ ⇣Èj. J⌦⇣⌧ JÀ @ ëJ⌦ ⇣Æ K ‡ X @�

Y g �A J Ø . ⌦̇✏◊ A™À @ ✏̄⌦

�@So then let us take the contradictory negation of the conclusion, which is

(6) With necessity, not every C is an A.

and let us assume that the proposition

⌘IÀ A⌘JÀ @ …æ ⌘ÇÀ @ ·” i. ⇣J ⌧J⌦ Ø , B Am◊ ΩÀ X Å⌧⌦À X @� , XÒk. Ò” È✏ K�@ ˙Œ´ H. h.

✏…ø ✏ ‡�@

(7) Every C is a B.

is true (noting that it was not impossible). Then (6) and (7) entail by thethird figure{In mood Bocardo LXL (Thom). }

– Q K⌦ ’À » Am◊ @ YÎ , @ H.✏…ø ⇣Ü C£ B� AK. ‡ Aø , @ H.

✏…ø Å⌧⌦À ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK.✏ ‡�@

(8) With necessity, not every B is an A.

But [we had that] with absoluteness, every B is an A. This is impossible.

. AÓD⌦ Ø ºÒ∫ ⌘Ç÷œ @ ¯ Q k�B @ ·´ ‡ Ò∫J⌦ Ø , » Aj÷œ @ Q�⌦ ́ H.

Y∫À @ ·´ B , ≠J⌦À�A⇣JÀ @ ·”

The impossibility doesn’t result from using an invalid syllogistic mood.Nor is it a consequence of the [possibly] false (7), which is not impossi- 192.10ble. So it will come from the other premise, the one that was in doubt.{The variant and well-supported text reading al-ḡayri looks better to me,but the sense is not affected. }

. » Am◊ ΩÀ X ‡ X A� Ø

Hence that premise (6) is the impossible one.{NB Implied use of principle: If conclusion of valid syllogism is impossible,one of the premises must also be impossible. }

@ YÎ ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ‡�@ © J” ‡ Aø Y⇣Ø » ✏ �B @ ’✏Œ™÷œ @ ✏ ‡�@ Qª Y J Ø , » ✏ �B @ ’Ê⌦ ™

⇣JÀ @ ⌦̇ Ø A” @ YÎ

[4.2.6] This is what is in the First Teaching, so we mention that the First 192.12Teacher denied that this [third figure]

·∫K⌦ ’À ‡ @� È✏ K A�

Ø , ⌦̄ P QÂ îÀ @ È J” i. ⇣J K

�@ Y ⇣Æ Ø ‡�B @ . ⌦̄ P QÂ îÀ @ i. ⇣J ⌧K⌦ ≠J⌦À

�A⇣JÀ @, A✏K⌦ P QÂ ï

7


composition entails a necessity proposition. But here a necessity proposi-tion has been deduced. (And in fact if it was not a necessity proposition

A“ª ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï ⇣Èj. J⌦⇣⌧ JÀ @ Ë YÎ✏ ‡�@ @ YÎ ·” ΩÀ ·✏�⌦J. Ø . ⌦̄ XÒk. ÒÀ @

⇣È✏J⌦ ⇣ÆJ⌦ ⇣ÆmÃ 'AK. ë⇣Ø A JK⌦ ’Àit wouldn’t genuinely contradict the impermanent proposition.) So it isclear to you from this that this conclusion is necessary, just as{His point is not that this is a further reason for believing it’s necessity, butthat we actually need necessity for the application he has just given. Pre-sumably his problem is that two apparently contradictory absolute propo-sitions can both be true in the same context. }

⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï » Aæ ⌘É�B @ ’ ✏Œ™⇣K ⌘IJ⌦k , » ✏

�B @ ’Ê⌦ ™⇣JÀ @ ⌦̇

Ø XP Ò⇣K ’À A÷ ✏ fl @� . ·m⇢ ' AÎ A J✏J⌦´ X @�

we ourselves have articulated it. It was not mentioned in the First Teaching,where the figures are taught as something necessary{Not confirmed in the manuscripts, but in Ibn Sı̄nā ka-mā ’id

¯

ā is commonand I haven’t seen another ka-mā ’id

¯

. But the sense is a bit strange. Fortranslation I ignored the ’id

¯

.}


8


193

⇣I “™⇣JÉ @� , ⇣I “™⇣JÉ @� A✏‹œ AÓ✏ E�@ ¯ Q⇣K B�@ . ⇣H A K Aj⇣J” B� @ ê AJ⌦⇣KP B� @ …J⌦⌧. É ˙Œ´

for exercising [the student] and testing [the material]. Don’t you see thatwhen you use it, you use it{’imtih

.

ān is usually testing not of the student but of the material - tryingit out so as to build up experience and intuitions. He says at 204.11 thatthe modal syllogisms in Aristotle are mostly for ’imtih

.

ān and they are notdefinitive; see also 208.6. Elsewhere he says ’irtiyād

.

is the purpose of non-demonstrative syllogisms. I know no other place where he suggests thatthe predicative figures are just for ‘testing’. }

. ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ î À ⇣Èj. ⇣J J”as entailing a necessity conclusion?

·” , ⇣ËP ÒíÀ @ Ë YÎ ˙Œ´ ≠ mÃ '@ @ YÎ ·✏�⌦J. ⇣K ‡�@ ·∫÷fl⌦ Y⇣Ø È✏ K�@ ˙Œ´

[4.2.7] This use of absurdity can be justified 193.2

Å⌧⌦À ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. ‡ Aø ‡ @� : » A⇣ÆK⌦ ‡

�@ …K. ; ⇣È✏⇣JJ. À @ » Am◊ Q�⌦ ́ H.

Yª Y g �ÒK⌦ ‡�@ Q�⌦ ́

without any appeal to the device of taking [a consequence of a possibleproposition] as [perhaps] false but not impossible. Instead one says:

(9)If with necessity not every C is an A;and every B is an A

⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ‡�@ ⌦̇

G A⌘JÀ @ …æ ⌘ÇÀ @ ·” I. k. @Ò Ø , @ H.✏…ø ‡ Aø , @ h.

