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Paper 2 for IB History on the Bay of Pigs
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Choi 1
Paper Two
The Cold War: 1960-1975
IB 20th Century World History
April 16, 2009
Wendy Choi
Period 5
Choi 2
1. U-2 and the Bay of Pigs (US mistakes that destabilized the status quo)
In 1960, Khrushchev “aborted the Paris summit meeting… by revealing that the Soviets
had shot down an American high-altitude U-2 spy plane over Soviet territory.”1 In the April of
1961, the CIA’s secret plan to overthrow Cuba — known as the Bay of Pigs— was executed by
Kennedy and “proved a deeply humiliating fiasco” for the United States.2 In fact, both the U-2
incident and the Bay of Pigs decreased the US’ power of assisting other countries to achieve
freedom and equality. After the U-2 incident, the Soviet Defense Minister Roman Malinovsky
cautioned the United States that any further violation of the Soviet skies will result in a possible
nuclear attack on the base which sheltered the plane. In 1966, the professor and specialist of
Russian foreign policy and international security Arnold Horelick and his colleague Myron Rush
observed: “Thus, for the first time, Soviet leaders threatened to strike allies of the United States,
possibly with nuclear weapons.”3 Conversely, the U.S. effort to reinitiate its wobbly puppet-
government in Cuba destabilized the political and military balance between capitalism and
socialism. Moreover, politicians also point out that after the Bay of Pigs invasion, foreign
leaders understand fewer military actions may pressure the U.S. into further involvement.4 As a
result, the U.S. mistakes in hovering the USSR’ skies with its U-2 spy planes and the U.S.’
idealistic expectations at the Bay of Pigs increased the political and military influence of the
USSR during the Cold War.
Word Count: 296
1 Findley, Carter, John Rothney. Twentieth-Century World. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2002. 253.2 Findley, Carter, John Rothney. Twentieth-Century World. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2002. 254.3 Blechman, Barry, Stephan Kaplan, David Hall. Force without War. Brookings: Brookings Institution Press, 1978. 387.4 Blechman, Barry, Stephan Kaplan, David Hall. Force without War. Brookings: Brookings Institution Press, 1978. 532.
Choi 3
2. Berlin Wall and Crisis (Soviet mistake that destabilized the status quo)
As opposed to the common belief that the Soviet wants to compel the West’s withdrawal
from West Berlin and to bring doubts to Western Europe over American commitment and the
NATO alliance’s efficacy, the Soviet’s chief purpose in constructing the Berlin Wall was to
maintain the status quo in Eastern Europe by preserving an independent Communist East
Germany.5 However, rather than preserving the two Germanys, the Soviet has promoted their
unification. The East Berliner Marga Karsten describes the horrid situation of the Berlin Crisis
after her husband abandoned her and escaped to West Berlin, “My whole world collapsed. . . I
had to collect his belonging from work; it is as if I’m collecting the belonging of a dead person.”6
In June of 1959, Khrushchev even publicly agrees to a status quo and a potential
reunification of the two Germanys by the German citizens themselves until 1961. 7 While the
Berlin Blockade was strictly held in place, gives the world an impression of a strictly maintained
status quo in Eastern Europe. This is because the wall forcefully keeps the East and West
Germans apart. However, in the long term, the East Germans became increasingly tired of the
wall and the hideous condition in which that they were forced to live. Ultimately, the Berlin
Wall demoralized the Soviet’s cause in the Cold War and thus reduced the Soviet allies’
confidence in the USSR’s victory.
Word Count: 274
5 Garthoff, Raymond. A Journey through the Cold War. Brookings: Brookings Institution Press, 2001. 127.6 Primary Source from a Class Video on the Berlin Crisis7 “History They Didn’t Teach in School—Berlin Wall.” University of Houston Department of History. 17 Mar 2009. <http://vi.uh.edu/pages/buzzmat/htdtisberlinwall.html>
Choi 4
3. Cuban Missile Crisis (Event that the U.S. “lost”)
Almost a month after the United States’ failure to overthrow Castro at the Bay of Pigs
Invasion— on the 1st of May, 1961— Castro declared that Cuba is now a socialist republic and
some politicians feared the possibility of a Dominican occupation of Cuba as a result of Castro’s
assassination.8 Shortly after in the January of 1962, the Soviet Union negotiated a trade of treaty
with Cuba (to compensate for the U.S. embargo with the purchase of half of the Cuban sugar
crops9) and the U.S. responded with an embargo on Cuban goods.10 This further amplified the
conflict between the United States and Cuba, and so Castro refused to yield. In response, Castro
established closer relations with the USSR. Most importantly, Castro “retaliated by seizing
control of economic assets in Cuba— sugar mills, oil refineries, banks— that were largely
American owned. . . [therefore,] Khrushchev saw opportunities to extend Soviet influence by
helping developing countries.”11 All in all, The Cuban Missile Crisis was a failure for the United
States economically because Cuba’s shift to the USSR disproportioned the entire economic,
military, and diplomatic situation in the struggle between Communist and capitalist nations
during the Cold War.
