IAEA Seminar on Governance of Uranium

Production Activities, Copenhagen,

27-28 May, 2014

Transportation and Emergency Planning*

Kevin Scissons, Canada

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* Based on IAEA Training course on Authorization and Inspection of Uranium

Mining and Milling Activities in Africa

- Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa, August 2013

During uranium mining operations, transportation of

various hazardous materials occurs.

Includes materials, like acid, alkali, fuel or explosives,

reagents, low level radioactive waste rock, uranium-

containing resin , as well as uranium processing

concentrates (UPC) or “yellowcake”.

National Regulations of Dangerous/Hazardous Goods

will apply as appropriate. Thus Regulatory Oversight is

necessary.

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Packaging

Transport

Security Trans-boundary

Emergency Response

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Transportation of Rad. Material

Industrial Package (Australia)

Type IP-2 Package Type A Package

Artisanal exploitation of

radioactive minerals (DRC)

High Grade Ore Slurry,

Canada

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Class 1 Explosives

Class 2 Gases

Class 3 Flammable Liquids

Class 4 Flammable Solids

Class 5 Oxidizers & Peroxides

Class 6 * Toxic & Infectious

Class 7 Radioactive Materials

Class 8 Corrosives

Class 9 Miscellaneous Dangerous Goods

RADIOACTIVE

* Likely only

Class of goods

NOT associated

with Uranium

Mine, Processing

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1 Sv = 100 rem

The IAEA regulations have a classification scheme for radioactive materials.

Has requirements for transportation and packaging and testing

procedures. If all countries use TS-R-1, trans-boundary issues minimal.

Main focus on the provision of adequate packaging to safely contain the

radioactive material during normal handling as well as accident conditions.

Due to its low activity per unit mass, uranium ore (< 2% grade) and the

processed concentrates are considered a minor hazard and can therefore

be transported as industrial package with appropriate placarding and

labels.

Note: By example, the high grade Canadian uranium ores, of up to 25% grade, are

classed for IP-2 containers, due to the dose (on surface of package: ~ 200 µSv/h; and

80 µSv/h at 1 m.)

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IAEA’S TS-R-1

General :

Radiation Protection

Emergency Response

Quality Assurance

Compliance Assurance

Non-compliance

Special Arrangements

Training

Activity Limits and

Classes

Requirements and

Controls for Transport

Requirements for

Packaging, Testing

Approval and Admin.

Requirements

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Content

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LSA-I includes:

(i) Uranium and thorium ores and concentrates of

such ores, and other ores containing naturally

occurring radionuclides which are intended to be

processed for the use of these radionuclides;

(ii) Natural uranium, depleted uranium, natural

thorium or their compounds or mixtures, that are

unirradiated and in solid or liquid form;

302. A radiation protection programme shall be

established for the transport of radioactive

material. The nature and extent of the

measures to be employed in the programme

shall be related to the magnitude and

likelihood of radiation exposures.

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Example excerpt:

Good industry practices include:

drum design, size, materials and labelling, as well as

requirements for lids and rings.

external, non-fixed radiation is to be kept low

* verified that the drums are clean (swiped)

adequate securing of the drums for transport.

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*

URANIUM PROCESSED CONCENTRATE (CONT’D)

Shipment of uranium concentrate is in sealed, reusable steel

drums. For international shipments, they are stacked securely

in ISO (sea) containers.

Main health concern of processed concentrate is due to its

chemical toxicity as a heavy metal, rather than its radioactivity.

If properly packaged and handled, no health hazard is

expected from the uranium concentrates and annual individual

doses should not exceed 1 mSv.

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Requires Regulatory Approval

if Ore is by large haul

trucks, ore slurry totes,

ISL resin, or train. In fact

Radiation Issues differ with

Ore vs. yellowcake.

The IAEA TS-R-1 regulations have been adopted in

about 60 countries.

This can avoid delays or denials of shipment at the

interface of different regulatory regimes (as

transported over large distances, multiple countries).

Having a broad acceptance on these regulations is a

major advantage, and can prevent authorities or

carriers to refuse shipments.

Illegal trans-boundary shipments

are still another issue.