✏…øthen by the second figure it has to be that

(10) With necessity not every C is a B.

{Second figure Baroco XLL (Thom). This is another proof of 192.2 by con-tradiction, but taking the other premise. }

@Ò J✏⌧⌦K. Y⇣Ø . ≠ g @ YÎ , H. h.✏…ø ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ‡

�@ A J∫‹ÿ ‡ Aø , H. h.✏…ø Å⌧⌦À

But [by the other premise in (5) it was possible that every C is a B, and this 193.5makes an absurdity. They also showed{It seems ‘they’ is Prior Anal i.15, 34b2–6, but if so Ibn Sı̄nā seems to have atext with different modalities from the standard Greek. }

, H. h.✏…ø : ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ˙

✏⇣Êk ⇣Ë XÒk. ⇣È J∫“÷œ @ @Ò ™k. ‡�AK. Q k

�@ Èk. ÒK. ≠ mÃ '@ @ YÎ

9


this absurdity in another way, by making the possiblility premise a real-world proposition so that the syllogism becomes:

(11)Every C is a B;and every B is an A;so every C is an A.

{For his text to make sense, the conclusion should be with possibility.}

I. m.⇢'⌦ ‡ Aø A” , @ h.✏…ø Å⌧⌦À ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. ‡ Aø . @ h.

✏…æ Ø , @ H.✏…ø

Then [they assumed that] with necessity not every C is an A. But there wasno need for them to give{NB Here mā kāna with mā a negation. }

. » ✏ �B @ ·´ @ YÎ Q ✏ k �ÒK⌦ ‡�@

this argument when they had given the first one.

‡�@ I. m.⇢'⌦ B ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢÷œ @ ⇣H A”✏Y ⇣Æ÷œ @ ✏ ‡ @� : Ë A J™” A” » ✏

�B @ ’Ê⌦ ™⇣JÀ @ ⌦̇

Ø @ YÎ Y™K. …J⌦⇣Ø[4.2.8] In the First Teaching, it says after this what he has in mind: that 193.9

the absolute premises shouldn’t{Prior Anal i.15, 34b7}

C Ø A” A⇣J⇣Ø ⇣Ü Yì Y⇣Ø AÎP ÒÉ ✏ ‡�@ AÍ⇣Ø C£ @� ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ˙✏⇣Êk , ⇣È✏⇣JJ. À @ AÎP ÒÉ ˙Õ @� ⇣I

Æ⇣J K⌦refer to their quantifier at all, in such a way that their absoluteness is that 193.10their quantifier is true at some time. So the proposition{NB Absoluteness on the quantifier. Here it clearly means that the timequantifier is given a particular (in general imaginary) instantiation, whichapparently he regards as attached to the subject quantifier. }

. ‡ A” QÀ @ YÎ ⌦̇ Ø H. h.

✏…ø Ë A J™” , H. h.✏…ø : ⇣H A ⇣Æ ¢÷œ @ ⌦̇

Ø » A ⇣ÆK⌦ ‡�@ I. m.⇢'⌦

(12) Every C is a B,

in the meaning that every C is a B at such-and-such a time, shouldn’t beused as an absolute proposition.

·∫K⌦ ’À @ X @� , ‡ AÇ � @� º ✏Qj⇣J”

✏…ø ✏ ‡�@ A” A⇣J⇣Ø ⇣Ü Yí�⌦ ‡�@ © K A” B È✏ K �B ΩÀ X

This is because there is nothing to prevent its being true at some time thatevery moving thing is a human, if there is

10


: A J ⇣Ø X @� . A J⇣Ø Yì , º ✏Qj⇣JK⌦ ‡

�@ ·∫÷fl⌦ ÄQ Ø ✏…ø : A J ⇣Ø @ X @� . ËQ�⌦ ́ º ✏Qj⇣J”

nothing else moving. But the proposition

(13) Every horse can be moving.

is true, and when we say

ÄQ Ø ✏…ø ✏ ‡�@ È J´ I. m.⇢'⌦ ’À . A” ⇣I⇣Ø ✏̄⌦�@ A K AÇ � @� ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ‡

�@ ·∫÷fl⌦ º ✏Qj⇣J” ✏…ø

(14) Every moving thing [[can be]] a human (i.e. at such-and-such atime).

it doesn’t follow from this that every horse{It has to be ‘Every moving thing is a human’, in spite of the lack of ms sup-port. Also Ibn Sı̄nā has missed Aristotle’s argument, which is that with thisinterpretation the syllogism can’t be valid, because of the all/none coun-terexamples. Note also that Aristotle speaks of the counterexample conclu-sions as ‘following’, as noted by Striker p. 148. }

…™k. ‡ A� Ø . ‡ AÇ � @� Ä @Q

Ø �B @ ·” Z ⌦̇Ê⌘Ö B ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. …K. , A K AÇ � @� ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ‡

�@ ·∫‹ÿcan be a human. With necessity, no horse is a human. 193.15

’Ê⌦ ™⇣JÀ @ ⌦̇

Ø …J⌦⇣Ø A” @ YÍ Ø . ‡ @ÒJ⌦k ÄQ Ø✏…ø ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. ‡ Aø , ‡ @ÒJ⌦mÃ '@ ‡ AÇ � B� @ » YK.

With necessity every horse is an animal, but this is putting ‘animal’ in placeof ‘human’. So this is what was said in the First Teaching.{He seems to miss that this in Aristotle is an application of the all/nonemethod for proving sterility. }

. Ä AJ⌦⇣Ø È J´ ≠✏À �A⇣JK⌦ B Q�. ª

�B @ @ YÎ …⌘J” ‡ Ò∫K⌦✏ ‡ �B AJ. ⌧. É @ YÎ …™k. Y ⇣Æ Ø , » ✏

�B @It has been counted as a reason for not constructing any syllogism with amajor premise of this kind.