Word Count: 264
8 Langley, Lester. The Americas in the Modern Age. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005, 184.9 Findley, Carter, John Rothney. Twentieth-Century World. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2002. 253.10 Godwin, Jack. The Arrow and the Olive Branch: Practical Idealism in U.S. Foreign Policy (The Ethics of American Foreign Policy. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., 2008, 108.11 Findley, Carter, John Rothney. Twentieth-Century World. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2002. 253.
Choi 5
4. Power Shake-Ups: The Kennedy Assassination and the Fall of Khrushchev (The change in
personnel changed the basic course of the Cold War)
After President Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963 and Soviet Premier
Nikita Khrushchev’s resigned on October 15, 1964, the once pre-nuclear-war-horror of the Cold
War also gradually expired. Since the first failure of the Ten-Nation Committee on
Disarmament in June 1960, the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament
(ENDC) proved ineffective after 353 sessions in January 1962 due to the unyielding nature of the
U.S. and the Soviet.12 Later after Kennedy’s death, President Johnson brings the total cut of
enriched uranium down by 40 per cent in four years with an additional 20 per cent cut in
plutonium production set; Premier Khrushchev also “‘discontinue[d] the construction of two new
big atomic reactors for the production of plutonium,’ ‘reduc[ed] substantially the production of
uranium 235 for nuclear weapons,’ and allocate[d] more fissionable materials for peaceful uses
—in atomic power stations, in industry, agriculture, in medicine, in the implementation of major
scientific, technical projects, including the distillation of sea water.”13 Especially after
Khrushchev’s resignation, “Britain’s production of military plutonium ‘is being gradually
terminated.’ ”14 The Soviet turned to the goals of withdrawing American troops from alien
territories, the negotiation for a nonaggression pact among NATO and Warsaw countries,
organization of nuclear-free buffer zones, and a mutual decline of stationed armed forces all over
the globe. Moreover, the grudges from the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Bay of Pigs seem to be
slowly fading with the death of Kennedy. All in all, Kennedy’s death and Khrushchev’s
resignation diminished the nuclear buildup around the world. (Word Count: 294)
12 Lall, Betty. "On Disarmament Issues: The Polish Plan." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Jun 1964: 42.13 Jack, Homer. "Seventeen Continue." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Jun 1964: 43.14 Jack, Homer. "Seventeen Continue." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Jun 1964: 44.
Choi 6
5. Vietnam: Gulf of Tonkin to 1967 (Wrong policy, wrong place, wrong time)
The Southeast Asia Resolution, also known as the Gulf of Tonkin solution, sparks from
first— the damage of three boats in August 1964, when USSS Maddox encountered torpedo
boats of North Vietnam— and second: an error report two days later of yet another engagement
with North Vietnamese liner.15 This occurred in the month of August, 1964. Moreover, this
resolution by the U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson sustained a policy similar to the Truman
Doctrine three political terms ago. However, despite the policy’s good intentions, President
Johnson seemed to have interpreted the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution as an unchecked power for
him to conduct war without Congress’ consent. This creates doubts within the Congress over the
misuse of executive power. Eventually, “for a variety of reasons— a realization of its rightful
role, a response to public pressures, a distrust of Richard Nixon— Congress began to assert itself
in foreign-policy concerns after a long period of quiescence. The ingredients all in place for
fateful crashes.”16 By duty, this policy assigned U.S. to a moral duty to protect South Vietnam,
which is a perfect example of U.S. reputation and security throughout the world. Worse, this can
be injurious to the U.S. if the U.S. withdraws or loses the war. By this time, the Americans are
no longer committed to the war; therefore, the U.S.’s credibility and status had become shaky
from the eyes of the world.
Word Count: 275
15 Moise, Edwin. Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1996, Xi.16 Kutler, Stanley. Wars of Watergate: The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1990, 155.
Choi 7
6. The Ascendancy of the Soviet Union: The Brezhnev Era and the Prague Spring (How the
West almost lost: based on Kennan’s ‘X Article’)
According to Kennan’s “X Article,” “in vast sectors of economic life[, Russia] has not
yet been possible to instill into labor anything like that general culture of production and
technical self-respect which characterizes the skilled worker of the west.”17 This is undeniably
accurate and a gradual westernization also contributes to the gradual Soviet ascendency in the
late 1960s’. After Brezhnev succeeded Khrushchev, the Soviets repeatedly triumph in the
production of grain, oil, iron ore, steel, and chemical fertilizers. To be explicit, Soviet
industrialization means even “Soviet women were employed outside the home.”18 One of the
most important advancement with increasing western influence is the idea of satisfying consumer
demand. Thus, Brezhnev also reformed the Soviet worker’s discipline. One the other hand, from
January to August in 1968, the Soviet dominated Czechoslovakia for a period of time until the
succession of Slovak Alexander Dubček as the Czech secretary created a period known as the
Prague Spring. 19 When a half-million Warsaw Pact troops attacked and invaded the federalized
Czechoslovakia, the Russian government proved their power to intervene with foreign policy in
the sustenance and expansion of communism. Thus, the Brezhnev Era and the Prague Spring
reinforced the sustenance of increasing Communist power and the stability of the Soviet Union
itself.