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Contains elements * like: Full description of the radioactive material

Threat assessment to identify any credible threats

Description of the type of vehicle used to transport

Proposed security measures in place during transport, such as will there be continuous tracking (GPS) and an escort?

Communications arrangement between the carrier and the response force (local police or military?)

Communication arrangement for licensee and response force

Primary and alternate transportation routes

Any trans-boundary issues

Considering its value, operator will be considering security

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* Based on CNSC Protocol

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY PLAN

Providing physical protection, (and following the

regulations regarding the legitimate transport of

radioactive substances), is important now more than

ever:

to avoid illegal acquisition and illicit trafficking

protect the public

protect the operators investment

secured shipments minimizes regulatory follow-up

to stolen materials, and the public’s concerns.

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Transportation incidents involving radioactive material is

always a topic of public concern.

Therefore a comprehensive emergency plan has to be

developed in the case of a spill/accident.

This includes:

an active risk communication towards the public;

first response training for the drivers to initially minimise the impacts;

qualified response units along the transportation route.

A framework for planning and preparing for response to

accidents in the transport of radioactive material has been

developed by the IAEA:

“Planning and Preparing for Emergency Response to Transport Accidents

Involving Radioactive Material” Safety Standards Series No. TS-G-1.2 (ST-3),

IAEA, Vienna (2002).

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Several governmental organizations, the consignor, the

carrier and their personnel have responsibilities to act to

mitigate its consequences.

In most transport accident situations this response consists

of life saving, medical aid, fire suppression and control, and

the normal police work with any accident.

Accidents involving radioactive materials must be reported

to the Nuclear Regulator, Transport Officers or Transport

Specialists for follow-up.

Important to have specialized organizations trained to deal

with radioactive material to assess the accident and

implement the protective measures used to contain, control

or eliminate any radiological hazard.

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“5.1. In responding to transport accidents involving radioactive

material the main actions to be taken are to:

(a) Rescue and provide emergency medical aid to any victims,

(b) Control fires and the other common consequences …

(c) Identify the hazards of the material involved,

(d) Control any radiation hazard and prevent the spread of radioactive

contamination,

(e) Recover the package or packages and transport vehicle,

(f) Decontaminate personnel,

(g) Decontaminate and restore the thoroughfare and delineate the borders

of other contaminated areas,

(h) Decontaminate in the vicinity and restore to a safe state.”

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Who will be the first responders to the incident scene?

Are things like first aid and medical staff needed?

Are radiation protection specialist(s) available or can be contacted, and how will they be transported to the incident scene?

Is access control at the incident scene in place?

Is there containment of any released materials, and risks mitigation understood?

Plan for clean-up of the affected areas and disposal of contaminated materials?

Who will verify adequate clean-up and decontamination?

Is there good management of field operations and external communications in place, or being put in place?

What other support to the emergency operations is needed?

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Incident Response Questions (examples) :

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Risks from a

sealed container of

yellowcake drums

Risks from an

open container of

yellowcake drums, with

spilled product.

FROM: URANIUM COUNCIL

TRANSPORT WORKING GROUP

“Guide to Safe Transport of Uranium

Oxide Concentrate”, Australia 2012

Compliance Assurance follow similar protocols we have

discussed. This includes:

Transport Inspector training

Reporting requirements and practices for inspectors

Standards of conduct of inspectors

Enforcement policy, procedures and practices

Method of inspection to be used (packaging, in transit)

Methods for selection of inspection samples

Relevant technical information and questionnaires, as likely a

mix of hazardous materials are in transit.

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COMPLIANCE PROGRAMME – (CONTINUED) Considerations:

Inspection Team, Specialists needed

General, Focus Specific, or Audit Inspection of carrier

Sampling required, and preparation

Previous Insp. results, follow-up

Enforcement protocols, options (illegal shipments)

Security verification

Trans-boundary issues, protocols

Insp. Report outcome and follow-up

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Packaging

Transport

Security Trans-boundary

Emergency Response

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REGULATORY COMPLIANCE

ASSURANCE

Following the TS-R-1

Regulations and other IAEA

documents we discussed, the

issues for health and safety are

minimized for: Packaging,

Transportation, Trans-boundary,

Security and Emergency

Response