11


194✏ ‡�@ , Y✏J⌦m.⇢'. Å⌧⌦À ⇣È ÆíÀ @ Ë

YÎ ˙Œ´ ⌦̄ XÒk. ÒÀ @⇣á ¢÷œ @ » A“™⇣JÉ @�

✏ ‡�@ ✏l⇡ï ‡ AK. Y ⇣Æ ØSo it is clearly correct that the use of absolute and impermanent proposi-tions of the kind described above is not good, and that

. È ÆÀ A m⇢'⌦ » ✏�B @ ’Ê⌦ ™

⇣JÀ @the First Teaching disagrees with it.{Later on this page he gives his dissenting perspective: we should ask whatthe speaker intended. }

¯ Q�. ∫À @✏ ‡ A�

Ø , ≠✏À �Ò” Q�⌦ ́ Ä AJ⌦ ⇣ÆÀ @ @ YÎ✏ ‡ @� : » Ò

⇣ÆK⌦ ‡�@ …�K A ⇣ÆÀ ‡ Aø ‡ @�

[4.2.9] Someone might well say: 194.3

(15)

This syllogism is not [correctly] composed. When the majorterm stands in this configuration, the middle term in it has tobe shared [between the premises]. So [the minor premise] willsay that every horse can be moving ‘at that time’. But this isfalse, because at that time there can’t be anything that is movingand not human, since every moving thing is human, and wheneverything moving is human it’s impossible that a horse is mov-ing.

✏…ø ✏ ‡ @� : » A⇣ÆJ⌦ Ø , ÈJ⌦ Ø AøQ⇣� ⌘Ç” °É

�B @ ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ‡�@ I. j. J⌦ Ø ⇣ÈÍm.Ã '@ Ë

YÓE. ⇣I K Aø @ X @�

ΩÀ X ⌦̇ Ø ✏ ‡ �B ; H. X Aø @

YÎ . ⇣I⇣ØÒÀ @ ΩÀ X ⌦̇ Ø Aø✏Qj⇣J” ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ‡

�@ ·∫÷fl⌦ ÄQ Ø✏…ø Ym.⇢'⌦ Y⇣Ø ‡ Aø X @� , ‡ AÇ

� B� @ Q�⌦ ́ Aø✏Qj⇣J” Z ⌦̇Ê

⌘Ö ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ‡�@ ·∫÷fl⌦ B ⇣I⇣ØÒÀ @

ÄQ ÆÀ @ ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ‡�@ …J⌦j⇣⌧Ç�⌦ A K AÇ � @� º ✏Qj⇣J”

✏…ø Yg. ÒK⌦ ·�⌦g , A K AÇ � @� º ✏Qj⇣J”⇣ÈK. X Aø ⇣È J∫“÷œ @ ⇣È✏J⌦ í ⇣ÆÀ @ Ë YÎ ‡ Òª I. k. ÒK⌦ B ΩÀ X

✏ ‡ @� : ÈÀ » Ò⇣Æ K A✏ J∫À . Aø✏Qj⇣J”

Our reply to him is as follows. That doesn’t make this possibility proposi-tion false

‡ Ò∫K⌦ B » Ò ⇣ÆÀ @ ΩÀ X✏ ‡ A�

Ø . ✏ê A mÃ '@ ‡ Aæ” B� AK.⇣È J∫“÷œ @ ⇣È J∫“÷œ AK. ⌦̇

Ê´�@ , ⇣ÈÀ Am◊and impossible, where by ‘possibility’ I mean narrow possibility. [The con-tent of] this sentence is in fact neither

12


{NB Maybe he confuses ‘this sentence can’t be true’ with ‘this sentence as-serts that something is impossible’. }

, B Am◊ AK. Yª ΩÀ X Å⌧⌦ Ø , ÄQ Ø ÒÎ º ✏Qj⇣J” B✏ ‡�@ Yg. ‡ @� È

✏ K A� Ø . AJ. k. @ B B Am◊

impossible nor necessary. Even if it is true that no moving thing is a horse, 194.10[the content of the proposition] is not false and impossible,

© ⇣ÆK⌦ ⌦̄ Y✏À @ ✏ê A mÃ '@ ·∫“÷œ @ ÒÍ Ø . ·K⌦ YÎ ·�⌦K. Q”

�@ ÒÎ …K. , A✏K⌦ P QÂ ï A✏⇣Æk A⇣Ø Yì B

nor is it necessarily true. Rather it is intermediate between these two. So itis the kind of narrow possibility that holds

, …J. ⇣Æ⇣JÇ÷œ @ ‡ A” QÀ @ ÈJ⌦ Ø Q�. ⇣J™K⌦ , ⇣á ¢÷œ @ ˙Œ´ © ⇣ÆK⌦ B ⌦̄ Y✏À @ ·∫“÷œ @ A ✏”�@ . ⇣á ¢÷œ @ ˙Œ´

of things that are true absolutely. The kind of possibility which doesn’t holdof things that are true absolutely, the one about what is true in the future,

‡�@ A ✏” A� Ø . …J. ⇣Æ⇣JÇ÷œ @ ‡ A” QÀ @ ˙Œ´ A” Èk. ÒK. ÈJ⌦ Ø ÈJ⌦ ´

✏» YK⌦ B✏ @� » A

⇣ÆK⌦ ‡�@ ·∫÷fl⌦ C Ø

can only be used to make statements about what is in some way true in thefuture. So either

⌦̇´ @QK⌦ B ‡�@ A ✏” @� ;

≠À�@ Y⇣Ø , ⇣È✏⇣JJ. À @ Ä AJ⌦⇣Ø ⇣á ¢÷œ @ @ YÎ ©” È J” ≠ ⇣K�AK⌦ B

one can’t [correctly] make the syllogism with that kind of possibility premiseand the absolute premise above, although that is the syllogism that hasbeen made; or what [Aristotle said] is not being

A÷fl. © ìÒ”✏…ø ⌦̇

Ø ’∫m⇢ ' ‡�@ A JJ⌦ ´✏ ‡ A�

Ø , Z ⌦̇Ê⌘Ö ΩÀ X ·” A JJ⌦ ´ A” . @ Qª X A”

taken into account. What we need to take home from this discussion/Aristotle’s194.15words (??) is that in every case, when we judge how things

‡ Aø ‡ @� . @ Yª ‡ Aø @ Yª ⇣á ¢÷œ AK. X @Q÷œ @ ‡ Aø ‡ @� È

✏ K�@ P AJ. ⇣J´ @� ©” , ÈJ⌦ Ø I. m.⇢'⌦

have to be, we do it by interpreting the [speaker’s] intention as being ‘Withabsoluteness X is Y ’, and if

, † A ÆÀ �B @ ⌦̇ Ø ⌘Å⇣Ø A J K ‡�@ A JJ⌦ ´ A” .Q k

�@ ’∫k ÈÀ ‡ Aø ,Q k�@ A�J⌧⌦ ⌘É ⇣á ¢÷œ AK. X @Q÷œ @he intended something else with absoluteness, that’s a different content.We have to discuss the expressions,

. @ Yª ‡ X @ Yª ⌦̇ Ê´ C�K A⇣Ø ✏ ‡�@ ˙Œ´ ✏QÂî �

13


and decide that the speaker means this rather than that.{NB It all depends on what the speaker means by his premises. }

Transcription checked 7 Sep 12. Readings checked 16 Oct. 12.