Word Count: 247
17 Kennan, George. "X - The Sources of Soviet Conduct." Foreign Affairs Jul 1947: III. Print.18 Findley, Carter, John Rothney. Twentieth-Century World. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2002. p333.19 Findley, Carter, John Rothney. Twentieth-Century World. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2002. p329.
Choi 8
7. Vietnam 1968-1973: Tet and Khe Sahn (Lost opportunities for victory)
The Battle of Khe Sanh in 1968 was the bloodiest and the most debated battle of the
Vietnam War. It drew both the U.S. Marines and the North Vietnamese Army into prolonged
bloodshed. The Communists forces, including reinforcements, accounts for about 20,000 to
30,000 soldiers. The Marine Corps casualty reporting system was based on named operations
rather than geographic location. Consequently, and unknown at the time, Operation Scotland—
began on November 1, 1967— became the source of the Battle of Khe Sanh in terms of Marine
casualty reporting. In fact, American General Earle Wheeler realized “American forces around
the world were stretched too thin” and Westmoreland refused to reinforce Wheeler for this
reason.20 A few months later in January 1968, the Tet Offensive ended in a military defeat for
the National Liberation Front. However, the United States has lost in respect to the
psychological and political impact of the battle. 21 This can be blamed on the media, and
television because a distorted picture of the attacks on the cities led to public and congressional
misunderstanding of the attack and overreacted. 22 This in turn sparked the withdrawal symptom
of many American people from their commitment as a nation to the Vietnam War. Thus, the
Battle of Khe Sanh and the Tet Offensive weakened American forces around the world and thus
shattered American national confidence in the Vietnam War. Therefore, both the events at Tet
and Khe Sanh shattered American morale and therefore also greatly undermined the US’ chance
of gaining victory in the Vietnam War.
(Word Count: 293)
20 Willbanks, James. The Tet Offensive. New York: Colombia University Press, 2007. p 70.21 Findley, Carter, John Rothney. Twentieth-Century World. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2002. p333.22 Schmitz, David. The Tet Offensive. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005. p.157
Choi 9
8. Détente: Nixon’s Trips to China and Russia, opening and agreements (Wrong policy, wrong
place, wrong time)
Three months after Nixon’s trip to Beijing, Leonid Brezhnev greeted Nixon with
enthusiasm in Moscow in May 1972. About half a year prior to Nixon’s visit, the Soviets have
proven themselves an equal in nuclear warheads to the United States by the Cuban Missile
Crisis. The May US-Soviet meeting concludes with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT
I) to limit further nuclear weapon production. Under a “spirit of détente,” SALT I encouraged
the reinstatement of a seemingly healthy business relationship between the Soviet and the US.23
However, détente’s cautious supporter George Kennan once warned in his famous “X Article”:
“The United States would do well not to indulge in unreal hopes for intimacy with [the] Soviet
regime” and that they cannot rid themselves “references to the American ‘imperialists’ and
‘monopolists’. . . [thus] constitutes in itself a barrier to better international understanding.” 24
Thus, a relationship that first appeared mutually beneficial— after a period of time— reveals that
“In return for Soviet promises to guarantee basic human rights, which soon proved valueless, the
West acknowledged Stalin’s expansion of the Soviet perimeter in Eastern Europe.”25 Whereas
the United States must yield to the Soviets’ previous aggression, the rising super power China
also gained US support for their entrance into the United Nations. Thus, the power in Western
value has been greatly reduced with time due to a global desire to establish a détente relationship
between the Democratic West and the Communist East.
Word Count: 276
23 Findley, Carter, John Rothney. Twentieth-Century World. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2002. p261.24 Kennan, George. "X - The Sources of Soviet Conduct." Foreign Affairs Jul 1947: II. Print25 Findley, Carter, John Rothney. Twentieth-Century World. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2002. p262.