14


195

[From here to 196.17 corresponds to nothing in Aristotle.]

⇣È J∫‹ÿ ⇣Èj. J⌦⇣⌧ JÀ @✏ ‡�@ ‡ AÎQ�. À @ @ YÓE. ·✏�⌦J. ⇣K Y⇣Ø È

✏ K�@ : ·�⌦ �K A⇣Ø XÒ™ J Ø , @ YÎ A✏ J✏⌧⌦K. Y⇣Ø X @�

[4.2.10] Now that we have proved (5), we go back to the point that in 195.1this demonstration it is shown that the conclusion is a broad-possibilityproposition.{This was claimed at 192.4 and the proof follows that statement. }

Ë A K Y g�@ ‡ A� Ø . ËQ�⌦ ́ ⌦̄ P QÂ

îÀ @ ✏—™K⌦ A” ⇣á ¢÷œ @ A K Y g�@ ‡ @� ,

✏⇣ámÃ '@ ÒÎ ΩÀ X . ⇣È ✏” A´That is correct if we took the absolute premise [in (5)] to be the kind ofabsolute that includes both necessary and non-necessary. But if we took it

✏ · £ ‡ A� Ø . ✏—´ �B @ ˙ Ê™÷œ AK. È J∫‹ÿ B

✏ @� ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ‡�@ I. m.⇢'⌦ ’À ÈJ⌦ Ø ⇣ËP QÂ ï B ⌦̄

Y✏À @ ⇣á ¢÷œ @as the kind of absolute which excludes necessary propositions, [the conclu-sion] can only be a possibility proposition in the broader meaning. So ifsomeone thought

, ⇣È✏J⌦ ✏ì A g ⇣È✏J⌦ ⇣ÆJ⌦ ⇣Æk ⇣È J∫‹ÿ ⇣Èj. J⌦⇣⌧ JÀ @✏ ‡�@ P Òª Y÷œ @ ≠ mÃ '@ ⇣áK⌦ Q£ ·” ✏l⇡ï Y⇣Ø È

✏ K�@ ✏ ‡ A ¢À @that it was correct, because of the above-mentioned absurdity, that the con-clusion is a strict-narrow-possibility proposition,

‡�@ I. m.⇢'⌦ ✏ë k�B @ ✏ê A mÃ '@ ‡ Aæ” B� AK. H. h. ·∫K⌦ ’À @

X @� Å⌧⌦À È✏ K A�

Ø . ·Çm⇢'⌦ ’Œ Ø

that would not be correct. In fact when it is not the case that C is B with 195.5narrow or narrower possibility, it can’t be true that{NB laysa yajibu here has to mean ‘It can’t be that’. }

✏ ‡ �B . @ h.✏…ø ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ‡

�@ P Òm.⇢'⌦ …K. ; @ h.✏…ø Å⌧⌦À ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. ‡ Ò∫K⌦

with necessity no C is an A. But it might be true that with necessity everyC is an A. This is because

⌦̄ P QÂ îÀ @ …K. , XÒk. Ò

✏ À @ ⌦̄ P QÂ ï ÒÎ ⌦̄

Y✏À @ ÒÎ Å⌧⌦À ·∫““ À ≠À A j÷œ @ Q”�B @

the things that are incompatible with being [strictly] possible are not thethings that are necessarily not true, but rather the things that are necessarily

⇣È✏J⌦ ✏ì A g ⇣È J∫‹ÿ ‡ Ò∫⇣K Y�J ⌧J⌦k ⇣Èj. J⌦⇣⌧ JÀ @✏ ‡�@ ·✏�⌦J. K A

✏ J∫À . A™J⌦‘g. XÒk. C✏À @ XÒk. ÒÀ @ ⌦̇

Øtrue and the things that are necessarily not true together. But in this case

15


too we will prove that the conclusion is a narrow possibility proposition.

, @ XÒk. Ò” H. h.✏…ø ·∫J⌦À , @ h. ë™K. ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. ‡ Aø ‡ @� È

✏ K �B ΩÀ X . A í�⌦�@

It is so because

(16)if with necessity some C is an A;let it be true that every C is a B;then with necessity some B is an A.

{Here he invokes Disamis LXL (Thom), which Thom MMS p. 73 lists asaccepted by Ibn Sı̄nā and rejected by Aristotle. Note also that Ibn Sı̄nā’sargument here requires his false rule of possibility. }

. ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. B È✏ ø ‡ Aø . @ H. ë™K. ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. ‡ Ò∫J⌦ Ø

Then it holds of every [C] that it is not with necessity [an A]. 195.10{Supposedly the conclusion in (16) is absurd, so the first premise is false,as stated here. The conclusion in (16) is supposed to be contradicting theassumption that the major premise in (5) is narrow-absolute. NB Note herethat narrow-absolute would assert that for every B, it is not necessarily anA.}

I. m.⇢'⌦ …Î È✏ K�@ A ✏”�@

[4.2.11] There is a question whether [the conclusion of (5)] should be 195.10{Are we still assuming that the major premise is narrow-absolute? Cf.195.18 below. }

‡ Aæ” B� AK. H. h.✏…ø ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ˙

✏⇣Êk ⇣á ¢÷œ @ È g YK⌦ B ⌦̄ Y✏À @ ·∫“÷œ @ A J∫‹ÿ ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ‡

�@a possibility proposition with the kind of possibility that doesn’t include[being true in] the absolute, so that it states that every C is a B with nar-rower possibility,

‡�@ P Òm.⇢'⌦ È✏ K A�

Ø . I. k. @ÒK. ΩÀ X Å⌧⌦À : » Ò ⇣Æ J Ø , ⇣È✏⇣JJ. À @ H. Am.⇢'⌦ @�

⇣Ü C£ @� B ✏ë k�B @

where it is not affirmed at all [of any C] that it is [a B absolutely]. Our viewis that it doesn’t have to be. In fact it could be that

. H. Å⌧⌦À A÷œ …™ ÆÀ AK. H. ÒÎ A”✏…æÀ @ XÒk. Ò” ‡ Ò∫J⌦ Ø . H. ·” ✏—´

�@ @ ‡ Ò∫K⌦the As include the Bs and that [A] is true of everything that is a B in act,and of something that is not a B.{NB Here mā + V means ‘something that Vs’, not the usual ‘whatever Vs’.But only the context shows this. }

16


, Ë Y™K. �@ È J. ⇣Ø …K. ; H. ÒÎ A” Y J´ H. ÒÎ A÷œ ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ‡

�@ A í�⌦�@ I. m.⇢'⌦ B

Also it doesn’t have to be that A is true of Bs only for as long as they areBs; but it could still hold before or after [they are Bs].

B A ⇣Æ ¢” Z ⌦̇Ê⌘ÑÀ @ ‡ Òª ✏ ·∫À , H. È

✏ K�@ ÈÀ A J∫‹ÿ ‡ Aø ‡ @� , ÈÀ @ XÒk. Ò” h. ‡ Ò∫J⌦ Ø

© J÷fl⌦So C will be true of a thing even when it is [only] possibly a B. But a propo- 195.15sition’s being absolute doesn’t prevent{The first sentence confirms that the conclusion need not be narrower-possible. The force of the second sentence is unclear since it is unclearwhether the absolute is supposed to imply ‘true now’. }

P Òj. J⌦ Ø , A✏K⌦ P QÂ ï ·∫K⌦ ’À , ⇣I⇣Ø ⌦̇ Ø ÈÀ A ⇣Æ ¢” ‡ Aø ‡ @� È

✏ K A� Ø . A✏J⌦ ⇣ÆJ⌦ ⇣Æk A J∫‹ÿ È KÒª

it from being a strict possibility proposition. In fact even if something holdsabsolutely at a time, and not necessarily, it can

‡ Ò∫K⌦ ‡�@ B✏ @�

✏—Í✏À @ , È J. ⇣Æ⇣JÇ” ˙Õ @� Ä AJ⌦⇣ÆÀ @ I. Çm⇢'. A J∫‹ÿ A” ⇣I⇣Ø ⌦̇

Ø ÈÀ ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ‡�@

hold at some time with the kind of possibility that is in terms of the future— though not of course if it

ΩÀ ·✏�⌦J. ⇣K .P Òª Y÷œ @ †QÂ⌘ÑÀ @ ˙Œ´ ¯ Q�. ∫À @ ⇣Ü Yì © J÷fl⌦ @ YÎ , A÷ �fl @ X ÈÀ @ XÒk. Ò”holds permanently, which would prevent the truth of the major premiseunder the aforementioned condition. A way of looking at this that showsit to be correct{Not a condition but an assumption, that the major premise is narrow ab-solute. }


17


196

⇣I K Aø ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï ⇣È✏K⌦ XÒk. ÒÀ @ Ë YÎ » YK. ‡ Aø ÒÀ È✏ K�@ Y™K. ⇣I“

✏ ´ @ X @� , @ YÎ ⇣á ✏⇣Æm⇢'⌦ Èk.

was proved for you [earlier], when you learned afterwards that if in placeof this impermanent [premise] there was a necessity proposition

. ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï ⇣H Aj. J⌦⇣⌧ JÀ @then the conclusion would be a necessity proposition.

È⇣K @ X ⇣I” @ X A” A÷ �fl @ X @ h. Ë YÎ A J⇣JÀ �AÇ” ⌦̇

Ø ‡ Aø ÒÀ È✏ K @� : » Ò⇣Æ J Ø ‡�B @ A ✏”�@

[4.2.12] Now we say: Suppose that in this question of ours, the C was 196.3an A permanently for as long as its essence continued to be{NB law with an answering t

¯

umma instead of la. }✏…ø ✏ ‡ @� : A J

⇣Ø A✏ Jª Y⇣Ø , ‡ Ò∫K⌦ B ‡�@ H. ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ‡

�@ ÈÀ ·∫÷fl⌦ ‡ Aø ✏’Á⌘' , ⇣Ë XÒk. Ò”satisfied. Then it is possible for it to be a B, and possible for it not to be aB. We have already said that every

@ ÈÀ P Aì H. h. ⇣HP Aì @ X @� ‡ Ò∫J⌦ Ø , A” A⇣J⇣Ø @ ÈÀ Yg. ÒK⌦ A÷

✏ fl @� È✏ K A�

Ø H. ÈÀ Yg. ÒK⌦ A”thing that B is true of will have A true of it at a certain time, so it can be the 196.5case that when the C becomes a B, A becomes true of it

È⇣K @ X – @ X A” A÷ �fl @ X ÈÀ @ ‡ Ò∫J⌦ Ø , A÷ �fl @ X ÈÀ @ ‡ Aø Y⇣Ø . ⇣Ë XÒk. Ò” È⇣K X ’Á�' @ X Q�⌦ ́ @Q”�@

but not permanently for so long as its essence is satisfied. But [we have sup-posed that] A is true of it permanently, so A will be true of it permanentlyfor as long as its essence continues to be

, È⇣K @ X ©” XÒk. Ò” A” Q”�@ Y J´ ’Á�' @ X Q�⌦ ́ ÈÀ Q�⌦í�⌦ Y⇣Ø È

✏ K A� Ø ΩÀ X ©” , ⇣Ë XÒk. Ò”

satisfied, but nevertheless A will be true of it not permanently and for solong as it exists and its essence is satisfied.{NB Horrible pun if the text is right: the individual exists (mawjūd) and itsessence is satisfied (mawjūd)! }