Choi 10
9. New Realities on the Periphery: Arab-Israeli Wars and the 1973-4 Oil Embargo (A lack of
understanding by both super powers almost creates WWIII)
In general, the 1973 Arab-Israeli war led to the greatest paradigm shift in Middle East
economic connection to the global economy since European imperialism during the 14th to 15th
century. The five major economic powers at that period consist of the U.S., Soviet Union,
China, Western Europe, and Japan. Many pessimists see “the sudden oil embargo engineered by
the Arabs during the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, with the subsequent price increases, has caused
financial strains so severe as to plunge the world into inflation and recession. The pessimists
claim that OPEC plays a nefarious role in the world economy.”26 Post industrialization, both the
US and the Soviet Union realizes the importance of the Middle East countries in oil exportation.
Moreover, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela formed the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to gain leverage to raise prices at will. Oil exportations
and American involvement in the Arab-Israeli War stroke a chord in Middle Easterners: oil
wealth is more vital to populous countries; and therefore, an agriculturally self-sufficient country
without petroleum and which obtains a diversity of industrial resources may thrive best.
Discontented by their inability to progress above the lower middle class stage, the Middle East
abandoned the utopian belief of unity and soon developed themes of classical liberalism and
nationalism. Thus, as the Soviet began to occupy Arabic countries, the United States—with its
more extensive and powerful troops—also occupies most of the Middle East. Unknowingly, the
Soviet Union and the United States ignored Islamic Fundamentalism and their competition of the
Middle East nearly led to a third World War. (Word Count: 286)
26 Duignan, Peter, Lewis Gann. The Middle East and North Africa. Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1981. p112.
Choi 11
10. Loss of American Prestige: Watergate and the Fall of South Vietnam & Cambodia (No big
deal for America)
The United States was established to preserve a nation for those who believe in true
freedom and equality. However, Nixon’s presidency from 1969 to 1974— including the
Watergate Crisis, the Cambodian Incursion which was regarded as American imperialism, and
the Fall of South Vietnam into social inequality under Diem’s dictatorship subsequent to
Vietnamization— have nearly shattered American prestige. After Nixon’s term of office in the
executive branch, not only have American voters lost confidence in the presidency; they are also
disillusioned by the Republican Party as well as most legal professions.27 To be exact, following
Nixon’s resignation, Gerald Ford succeeded his presidency and pardoned Nixon of all his faults
to preserve an optimistic American reputation in foreign view. Unfortunately, this act of pardon
was regarded as betrayal for American citizens and has completely shattered American
confidence in the Republican Party, thus result in Democrat victory in the election of 1976.
Moreover, the Democrats gained forty-nine seats in the House. Due to American voter’s general
distrust of their politicians, by the end of the Democratic President Carter’s term, the Republican
Party has “gained a net of 50 seats in the elections of 1978 and 1980.”28 Therefore, Nixon’s
presidency and his faults had a shocking impact on the general view of American politics as well
as its prestige in the minds of foreign nations.
(Word Count: 265)
27Auerbach , Jerold. Unequal justice: lawyers and social change in modern America. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976. p7.28Elving, Ronald. “Rebels of '94 and 'Watergate Babies' Similar In Class Size, Sense of Zeal.” CQ News. 24 Jan 1998 12 April 2009 <http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/01/26/cq/elving.html>.
Choi 12
Bibliography
Auerbach , Jerold. Unequal justice: lawyers and social change in modern America. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1976.
Blechman, Barry, Stephan Kaplan, David Hall. Force without War. Brookings: Brookings
Institution Press, 1978.
Duignan, Peter, Lewis Gann. The Middle East and North Africa. Stanford: Hoover Institution
on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1981.
Elving, Ronald. “Rebels of '94 and 'Watergate Babies' Similar In Class Size, Sense of Zeal.” CQ
News. 24 Jan 1998 12 April 2009
<http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/01/26/cq/elving.html>.
Findley, Carter, John Rothney. Twentieth-Century World. 5th Ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 2002.
Garthoff, Raymond. A Journey through the Cold War. Brookings: Brookings Institution Press,
2001.
Godwin, Jack. The Arrow and the Olive Branch: Practical Idealism in U.S. Foreign Policy
(The Ethics of American Foreign Policy. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group,
Inc., 2008
“History They Didn’t Teach in School—Berlin Wall.” University of Houston Department of
History. 17 Mar 2009. <http://vi.uh.edu/pages/buzzmat/htdtisberlinwall.html>
Choi 13
Horelick, Arnold, Myron Rush. Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1966.
Jack, Homer. "Seventeen Continue." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Jun 1964: 43.
Kennan, George. "X - The Sources of Soviet Conduct." Foreign Affairs Jul 1947: III. Print.
Kutler, Stanley. Wars of Watergate: The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon. New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, Inc., 1990, 155.
Lall, Betty. "On Disarmament Issues: The Polish Plan." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Jun
1964: 42.
Langley, Lester. The Americas in the Modern Age. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005.
Moise, Edwin. Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. Chapel Hill and London:
University of North Carolina Press, 1996.
Schmitz, David. The Tet Offensive. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,
2005.
Willbanks, James. The Tet Offensive. New York: Colombia University Press, 2007.