‡ X A� Ø . h. À A÷

�fl @ X @ ‡ Òª ·” Ë A J ìQ Ø A” @ YÎ ⌦̇ Ø I. ⌧. ÇÀ @ ‡ Ò∫J⌦ Ø . ≠ g @

YÎThis is absurd. The cause of this absurdity is our assumption that A ispermanently true of C. So therefore{NB ‘The cause of this absurdity’ as if just one premise caused it. Also thisapplication of absurdum is a Robinson. }

18


·∫K⌦ ’À , A÷ �fl @ X ÈÀ ·∫K⌦ ’À @ X @� .⇣È⇣Ø X Aì ¯ Q�. ∫À @ ‡ Ò∫⇣K ⌘IJ⌦k A÷ �fl @ X ÈÀ ‡ Ò∫K⌦ B

A™ K A”A won’t be true of the C permanently when the major premise is true.When A is not permanently true of the C, that doesn’t prevent{No, he hasn’t shown this, because the major premise doesn’t imply imper-manence, though it is compatible with it. At best he can say the conclusionneed not hold permanently. }

†QÂ⌘Ñ�. ÈÀ A ⇣Æ ¢” ‡ Ò∫K⌦ È✏ K A�

Ø . A ⇣Æ ¢” È KÒª ©” ✏ë k�@ A J∫‹ÿ h. À @ ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ‡�@

A being true of the C both with the narrower possibility and absolutely. In 196.10fact A can be true absolutely of the C under a condition

ÈÀ È ìQ Æ K ‡�@ ⇣H �A ⌘É ⇣I⇣Ø ✏…ø †QÂ⌘Ñ�. A J∫‹ÿ , » AJ. ⇣Æ⇣JÉ B� @ Q�⌦ ́ P AJ. ⇣J´ @�

⇣ÈÍk. which specifies a modality and a consideration different from being true inthe futue. Thus A can be true of the C with possibility under a conditionspecifying any future time that we choose for it.{NB wajha and ’ictibār }

, ΩÀ X I. m.⇢'⌦ B È✏ K @� : » Ò

⇣Æ J Ø ? ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢” ⇣Ü Yí⇣� …Î ⇣Èj. J⌦⇣⌧ JÀ @ Ë YÎ✏ ‡�@ A✏” �A Ø . CJ. ⇣Æ⇣JÇ”

[In that case] will this conclusion be true with absoluteness? We say: Itneed not be,

⇣I⇣Ø ˙Õ @� È⌘K Yg ⇣I⇣Ø ·” H. ⇣È

✏⇣JJ. À @ Yg. ÒK⌦ B h. ·” Yg @ÒÀ @ ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ‡�@ P Òm.⇢'⌦ È

✏ K �Bbecause it can be that one of the Cs is never a B from the time of its creationto

·” YÎ; @ÒÀ @ ‡ Ò∫J⌦ Ø . ° ⇣Æ Ø H. ÒÎ ‡ Ò∫K⌦ A” Y J´ @ ÈÀ Yg. ÒK⌦ A÷✏ fl @� ‡ Ò∫K⌦ , Ë X AÇ

Øthe time of its destruction, and A is true of it only while it is a B. Then thisC

, I. ⇣J∫K⌦ ‡�@ ·∫÷fl⌦ ‡ AÇ � @�

✏…ø : A JÀÒ⇣Ø …⌘J” . @ A í�⌦�@ B , ⇣È✏⇣JJ. À @ H. ÈÀ ⇣á Æ

✏⇣JK⌦ B h.will not have either B or A true of it at all. An example is 196.15

(17)Every human can write;and every writer touches the paper with his pen.

⇣Ü Yí�⌦ ˙✏⇣Êk , ⇣Ü C£ B� AK. È

⇣Ø Yì È” Q K⌦ Å⌧⌦ Ø , ÄQ¢À @ È“ ⇣ÆK. ✏Ä A‹ÿ I. ⇣K Aø✏…ø

The truth of the conclusion with absoluteness, which would be that it istrue

19


. H. QÂ îÀ @ Q�K AÉ ÈJ⌦ ´ ✏Å ⇣Æ Ø , @ YÎ ⇣I“ ´ @ X A�

Ø . ÄQ¢À @ È“ ⇣ÆK. ✏Ä A‹ÿ ‡ AÇ � @�✏…ø ✏ ‡�@

that every human touches the paper with his pen, doesn’t follow. Now thatyou know this, try it out with it the other moods.


20


197

[With negative premise]

C Ø , @ H. ·” Z ⌦̇Ê⌘Ö B , ‡ Aæ” B� AK. H. h.

✏…ø :ÒÎ @ YÎ Y™K. ⌦̄ Y✏À @ H. QÂ îÀ @

[4.2.13] The mood which is next after this is:

(18)Every C is a B with possibility;and no B is an A;so no C is an A, with broad possibility.

{Celarent, Prior Anal i.15, 34b19.}

©” . ≠ mÃ 'AK. ⇣I“ ´ Y⇣Ø A” Ä AJ⌦⇣Ø ˙Œ´ È K AJ⌦K. . ✏– A™À @ ‡ Aæ” B� AK. @ h. ·” Z ⌦̇Ê⌘Ö

Its proof is by a syllogism which you already know, by absurdity. Never-theless

˙Œ´✏» YK⌦ A” …J⌦⇣Ø Y ⇣Æ Ø . ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. @ h. ·” Z ⌦̇Ê

⌘Ö [ B] ⌦̆ Î⇣Èj. J⌦⇣⌧ JÀ @

✏ ‡�@ P ÒÓD⌘Ñ÷œ A Ø ΩÀ Xthe standard view is that the conclusion is that no C is an A with necessity.In the First Teaching it is said what are the indications that{NB šay’un should clearly be lā šay’a, with several mss. Also the Greek ofAristotle has here ‘it is necessary that possibly . . . ’, where the ‘necessary’ isthe necessity of the entailment. }

. » ✏ �B @ ’Ê⌦ ™⇣JÀ @ ⌦̇

Ø ΩÀ Xthis is so.

Å⌧⌦À Ë A J™” ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ,Q�⌦ g�A⇣K ’Á'⌦ Y

⇣Æ⇣K ° Æ✏ À @ ⌦̇ Ø ©⇣Ø Y⇣Ø ‡ Ò∫K⌦ ‡

�@ ˙Õ �B @ ✏ ·∫À[4.2.14] But the best [explanation] is that some of the text has got into 197.5

the wrong order, and the [intended] meaning is ‘It is not the case that

⇣ÜQ Ø . h. ·” Z ⌦̇Ê⌘Ö ⌦̇

Ø B ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. È✏ K�@ B , h. ·” Z ⌦̇Ê

⌘Ö ⌦̇ Ø B , @ ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK.

·�⌦K.with necessity A is in any C’, not that ‘With necessity it is not in any C’.There is a difference between

Z ⌦̇Ê⌘Ö ⌦̇

Ø B ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. : A JÀÒ⇣Ø ·�⌦K. , h. ·” Z ⌦̇Ê⌘Ö ⌦̇

Ø B ⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. Å⌧⌦À : A JÀÒ⇣Øsaying ‘not with necessity in any C’ and saying ‘with necessity not in any{NB point of usage: does the wa- before lā indicate that this is not the second

21

QIYAS .2 Prior Anal i.15, 35a2

part of a double negative? I think there are counterexamples to this in thecIbāra.}

ÒÎ ÈJ⌦ Ø X @Q÷œ @✏ ‡�@ ˙Œ´

✏» YK⌦ B A⌘J” » ✏�B @ ’Ê⌦ ™

⇣JÀ @ ⌦̇ Ø @ YÍÀ XP �@ . ⇣I“ ´ A“ª h. ·”

C’, as you know. In the First Teaching [Aristotle] gave an example for this,which indicates that the intended [meaning] in it is{Prior Anal i.15, 34b33.}

: ΩÀ YÀ » A⌘J÷œ @ . ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï A÷ �fl @ X ‡ Ò∫⇣K AÓ✏ E�@ B , ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï ‡ Ò∫⇣K Y⇣Ø ⇣Èj. J⌦⇣⌧ JÀ @

✏ ‡�@that the conclusion ‘can be necessary’, not that it ‘is permanent and neces-sary’. The example is:{NB dā’iman here in the metalanguage, meaning ‘in all cases’? No, I thinkit and d

.

arūriyyatan are in apposition. The example refers to times. }

: ⇣Èj. J⌦⇣⌧ JÀ @ , H. @Q ™K. Q✏∫ Æ÷œ @ ·” Z ⌦̇Ê

⌘Ö B , …™ ÆÀ AK. ✏̄⌦�@ Q∫ ÆK⌦ ‡

�@ ·∫÷fl⌦ ‡ AÇ � @�✏…ø

(19)

Every human can meditate (i.e. in act);and no meditator is a crow;and the conclusion is that no person is a crow, which is with ne-cessity.

, H. @Q ™À @ » YK. …™k. @ X @� .⇣ËP QÂ îÀ AK. ΩÀ X , H. @Q ™K. Ä A JÀ @ ·” Z ⌦̇Ê

⌘Ö C ØIf one puts ‘moving thing’ in place of ‘crow’,

⇣ËP A⇣K , ⇣È J∫‹ÿ ‡ Ò∫⇣K ⇣ËP A⇣K ⇣Èj. J⌦⇣⌧ JÀ @ ‡ X A� Ø . ⇣È✏K⌦ P @Q¢ ì @� Q�⌦

́ ⇣Èj. J⌦⇣⌧ K i. ⇣J K�@ , º ✏Qj⇣J÷œ @

it entails a conclusion which is not necessary. Therefore the conclusion [ofthis mood] is sometimes a possible proposition and sometimes

. ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï ‡ Ò∫⇣Ka necessary one.{Unpick. The conclusion can be only-possibly true or necessarily true, inexamples with true premises. Therefore the premises do not entail a strict-possibility conclusion or a necessity conclusion. }

‡�@ I. m.⇢'⌦ » ✏�B @ ’Ê⌦ ™

⇣JÀ @ ⌦̇ Ø …J⌦⇣Ø Y ⇣Æ Ø . X YmÃ '@ Ë YÎ ⌦̇

Ø Q ¢ J K ‡�@ A JJ⌦ ´ ⌦̆⇣ÆK. Y⇣Ø

[4.2.15] It remains for us to investigate these terms. It was said in the 197.14First Teaching that{Prior Anal i.15, 35a2.}

22


B✏ @� ,⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï » ✏

�B @ Ä AJ⌦ ⇣ÆÀ @ ⌦̇ Ø ¯ Q�. ∫À @

✏ ‡ A� Ø . ⇣Ü Yì Y⇣Ø . Ë YÎ Q�⌦ ́ I. ¢�⌦

different examples are needed, and this is true. The fact is that the major 197.15premise in the first syllogism is a necessary proposition, unless{Why is this an objection? Necessary truths are still truths. At worst onecould say that with this example Aristotle could have shown a strongernon-deducibility. Maybe 198.3 hints at an answer: some people read themajor premise in (19) as stating narrow absoluteness, i.e. that the proposi-tion is true but not necessarily so. But as the text stands, they are hardlyentitled to read it this way. }

✏ií�⌦ A✏‹ÿ …✏J⌦ j⇣J÷œ @ ·´ H. @Q ™À @ I. É ‡ Ò∫J⌦ Ø , …✏J⌦ j⇣J÷œ @ Q✏∫ Æ÷œ @ » YK. …™m.⇢'⌦ ‡

�@one puts ‘imaginer’ in place of ‘meditator’, so that it denies that ‘crow’ istrue of any of the things that can truly be said to imagine

Ë YÎ ⌦̇ Ø ⇣ËP Òª Y÷œ @ ⇣È✏J⌦ìÒÀ @ ⇣ÈjJ⌦í JÀ @ A J⌧⌦Ç � Y⇣Ø Z ⌦̇Ê

⌘Ö » ✏�@ ‡ Ò∫J⌦ Ø A” ⇣I⇣Ø ⌦̇ Ø

at some time. But in the first place this would be to forget the advice andthe warnings that were given only


23


198

È✏ K A� Ø . ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢” ⇣ÈJ. k. Ò” Ë @Q�. ª ⌦̄

Y ✏À @ H. QÂ îÀ @ ⌦̇ Ø ·∫÷fl⌦ È JJ⌦™K. @ YÎ

✏ ‡�@ : A✏J⌦ K A⌘K , ⇣È´ AÇÀ @a moment ago. And secondly these same terms could be used in the moodwhose major premise is affirmative absolute: in fact

‡�@ ·∫÷fl⌦ ‡ AÇ � @�✏…ø ✏ ‡�@ i. ⇣J ⌧K⌦ B , H. @Q ́ …✏J⌦ j⇣J”

✏…ø ✏ ‡�@ º A JÎ ⇣Ü Yí�⌦ Y⇣Øit can be true there that every imagining thing is a crow, and it doesn’t entailthat every human can

Qª X A” ˙Œ´ h. A⇣J K B� @ ‡ Aø , ⌦̄ P QÂ îÀ @ ✏—™K⌦ A” ⇣á ¢÷œ @ Y g

�@ @ X @� È✏ J∫À . AK. @Q ́ ‡ Ò∫K⌦

be a crow. But when the absolute is taken as including the necessary, theentailment is as stated

, ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï ⇣Ë ✏X A” ⌦̇ Ø ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢÷œ @ ⇣I K Aø ‡ @� A✏K⌦ P QÂ ï ‡ Ò∫K⌦

⇣ËP A⇣K È✏ K A� Ø . » ✏ �B @ ’Ê⌦ ™

⇣JÀ @ ⌦̇ Ø

in the First Teaching. So sometimes [the conclusion] is a necessary propo-sition (when the absolute premise is in necessary matter),

. ⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï Q�⌦ ́ ⇣Ë ✏X A” ⌦̇ Ø ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢÷œ @ ⇣I K Aø ‡ @�

⇣È✏K⌦ P QÂ ï Q�⌦ ́ ⇣ËP A⇣Kand sometimes it is not a necessary proposition (when the absolute premise 198.5is in a matter which is not necessary).

⌦̄ Y✏À @ H. QÂ îÀ @

[4.2.16] The next mood 198.5

·∫÷fl⌦ : i. ⇣J ⌧K⌦ , @ H.✏…ø , H. h. ·” Z ⌦̇Ê

⌘Ö ‡ Ò∫K⌦ B ‡�@ ·∫÷fl⌦ È✏ K�@ ÒÎ Ë Y™K.

is

(20)It is possible that no C is a B;and every B is an A;entailing: It is possible that no C is an A.

Å∫™K. ✏’Á⌘' , ⇣ÈJ. k. Ò÷œ @ ˙Õ @�⇣ÈJ. À AÇÀ @ Å∫™K. ·✏�⌦J. ⇣K . @ h. ·” Z ⌦̇Ê

⌘Ö ‡ Ò∫K⌦ B ‡�@

It is proved by converting the negative premise to an affirmative one, andthen converting

⇣ÈJ. À AÉ ¯ Q ™íÀ @ ⇣I ™k. ‡ A� Ø , ·�⌦⇣J✏J⌦

✏ ø ·�⌦⇣JJ. À AÉ ·” ‡ Aø @ X @� ΩÀ Yª . ⇣Èj. J⌦⇣⌧ JÀ @

the conclusion. The same applies when both premises are negative anduniversally quantified. But if the minor premise is taken to be negative

24


⇣I ™k. ‡ A� Ø . ⇣H A ⇣Æ ¢÷œ @ ⌦̇

Ø ⇣I“✏ ´ A” ÈJ⌦ Ø ⇣È✏ ™À @ . Ä AJ⌦⇣Ø È J´ I. m.⇢'⌦ ’À ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢”

absolute there doesn’t have to be a syllogism from it. You were taught thereason for that in the discussion of the syllogisms with absolute premises.If the minor premise is taken to be

, ⇣ÈJ. À AÉ �@ ⇣I K Aø ⇣ÈJ. k. Ò” , ⇣È✏J⌦

✏ ø ⇣È J∫‹ÿ ¯ Q�. ∫À @ , ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢” ⇣È✏J⌦�K Qk. ⇣ÈJ. k. Ò” ¯ Q ™íÀ @affirmative existentially quantified absolute, and the major premise a uni- 198.10versally quantified possibility proposition, either affirmative or negative,

, ⇣È ⇣Æ ¢” ¯ Q�. ∫À @ , ⇣È J∫‹ÿ ¯ Q ™íÀ @ ⇣I K Aø ‡ A� Ø . ✏Ω ⌘É CK. ¯ Q�. ∫ À ⇣ËQ�. ™À A Ø

then the major premise is the one that controls the modality of the conclu-sion, no doubt about that. If the minor premise is a possibility propositionand the major premise is absolute,

¯ Q ™íÀ @ ⇣I K Aø ‡ @� .⇣È✏J⌦�K Qk. ‡ Ò∫⇣K AÓ

✏ E�@ ̈ C g C Ø . ΩÀ ≠ É A” ˙Œ´ ⇣Èj. J⌦⇣⌧ JÀ A Øthen the conclusion is as you learned earlier, and it makes no difference if[the minor premise] is existentially quantified. If the minor premise

. ⇣I“✏ ´ A” Òm⇢ ' ˙Œ´ H. Am.⇢'⌦ B� @ ˙Õ @� Å∫™À AK. ⇣I ⌧✏J⌦⌧. ⇣K , ⇣È J∫‹ÿ ⇣È✏J⌦�K Qk. ⇣ÈJ. À AÉ

is a negative existentially quantified possibility proposition, [the syllogism]is proved by converting to the affirmative in the way you have learned.


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Ibn Sina: Qiyas iv.2¯ - Wilfrid Hodges · Ibn Sina: Qiyas iv.2¯ Trans. Wilfrid Hodges, based on the Cairo text ed. Ibrahim Madkour et al. (DRAFT ONLY) 4 November 2012 190 » B@